The Sea Services in the Korean War, 1950–1953

is dedicated to the Marines, Sailors, Coast Guardsmen and attached Merchant Mariners who served in harm’s way during the Korean War, and their families.

You will always be remembered.
Foreword

The Marine Corps History and Museums Division, Naval Historical Center, and Coast Guard Historian’s Office, in conjunction with the U.S. Naval Institute, take pleasure in publishing *The Sea Services in the Korean War, 1950–1953*, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Korean War.

Above all else, this collection is intended to honor our sea service veterans, and those of our allies, who contributed greatly to preserving the independence and freedom from Communist occupation of the Republic of Korea, today a strong, prosperous, and democratic member of the family of nations.

The courage, gallantry, sacrifice, and achievements of America’s Marines, Sailors, and Coast Guardsmen in Korea form one of the great episodes in the annals of warfare. Naval expeditionary forces were the first to respond to the North Korean invasion. At Pusan, Inchon, Seoul, Chosin (Changjin), and during the countless actions of the “static war” that followed (from the Punch Bowl to the Nevada Cities), the Navy–Marine Corps Team distinguished itself as a cohesive, flexible, and responsive asset, decisive at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Marines and Sailors excelled, as well, in special and covert operations throughout Korea, and in China. Coast Guardsmen performed vital navigational, meteorological, search and rescue, and port security missions, and served as advisers to what became the Korean Navy. More than 1.6 million Marines, Sailors, and Coast Guardsmen served in uniform during the Korean War. More than five thousand sea service personnel lost their lives in Korea. Total Marine killed and wounded exceeded thirty thousand. Forty-two Marines (twenty-seven posthumously), and seven Sailors (five posthumously) were awarded the Medal of Honor.

At the heart of this collection are the three works that make up the “After-Action Reports” of the naval service: the two official histories, *U.S. Marine Operations in Korea* and *United States Naval Operations--Korea*, and the Naval Institute Press’s *The Sea War in Korea*. While much has been (and hopefully will be) written about Korea, these works remain timeless in their authors’ thorough documentation of events and observations still fresh in the minds of the participants. They remain the starting point for any serious study of the Navy–Marine Corps Team in Korea.

This collection also contains a thorough review of extant literature on the Korean War by Professor Allan R. Millett (Colonel, USMCR, Ret.), an authority on the conflict, intended to aid readers in continuing their study of the war. Further, Mr. Scott T. Price’s essay on the Coast Guard in the Korean War provides timeless insights into the Coast Guard’s versatility as a unique national security asset.

*The Sea Services in the Korean War* was conceived as a resource that would be widely accessible, in convenient form, to veteran and serving Sailors, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen, as well as to students, scholars, and the general public. To the fleet, in particular, serious study of the Korean War, fought within what remains a potential, real-world theater of operations, is a moral and professional imperative. Moreover, for all Americans, the lessons of the Korean War confirm that the United States remains a maritime nation, with a critical requirement for naval expeditionary forces that are flexible, responsive, and sustainable from the sea.

This collection would not have been possible without the efforts of many people, working as a team, whom we wish to thank here. From the Marine Corps History and Museums Division, Mr. Robert E. Struder, head of editing and design, conceived the idea of the CD-ROM as the medium of choice. Lieutenant Colonel Leon Craig, Jr., executive officer, provided essential guidance throughout the project proposal process. At the Naval Historical Center, Ms. Ruby Hughlett, contract liaison officer, provided much-needed assistance regarding the contracting process. At Headquarters Marine Corps, the able review and guidance of Julius Rothlein, Esq., of the Office of the Counsel for the Commandant, and contracting officials Mrs. Barbara L. Labriola and Mr. Jeffrey M. Non were instrumental in the timely completion of this project. At the Naval Institute Press, accomplished historian and brown-water Sailor Lieutenant Commander Thomas J. Cutler, U.S. Navy (Ret.), senior acquisitions editor, became an early believer in this project and has managed it throughout to its successful conclusion. Mr. J.
Randall Baldini, publications manager at the press, worked closely with Mr. Anthony Cowden, Mr. Leon Miller, and Mr. Joe Jackson of Sonalysts, Inc., to create a product that meets the highest editorial and technical standards. We also wish to thank our senior historians, Dr. Edward J. Marolda, Mr. Charles D. Melson, and Mr. Scott T. Price, for their input and oversight. Our special thanks, of course, to contributors to this collection Admiral James C. Holloway III, U.S. Navy (Ret.), and Colonel Millett.

Finally, publication of this collection was made possible with a generous grant from the Department of Defense Fiftieth Anniversary of the Korean War Commemoration Committee located within the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for International Affairs (DUSA-IA). The committee’s primary mission is to honor those who served our nation in Korea, and their families. We wish to express our appreciation to the DUSA-IA, the Honorable Gayden E. Thompson, and to Colonel Charles P. Borchini, USA, Lieutenant Colonel James R. Fisher, USA, Lieutenant Colonel Mark R. Franklin, USA, Lieutenant Colonel Martha V. Smyth, USAF, and Lieutenant Colonel Ward E. Scott II, USMC, at the committee for their support of this project.

--Colonel John W. Ripley, USMC (Ret.), Director of Marine Corps History and Museums
--William S. Dudley, Ph.D., Director of Naval History
--Robert M. Browning, Ph.D., Chief Historian, U.S. Coast Guard
The United States of America Korean War Commemoration

The congressionally authorized United States of America Korean War Commemoration will commence on 25 June 2000 (the 50th anniversary of the North Korean invasion of the Republic of Korea) and continue through Veterans Day, 11 November 2003.

The primary purpose of the Commemoration is to thank and honor those Americans, living and dead, who fought in the Korean War, and their families, and to ensure that “A Grateful Nation Remembers” their selfless service, courage, sacrifice and accomplishments.

The Department of Defense, in coordination with other public and private organizations throughout America, will conduct and support events that commemorate the 50th Anniversary of the Korean War throughout the commemorative period. Further, the Department of Defense 50th Anniversary of the Korean War Commemoration Committee and the individual Armed Services are producing a number of educational, historical and commemorative items for distribution as part of the Commemoration.

For more information about the official U.S. Korean War Commemoration, please contact:
The Department of Defense
Korean War Commemoration Committee
1213 Jefferson Davis Highway
Crystal Gateway 4, Suite 702
Arlington, VA 22202
(703) 604-0831 (DSN 664-0831)
http://Korea50.army.mil

Sea Services Korean War Commemoration Committee

To coordinate, plan and schedule the Korean War commemorative activities of the Sea Services, the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard have formed the Sea Services Korean War Commemoration Committee, chaired by the Director, Navy Staff. For more information about these activities, please contact the Community Relations Branches of the Navy (703-697-0250), Marine Corps (703-614-5102/5439) or Coast Guard (202-267-0929) or write: Chairman, Sea Services Korean War Commemoration Committee, OPNAV N09B, 2000 Navy Pentagon, Washington, DC 20350-2000.
The Korean War: An Introduction
Adm. James L. Holloway III, USN (Ret.)

Korea was a war America did not expect to fight and had no plans for fighting. But it was a war America had to fight.

In the following years it was known as the “forgotten war.” Today, half a century later, viewed in a broader perspective, Korea has evolved as one of this nation’s more important wars in terms of its long-term impact on American history.

The Korean War came at the beginning of a much larger and more desperate struggle that lasted for four decades. This was the Cold War, and during this epic struggle between the Western Democracies and the Communist Bloc, the very survival of the United States was at stake.

For more than thirty years, the United States as a nation and Americans as a people were threatened with annihilation by 12,000 Soviet nuclear weapons. The Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated that in a strategic nuclear exchange with the USSR between 80 and 130 million Americans would die.

In the Cold War, the United States accepted the role of leadership for the entire free world against the Soviet Union and its client states. In spite of what may have been seen as a limited victory in Korea and a stalemate in Vietnam, the United States consistently prevailed throughout these 45 years of confrontation with the Communist Bloc. During that time there was no Soviet military aggression against the NATO partners or our Japanese allies. North Korea has not again attacked South Korea. In the end, the United States won the Cold War with the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Korea was the first time in the Cold War that the United States committed American troops to combat in its armed confrontation with the Communists. Had the United States not elected to fight in Korea, and been able to conclude the war with a successful outcome by driving the North Koreans and Chinese back to the line of original demarcation, the Cold War could have had an entirely different outcome, most probably to the gravest disadvantage to our country.

The United States won the war in Korea. Just as in the case of the Cold War however, it was not a clear-cut victory such as we achieved in World War II with the unconditional surrenders of Germany and Japan. Nevertheless, peace was attained on conditions acceptable to us.

The Korean War began at 4:00 am on June 25, 1950 when seven crack divisions of North Korean troops stormed across the 38th parallel without warning, to invade South Korea. The non-Communist world was caught completely by surprise.

America was enjoying the rewards of a welcome peace earned by a hard fought victory in World War II, an all-out mobilization that reached every individual American. After World War II, without a military threat on the horizon, America had dismantled its massive armies and fleets that had gained the allied victory. Armament production had been halted, material and supplies abandoned overseas, military equipment scrapped, ships and aircraft mothballed, and the citizen soldier returned to their jobs, their families and to school. By 1950, force levels of ships, aircraft and divisions had been reduced to well below pre-war totals. Of special significance was the exodus of veterans from the active duty ranks. Americans were tired of war.

The U.S. Navy, which in World War II had more than fifty aircraft carriers in the operating forces, was programmed to reduce its active inventory of fleet carriers--those capable of operating jet fighters--to five. The U.S. Army troops in the Pacific Theater were untrained for combat. Recruited largely on the promise that in the Army they would learn a trade, the young and inexperienced soldiers were enjoying duty in Japan, which in 1950 still remained an occupied country under General MacArthur's command. The troops were equipped with obsolescent weapons with which they were only marginally proficient. Neither the troops nor American leadership expected they would be exposed to real battle. They were unprepared for combat.
In spite of the country’s total lack of enthusiasm for a new war, its military unpreparedness, and the lack of any tangible threat to the American people by the North Koreans, President Truman did not hesitate in reacting. In quick succession after the invasion of 25 June, he committed U.S. naval and air forces to help stem the invasion of the South, then ordered American ground forces into the conflict. At the same time he brought the United Nations, still in its infancy, into the war against the North Koreans. This was the first occasion of any international world governing body organizing a military force and conducting warfare.

Truman had made the most difficult decision a president can make, to go to war. It was especially hard in this case, as Americans had not yet recovered from the hardships and trauma of World War II. The invaders were not threatening U.S. lives or property, nor had we any long standing ethnic or social quarrels with North Korea. President Truman saw the true foe as Communism. If a line were not drawn somewhere, the totalitarian regimes would threaten most of the free world. The U.S. had to act before so many democracies were overrun, that it would be too late for the Western powers to act collectively. President Truman and his advisors saw this as the time to react with force of arms, the sooner the better.

It was admittedly not the place the U.S. wanted to stage this first showdown with forces of Communism. Secretary Acheson expressed it well: “If the best minds in the world had set out to find us the worst possible location to fight a war, the unanimous choice would have to be Korea.” But the United States and its allies were not offered a choice in the selection of the initial arena for this long-term struggle for the survival of the free world. The Communists had seized the initiative with their sudden and overpowering assault across the 38th parallel. Whether the United States liked it or not, the battleground would be the Korean peninsula. The United States and its allies had collided with the forces of the Soviet Union's surrogates, China and North Korea, while the whole world watched. Were the democracies willing to go to war for their principles of human rights? Would they fight at the risk of their citizens’ lives? Could they hold their own in battle against the tough Communist troops, indoctrinated to shed their blood for their greater cause? At stake was the prestige of the United States and the survivability of free nations.

For the American leadership, the difficult decision to go to war was initially eased by a general underestimation of the enemy. On hearing of the invasion, the Commander of U.S. Forces in the Far East, Five Star General of the Army, Douglas MacArthur observed, “This is probably just a reconnaissance in force. If Washington will not hobble me, I can handle it with one arm tied behind my back.” The troops themselves before their first encounter with the enemy, exhibited an “overconfidence bordering on arrogance” according to General Barth of the U.S. Army's 24th Division. The GI’s thought the North Koreans would break and run when they first saw American uniforms. The troops were not to blame. Ripped out of their non-combatant occupation duties in Japan, they were rushed to the front by airlift in a matter of hours without any preparation for combat in Korea.

The first major event of the shooting war in Korea for the United States occurred on 3 July 1950 when carrier aircraft from the Valley Forge struck Pyongyang in North Korea destroying much of the small North Korean Air Force. Two days later on 5 July 1950, troops from the Army’s 24th Infantry Division attempted to ambush the column of tanks and infantry leading the main invasion force at Osan, only 200 miles from the southernmost port of the Republic of Korea, Pusan. The small U.S. Army force, its 540 soldiers averaging only 20 years of age, without tanks and with a total of eight anti-tank artillery rounds, faced a column of thirty Russian T-34 tanks and 5000 veteran soldiers. The Americans were routed. As U.S. reinforcements were poured into the port of Pusan, they were rushed to the front piecemeal in an attempt to slow the advance of the North Koreans and keep the entire Korean peninsula from being overrun before enough UN troops and equipment could be landed to engage the enemy on at least equal terms of manpower and equipment. Through the next sixty days, the outnumbered and outgunned Americans fell back before the North Koreans, driven by their leaders without regard for casualties, to score a quick and total victory by pushing the Americans off the peninsula.

Exploiting the momentum of their attack and the fanaticism of the troops, the North Koreans enveloped
and broke through the UN lines whenever the Americans attempted to make a stand, forcing the U.S. and ROK forces into a constantly shrinking perimeter around Pusan. Air strikes by Navy and Marine Corps planes based on carriers offshore slowed enemy forces but could not stop them. By the end of August, the Americans and South Koreans had still not been able to stop the North Korean advance. The situation was so perilous that the 8th Army commander, General Walton Walker, asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff if he should plan for an evacuation of all U.S. forces to Japan, or should he still attempt to establish a secure perimeter around Pusan and depend upon continuing reinforcements to fight off the North Koreans and maintain his foothold in Korea. With President Truman's concurrence, the JCS instructed Walker to “stand and fight.”

Then in the first week of September, the UN lines around Pusan held in spite of the human wave attacks. This was the turning point. It had been a close thing, but the U.S. was not going to be driven off the peninsula. They were in Korea to stay.

From this inauspicious beginning of a war we didn't plan to fight, in the wrong place, at a bad time, against a determined enemy which had seized the initiative of surprise to come perilously close to driving the Americans into the sea in a humiliating defeat, the Americans found a remarkable resiliency. With the courage and a fortitude to justify its qualification for the mantle of leadership for the Western world, the United States stormed back from the very edge of disaster to badly bloody North Korea and defeat its armed forces, and then to throw the Chinese communist armies out of South Korea, restore the original borders and to conclude the conflict on terms acceptable to our side. In this aspect alone, the Korean War must be viewed as an example to the world, ourselves, our enemies and our allies alike, of the great power and integrity of the United States.

From the military standpoint, the Korean War falls into five distinct phases.

The first campaign began in June 1950 when the North Koreans, without warning, crossed the thirty-eighth parallel to invade an unsuspecting South Korea, then in the sphere of the Western Powers. Against lightly armed forces of South Koreans (more of a police force than an army) the North Koreans--one third of them veterans of the Chinese Communist Peoples Liberation Army--quickly overran most of South Korea. The introduction of American troops from the U.S. Army of occupation in Japan, thrown into the battle without adequate preparation, could at first only slow the North Korean columns of armor supported infantry. In early September 1950, the UN lines stiffened and held, and the Americans poured reinforcements and supplies into the Pusan perimeter, while the North Koreans, battered and exhausted from their drive south, regrouped.

The second campaign began on 15 September 1950, when the 230-ship Joint Task Force-7 landed the 1st Marine Division at Inchon. The Marines then drove east across the peninsula to link up with the U.S. Army divisions breaking out of the Pusan perimeter from the south. This bold strategic strike caught the Communists by surprise, and the bulk of the North Korean army was caught in a massive trap, surrounded and cut off from their bases of ammunition and re-supply. Most were killed or captured and others, deserting their units and abandoning their weapons, infiltrated through the UN lines to flee to the North. As the North Korean Army disintegrated, the UN forces quickly retook Seoul, crossed the thirty-eighth parallel and pushed north. General MacArthur, the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Command, intended to occupy all of North Korea up to the Yalu River, the border with China. There were international murmurings that this advance would be considered as a threat by China and could only result in an armed response. In Washington as well there was a growing concern to avoid any provocation for China to enter the conflict.

By mid November, with the communist forces in a complete rout, the Americans and ROKs were racing north and a U.S. Army column actually reached the Yalu River, at the town of Hyesenjin. As the American troops paused to regroup and enjoy a hot Thanksgiving dinner in the field, General MacArthur announced that North Korea had been defeated, its armies destroyed; and that South Korea had been liberated and its borders restored. The Americans would be out of Korea and on their way home by Christmas.

The third phase of the Korean War began on November 25, 1950, when Chinese Communist armies
entered the conflict with massive attacks in depth across the UN front. The Chinese offensive came as a surprise to General MacArthur and his field commanders, in spite of the fact that in Washington and other foreign capitals, there had been a sober apprehension that China would not stand idle if the UN forces advanced to the Yalu. China had been able to infiltrate more than 200,000 regular army troops, euphemistically referred to as "volunteers," into North Korea without detection by UN intelligence, and deployed them to cut off the over-extended UN columns pushing toward the Chinese border. The surprise and the ferocity of this Chinese offensive overran and destroyed the most exposed UN forces--the American and ROK divisions in the west and the U.S. Army task force at the Chosin Reservoir--and forced the entire UN front to fall back. For the Americans, the withdrawal back was rapid-twenty miles per day--but orderly. The retiring troops were able to break contact with the advancing Chinese, but had to abandon and destroy huge supply dumps of equipment and ammunition. Again the question arose: should the U.S. evacuate its forces from Korea, rather than 10,000 miles from home attempt to fight the armies of Communist China in their own backyard. In spite of popular polls in the U.S. that by 66% favored abandoning the war, President Truman said, “stay.”

For the third time in five months the capital city of Seoul changed hands as the UN fell back to reform their lines at the narrow waist of Korea, where their available forces could fill the gaps left by the badly battered U.S. and ROK divisions and present a solid front to the advancing Chinese. In January of 1951, the UN armies reestablished and stabilized their front on a line just south of the 38th parallel and held against the Chinese advance.

Then, on 25 January, General Matthew Ridgeway, who was now in command of the UN forces in Korea following the death of General Walker in a jeep accident, kicked off the fourth campaign of the war with a full-scale offensive all along the front. The objective was to inflict heavy casualties on the Communists and drive them out of South Korea. Ridgeway’s fresh leadership and the growing battle experience of the U.S. troops were paying off. There was a palpable upswing in morale to be on the offensive again after a month of retreating. U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force planes devastated enemy troop concentrations. Seoul was quickly retaken and at the end of March the UN troops were again north of the 38th parallel, in spite of determined opposition. China continued to rush fresh troops and equipment south to the front, and in late April mounted a major offensive of their own with the main weight of the counterattack down the historic Seoul invasion corridor. The UN lines held and the Chinese were stopped outside of Seoul. A second Chinese offensive in May was thrown back with heavy losses from U.S. air and artillery. By June the UN lines were again firmly reestablished along the 38th parallel. The key city of Chorwon in the central plains controlling the invasion route to Seoul was captured and held by American forces. By midsummer, the two opposing armies had stalled and were dug in all along their fronts, which generally followed the line of the original border.

On July 10, 1951, with the opposing armies facing each other in a stalemate, along a boundary heavily fortified on both sides, peace talks were initiated at Kaesong and later at a special compound in the village of Panmunjom in no-man’s land between the UN and the Communist forces. This marked the beginning of the fifth phase of the Korean War. The original dividing line between North and South Korea had been decreed by the Allied Powers at Potsdam to lie drawn along the 38th parallel, an abstract geographical reference line. This was simply a matter of convenience, without any serious considerations of terrain or historical precedent. It was impractical as a defensible national border. The July 10th positions of the opposing forces followed the topography of defendable terrain close to, but not superimposed upon, the 38th parallel. The de facto line of demarcation between north and south was now more realistic for purposes of a natural national boundary. The final campaign, which lasted more than two years while the peacemakers bargained with threats and boycotts, saw some of the heaviest fighting of the war as the Chinese and newly reorganized North Korean divisions mounted attacks and limited offensives to frustrate the UN negotiators and seize more real estate. In these last two years, the Americans suffered more than 12,000 killed before the cease-fire took place on July 27, 1953. It was three
years a month and two days after a carefully planned, well executed, unanticipated attack by a surprisingly well trained and equipped North Korean army of 22 divisions, crossed this same border--now restored as the DMZ--on their way south with the intention of conquering all of the Republic of South Korea and annexing the territory to the Communist nation of Korea.

Geographically the Korean War ended just as it began, along the 38th Parallel. The entire war in which more than 4 million men, women and children were killed on both sides, involved 22 nations and was fought entirely on the Korean Peninsula, a piece of land approximating the configuration of Florida but about 25% larger. For each combatant the outcome of these three years of intense warfare was different.

For North Korea it was a clear defeat. Their objective of annexing South Korea was not attained. Their Army was defeated, their capital city, Pyongyang was largely destroyed, and more than 300,000 North Korean soldiers were killed or missing in action.

Communist China’s end position can only be considered a draw. Flexing their muscles in a show to the world of their new military might, the Chinese entered the war to rescue a communist ally, North Korea, and to demonstrate that China would not tolerate any military threat near its borders. The result was that the Chinese Communists suffered losses of more than 420,000 killed and missing, and in the end, were unable to defeat the U.S. led United Nations forces, even though fighting adjacent to their own borders. In the end, China was forced to accept an armistice which simply reflected the status quo ante. The failure of 120,000 Chinese to defeat the 25,000 Marines of the First Marine Division surrounded at the Chosin Reservoir, was especially demoralizing to the Chinese leaders.

For the United States, it was a victory. To some a limited victory, but then it was a limited war. It was certainly not a defeat. The Americans did what they intended to do: prevent the armed seizure and annexation of South Korea by the Communists. In the process, the Americans threw the North Koreans out of South Korea, decimated their army, and then drove the Chinese Communist army out of South Korea to end the conflict on terms acceptable to us.

From the perspective of the United Nations, the war in Korea was a success of historic proportions. For the first time, an international peace keeping body had organized a multinational military force, exercised its command and then successfully reversed the territorial incursions of an aggressor state. Furthermore the results were lasting. South Korea has not since been attacked or invaded.

Historically, the Korean War has become a unique chapter in the annals of modern warfare, setting precedents and providing lessons which have served to guide the formulation of foreign policy and national strategy for the United States.

It defined limited war as conflicts to be fought by their own unique sets of rules.

--In Korea, America could not fight to win unconditionally. To do so would engulf the U.S. in a general war with the Chinese people on the Asian mainland.

--Nor could America lose the war. The honor, prestige and position of leadership if the free world was at stake.

--The war was limited to fighting the Asian Communists. During the entire conflict, NATO forces facing the USSR and its client states in Europe and the North Atlantic maintained posture of readiness and strength to deter a Soviet invasion into Western Europe. Considering that the Soviets had available more than 100 divisions of ground troops and were rapidly modernizing their navy, this was a formidable responsibility for the United States, in which the military might and political leadership of NATO reposed.

--Mobilization during Korea was limited; “guns and butter” was the policy. The American public was sensitive to casualties and the Congress concerned about the budget. Tactical operations had to be planned with careful consideration to hold down losses. This often eliminated major operations with a high potential for significant long-term military and political success. Budget pressures limited procurement of ammunition and
aviation fuel, resulting in rationing of rounds for artillery bombardments in support of the ground forces, and the marginal readiness of combat aviation units due to too few training flying hours.

--With the war limited to the Korean peninsula, the concept of politically defined sanctuaries was established. U.S. air operations north of the Chinese border were proscribed by the UN with the consent of the U.S. government. Although locked in combat with the Chinese Communist Army, UN air strikes on airfields, logistic bases and troop marshalling areas north of the Yalu were forbidden. Even the hot pursuit of communist aircraft returning to their Chinese bases after combat in Korea was forbidden beyond the Yalu. The U.S. also had its de facto sanctuaries, but these existed not by political denial, but were the result of the absolute air and naval superiority achieved by the U.S. in the theater of operations. Maritime forces operated with impunity off the coasts of Korea, launching air strikes, conducting shore bombardments, reinforcing troops and delivering combat logistics, all in support of the UN forces ashore. UN aircraft could fly virtually without concern for hostile fire at altitudes above 10,000 feet over the terrain. This was the upper limit for effective enemy AAA fire, and there were no surface-to-air missiles in North Korea.

--USAF F-86 fighters flying a barrier combat air patrol in the northwest corner of Korea, intercepted Chinese MIG-15s as they crossed the Yalu coming out of their sanctuary bases, to provide cover for the UN aircraft conducting air to ground interdiction operations to the south. The U.S. air superiority over all Korea was virtually absolute.

--Korea was the first conflict in which the U.S. had an operational inventory of nuclear weapons. The world, as well as the American people were waiting to see how the U.S. policy for the employment of these weapons of mass destruction would evolve.

In the late 1940s after World War II, the U.S. stockpile of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons rapidly grew in numbers and diversity from strategic megatonnage monsters to tactical nuclear weapons. Early during the policy formulation for the employment of nuclear weapons, they were viewed simply as an extension of conventional munitions, to be used where larger explosions were needed. Weaponeering decisions would be based on the most effective way of achieving the desired results.

--By the time of the Korean War, tactical nuclear weapons had reached yields greater than the Hiroshima bomb. The USSR by then also had the A-bomb. Concern for escalation and the resulting mutual destruction had rendered original policy for the normalization of nuclear weapons impractical. The U.S. policy on the use of “special weapons,” as they were known, hardened, and although the inventory continued to grow in numbers and effectiveness, the requirement for presidential release made it clear that their application would be reserved for those extremis situations in which national survival would be at stake.

There were occasions when field commanders in desperate situations may have contemplated the use of tactical nuclear weapons as an equalizer to limit American casualties in the face of the seemingly inexhaustable numbers of Chinese infantry. But the employment of nuclear weapons in Korea was never seriously considered. In another sense during the Korean War, nuclear weapons played a key role in our national survival. With America engaged in a full-scale war in Korea, the USSR could see this preoccupation as a weakness in NATO and an invitation to launch an attack on Western Europe. It was only the realization of America’s readiness for strategic warfare, constantly displayed by ongoing SAC operations, that served as a powerful deterrent to a Soviet temptation for an invasion across the East German plains.

--As the war in Korea crystallized our tactical nuclear weapons policy, it conversely drove home the lesson that in the future, the U.S. national defense planning must be as much concerned with conventional war fighting as with nuclear deterrence. Nuclear weapons did not deter the war in Korea, nor could they be employed tactically. American National Security Policy would, in the future, have to be prepared to fight and win conflicts by conventional arms reserving the nuclear arsenal to deter the escalation of limited wars by the introduction of Russian military forces.
The Communists may have assumed that the United States was not prepared to fight a conventional war in Asia in 1950, but they badly underestimated America’s national will, the resourcefulness of its military planners and the resilience of the American character.

At the end of World War II, America’s first priority was the return of the civilian soldier to his home. Millions of tons of ammunition, supplies and equipment had to be abandoned overseas. However, the greatest capital investment in major weapons systems was in ships and aircraft, all of which were fortunately mobile. Great numbers of these modern assets were brought home and mothballed, the ships in fresh water estuaries and the aircraft on desert air bases. When the North Korean invasion caught the newly established Department of Defense at its nadir, the services turned to their mothballed equipment.

The Navy carrier force grew to 19 fleet carriers, enough to maintain four off Korea as well as two constantly in the Mediterranean for the support of NATO. P-51 Mustangs, veterans of Eisenhower’s campaigns through France and Germany, became the main ground attack aircraft for the USAF and our allies. F4U Corsairs which had fought Japanese Zeroes in the Pacific, again flew from Navy carriers and Marine shore bases in support of UN ground forces. It was this air support which achieved total air superiority over the Korean battlefield and formed the third leg of the UN’s combined arms triad of infantry, artillery, and air. By the Chinese Army’s admission, UN air power was the equalizer which offset the Communist’s vast superiority in ground forces.

Battleships, cruisers and destroyers came out of mothballs to provide seagoing artillery to protect the UN flanks. The evacuation of General Almond’s X Corps with all of its combat vehicles out of Hungnam in December of 1950, would not have been possible without the ring of fire delivered from these major combatants, and the sea lift provided by the amphibious and cargo ships.

Korea, though called the forgotten war, nevertheless contributed two unforgettable military operations to brighten the legacy of U.S. arms: Inchon and Chosin.

At the west coast port of Inchon, just 15 miles Southwest of Seoul, the U.S. Navy, in an amphibious operation conducted under the most difficult conditions of terrain and tide imaginable, put ashore 50,000 troops led by 25,000 Marines on 15 September 1950, who then drove east to link up with the Eighth Army breaking out of the Pusan perimeter to complete a massive rout of the North Korean Army. The First Marine Division made the assault landing, secured Inchon in one day, reached Seoul on the 18th and liberated the capital of South Korea five days later. By the end of September, the Americans had routed the North Koreans and reached the 38th parallel. By means of the amphibious landing at Inchon, the United Nations in just three months had accomplished what it had set out to do, “repelled armed invasion and restored peace and stability in South Korea.”

In the long term, Inchon was more than a boldly conceived operation, a masterpiece of technical execution, and a pivotal victory. It was an essential lesson for our new Department of Defense, that advancing technology would not necessarily make obsolete the proven fundamentals of warfare. In 1949, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar Bradley had stated in congressional testimony that amphibious landings were a thing of the past. Never again in the future would it be feasible to assemble and concentrate the shipping required for such an operation since it provided too inviting a target for atomic bombs. Bradley implied that a U.S. Marine Corps was no longer needed as part of our Defense Establishment.

Chosin was a different sort of campaign. On 25 November, when the Chinese Communist People’s Liberation Army first entered the Korean conflict to catch the American intelligence and UN forces by surprise, the First Marine Division was deployed deep in North Korea, west of the Chosin Reservoir, at the end of a 78-mile two-lane dirt road winding through some of the most mountainous country of the Korean peninsula. Surrounded by 120,000 regular troops of the Chinese Communist Army, battling deep snow and temperatures down to thirty below zero, the 25,000 marines of the First Marine Division fought their way out of the trap, bringing their equipment, wounded, and dead with them, and defeating 7 Chinese divisions in the process. China was so determined to destroy the Marines--and equally sure they would be able to do so--that staggering losses...
were accepted. Sixty percent of the 120,000 Chinese engaged became casualties, including 30,000 killed or missing in action. Marine losses were a thousand killed and missing, but the First Marine Division battled their way out and destroyed two Chinese armies in the fighting.

Korea became the forgotten war largely because American didn’t want to remember. Coming so soon on the heels of World War II and with such an unsatisfying conclusion when compared to the unconditional surrenders of the Germans and Japanese in World War II, the country didn’t want to think about it. Americans simply wanted to get on with their lives.

Now, fifty years of subsequent history has put Korea into its proper perspective: Korea was a victory, perhaps a limited victory but then it was a limited war. It was the first of a series of limited wars, which in the aggregate constituted the Cold War with the Communists. The U.S. won the Cold War with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Korea was instrumental in our success in that larger conflict, because the commitment of American citizens to risk their lives in far off Asia in support of our promises and principles, gave a critical substance to American foreign policy: credibility.

Credibility was the watchword of the Cold War that held the Russians in check. Our threat to go to war to support our allies was believed because of Korea. So our threat to resort to nuclear weapons if necessary to protect our most vital national interests was carefully weighed by the Kremlin. This credibility, established by Korea, also prevented a Soviet misinterpretation of our intentions, a miscalculation that could have taken the U.S. and the USSR over the brink into a nuclear exchange with its resulting mutual assured destruction. That perhaps represents the ultimate contribution of the Korean War to our national security over the past half century.

--Adm. James L. Holloway III, USN (Ret.)

[Admiral Holloway was Chief of Naval Operations from 1974 to 1978. As a lieutenant commander he served in Korea from 1950 to the end of the war flying F9F Panthers from the carriers Valley Forge and Boxer. In 1953 when serving as executive officer of Fighter Squadron Fifty-Two, he took command of the squadron when his commanding officer was shot down by the Chinese over North Korea. Admiral Holloway is currently co-chairman of the U.S.-Korea 2000 Foundation, Inc. He became president of the Naval Historical Foundation in 1980 and now serves as chairman.]
CONTROL OF THE SEA has been one of the United States' greatest blessings. As Washington repeatedly pointed out, without superiority on the sea the American Revolution could not have been won. Three generations later seapower was decisive in preserving the Union in the Civil War, was overwhelming at sea, fundamental to victory ashore. In the twentieth century it has been indispensable for victory in the giant world wars that have shaken our times. In the Korean War it was the foundation for successes and repeated salvation against disasters.

The far possibilities inherent in control of the sea were highlighted at Inchon when General MacArthur signaled, "The Navy and Marines have never shone more brightly than this morning." Yet even the brightest victories are but a fragment of the vast and far-reaching influence of power based at sea--a power that has been growing in leaps and bounds with the growth of science and technology.

As the industrial revolution gathered momentum generations ago, it began to have profound effects upon navies. One result was the remarkable increase in power not only for operations afloat but in attack against forces ashore. Several of the many revolutions that changed navies last century, such as the internal-combustion engine, combined to make possible at about the same time both an effective submarine and a practical airplane. Thus navies began to go under the sea and into the air to gain new dimensions and potentialities unlimited. Neptune's trident had gained three prongs and become a true trident indeed.

Most of the ever-expanding technological revolutions have increased the capacity of balanced navies both to control the sea and to operate against the land. Hence the last generation has witnessed an unprecedented increase in amphibious capacity which wrote a remarkable record of consistent success against island and continent in World War II. It was America's great fortune that this amphibious capability, though mutilated in the years immediately after World War II, nevertheless by remnants and improvisation could still serve well in Korea.

Americans think of the Korean War as death and hardship in the bitter hills of Korea. It was certainly this, and for those who fought this is what they generally saw. Yet every foot of the struggles forward, every step of the retreats, the overwhelming victories, the withdrawals and last ditch stands had their seagoing support and overtones.

The spectacular ones depended wholly on amphibious power--the capability of the twentieth century scientific Navy to overwhelm land-bound forces at the point of contact.

Yet the all pervading influence of the sea was present even when no major landing or retirement or reinforcement highlighted its effect. When navies clash in gigantic battle or hurl troops ashore under irresistible concentration of shipborne guns and planes, nations understand that seapower is working. It is not so easy to understand that this tremendous force may effect its will silently, steadily, irresistibly even though no battles occur.

No clearer example exists of this truth in war's dark record than in Korea. Communist-controlled North Korea had slight power at sea except for Soviet mines. So beyond this strong underwater phase the United States Navy and allies had little opposition on the water. It is, therefore, easy to fail to recognize the decisive role navies played in this war fought without large naval battles.

The United States and the United Nations stopped aggression (and could have won clear cut victory) through the sound exercise of control of the sea. This power is, of course, only one facet of national power and itself, alone, could not assure victory in the Korean War, if in any war; yet loss of it would have assured certain defeat.

These facts stand out repeatedly in the following graphic account of the interweaving of sea based strength
in land conflicts. They point out again the old lesson to America of the importance of the sea to her destiny—an importance that grows rather than lessens with transoceanic missiles, Polaris submarines, nuclear power and space satellites.

In the writing of this history the author has been given a free hand. All of the large body of documents then accumulated in the custody of the Division of Naval History in preparation for this history, and all of any classification that could subsequently be obtained, were assembled, organized, and made available to him under the able direction of Miss Loretta I. MacCrindle, Head of the Classified Archives Branch of this Office, and after 1958 by her most capable successor, Mr. Dean Allard. In this work, they had the extremely valuable assistance of Miss Barbara A. Gilmore and Mrs. Mildred D. Mayeux. Special searches were conducted far and wide for missing documents. Microfilms of dispatches of the period were researched when they were not available in their original form. Personal papers of Admiral Joy and others were made available and leading participants were interviewed or sent pertinent portions of the manuscript for comment. Admiral A. D. Struble in particular worked hard over the manuscript and devoted many days to interviews and discussion with Mr. Field and with this office. Except for a few missing items it is doubtful that a more complete United States naval record of original sources can ever be assembled.

The manuscript was read in its various stages by Captain F. K. Loomis, Assistant Director of Naval History, and myself. We did not hesitate to make a number of criticisms, general and specific, but the author made only the changes he thought justified. Hence the book bears no censorship in any way, neither is it a Navy Department publication to express an official view. It is the work of an experienced historian given the facts to tell the story as he saw it.

Korea is but one chapter in the hot and cold war pressed by those who would destroy democracy. These pages show the influence of the sea in small and large ways throughout the Korean War. In a broader sense they reflect the state of the whole free world—a confederacy of the sea joined in united strength only if the sea is held and made one by those who love freedom.

These nations find that their life blood and liberty itself flow in the sea. In this book, the author writes that the presence of the United States Navy in the Far East has been "the alpha and omega of Korean-American relations." It has also been, and seems certain to continue to be through the unknown future, the Alpha and Omega of all United States-world relations.

--Rear Adm. E. M. Eller, USN (Ret.), Director, Naval History Division
History of United States Naval Operations – Korea
James A. Field Jr.

Preface

PERHAPS THE SIMPLEST WAY to describe the Korean War is to say that it was different, for it fell, or seemed to fall, outside the pattern of all previous American experience. It was a surprising war in a surprising place at a surprising time, and one which imperatively called for answers to neglected problems of national defense. It was begun as a police action; it developed rapidly into an undeclared war of no small magnitude; it ended as an unpopular and seemingly profitless stalemate. It was conducted, at least in theory, less as a national enterprise in defense of an easily apprehended national interest than as an exercise in collective security under the aegis of the United Nations. And while partial precedents can doubtless be discerned in battles long ago, the package was a new and unsettling one.

In addition to differences such as these in the nature of the war itself, there were others which bear upon the historian. Since the enemy had no navy, the conflict lacks the drama inherent in the clash of fleets. Since the focus of action was always on land, the three services were pretty constantly mixed up in each other's affairs, and simple single-service history becomes an impossibility. The chronology of the struggle, in which a year of violent and dramatic action was followed by two of deadlock, poses problems of selection and emphasis and makes for injustice to those who came late on the scene. The absence, in notable contrast to the situation of 1945, of any appreciable quantity of enemy records, constitutes a further obvious difficulty.

Nevertheless, an attempt to tell the story of United States naval operations in Korea has seemed worthwhile. If many of the specific lessons of the conflict are now obsolete, the general principle remains: that for those who have abjured the offensive, the main problem is how to prepare for the unexpected, or more cynically, how to be surprised at least cost. If war is to remain a political act, the Korean experience seems worth contemplating for its demonstration that the neglected problems of stalemate may at times be as important as those of advance and retreat. If the absence of contending fleets detracts from the excitement of the story, it also emphasizes the fact that since all war is an exercise in persuasion, naval activity has always been ultimately directed against the far shore. And finally, one may hope that caution will help to counteract the one-sided nature of the available source material.

To the puzzling question of how far to treat the actions of the other services, I have found no wholly satisfactory answer. I have attempted throughout to keep before the reader a general picture of the campaign, but to deal in detail with Army and Air Force operations only when they interacted with those of the Navy. But while this standard has seemed the only one possible, it should be made plain that it distorts the picture. For the Army it means that emphasis is on the hard times when help was called for, rather than on periods of prosperity when things were moving well; for the Air Force the vexed question of tactical support receives considerable attention, while the work of Bomber Command and of the fighter pilots up by the Yalu is scanted.

In some cases this procedure gives rise to questions of a certain delicacy. The Korean War took place at a time when the new defense establishment was suffering growing pains; the course of the conflict was such that divergent and strongly held views were put to the test; interpretation of the consequences is unavoidably controversial. Although I have not thought it possible to gloss over these matters, I cannot hope that my conclusions will please everyone. Perhaps, indeed, they will satisfy none: the manuscript has been read by those connected in one way or another with Army, Navy, and Air Force alike, all of whom (happily for different reasons) have disagreed with certain of the views expressed. In this connection it may be worth stating, for those who wonder how "official" this history is, that I have had full liberty to express my own opinions, and that there have been no deletions from the manuscript on security or other grounds.
One final caveat. Throughout the book I have referred to General MacArthur, and to his successors in supreme command, by their United States short title, CincFE, rather than as CincUNC, Commander in Chief United Nations Command. This usage has been employed as a matter of euphony only, and in no way indicates a desire on my part to de-emphasize the international nature of the campaign.

No one ever writes a book alone, and like all authors I have incurred heavy debts. I am grateful to those individuals, in and out of the armed services, who have been generous of their time in discussing the war and in criticizing the manuscript, and to others who on other occasions have contributed to my education in these matters. I must record my thanks to the administration of Swarthmore College for the grant of a leave of absence without which completion of the book would have been long delayed. Throughout the enterprise Rear Admiral E. M. Eller, USN (Ret.), the Director of Naval History, and his staff have been most helpful. Erwin Raisz has been both skillful and patient in working through the complex specifications for the maps which illustrate the volume. Karlene Madison's contribution went far beyond the military fortitude with which she typed and retyped. My wife and children have shown great forbearance.

--James A. Field, Jr., Swarthmore, Pennsylvania
Chapter 1. To Korea by Sea
1. The Commodore's Treaty

AS THE SUN rose from behind the Korean hills all was in readiness for the assault. On the warships lying off Inchon plans and preparations were complete. As morning wore on the boats were brought alongside and the landing force was embarked. Upstream from the transport area Monocacy and the gunboats were already engaging enemy strong points, and toward mid-day with the flooding tide, the landing craft left the anchorage and headed north. At 1330, under cover of the continuing bombardment, the signal was given and the boats went in. By 1345 the first wave of Marines was ashore and moving forward, while the boat crews and other members of the landing force struggled to get supporting weapons through the thick Korean mud and onto hard ground. So effective had been the bombardment that initial objectives on the heights overlooking the beaches were overrun without difficulty. By 1645 the artillery had been brought up, outposts were placed, the lines tied in, and the force settled down to get such rest as it could prior to resuming the advance at first light. It was the 10th of June, 1871.

The event is of some importance, if only for its illumination of the fact that the presence of the United States Navy in the Far East has been the alpha and omega of Korean-American relations. American naval activity was responsible for the opening of this distant nation and for its incorporation into the international system. When the decline of American interest resulted in naval withdrawal, Korean independence proved short-lived. In mid-20th century the Navy's return to the Western Pacific was the precondition of Korean liberation from Japanese control; a second such return permitted the preservation of the Republic of Korea from Communist domination. Only through free access by sea can the United States wield influence upon this distant peninsula. When access is disputed only naval power can ensure it. The history of American relations with Korea has been in large degree a function of the availability of such power.

The attack on the Korean forts in the summer of 1871 was one of the last acts of pre-industrial outward-looking America, the product of a pattern of overseas activity which dated back to the earliest days of the republic. The importance of maritime trade to the young nation had led to the growth of a merchant marine second only, and barely so, to that of Great Britain, and had governed the development and activities of the United States Navy. Created to defend American commerce against the pirates of Algiers, the Navy developed into a police force for the seven seas, an instrument of scientific discovery, and a spearhead of western influence in distant places. Campaigns against pirates were fought in the Mediterranean, the West Indies, and in China seas. Exploring expeditions ranged the globe. Naval diplomats sought commercial treaties from the princes of Barbary and the Sultan of Turkey, and the Mediterranean activities of Commodores Preble and Rodgers were followed by more famous efforts on the far side of the globe. As early as 1815 Commodore David Porter had proposed an expedition to the Pacific to open Japan, China, and surrounding territories to American commerce. The suggestion was premature, and in China, at least, the merchants got there first without government help. But the voyage of Edmund Roberts in Peacock, the activities of Commodore Kearny in China, and Perry's opening of Japan nevertheless bore witness to a navy and commercial policy of a remarkably forward nature for what was then one of the minor powers of the world.

Although the period of the Civil War brought the effective liquidation of the American merchant marine and a corresponding concentration on internal development, the old interest in the oceans and in what lay beyond them did not immediately disappear. The decade after Appomattox, which brought the attack on the Korean forts, was an active one overseas. These years saw the purchase of Alaska in the northwest, and proposals for the acquisition of Greenland and Iceland in the eastern approaches; interest was evidenced in the acquisition of a
North African naval base; a reciprocity treaty was negotiated with Hawaii, and in Samoa an American agent became prime minister of that most beautiful of all kingdoms. *Divitis indiae usque ad ultimum sinum*, the motto of the town of Salem, had been the operating motto of American merchants and sea captains and of the American Navy, and now at the end of a century of independence the uttermost gulf had been reached. Across the Pacific, beyond the great bulge of the China coast and sheltered by the island screen that runs from Formosa to the empire of Japan, lay the Yellow Sea. On its eastern shore, at the mouth of the River Han, stood the forts which guarded the capital of Korea, last of the isolated civilizations of earth.

A generation before, Edmund Roberts had suggested that a Japanese treaty might lead to trade with Korea. In the 1840's a resolution had been introduced in Congress urging the establishment of commercial relations with both countries. But these proposals were nugatory, and in Korea, as so often elsewhere, the ultimately effective impulse to governmental action came not from home, but from the oversea activities of merchant marine and Navy. In 1866 the American merchantman *General Sherman* was destroyed, and its crew massacred, in the Taedong River below Pyongyang. The report of this tragedy brought the dispatch of a ship of the Asiatic Squadron, the U.S.S. *Wachusett*, Commander Robert W. Shufeldt, to investigate the affair, and to communicate with the King of Korea.

Shufeldt's mission proved fruitless, but the *General Sherman* incident led two successive commanders of the Asiatic Squadron, Rear Admirals Stephen C. Rowan and John Rodgers, to interest themselves in the possibility of a Korean treaty. The latter's proposal of a naval expedition, modelled on that of Commodore Perry, brought government action, and the American minister to China was designated to carry out the negotiation in cooperation with the Squadron Commander. Preparations were made, a force was assembled at Nagasaki, and on 30 May 1871 five United States ships of war, totaling 85 guns, dropped anchor off the mouth of the Han.

For this procedure the Perry expedition was not the only precedent: in just such a manner an earlier John Rodgers had extorted a favorable treaty from the contumacious Bey of Tunis. But the capital of the King of Korea, unlike that of the Bey, was upstream and beyond the range of naval guns; unlike the forces of the Bey, and indeed unlike the Japanese on the occasion of Perry's arrival, the Koreans opened fire; although Rodgers had strength enough to capture the forts, he lacked that necessary to capture a treaty. On 3 July, honor having been satisfied, the expedition withdrew.

Nine years were to elapse before congressional pressure to obtain a treaty and the ambition of another naval officer to conclude it led to a second effort. In 1880 Commodore Shufeldt, who 14 years before had carried the first letter to the Korean King, returned to the Orient in the U.S.S. *Ticonderoga* with authority to treat. Efforts to communicate with the Koreans through the government of Japan were unproductive, but in mid-summer an offer of assistance came from the Chinese viceroy Li Hung-chang. China and Japan were currently at odds; as had been the case with other rulers subject to outside pressures, Li was desirous of American aid in developing his navy; in exchange for technical assistance he undertook to forward negotiations with Korea. Shufeldt proceeded to China, advice and advisors were provided the Chinese, and talks with Li were begun. In these discussions between Commodore and Viceroy may be seen some of the abiding realities of the situation: 71 years later, under very different circumstances, another American flag officer was to find himself negotiating with the Chinese concerning the future of Korea.

Two years of complicated intrigue were required before Shufeldt could attain his goal. But at last, on 22 May 1882, a treaty arranged in Tientsin by the Chinese Viceroy was signed on the Korean shore within view of the U.S.S. *Swatara*. By this instrument, which provided for perpetual peace and friendship and for the exchange of diplomatic and consular representation, American citizens were granted trading rights, extraterritoriality, and most-favored-nation treatment. The aims of commerce were satisfied and, as Shufeldt reported, the United States had brought "the last of the exclusive countries within the pale of western civilization."

The movement to open Korea, with its inevitable impact on the equilibrium of eastern Asia, has been
described as America's most important action in the Far East prior to the occupation of the Philippines. Be this as it may, it was the last such action, and as such marked the end of an era both for the Navy and for the nation. Industrialism was bringing the end of the period of free exchange of goods, the development of internal resources was replacing foreign trade as a prime source of wealth. As nations became industrialized so did their navies, and the new complexities of maintenance, together with the new fuel problem, forced the fleets of the world to retire on their bases. With the development of new nationalisms the naval function shifted from one of exploring, opening, and policing to one of fighting. Shufeldt had opened Korea, but although the Secretary of the Navy in 1884 urged the establishment of a naval station at Port Hamilton, off the southern Korean coast, and although it appears that such facilities were offered by the Korean government, nothing was done. The next important American naval action in Asiatic waters came in 1898 in the Battle of Manila Bay.
History of United States Naval Operations – Korea
James A. Field Jr.

Chapter 1. To Korea by Sea
2. The American Link

The country launched by the American Commodore upon the seas of international life had dwelt for centuries in isolation. Although Europe had long traded with China and the Spice Islands, it was only with the 19th century that western ships in increasing number visited the Korean coasts. There, as earlier elsewhere, the history of exploration came to be written on the Admiralty charts of the world: Russian interest was memorialized in such places as Port Lazaref and Kornilov Bay; French designs in Eugénie Island and the Prince Imperial Archipelago; British discovery in Broughton Bay and Port Hamilton; the arrival of the Americans in Washington Gulf, Maury Island, and Monocacy Bay.

But while discoveries could be made and recorded, efforts to penetrate beyond the Korean shoreline were long unsuccessful. Within the peninsula the first important western contact was that of Christianity, which filtered in by way of China, and which in the 1830's brought French missionary priests to the Hermit Kingdom. But many were martyred, and nature as well as the natives was hostile to foreign interference. In 1846 the French frigates Gloire and Victorieuse, sent to investigate a massacre of missionaries, grounded on uncharted shoals; the extreme tidal range of the Yellow Sea left them high and dry, the crews were taken off by a passing English ship, and the frigates abandoned to the elements. In 1866, the year of the loss of the General Sherman, another French expedition was defeated at the mouth of the Han River, and five years later Admiral Rodgers was frustrated in his purpose. Yet the influence of the west was growing: conversions to Christianity continued, by mid-century there were some 15,000 Korean Catholics, and in the 1860's the first Protestant missionary effort was begun.

Through her centuries of isolation Korea had maintained a special, if somewhat vague, relationship with China. This relationship, which the Koreans apparently felt not disadvantageous, was conceived of in Confucian terms. Governed not by law but by standards of propriety, it required a deferential attitude, such as that of younger toward elder brother, on the part of Korea in her relations with the Middle Kingdom. Put forward by the Koreans as the reason they could have no dealings with outsiders, and concurred in by the Chinese with the proviso that Korean actions were none of their concern, this familial relationship seemed to legalistic westerners a piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense. For Korea, however, it had at least the utility of providing some freedom of maneuver, and of delaying by a few years the inevitable arrival of the barbarians. Only in 1876, when Japan did for Korea what Perry had done for her, did the Hermit Kingdom accept relations with an outside power. Only with the Shufeldt treaty did she accept them with a non-Asiatic people. Oddly enough, despite Chinese assistance in both negotiations, neither treaty made mention of Korean dependence on China, and this apparent admission of sovereignty had considerable impact on the outer world. Although the Commodore's accomplishment went largely unnoticed at home, such was not the case abroad, where Britain, Germany, France, and Russia hastened to make treaties on the Shufeldt model.

Inevitably all this raised serious questions about the ancient relationship with China. But here the basic issue was the vitality of China herself, and at this point in history the Middle Kingdom was a doubtful proposition. Things being what they were in the 1880's, it would have taken a very vigorous elder brother to preserve the peace of a peninsula which divides the waters between China and Japan, and which dangles from the Asiatic mainland where Manchuria and the Maritime Provinces meet. The treaty with the United States, with its emphasis on Korean independence, may have hastened the coming of trouble, but hardly more than that. Long before the treaty was concluded Shufeldt had written that "Corea would in fact be the battlefield of any war with China and Russia or Japan in whichever way these nations might confront each other," and his prediction was
speedily borne out.

Without preparation for the diplomatic rough and tumble of the outer world, situated between three stronger powers in a time of rapid change, the little kingdom found itself subjected to increasing pressures, and the winds blew ever stronger from north, east, and west. In the old Confucian family there had been the easy traditional relationship of father and son, or of elder and younger brother. In the new family of nations into which Korea had been welcomed there were three competing volunteers for a big brother role construed in more modern terms.

China was attempting to reassert her historic dominance, Russia to move southward into ice-free ports, and Japan to gain control of the peninsula as a springboard for continental expansion. All urged their chosen advisers upon the Korean King, and the triple pressure from without was reflected in serious strains within. Torn by the inevitable factionalism of a people emerging from isolation, the country found itself divided between nationalists and reactionaries, between a progressive party desirous of acquiring foreign skills and methods and a traditional pro-Chinese faction. In this situation America and the Americans, although far away and preoccupied with other things, had for the progressive group of Koreans a special meaning.

The United States had been the first of the western powers to make a treaty with Korea. It was for some time the only such power to send a minister to the Korean court. A provision of the Shufeldt treaty stated that "if other powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either government, the other will exert their good offices . . . to bring about an amicable arrangement." Together with the traditional American sympathy for a society attempting to modernize itself, all this seemed full of promise for the new era and inevitably placed the United States in a conspicuous position. The King, on the arrival of the first American minister, is reported to have danced with joy.

But in Washington, and in the United States generally, small attention was paid to Korean matters. From the viewpoint of the America of the 1880's the treaty was but a last echo of the period of maritime greatness and the product of Shufeldt's personal diplomacy. Yet however little the provision for good offices may have meant to the American government, America had from the beginning given sympathy and support to the independence of small nations. It remained willing, if asked, to issue sound advice. Since, in the last analysis, self-determination means self-defense, it would provide, although dilatorily, assistance in military organization. Nor was the importance of the United States limited to the actions of its government: American businessmen would bring their skills across the sea; the American religious community would send forth missionaries bearing, along with the Protestant word, western education and western techniques. Somehow the Koreans seem to have sensed a disinterested benevolence in the distant republic, and to have founded great and indeed excessive hopes upon it: in 1897, in an audience with the American minister, the Korean King was to remark, "We feel that America is to us as our Elder Brother."

Reality, unfortunately, did not live up to expectations. The conclusion of the Shufeldt treaty had reversed the roles of Korea and the United States, and the Hermit Kingdom was now the petitioner. Desiring to consolidate his new-found independence, the King cleared out his Chinese and Russian advisers in the hope of replacing them with Americans. But the response of the American government was disappointing. Although internal disorder in 1882 brought the arrival of the U.S.S. Monocacy with instructions to offer good offices, and although the United States created a ministerial post at Seoul equal in rank to those at Tokyo and Peking, the instructions of Lucius H. Foote, the first incumbent, reflected the non-participating sympathy so often evident in American policy in distant places. Foote was authorized to tender advice to the King, but unless covered by specific instructions this advice was to be considered personal rather than official, and such instructions rarely came. Korean requests for advisers in foreign affairs, for military instructors, and for school teachers remained unfulfilled, and the American minister found his dispatches unanswered by a lethargic State Department and his grade reduced by an economizing Congress.

Resentful of these indignities and of the apparent indifference of the home government, Minister Foote
resigned his post. But lack of official interest in Washington did not prevent further development of non-governmental relations. As the negotiation of the treaty had been largely an individual enterprise on the part of Shufeldt, so relations between the two countries became increasingly personal and unofficial. From China came an American to be Inspector-General of Korean Customs; a former United States consul at Tientsin assumed the post of vice-president of the Foreign Office. In 1884, following the departure of Foote, custody of the legation fell to a young naval officer, Ensign George Foulk, who became deeply concerned with the future of Korea and for three years struggled to uphold both the integrity of that country and the dignity of the United States. By the time of his recall Foulk had gained the highest favor, and the desire of the Korean King to name him personal adviser in foreign affairs was frustrated only by heavy pressure from the Chinese government.

Despite this victory for Chinese influence the American connection continued strong. Munitions for the army were ordered from the United States. Under the leadership of General William M. Dye, the military mission which the King had earlier requested finally arrived in 1888. Dye, a veteran of Vicksburg and the Red River campaign who had later served in the army of Egypt, took over the military academy, published a tactical manual in Korean, and produced a body of highly trained troops. But the Korean noblemen proved unamenable to discipline, and that part of the army not subject to his personal influence continued to suffer from faction and intrigue.

In economic development, too, there was progress. With the passing of years American businessmen followed the Navy's trans-Pacific lead to found a Korean-American bank, to operate Korea's most important gold mine, and to build a street railway system for the capital. In Seoul there arose the Astor House hotel, and over the Yalu River a bridge, built by American engineers, which in the fullness of time would be knocked down by American naval aviators.

The final, and increasingly the most important link between the two countries, was that of the missionary effort. The 19th century had seen a great expansion of Protestant missions in which Americans had played a leading part. Throughout the non-European world these pioneers had been active in bringing the gospel and the gifts of western civilization to those who dwelt in darkness, and in beginning a revolutionary undermining of the static societies of Asia. Typically, although influential in worldly things, the missionaries had accomplished few conversions, but in Korea, where Christianity had already taken root, their success was greater. By 1885 both Presbyterians and Methodists had arrived from America and begun their work, profiting from the esteem in which their country was held. By the end of the decade a dozen stations had been established, running from Kanggye far in the north through Pyongyang, seven-gated Kaesong and Seoul, and southward to Taegu and Pusan.

Schools, colleges, and hospitals were established by the missionaries, in their efforts to assist the people, and in time an important Christian community developed. By 1910 there were some 72,000 Korean Catholics and almost 180,000 Protestants. Yet things move slowly in the Orient: at least as late as the First World War the missionaries in Pyongyang could enjoy the sight, at one of the city gates, of the anchor and chain from the General Sherman, preserved in commemoration of that successful encounter with the outer world.

Their obvious concern for Korean welfare, and their open support of Korean independence, quickly brought the missionaries into close relations with government as well as people. The medical missionary Horace N. Allen established a government hospital, was appointed court physician, and served both as a Korean emissary to the United States and as American minister at Seoul. Horace B. Underwood, translator of the gospel into the Korean tongue, became an unofficial adviser to the King, and his wife the Queen's physician. The link between missionary activity and the Navy, so strong in Ottoman regions, reappeared in Korea: when the King, despite strong Chinese opposition, moved to establish a legation in Washington, Allen accompanied the emissaries, who eluded the Chinese warships sent to intercept them by taking passage in the U.S.S. Ossipee. Although these intimate connections proved at times embarrassing to the American government, to the Koreans they seemed a very present help. In the dark days of 1895, following the Japanese-instigated murder of the Queen, the
missionaries rallied to the King, giving him moral support and safeguarding his food supply. In 1905 Korean confidence in the selfless strangers was again demonstrated when, in a last desperate effort to avoid Japanese domination, the Emperor secretly sent Allen and Homer Hulbert, another distinguished missionary, to seek the assistance of the United States.

Great changes came with the Japanese occupation, but in time the older pattern was repeated. In 1945 the United States Navy again sailed the coasts of Asia, and its return was followed by a new opening of Korea and a new period of American influence. Where earlier Americans like Foulk and Allen had advised the Korean King, American Military Government now supervised the creation of a new state; where American entrepreneurs had brought the techniques of the West there now came ECA aid; where General Dye had commanded the palace guard there appeared the Korean Military Advisory Group. Again the missionaries arrived, to renew their efforts, and Homer Hulbert, the American interpreter of Korean culture and the Emperor's personal emissary in the crisis of 1905, returned to end his days in this distant country.
Chapter 1. To Korea by Sea

3. The Dominance of Japan

All this lay hidden in the future as the 19th century ended. Korea was small and far away, its opening seemed the last effort of an age that was past, and the treaty provision for good offices was to prove less meaningful than the dancing king had hoped.

For Korea the years following the conclusion of the Shufeldt treaty brought internal chaos and increasing Chinese influence. By 1894, despite the presence of American and other foreign advisers and despite the best efforts of the Japanese, Chinese dominance had been thoroughly reestablished. But the triple pressure continued, and while the Middle Kingdom could dominate her younger brother she was unable to withstand her stronger neighbor. The position so carefully retrieved by Li Hung-chang was to be suddenly destroyed by war with Japan.

In the summer of 1894 anti-foreign rebellion broke out in the southern provinces of Korea. A request from the King for the assistance of Chinese troops was somewhat reluctantly acceded to, but by the time these arrived the revolt had been put down. Japan, meanwhile, on the pretext of protecting her nationals and property, had sent troops of her own, and despite the restoration of peace continued to increase these forces until they greatly outnumbered those of the Chinese. Efforts by the American minister and others to compose the differences and secure the withdrawal of troops proved unsuccessful. There followed a coup in which the Japanese seized the King and installed his father-in-law as Regent. Chinese troopships bringing reinforcements were sunk by the Japanese, and in August war was declared.

The Sino-Japanese war, which eliminated Chinese influence in the Korean peninsula for more than half a century, was a sufficiently one-sided affair. Politically it is noteworthy as the first step in a Japanese expansion which would only be checked at Midway and Guadalcanal. Militarily it was important for the Battle of the Yalu, the first major engagement between ironclads, which marked the opening of the era in which the world's strategic pattern depended upon the new navies of industrialism. For the United States this engagement demonstrated that a policy based on a belief in self-determination may have its difficulties, and that one people's selfdetermination may be another's poison. While the Japanese Navy, victors at the Yalu River, had benefited from American advice and assistance, the Chinese battleship *Chen Yuen* was fought in this engagement by Philo McGiffin, a Naval Academy graduate of the Class of 1884.

By the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895 Japan acquired Formosa and the Pescadores, and so gained strategic control of the approaches to North China and to Peking; the treaty also ensured Korean independence of Chinese domination. The Japanese had expected that it would ensure still more, and would give them control of Korea's foreign relations and internal communications, but their position was greatly compromised by their murder of the Korean Queen, which excited both Korean nationalism and foreign interference.

Although the attitude of the American government remained one of strict neutrality and abstention, Americans in Korea were gravely concerned by the prospect of Japanese control. This concern was demonstrated by the actions of the American minister, John M. B. Sill, who maneuvered against the Japanese; by missionary support of the King; and by an attempt of Korean patriots, with the assistance of certain Americans, to rescue the King from Japanese control. On the failure of the effort some of the Koreans were given asylum in the American legation, and Sill asked for a warship to convey them to safety. But his request was refused by the State Department and his actions on behalf of Korean independence were censured.

The resultant power vacuum was quickly filled. The King took refuge in the Russian legation, temporary Russian dominance of Korean affairs ensued, and at Russian suggestion the Kingdom of Korea was translated into
the Empire of Dai Han. But in their turn the Russians overreached themselves, and in 1898, at the request of the Emperor, their advisers were withdrawn. There followed, briefly, a period of apparent Korean independence, marked by resurgent Japanese economic penetration, by Korean misgovernment and confusion, and by tension between Russia and Japan which led shortly to a second war.

War with Russia brought further triumphs to the Japanese. A second Battle of the Yalu, fought this time on land, resulted in the first great triumph of an Asiatic army over a European one, and the repercussions of this notable event, reinforced by the naval victory of Tsushima and the course of the subsequent campaign, reached through India to the heart of Africa. Yet though the fighting was with Russia, Japanese operations were aimed at Korea. Two days before declaring war the Japanese seized the capital and the palace of the Emperor, and within a month an agreement was signed in which Japan guaranteed the integrity of Korea and the Koreans promised to take none but Japanese advice.

The vigor with which the Japanese pressed their advantages proved irresistible by the faction-ridden inhabitants of the peninsula. Korean confidence in the promise of American good offices had been strengthened by the assurances of their American friends, internal reform had been neglected, and no steps had been taken—if indeed any could have been taken—to improve the position of Korea. Seeing his country becoming a Japanese protectorate, the Emperor in September 1904 appealed for American help in maintaining its integrity, and in the next year urgent efforts were made to communicate secretly with President Roosevelt through the American missionaries and through a young Korean patriot named Syngman Rhee.

The hopes founded on the American elder brother proved delusive. Although the treaty ending this war on the Asiatic mainland was signed on the eastern seaboard of the United States, this geographical oddity reflected Theodore Roosevelt's concern with larger matters than Korean independence. Already the President had made his attitude clear, observing that "we cannot possibly interfere for the Koreans against Japan. They could not strike a blow in their own defense." And Korea's future, so far as the United States was concerned, was settled by the Taft-Katsura conversations of 1905, in which the Secretary of War expressed the view, immediately confirmed by the President, that Japanese suzerainty would contribute to the peace of the Orient.

So Korea became a Japanese protectorate and acquired a new and unwished—for elder brother. Ironically enough, when the Japanese took over the management of Korea's foreign relations, it was the United States, the country whose good offices had been promised in case of unjust treatment, which was the first to remove its legation from Seoul. But while the loss of Korean independence was distressing to those Americans, diplomatic and missionary, who were on the spot, it can hardly be denied that President Roosevelt correctly construed the feeling of the country. The victories of Japan, it seemed, proved the Japanese to be America's foremost pupils, and testified retrospectively to the importance of Commodore Perry's mission. Despite difficulties over Japanese immigration and landholding, a general admiration for the accomplishments of the Japanese nation had developed in America, as indicated by a spate of juvenile novels with such unlikely titles as With Togo to Tsushima, or, Two American Boys in the Navy of Japan.

Yet there were deeper forces affecting the conduct of the United States than the transitory admiration for Japanese progress in western ways. If somewhat absent-mindedly, the United States had also participated in the new imperialism. With the overseas holdings acquired in the War with Spain came new responsibilities. The new realism in foreign affairs, manifested in the policies of Theodore Roosevelt, was part of the price of empire.

In the development of this new realism, as in that of the New Navy which had won the victories at Santiago and Manila Bay, the writings of an American naval officer were of great influence. To Alfred Thayer Mahan, as he sat in the English Club at Lima perusing Mommsen's History of Rome, there had been vouchsafed a vision of the meaning of command of the seas. Building upon this vision Mahan developed a gospel of sea power and, as his evidence was drawn from the great 18th century wars for empire, his message was well suited to the new imperial age. Hailed throughout the world, and particularly by the rising naval powers of Germany and
Japan, his writings became a potent influence in burying the strategic concepts of the old Navy in which he had served so long and a strong stimulus to the navalism of the early 20th century.

Rapidly, in these years, the strategic geography of the world changed and became compartmented, and not least as a result of the rise of Japan and of Japanese adherence to the doctrines of the American naval officer. Where Shufeldt had brought Korea "within the pale of western civilization," Mahan provided a philosophic framework for Japan's effort to make East Asia her exclusive sphere. Where detachments of western navies had policed the Asiatic seas on behalf of the international commercial community, there now developed an oriental battle fleet. For the United States, with its flag planted in the Philippines some 7,000 miles from home, the development was a significant one and elicited a double response. In 1908 the Great White Fleet set forth across the Pacific on its cruise around the world; in 1910 Japan annexed Korea with the approval of the American government. The protectorate was ended, the Emperor pensioned off, and the country opened by the American commodore disappeared from the map. Where Shufeldt had seen commercial opportunity, Americans now thought of Korea, if they thought of it at all, as a picturesque and distant land of topknots and horsehair hats. All that remained of the period of independence was the missionary link, now weakened and harassed by the Japanese rulers of the peninsula, and a scattered and impotent band of Korean nationalist conspirators.
The lot of Korea under Japanese rule was hard. In a consistent effort to subjugate the populace the Japanese took over the administration, the control of education, and the police. A directed economy was imposed with the aim of ending Korean self-sufficiency and of integrating the country into the imperial economy of Japan. Investment in Korean plant was not inconsiderable, but the benefits flowed back across the sea, and the inhabitants of the peninsula were reduced to hewers of wood and drawers of water for their alien overlords.

Despite the best efforts of the conquerors, however, the independence movement remained alive. Those who had struggled to save their country from alien control became the nucleus of a continued resistance which made Korea the Ireland of the East. The quiet of the Land of the Morning Calm was a quiet imposed from above, but from time to time the pressures broke through in riots and uprisings, and in 1919 there came an echo of the past. In Paris President Wilson was laboring to remake the world on principles derived from the older America; his emphasis on the self-determination of peoples and the rights of small nations had repercussions even in Korea, where the resisters, hoping to draw attention to their country's plight, issued a Proclamation of Independence.

But Japan had fought with the Allies. The Proclamation got no response, the protesters were driven underground or into exile, and the sole accomplishment of their effort was the formation of a Korean Provisional Government at Shanghai. Yet even here there were traces of the American connection: the presidency of this government was conferred upon Syngman Rhee, who had been educated by American missionaries, who had studied at Woodrow Wilson's Princeton, who on returning to Korea had escaped arrest through the assistance of a missionary bishop, and who was living in Hawaii.

Yet while the influence of American ideas was still potent, American policy remained one of continuing abstention. Japanese annexation of Korea had not been questioned. American participation in the League of Nations was defeated by the Senate. When crisis threatened with Japan the solution was found in the Washington treaties, which by restrictions on warship construction and on base development effectively trisected the Pacific Ocean and left the Japanese unchallenged in their sphere. A growing inclination to disengage from the Orient brought the grant of prospective independence to the Philippines.

This retirement from the outer world, which culminated in the extreme isolationism of the late thirties, was ended by the new dictatorships. For while these did not immediately menace the security of the country, they did endanger the continued existence of that minimum degree of world order which seems necessary to the United States. With Munich the withdrawal stopped, while the fall of France and the threat to Britain brought a forward diplomacy in the Atlantic and a sizable rearmament program. With the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor new emphasis was placed on the Pacific. There followed, in due course, a second advance to the shores of Asia, and one in force such as had never before been seen. The United States Pacific Fleet, which by summer of 1945 was dominant in Japanese home waters, was a far cry from the five ships and 85 guns with which John Rodgers had attacked the Korean forts.

To the captive Koreans the outbreak of war in the Pacific brought new hope. Repeated efforts between the wars to gain the attention of the powers had met with no success. Various uprisings in the thirties had been repressed, and in 1940 an organized non-cooperation movement had been vigorously put down. In China the advance of the Japanese armies forced the Korean Provisional Government to flee inland to Chungking. But Pearl Harbor changed the shape of things, and on 11 December 1941 the government in exile declared war on Japan.

Somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, despite the ancient friendship and the missionary link, the Korean
question remained long neglected by the United States. The Provisional Government was ignored, and attempts by Syngman Rhee to win recognition gained no countenance from the State Department. By 1943, however, American thinking with regard to Korea had advanced to the point of contemplating that liberation from Japan would be followed by an international trusteeship. The communiqué of the Cairo Conference promised Korean independence "in due course," and both at Yalta and at Moscow discussion of the trusteeship idea resulted in apparent general agreement.

But while agreement on trusteeship came easily in talk and in paper planning, the realities of the Korean situation remained much as before. Geography, at least, had not changed. The Japanese elder brother was facing expulsion, but Russia and China were still much in the picture, and so, once again, was the United States. Although Korean nationalism was undiminished, the strains which had beset the Korean kingdom persisted and the independence movement was itself a divided one. Syngman Rhee, the President of the Provisional Government, was in the United States, where important Korean groups existed in Hawaii and in Washington. In China, and under Chinese Nationalist influence, was the greater part of the Provisional Government, along with some army divisions supported by the regime of Chiang Kai-shek. The other China of Mao Tse-tung boasted its own Korean adherents, and as early as 1939 had created a so-called Korean Volunteer Army. Large numbers of Koreans had taken refuge in the Soviet Maritime Provinces, and many had served in the Russian armies. And finally, Koreans of all factions urgently desired immediate independence, and took a poor view of qualifying phrases such as "in due course."

In this situation events took charge. The sudden end of the war in the Pacific found the United States unprepared, its attentions focused on the projected invasion of the Japanese homeland. Hasty efforts in Washington to cope with the issues of Japan's surrender resulted in a directive which provided, with Soviet concurrence, that Japanese forces in Korea north of the 38th parallel would surrender to the Russians, and those south of that line to the United States. In time, of course, this decision on the mechanics of surrender was to divide Korea in rigid and illogical fashion, but it also saved the southern half of the country from Communist control. On 12 August, with American forces still 600 miles and almost a month away, Russian troops entered Korea against negligible Japanese resistance.

The moment of victory in the Pacific found the United States suffering from a shortage of sea power in the midst of plenty. The defeat of Japan was one thing; the simultaneous occupation of key points all along the Asiatic littoral was quite another. Since all available amphibious lift was needed for the occupation of the Japanese islands, peripheral areas had to wait. But in time ships did become available. Lieutenant General John R. Hodge's XXIV Corps was embarked at Okinawa, and on 8 September 1945 a group of Seventh Fleet transports steamed up the Inchon approaches and prepared to land the troops. The second coming had taken place. The wheel that Rodgers and Shufeldt had set in motion had come full circle.
IN ONE IMPORTANT sense the second coming of the Americans resembled the first. Again the arrival marked the culmination of a great thrust overseas; again, even as the shores of Korea were reached, the tide was beginning to turn. Shufeldt's treaty had been greeted with massive disinterest by an America absorbed in internal development; by the time Hodge led his corps ashore at Inchon demobilization had begun and domestic concerns were again uppermost in the American mind. For the next five years American policy in Korea would be dominated by the desire to fulfill the wartime commitments as quickly and economically as possible, and to get out and go home.

The Cairo Declaration had promised a unified, free, and democratic Korea. The 38th parallel, however, promised some difficulties in the achievement of these aims. Although originally proposed as an administrative convenience to facilitate the surrender of Japanese forces, this arrangement soon acquired other overtones. In view of the interallied frictions which had already developed in Europe, the dividing line seemed to derive virtue as a barrier to further Soviet advance, as a cover for the American position in Japan, and as providing the United States with a position of strength from which to press for Korean independence. In this last context, a country which habitually saw the resolution of political disputes as a function of voting strength could look with satisfaction on the fact that almost two-thirds of Korea’s thirty million inhabitants lived south of the parallel.

But whatever the virtues of the 38th parallel, division of the country between the two new elder brothers created a situation which called for serious diplomatic preparation. This, however, seems not to have been forthcoming. In the State Department the question of the divided peninsula appears to have been looked upon as little more than a minor nuisance, while for American public opinion the question hardly existed. The democratizing of Japan under the shining leadership of General MacArthur effectively monopolized the public consciousness; compared with this the liberation of Korea by a simple corps commander excited little interest.

No political guidance and little information had been provided General Hodge. No military government teams were available to accompany his corps. Whether the Koreans were to be regarded as liberated friends or as the inhabitants of a corner of a conquered empire remained obscure. In this situation Hodge and his officers had to improvise policy as best they could, maintain order, and somehow administer the country, while awaiting directives from home. American Military Government was consequently imposed on South Korea, and a successor Korean government which had sprung up in the wake of the Japanese defeat was refused recognition. But this policy, reminiscent of the wartime trusteeship proposals, antagonized important native elements and made the position of the American command more difficult.

The end of the war found Korea approaching economic collapse. The country was beset by a spiralling inflation, and by acute shortages of raw materials, tools, and capital. A generation of Japanese occupation in which all managerial posts had been retained in the hands of the conqueror had resulted in a woeful lack of administrative personnel. To add to the difficulties of an exploited economy, now suddenly bereft of its managerial staff, the division at the 38th parallel had separated fields on the south from fertilizer in the north, and the larger cities and the majority of the population from the sources of hydroelectric power and of coal.

Obvious first steps in reconstruction were to permit freedom of movement between the two zones, and to unify at least the administration of the Korean economy. Proposals to this effect were made by General Hodge, but the Russian commander was unresponsive. The problems of unification were perforce transferred to a higher plane, and at Moscow, in December 1945, a joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. committee was established to prepare, in
consultation with the Koreans, for a democratic government of Korea. At the moment, perhaps, this step appeared promising; in fact it merely marked the disappearance of the Korean question into those proliferating procedural jungles which, in the post-war period, so obfuscated points at issue between Russia and her western allies. The details of the work of the Joint Committee need not concern us here: suffice it to say that disputes over terminology concerning the proposed trusteeship led to adjournment in May 1946. Some progress had by this time been made by the two military commands in accomplishing a limited exchange of certain commodities. But on political matters progress was nil and Korea remained divided.

It was possible of course to consider that the Korean question should be settled on its own merits. Such presumably was the view of the Koreans, such had been the viewpoint of Americans in the eighties and nineties, and such was the attitude of General Hodge and of others on the spot. But Korea was but one facet of the world-wide problem of adjustment between the Soviets and the West which followed the collapse of Germany and Japan. Difficulties had developed even before the shooting stopped, as in the problem of the Polish boundary; as the months went by the situation was exacerbated by squabbles over German reparations and the communization of the Balkan states; internal strife in China made it evident that the defeat of Japan had not ended the war for East Asia. In March 1946, the month that the Korean Joint Committee convened to begin its deliberations, the darkening picture was dramatically presented in Winston Churchill's speech at Fulton, Missouri. In these circumstances only an extreme optimist could conceive of a resolution of the Korean question in simple local terms.

Throughout the year interallied relations remained difficult, and spring of 1947 came in an atmosphere of increasing crisis. The month of March brought the breakdown of the Moscow Conference and the signing of the Treaty of Dunkirk. It brought also, as a result of Soviet pressures on Turkey and of Communist guerrilla warfare in Greece, the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine. In June the depressing possibilities presented by the economic dislocation of western Europe produced the Marshall Plan for cooperative reconstruction with American support. One month later an influential American periodical published a disillusioned article on "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" under a pseudonym carefully selected to make unmistakable the official nature of the analysis.

In such an atmosphere of hardening American policy it was unlikely that much would come of bilateral discussion of Korean problems. Following a second abortive effort by the Joint Committee in the summer of 1947 the United States proposed a four-power conference on Korea, and advanced procedural suggestions which were extremely sensible if considered simply from the Korean point of view. But the Russians declined to cooperate. The fact that the great majority of the Korean population lived within the American zone, that South Korea had the votes, had come to mean that unification on any democratic basis would be equivalent to an American victory and to a retreat of the Soviet frontier. If a way existed of compromising this question while maintaining a decent regard for the Koreans themselves, it was not discovered. With Russian rejection of the American proposals, all serious effort to reach a solution through negotiation came to an end.

But to the United States the occupation of South Korea was a costly and troublesome business. The expenses of relief were high; the continuation of military government lent itself to propaganda about fascism and colonialism. In September 1947 a Joint Chiefs of Staff study concluded that Korea was of little strategic importance, and that in view of the current shortage of operating forces the divisions locked up in the peninsula would be better employed elsewhere. As in the earlier period of Foote and Foulk and Sill, the cost of a forward policy in Korea seemed greater than any promised reward, and as frustration increased, the search for a solution to Korea's problems gave way to an attempt to disengage.

The upshot was a new departure in American policy, and a decision to transfer the Korean question to the United Nations. This step, part of a developing effort to use this organization to mobilize pressure against the Soviets, was in some respects highly appealing. It promised to divest the United States of an expensive and onerous burden and to focus attention on Russian obstruction of Korean unification; it put those countries critical
of the American administration of South Korea in a position where they would have to take some responsibility. Like so many American decisions in the years following the Second World War it appeared to answer the felt needs for economy while maintaining at least verbal adherence to previously stated goals. But unless one seriously believed in the effectiveness of "world public opinion," the transfer of the Korean question to the U.N. hardly represented a harmonizing of ends and means. No serious effort was made to gain Soviet approval of an agreed procedure, or to develop a program acceptable to all concerned. Yet the Soviets had clearly demonstrated their concern, and Russian forces still occupied North Korea.

On 17 September 1947 the United States placed the question of Korean independence on the agenda of the General Assembly, and in the next month discussion began. The trusteeship concept had by this time disappeared, and had been replaced by a plan for United Nations midwifery of an independent nation. The American proposal called for the creation of a U.N. commission to supervise the organization of an all-Korean government with representation on the basis of population; in reply the Soviets insisted that representatives of North and South Korea should participate in these discussions as equals. The General Assembly, having taken up the question under American initiative, in November adopted a modification of the American plan. A Temporary Commission on Korea was established composed of representatives of nine countries, including the Ukraine but not the United States, which would observe elections, assist the elected representatives in the formation of a Korean government, and help to arrange the withdrawal of the occupying powers.

In January 1948 the Temporary Commission, less its Ukrainian representative, reached Seoul to be greeted by cheering crowds. But no cheers came from north of the parallel, and the inability of the Commission to secure Soviet cooperation, or even to gain access to North Korea, raised the question of whether to hold elections in South Korea alone. This prospect, generally opposed by Korean politicos, was supported by the American military command. It was also supported by certain Korean leaders, of whom Syngman Rhee, now returned to his homeland and chairman of the National Association for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence, was most prominent.

Doubtful both as to its mandate under these conditions and of the possibility of free elections in South Korea, the Commission sought counsel of the General Assembly's interim committee. Despite large scale riots organized by Korean Communists it was decided to proceed with supervised elections, and with the formation of a National Assembly in which one-third of the seats would be reserved for a North Korean delegation. This decision, which promised to bring closer the time of possible evacuation, and to liquidate the military commitment without abandonment of the political aims, was gratifying to the United States.

Elections in South Korea were consequently scheduled for May. The preparatory tasks of the Temporary Commission were complicated by more riots in March and April, by ostentatious firing exercises and fortification building along the northern side of the 38th parallel, and by "unification conferences" staged by the North Korean authorities in a further attempt to undermine the electoral procedure. Nevertheless the elections went off on schedule, with large popular participation and few noticeable irregularities. Four days later the reply from the north arrived as the Communists pulled the switches on the power lines, a move countered by the dispatch of two U.S. Navy power barges to furnish electricity until the output of South Korean steam plants could be increased.

There now followed, in both zones, a race to set up governments. On 1 May 1948 a new constitution had been promulgated in North Korea. In the south the National Assembly chose Syngman Rhee as chairman at the end of May, drafted a constitution and elected him President in July, and completed the formation of a government in early August. On 9 August President Rhee requested the occupation authorities to turn over the administration of South Korea and on the 15th his wish was granted. Ten days later an election was held in North Korea, observed only by the occupying power, and was followed by rapid ratification of a constitution. On 7 September the government of the People's Republic was established under a person calling himself Kim Il Sung, and on the 19th the Soviets announced that Russian forces would be out by year's end. Below the parallel,
withdrawal of American troops began in September, but this movement was shortly halted as a result of representations by President Rhee, and a regimental combat team was retained in South Korea until June of 1949.

With the establishment of an independent and freely elected South Korean government, it could be argued that the decision to refer the Korean question to the United Nations had been largely justified. On the other hand, it was at least possible that disengagement and the withdrawal of occupying forces had increased rather than diminished the danger of conflict. If North Korea was a Soviet puppet, South Korea depended for its continued existence upon the United States, and there was no guarantee that these antagonistic client states would prove as responsible and as restrained as their protectors. Saber-rattling had already gone on in the north, while below the parallel, President Rhee had not been backward in expressing his willingness to unify by force. The Korean situation, always an inflammable one, was now certainly no less so. Where Korea's geography had made it the oriental equivalent of the Low Countries, and its resistance to Japanese rule had given it the aspect of an Asiatic Ireland, its new situation, to those who could remember the 1930's, gave some promise that it would become a far eastern Spain.
Chapter 2. Policy and Its Instruments

2. Unified Defense

The year 1948 opened with the United Nations overseeing the birth of the Republic of Korea and the Russians that of the North Korean People's Republic. Elsewhere the new year brought a series of crises in the relations between east and west which seemed even more dangerous than those of the previous spring. In Czechoslovakia, a country closely linked in its origins with the United States, and one whose abandonment at Munich had profoundly moved Americans, the government was taken over by the Communists, and the coup shortly followed by a second defenestration of Prague. Following close upon this tragedy an ominous dispatch from General Lucius D. Clay, USA, the American commander in Germany, reported a new atmosphere of menace in his dealings with the Russians. Where economic dislocation in Europe and civil war in Greece had earlier seemed susceptible to treatment by financial grants and military missions, these events raised the specter of full-scale war.

Bestirring itself to counter the threat so dimly foreseen, the government found that the national defense cupboard was bare: the reasoning which had impelled the Joint Chiefs of Staff to urge withdrawal of Army units from Korea was reemphasized in the discovery that a call for more than one division would require partial mobilization. Faced with this situation, President Truman on 17 March 1948 called upon the Congress for an immediate increase in armed strength. But the summons to arms was complicated by the issue of universal military training and by lack of any firm program: only as the congressional debate began did the armed services, now six months unified in the new National Military Establishment, undertake for the first time since the war a serious consideration of the relation between policy and its instruments.

Three years earlier the United States had possessed the greatest military machine in history. Across the Atlantic, in the spring of 1945, its ground forces were reaching far into Europe; on the far side of the Pacific they were landing in strength on the island of Okinawa. Over Germany and Japan American bombers with long-range fighter escort penetrated almost at will. On the seas the United States operated an irresistible navy, which had destroyed its Japanese adversary and had demonstrated its ability to land troops against whatever opposition. But by spring of 1948 all this had gone. The armed forces had done their job too well. Since human institutions are created to answer human needs, the most successful are presumably self-obsoleting, and the American people had paid their Army and Navy the supreme compliment of assuming that the requirements which had called them into being had been fulfilled. As the shooting ended, demobilization became the order of the day, and with the same vigor with which they had fought the war the armed services proceeded to disband. Within a year there was very little left.

Yet while disarming themselves along with their former enemies, the American people also undertook to reorganize their armed services in the interests of efficiency and economy by a unification of these forces in a single department of defense. Much of the pressure for this change came from the long-held Army belief in the efficacy of a single command, much from the desire of the Army Air Force for equal status, but there were other factors at work. The failure of intelligence and coordination at Pearl Harbor had led many to see a solution in terms of command unified in Washington as well as in the field; there was a widespread impression that unified procurement and planning would produce appreciable economies. In any event the pressures were strong, and the apparent lessons of the immediate past were given great, perhaps too great weight. It is proverbial that generals always prepare for the last war, but in this instance the generals had strong popular support. With the enactment of unification legislation in 1947, the presumed dominance of the heavy bomber in the Second World War was
institutionalized in an independent Department of the Air Force.

This step, seemingly so natural and right, and which as a practical matter was surely unavoidable, had large implications. Although the greatest wartime successes of the air weapon had been tactical in nature, the doctrinal emphasis, based on formulations a generation old, continued to stress the centrality of strategic air warfare. Yet while emphasizing the long-range bombing function, with its implication of the separateness of air war, the theorists also insisted on the indivisibility of air power. This situation, deriving from a long standing equation of means and ends, of vehicle and mission, presented interlocking technical and administrative problems.

Revolutionary advances in military technology, the product of Mars' forcing-house, had brought the piloted bomber close to the end of the road. If World War II was not "the last war of the pilots"--the phrase was General Arnold's--it was pretty close to it, for the bomber fleets which darkened the skies over Germany and Japan ended the war in double jeopardy. At the home base the threat was of replacement by guided missiles, of which the V-2 was but the early forerunner; over the target the danger came from new antiaircraft weapons and from the jet interceptor. For a time, doubtless, it would still be possible to produce an airplane that could get through, though at a cost which could only be justified, for the bomber no less than for the prospective long-range missile, by the employment of nuclear weapons.

While technology was undermining the theory of war based on the piloted bomber, the unitary nature of that theory posed difficulties in the organizational sphere. Indubitably there were areas of aircraft employment--reconnaissance, tactical operations with ground and naval forces, air transport--where discrimination as well as guidance was necessary, and where the pilot was less easily replaced by the gadget. But while these operations, interlocking with those of the surface forces, were precisely those in which the advocates of separate air war were least interested, the monopoly theory which lumped all activities of winged vehicles together still seemed to require their assignment to the separate air force.

Clearly there were puzzles here. Improvements in air defense had made the future of strategic bombardment, and so implicitly that of the independent air force, dependent upon the use of a weapon which the United States was attempting to place under international control. The monopoly theory posed serious problems for the Army, bereft as it would be of control over instruments vital to its mission; if followed out strictly it would raise great difficulties for the Navy as well. And finally, as the development of the missile gained momentum, Army and Air Force would face difficult metaphysical questions as to the precise range at which this ceased to be the analogue of an artillery shell but became, for administrative purposes, an airplane.

If the future was thus replete with paradox, so was the path to unification. Within the military it was the Army, which had never wholly succeeded in integrating its air and ground components, which led the parade. The Army's desire for a single staff and a single command as an extension of its own organizational practices was natural enough, but its willingness to divest itself of its air arm is more difficult to understand. Some, indeed, opposed this move: in 1945 a board of Army officers recommended against the abandonment of tactical and transport aviation. But history had passed them by: a generation of Air Corps pressure for autonomy had been capped by a four year partnership with the RAF, with concomitant representation on the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff; the genie was out of the bottle, and the proposal was overruled.

The attitude of the Army Air Force, both traditional and understandable in that unification promised its best hope of independence, was perhaps extreme, calling as it did for triplication in the name of unity and for the creation of a separate service whose cardinal strategic principle was that of freedom from outside control. The Navy, historically the most successful in the coordination of diverse forces, and which had operated surface and undersea components, aviation, and the Marine Corps in reasonable harmony and with great success, approached the wedding with reluctance.

The ardent agreement between Army and Army Air Force, earlier so long at odds, as to the desirability of unifying first and facing the problems afterward, was unnerving to the Navy. Widespread rumors that the Army
hoped to abolish the Marine Corps were not reassuring. Evidence of Air Force desires to absorb naval aviation raised the frightening possibility that the fate which had overtaken the Royal Navy in 1919, and which had proved so costly when war came again, might be repeated here. To some, at least, in the naval establishment, questions of intelligence, procurement, resources planning, and the integration of military and diplomatic policy seemed of primary importance, and not simply soluble by the establishment of a single command. But the basic reason for naval reluctance lay in the fear expressed by Admiral King that the contemplated organization would permit the reduction of American "sea power" by those unfamiliar with its potentialities. Since the reorganization provided for two services whose primary concern was with war on and over great land masses, the fear was perhaps not wholly unreasonable. Since representatives of one of these services, from the time of General Mitchell, had gone repeatedly on record regarding the inutility of navies, apprehensions were not diminished.

A further reason for these apprehensions, and one largely the fault of the Navy itself, stemmed from a serious failure in communications both with the public and with the other services. Somehow, it seemed, the Navy had never fully succeeded in putting its case across, and in explaining itself and its needs even to those who were, or ought to have been, its best and most sympathetic customers. Those who, in Admiral King's phrase, were unfamiliar with these matters had been permitted to remain that way. The silent service had been too silent for its own good.

To a degree this fact is understandable, for naval warfare is to some extent mysterious. An image, of a sort at least, of land or air war is easily put before the public: the advance of the armies is visible on the map; the flattening of cities is easily understood. But on the ocean there are no frontiers, negative results may be as valuable as positive ones, and the operations which maintain and exploit control of the seas are frequently invisible. That the presence of armies in a foreign theater and of aircraft in foreign skies testifies to a completed naval task is not always appreciated. Great successes are often obtained by a minimum of fighting, though with a maximum of effort, but to dramatize and explain this effort is a sophisticated and difficult problem. Regrettably, in an age of violence, such commodities as pressure and movement and maneuver have less public appeal than shock.

As in all human affairs there was in the unification controversy a mixture of wisdom and foolishness, and of selfishness with disinterested patriotism. If there were cannibals in the Army and Air Force who cast hungry eyes at the Marine Corps and at naval aviation, there were also naval officers who saw all future conflict in the image of the war against Japan. Nevertheless, in due course, a compromise was reached and an act was passed. And while the fact of unification reflected the initiative of those outside the Navy Department, the form of the legislation was in considerable degree the product of those within. The services, now three in number, were federated rather than merged; the same act that reordered the military establishment also created the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Resources Board. In the autumn of 1947 the Secretary of the Navy, James V. Forrestal, became the first Secretary of Defense.

The passage of the National Security Act of 1947 did not, of course, solve all problems of form and function. Not all gears could mesh at once. There were, for example, important differences in the systems of staff and command. The Army and Air Force, conditioned to large-scale continental operations, had developed highly centralized systems of management of forces in the field. But while Air Force doctrine placed the locus of command at the highest possible level, and while the Army's basic tactical unit was the division, to the Navy the part was almost as important as the whole. Naval operations were far more atomistic, and called now for a large fleet, now for a small force, now for a single ship. The lack of shipboard accommodations for large managerial organizations, the need to maintain radio silence at sea, and the necessity for continual separation and reassembly of various units for various tasks made necessary a delegation of responsibility and a decentralization of authority on the basis of agreed doctrine. And both in Washington and in the field these morphological differences had serious implications for the planning and conduct of joint operations.
Nor was this all. Under the new roof there dwelt not only different services and different practices, but also different histories. All services, in the years following the war, faced an unavoidable problem of rethinking roles and missions, and in some ways this was hardest for the Navy. The Army had gone through its period of reorientation in the late thirties, when the Nazi threat brought an end to the concept of hemispheric defense. Now, with their recent experience of the war against Germany, Army commanders made an easy transition to the new policies of coalition, containment, and the defense of Europe. The Air Force, enjoying its original monopoly of the nuclear weapon, was enabled to renew its ancient promises of quick and decisive war. But the Navy's experience was dominantly that of the war against Japan; Pacific veterans held the top positions in the Navy Department; and while the Navy's performance in the Pacific had on the whole been brilliant, that war was perhaps not the most obvious source of precedent for the situation of mid-century. It is, after all, hard to reach Moscow by boat.

Finally, in a sense, the successes of wartime came to tell against the Navy in peace. No strong hostile navy presented an obvious menace. To commanders who had crossed the seas as passengers, the passage and the amphibious assault presented no great difficulty, but were simply the prelude to the real campaign; to those whose responsibility it was to get them there the situation appeared otherwise. As in the Second World War, certain leaders of the RAF had never fully understood their dependence on victory over the submarine, so now American ground and air officers would willingly deploy their forces overseas with little thought as to how their support could be assured should the new weapons not produce a quick decision. Busily at work on the superstructure of strategy, they could either neglect or assume its foundation. Concentrating as they did on the defense of Europe, possibilities elsewhere could be ignored.

In these divergent attitudes there was nothing fundamentally irreconcilable. But under the conflicting pressures of strategic need and budgetary possibility, the interservice differences became increasingly acute. In January 1948 the first budget subsequent to unification was sent up to the Congress, with a request for $11 billion for the National Military Establishment. But February, when the hearings began, was also the month of the Czech coup and of the discovery that the Army had but one uncommitted division, and March brought the telegram from General Clay. With the President's appeal for more armed strength, the military, already deeply involved in the complexities of reorganizing their vast establishment, found themselves faced with the problem of expansion. But since neither in the armed services nor in the State Department was there agreement as to the armaments needed for the support of policy, competition for the new appropriations inevitably developed. Such competition, of course, had always existed, but in the time of separate departments it had gone on in the light of day, in hearings before congressional committees. Under the new dispensation, the service chiefs had to deal not with the Congress but with each other; across the table the legislator had been replaced by a competitor; the triangular nature of the new establishment promised great rewards from an alliance policy which would set two services against one.

In this situation the Navy was at a disadvantage. In the Joint Chiefs of Staff it was the minority member: although there were differences a-plenty between Army and Air Force, they were successfully plastered over. In strategic formulations based on the threat to Europe it seemed to have little more than a supporting function. Increasingly it found itself forced back on the defense of its organizational integrity. And as the Air Force pressed steadily for the dominant role in the military establishment, and as competition for funds became competition for public support, open quarrelling broke out in the public press. In an attempt to head off the in-fighting, the Secretary of Defense convened a conference of the Joint Chiefs at Key West in March 1948. But although he there persuaded the sovereignties to recognize each other's legal existence, no real meeting of minds was gained in the areas where functions and weapons interlocked, and the high command of the Air Force remained opposed to the existence of naval aviation. Outside the military there had also been interest in these matters, and the report of the President's Air Policy Commission on "Survival in the Air Age," which effectively equated the future of
warfare with the large-scale delivery by the Air Force of weapons of mass destruction, had further exacerbated the situation. Thus early in 1948 the argument was already off center, and had focussed on the air question, with emphasis on nuclear bombardment, to the detriment of any rounded approach to the development of instruments of policy. After a fashion, at least, the problems of a short and big war were being faced, but those of a small and long one had been forgotten.

Where wisdom lay among these conflicting viewpoints is doubtless a matter for the philosopher rather than the historian. At all times, inevitably, differing service preconceptions give rise to different strategic views, and a changing world will emphasize the virtues first of one outlook and then of another. But what can be noted, and indeed almost postulated as a law, is the tendency for the minority view to become the correct one. Defense planning is, after all, merely a preliminary form of strategic deployment, and strategy is a two-sided game. This fact, too often forgotten, ensures that whatever the formulations of the moment the enemy will work to circumvent them, and in time may make progress in this effort.

Despite all difficulties within the Defense Department, a program of a sort was worked out and presented to Congress at the end of March. This program, greatly scaled down by Secretary Forrestal from the original desires of the service chiefs, and dissented from by the Air Force, called for an increase of $3 billion in expenditures over the $11 billion already budgeted for the coming year. In the end, after the services, the Congress, and the Budget Bureau had all had their say, the decision was made by the President. No program would be undertaken which would bring future annual costs above $15 billion.

Under this presidential ceiling, in the autumn of 1948, the planning for fiscal 1950 was begun. But by now the military had begun to worry. Even allowing for the human tendency to pad the budget, the first estimates from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which called for $30 billion, would have seemed to indicate that capabilities and intentions were out of phase. By September, however, the Joint Chiefs had developed a war plan, and had painfully reduced their requests by almost half. Down to about the $20 billion mark agreed, solutions were forthcoming, both in allocation of funds and in strategic planning, but at lower figures these were not obtainable. The final request for $16.9 billions, which was accompanied by the statement that the presidential limit would support only an atomic counteroffensive from the British Isles and would entail abandonment of the Mediterranean in case of war, was the product of a split vote. In this difficult situation the Secretary of Defense, who had thus far displayed a notable concern for balanced forces, now turned to concentrate upon strategic air. Under the circumstances this was wholly logical, for if the air riposte was all that could be managed, it was surely desirable to strengthen it as much as possible. But the budget ceiling remained firm, and a request for additional funds for the Air Force was refused.

This presidential decision was of great importance. What had begun as a year of crisis was ending as an election year, and the complications overseas were fading from the public mind. Except for the reenactment of Selective Service, the proposed expansion of the armed forces, trumpeted in the spring of 1948, was over by fall without having proceeded very far. American military capabilities, vis-a'-vis the Soviet Union, remained limited to the atomic counteroffensive; American capabilities in other contexts had hardly been considered. But the rigidity of this military posture, so out of line with diplomatic policy, was disguised by the still sizable dollar sums allotted the Army and Navy, which while insufficient for serious wartime operations preserved a mobilization base and some appearance of a balanced establishment.

By mid-summer of 1948 two facts had become obvious. The first was that rearmament would be severely restricted by the President in terms of dollars. The second was that in the competition for these dollars the Air Force, with its long-range nuclear bombing function, enjoyed the larger measure of public and congressional support. Yet June 1948 saw the commencement of the Berlin blockade, a maneuver not easily countered by strategic bombing. It was clear that the outside world remained both dangerous and unpredictable. It was less clear that the weapons best suited to win the battle of the budget were those most useful in support of other
aspects of national policy.

Throughout the year, as the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs grappled with their problems, the interservice propaganda war continued with the Air Force well in the lead. Although the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations were committed to the support of Forrestal's program, the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force remained vigorously partisan, calling at every opportunity for special treatment. Since the justification for such treatment rested upon the nuclear weapon, Navy claims to share in its delivery did nothing to calm the atmosphere. In the fall the Air Force Association, the civilian auxiliary, violently attacked the whole concept of naval aviation, and in reply an aviation admiral attacked the Air Force. Throughout these months a series of articles, bitterly critical of the Navy and of naval aviation, were being prepared with Air Force cooperation for publication in a national magazine; these would appear between November 1948 and April 1949, at the time the 1950 budget was scheduled to come before the Congress. In this atmosphere of tension the new year began, and in April the House Appropriations Committee reported out a bill providing large sums for the Air Force and reduced support for the Navy.

Increasingly, as the months passed, the defense establishment was developing along lines unsuited to a maritime strategy and alarming to senior naval officers. Increasingly, also, military policy was diverging from that of the Department of State. In diplomacy the effort was toward an ever closer grouping of alliances, especially with regard to Europe. In military matters the emphasis was tending toward the development of a capability for independent action by investment in intercontinental bombing at the expense of ground and naval strength. But to suggestions from State that this overlooked the chance of localized conflict, the reply was returned that increased surface forces were financially impossible.

In the spring of 1949 Secretary Forrestal left the Military Establishment and was replaced by Louis Johnson. There was now a firm, tactless, and economical hand at the helm, and a bill in Congress to amend the National Security Act promised that the hand would become firmer. In April, less than a month after the arrival of the new Secretary, the ax first hit the Navy, with cancellation of the construction of the aircraft carrier United States, a step supported by Army and Air Force, but on which neither the Secretary of the Navy nor the Chief of Naval Operations was consulted.

It would have been hard to think of a more dramatic blow at the naval establishment. This first post-war carrier had been designed, on the basis of wartime experience, in anticipation of the newer and heavier aircraft coming into operation, and with an eye to the use of the new weapons. Its construction had been approved by the Congress, and other projects had been abandoned to permit it to go forward under the budgetary limitations. But although the impact of the cancellation within the Navy was tremendous, it was little felt outside. The Secretary of the Navy resigned at once in vigorous protest, but Congress and public seemed little disturbed.

Once more the Navy had failed to make its case. Whatever its primary purpose, the usefulness of the great carrier would far transcend the single function of strategic bombing. But the debates on military policy had become so centered on this type of operation that the ship had been drawn into the quarrel, and suspicion of an intent to invade Air Force prerogatives was increased by a symbolism which some read into the name United States. The subject, indeed, was raised in congressional hearings, where the naval witnesses unfortunately failed to remember that a frigate of the same name had been one of the first ships of the old Navy. There was also, perhaps, a failure of subtlety here, for among the early frigates there had also been a Congress and a President, either of which names, it would seem, might have served as better defensive armament.

Within the naval establishment the fact and manner of the cancellation revived the fears that the transfer of naval aviation to the Air Force and the abolition of the Marine Corps were imminent. These apprehensions were compounded by the events of the next few months. In July a new ceiling of $13 billion was placed over the defense budget, and the scalpels of the economizers were soon poised over the carriers of the Essex class, of which the Navy wanted to maintain eight in operation, the Army considered four sufficient, and the Air Force
wished all mothballed. In August the Secretary of Defense halved the strength of naval and Marine aviation by ordering a reduction of operating carriers from 8 to 4, of carrier air groups from 14 to 6, and of Marine Corps squadrons from 23 to 12. This was followed by efforts to prepare for the next fiscal year by a reduction of current expenditures, and in September the Navy was instructed to trim its current budget by $353 million, a step possible only through drastic cutbacks in the procurement of new aircraft.

By this time the tension between the services had reached an extraordinary pitch. Although the Air Force, riding the tide of success, now moderated its propaganda activities, bitterness within the Navy continued to grow. Having been abused in the press, having been consistently outvoted in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, finding themselves subjected to an antagonistic Secretary of Defense and to a doubtfully sympathetic Secretary of the Navy, many senior naval officers felt that their worst fears of unification were coming true. It seemed, as Admiral King had prophesied, that American sea power was being reduced by those who did not understand it, and the country's safety committed to an unsound theory of war.

These interservice tensions led in the latter part of 1949 to some remarkable developments. An anonymous document, produced in the Navy Department, which alleged that Air Force procurement policies were dominated by the financial interests of those in authority, was brought to the attention of the Congress. The Secretary of Defense charged in a speech at the National War College that the Navy was waging a "campaign of terror" against unification. There were reports in the press of naval officers being shadowed by detectives hired by the Department of the Air Force. In September a well-known naval aviator declared publicly that the Navy was being purposely eliminated as a factor in the defense establishment. In October the press received through unorthodox channels a copy of a letter in which a prominent flag officer expressed to the Secretary of the Navy his fear that the country's security was being jeopardized by acceptance of the theory of quick victory through strategic bombing, stated that "the morale of the Navy is lower today than at any time since I entered the commissioned ranks in 1916," and urged a congressional investigation of the fundamentals of national security. Publication of the letter forced the investigation.

In October 1949, in an atmosphere somewhat sobered by the report of an atomic explosion within the Soviet Union, the congressional hearings were begun. In these hearings the Navy labored under serious handicaps. Its new secretary was hostile to the dissidents' case, while the Chief of Naval Operations, in this extremely difficult situation, was endeavoring to mediate between his subordinates and higher authority. Preparation of the Navy brief consequently lacked official sanction and the assistance that such sanction could give, while the emotional involvement of the naval witnesses made it difficult to identify the enemy and to plan a coherent campaign. The result was that the naval testimony was somewhat scattered and uncoordinated, imperfectly prepared, and at times tactically ill-advised.

Although the basic issues went far deeper, the October hearings were an outgrowth of an earlier investigation of procedures used in procurement of the B-36 intercontinental bomber, and the B-36 remained prominent as a subject of discussion. Whatever the technical merits or demerits of this giant of the skies, it had become a symbol of current difficulties, and to most naval officers seemed to have grown horns and a tail. Yet the approach to the question was a narrow one, with too much of the naval case concentrated on the B-36 as airplane and too little on the B-36 as symbol--symbol of a strategy, symbol of domestic propaganda, and symbol of future budgetary troubles. On the other hand much naval testimony seemed retrospective, centering on the war against Japan, while clarification of the current implications of naval and amphibious capabilities was hampered by general acceptance of the concept that Russia was the one possible enemy and Europe the one possible theater. The result was that to many the arguments seemed either a disagreement of experts on technical matters or a simple case of hurt feelings; it was even possible to suggest that the Navy was aggrieved merely because the Air Force had developed a bomber of astonishingly long range. Nevertheless the hearings presented an impressive and disturbing spectacle: as the congressional committee observed, nearly the entire high command of the United
States Navy appeared to protest the current policies of the Department of Defense. Two points emerged fairly clearly from the testimony of the naval witnesses. The fact that the type of armed force embodied in the Navy and the Marine Corps was being whittled down to a dangerous level, emphasized in the testimony of three major fleet commanders, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Chief of Naval Operations, was forcefully developed. A second point, repeatedly made, was that the Navy was not accepted as an equal partner in the unification process, and while the documentation was unnecessarily weak, this contention received strong if surprising confirmation in the bitter and partisan rebuttal delivered by General Omar N. Bradley, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Some matters of central importance, however, were not made wholly clear. The fact that the budget ceiling imposed by the President on the defense establishment was too low to permit effective support of the commitments assumed by the President and the State Department was obscured by the attack on the Air Force. Perhaps the point could not have been well made under any circumstances. It is difficult to take issue with civilian judgment without seeming to attack civilian control; an outright appeal for funds opens the military man to undesirable accusations; in their economic thinking the military incline to the conservative, and to unquestioning acceptance of statements that the economy can only stand so much. In any event it was the members of the congressional committee, rather than the military witnesses, who showed the most concern over the adequacy of appropriations.

A second subject which remained somewhat obscure, and one always difficult to explain clearly, was the relationship between armament and foreign policy, and between types of armament and strategic flexibility. The discussion did indeed involve the importance of relating strategy to war aims, of differentiating when dealing with tyrants between the rulers and the ruled, and of maintaining insofar as possible the fabric of civilization in the interest of the post-war world. The implications of an intercontinental bombing strategy for a diplomatic policy of alliance, and the inconsistencies implicit in simultaneous efforts to create a North Atlantic Treaty Organization and a weapons system independent of foreign bases were touched on. Salutary emphasis was laid on the need for tactical air strength to attack enemy forces in being and their lines of communication, and for immediately available forces, with ground and air components trained and packaged together, ready for quick deployment. But the course of the hearings was such as to deprive these matters of their merited consideration.

Consideration, nevertheless, would soon be given them, although less as the result of the efforts of naval officers than of those of the North Korean People's Army. For this unforeseen war in an unexpected theater was to pose in excruciating form the strategic and tactical problems the defense establishment had not been permitted to meet. As if to emphasize the problems of balanced forces and limited war brought forth in the hearings, the Korean conflict would see the naval witnesses occupying crucial posts: Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Commander of the Fast Carrier Task Force in Korean waters and Chief of Staff and acting Commander Naval Forces Far East; Commanding General of the First Marine Aircraft Wing. The nature of the war would raise an imperative but unanticipated need for close interservice cooperation, and would keep the problem of roles and missions, so long a bone of contention in Washington, steadily to the fore. And finally, the course of the struggle on that distant peninsula would do much—at least temporarily—to redress the military imbalance of 1949.

For the moment, however, the "revolt of the admirals" was inconclusive. The rebuttal testimony of representatives of the Army and Air Force was generally moderate in tone; controversial issues were skirted, sin was denied, and the Navy chided for not accepting unification. In the sequel the Navy lost one Chief of Naval Operations with the removal of Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, and gained another in the person of Admiral Forrest P. Sherman. The escape of steam during the hearings diminished pressures inside the Pentagon and produced a period of comparative interservice moderation. The report of the congressional committee was in many respects a model discussion of a highly complex matter: whatever the public thought, and despite the diffuseness of the
naval presentation, the members had not missed the points at issue. Within the National Security Council, where the Russian atomic explosion had led to a review of military policy, the naval arguments may have had some weight. But so far as the all-important question of the budget was concerned, the hearings were of no effect. The ceiling for fiscal 1951 remained at $13 billion, reduction of naval strength continued apace, and even the Air Force found its plans cut back. Within the House of Representatives efforts were begun to provide the Navy with funds for new construction, although not for a new United States, but the attitude of the executive branch remained unchanged.

Yet what in retrospect seems most striking about the hearings of 1949, and what presumably would have most impressed an observer from beyond the Iron Curtain, was less the evidence of difficulties between the services than the emerging picture of American strategic thought. Almost all witnesses, of whatever service, agreed that there was but "one possible enemy." Almost all focussed their attention on the defense of Europe. Just as some of the naval testimony was nostalgic in nature, so was that of the dominant Army Air Force wing, although with a different bias stemming from a different past. The next war, it seemed clear beyond peradventure, would begin like the last with a massive enemy surprise attack; just as in World War II, except for the use of bigger and better weapons, the reply would take the form of a strategic air offensive; the end would come on the ground with a new V-E Day. Whether the Russians were equally convinced of this was a question raised by none.

Repeated emphasis on "the" strategic plan and on the importance of long-range nuclear bombardment, together with the contemplated reductions in naval and amphibious capabilities, promised a steady diminution in ability to reply to pinpricks, or to police non-Russian aggression, or to act with strength and speed outside the European theater. The capabilities and intentions of the United States were plain. There had grown up, in effect, a mirror-image concept of strategy: the United States thinks Europe is important and has created NATO; therefore the Russians must think Europe important, and be planning to invade it. An equal rigidity on the part of the enemy was assumed, all capacity for subtlety or maneuver was denied him, and the upshot would seem to have been an invitation to war by proxy in distant places.

The situation which the hearings thus exposed was a remarkable one even for a nation not noted for flexibility or sophistication in strategic thought. The lack of clarity in the area of grand strategy evinced by the naval witnesses can doubtless be explained as a result of their immediate troubles, and of the intellectual difficulties they faced in trying to harmonize a traditionally more flexible outlook with the rigidities of the agreed strategic plan. Implicit, if not explicit, in some of their testimony, there can be found a very different point of view. But to account for the attitude of those within the military establishment who professed themselves satisfied with the situation is more difficult, for they were wrong on any reading of history. Essentially, it would seem, the fact that able and devoted men could agree along such lines stemmed from the fear of defeat by bankruptcy, and the historian of this episode must conclude that if war is too important a matter to be left to the military, it is also too important to be subjected to the budgetary treatment of 1948-50. Those skilled in the mysteries of economics had told the service heads that their country could spend no more in time of peace, and peace presumably existed until the shooting began. The President had imposed a firm ceiling, and orders were orders. Accepting the $13 billion limit and the force that this could purchase as the nation's maximum capability, the dominant members of the Joint Chiefs could think only as they did. In no other way could they continue to carry their heavy responsibilities. A broader outlook on possibilities was too agonizing to be endured.
In contrast to the alarms and crises of preceding years the early months of 1950 brought an appearance of stability in the world at large. Within the Defense Department things were quieter. In Europe Tito's defection from the Russian bloc had been followed by termination of the civil war in Greece. The Berlin blockade had ended, West Berlin remained free, and the development in the autumn of 1949 of two German governments amounted to an acknowledgment that for the foreseeable future the German question would remain insoluble. In Asia the Chinese civil war was over, the Mandate of Heaven had been withdrawn from Chiang Kai-shek, the Generalissimo with his remaining forces had retired to Formosa, and the Chinese People's Republic had been proclaimed. In Korea, as in Germany, agreement to disagree had been institutionalized in the formation of two governments. Although the state of the world was not one to bring entire satisfaction to American policy makers, things appeared to be settling down.

In many respects, moreover, it could be said that the United States had responded brilliantly to the challenge with which it had been faced. Far from withdrawing from a degenerate outer world, the American government had reacted with extraordinary fertility of imagination, and had accomplished some notable acts of statecraft. The Truman Doctrine had marked the turning point, and had signaled a determination to face up to the problems of mid-century, but the Truman Doctrine by no means stood alone. The vision of Secretary Marshall's Harvard speech had borne fruit in the European Recovery Program, which began operations in the summer of 1948. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the diplomatic reply to the Czech coup and the Berlin blockade, became operative in 1949, as did a Mutual Defense Assistance Program designed to give arms to those who manned the frontiers of freedom. Enactment of the Point Four program, intended to make freedom worth defending where needs were more material than conceptual, seemed in early prospect. Progress in rationalizing the defense establishment had been less obvious, but it could be maintained that the military had met with great success their only test of strength: the work of the Air Force, assisted by Navy and RAF transport squadrons, in maintaining the Berlin airlift, had not only led to diplomatic triumph but had presented to the world a picture of a United States that was determined, restrained, and possessed of extraordinary operational capabilities.

Nevertheless it should be noted that the successes of American policy were largely European: in Asia the settling dust revealed a situation at variance with all earlier hopes. The principal effects of Communist success in China were perhaps two: to increase the importance of Japan as the pivot of American policy in the Orient and, since Europe seemed more amenable as well as more important, to reemphasize the European orientation of diplomacy. Two countries, Germany and Korea, were divided by the frontiers of the divided world, yet while American divisions were held in Germany, the last American troops were withdrawn from Korea in June 1949. That the defense of South Korea was now a matter for the South Koreans themselves could be assumed from the tendencies in American military policy brought out in the October hearings, as well as from speeches by General MacArthur and Secretary of State Acheson which drew the American strategic frontier through the Korean Strait.

Despite the transfer of responsibility for Korean unification to the United Nations and the withdrawal of American troops, the Republic of Korea remained a problem for American policy makers. Since 1945 American aid to Korea had annually exceeded the sum of $100 million, and the economy of the Republic was wholly dependent on congressional appropriation and the ECA. Similar circumstances doubtless obtained above the parallel, but the steady southward flow of refugees, which did nothing to simplify the economic problems of the Republic, gave evidence of a less tactful and less generous protecting power.
There was also a military problem. In the north the Russians had set up a military academy in 1945, and three years later had activated the North Korean People's Army, three divisions strong. In the course of time the North Koreans were provided with Soviet tanks; by 1949 three more infantry divisions had been activated; a rapid expansion in the spring of 1950 raised NKPA strength to ten infantry divisions, a number of infantry regiments, and an armored brigade. An aviation unit had been created in 1946; in 1948 the obsolete Japanese aircraft used for training began to be replaced by newer types received from Russia; by 1950 the number on hand was approaching the hundred mark. The People's Republic boasted a navy of some 45 small craft, including a few 60-foot aluminum-hulled Russian torpedo boats; at Najin, in the northeast, the Russians administered a training program for Korean naval personnel; there and at Chongjin and Unggi the Soviet Navy enjoyed the use of base facilities.

In the Republic of Korea the situation was otherwise. Following the withdrawal of American fighting forces the United States had provided, at the request of the Korean government, a small Korean Military Advisory Group, and military supplies for a force of 50,000 men were left behind. But while an impressive quantity of small arms, vehicles, ammunition, and artillery was transferred, along with some 20 training planes, and while further deliveries were scheduled under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, the capabilities of the South Korean Army remained somewhat limited. As a result of the belligerence of Syngman Rhee, who seemed quite prepared to attempt a forcible unification of the peninsula, this army was given no tanks, no medium or heavy artillery, and no military aircraft.

By 1950 the strength of the ROK Army was approaching the 100,000 mark and eight divisions had been organized. Small unit training had made good progress, but experience in large-scale maneuvers was lacking and there had been no training in defense against tanks. Nevertheless, the Military Advisory Group was optimistic, and its confidence that ROK forces could handle the threat from the north was apparently accepted on the higher levels.

The Republic's navy, somewhat larger than its northern counterpart, had been established in 1948 on the foundation of the coast guard set up during the American occupation. Its strength in 1950 was something over 7,000 men; its headquarters were in an office building in Seoul and its principal base facilities at Chinhae on the south coast; its ships were largely ex-United States YMS types and ex-Japanese minesweepers and picket boats. Some advice and assistance had been provided in the early years by former United States Coast Guard personnel attached to the KMAG, but money and material had been sadly lacking, ships had been kept in operation only by cannibalizing, morale had been low, and defections had taken place. In 1949, however, prospects had brightened with the receipt of a shipment of spare parts from the United States, and Rear Admiral Sohn Won Il, ROKN, the Chief of Naval Operations, had gone to America to bring back four ex-U.S. Navy 173-foot steel-hulled PCs. Something, too, had happened to morale, for the money to purchase one of these vessels had been provided by subscription of the officers and men, an unusual event in any navy.

So the Far East still presented problems, and not only in Korea. The Communist success in China had become a major subject of domestic political dispute; a large proportion of American ground strength remained on occupation duty in Japan; inevitably the American posture in the Orient was kept under review. General J. Lawton Collins, USA, the Army Chief of Staff, had visited Japan in the autumn of 1949, and June of 1950 saw a renewal of high-level travel to the Far East. The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff flew to Manila for discussions with Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble, Commander Seventh Fleet; John Foster Dulles, consultant to the Secretary of State, paid a visit to Korea; all then proceeded to Japan for talks with General MacArthur. While at Seoul Mr. Dulles had addressed the Korean National Assembly, and had assured his audience of the strength and resolution of the free world and of the support of the American people. Intended as a diplomatic counter to North Korean threats, the speech proved unsuccessful, and photographs of Mr. Dulles peering across the 38th parallel were shortly featured in the Communist press as it hailed him as the strategist of South Korean aggression.
By the time these visitations took place the ostentatious military preparations in the north had alarmed the Rhee government, and had led the U.N. Commission to establish a system of border observers. For some time, also, reports of increasing North Korean strength had been available to the intelligence section of the Far East Command in Tokyo. An appreciation of December 1949, which considered it axiomatic that the Russians would be unwilling to permit the survival of a non-Communist Korean state, had commented on the arrival of reinforcements from Manchuria and suggested that spring would bring a period of danger. In January it was reported that March and April had been designated as the time for an attack on South Korea. In March it was noted that recent evidence pointed to an invasion in June. Subsequent information indicated that the inhabitants were being evacuated from the border zone north of the parallel, and that North Korean regular divisions had been deployed along the dividing line. In the last weeks of peace word was received of minor clashes along the parallel, of conferences of North Korean commanders, of guerrilla infiltration of South Korea, and of North Korean receipt of Soviet aircraft. But all this information received negative evaluation in the Far East Command: the March report of a prospective June invasion was forwarded with the comment that civil war was unlikely, although the reasons for this view remained unstated, and this judgment was repeated in subsequent appreciations.

One of the principal conclusions of the Pearl Harbor investigating committee had concerned the failure of evaluation and action despite the availability of intelligence, and this aspect of that tragedy had provided one of the chief arguments for postwar efforts to coordinate diplomatic, military, and intelligence activities. Yet this war like the last was to begin with a failure of intelligence, and if the immediate damage to the United States was less, the performance of the new apparatus seems if anything to have been worse than that of the old. Once again the information was available, this time in even more detail, but the ability to use it was still more notable in its absence. Once again it was clear how imprisoned men are in their own frames of reference, and how difficult it is to believe in unpleasant possibilities. Again, perhaps, there can here be seen the influence of the agreed strategic plan. Whatever the secret agents say, the evaluating authorities will believe only what they wish to believe.
ON 25 JUNE 1950, at 0400 in the morning, the North Korean People's Army, with seven infantry divisions and one armored brigade in the line, and with two more infantry divisions in reserve, struck south across the parallel. In Korea it was Sunday, a favored day for starting modern wars.

In Washington, half a world away and half a day behind in time, it was the middle of a summer Saturday. President Truman was out of town, visiting his family in Missouri. In the offices of government, in the State Department in Foggy Bottom and in the Pentagon across the river, only duty personnel were at work. As evening came, press rumors of a Korean crisis drifted into the State Department, and then, at twenty-six minutes past nine, a dispatch reporting the invasion was received from Ambassador John J. Muccio in Seoul. Around the town the telephones began to ring. Echelon by rising echelon the officers of the Department of State were summoned. Before midnight came, the Secretary of State had reached the President by telephone, and the Secretary General of the United Nations had been notified of the emergency.

Sunday in Washington was a day of frenzied activity. Two hours after midnight Secretary Acheson again telephoned the President, the decision to seek action of the Security Council was made, and at three in the morning the request was formally presented to Secretary Lie. Hastily summoned, the members of the Security Council met at three that afternoon, but with the Soviet delegate in self-imposed absence. By this time a report of the invasion had been received from the United Nations Commission on Korea, and the United States had prepared a resolution on this breach of the peace which called upon the North Korean People's Republic to desist from aggression. By a vote of nine to nothing, Yugoslavia alone abstaining, the resolution was approved.

While these measures were in train at Lake Success, the United States government was in emergency action. Throughout the morning the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Army, and the military chiefs were in conference at the Pentagon. In the afternoon, in response to another call from Secretary Acheson, President Truman flew back to the capital. In the evening the President and his military and diplomatic advisers held a meeting at Blair House which began with dinner and which lasted until 11 o'clock. Here the first decisions leading to American commitment in Korea were taken.

The situation which confronted the United States that Sunday evening was sufficiently obscure. Aggression had been committed. The cold war had become hot. But the aggression was local, the general emergency had not begun, and along the rest of the cold war's battleline prospects were unpredictable. At Blair House the discussion ranged from Korea to Formosa, to the implications of the invasion for Japan and the Philippines, and to the strength of Russian forces in the Far East. The possibility of Russian or Chinese intervention in Korea was raised, but to those present seemed remote. Over and above these concrete questions, to which concrete answers could at least be hazarded, there weighed heavily on the minds of all the memories of the 1930's. All present had lived through the agonizing series of crises which had marked the world's descent into the second great war, and whose very names--Manchuria, Ethiopia, the Rhineland, Munich--had become emotional symbols. If, as seems quite possible, Stalin was encouraged in the Korean venture by memories of democratic impotence in the Manchurian crisis, he overlooked one factor of central importance: his principal antagonist in 1950, the man from Missouri, was also a student of history.

In the light of these memories, and with the overpowering feeling that aggression, once unchecked, might sweep all before it, certain preparatory decisions were taken. American civilians and dependents were to be evacuated from Korea by sea and air; to cover this evacuation air and naval action in defense of the Korean
capital, of the harbor of Inchon, and of Kimpo airfield was authorized. The Seventh Fleet was to be started north from the Philippines so as to be more readily available should things get worse. Shipment to Korea of ammunition and of military hardware under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program would be expedited by all available means. Shortly after eleven the meeting broke up, and the military chiefs hastened to the Pentagon to communicate the decisions to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, USA, Commander in Chief, Far East Command.

Monday the 26th was another day of action. Around the world, outside the Iron Curtain, the news of the invasion of South Korea had shocked governments and peoples alike. But although feelings were both indignant and apprehensive, few saw any likelihood of direct action; the salvation of the Republic of Korea was up to the South Koreans. In the morning President Truman announced the decision to expedite arms aid to the Rhee government under the MDA Program, but no mention was made of the movements of American armed forces. In the evening a second conference of the military and civilian chiefs took place. On the far side of the globe, as the meeting began, ships and aircraft were evacuating Americans from Korea and the Seventh Fleet Striking Force had sortied from its bases in the Philippines and was steaming north.

The decisions taken at this second Blair House meeting were far-reaching. The Secretary of State had come with positive recommendations. His suggestion that air and naval support be given the Republic of Korea under sanction of the Security Council resolution of the day before, that increased military aid be extended to the Philippines and Indo-China, and that Formosa be neutralized, met with general approval. The need for rapid action made this use of force appear imperative; the continuing overestimate of the ROK Army, and the confidence that neither Soviets nor Chinese would intervene, made it appear sufficient. Little thought seems to have been given the question of whether to commit ground forces. The recommendations were accepted by the President, and a directive was at once sent General MacArthur authorizing him to use his air and naval forces against the invading army south of the 38th parallel, and instructing him to neutralize Formosa by the use of the Seventh Fleet.

This news was made public at noon on Tuesday the 27th. Following an earlier meeting with congressional leaders at the White House, the President announced that pursuant to the action of the Security Council he had ordered naval and air support of the Republic of Korea, and that he had instructed the Seventh Fleet to prevent either an attack on Formosa from the mainland or an invasion of China by the forces of Chiang Kai-shek. The mood of other governmental bodies matched his own: the House of Representatives extended the Selective Service Act by a vote of 315 to 4; in the Senate the action was unanimous. In the afternoon the Security Council met again at Lake Success to vote on an American-sponsored resolution which called upon members of the United Nations to assist the Republic of Korea in repelling the attack. Action was for a time delayed while the Indian and Egyptian delegates sought vainly to obtain instructions from their governments, but in the evening the vote was taken and the resolution passed.

Following so rapidly upon the President's announcement of American action, this move by the United Nations led to an extraordinary rise in spirit throughout the western world. For the first time within memory the democracies seemed to have produced a leader who would stand fast in time, and little heed was paid to Soviet denunciation of the U.N. action as illegal. But while hearts were high the news was increasingly bad: the forces of the Republic of Korea were disintegrating, the invaders were advancing almost unopposed, the capital of Seoul had fallen. On Thursday the 29th the gloom increased. The armies of the Korean Republic were proving weaker than anyone had expected and those of North Korea stronger; the threat of American air and naval action was dearly ineffective. In the afternoon the National Security Council met at the White House; inevitably, since the show of force seemed to have accomplished nothing, the discussion turned to the question of whether to commit ground troops. Here, in unexpected form, was the prospect of that war on the mainland of Asia against which all military authorities had warned. For such a war there were no plans, no detailed estimates of the forces required.
These, indeed, could only be guessed at, although doubtless it was still possible to postulate a distinction between policing a minor power like North Korea and warring with a more serious opponent. Although the discussion seems to have drifted in the direction of commitment, decision was deferred pending the receipt of further information from General MacArthur, who had flown to Korea for a personal reconnaissance of the battle front.

Shortly after midnight the report from the Supreme Commander came in. In a telecon discussion in the first hours of Friday morning General MacArthur stated that the line could not be held without American help, and recommended the immediate movement of one regimental combat team to the Korean front as nucleus for a possible build-up to two divisions for early offensive action. This in time would prove a notable underestimate of the required force, but the view that the invaders would cease and desist, once confronted by U.S. Army contingents, was shared in Washington. In any event the highest authority on the spot, the man who would be responsible for conducting the campaign, had spoken. The decision could not be deferred. A little before five in the morning the Secretary of the Army telephoned the President to tell him what General MacArthur had reported. The President said to send the troops.

Here was the full commitment, although its ultimate magnitude was as yet unforeseen. On the morning of Friday, 30 June, after meeting with the Secretaries of State and of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and congressional leaders, President Truman made public the new decisions. General MacArthur was authorized to bomb north of the 38th parallel as governed by military necessity, a naval blockade of North Korea would be proclaimed, and "certain supporting ground units" would be committed to action.
History of United States Naval Operations – Korea  
James A. Field Jr.

Chapter 3. War Begins  
2. The Far East Command

Despite optimistic statements issuing from the upper levels, the readiness of the United States for war in the summer of 1950 was very doubtful. For the war with which the country found itself confronted, this was the more the case. The Army had a total of ten combat divisions, all but one understrength. The Marines had two, both undermanned. The Navy was in the process of being cut down and even the Air Force, despite public and congressional favor, had been forced to narrow its focus and channel its capabilities.

The interaction of budget ceiling and strategic plan had led to emphasis on long-range bombardment and the European theater, an emphasis reflected in the deployment of American strength. The ground forces were divided between the continent of Europe, the continental United States, and occupation duty in Japan. The Navy's larger half was in the Atlantic. The weight of the Strategic Air Command and of other Air Force units lay at home and in the forward European bases. On the assumption that the first and most important Communist objective was Western Europe, it may be said that this deployment proved itself. No war came there. But for the war that did come this posture was more than a little awkward.

American forces in the Orient in 1950 were organized into the presumably unified command of General MacArthur, Commander in Chief Far East Command, who was also, as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, responsible for the occupation of Japan. Occupation responsibilities bulked large at Headquarters, but in addition to these duties General MacArthur was charged with the defense of Japan, Okinawa, the Marianas, and the Philippines. To enable him to carry out these missions, forces of all three services had been assigned CincFE. 

Notwithstanding the European orientation of strategy, the needs of the Japanese occupation had brought a large proportion of American ground strength to the Far East. On paper, Army Forces Far East was not unimpressive: its four divisions—the 7th, 24th, and 25th Infantry Divisions, and the dismounted 1st Cavalry Division—organized as the United States Eighth Army, were commanded by Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, USA, who had been one of Patton's corps commanders in France. But all of Walker's divisions were understrength, with only two battalions to a regiment, and were undertrained and underequipped as well. No Army theater headquarters had been established, but the functions of such an organization were carried out by CincFE's staff.

The Far East Air Forces, the air component of General MacArthur's command, were commanded by Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer, USAF. In June 1950 FEAF contained five fighter and two bomber wings, a transport wing, and miscellaneous support units making up a total of some 1,200 aircraft. The principal mission of the Far East Air Forces, the air defense of Japan, Okinawa, Guam, and the Philippines, was reflected in the order of battle: of the 553 aircraft in organized units, 365 were F-80C jet fighters. These aircraft, which had recently replaced the piston-engined F-51 Mustang, had, as befitted their intended purpose, comparatively high performance. But their combat radius without external fuel tanks was limited to 100 miles; with external fuel no bombs could be carried, and their operation required sizable modern airstrips. The efficiency of General Stratemeyer's command suffered from certain deficiencies of material, its engineering support was inadequate, and training had been restricted by budget cuts.

Joint training by the Army and Air Force in Japan had been minimal, in part owing to the defensive nature of their missions, in part to the emphasis in all American military planning on strategic rather than tactical air operations. The Air Force, it should be said, had indeed proposed some exercises at the division level which
would involve a working out of the mechanics of air support, and had suggested the creation of a Joint Operations Center. But occupation duties and the lack of suitable maneuver areas had adversely affected ground force readiness, and the Army, not wishing to sacrifice its program of small-unit training, had declined the offer. The result was that such joint exercises as were held were small in scale, and formal and cut and dried in nature.

Despite these limitations, the main strength of the Far East Command lay on the ground and in the air. Only a little over a third of the Navy's active strength was in the Pacific, only a fifth of that was in the Far East, and the naval component under Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy was very small. But although Naval Forces Far East was largely a housekeeping command, ComNavFE did control, in Task Force 96, a small amount of fighting strength, and in Task Force 90 the nucleus of an amphibious force.

The combat units of Task Force 96, Naval Forces Japan, were fast and able ships, but none mounted anything larger than a 5-inch gun. Juneau, Captain Jesse C. Sowell, flagship of Rear Admiral John M. Higgins' Support Group, was a younger sister and namesake of the light anti-aircraft cruiser sunk by a Japanese submarine in 1942 while retiring after the Battle of Guadalcanal. With a designed displacement of 6,000 tons, she had a speed of better than 33 knots and mounted a main battery of 16 5-inch dual purpose guns. The four ships of Captain Halle C. Allan's Destroyer Division 91-Mansfield, De Haven, Collett, and Swenson--were 2,200-ton, 35-knot ships of the Sumner class, completed in 1944 and mounting six 5-inch guns each.

In addition to this small fighting force, ComNavFE controlled a variety of auxiliary ships. The most important of these were those of Amphibious Group 1, Rear Admiral James H. Doyle: the command ship Mount McKinley, the attack transport Cavalier and the attack cargo ship Union, LST 611, and the fleet tug Arikara. This group, which held the tactical designation of Task Force 90 in the Naval Forces Far East organization, had recently arrived in Japan to conduct a program of amphibious training with units of the Eighth Army.

A third category of force at Admiral Joy's disposal consisted of the units of Mine Squadron 3, which were engaged in check-sweeping World War II minefields. Minron 3 contained six 136-foot, wooden-hulled, diesel-engined craft, and four 184-foot, twin-screw Admirable class AMs; but three of the latter were in caretaker status and the fourth, Pledge, in reduced commission. Finally, ComNavFE controlled a number of Japanese-manned ships belonging to the Shipping Control Administration, Japan--Scajap--which were employed in logistic support of the occupation and in repatriation of former Japanese prisoners of war from the continent of Asia.

The activities of Admiral Joy's headquarters, like those of the forces it controlled, had been limited to the peaceful routine of an occupation force. The staff totaled only 28 officers and 160 enlisted men. There were four officers in the operations section, five in plans, four in communications. Since the activities of naval aviation in the Western Pacific were centralized at Guam, the NavFE staff had no air or aerology departments. Although two officers qualified in mine warfare were authorized, none was aboard. Like everyone else in the armed services, Commander Naval Forces Far East had based his plans on the assumption of a major conflict with the Soviets which would be centered elsewhere. The operation plans in effect in June of 1950 were concerned with such matters as passive defense, security under air attack, and the evacuation of American citizens in emergency.

Naval base facilities in Japan were minimal. There was no logistic command, no representative of Service Forces Pacific Fleet to plan, coordinate, or procure. At Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, there was a minor ship repair facility which could perform routine upkeep, but which lacked specialized shops for torpedoes or for electronics repair; a supply section adequate to the support of the roughly 5,000 naval personnel and dependents in Japan and Japanese waters; an ordnance facility with some 3,000 tons of ammunition; and a naval hospital whose capacity had recently been reduced to 100 beds. At Sasebo in western Kyushu, where the Imperial Japanese Navy had formerly maintained a major base, there was an excellent harbor with extensive drydocking facilities. But other equipment was at a minimum, and the on-board complement was only 5 officers and 100 enlisted men. And neither Yokosuka nor Sasebo was well supplied with the material for underwater harbor
defense.

The single naval air base in Japan was the Naval Air Facility, Yokosuka, which supported two or three flying boats loaned by the Seventh Fleet for search and rescue missions. NAF Yokosuka had been but recently commissioned, rehabilitation of the buildings was still underway, only about five percent of the area of the former Japanese seaplane base was Navy-controlled, and Eighth Army was using the landing strip as a park for vehicles. As for land-based naval aviation, its total strength in Japan consisted of one target tow plane for antiaircraft gunnery training.

Fortunately, however, Task Force 90 and Task Force 96 were not the only naval units in Asiatic waters. Based in the Philippines, 1,700 miles to the southward, and under the command of Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble, there lay the Seventh Fleet, the principal embodiment of American naval power in the Western Pacific. Yet while rejoicing in the title of fleet, Struble's command, in Second World War terms, amounted to little more than a few small task units. There was a carrier "group" with its screen, a submarine group, the two patrol plane squadrons of Fleet Air Wing I, an evacuation group concerned with the safety of American citizens in emergency, and a variety of minor supporting units. The logistic group, which contained a small station reefer, a destroyer tender, and an oiler on shuttle service, constituted the total mobile fleet support in the Western Pacific, and was hard pressed to supply even the small Seventh Fleet.

The Fleet's principal base of operations was on the island of Luzon, where the Navy, following the war, had developed new facilities at Subic Bay and an airfield at Sangleys Point. Peacetime operations of the Seventh Fleet were under the control of Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, Admiral Arthur E. Radford, but standing orders provided that, when operating in Japanese waters or in the event of an emergency, control would pass to Commander Naval Forces Far East. There were, however, certain problems implicit in this arrangement: Admiral Radford's area of responsibility included potential trouble spots outside the limits of the Far East Command; lacking an aviation section on his staff, the control of a carrier striking force and of patrol squadrons would present problems for ComNavFE; Admiral Struble was senior to Admiral Joy.

Although early postwar policy had called for the maintenance of two aircraft carriers in the Western Pacific, the reductions in defense appropriations had made this impossible: for some time prior to January 1950 no carrier had operated west of Pearl; current procedure called for the rotation of single units on six-month tours of duty. In these circumstances Admiral Struble's Seventh Fleet Striking Force, Task Force 77, was made up of a carrier "group" containing one carrier, a support "group" containing one cruiser, and a screening group of eight destroyers. The duty carrier in the summer of 1950 was Valley Forge, an improved postwar version of the Essex class, completed in 1946, with a standard displacement of 27,100 tons, a length of 876 feet, and a speed of 33 knots. Flagship of Rear Admiral John M. Hoskins, Commander Carrier Division 3, Valley Forge had reported in to the Western Pacific in May, at which time her predecessor, Boxer, had been returned to the west coast for navy yard availability. The 25th of June found Valley Forge, with the destroyers Fletcher and Radford, in the South China Sea, one day out of Hong Kong en route to the Philippines. Admiral Struble was in Washington; Admiral Hoskins, upon whom command of the Seventh Fleet had devolved, was at Subic Bay; the carrier's commanding officer, Captain Lester K. Rice, was acting as ComCarDiv 3.

The air group of Valley Forge, Carrier Air Group 5, Commander Harvey P. Lanham, was the first in the Navy to attempt the sustained shipboard operation of jet aircraft. Its complement of 86 planes was made up of two jet fighter squadrons with 30 Grumman F9F-2 Panthers; two piston-engined fighter squadrons equipped with the World War II Vought F4U-4B; and a piston-engined attack squadron of 14 Douglas Skyraider AD-4s. Over and above these five squadrons the group contained 14 aircraft, principally ADs, which were specially equipped and "configurated" in current Navy jargon--for photographic, night, and radar missions. The fighter squadrons had enjoyed considerable jet experience prior to receiving their Panthers and moving aboard ship; the
group as a whole had conducted extensive training in close support of troops with the Marines at Camp Pendleton, California.

The submarine force under the operational control of Commander Seventh Fleet, administratively organized as Task Unit 70.9, consisted of four fleet submarines and a submarine rescue vessel; its principal activity had been in antisubmarine warfare training exercises with units of the Fleet and of Naval Forces Far East. One of the four boats, Remora, was at Yokosuka on loan to ComNavFE; Cabezon was at sea en route from the Philippines to Hong Kong; Segundo, with Commander Francis W. Scanland, the task unit commander, was at Sangley Point in the Philippines; Catfish was at Subic Bay. The submarine rescue ship Florikan was at Guam, where she was about to be relieved by Greenlet. No submarine tender was stationed in the Western Pacific, but limited quantities of spare parts and torpedo warheads were available from the destroyer tender Piedmont at Subic Bay.

Patrol plane activity in the Western Pacific, another Seventh Fleet monopoly, was centralized at Guam under control of Commander Fleet Air Wing I, Captain Etheridge Grant, who served also as Commander Task Unit 70.6 and Commander Fleet Air Guam. For long-range search and reconnaissance in the theater Captain Grant had at his disposal two squadrons of patrol aircraft. Patrol Squadron 28, a heavy landplane squadron with nine P4Y-2 Privateers, the single-tailed Navy modification of the Liberator, was based at Agana, Guam. At Sangley Point, Luzon, Patrol Squadron 47 operated nine Martin PBM-5 Mariner flying boats. In addition to these two squadrons and their supporting organizations, Fleet Air Wing I had a small seaplane tender, Suisun, which on 25 June was moored in Tanapag Harbor, Saipan.

For Captain Grant the impending crisis would not prove wholly unfamiliar, for the outbreak of war in December 1941 had found him commanding a seaplane tender in the Philippines. But his situation on 25 June was a somewhat scrambled one, for a second Mariner squadron, VP 46, was moving into the area as relief for VP 47, and the take-over process had already begun. Homeward bound, their tour in distant parts completed, the PBMs of VP 47 were widely dispersed. Two were at Yokosuka on temporary duty with Commander Naval Forces Far East, two were at Sangley Point, two were in the air and on their way, and three had already reached Pearl Harbor.

Such then was America's Western Pacific naval strength in June of 1950. Combat units assigned to ComNavFE and Commander Seventh Fleet totalled one carrier, two cruisers, three destroyer divisions, two patrol squadrons, and a handful of submarines. Not only was this a limited force with which to support a war on the Asiatic mainland: its southward deployment, with the principal base facilities at Guam and Luzon, made it ill-prepared for a campaign in Korea.

Yet if forces, bases, and plans alike seemed inadequate to the challenge of Communist aggression, there were certain mitigating factors. To employ force, whether for police action or for war, on the far side of an ocean, is to conduct an exercise in maritime power for which fighting strength, bases, and shipping are essential. Unplanned for though the emergency was, a sufficient concentration was still possible. The occupation forces in Japan contained a large fraction--four of ten Army divisions--of American ground strength. FEAF's air strength was by no means inconsiderable. Naval forces in the Far East could be reinforced, from the west coast in the first instance, in time from elsewhere. Limited though the fleet bases were in the narrow sense, in the larger context the base was Japan, and the metropolis of Asia offered many advantages in the form of airfields, staging areas, industrial strength, and Skilled labor. Additionally, and by no means least, there existed and was available a sizable Japanese merchant marine, which could help to provide the carrying capacity without which control of the seas is meaningless, and which could be employed to project the armies and their supplies to the far shore.

The war in Korea, moreover, was in a sense a suburban war, and one must go back to 1898 to find in the American experience a parallel to this proximity of base and combat areas. The distances between Key West and Cuba and between Sasebo and Pusan are much the same. It could be argued, perhaps, that Admiral Joy's situation presented certain parallels to that of Admiral Cervera, but there was at least one notable difference: in 1950,
despite the withdrawal of the entire occupation force, the populace of Japan proved reliable; in 1898, despite the presence of a Spanish army, the populace of Cuba did not. Doubtless to the Communists Korea seemed the most promising spot for aggression. In many ways it was also the area where the United States could best extemporize a reply.
Chapter 3. War Begins
3. First Days of Naval Action

The main thrust of the Communist invasion, three infantry divisions with armored and air support, was directed initially toward the capital at Seoul. Poorly disposed for defense and considerably outnumbered at the scene of action, the Army of the Republic of Korea broke under the weight of the attack; the government fled to Taejon; Seoul fell. As the enemy pressed southward down the road toward Suwon, the South Korean Army appeared to be in the process of dissolution. On 30 June, after describing its heavy losses of supplies and equipment, General MacArthur had concluded that it was no longer capable of united action, and that only by commitment of American ground forces could the Han River line be held.

At sea the invasion was accompanied by a number of small unopposed landings along the east coast, which were magnified by rumor both as to number and as to location. These maritime efforts, which extended as far south as Samchok, would end with the arrival of United Nations naval forces, but in the first crucial hours of the war they were confronted only by the Navy of the Republic of Korea.

This Navy had its principal establishment at Chinhae, just west of Pusan, where the Japanese during their occupation had developed a considerable naval base with docks, barracks, petroleum storage, and a marine railway. Next in importance was the base at Inchon, seaport of the capital city, and rudimentary facilities had been established at Mukho and Pohang on the east coast, at Pusan and Yosu on the south, and at Mokpo and Kunsan on the shore of the Yellow Sea. At Inchon, on 25 June, there were four YMS, two steel-hulled ex-Japanese minecraft (JML), and the ROK Navy's single LST. At Mokpo, at the southwestern tip of the peninsula, there were two YMS and some small craft. Nine YMS were in the Pusan–Chinhae area along with some small craft, as was also the recently arrived PC701, Bak Du San, purchased by subscription of naval personnel. Three other PCs had been obtained from the United States, but these were still in the Hawaiian Islands, and so was the Chief of Naval Operations.

With all ships on the western and southern coasts, no strength was immediately available to oppose the east coast landings. Nevertheless the ROK units at once put to sea, and on the evening of the 25th there took place the most important surface engagement of the war. Northeast of Pusan PC 701, Commander Nam Choi Yong, ROKN, encountered a 1,000–ton armed steamer with some 600 troops embarked, and sank it after a running fight. Since Pusan, the only major port of entry available for the movement of supplies and reinforcements to South Korea, was at the time almost wholly defenseless, the drowning of the 600 was an event of profound strategic importance.

In Tokyo the 25th of June found the headquarters of Naval Forces Far East settled down for a normal peacetime weekend. Then the telephone rang, and when the Lieutenant Colonel of Marines who was Staff Duty Officer that day picked up the receiver he found himself talking to the Military Attaché at Seoul. This conversation put an end to holiday routine. Within minutes the headquarters had shifted to a state of readiness, and overnight it became clear that war, at least of a sort, was at hand.

The unexpected nature of the Korean involvement and the speed with which the crisis broke meant that most NavFE planning, like that of other military headquarters, had to be thrown out the porthole. But it was at least possible to salvage some of it as was concerned with the evacuation of American citizens. On the 25th, as American civilians and their dependents were ordered out of the Seoul area by Ambassador Muccio, ComNavFE instructed Admiral Higgins to send Mansfield and De Haven to cover the exodus from the port of Inchon. The evacuation was an interservice affair: on the 26th, as the destroyers were steaming west to cover the departure
from Inchon, Air Force fighters orbited over the harbor; on the 27th loading of refugees was also commenced at Pusan, FEAF transport aircraft began to fly personnel out of the capital's airfield at Kimpo, and Air Force fighters destroyed seven enemy aircraft in the area of Seoul.

After getting the civilians out the next step was to get some ammunition in, under the accelerated MDA Program ordered by President Truman on the 25th. During the days of their imperial greatness the Japanese had talked of constructing a tunnel under the Korean Strait, but this grandiloquent scheme never reached the stage of action and the road to Korea remained, as in the days of Hideyoshi, a sea road. Ammunition from stocks available in Japan was therefore hastily loaded onto two ships bearing the agreeably symbolic names of Sergeant Keathley and Cardinal O'Connell. The operation order covering this movement was sent out by Admiral Joy's headquarters in the early hours of the 27th, and in the course of the next two days sergeant and prelate sailed forth to war.

The decision to give air and naval assistance to the Republic of Korea was made at Blair House on the evening of Monday the 26th, Washington time, midday of the 27th in the Far East. At 2015 that evening Admiral Joy's Operation Order 5-50, the basic order of the Korean naval campaign, was issued. In this dispatch ComNavFE informed his forces that President Truman had ordered the fullest possible support of South Korean units south of the 38th parallel "to permit these forces to reform," and had instructed the Seventh Fleet to take station to prevent either a Communist invasion of Formosa or the use of that island for operations against the mainland. Task Group 96.5, composed of Juneau and the four destroyers of Desdiv 91, was designated the South Korea Support Group, instructed to base at Sasebo, and ordered to patrol Korean coastal waters, oppose hostile landings and destroy vessels engaged in aggression, provide fire support to friendly forces, and cover shipping engaged in evacuation or in carrying supplies to South Korea. Five and a half hours later the order was amplified to designate as primary targets for the attention of the task group the coast and off-lying islands from Tongyong, west of Pusan, to Ulsan on the east, and the east coast sector between Samchok and Kangnung.

On the evening of the 27th, when ComNavFE's operation order was promulgated, Admiral Higgins' Support Group was widely dispersed. The flagship Juneau, with the task group commander embarked, was leaving Sasebo to investigate a reported North Korean landing on the island of Koje Do, southwest of Pusan; in the Yellow Sea De Haven was escorting a Norwegian freighter with the first evacuees from Inchon, while Mansfield awaited the sailing of a second load in a Panamanian ship; Collett and Swenson had been ordered down from Yokosuka to Sasebo. Early on the 28th Juneau anchored off the southeastern shore of Koje Do, a party was sent ashore by whaleboat, difficulties in communication with the inhabitants were somehow surmounted, and the fact established that the island remained peaceful and undisturbed. Following this check on his southern area of responsibility, Higgins headed north, and in the afternoon put the landing party ashore at Ulsan with similar result. With evening Juneau again got underway, and continued up the coast to patrol the area between Samchok and Kangnung, which was reported to have been occupied by the enemy.

In Korea the situation was shrouded in uncertainty, and available intelligence was both fragmentary and confusing. False reports had caused the investigation of Koje Do and Ulsan, and a more tragic instance of misdirected effort was now to follow. At 0203 on the morning of the 29th, in 37° 25' N, Juneau detected two groups of surface ships by radar. Since the South Korean Navy was reported to have retired south of 370, fire was opened, one target sunk, and the others dispersed. But the information, unfortunately, was in error: the ROK retirement was still in progress, the sunken target was the South Korean JML 305, and the action gave rise to Korean reports of a Russian cruiser in the Samchok area.

On the 29th, as Juneau continued her patrol, Admiral Higgins ordered Swenson, which had now reached Sasebo, to rendezvous with Mansfield in the Yellow Sea. During the day De Haven joined the flagship, and at 2311 Juneau commenced firing the first bombardment of the war. At Mukho half an hour's deliberate shooting, conducted with searchlight illumination and with target advice from an ROKN lieutenant, brought the expenditure against enemy personnel of 16 rounds of influence-fused 5-inch and more than 400 rounds of 5-inch antiaircraft.
common, with what were felt to be excellent results.

The invasion of South Korea found Admiral Doyle's Amphibious Group busy with its training duties. On the morning of the 25th Task Force 90 got underway from Yokosuka, with elements of the 35th Regimental Combat Team embarked, to conduct landing exercises outside Tokyo Bay. Although operations were carried out on the 26th and 28th, in accordance with the training order, the attention of both teachers and pupils was progressively distracted by reports of happenings in Korea. During the second landing observers from the Far East Air Forces were ordered back to their stations; on completion of the exercise the ships returned at once to Yokosuka to debark the troops. On 30 June, as a movement of ground forces into Korea appeared increasingly probable, all ships of the Amphibious Group were placed on four-hour notice for getting underway.

No reports of enemy mining had as yet come in, although in time there would be plenty, but there was no lack of tasks for the small ships of Minron 3. The eight AMS were at once deployed on picket duty, harbor defense, and convoy escort. In this they were joined by Pledge, the only operational AM, while at Yokosuka the work of activating the other ships of Mindiv 32 was at once begun.

It was late on the 30th, Tokyo time, that President Truman approved the commitment of American troops. Early the next afternoon Admiral Joy's headquarters issued its Operation Order 7-50 assigning 16 Seajap LSTs to Admiral Doyle, and instructing him to lift the 24th Infantry Division, Major General William F. Dean, USA, from Fukuoka and Sasebo to Pusan. Pursuant to this order CTF 90 got underway at once with Mount McKinley, Cavalier, and Union, escorted by HMS Hart, and headed for Sasebo. The uncertainty which still existed as to the dimensions of this war was not diminished during the journey. Two doubtful sound contacts on submarines were reported by Hart, depth charges were dropped, and at midday of the 3rd, while rounding the southwestern tip of Kyushu, visual sighting of a surfaced submarine was made.

Admiral Doyle's ships reached Sasebo on the afternoon of the 3rd, only to find that the 24th Division had already begun its move. Two infantry companies with supporting artillery had been flown to Pusan on the 1st, and the rest of the division was hastily loading in locally available shipping to follow by sea. Since the situation seemed under control, the ships of Task Force 90 were retained at Sasebo for other employment.

While the few American naval units in Japanese waters were being committed to the support of the Korean Republic, Admiral Joy's command was increasing in size. Following the decision at the first Blair House meeting to start the Seventh Fleet toward Japan, a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations had directed its commander to send his carrier striking force, his submarines, and necessary supporting units, to report to ComNavFE at Sasebo. This order reached Admiral Hoskins on the 26th as the Valley Forge group was entering Subic Bay. At 0515 on the 27th, after emergency replenishment, the Striking Force sorted, accompanied by Piedmont and Navasota, and headed north. On the afternoon of the same day Admiral Joy assumed operational control, but feeling that Sasebo, in the rapidly developing circumstances, was a little close to the Russian air concentration at Vladivostok, diverted the force to Okinawa.

ComNavFE's Operation Order 5-50, issued that evening, instructed the Seventh Fleet to conduct surface and air operations to neutralize Formosa. On the morning of the 29th, pursuant to these instructions, Admiral Hoskins made his presence felt by flying 29 F4Us and ADs up Formosa Strait. At 0630 in the morning of 30 June Task Force 77 reached Okinawa and dropped anchor in Nakagusuku Wan, now known as Buckner Bay in honor of the commanding general of the Tenth Army, killed in June 1945 in the moment of victory. At this base, strategically located between Korea and Formosa, the fleet did have the protection of distance, but there were no antisubmarine defenses other than those provided by the force's own destroyers, and no stocks of ammunition.

The Seventh Fleet submarines, in the meantime, were also moving northward. Segundo and Catfish took on full loads of torpedo warheads from Piedmont at Subic Bay on the 26th, and on the next day sailed for Sasebo. Cabezon made a fast turnaround at Hong Kong and joined with the others on the 28th off the northern tip of Luzon. Revised orders from Commander Seventh Fleet changed their destination also from Sasebo to Okinawa,
and there they arrived on 30 June, to be joined next day by the submarine rescue vessel Greenlet from Guam. At Buckner Bay new orders were received, and on the 3rd Greenlet and her three charges sailed in company for Yokosuka.

The hasty redeployment of the Seventh Fleet also affected the patrol planes, and the homeward voyage of Patrol Squadron 47, so recently begun, was destined not to be completed. The two Mariners at Yokosuka were at once assigned to local antisubmarine patrol; those en route and those which had reached Pearl Harbor were recalled to the Western Pacific. One plane was lost in an accident at Guam, when it missed its buoy, grounded, and sank, but by 7 July six PBMs were operating out of Yokosuka. Two for the moment remained in the Philippines, but these would shortly fly north to Japan, as aircraft from the incoming VP 46 reached Sangley Point and Buckner Bay.

With the transfer of Seventh Fleet forces to his operational control, Admiral Joy acquired all immediately available American naval strength. Considering the unpredictable responsibilities of his situation this was little enough, and a most helpful addition soon came in the form of British Commonwealth units commanded by Rear Admiral Sir William G. Andrewes, KBE, CB, DSO, RN, Flag Officer Second in Command, Far Eastern Station. On 29 June, following the vote of the Security Council for military assistance to the Republic of Korea, the British Admiralty placed Royal Navy units in Japanese waters at the disposition of ComNavFE; on the next day similar action was taken by the Australian government; in Canada three destroyers were ordered to prepare to sail; from New Zealand came promise of the early dispatch of two frigates.

Commonwealth naval strength in Japanese waters was by no means inconsiderable. Andrewes' command included Triumph, a 13,000-ton light carrier, completed in 1946 and operating about 40 aircraft; two 6-inch gun cruisers, heavily armored Belfast, the largest cruiser in the Royal Navy, and Jamaica; three destroyers and four frigates. The hospital ship Maine, soon to be added to the force, was for some time to be the only such vessel available for the evacuation of casualties from Korea. In the absence of American naval air bases in Japan the Royal Australian Air Force seaplane base at Iwakuni on the Inland Sea, which was at once made available, was to be of great assistance.

On the evening of the 29th ComNavFE requested Admiral Andrewes to send Jamaica and the frigates to join Admiral Higgins' Support Group, and to proceed with his flagship Belfast, the carrier Triumph, and the two British destroyers to Okinawa and report to Commander Seventh Fleet. Early in the morning of the 30th Admiral Joy assumed operational control of Andrewes' forces, and in the evening modified Operation Order 5-50 to include the Commonwealth units for Korean operations only, thus exempting them from the neutralization of Formosa and the Pescadores, which remained a purely American affair.

With these augmented but by no means extravagant forces Admiral Joy confronted his tasks. He was required to evacuate American citizens, support the Republic of Korea, blockade the North Korean coastline, and at the same time to remain prepared for the unpredictable in connection with Formosa, the protection of his flanks, and a possible expansion of the conflict. And as his responsibilities and his forces grew, further difficulty was presented by the inadequacy of his staff and of those of subordinate commands. The total strength, officer and enlisted, of the NavFE staff at the end of June was 188; by November it would have reached 1,227. But in the first weeks, before reinforcements arrived, the job had to be done with what was on hand. Rarely in the history of 20th century warfare can so many have been commanded by so few.

It was not done without effort. The Plans Section went to heel and toe watches, 12 hours on and 12 off. The Operations Officer moved in a cot and did such sleeping as he could in his office; his people found themselves working a 12-hour day, with an additional four-hour night watch four days out of five. For Communications the situation became a nightmare as high-precedence traffic skyrocketed; in the first days the load of encrypted messages went up by a factor of 15, and was further complicated by great quantities of
interservice and United States-British dispatches. Somehow they made do. Even as anguished requests were sent off to Washington for more personnel, the round the clock efforts of those on the spot were accomplishing the reorganization and redeployment of available naval strength. To Naval Forces Japan had now been added the Seventh Fleet and British Commonwealth units; with these accessions Admiral Joy had gained all that would be available until reinforcements could come from afar. This strength was organized in three principal groups: Naval Forces Japan, the Seventh Fleet, and the Amphibious Force.

Of these, Admiral Doyle's Amphibious Force Far East, Task Force 90, had been moved forward from Yokosuka to Sasebo, where it was awaiting instructions. Under the direct control of ComNavFE, Task Force 96, Naval Forces Japan, was engaged in various tasks. The long range aircraft of VP 47 had been organized as the Search and Reconnaissance Group, Task Group 96.2, under Captain John C. Alderman, Chief of Staff to Commander Fleet Air Guam, who had been on leave in Japan at the onset of hostilities and found himself shanghaied for this purpose. In Korean waters the Support Group, Task Group 96.5, originally consisting of Juneau and Destroyer Division 91, had been reinforced by Jamaica, Shoalhaven, and Black Swan, and Alacrity was about to join up. Although Admiral Andrewes' ships had received the designation of Task Group 96.8, these for the moment were divided between the Support Group and the Seventh Fleet Striking Force, which had reached Okinawa on 30 June. Joined on the next day by Triumph, Belfast, Cossack, and Consort, Task Force 77 remained for the moment poised between Korea and Formosa.

No less difficult than the problems of concentration and control of forces were those of their support. The shore activities of Naval Forces Japan had been centralized at Fleet Activities Yokosuka, with the secondary base at Sasebo in what approximated caretaker status. But although the workload at Yokosuka was at once increased, as activation of reserve minesweepers and frigates was begun, war in Korea soon reversed the roles of the two bases. Sasebo is more than 500 miles closer to Pusan, a fact of obvious importance and one emphasized by the original orders from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Seventh Fleet. At Sasebo an immediate expansion was undertaken, and effort made to provide more personnel; the lack of antisubmarine defenses brought urgent action to provide at least a token patrol off the entrance, and this was accomplished on the 29th.

Two more organizational problems faced Admiral Joy in the first hectic days: the provision of some sort of escort for shipping en route to Pusan, and the establishment of the blockade of North Korea, recommended by the Chief of Naval Operations on 30 June and ordered by the President next day. These matters were dealt with by ComNavFE in Operation Order 8-50 promulgated on 3 July and effective on the 4th, which made further refinements in the organization of Task Force 96.

Escort of shipping between Japan and Korea had so far been on a wholly catch-as-catch-can basis: Arikara and Shoalhaven had been so used on 1 and 2 July, Jamaica and Collett on the 3rd. But now provision was made for an Escort Group, Task Group 96.1, with a commander and units to be assigned when available. Shortly the job would be turned over to the frigates under Captain A. D. H. Jay, DSO, DSC, RN, commanding officer of Black Swan.

Blockade and inshore work south of latitude 37° was assigned the ROK Navy, shortly to become Task Group 96.7, with such assistance as might become available from the Far East Air Forces and from any NavFE units that happened by. For the coastline north of 37° separate East and West Coast Support Groups were established: in the east the job was entrusted to Admiral Higgins' Task Group 96.5, in the west to the Commonwealth units of Task Group 96.8. The northern limits of the blockade were set at 41° on the east coast and at 39°30' in the west, well south of the northern frontiers, and the precaution implicit in these boundaries was emphasized by a specific admonition to all units to keep well clear of Manchurian and Russian waters. Important though this statement of policy was, it remained for some time of purely academic importance, for emergency
calls for gunfire support along the coast were such as to limit the blockading forces to only intermittent sweeps north of the 38th parallel.
History of United States Naval Operations – Korea
James A. Field Jr.

Chapter 3. War Begins
4. Air Strikes, Coastal Bombardment, Flank Patrols

With supplies and troops on the move, and with gunnery ships converging on the Korean coast, it remained to reach inland by air. Air strikes could destroy the North Korean Air Force. Air strikes could harass the invading formations, interrupt their supply, and so help in the ground battle which was about to be joined. Air supremacy, indeed, seemed the key to modern war: without it victory was impossible; with it victory followed as the night the day. Its attainment was a matter of utmost urgency.

The Far East Air Forces had been committed, along with the Navy, to the support of the Korean Republic on 27 June; like the Navy they had already seen action. On the first day of the invasion Air Force fighters on patrol over the Sea of Japan had been fired on south of the parallel by a small North Korean convoy; two days later transport planes had flown American nationals out of Kimpo and fighters covering the evacuation had destroyed some enemy aircraft; the first missions in support of the ROK Army had been dispatched on the 28th.

Like the rest of the defense establishment, FEAF had planned on a different war. The 19th Bombardment Group at Guam, the only such unit in the Far East, was trained for strategic attack. The equipment and training of the fighter groups stationed in Japan had been tailored to the mission of air defense, a responsibility which the coming of war in Korea did little to diminish, and which, for a time, it promised perhaps to emphasize. Nevertheless the decision to commit American forces was followed by a rapid movement of the bombers to Okinawa, whence they flew their first missions against the invader, and by concentration of available fighter strength in the Fukuoka area in Kyushu, where the Fifth Air Force, Lieutenant General Earle E. Partridge, USAF, set up an operations center. But although these Kyushu airfields were the closest available to Korea, the limited endurance of the F-80C permitted it to remain only very briefly in the target area, and effective operations waited upon the establishment of Korean bases, the manufacture of new wing tanks, or a change in aircraft type.

Lack of target information for the bombers and the limited capabilities of Air Force fighters placed great premium upon carrier-borne aviation. Never, perhaps, had the virtues of free movement upon the face of the waters shone so brightly, even to those who had long derided this instrument of war. On 29 June, as his Seventh Fleet Striking Force was approaching Buckner Bay, Admiral Struble flew into Tokyo from Washington. By presidential proclamation and NavFE operation order the mission of the Seventh Fleet was the neutralization of Formosa, but the rapid deterioration of the situation in Korea raised pressing questions concerning its employment there. Early on the 30th Struble queried his staff by dispatch as to how soon Valley Forge and Triumph could conduct a first strike in the area of the 38th parallel, and in a conference with General MacArthur, Admiral Joy, and General Stratemeyer, the decision was reached to strike objectives in the Pyongyang area. First emphasis would be given to the airfield complex of the North Korean capital, second priority to the railroad yards and to the bridges over the Taedong River. Following these discussions Struble flew on to Okinawa to rejoin his force, and early in the evening ComNavFE promulgated Operation Order 6–50 governing the employment of the carrier striking force.

The prospect of operating this mixed force presented some problems, owing to the differences between British and American aircraft types and to the fact that Triumph’s maximum speed of 23 knots was 10 knots slower than that of Valley Forge. But the British were eager to go; many of their officers had had experience in joint operations in the Second World War and the two forces had recently held joint maneuvers; the advantages outweighed the difficulties. Although obscurity still surrounded the intentions of Communist submarines, Seventh Fleet forces had already reported two contacts, one some distance off Okinawa, one at the entrance of Buckner
Bay; the Seventh Fleet submarine commander was therefore drafted as antisubmarine warfare adviser to ComCardiv 3. On the evening of 1 July Task Force 77, now enlarged to two carriers, two cruisers, and ten destroyers, sortied from Buckner Bay and headed northwest and north toward the launching area in the Yellow Sea.

Along the Korean coastline, following the Mukho bombardment of the evening of the 29th, Juneau and DeHaven had continued on patrol. The British cruiser Jamaica had reported to Admiral Higgins by radio at 1940, and had requested a rendezvous, and on the next day Black Swan also checked in by dispatch. But radio communications had become clogged, owing to the sudden expansion of high-precedence traffic, and communications with the British were for the moment worst of all: the instructions for a rendezvous never reached the British ships, and his allies had to seek out Admiral Higgins by intuitive means.

Nevertheless the clans were gathering. On the west coast, where Swenson had joined Mansfield on 30 June, the patrol of areas Yoke and Zebra continued without contact with the enemy. On the east coast, following conferences with southbound ROK naval personnel, Juneau returned to Mukho to expend a further 43 rounds of 5-inch VT against troop positions and a shore battery. Collett came up from Pusan, where she had embarked ROK interpreters, signalmen, and liaison officers for distribution throughout the force, and at 2200 Jamaica joined. On the 1st, Alacrity and Black Swan arrived, and the day was spent in patrolling the coast and reorganizing the Support Group. DeHaven and Collett were detached to Sasebo to fuel and to escort troopships to Pusan; Alacrity was ordered into the Yellow Sea to relieve Mansfield in Area Yoke; Juneau, Jamaica, and Black Swan continued on east coast patrol.

On the morning of 2 July the South Korean Support Group returned to action. At 0615 bow waves were sighted close inshore, and investigation disclosed four torpedo boats and two motor gunboats heading north from Chumunjin, whither they had escorted ten motor trawlers loaded with ammunition. As the cruisers put on speed to intercept the enemy, the torpedo boats, with more bravery than discretion, turned to attack. Fire was opened at 11,000 yards, and by the time the range had closed to 4,000 one PT had been sunk and one stopped, a third was heading for the beach, and the fourth was escaping seaward. The final score of the engagement was three torpedo boats and both gunboats destroyed, and two prisoners taken by Jamaica. Following this first engagement with the North Korean Navy, also in effect the last, the cruisers bombarded shore batteries at Kangnung, and late in the day Jamaica was sailed for Sasebo to fuel.

The 3rd of July saw a number of dispersed skirmishes around the Korean coastline. Along the convoluted western shore Communist activities had extended far south of the formal battleline, and in the evening the ROK YMS 513 caught and sunk three small boats unloading military supplies at Chulpo. On the east coast Juneau finished off the ammunition trawlers at Chumunjin, and the British frigate Black Swan was subjected to the first enemy air attack of the war.

Although the North Korean Air Force, in the first days of conflict, had performed useful services in demoralizing ROK troops, its strength in any serious terms was small. Estimates of its composition as of the outbreak of hostilities varied between some 75 and 130 aircraft, none of very recent types. But on 2 July ComNavFE had alerted the Support Group against possible air attack, and at 2012 on the 3rd two enemy fighters, thought to have been Stormoviks, came in on Black Swan from over the land and out of the haze, inflicted minor structural damage, and escaped without being hit. Fortunate in their evasive action, these pilots were doubly fortunate in their assignment that day, for their colleagues back at Pyongyang had just received a thorough working over by the aircraft of Task Force 77. In any event such attacks were not to be soon repeated: the efforts of Seventh Fleet and Fifth Air Force fighters and the airfield attacks by Bomber Command speedily demobilized the North Korean Air Force. Black Swan’s experience remained for some time unique, and not until 23 August did another U.N. ship undergo attack from the air.

Since the evening of 1 July Task Force 77 had been steaming north from Buckner Bay, and by early
morning of the 3rd Admiral Struble's Striking Force had reached the designated launching point. There, in the middle of the Yellow Sea, the force was some 150 miles from the target area, but only 100 miles from Chinese Communist airfields on the Shantung Peninsula and less than 200 miles from the Soviet air garrison at Port Arthur. The air defense problem, therefore, was potentially somewhat larger than the size of the North Korean Air Force would indicate; like the submarine situation, it required a certain investment in defensive measures. At 0500 Valley Forge launched combat and antisubmarine patrols; beginning at 0545 Triumph flew off 12 Fireflies and 9 Seafires for an attack on the airfield at Haeju, and 15 minutes later Valley Forge commenced launching her strike group. Sixteen Corsairs loaded with eight 5-inch rockets each, and 12 Skyraiders carrying 1,600-pound bombloads were launched against the Pyongyang airfield. When the propeller-driven attack planes had gained a suitable headstart, Valley Forge catapulted eight F9F-2 Panthers, whose higher cruising speed would bring them in first over the target area.

No serious opposition was encountered by the American jets as they swept in over the North Korean capital. Two Yaks were destroyed in the air, another was damaged, and nine aircraft were reported destroyed on the ground. For the enemy, this sudden appearance of jet fighters more than 400 miles from the nearest American airfield was both startling and salutary. Quite possibly, as one American commander observed, it may have deterred a sizable commitment of aircraft to North Korean bases.

Following the Panthers in, the Corsairs and Skyraiders bombed and rocketed hangars and fuel storage at the airfield. Both at Pyongyang and at Haeju enemy antiaircraft opposition was negligible, and no plane suffered serious damage. In the afternoon aircraft from Triumph flew a second strike, and a second attack was launched by Valley Forge against the marshalling yards at Pyongyang and the bridges across the Taedong River. Considerable damage was reported inflicted on locomotives and rolling stock, but the bridges survived this effort.

In view of the Formosan commitment, the carrier strikes had been originally planned as a one-day affair. But this had been modified during the approach, owing to the "rapidly deteriorating Korean situation," and General MacArthur had authorized the attack to continue as practicable beyond the first day. Targets for the second day, selected by CincFE, were designated by dispatch on the night of the 2nd, with first priority given the railroad facilities and bridges in the neighborhood of Kumchon, just north of the parallel on the main line from Pyongyang to Seoul, second priority to similar installations at Sariwon, halfway between the two capitals, and third priority to those near Sinanju, where the main road and rail lines from Manchuria cross the Chongchon River.

With a fine disregard of these instructions Task Force 77 celebrated the Glorious Fourth with further attacks on Pyongyang. This time a break was made in one of the Taedong River bridges, some locomotives were destroyed, and some small ships in the river were attacked. Antiaircraft opposition had increased somewhat over that of the previous day, four ADs were damaged, and one, unable to lower its flaps, landed fast and bounced over the barrier, destroying three planes and damaging six more. With completion of flight operations the Striking Force retired southward. On the 5th Admiral Andrewes, with Belfast, Cossack and Consort, was detached to join the blockading forces in compliance with orders from ComNavFE, Admiral Struble flew to Tokyo by carrier plane, and Task Force 77 continued on to Buckner Bay. There it arrived on 6 July, and there it was retained until the 16th.

On the east coast, on 4 July, Juneau and Black Swan worked up and down the shore between Samchok and Chumunjin, firing on bridges and on the coastal road. On the 5th Jamaica returned from Sasebo, Juneau retired to replenish fuel and ammunition, and for the next few days the bombardment duty was left in the hands of the British.

The 5th of July, which saw Task Force 77 retiring southward and Juneau completing her second tour of firing at coastal targets, saw also the beginning of the ordeal of the American foot soldier. As early as 27 June an
Advance Command Group under Brigadier General John H. Church, USA, had been established at Suwon, some 25 miles south of Seoul, to help in reorganizing ROK forces and to expedite logistic assistance. But events soon demonstrated the optimism of this assignment, and on 30 June, with the arrival of the North Korean People's Army momentarily expected, this group was withdrawn to the southward. As ADCOM was retiring the first units of the 24th Infantry Division were being flown into Korea, and as the rest of the division was hastily embarking in Japan this advanced element, two infantry companies with supporting artillery under Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Smith, USA, began its northward movement from Pusan. On the 5th Task Force Smith made contact with the enemy at Osan, south of Suwon, where it ran into an entire North Korean infantry division with armored support. From 0800 to 1500 the fight went on, at which time the survivors, outmaneuvered, outflanked, and most of all outnumbered, withdrew with the loss of all equipment save small arms. Twelve miles back down the road a larger force underwent the same fate, and the Americans were forced back on Chonan, where they would hold to 8 July.

The war was now ten days old. American citizens had been evacuated; a carrier air strike had been made against the enemy capital and the enemy air force; the east coast invasion route was under fire from naval guns. In the air the Far East Air Forces were putting forth their best efforts. On the ground the Army had engaged the enemy. Across the Korean Strait a stream of shipping was flowing into Pusan where, prior to the arrival of an Army port company, the unloading of 55 ships with 15,000 troops and 1,700 vehicles was handled by two ECA employees, Alfred Meschter and Milton Nottingham. In Korea the situation was being dealt with to the limit of the abilities of the forces available. There remained the problem of the northern and southern flanks.

What the dimensions of this problem might be, no one knew. If the invasion of South Korea had surprised the United States, and had shown how wrongly intelligence had been evaluated, what faith could be put in estimates of Communist intentions elsewhere? Suddenly capabilities became important. The State Department had warned all hands on 26 June of the possibility that Korea was but the first of a series of coordinated moves; the military forces of the United States had gone on world-wide alert; in the Mediterranean the Sixth Fleet had put to sea. In the immediate theater of operations, no less than on the world scene, possibilities were unpleasant and visibility poor. The Joint Chiefs, it is true, had estimated that there would be no Soviet or Chinese intervention, but there was plenty of history, including a day at Pearl Harbor, to teach the outpost commander that estimates make poor weapons.

What of the northern neighbor, whose airfields at Vladivostok and Port Arthur flanked the Korean peninsula and were less than two hours flying time from Japan? What of the estimated four-score submarines based in the Vladivostok area? For the air threat, which had caused Admiral Joy to divert the Seventh Fleet to Buckner Bay, FEAF's fighter strength provided some counter, but the submarine situation was less satisfactory. The excitement of the first week of conflict had brought forth eight reports of submarine sightings, ranging from Okinawa to the Sea of Japan, and while most were doubtless in error they at least posed serious questions. Harbor defense equipment was lacking in the Far East, and the shortage of antisubmarine units was acute: of the three American destroyer divisions in the theater, two were needed to provide a minimum sound screen for Valley Forge. Of necessity, therefore, the patrol planes of VP 47 were employed on local antisubmarine patrol and in the escort of shipping, and long range search had to await the coming of reinforcements.

What were the intentions of the Communist Chinese? In Korea their capabilities could for the moment be largely disregarded, but ComNavFE had been instructed to use the Seventh Fleet to neutralize Formosa, and to prevent attack in either direction across Formosa Strait. Here Chiang's forces presented no problem, but the Communists had the capability, and both the Generalissimo and Admiral Struble thought an August effort wholly possible. The implications of such a development, added to the situation in Korea, greatly outweighed Admiral Joy's new accretions of force, and he may well have wondered what tools he was supposed to use to do this job. Some show of muscle, at least, had been made by Valley Forge as she steamed north, when she flew an air parade over Formosa Strait and the city of Taipei. But the chance that more would be required, as well as problems of
logistic support, had made it necessary, following the Pyongyang strikes, to return Task Force 77 to Okinawa.

If Formosa was to be defended, coordinated planning was obviously necessary, and the state of Nationalist morale was such as to require stiffening. Arriving in Tokyo on the afternoon of 5 July, Struble had proposed a prompt resumption of carrier strikes, this time from the Sea of Japan. But decision on these was delayed, the talk turned to the Formosa problem, and the suggestion of a visit to that island was approved by General MacArthur. On the 6th, Commander Seventh Fleet flew back to Buckner Bay, and on the next day boarded a destroyer for a high-speed run to Taipei and two days of talks with the Generalissimo and the Nationalist military. Another few days would see the Formosa Strait under reconnaissance by planes of Fleet Air Wing I, but the question of a surface patrol was more difficult. With the gunnery ships committed up to their ears in Korea, and with the situation there calling ever more urgently for Task Force 77, all that remained were the submarines of the Seventh Fleet. On 18 July Catfish was sailed from Yokosuka for a reconnaissance of the China coast, and was followed on the next day by Pickerel.

Finally, the northern sector, so great in undisclosed potentialities, was also brought under surveillance. On 7 July the first patrol plane reinforcements reached the Far East, and the long range P2V Neptunes of VP 6 were at once assigned to search in the Sea of Japan. On the 23rd the submarine Remora, escorted by Greenlet, headed north from Yokosuka for a patrol of La Pérouse Strait.
ON BOTH SIDES of the Pacific the invasion of South Korea was followed by a period of violent activity. Along its western rim the forces of the Far East Command, so suddenly committed, were bending every effort to evacuate friendly nationals, to support the Republic of Korea, to check the North Korean invaders, and to guard the flanks. Far to the eastward the government of the United States, hastily gathering reinforcements and preparing to move them across the world's largest ocean to the scene of action, girded itself for an effort to influence history by sea power.

For this effort, however unexpected, there was no lack of precedent: if less all-embracing than some of its disciples have thought, the influence of sea power has still been one of profound importance. Seven-tenths of the earth's surface is wet, and the capability of moving goods and services, including armies, across this surface, and of restricting such movements on the part of others, is a very considerable one. Since most civilized activities involve the movement of goods, the history of civilization is in large degree the history of transport routes, and of those who have controlled them. Through their private Mediterranean and their unmatched roads the Romans impressed upon their times; in recent centuries much history has revolved around the story of the oceans.

With the development of sailing ship technology the states of western Europe entered upon a great age of competitive expansion, which by the 18th century saw the nations of the Atlantic littoral locked in struggle for control of overseas wealth. The upshot of these wars was the dominance of Great Britain, an island nation difficult to invade, located to windward across the western approaches to the continent, and with bases scattered at the narrow places of the extra-European world. So situated, the British could withstand all comers, and could bring down mighty enemies through policies of alliance and subsidy, assisted by the freedom of action conferred by sea control which made possible descent at will along the European coastline. It is a commonplace that the peaceful world order of the 19th century rested in large measure upon the Royal Navy.

But the influence of history upon sea power has also been profound, and even as this classic period was celebrated by its historian the foundations were shifting. With the improvement of land communications the inner regions of Europe developed rapidly in population, wealth, and power. Effective and economical movement of goods was no longer a maritime monopoly, and land transport increasingly approximated that in a fluid medium. In Europe there followed an inward displacement of the disturber of the peace, from Napoleon to the Kaiser, from Hitler to Stalin, while across the oceans new power centers, arose with the new industrialization of the United States and of Japan. These developments led to the new strategic formulations of the 20th century, while at the same time the developments of the new technology powerfully modified the nature and conduct of war.

In place of the world of the sailing ship there developed a world based on the possibilities of coal and oil. In place of overseas empire internal development was emphasized. In place of the single European power center there now existed three, and in warfare there developed a third dimension. Faced in these changing circumstances by threatening new rivals, and struggling to maintain the world they knew, the maritime powers of Europe now looked overseas for essential supplies and reinforcements, and to the New World to redress the balance of the Old. Off the coast of Asia the adaptable, prolific, and xenophobic Japanese gazed southward toward the resources of the Indies. If the changes of the industrial age had downgraded the oceans as the source of commercial wealth and had produce new inland concentrations of power, they gave added emphasis to ocean high ways as sources of salvation construed in mundane terms of money, men, and oil. As defense of the rimlands against the interior
superseded the struggle for distant colonies, the unique importance of the battle fleet was modified, the set-piece battle declined in importance, and the far shore replaced the enemy fleet as the focus of operator. But the continuing struggle for the control of ocean routes remained the most important of all. It became also one of the costliest: between 1939 and 1945 more than 72,000 lives were lost in the Battle of the Atlantic.

To the western powers, therefore, the two wars with Germany fell in the same strategic mold: initial resistance to the prepared aggressor while strength was mustered in the rear and preparation made to fight things through. The time required for this evolution had, of necessity, to be bought by those on the line: by Britain's contemptible little army and the taxis of the Marne, by the RAF and the Royal Navy, and in both wars, be it said, by mighty Russian formations on the eastern front. In some senses the war against Japan was different, yet this last great struggle for overseas empire followed the same sequence of expansion, containment, and return. For the nations of the west, for those who liked the world as it was and resisted violent change, this pattern clearly posed three requirements. The line had to be held against disaster; control of the seas had to be gained and maintained; these things having been done, it was necessary to mobilize and move in the reserve. Failure in one of these requirements meant failure in all.

There was thus imposed upon the west a maritime strategy in which final victory on land resulted from the exploitation of the seas. Even in the second war this remained true. Hitler's advance stopped at the Channel; Rommel's African operations were a function of the struggle for the central Mediterranean. Control of the seas gave access to the resources which sustained and the reinforcements which strengthened Great Britain. British and American maritime power kept Russia in the war, forced the Germans to disperse their defenses, and delivered a concentrated and irresistible assault. Naval force severed the Japanese from their essential resources, brought the bombers to Saipan, and prepared the invasion it made unnecessary.

The end of the second war found the United States the dominant maritime power of the world. In many respects its position approximated that of Great Britain in the 19th century. It possessed the world's largest navy; it maintained bases and forces in being at various points about the globe. If the American flag merchant marine was not, like that of Britain at an earlier date, the world's greatest, Americans controlled a very large tonnage sailing under foreign flags and had access for emergency use to most of the world's shipping. Along with these trappings of power the United States had also inherited the responsibilities, together with such lessons concerning the conduct of these affairs as history seemed to teach.

Chief of these lessons, it seemed, was that of the chronic unpreparedness of the western powers. Minimum forces in the line, inadequate naval strength, and unmobilized reserves had twice brought them close to catastrophe. The appearance of a new aggressor, therefore, had been followed by the deployment to the Mediterranean of the Sixth Fleet, reinforcement of the Strategic Air Command, and the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. On one side of the world, at least, and within the limits of presumed budgetary capabilities, it seemed the lessons had been learned. So far as the peninsula of Europe was concerned the defenses were going up.

Then, shockingly, the same strategic problem was presented on a smaller and more distant peninsula. Once again the race was on to manipulate the variables of space, time, and movement capacity so as to check the invader and turn defeat into victory. Once again, after the first few days of optimism, the outcome of the race seemed unpredictable. The North Koreans had tanks and aircraft, the South Koreans did not. The North Koreans, their armies loaded with veterans of the Chinese Civil War and with even a few who had fought at Stalingrad, had experienced combat leadership; the South Koreans did not. The Communist powers of Asia had military stockpiles far exceeding those available to the government of Syngman Rhee. Yet even these stockpiles were not limitless: the industrial base of Communist aggression lay far to the west in European Russia, and the capacity of the trans-Siberian railway was only some 17,000 tons a day, less than that of the port of Pusan, much less than that of Pacific Ocean shipping.
Having taken up the challenge of the 25th of June, the maritime world for the third time in a century faced excruciating problems of time and distance. From the 38th parallel north of Seoul, where the main invading force came down across the border, the airline distance to Pusan is some 225 miles. From Pusan to San Francisco by the great circle route is 4,914 miles, and by way of Pearl Harbor a thousand more. The task which faced the United States in mid-summer 1950 was that of equalizing these distances.

It was on this mission of equalization that Task Force Smith flew to Pusan and entrained for the north. It was not an impressive force: two companies of infantry, one company of field artillery, two mortar platoons and one of recoilless rifles, six rocket launching teams. The emergency which brought it to Korea was one for which it had neither planned nor trained. Others, however, had gone before it on a similar errand. Like the British Expeditionary Force of another generation at Mons, like the RAF in the September sky ten years before, like the Americans and Filipinos at Bataan, the navies in the Java Sea, and the carrier pilots at Midway, Task Force Smith and those who followed were put in to hold the line. Whether this commitment would be justified depended on the speed with which help came. To come, it had to cross the seas.
The troops and supplies, so urgently needed in Korea, could come in the first instance only from within the Far Eastern theater. In the first days of war, ammunition had been sent in on the O'Connell and Keathley, and Admiral Doyle's Amphibious Group had been ordered down to Sasebo. On 1 July, as Task Force Smith was flown to Pusan, the rest of the 24th Division had begun a hurried embarkation, at Sasebo and Inland Sea ports, in vessels belonging to the Shipping Control Administration, Japan. Escort for the priceless cargo carried by these Scajap ships was provided by the fleet tug Arikara, a somewhat limited screening force to represent the greatest naval power on earth.

The Scajap fleet, Japanese manned and Japanese supported but operating under occupation force control, held the designation of Task Group 96-3 in the organization of Naval Forces Japan. In the emergency of 1950 its 12 freighters and 39 LSTs were to prove a priceless asset, and beginning with the movement of the 24th Division the Scajap ships would be used to the limit in intra-area lift. But the principal responsibility for over-water transportation, both by statute and by order of CincFE, fell upon the Military Sea Transportation Service.

The Military Sea Transportation Service is a unified logistic organization, established within the Navy Department to provide, under a single authority, the necessary sea transport for Defense Department cargo and personnel, save only that handled by the fleet itself. As such it had absorbed the old Naval Transportation Service and the ships and seagoing functions of the Army Transportation Corps. Headed by a vice admiral responsible to the Chief of Naval Operations and administered through a naval command structure, but staffed largely by civil service personnel, the Service was designed to function both as a scheduling and as an operating agency. In the first capacity MSTS chartered from commercial operators the space required for the greater portion of Defense Department sea lift. In the second, in addition to its commissioned and Navy-manned (USNS) and civil service-manned (USNS) transports and cargo ships, MSTS came to own and control a tanker fleet operated under contract by private companies for the Military Petroleum Supply Agency, the unified petroleum procurement agency of the Department of Defense. In emergencies for which space charter and the MSTS fleet were together inadequate, the Service could resort to time charter of merchant shipping.

MSTS had been created in October 1949 by directive of the Secretary of Defense, pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947. In the following months it developed into a worldwide operating agency, with major area commands in London, New York, San Francisco, and Tokyo. The first Deputy Commander for the Western Pacific reached Tokyo in January 1950 to organize his command, activation of which was scheduled for 1 July. On that date, in accordance with plan, Captain Alexander F. Junker assumed his responsibilities as DepComMSTS WestPac to find himself faced by an emergency of wholly unexpected dimensions.

The first problem was to find the shipping for an immediate large scale lift of troops and supplies. That under Captain Junker's own control—the MSTS "owned" shipping in the area—was initially limited to 25 intra-area support ships inherited from the Army. Not all of these were of types useful to the task, but there were ten 175-foot, 500-ton capacity cargo ships (AKL) of Army design, the two 340-foot coastal transports (T -APc) Sergeant Keathley and Sergeant Muller each normally carrying 100 troops, and six LSTs. Three LSTs and two AKLs had been inactivated, but work on them was quickly put in hand, and the LSTs were operating by the 8th.

A second source of shipping was, of course, to be found in the Scajap fleet, which was immediately made available and which continued to be employed in close connection with MSTS. A third expedient was to retain and employ MSTS transports and cargo ships which, like the aircraft transport Cardinal O'Connell, had reached
the Far Eastern theater on normal trans-Pacific runs. Finally, most fortunately and most importantly, there was the possibility of charter of Japanese merchant ships.

By 10 July the MSTS-controlled fleet in or en route to the Western Pacific had risen from 25 to 70 vessels, not counting the 50-odd ships belonging to Scajap. But not all had reached the Far East and some, for reasons of size or type or availability, were unsuited to the work at hand: of the total of 70 vessels, 52 were available for emergency movements to Korea. Of these, Japanese vessels on charter on 10 July accounted for 29 bottoms and 74,000 measurement tons; five days later this number would have increased to 40. In addition to the Marus and to the ships inherited from the Army, Captain Junker had two AKAs and three T–APs which had reached Japan and which had been retained to lift men and material to Pusan.

The 24th Infantry Division had completed its movement to Korea by 6 July. Hard on its heels the 25th Division began to move, its first elements loading at Moji on Shimonoseki Strait on the 8th, and subsequent echelons at Inland Sea ports and at Sasebo; for this movement Japanese time-chartered ships were extensively used. The third major Army unit to be lifted from Japan was the 1st Cavalry Division, and this, since handling facilities at Pusan were clogging from overload, was put in over the beaches. This movement was accomplished by Admiral Doyle’s Amphibious Group, temporarily augmented by the loan from MSTS of two AKAs, three T–APs, one ocean tug, five LSTs, and four time-chartered Japanese Marus. Late in July the final intra-theater movement of the initial phase brought in two battalions of the 29th Infantry Regiment from Okinawa. On the 16th MSTS assigned two Japanese passenger vessels and a cargo ship to this lift, and on the 24th these troops were landed at Pusan.

Thus the job was done. By mid-July all Army forces in the Far East had been committed or were scheduled for commitment, with the single exception of the 7th Division, held back to provide a skeleton garrison for Japan. And while the emergency movements within the Far Eastern theater were going on, others were in preparation elsewhere. In Hawaii the Mid-Pacific branch of MSTS was assembling shipping to lift the 5th Regimental Combat Team west. On the west coast planning for the movement of the 2nd Division was in progress, and urgent efforts to project supplies forward across the ocean highways were underway.

In the United States the logistic agencies of all three services were struggling with a flood of emergency requisitions for medical and hospital supplies, for equipment in general, and above all for ammunition. All along the west coast naval ammunition facilities which had been operating in reduced or maintenance status were expanded. In June, Port Chicago in San Francisco Bay had a normal weekly handling capacity of 1,250 tons of naval ammunition. On the 28th CincPacFleet called for operations on a three-shift basis, extra personnel was laid on, and within a month Port Chicago was outloading more than 9,000 tons a week for both Navy and Army. On 8 July activation of facilities at Fallbrook and Seal Beach, California, was begun, and Bangor Annex, at Keyport in Puget Sound, was made available for the outloading of Army and Air Force ammunition.

For all services requirements skyrocketed. The planned overseas movement of Army ammunition alone was to rise from zero to 77,000 tons for the month of August, a growth paralleled by increased calls for general stores, refrigerated provisions, and for personnel. The Military Sea Transportation Service had prepared for a predicted movement of 66,000 tons of cargo to the Far East in July; in fact it ended up moving 312,000 tons and 30,000 passengers. More tonnage was urgently required and was being hastily assembled by Captain William R. Thayer, Deputy Commander MSTS Pacific; by the third week in July the transports under his control had increased from 20 to 31, and 12 commercial vessels had been taken on under time charter.
Chapter 4. Help on the Way

3. Fighting Ships

Like all conflicts, that in Korea had its strange and unpredictable characteristics. One of these was the fact that, so far as control of the seas was concerned, the war started with the exploitation phase. It was never necessary to fight the convoys through. But of this no one could at first be sure, and with men and supplies in very large quantity committed to the ocean highways, and with the extent of opposition doubtful, insurance was necessary. To maintain sea control, should new enemy forces choose to dispute it, further combatant strength was needed.

Yet almost all the fighting ships west of the continental United States had already been committed. Statistically speaking, the division of the Pacific Fleet in June between ships operating in home waters and those to the westward was roughly an even one. One hundred and twenty-five naval vessels of all types were based on the west coast while another 128 were scattered between Alaska, the Hawaiian Islands, the trust territories, and the Western Pacific. But the statistics are deceptive, including as they do auxiliaries, small craft, and local forces, and the distribution of major combatant types was very different. Of 86 active units, three-quarters were based on the west coast of the United States.

Of the three large aircraft carriers in the Pacific Fleet, one was with Task Force 77 and two were in the San Diego area, where the Fleet's two escort carriers also based. The Fleet contained no active battleship. Two cruisers were already at work in Far Eastern waters and the remaining four were on the west coast. Of a total of 57 destroyer types and 30 submarines, 12 and 6 respectively were operating outside of continental waters, 12 and 4 were operating under ComNavFE. Quite clearly any naval reinforcement had to come a long way.

The first forward movement concerned the long-range patrol planes. On 26 June the seaplane tender *Gardiner's Bay*, which had completed fitting out for a tour in the Western Pacific, sailed from San Diego for Yokosuka, where she arrived on 12 July. On 28 June Patrol Squadron 6, a medium landplane squadron operating nine P2V-5 Neptunes, was deployed forward from Barber's Point, Oahu. By the 7th the squadron had reached Japan where, in the absence of any suitable naval air station, it operated out of Johnson Air Force Base at Tachikawa.

The two heavy *Baltimore*-class cruisers of Cruiser Division 3, moored in Long Beach when the Korean War broke out, had arrived only two weeks before from an eight-month cruise in the Western Pacific. These ships, *Helena* and *Toledo*, completed in 1945, had a standard displacement of 13,600 tons, a speed of 33 knots, a main battery of nine 8-inch guns and a secondary battery of twelve dual-purpose 5-inch. Alas, the delights of civilization were to be but briefly tasted, and the expected period of rest, recreation, and upkeep was to be brutally cut short. On 29 June the division commander, Rear Admiral Charles C. Hartman, received orders to prepare to head back west again with a departure date a week away. All leaves were at once cancelled by telegram, emergency repairs were hastened, and supplies quickly loaded aboard.

At San Diego there were two *Essex*-class aircraft carriers: *Boxer*, Captain Cameron Briggs, back from her tour in the Western Pacific, was waiting to enter a navy yard for repairs; *Philippine Sea*, Captain Willard K. Goodney, had just arrived from the Atlantic Fleet and was preparing for an October departure for the Far East as relief for *Valley Forge*. The air group designated for this deployment, Carrier Air Group II, Commander Raymond W. Vogel, was similar in composition to Air Group 5, being composed of two F9F jet fighter squadrons, two squadrons of F4Us, one of ADs, and a mixed bag of specially configurated Corsairs and Skyraiders. Its training, however, was considerably less advanced than that of the *Valley Forge* group. The jet squadrons had been
handicapped by shortage of aircraft and the pilot situation was highly unstable: many of the younger officers had received orders for separation on 30 June, and many of their replacements were not yet up to fleet standards. Difficult as the situation was, it would have been much worse had the North Koreans appreciated the strategic importance of accounting periods and delayed their attack until the end of the fiscal year. As it was, emergency action by the Bureau of Naval Personnel made it possible to avoid forced separations from the service and to minimize dislocation.

With the outbreak of hostilities in Korea all plans and schedules were scrapped. Loading for the Western Pacific was put on a high speed basis, considerable gear was transferred from Boxer to her sister carrier, and the air group was embarked under emergency orders. On 6 July Philippine Sea got underway from San Diego for Pearl Harbor, where she arrived on the 14th to commence a ten-day period of accelerated training exercises.

The remaining carrier strength of the Pacific Fleet, Carrier Division 15, consisted of the escort carriers Sicily, another recent immigrant from the Atlantic, and Badoeng Strait. These were ships of the postwar CVE 105 type, modelled on the old Sangamon class of converted tankers which had seen so much service in the war against Japan. Based at San Diego and normally assigned to antisubmarine warfare duty, the ships of Cardiv 15 were also from time to time employed to give carrier refresher training to Marine fighter squadrons from El Toro. The outbreak of war found Badoeng Strait en route to Pearl Harbor on a summer training cruise, with a Marine fighter squadron, 223 reserve midshipmen, and five visiting professors of disciplines ranging from economics to forestry on board.

All this was quickly changed and the division disassembled to solve some urgent problems. Badoeng Strait landed her professors at Pearl and returned hastily to San Diego, where she disgorged the trainees and began loading more Marine aircraft and aircrews on a 24-hour basis. Sicily, alerted on 2 July, was sailed on the 4th for Pearl Harbor and Guam, to strengthen the antisubmarine capabilities of Western Pacific forces. The division commander, Rear Admiral Richard W. Ruble, was ordered forward with his staff by air to help handle the rapid build-up of naval air strength in Japan. On 10 July admiral and staff reached Tokyo, and two days later Ruble took over command of Task Group 96.2, Naval Air Japan.

The three Canadian destroyers, earlier alerted, sailed from the west coast on 5 July. On the 6th, in accordance with his orders of a week before, Rear Admiral Hartman sortied his cruisers from Long Beach, joined up with four fleet oilers, six destroyers, and five submarines, and headed for Pearl Harbor. This westward deployment of submarines had been ordered by CincPacFleet as a precautionary measure, in view of the possible commitment of Russian naval units to the Korean conflict. But this fear was to prove groundless, none of these boats was moved west of the islands, and submarine strength in the Western Pacific was increased only by the submarine transport Perch, requested by the Marines for special raiding purposes.

Admiral Hartman’s force was only a day out of Long Beach when Toledo was ordered forward at best speed, and two days later Helena and Destroyer Division III were detached from the task group with orders to hurry onward. Thus scattered by the need for haste the ships steamed west: Toledo reached Pearl Harbor on the 9th and left on the 11th; the Helena group arrived on the 11th and left on the 13th; the tankers, the submarines, and the two remaining destroyers pressed on behind. For destroyers en route to the Far East the distances west of Pearl posed problems of fuel consumption: steaming at 24 knots would save a day in transit, as compared to steaming at economical speed, but would also necessitate refuelling. But the oilers with which they had left the coast were far behind, none was available at Pearl for forward deployment, and the facilities at Midway Island, on the direct route westward, had been deactivated in May on instructions from the Department of Defense.

The budgetary ceiling had thus affected not only the strength of the Pacific Fleet but also its mobility in time of crisis. Reactivation of Midway was clearly in the cards, but for the moment extemporization was necessary. Two chief petty officers, recent graduates of the Service Force Petroleum School, were rounded up and embarked on the first destroyer as it was leaving Pearl Harbor. On arrival at Midway the chiefs activated the
fuelling system and replenished two of the destroyers from the oil which remained in the tanks, while Helena
refueled the others.

With the war still in its second week very considerable reinforcements were on their way. Three days
after American troops first entered action, naval fighting strength equal to the original Western Pacific
derployment had set sail from the continental United States. But the departure of these units from the west coast
found the Pacific Fleet approaching the bottom of the barrel. On 8 July, in order to provide some slight reserve for
new contingencies, the Chief of Naval Operations authorized the activation of certain units of the mothball fleet.
The westward movement of so large an increment of naval strength posed urgent problems of logistic support. The naval population of the Western Pacific, which on 25 June approached 11,000, was to more than triple in the space of five weeks. To plan and organize in one month's time for the support of such a force 6,000 miles from home is no mean problem, the more so when, in addition to food and clothing, these individuals are busily consuming fuel, ammunition, equipment, and spare parts at an accelerated rate.

Overseas stocks of the countless items needed to support a modern fighting force were limited. At Pearl Harbor a supply officer could find everything, or almost everything, but to the westward the situation was spotty. At Yokosuka, by good fortune, there were fairly sizable supplies of general materials and nucleus stocks of technical spares. But Guam, which had supported very large naval forces during the war against Japan, had nothing: the island's mission of fleet support had been cancelled in 1947. At Subic Bay in the Philippines there were small quantities of various items, but Subic, originally planned as a major fleet base, had been reduced to partial maintenance status in January. All this had been done in the name of economy; it had been rationalized by the stated intention of providing mobile support for any forces west of Pearl Harbor; such support was now called for with a vengeance.

The concept of mobile support for the fighting ships of the U.S. Navy has a long history. In its origins it dates back to the War with Tripoli when the frigate John Adams, with reduced armament, was assigned to shuttle service between the Chesapeake and the Mediterranean carrying drafts of men and shipments of supplies for Commodore Preble’s squadron. But provision of the spare spars and cordage, the pease and salt meat, which the Adams brought out, was simplicity itself compared to the problem of supporting a modern navy. Long before the electronic age the progress of technology had threatened to restrict the radius of fleet action, in the first instance in the fundamental question of fuel.

The fuel problem and the other logistic complications which came with mechanization first faced the United States in connection with the Civil War blockade of Gulf coast ports. They arose again following the War with Spain, as the immense distances of the Pacific came to be realized, and were emphasized over the years by increasing possibilities of trouble with Japan. As early as 1904 Civil Engineer Andrew C. Cunningham had put forward the idea of a floating base; efforts at mobile support of naval forces in Europe had been made during the First World War; and by the middle twenties the concept of the mobile base had become the accepted one for support of the fleet at sea. Following Pearl Harbor performance caught up with precept, and in the later stages of the Pacific War great fleets of tenders, repair ships, and floating drydocks moved westward from atoll to atoll in attendance on the striking forces.

The concept of mobile support had abundantly proved itself as both economically sound and strategically effective. But its wartime embodiment, the vast collection of men and material which made up Service Squadron 10, was no more. The total roster of Service Force ships assigned to the Western Pacific on 25 June consisted of one destroyer tender, one reefer, a fleet oiler on shuttle duty for the Seventh Fleet, a fleet tug, and an LST on loan to Task Force 90 for training purposes. There had been no prior planning for a minor war, or indeed for anything short of full mobilization. In the sphere of fleet logistics, as elsewhere, the response to the North Korean invasion was to be an exercise in extemporization.

Responsibility for the logistic support of the Pacific Fleet and of other Pacific naval activities lay with the Service Force Pacific Fleet, commanded by Rear Admiral Francis C. Denebrink, whose headquarters were at
Pearl Harbor. Like everyone else the Service Force had felt the impact of the fiscal year just ending. Not only in the Western Pacific had mobile support been reduced to a bare minimum: the only hospital ship and the only fleet stores issue ship in the Pacific Fleet had been decommissioned, and the lone dock landing ship in Admiral Denebrink’s command had escaped this fate only as a result of the requirements of Operation Greenhouse, the atomic test series then pending at Eniwetok.

The total strength of the Pacific Fleet Service Force, as of the end of June, came to 91 auxiliaries of various types. The largest share of these mobile support units, 47 ships, was organized in Service Squadron 1, Captain Bernard L. Austin. This command was responsible for the logistic support of fleet units in the Eastern Pacific, including Alaska; most of its units were located in west coast ports. At Pearl Harbor, under the direct control of ComServPac, were the 26 auxiliaries of the Logistic Support Group, whose area of responsibility included fleet units and bases in the Western, Central, and South Pacific. The 18 remaining units were assigned to Service Division 51, a subordinate echelon of the Logistic Support Group, located at Guam and charged with the administration of Service Force responsibilities in the Marianas and Carolines.

In the first days of hostilities uncertainty as to the identity of the enemy and the extent of the underwater threat had led ComNavFE to call for additional small craft for offshore patrol. In response to this request Admiral Denebrink recommended to CincPacFleet the reactivation of the three mine-sweepers in caretaker status at Yokosuka, and of five subchasers and three fleet tugs. At the same time the Service Force staff turned its attention to the urgent problems of logistic support for the forces going into action in the Far East.

Ammunition came first. At Yokosuka, under the control of Commander Fleet Activities Japan, there was a small stock of some two or three thousand tons of various types, but with one surprising deficiency: there was no antisubmarine ordnance in Japan. Ammunition in the Philippines was negligible; at Guam there were some 6,000 tons. Necessarily, therefore, the supply of items lacking at Yokosuka and Guam, and the replacement of expenditures from these stocks, had to be made from the Hawaiian Islands, more than 3,000 miles away, where there were wartime leftovers in massive quantities. To lift ammunition to the forward area, ComServPac had available a single ammunition ship, Mount Katmai, at Port Chicago, and an assortment of cargo types which, with special sheathing of the holds, could be made to do.

Lacking word from Admiral Joy as to the pattern of anticipated needs, and lacking also a subordinate Service Force commander in the forward area to coordinate requirements, the staff at Pearl Harbor undertook at once, by deduction and by intuition, an estimate of what was required. This work was expeditiously done. The estimate was ready by the night of 26–27 June in the form of a revised loading plan for Mount Katmai, and was at once promulgated by dispatch for comment. Within two days the views of the operational commanders concerned had been received and integrated and a detailed loading list was on its way by air to the west coast.

But Mount Katmai’s arrival was weeks away, and in the next few days, as special requests came in from ComNavFE, ammunition was moved forward from Guam by cargo ship. In the absence of underwater ordnance in Japan, and with the submarine problem still unclarified, depth charges were given priority: on 13 July a shipload reached Yokosuka, followed on the next day by another of 5-inch and 40-millimeter ammunition. By this time also a load of 8-inch cruiser ammunition was at sea en route from Guam to Sasebo, and another ship had been sailed for Buckner Bay with aircraft ordnance for Task Force 77.

The second problem of immediate and overriding importance was that of fuel. In the Pacific the responsibility for petroleum supply was a divided one: Commander Service Force, as logistic agent for CincPac, was responsible for the Pacific Area outside of General MacArthur’s command, while the Area Petroleum Office at CincFE’s headquarters was charged with procurement for the forces of the Far East Command. Throughout the Pacific POL inventories were low, in consequence of directives based on budgetary restrictions; this situation was potentially most dangerous in aviation gasoline, production of which is inelastic and not susceptible to rapid expansion. Anticipating a rapid increase in consumption, ComServPac’s Petroleum Office made early requests for
larger allocations, and fortunately so. The timely arrival of these from the continental United States would provide adequate stocks for the trans-Pacific pipeline, and make it possible to help out the Far East Command, where serious shortages developed owing to lack of similar foresight.

The need for aviation gasoline was matched by that for black oil for the naval forces moving westward. Of the ten fleet oilers assigned to the Service Force, two were on shuttle duty serving the Seventh Fleet and the mid-Pacific, eight were in west coast ports. Four of these—Cimarron, Cacapon, Caliente, and Platte—were immediately ordered forward and sailed in company with Admiral Hartman's cruisers and destroyers. Three were routed onward from Pearl to Okinawa and Japan, while Caliente, on 24 July, discharged 65,000 barrels of fuel oil at Midway Island to keep that newly reactivated base in business.

The emphasis on floating support for fleet units, made necessary by the limited base facilities in the Western Pacific, was desirable for other reasons as well. A prime virtue of naval power is its mobility; if the bases can also move this virtue is increased. For reasons of economy, and to obviate the need for an extensive shore establishment in Japan which would itself be logistically costly and complicating, mobile support was also desirable. But complete floating support for the fleet was well beyond the capabilities of the Service Force as then constituted, or indeed under any circumstances short of pretty complete mobilization. Again it is worth emphasizing how fortunate it was for this campaign that the resources and productive facilities of the Japanese base were close to hand. In the Second World War almost complete support for forces overseas had been provided from the continental United States. But now at midcentury the effort was made to live off the land, and the foraging party reappeared, not in the form of the sergeant with his squad, but in that of the supply officer armed with contract and fountain pen.

Yet however helpful, the Japanese economy could not support the war alone, and two questions called for immediate answers from Admiral Denebrink and his staff. What Service Force units would be required in the operating areas to support the fleet? What shipping would be necessary, over and above that provided by MSTS, to keep the 6,000-mile Pacific pipeline full? A study of anticipated needs led to requests on 5 and 8 July for the activation of two gasoline tankers and the assignment of another ammunition ship, and then on the 9th the full bill was presented in a memorandum to CincPacFleet which called for the activation of 58 auxiliaries in 16 categories ranging from destroyer tenders down to tugs.

By this time the redeployment of Service Force units was well underway. Seven auxiliaries were headed north from the Marianas and the Carolines, six were on their way from Pearl Harbor, and another seven from the west coast of the United States. This very considerable movement into the forward area consisted of two destroyer tenders, two reefers, three cargo ship types, three fleet oilers, two gasoline tankers, two repair ships, five fleet tugs, and a dock landing ship. So much activity required a coordinating authority and so, at ComServPac's request, the Chief of Naval Operations on 10 July established Service Squadron 3 as the Navy's principal logistic agent in the Western Pacific. Captain Austin was transferred from Service Squadron I to take command of this new force, which was gathering at Buckner Bay.
History of United States Naval Operations – Korea
James A. Field Jr.

Chapter 4. Help on the Way
5. The Marine Brigade

The first few days of combat had made it evident that the North Korean People's Army was not going to be frightened home again either by United Nations resolves or by the intervention of token American forces. Shortly it seemed doubtful whether the commitment of all available Far Eastern strength would stop the invaders. Further reinforcements became increasingly urgent, and these, necessarily, had to come from outside the theater. Although foreign help had been promised, its arrival was some time off. But in Hawaii the Army was preparing a regimental combat team for sailing, on the west coast a division had been alerted, and MSTS was assembling the shipping for these lifts. And the Marines, too, were on their way.

In addition to the ten Army combat divisions in existence in 1950 the United States could also call on the two divisions of the Fleet Marine Force. Total Fleet Marine Force strength at this time was about 28,000 men, of whom 12,000 were in FMF Pacific, in the 1st Marine Division and its attached 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and the balance of almost 16,000 in FMF Atlantic, the 2nd Marine Division and MAW 2. Headquarters of the Fleet Marine Force Pacific were at Pearl Harbor; the 1st Marine Division was at Camp Pendleton, California; Marine Air Wing I was at nearby El Toro. Like all branches of the armed forces the Marines had suffered from austerity: all units were understrength, and the 1st Marine Division was operating with two platoons to a company and two companies to a battalion.

The United States Marines have landed on many foreign shores since Lieutenant O’Bannon and his immortal six set out from Alexandria to march on Tripoli. But in the middle of the 20th century their special claim to fame, and the basis of their mission as defined in the National Security Act, rested on their development of the techniques of amphibious warfare. The success of the Corps in developing workable techniques for assault from the sea against defended objectives, considered by some the most far-reaching tactical innovation of the Second World War, was achieved in the face of overwhelming expert opinion that such attacks were no longer possible. Contemplating the sad spectacle of Gallipoli, a distinguished naval historian of the interwar period had commented that while Great Britain might perhaps survive another war, she could never survive another Churchill. In fact, however, she did both, while the Navy and Marines destroyed the presumed basis for this judgment by spearheading the amphibious advance from Guadalcanal to Okinawa, an advance in which they suffered no single check.

The United States now found itself confronted with difficulties in Korea, a peninsula with a long shoreline and located on the far side of an ocean. A priori, one would assume this a made to order theater for the Marines, and the responsible Commander in Chief had already shown his interest: early in 1950, in connection with his mission of defending Japan, General MacArthur had requested instructors to train his occupation forces in amphibious warfare. Navy and Marine training specialists had consequently been provided, along with Admiral Doyle’s Amphibious Group, and had just begun to hold school in Japan when the invasion broke.

Yet amphibious warfare, in 1950, was out of favor with many due to strategic preconceptions, and the Marines with others for other reasons. In the congressional hearings on the unification troubles the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had described the amphibious landing as a thing of the past, and had observed that anyhow he had taken part in the two greatest amphibious operations of history and the Marines had not. The prediction awaited the test of time; the statement, certainly correct, might well have been amplified to point out that the Army troops which stormed the beaches of Europe did so in accordance with doctrine developed by the Marine Corps and the Navy. Even in war the pen and the guiding brain are at times as significant as the sword.
Quite apart from their amphibious specialty, there were other advantages to be derived from the commitment of the Marines to Korea. What was needed was needed fast; the Corps lives with its bags packed. While the requirement to go anywhere at short notice had made the Marines mobile, the requirements of the assault from the sea had led to the development of an extremely powerful package of strength. Man for man there was probably no more powerful force in existence anywhere. The ground elements made up a heavily armed and highly professional outfit in which every individual could handle a rifle. The air-ground team, long hoped for but delayed by World War II requirements, had by the end of that war become a fact, and the Marines had no need to wheedle their necessities in the upper regions out of a separate force with separate preoccupations. All their pilots had had infantry training; all were carrier qualified, and could operate from decks offshore until airstrips became available. With these capabilities, and with this understanding of the requirements on the surface of the earth, they commanded and deserved the confidence of the riflemen below.

Again, the Fleet Marine Force was well trained. As a small organization, the Marines had found it possible to maintain recruiting without recourse to trade and travel propaganda; since their withdrawal from North China they had been able to attend to business without the distractions of occupation duty. Between December and June the units of FMF Pacific had gone through two field exercises of regimental size or larger, an amphibious demonstration, and various lesser drills involving submarines, helicopters, and the seizure of San Nicholas Island by an airlifted battalion.

A further factor of importance, and one again suggestive of the realism of the Corps, was its readiness for movement. Naval movement plans, it is true, are almost automatic, but for other forces preparations are necessary, and the Marines appear to have been the only people in the armed services with concrete arrangements for anything less than that Armageddon euphemistically known as a "general emergency." In 1948 plans had been worked out for the rapid movement of a regimental combat team and a Marine air group from the west coast to any point in the Pacific, and the materiel bureaus of the Navy Department were on ten-day notice to provide the necessary mounting-out equipment.

Finally, Marines are volunteers both in fact and by temperament. Their inbred highly competitive attitude had been strengthened by the post-war atmosphere within the Pentagon, with its repeated rumors of plans for the abolition of the Corps or for its limitation to guard duty. At Corps headquarters, where there hangs a painting of the Korean landing of 1871, there was little question as to involvement in this war, and on 28 June the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Clifton B. Cates, USMC, recommended to the Chief of Naval Operations employment of the Fleet Marine Force in Korea. Three days later Admiral Sherman queried CincPacFleet as to the time necessary to move out a battalion landing team or a regimental combat team. Admiral Radford’s reply, received on Sunday the 2nd, stated that a BLT could be loaded in four days and sailed in six, and an RCT loaded in six and sailed in ten. CNO at once advised Admiral Joy by dispatch that a Marine regimental combat team could be made available to CincFE if desired, and this offer, relayed to General MacArthur by ComNavFE in person, was accepted with enthusiasm. Before this busy Sunday was over the 1st Marine Division had been alerted and Admiral Sherman, with JCS approval, had ordered CincPacFleet to move an RCT with appropriate attached air strength to the Far East for employment by CincFE.

Three days after these orders to Admiral Radford, Fleet Marine Force Pacific issued its operation plan. This prescribed the task organization of the force, designated the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (Reinforced), which was to be built around the 5th Marines from Camp Pendleton and Marine Aircraft Group 33 from El Toro. Command of the brigade was assigned Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, USMC, assistant commander of the 1st Marine Division, while Brigadier General Thomas J. Cushman, USMC, deputy commander of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, became both deputy brigade commander and commanding general of the wing’s forward echelon. In an age of specialization this flexibility, which could be matched by no other ground force in any country, is worth remark: the routine step of making the aviator the second in command of the brigade was another promise
of close teamwork between ground and air.

From the time of the warning order, division and wing staffs had been hard at work on the problems of mounting out the brigade. The task of bringing the various components up to authorized war strength was complicated by the fact that the summer period of leave and transfer had begun, and by a directive of 3 July from the Commandant of the Corps which required that all sergeants and below whose enlistments would expire before March be transferred and left behind. But leaves were cancelled and transfers rescinded, and not all of the enlisted personnel were willing to accept this high-handed treatment by headquarters.

By 7 July, when the brigade was formally activated, shortages were being filled by personnel from the Marine Barracks at Camp Pendleton and from west coast stations. Supplies and gear were moving from Pendleton and from the storage center at Barstow in the California desert to the staging areas. The time from receipt of the alert had been well employed, but the speed with which the brigade moved out owed much to earlier planning, and to the ten-day readiness stocks of material which had been maintained for both ground forces and the air group. By the 9th, when the first ships became available, embarkation plans had been completed and loading could be begun.

The brigade had been built around the infantry strength of the 5th Marines, with 132 officers and 2,452 enlisted men. The next largest ground component, the artillery, was provided by the 1st Battalion of the 11th Marines, 44 officers and 474 enlisted men. To these were added motor transport, medical, shore party, engineer, tank, and amphibious tractor companies; detachments of signal, ordnance, service, reconnaissance, and military police units; an amphibious truck platoon; and the organic observation squadron, VMO 6, with eight OY observation planes and four H03s–1 Sikorsky helicopters. The air strength of the brigade, the forward echelon of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, was made up of MAG 33’s two day fighter squadrons, totaling 48 F4U–4B aircraft, and one night fighter squadron of F4U-5Ns.

The responsibility for producing the shipping to lift the Marine Brigade fell upon Rear Admiral Francis X. McInerney, acting commander of the Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet. To provide this lift, a supply expedition which was preparing to sail for Point Barrow, Alaska, was hastily modified, and its commanding officer, Captain Louis D. Sharp, Jr., was designated Commander, Provisional Transport Group. All available ships were incorporated in the Transport Group, and the capacity thus made available was almost enough. Except for some motor transport everything was taken along, but this deficiency would be remedied on the far shore, by capture from the enemy or the Army.

Ground forces of the brigade embarked at San Diego in the three attack transports of Captain Sharp’s Task Group 53.7, George Clymer, Henrico, and Pickaway; in the attack cargo ships Whiteside and Alshain; and in the LSDs Gunston Hall and Fort Marion. Air group personnel and equipment boarded the transport General A. E. Anderson and the attack cargo ship Achernar at Terminal Island; aircraft and aircrews were embarked on Badoeng Strait. On 12 July, exactly ten days after the receipt of the warning order, the LSDs sailed from San Diego with the tanks and the amphibious tractor companies, and two days later the rest of the convoy followed.

General Craig and General Cushman had remained behind to tidy up administrative detail. On the 15th they departed by air from El Toro to Japan, where they arrived on 19 July. Another Marine, however, had preceded them to Tokyo. The Commanding General of the Fleet Marine Force Pacific, Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., USMC, had flown west on the 7th, and on the 10th conferred with General MacArthur. On the same day, as a result of this discussion, CincFE asked the Joint Chiefs for the entire 1st Marine Division.
Chapter 4. Help on the Way

6. Air Transport and Air Reinforcement

No aspect of armed force has received more emphasis in our time than the military employment of the airplane. First conceived of as a means by which the commander could tell what was going on on the other side of the hill, aircraft have had their principal impact in two other areas: as long-range gun, extending the distance at which blows may be aimed and delivered, and as flying vehicle, capable of the rapid movement of goods regardless of obstacles on the surface of the earth. With ground and surface reinforcements headed westward, it remains to consider the air aspect of the transoceanic deployment in support of the Korean campaign.

This, it need hardly be said, was no independent phenomenon. The use of the air is intimately connected with the course of affairs below. In reconnaissance as in transport, whether of explosives, troops, or supplies, the mission of the airplane is defined by the course of events on land and sea. And while in all these functions the airplane has developed tremendous capabilities, in all it depends on surface logistic support. If, as has so often been said, communications dominate war, the aerial capability has both solved old requirements and imposed new ones in this controlling field.

Command of the air, so essential to western-style war, depends in a transoceanic theater on command of the seas. Like the Army, the Air Force is projected, supported, and sustained by surface shipping. In some sense this fact has been neglected as the result of what may be described as optical illusion. Aircraft in flight, indeed, resemble air theorists on paper in their apparent independence of logistic problems. But although the flexibility of the airplane is extraordinary, within its limits of range and performance, it is equally true that the logistic requirements of a modern air force are immense. Where bases do not exist they must be constructed; where they do exist they must be supported; the appetite for fuel and ammunition, spare parts, shops and tools, runway surfacing, buildings and personnel, which is evinced by any considerable deployment of air strength is a very impressive one. The plane in the air on its mission is the end product of an elaborate, costly, and highly developed organization.

Yet given the base facilities and the aircraft, it is possible to deliver across great distances not only ammunition to the ultimate consumer but much else besides. In the Second World War the possibilities of airborne operations were dramatically demonstrated by the German conquests of Norway and Crete, and by the Allied airdrop into Normandy in 1944. Equally if not more important were the logistic feats accomplished through air supply: in Burma the British planned a whole campaign around this capability; in France, although insufficient air tanker capacity halted Patton’s tanks in 1944, the final advance into Germany saw the airlift bringing up half a million gallons of gasoline a day. Nothing so colossal was to supervene in Korea, although air supply would prove a priceless asset, but from the beginning air transport was called on to assist the overseas deployment.

Since air transport offered the quickest method of alleviating critical shortages, the call for help was urgent. From all services requests came flooding in for vitally needed gear and personnel. For Naval Forces Far East, communicators to handle the dispatch load, boat crews for undermanned amphibious shipping, individuals of all ranks and rates were hurried west to build up personnel to something approaching wartime complement, to staff the expanding base facilities, and perhaps most urgent of all, to staff the staffs. The result of this overwhelming demand was to force an extremely rapid expansion upon the air transport facilities of the armed services, the Military Air Transport Service and the Fleet Logistic Air Wing.

The Military Air Transport Service, operated by the Air Force, is the aerial counterpart of MSTS. Established as a unified logistic organization pursuant to the National Security Act, MATS operates what is in
effect a scheduled airline between major traffic generating points around the world. To supplement this schedule by providing feeder service to dispersed naval activities, the flexibility of non-scheduled operations, and something to fall back on in a general emergency when MATS would be pretty well mortgaged to other activities, the Navy had set up its Fleet Logistic Support Wings. Of these there had originally been two, one on each coast, but the passion for centralizing which had afflicted the Defense Department had led to their merger, despite objections from the fleet commanders, into a single Fleet Logistic Air Wing, responsible to the Chief of Naval Operations and with headquarters at Patuxent River, Maryland.

At the outbreak of hostilities three Navy air transport squadrons were employed in the Pacific to supplement the regular MATS schedule. One, under the operational control of CincPacFleet, was operating six R5Ds from Barber’s Point, Oahu; the second was flying four JRM Martin Mars flying boats out of Alameda; the third, with five R5Ds and two R6Os was at Moffett Field. This capacity was speedily to prove inadequate.

On 28 June CincPacFleet asked the Chief of Naval Operations for operational control of the west coast squadrons, and two days later the request was granted. On 1 July, in his capacity as CincPac, Admiral Radford requested the commander of the Pacific Division of MATS to double his lift within ten days. On the 4th, as CincPacFleet, he ordered the Commander 14th Naval District to establish facilities for transport aircraft at Midway, and called upon Patuxent River for an additional increment of planes. Three more R5Ds were at once assigned the Moffett Field squadron, but backlogs were piling up on the west coast, more were urgently needed, and on the 7th the Fleet Marine Force Pacific was asked to contribute ten more transport aircraft.

All this was little enough. Air transport is not always the economical way of moving men and goods, but its expediency in time of crisis creates irresistible pressures. Despite the transfer of additional equipment to the Pacific run, and despite creation of a west coast coordinating office to make some sense out of priorities inflated beyond all meaning, the jam increased. By mid-July personnel awaiting transportation totalled nine times FLAW’s maximum weekly lift, the cargo backlog was seven times maximum, and MATS, in a similar situation, was chartering commercial planes. Nor had the theoretical virtues of centralization held up in the emergency: Patuxent River was too far away, and before the month was out CNO had established the Fleet Logistic Air Wing Pacific under the control of CincPacFleet.

By the end of July all available Navy and Marine R5Ds in the continental United States had been appropriated, some had been taken off the Port Lyautey run, and the number flying the Pacific had increased from 11 to 56. This build-up, while speeding vital cargoes, brought its own problems of surface logistics in the need for fuel, parts, and administrative personnel along the route westward through Oahu, Johnston, Kwajalein, and Guam, and in the requirement for the reactivation of facilities at Midway.

In Korea, in the meantime, the air war had begun. Like the war at sea, it began in the exploitation phase. But while command of the air was not seriously contested, there were still logistic and operational problems to solve. To ensure uninterrupted maintenance, both of air transport and air action against the enemy, ComServPac had already requested increased allocations of aviation fuel. To keep the Air Force bombers supplied with ammunition the west coast loading facilities had been reactivated. Happily, there was no need to construct bomber fields in the Far East. The capacity of Air Force bases in Japan and Okinawa exceeded the forces available, and shortly after the commencement of hostilities two B–29 bombardment groups were flown out from the United States to make up, with the 19th Group already there, the Bomber Command of the Far East Air Forces.

Unfortunately the Superforts, so rapidly deployed, were not the weapons best suited to repel the North Korean invasion. Major General Emmet O’Donnell, USAF, who headed up the Bomber Command, wanted to "go to work on burning five major cities in North Korea to the ground, and to destroy completely every one of about 18 major strategic targets." Here once again was the ancient belief, so often disproven and so often reaffirmed, that the flattening of cities will speedily end a war. But the burning process, vetoed in Washington, was somewhat inconsistent with the early concept of police action, and only a confirmed North Korean booster could have
discovered 18 major strategic targets in that country. In this war the supplies came from over the border, while the target of priority was the invading army.

Yet if the B–29 was not the ideal weapon to provide what was required, the jet fighters assigned to the defense of Japan were, in the first instance, hardly better. The cycle of strategic planning and weapons design, predicated upon the big war, had all but priced the Air Force out of the kind of operations which were now so urgently needed. Emphasis on the Sunday punch, natural enough under budgetary restrictions which meant that something had to go, had largely eliminated the workaday measures of limited war. But once again, under pressure of emergency, the Air Force demonstrated its notable ability to act with vigor in time of crisis against all its peacetime preachment. In the first week of July the crucial needs of the ground forces brought the decision to reconvert back again, and to abandon the jets for the F–51 Mustang with its superior endurance, lifting capacity, and ability to operate from rudimentary Korean airstrips. The next step was to get more planes.

The obvious imminence of increased aircraft attrition had led the Chief of Naval Operations to include, in his orders of 8 July to the Reserve Fleet, instructions to activate two transport aircraft carriers. But to get these moving would take time, and while there were a few Mustangs in Japan, FEAF’s need for more was urgent. Boxer, recently returned from the Western Pacific and awaiting overhaul, had the capacity and the speed, and was ordered into the breach. After emergency repairs at San Diego, she sailed for Alameda, where on the 8th she began to load. The Air Force got the planes to the docks and on the 14th, carrying 145 F–51s and six L–5s for the Air Force, 19 Navy planes, a Marine GCA unit, and a capacity load of fuel, ammunition, and personnel, Boxer steamed out the Golden Gate and headed west.

By mid-July the waters of the Pacific and the air above them were again bearing westward a great burden of military traffic. Fighting ships and their numerous auxiliaries, Army troops and the Marine Brigade, planes for the Air Force, food, fuel, and ammunition for all were converging upon the Far Eastern theater. Hour by hour the 6,000-mile distance was decreasing. If a line could be held into August a wholly new order of force would be available to stem the Communist aggression. But distances in Korea were decreasing too. By 15 July North Korean forces had covered half of the 225-mile journey to Pusan. The foothold was not yet secure. Whether it could be held depended on the course of events in the Korean hills, in the Korean air, and along the Korean coasts.
ALTHOUGH the conduct of war is always, in large measure, an exercise in applied geography, in Korea this was more than usually the case. On land, at sea, and in the air, the movements of forces and the employment of weapons were greatly affected by the nature of the arena.

The Korean peninsula, divided by the fortunes of international politics, itself divides the Yellow Sea from the Sea of Japan. S-shaped, and with its long axis oriented generally north and south, the country lies between the parallels of 34° and 42° North, and spans the latitude between Los Angeles and central Oregon, or between North Carolina and the southern New Hampshire border. Although Korean territory extends for almost 600 miles from north to south, the distance between eastern and western coasts nowhere exceeds 200 miles, and in places is little more than half that distance. One consequence of this geographical configuration is of striking military importance: with a total area of some 83,000 square miles, or of 85,000 if all the islands are included, only a small strip along the northern border is more than 100 miles from the sea.

But although Korea is surrounded by sea, its situation to leeward of the greatest of continents has given it a climate of extremes. While summer in the north is temperate the mountain winter is extremely bitter: even on the seacoast the mean January temperature at the Russian border is but 15° Fahrenheit. In southern Korea, by contrast, the climate is warm enough to permit the growing of cotton; summer temperatures reach the nineties, and the rains of June and July produce an exhausting combination of heat and humidity; at the peninsula's southwestern tip, winters are frost-free and the August mean is 80°. Summer is also the season of typhoons, which form in the Marianas and move northwestward toward the East China Sea. Typically, they recurve in time to pass over southern Japan or through the Straits of Tsushima, with only their fringes affecting southeastern Korea; sometimes, however, they recurve late and cross the peninsula; always their approach brings problems for the navigator and the strategist.

For five years prior to the outbreak of war the 38th parallel had divided Korea into roughly equal parts. But the division was an illogical one, resulting in such oddities as the isolation of the Ongjin peninsula in the west, and the separation of the city of Haeju from its port facilities; still more important was its separation of the populous and agricultural south from the complementary industrial economy of the north. Yet the parallel was not the country’s sole internal barrier, for long before geographers drew lines on maps, nature had divided this peninsula and subdivided it again.

Much of Korea is mountainous. In all the peninsula there are no true flatlands or plains. Like Italy with its Alps, Korea is protected from the continental land mass to the north by high mountains which fill the triangular area above the mouth of the Yalu River, and extend beyond the border to the Manchurian plain. Much of this triangle lies above 3,000 feet; peaks of over 6,000 feet are not uncommon; only along the coast does the altitude drop below 1,500 feet. The Yalu and Tumen Rivers, which separate Korea from Manchuria and from the Russian Maritime Provinces, have their origins in the Pai Shan range, which towers above 9,000 feet and is capped by perpetual snow.

Only three significant routes of access to the peninsula penetrate this formidable terrain. Of these the most important is the western corridor, along the lower reaches of the Yalu, through which the Japanese advanced in 1905 against the Russians and through which Communist Chinese forces would move against the United Nations. But there is also a gap in the mountains in central North Korea, formed by the valleys of the Tongno and Chongchon Rivers, while in the extreme northeastern corner of the country, narrow valleys and a coastal strip lead
down from eastern Manchuria and the Vladivostok region.

From the northern mountain mass a rocky cordillera runs southward, paralleling the eastern coast; along this shore, except in the embrasure at the head of the Korean Gulf between the seaport cities of Wonsan and Hungnam, the mountains descend steeply to the sea. North of Wonsan the coast is somewhat indented, with a number of harbors and towns; to the southward it is almost unbroken and the Korean divide, running within ten miles of the Sea of Japan, hems in a narrow and isolated ribbon of land where population is sparse, towns are small, and ports are few. Behind the coastal range the mountain spine recurs to the southwest, diminishes for a time in altitude, and then rises again in the south central region to form an isolated massif with peaks of five and six thousand feet. From the axial range, throughout the length of the peninsula, razorbacked spurs run off to west and southwest, compartmenting the country.

These mountain spurs and isolated masses divide the populous western part of Korea into a series of river basins, draining into the Yellow Sea and the Korean Strait, which in earlier times formed the principal geographic and economic units of the country. Although not navigable by ocean-going ships, these rivers remain of considerable internal importance: the principal Korean ports lie at their mouths, and the capitals of North and South Korea only a short way upstream. Five of these rivers, two north and three south of the 38th parallel, deserve the attention of the student of the Korean War.

The Chongchon River, northernmost of the strategically important west coast streams, is blocked to ocean shipping by drying mud banks which extend far offshore. But the central rail and road route to the north runs down its valley; the town of Sinanju, near the river’s mouth, is important as the junction of the western and central routes from Manchuria; and the bridges across the river are vulnerable to air attack.

Sixty miles to the southward the Taedong River, scene of the massacre of the crew of the General Sherman, empties into the Yellow Sea. Near its mouth lies Chinnampo, a city of some 90,000, seaport of the important northern mining and industrial region. Fifteen miles upstream the city of Kyomipo contains Korea’s largest iron and steel works; 30 miles to the northeastward lies the North Korean capital of Pyongyang. Once the ancient capital of the country, Pyongyang contains the tombs of long-dead monarchs, including that of Kija, legendary inventor of the topknot. In the Sino-Japanese War it was the scene of considerable fighting; early in the century it became the last abode of the deposed emperor. Under the Japanese it developed into a considerable manufacturing city, with industry based on the neighboring coal mines, and in due course, as the largest city in the north, became the capital of the People’s Republic. Like the bridges over the Chongchon at Sinanju, those which cross the Taedong at Pyongyang are of strategic significance.

Most important of Korea’s rivers is the Han, whose basin extends 150 miles from north to south and half that distance from east to west. With its principal tributaries, the Imjin and the Pukhan, the Han drains a major portion of the country on both sides of the 38th parallel. Rising only a few miles from the east coast, these streams wind through the central mountains before joining to pass the capital of Seoul and empty into the Yellow Sea near the principal west coast port of Inchon. For some 60 miles above its estuary the lower Han runs in a more or less east-west line, cutting the western lowlands and forming a potentially important and defensible military position. Click here to view map

South of the Han basin and west of the coastal range the country is drained by two important rivers. Some 90 miles below Inchon the Kum descends from the central massif to empty into the Yellow Sea; at its mouth lies Kunsan, a principal shipping center for the agricultural regions of southwestern Korea. In the southeastern corner of the peninsula, between the coastal range and the central highlands, the Naktong River flows southward for 100 miles or so, then east, then south again to empty into the Korean Strait. Near the mouth of the Naktong is the excellent harbor of Pusan, second city of the country and port of ingress from Japan. To the north the Naktong basin is divided from that of the Han by mountains more than 3,000 feet high; on the west it is separated from the Kum by the southern massif. Between these mountain masses the divide between the Naktong
basin and those of the Han and Kum diminishes in altitude; through this gap runs the main line of Korean communications, linking Japan and Pusan with the areas of heaviest population and agricultural production and with the capital at Seoul.

The geography of Korea, in sum, is dominated by three main features: a north blocked by high mountains; an east coast strip isolated by the mountain spine; and a broken piedmont to the west and south divided into a series of river basins. Upon this pattern industrial man, in the person of the Japanese, imposed his own geography. But although railroads, like faith, can sometimes move mountains, in Korea this movement was only a partial one. A traffic pattern could be developed which would unite the river basins, but the linking of eastern and western provinces remained incomplete. The mountain framework, broken, jumbled, and forbidding, continued to dominate the life of the country and to impose a north-south orientation which made division at the 38th parallel the more painful.

The first Korean railroad, built early in the century by the Japanese, linked the port of Pusan with the capital at Seoul. Although its construction required 99 bridges and 22 tunnels, it was completed by the time of the Russo-Japanese War. During that war its northward extension, from Seoul to Sinuiju on the Yalu River, was rushed to completion for strategic purposes. But a decade elapsed before the coasts were linked by a line through the mountain gaps between Seoul and Wonsan, and still longer until the construction of the east coast railroad, leading south from Siberia, began the transformation of fishing villages into industrial towns.

By 1950 the main structure of rail and road communications had assumed an X-shaped pattern, with the crossing at Seoul. From Manchuria in the northwest a line of double track spanned the Yalu at Sinuiju and ran southeast to Sinanju. There it was joined by a line which crossed the border below the Suipo reservoir, and by one coming from the upper reaches of the Yalu by way of the Tongno-Chongchon gap. From Sinanju, where these lines merged, the double track ran south to Pyongyang, Seoul, and beyond. On the far side of the mountain masses, widely separated from this west coast network, another rail line came south from the Vladivostok complex. One coastal spur extended from the lower Tumen River to Najin near the Russian border; farther inland, the main line ran south to Chongjin, along the shore to the new manufacturing cities of Hungnam and Wonsan, and on through the mountains to Seoul. On the east coast south of Wonsan the track extended as far as Yangyang, just above the 38th parallel, but from Yangyang to Pohang, 65 miles above Pusan, movement depended on road and sea.

The routes from the north thus converged at the Korean capital. Below this hub the railroad lines spread out again through South Korea. Two ran southeastward to the Pusan area, one leading directly from the valley of the Han into that of the Naktong, while the main line, now doubletracked, passed westward through Taegon in the Kum basin. From the latter, branches extended to the southwestern ports of Kunsan, Mokpo, and Yosu, but there was no south coast line, and rail traffic between Pusan and the southwestern ports had to be detoured northward around the central mountain massif.

To this extent the mountains remained unconquered. The lack of lateral communication remained the dominant feature of the transportation nets, road and rail alike. Of intercoastal rail links there were but two, one running north and south between Seoul and Wonsan, and one east and west, connecting the Wonsan-Hungnam region to Sinanju and Pyongyang. The Korean transport system thus rested upon three focal points, the Wonsan area on the east coast, the Pyongyang-Sinanju complex on the west, and Seoul. This situation sufficiently explains the strategic importance of these regions, for while the Korean road net was much more extensive than that of the railroad, and permitted access to most of the mountain regions, the roads were generally poor, unimproved, and unsuited to heavy mechanized equipment, and the anatomy of the highway system followed that of the rail lines.

Inevitably the scheme of maneuver adopted by the North Korean army for the conquest of this corrugated country was governed by the orientation of transport routes. The war had begun with a four-pronged invasion. The principal attack, delivered by the North Korean 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions and the 105th Armored
Brigade, and with two more divisions in reserve, was aimed south toward Seoul along the valley line from Wonsan. To the west the North Korean 6th Division overran the isolated Ongjin peninsula, and then joined with the 1st Division to move southeast, along the main line from Pyongyang, through Kaesong to the capital. In the central mountains the 2nd and the newly organized 7th Divisions attacked southward to Chunchon, terminus of a branch rail line from Seoul, after which the 2nd Division moved southwesterly down the railroad toward the capital while the 7th marched southward over mountain roads toward Wonju and the eastern of the two rail lines to Pusan. On the east coast beyond the divide, in a theater all its own, the North Korean 5th Division advanced southward along the shore road, leapfrogging ahead with small-scale amphibious operations.

Four prongs became three as the mass of the invading troops converged upon the capital’s transportation nexus. In this second phase the 5th Division continued its independent operations east of the mountain spine, while in the central mountains the 7th Division, supported by constabulary troops, threaded its way southward through Wonju in the direction of Andong. But the overwhelming bulk of the North Korean army, five first-line infantry divisions, two divisions of recent conscripts, and the armored brigade, had to be funneled through the Seoul complex. Once through the capital three divisions were peeled off to the southeast, and sent by rail and road to Wonju and Chunchon to join the troops coming south through the mountains, while the remaining five moved down the main road. It was the advance guard of this massive force that Task Force Smith had run up against on 5 July.

By the end of the second week of war the American 24th Division had been driven out of Chonan and was retiring on Taejon. Somewhat surprisingly, despite its overwhelming numerical strength, the North Korean army now slowed its advance: a full week was to pass before the battle of Taejon began. Although not apparently appreciated at the time, this was the first evidence of the logistic limitations which forced the enemy to conduct his offensives in a series of massive lunges, and which prevented the maintenance of continuous pressure during an advance. Only on 20 July, after a bitter three day fight in which General Dean, the division commander, was captured, was Taejon lost and the 24th Division forced once again to retreat.

By this time the invasion was again a four-pronged affair. Unknown to the Americans, the North Korean army had split its main force a second time, and had sent the 6th Division with attached troops southward to Kunsan, which it entered on the 16th, and toward the southwestern tip of the peninsula. In pursuit of the retiring 24th Division the enemy main body, now seven divisions strong, pressed southeastward from Taejon along the main road and rail line toward the saddle which gives access to the Naktong Basin. Five divisions were moving through the mountains to the Andong area, while on the east coast the 5th Division continued its solitary southward course.

Although this east coast threat was opposed only by the ROK 3rd Division, it was accessible to bombardment from the sea. ROK forces were also operating on the northern mountain front in the Andong-Chungju area, and the U.S. 25th Division was moving up from Pusan to Hamchang, north of Taegu, to block this enemy advance. It was the plan of General Walker, who assumed command of all ground forces in Korea on 13 July, to employ the 1st Cavalry Division to reinforce the 24th Division on the main enemy route of advance, and to push the 29th Infantry, which was coming from Okinawa, west from Pusan to a blocking position south of the central hill mass. But by mid-July North Korean forces had covered more than half the distance to Pusan, and had occupied the line Chonju-Taejon-Yongin-Yongdok, while the 1st Cavalry and the 29th Infantry had not yet arrived.

As Korean physiography and the Korean transportation net governed the land scheme of maneuver, so the hydrography of the area profoundly affected naval capabilities. The Korean coastline, generally straight along the Sea of Japan but deeply convoluted on south and west, has a length of some 5,400 miles. The steepness of the east coast, where the mountains rising from the sea confine road and railroad to a narrow coastal strip, has its underwater counterpart: except in the Gulf of Korea, off Wonsan and Hungnam, the 100-fathom curve runs close
to shore, coastal shipping is exposed, and warships can get within gun range of land communication facilities. But in the south and west conditions are very different, and the countless islands and deeply indented bays which mark the disappearance of the mountain ranges into the sea provide shelter for coastal traffic. The operations of major fighting ships are restricted, and effective supervision of coastal shipping calls for small craft of shallow draft. On the western shore further complications arise from the extraordinary hydrographic conditions of the Yellow Sea: whereas the tidal range in the Sea of Japan is of the order of a foot or two, here it ranges from 20 to 36 feet; currents are considerable and the water turbid; nowhere are there depths greater than 60 fathoms, and the 20-fathom line runs ten miles offshore. Extending far from land and exposed at low tide, the mud banks which trapped the French frigates a century ago remain a hazard for the unwary.

These hydrographic facts of life and the very limited forces available combined to dictate the early activities of the Navy. Task Force 77 had been withdrawn to Okinawa, and the period from 5 to 17 July saw naval effort concentrated on the movement of troops and supplies into Pusan, gunfire support of ROK forces resisting the enemy east coast advance, and the planning of future operations.
Chapter 5. Into the Perimeter
2. 5-17 July: East Coast Bombardment

Off Korea’s eastern shore, on 5 July, *Jamaica* relieved *Juneau* of her bombardment duties, and Admiral Higgins’ flagship headed for Sasebo to replenish. On the same day the British cruiser, accompanied by *Black Swan*, fired on the road and bridge in 37° 16’ N, where the coastal route runs close to the sea, and on the 6th shot up oil tanks, bridges, and shipping, and silenced a shore battery at Chumunjin. On the 7th, as *Black Swan* was relieved by *Hart*, the British cruiser destroyed an oil tank north of Ulchin, cruised northward firing at the cliff roads, and ended the day with an effective bombardment of Yangyang, the end of the coastal rail line from the north, where more oil tanks were destroyed.

While *Jamaica* was at work, the reinforcement and reorganization of the South Korea Support Group was underway in accordance with ComNavFE’s Operation Order 8–50. These instructions had been promulgated while the carriers were striking Pyongyang, and as Task Force 77 retired southward Admiral Andrewes was detached to join the Support Group; with *Belfast*, *Cossack*, and *Consort*, he proceeded to Sasebo where *Juneau* was replenishing. On 6 July Higgins and Andrewes flew to Tokyo to consult with Admiral Joy on the reorganization of the force and on problems of coordination with the Army in Korea and with the ROK Navy. An additional matter of importance, which had formed the subject of a dispatch from ComNavFE the previous day, was the question of the rail line on the northeast coast of Korea between Chongjin and Wonsan. Interruption of this line, both vital and vulnerable, would force the enemy to move rail traffic from the Vladivostok region by a circuitous route through Manchuria and down the west coast. Such interruption was urgently desired by Admiral Joy.

On the east coast 8 July saw *Jamaica* and *Hart*, now joined by *Swenson*, operating in the neighborhood of 37° There, where the highway skirts the water’s edge, road traffic was taken under fire, enemy shore batteries were engaged, and the British cruiser received a hit from a 75-millimeter shell which killed four and injured eight. Late in the day an alarm from Pohang brought *Jamaica*, *Hart*, and *Swenson* south at speed, while *Mansfield* broke off her escort duties and *Juneau* got underway from Sasebo. All five ships joined off Pohang on the morning of the 9th, but although the situation ashore was serious it was not yet out of control.

Since the threatened encirclement of the Korean forces north of the town remained only a threat, *Jamaica* was relieved and ordered to Sasebo, the destroyers were left to provide fire support, and *Juneau* proceeded to Pusan. There Admiral Higgins spent the day in conference with Korean and U.S. Army authorities, and in attempts to round up more interpreters and to obtain some solid information on the situation ashore. With evening the cruiser proceeded north again, and from 0200 to 0330 of the 10th bombarded the port of Samchok, following which she headed south to check once more on the situation at Pohang. But another more northerly mission was now brewing.

On the 10th a dispatch from ComNavFE instructed Higgins to extend his blockade as far north as practicable, and reemphasized the importance of the coastal tunnels on the Chongjin-Wonsan railroad. With these targets in mind equipment had already been procured and plans worked out to land a demolition party, and following another night on coastal patrol and a dawn bombardment of Yangyang and Sokcho, *Juneau* and *Mansfield* headed north for the region between Tanchon and Songjin.

At 2000 on the 11th the ships slowed and the demolition party, a lieutenant and four enlisted Marines and four gunner’s mates, led by Commander William B. Porter, *Juneau’s* executive officer, transferred from the
cruiser to **Mansfield**. Moving onward through the darkness the two ships reached the target area, ten miles south of Songjin, at midnight. **Mansfield** closed to within 1,000 yards of the beach, hove to and lowered her whaleboat, and the demolition party went on in. The landing was without incident, no opposition was encountered, and after considerable scrambling around the precipitous terrain the party managed to locate the tunnel and rig two 60-pound charges for detonation by the next train.

Although the results of the enterprise were unobserved, later reports of broadcasts by the North Korean radio seemed to indicate that the scheme had worked. By 0330 Commander Porter's party was back aboard, safe and sound, and with the distinction of having been the first members of the armed forces of the United States to invade Korea north of the 38th parallel. With their mission completed **Juneau** and **Mansfield** headed south again, and by noon of 12 July had rejoined Swenson on patrol between 37° and 38°.

The North Korean 5th Division had by this time reached south of the 37th parallel, and on the 12th the Army called for naval bombardment of the cliff road in 36°50'. On the 13th **De Haven** came up from Pusan with an artillery major for Admiral Higgins' staff and, although air and ground observers were still unavailable, communications were established with the 25th Division artillery detachment which was supporting the eastern front. Coastal fog on the 13th made targets hard to distinguish, but **Juneau** and **De Haven** nevertheless spent a busy day shooting at the cliff road in response to the Army request, at troops in Ulchin, at Mukho, at a railroad yard on the local line which leads back into the mountains, and at POL storage in the harbor of Samchok. The shooting was good, but the distressing ineffectiveness of 5-inch shells against roads and bridges made the arrival of 8-inch gunned cruisers from the United States appear increasingly urgent.

No requests from ashore were received on the 14th, and visibility remained poor, but with evening **Juneau** let off a few rounds against truck headlights on the road south of Ulchin. On the 15th, however, the cruiser and **De Haven** had a big day on the 20-mile stretch between 36°34' and 36°52' where the road runs generally close to the sea. For the first time an Army liaison plane was available to provide air spot, and a total of 645 rounds of 5-inch ammunition, expended against troops, shore batteries, and other targets, included a little night work against road traffic with the aid of star shell illumination. Joined by **Mansfield** on the next day, Higgins covered the coast between 36°30' and 37°15', and the three ships fired 173 rounds against targets of opportunity along the highway.

The 17th found **Juneau** fueling at Pusan while Admiral Higgins conferred with representatives of the Korean Navy. In the absence of the flagship, **Mansfield** and **De Haven** fired more than 400 rounds at miscellaneous targets in the same coastal area, and the British returned to the business of coastal bombardment with the cruiser **Belfast** and the destroyer **Cossack**. All this was useful, but the next day brought wholly unprecedented activity along the east coast in the form of an amphibious landing and a strike by the Seventh Fleet carrier force.
Chapter 5. Into the Perimeter

3. 3-30 July: The Pohang Landing

In the course of the first week of July American infantrymen had made contact with the enemy, the 24th Division had completed its movement to Korea, and the 25th Division had begun its embarkation. The Air Force had carried out attacks against the invading army and against targets of opportunity. A carrier strike had been flown against the North Korean capital, and the gunnery ships of Naval Forces Japan, augmented by British units, had continued their bombardment of the enemy’s east coast invasion route. This week saw also the commencement of planning for the first amphibious operation of the campaign.

Admiral Doyle had brought his ships into Sasebo on 3 July only to find that his prospective passengers had already departed. Next day, on orders from Admiral Joy, he flew back to Tokyo with members of his staff to work on a plan for the landing of two regimental combat teams of the 1st Cavalry Division on the west coast of Korea. For this operation CincFE’s preferred objective was Inchon, seizure of which would give access to the Seoul transportation complex and would cut the enemy’s main supply route; alternatively, it was proposed to land the cavalrymen at Kunsan, at the mouth of the river Kum, whence they could strike inland toward Taegon and the enemy’s right flank. The concept of a landing at Inchon was certainly strategically appealing, and was the germ of the operation which in September would put the enemy to ignominious flight. Its proposal in early July was evidence of early confidence in the efficacy of American intervention. But a few short days sufficiently demonstrated the visionary aspects of the idea, and even Kunsan, a much more modest alternative, was soon seen to be an impossibility. Almost at once the problem came to be not one of throwing the 1st Cavalry Division against the enemy’s flank, but of getting this force into Korea while there remained some Korean territory to get into.

For four days Doyle’s staff struggled with the Inchon and Kunsan problems. But although these objectives were discarded on the 8th, the work was not wholly wasted, for the need for an amphibious operation remained. Not only was it necessary to get the troops into Korea at the earliest possible moment, but to do so if possible without putting them through Pusan. By 6 July that port had handled 55 ships, more were on the way, and although the Army had set up a Pusan Logistical Command on the 4th, the port facilities were overloaded and in danger of being swamped.

Thus the situation called for a landing on the southern or eastern coast. The problem was to find an objective with easy access to the interior, north or west of Pusan and south and east of the advancing enemy. On 10 July Admiral Doyle’s suggestion of Pohang was accepted, planning proceeded at an accelerated rate, and the activity was legalized on the 12th when Commander Naval Forces Far East issued his Operation Order 9-50. The affair was christened with the code name "Bluehearts."

The town of Pohang, which would shortly receive these visitors from overseas, had some 50,000 inhabitants. Located about 65 miles north of Pusan, it lies on the western shore of Yongil Man, a bay about six miles wide. To the southeast Yongil Man is protected by a high peninsula; on the west it is bordered by dunes, with sand hills beyond; the bottom affords good holding ground. At Pohang there were two long jetties with ten feet of water alongside where landing craft could unload; from Pohang, rail and road communications ran south to Pusan and, more important for the purpose of the moment, west through the mountains to Taegu; there was an airstrip of sorts nearby. All in all, the choice of objective was both obvious and sound.

The speed with which the operation was planned and mounted was remarkable. Normal lead time for an amphibious operation is measured in weeks if not in months, but this objective was selected on 10 July, the
expedition sailed on the 14th and 15th, and the landing was made on the morning of the 18th. Such an unprecedented schedule gave little time to collect information and to plan, train personnel, and assemble and modify gear. That these dates were met must be reckoned a considerable feat.

There were, it is true, certain favoring circumstances. The Amphibious Group was a good outfit, and knew its business; although the 1st Cavalry Division lacked amphibious experience its men were willing and put their backs into the work. As a consequence of CincFE's plan for amphibious training of occupation troops there were present in Japan, in addition to Doyle's ships, detachments from the Pacific Fleet Amphibious Training Command, including an Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company or "Anglico," which could be assigned to the Cavalry Division's staff to help with the conduct of the operation. All concerned, Army and Navy alike, were cheek by jowl in Tokyo, so that written communications could be eliminated and the business got on with by high-speed conversation.

But there were also major problems. The first of these, and one which would recur throughout the war, was the problem of intelligence: nobody knew much about Pohang. If one proposes to put landing craft up on the beach in order to get troops ashore it is desirable to know the underwater characteristics of the objective area, but although American forces had occupied South Korea, and had undertaken to conduct a mapping program, Korean beach gradients and much else remained a mystery. This, it may be observed, was no new experience; the same situation had prevailed in the Philippines after 40 years of American occupation. In January 1945, when American attack forces set forth for Lingayen Gulf and the reconquest of Luzon, information concerning those beaches, which other Americans had previously defended against the Japanese, was conspicuous by its absence. Yet experience had not taught convincingly the need for basic intelligence studies, and so far as South Korea was concerned the lack of information, as Admiral Doyle remarked, "was appalling."

Fortunately there was a solution. Pohang was still in friendly hands. On 10 July U.S. troops were reported guarding the airstrip, an aviation engineer unit was landed by LST, and Fifth Air Force was preparing to move in a fighter squadron. On the 11th some officers from the Amphibious Group and Cavalry Division staffs were flown to Pohang, to return two days later with useful and previously unavailable information. On the 15th a second group flew across to make such preparations for the landing as were possible, and to keep the command informed of enemy progress down the coastal road.

There was also a problem of shipping. The Amphibious Group had been sent westward for training purposes, and the four vessels available—a command ship, an attack transport, an attack cargo ship, and an LST—were wholly inadequate to the contemplated task. Fifteen more LSTs were procured from Scagaj, and two attack cargo ships, Oglethorpe and Titania, were borrowed from the Military Sea Transportation Service for the assault phase. For the follow-up echelons shipping was also provided by MSTS, in the amount of three transports, a dozen Scagaj LSTs, and four Japanese time-charter vessels.

Although Oglethorpe and Titania had retained the classification of AKA while assigned to MSTS, their equipment and personnel had been radically reduced. The first problem was met by Fleet Activities Yokosuka, where landing craft, boat fittings, and much miscellaneous gear including slings, nets, and the like were installed. At the same time an emergency air movement of boat crews and other specialized personnel from the west coast helped to strengthen the crews, but the two ships were still below peacetime complement when the force set sail, and far below that of wartime.

The load imposed on Fleet Activities Yokosuka in preparation for "Bluehearts" was not limited to the modification of the AKAs. To assist in unloading at the objective half a dozen LSUs were reactivated; the proposal to tow these to Pohang by LST superimposed a requirement for the manufacture of towing gear. Both in this high-speed shipyard work and in the loading of the Attack Force there was reason to be grateful for Japanese facilities and Japanese labor. The larger ships, which carried an average of 138 vehicles and 575 tons of bulk cargo, were loaded in little over a day, and the vehicle-laden LSTs in only four hours. Despite all difficulties the
sailing date was somehow met.

The employment of Scap LSTs in both the assault phase and the follow-up echelons, and the use of chartered Japanese merchant ships, created an unusual situation. Seldom, indeed, do men embark for war in ships manned and navigated by enemy aliens. Since control of the Scap fleet was exercised through the Civilian Merchant Marine Committee, an agency of the Japanese Government, its administration was somewhat unwieldy. Always, of course, there was the language problem. But the most important complications were of a military nature. If sailed independently, the only contact with these ships was through Japanese radio channels, cumbersome and presenting difficult questions of security. Even when sailing in company, problems arose in communicating with units which could not be issued classified publications. Placing of Navy radiomen and quartermasters aboard, while answering some difficulties gave rise to others, not least in the manifestation at meal time of cultural differences between east and west. Yet these problems, if not overcome, were mitigated by various expedients, and the Scap LSTs gave yeoman service throughout the war.

Although the Pohang operation was a comparatively small one, and although plans and preparations were made in record time, the organization of the Attack Force followed standard amphibious practice. The landing force, commanded by Major General Hobart Gay, USA, consisted of the 5th and 8th RCTs of the 1st Cavalry Division, an artillery group of three battalions, and minor attached units. These were transported to the objective area in the large vessels of the transport group, in the 16 LSTs of the tractor group, and in follow-up shipping. The Attack Force also included a minesweeping group of one AM and six AMS; a gunfire support group made up of Juneau, the American destroyers Kyes, Higbee, and Collett, and the Australian Bataan; and units assigned for reconnaissance, control purposes at the objective, administration of the beaches, and the like. Deep air support was the responsibility of the Air Force, which by this time had a fighter squadron on the Pohang air strip; close air support at the objective, should the natives prove unfriendly, would be provided by the Seventh Fleet, which was coming up from Okinawa for the occasion.

On the 14th, as the minesweepers started work in Yongil Man, the tractor group of LSTs, towing the LSUs and with two fleet tugs as escort, sailed from Tokyo Bay, to be followed on the morrow by the transport group. The route was south along the coast of Japan, then north by Bungo Strait through which Yamato, mightiest battleship in the world, had sortied on her final cruise in vain attempt to strike the American fleet off Okinawa. Turning westward through the Inland Sea, the force steamed past Shimonoseki, where almost a century before the U.S.S. Wyoming had engaged the forces of the Daimyo of Choshu, and into the Korean Strait. Early in the morning of the 18th, the ships moved into Yongil Man. Fighting had been reported only a few miles north of Pohang, but the ROK 3rd Division still held the road, and at 0559 Admiral Doyle made the signal to "Land the Landing Force" in accordance with the plan for an unopposed operation. Task Force 77 and Juneau were released from their support commitments, and only a small combat air patrol from Valley Forge was retained overhead to protect the shipping of the Attack Force.

Although peaceful, the scene at Pohang on the 18th was a busy one. From the ships of the transport group at anchor in Yongil Man, troops and vehicles were shuttled ashore. Nine of the LSTs disgorged their cargo along the jetty wall and on the beaches of Yongil Man, along with the smaller landing craft; seven were ordered out to Kuryongpo around the point to unload vehicles. Landing was begun at 0715; general unloading commenced at 0930; except for Cavalier, all major ships had been emptied by midnight, while the LSTs had discharged all personnel, all vehicles, and more than half their bulk cargo. More than 10,000 troops and 2,000 vehicles, and almost 3,000 tons of cargo had been put ashore.

There is no landing better than an unopposed landing. Since the ROK troops were still holding out to the northward, the cavalry division had been greeted at Pohang not by the enemy but by General Walker, and by trains ready-formed to carry them to the front. To some, however, this came as a disappointment. As the first
sizable planned naval operation of the war, "Bluehearts" had drawn the attention of the press, and 26
 correspondents were embarked in the command ship Mount McKinley. At Pohang the lack of correlation between
 public interest and strategic worth, always a problem for the armed services in a democracy, reappeared in the
 report of the public information officer that "the fact that the landing was unopposed detracted a great deal from
 the news value." But however saddened the scribes, the bloodless and expeditious nature of the operation was to
 the military a matter for rejoicing.

 At noon on the 19th General Gay assumed command ashore. In the afternoon, with unloading completed,
 ships of the Attack Force shifted to heavy weather anchorages as Grace, the first typhoon of the season, was
 reported heading for Korea Strait. On the 22nd Grace came up the coast, bringing gusts of 50 knots to Yongil
 Man and delaying the arrival of the second echelon of shipping. This had been scheduled to come in on the 21st,
 but the MSTS units reached Pohang only on the 23rd, and the chartered Japanese freighters the next day. The
 LSTs of the third echelon arrived on the 26th and 29th.

 For a variety of reasons, unloading of the follow-up shipping was somewhat slow. The MSTS transports
 suffered from their shortages of personnel; the Japanese freighters lacked trained hatch crews and unloading gear,
 and the ever-present language problem complicated supervision; after two days of continuous labor the shore
 party was getting tired. Nonetheless the work proceeded. On the 23rd the commanding officer of a Navy LST was
 directed by Admiral Doyle to take over the duties of senior officer present, and late in the evening the force
 commander sailed in Mount McKinley, with Union, Kyes, and Diachenko, for Tokyo. A week later it was all over,
 and CTFO was able to report the completion of operations at Pohang and the withdrawal of all shipping from
 Yongil Man. But this report was by way of formality, for the strategic rewards of the operation had long since
 been apparent. On 22 July, four days after the initial landing, the 1st Cavalry Division had relieved the battered
 24th Division southeast of Taejon.
History of United States Naval Operations – Korea
James A. Field Jr.

Chapter 5. Into the Perimeter
4. 10-31 July: Seventh Fleet Operations

At Buckner Bay, 600 miles to the southward, Admiral Struble’s staff had been working on ways to deal with the Seventh Fleet’s Formosan responsibilities while planning with Admiral Hoskins for further carrier strikes in Korea. In Formosa, where some expected an invasion attempt before mid-August by a force of up to 200,000, rivalries and dissension on the upper levels and low morale below raised the prospect of rapid collapse in the event of a landing in strength. Seventh Fleet control of the Strait was consequently the crucial factor; with the Seventh Fleet involved in Korea, warning of attack was essential; on 10 July, therefore, as Struble returned from his visit to Taipei, redeployment of the Seventh Fleet patrol planes was begun. VP 28, a P4Y squadron, was moved up from Guam to Okinawa; VP 46, a Mariner squadron with units at Sangley Point and Buckner Bay, was ordered forward to the Pescadores along with the tender Suisun; Commander Fleet Air Wing I was relieved of responsibilities at Guam and instructed to advance his headquarters to Okinawa.

These movements were expeditiously completed. Captain Grant had his wing headquarters in operation at Naha Air Force Base by the 15th; on the next day VP 28 began daily patrols of the China coast and northern Formosa Strait; by 17 July VP 46 was flying searches in the southern sector. On the basis of this forward deployment Commander Seventh Fleet proposed on the 16th that General MacArthur announce the imminent commencement of naval air reconnaissance of Formosa Strait. The proposal was approved the same day, and having brandished the weapon of publicity against the Chinese Communists, Admiral Struble sailed from Buckner Bay to employ his Striking Force against the North Koreans.

In Korea his presence was urgently desired. On 9 July General Dean, then commanding all Army units in Korea, had inquired hopefully about the possibility of carrier air support. In response Struble next day advised Admiral Joy of his willingness to help out either with close support or with further strikes on west coast targets, while noting that until ammunition reached Okinawa on the 18th he would be limited to two days of close support operations. For effective work in support of troops the front line communications problem was governing: if the Tactical Air Control Squadron from Mount McKinley could be made available, all would be well; if not, Seventh Fleet could supply a small control team, although equipment would have to be provided it. Subject to these considerations Struble proposed to sail from Buckner on the 11th for operations on the 13th and 14th.

The offer, however, was not accepted. Admiral Joy’s reply stated that he knew of no plans for carrier close support, and that the Tacron was not designed for shore employment. The limitations on Seventh Fleet endurance, moreover, made him want to hold it in reserve to cover the landing of the 1st Cavalry Division, and on the 12th a dispatch operation order instructed Admiral Struble to provide objective air cover at Pohang, support of the landing force, and such additional effort as might be directed. Two days later Struble again flew to Tokyo for talks with Admiral Joy and General Stratemeyer; a schedule was worked out which called for two days in support of the landing and in northward strikes against the enemy, a day for replenishment, and two more days of operations; an east coast area was cleared with FEAF for strikes on the 18th and 19th. On 16 July, as the Seventh Fleet started north to cover the Pohang landing, Admiral Joy issued Operation Order 10–50 governing the conduct of carrier attacks against the North Korean forces.

The planning for these operations had seen the emergence of the first of a series of problems concerning carrier employment which was to trouble naval commanders throughout the campaign. So far as support of the Pohang landing was concerned there was no difficulty: this was a conventional naval task in which all hands felt...
quite at home. But attack on the North Korean forces and installations beyond the beachhead raised problems of coordination with the Air Force. Subsequent to the first carrier attack on Pyongyang, General Stratemeyer had requested the Seventh Fleet to confine its further strikes to northeastern Korea, north of the 38th parallel and east of 127° E, with target priorities beginning with rail and highway cuts and running down through petroleum facilities to airfields. Yet such an employment of carrier aviation, however desirable in the situation of the moment, was certainly not envisaged in the existing unification agreements. The roles and missions papers for the armed forces, worked out during the painful period of unification, made interdiction of enemy land power and communications an exclusive Air Force function in which the Navy could participate only after a complicated bureaucratic procedure of authorization. The fact that naval air was not to be so used had been one of the reasons advanced in support of the cancellation of construction of the carrier United States.

It had, of course, been recognized that in an emergency the instruments at hand and the urgency of the situation would take precedence over paper agreements. But there was the further difficulty that the employment of carrier aviation in interdiction was not contemplated in current naval thinking. On the one hand the interdiction of land communications calls for continuous effort; on the other, it was felt that logistic considerations and the dangers of air and submarine attack made it undesirable for carriers to operate for more than two days in the same location. By autumn, when concern over air and submarine opposition had greatly subsided and when underway replenishment had improved, the carriers would be operating for protracted periods in the same locality. But autumn was far away, and in the intervening period of emergency things would become worse before they became better.

This triple conflict between legislation, doctrine, and the exigencies of the situation was to prove the less manageable owing to difficulties in coordination with the Air Force. Although these, stemming both from doctrinal differences and from technical difficulties in communication, were never to be completely solved, some steps had already been taken. On 8 July General Stratemeyer had advised CincFE that it was essential that he have "operational control" of all naval aircraft in the theater. To the Navy, quite apart from doubts as to FEAF’s technical capability to handle this effort, the implications of the request appeared excessive, involving as they did the authority to control carrier movements as well as to assign targets, and after some discussion a CincFE letter of the 15th delegated "coordination control" to the commanding general of FEAF. It was on the basis of this agreement that Struble had cleared with FEAF his plans to strike northward from Pohang and that Joy issued his operation order of 16 July.

Morning of the 18th found Valley Forge, Triumph, and their screening ships in the southern Sea of Japan, some 60 miles northeast of Pohang. At dawn local antisubmarine and combat air patrols were launched by Triumph, and Valley Forge sent off a target combat air patrol and a support group of attack planes to assist the landing. No alternative targets seem to have been given the support group; the location of the front line and the needs of the ROK 3rd Division were apparently unknown; and when the landing proved unopposed and the task force was released from its air commitments the support group jettisoned its load.

Except for the requirement of a combat air patrol over Pohang, the Valley Forge air group was now available for attacks on North Korean targets. On the 18th and 19th, therefore, strikes were flown against railroad facilities, industrial plants, and airfields from Pyonggang and Wonsan north through Hungnam and Hamhung. In the two days of attacks two aircraft were lost, but both pilots were recovered. About 50 grounded aircraft were sighted, of which more than half were destroyed and the remainder damaged, while flights north along the railroad on the 19th exploded four locomotives. But the biggest explosion was at Wonsan.

This seaport city, located at the head of the Korean Gulf and at the east coast focus of Korean rail communications, had grown rapidly under the Japanese regime. Its population, now of the order of 150,000, had tripled within a generation. It was the site of a number of manufacturing plants, and the center of a considerable complex of petroleum installations, developed to support Japanese continental expansion, which included the
largest refinery in Korea. Following the arrival of the Russians in 1945 this refinery had for some time been inactive, but in 1947 a joint Russian-North Korean enterprise had been formed to operate it, Soviet supervisors had been provided, and late in the next year crude oil began to arrive in Soviet tankers for processing.

On the afternoon of the 18th Valley Forge jets reported that the refinery appeared in full operation, and at 1700 a strike group of 11 Skyraiders and 10 Corsairs was launched, the former armed with 1,000 and 500-pound bombs and the latter with high velocity aircraft rockets. As the group came in over the city the Corsairs went down first, firing their rockets and 20-millimeter guns, and were followed by the ADs with their bombs. The results were spectacular, with large fires and so much smoke that photographic damage assessment was difficult. On the next day a Valley Forge flight passing in the neighborhood observed the refinery still burning vigorously, while the smoke, rising to 5,000 feet, was visible to the force at sea.

The attack on the Wonsan refinery gave rise to an interservice conflict of claims. Air Force planes had attacked the city between 6 and 13 July. There then followed the carrier attack of the 18th, on the basis of which the Navy reported the destruction of the refinery. On 10 August another heavy raid was made by B–29s, after which a FEAF communique claimed total destruction of the refinery, which had been attacked on the basis of “reconnaissance photographs [which showed] that only a small portion . . . had been damaged in the previous small air strikes.”

Interrogation of supervisory personnel by Marine Corps officers in the autumn elicited the statement that although the early raids had had adverse effects on employee morale, and had stimulated the removal of bulk petroleum products, no bomb had hit in any vital area. The Valley Forge attack of the 18th was reported to have destroyed 12,000 tons of refined products, saturated every vital area in the refinery, and caused it to be declared a total loss. What remained of the plant had been flattened by the bombing of 10 August, and in early October, as ROK forces approached Wonsan, the Russian supervisors had headed north for the border.

Apart from the question of who hit what, the strikes of 18 and 1 July raise questions as to target selection in a police action. The objectives were, of course, in accordance with the desires expressed by FEAF concerning attacks by Seventh Fleet aircraft on North Korean targets. But the aspect of strategic air warfare which emphasizes attack on industrial plant is slow to have effect at the battleline; the real strategic targets were outside Korea, and destruction of North Korean facilities as of this date would seem merely to have promised difficulties in reconstruction, assuming U.N. success in the campaign. Overshadowed though it was by the refinery quarrel, it seems probable that the destruction of grounded aircraft by the Valley Forge air group was the most important result of the two-day operation; together with some similarly successful sorties by Air Force jets on the 19th, this pretty well liquidated the North Korean Air Force. But habits are hard to break, and just as the carrier commanders were reluctant to undertake continuous operations in the same area, so others found it difficult to divest themselves of strongly held notions on air warfare; on 31 July a message from the Joint Chiefs urged the strategic bombing of North Korean industrial targets.

It may be conceded, in this context, that the case of the Wonsan refinery is not entirely clearcut. Despite the handcarrying nature of the North Korean army the destruction of 12,000 tons of petroleum products may have had valuable consequences, so great is the importance of oil to modern war. And inevitably, the course of the Korean conflict being what it was, the policeman’s attitude developed into that of the warrior. But in these early weeks, at least, it would seem that the police action should have been conducted as such. Rioters are quelled with nightsticks, not by turning off the gas and water at their homes. Had it been possible in the early days to deliver, in accordance with Army desires and naval capabilities, well-controlled and well-coordinated close air support at the front, the effect on the ground situation would have been more immediate. It was on the ground that the emergency lay.

Two days of east coast strikes had gone off well, but nature now intervened to change the schedule. Concerned by the time involved in commuting between Okinawa and the scene of action, Commander Seventh
Fleet had been expediting arrangements for underway replenishment and was contemplating a shift of base forward to Sasebo; the plans of the moment called for the force to fuel at sea on the 20th in preparation for two more days of operations. But the approach of Typhoon Grace forced postponement, and with completion of flight operations on the 19th all ships set Typhoon Condition One and prepared for the worst in the way of weather. On the 20th, in winds of up to 40 knots, the force cruised the Sea of Japan, and late in the day headed south through Tsushima Strait to get clear of Grace’s skirts and gain an operating position off the west coast of Korea. On the 21st Triumph was detached with Comus for a ten-day period of availability at Sasebo.

Admiral Struble had advised ComNavFE on the afternoon of the 20th that he hoped to conduct a one-day strike on west Korea on the 22nd, spend a day in refueling and rearming his force, and return on the 24th and 25th for further attacks against west coast targets. But this schedule depended on factors beyond his control, on weather and on the availability of replenishment ships. The tanker Navasota was by this time on hand to fuel the force, but for rearming the situation was less clear, and depended on whether the AK Grainger, which had reached Okinawa on the 18th with a load of aircraft ammunition from Guam, could rearm the force at sea. Failing in this it would be necessary to proceed to Sasebo, with consequent delay.

At dawn on the 22nd, from a location in the Yellow Sea northwest of Kunsan, Valley Forge launched her air group. Although his force was now down to a single carrier, Struble undertook the double mission of support of troops and attack on northern targets: the propeller-driven ADs and F4Us were sent off to the eastward to work under airborne controllers from Fifth Air Force in close support of the ground forces; the jets headed north to attack targets beyond Seoul. The air support mission, first of the Korean War, went awry as the strike aircraft, unable to reach the controllers on the prescribed radio frequencies, resorted to attacks on secondary targets in the area of the capital. In the afternoon a second effort met with similar results, and after recovery of the strike group the force headed southward to rendezvous with Navasota. By this time Valley Forge was down to a little less than a one-day supply of aviation gasoline.

Rendezvous with the tanker was made late in the morning of the 23rd to the southward of Cheju Do, but Grainger and the ammunition were not there. On completion of refueling, therefore, Task Force 77 headed for Sasebo where it arrived on the morning of the 24th. The delay in resuming operations, which Admiral Struble had feared, had been forced upon him.

In the meantime the events of the 22nd had prompted a review of the mission of the Seventh Fleet. The waste of effort consequent to the inability of his strike groups to reach the controllers had led Struble to look for more profitable employment elsewhere. Casting his eyes northward, he proposed to ComNavFE a change of schedule which would call for two days of strikes against east coast targets from Chongjin southward, coupled with cruiser and destroyer bombardment between 40° and 41°, and asked for detailed target information. But by this time a new emergency was developing in Korea. The Pohang landing had been successful, the main front had been reinforced, but west of the central hill mass the advance of the North Korean 6th Division had continued unopposed. The entire southwestern region had been overrun, and the invaders were moving eastward with nothing to block their path. On the 23rd, while Valley Forge was refueling, an emergency dispatch from Eighth Army advised all major commanders that an "urgent requirement" existed for the employment of naval air in the west coast area beginning that very day, and requested information as to naval capabilities in close and general support.

From both Joy and Struble this dispatch brought prompt reply. The former observed that subject to the primary mission of the neutralization of Formosa, and to the undesirability of protracted operations in one spot, no great difficulty was expected in coordinating Seventh Fleet and Air Force operations, provided only that successful joint communications were established. But to Commander Seventh Fleet the situation appeared more complicated. While observing that Eighth Army’s urgent requirement could be met beginning on the 26th, he emphasized the fact that present methods of coordination were unsatisfactory, and that in addition to the
communications problem there was an urgent requirement for personnel trained in the control of close support aircraft. To fill this need Struble repeated his proposal of 10 July that either the Tactical Air Control Squadron from Admiral Doyle’s Amphibious Group be sent to Korea, or that the Seventh Fleet itself supply a small but experienced control team.

The need for some competent control group to handle close support had already received consideration. Four days earlier EUSAK—Eighth U.S. Army in Korea—had requested that the Anglico which had been attached to the 1st Cavalry Division for the Pohang landing be assigned on completion of that operation to assist the Joint Operations Center in control of naval gunfire and naval air. The request had been approved by Admiral Joy’s headquarters, and Admiral Doyle was so instructed on the 20th. But by then the Anglico was returning to Yokohama by sea, and by the time of its arrival it had come to seem more profitable to retain it in Japan to train Army and Air Force personnel.

So things stood when the crisis in the west and Eighth Army’s call for help led Struble to renew his suggestion for the employment of the Tacron or of a Seventh Fleet control party. These proposals also were to prove abortive. The plan for the Seventh Fleet tactical air control party, worked up at Buckner Bay, had contemplated a pooling of Valley Forge and Triumph material and personnel, but the sortie on the 16th had interrupted preparations. The recommended employment of the Tacron was vetoed at the instance of Admiral Doyle, who felt its personnel would be spread unprofitably thin. The upshot was that efforts to increase the yield of carrier operations in close support were limited to attempts, themselves badly needed, to improve radio communications between the Seventh Fleet Striking Force and the JOC.

At Sasebo rearming of Valley Forge had begun on the morning of the 24th. But replenishment was to be cut short by the rapid deterioration of the ground situation in the west. Early in the afternoon an emergency dispatch was received from ComNavFE, cancelling existing plans and assigning Task Force 77 the area south of the Kum and west of the line Kunsan-Chonju–Namwon-Kwangju. This region was believed to contain a major concentration of North Korean forces according to the dispatch the "total area is considered enemy." Commander Task Force 77 was adjured to search carefully and to destroy all armor, bridges, traffic, troop concentrations, and barges up to the limit of his capabilities. The only restrictions on his operations were to beware of Korean Navy YMS types operating inshore, and to "hit only military targets" at Kunsan, where preservation of port facilities seemed desirable in view of possible future amphibious operations. As the dispatch emphasized the critical situation of the ground forces and urged immediate efforts, Valley Forge broke off her rearming before completion, and Triumph, whose yard period had barely begun, rejoined the force. At midnight on the 24th Task Force 77 was again underway from Sasebo, headed north.

The carriers launched at 0800 on the 25th from a position south of Korea, and for the remainder of the day maintained planes in the air over the front line. Once again, however, results were disappointing pilots returning from the morning strikes reported that air controllers had more planes than they could handle and that radio channels were overcrowded; these factors, together with the lack of common charts and procedures, had prevented controlled attacks, with the result that the "free opportunity" area assigned in the west had been liberally used to dispose of ammunition.

Early in the afternoon Admiral Struble reported that owing to lack of targets the morning sweeps had been of very minor effect. In point of fact it appears that ComNavFE’s intelligence was stale, and that the North Korean 6th Division had by this time passed through the country assigned the carriers and was concentrated about Sunchon. The region so menacingly described in the emergency dispatch from Admiral Joy turned out to be a peaceful agricultural area populated principally by donkey carts and men working in rice paddies. Although he announced that he would continue with afternoon attacks, the effort seemed unfruitful to Commander Seventh Fleet, and once again he emphasized the need of proper communications with commanders in the field.
In view of the unproductive nature of the day’s work the Valley Forge air group had flown pilots to Taegu to arrange for targets and communications for the 26th. The result was an assignment to close support at the front, attack on miscellaneous targets as directed by the Joint Operations Center, and deep support strikes in the region between Taejon and Seoul. In the evening these intentions were reported by Commander Seventh Fleet to ComNavFE, and the Striking Force turned northeast and headed for the Korean Strait and for a morning position off Pohang.

Admiral Struble’s dispatch stating his plans for 26 July produced an immediate howl from Tokyo. No new area for carrier operations had been arranged with FEAF headquarters in Japan, and Admiral Joy requested immediate information as to Commander Seventh Fleet’s intentions. Prior to the 25th arrangements for carrier strikes had been made on the upper levels, between ComNavFE and the commanding general of FEAF, on a basis of general area coordination, but with the commencement of efforts to use carrier planes in support of troops this system began to break down. Struble’s reply described the arrangements which had been made directly with EUSAK and JOC, and since difficulties were still being experienced in direct communication, followed up with a request that ComNavFE clear with FEAF for operations as far north as Suwon. On the 27th a message from ComNavFE implicitly endorsed the procedure of coordinating operations with the JOC in Korea, and from this time on such coordination was increasingly attempted.

Within the force, morning of the 26th was marked by an extremely convincing submarine contact, but the early strikes led to little more than the destruction of some trucks on the enemy main line of communications. But in the afternoon, despite congestion of aircraft in the target area, one flight of four ADs at last found adequate control. The result was the reported destruction of 70 percent of Yongdong, a junction town just west of the saddle where two highways and the railroad come together, and two later flights of eight Corsairs applied more effort to this pressure point by striking troop concentrations in the region between Yongdong and Taejon.

On conclusion of the operations of the 26th, which at least represented some improvement over earlier efforts in support of Eighth Army, the task force withdrew to refuel. CincFE had expressed his enthusiasm over the effect of the carrier air attacks, and on the 27th the Fifth Air Force JOC, after politely describing the attacks of the 26th as "invaluable and much appreciated," inquired as to their results, requested information as to future operations, and stated it could handle as many flights as could be provided. But a report from Admiral Doyle on the state of Army and Air Force control of tactical air seemed to indicate a need for basic reorganization and training before adequate standards could be obtained, while the Seventh Fleet, despite the compliments, remained unsatisfied with the results of its work.

By now, too, there were signs that a crisis was making up in Formosa Strait. On the 21st a reported sighting of between 500 and 1,500 junks by the master of a British merchantman had led to special searches by Fleet Air Wing I. These proved negative, but on the 26th a VP 28 patrol plane was attacked by two fighters in the northern part of the Strait. In this situation, and as continuation of the support effort seemed of doubtful value, Struble recommended to ComNavFE that the Seventh Fleet move south to the Buckner-Formosa area for a possible sweep of the Strait.

This proposal, however, was disapproved. The needs of Eighth Army remained paramount, other units were dispatched to the southward, and on 28 July Task Force 77 returned to the attack, operating in the area northwest of Mokpo. The strikes of propeller-driven aircraft on the 28th were again concentrated around Yongdong, and in the neighborhood of Hamchang at the northwest corner of the perimeter. Attacks were made on troop concentrations, trucks, and tanks, and although one jet flight to the Naktong River front failed to contact a controller and returned without result, control arrangements were reported somewhat improved.

In an attempt to make them even better, by improvement of communications between the task force and the JOC and by simplification of the complicated control procedures then in effect, another mission was flown to Taegu. This visit bore fruit in the establishment of a direct communications link, and helped to minimize some
operating problems by making JOC personnel aware of what the carrier force could and could not do. The previous overloading of airborne controllers was partially rectified by the assignment, for the 29th, of a defined section of the front line and of specific Mosquito aircraft to the planes of Task Force 77. Within the force, with similar ends in view, another move to organize a tactical air control party with Valley Forge and Triumph personnel had begun, but the early permanent detachment of the British carrier was to prevent fruition.

On the 29th the Corsairs and Skyraiders shifted their efforts to the Hadong-Sunchon region of the south coast, from which a battalion of the 29th Regiment, moved west from Pusan to block the passage south of the central hill mass, had just been driven by the North Korean 6th Division. Here pilots reported destruction of a score or more trucks and a couple of tanks and damage to bridges and rolling stock, and described control procedures as varying from very good to very bad. To the northward, on the Naktong River front, a morning strike of eight Panther jets found a controller who was at least frank to admit that he was overloaded and could not work them; four were detached on armed reconnaissance to the northward while the others, although unable to make radio contact, showed their initiative by following an F–80 flight in a strafing run on enemy troops.

With the end of the day’s operations the Striking Force retired. Carrier operations during July, limited though they were by logistic problems and frustrated by difficulties in control, had been reasonably successful, but they had not been free from cost. In addition to the aircraft destroyed in the deck crash of 4 July, two F9Fs, three F4Us, and a helicopter had gone into the water, and on the 22nd an AD had crashed and burned, taking its pilot down with it. Most downed personnel, however, had been fished out of the sea by screening ships; one pilot had been recovered 80 miles from the force by Triumph’s amphibian plane; another, shot down behind enemy lines, had been picked up by an Army helicopter which in turn had gone down from fuel exhaustion, but both pilots ultimately had made contact with friendly forces. Perhaps the most remarkable loss of the period had occurred on the 28th when a Triumph fighter pilot on combat air patrol, vectored out to investigate a radar contact which showed unfriendly, had somewhat absentmindedly closed a B—29 only to find himself shot down west of Anma Do in the Yellow Sea. But he too was recovered by a destroyer.

Following the operations of the 29th five ADs were launched with pilot passengers to pick up replacement aircraft which had reached Japan in Boxer; Triumph and Comus were detached to Japan for further assignment to the west coast blockading force; Admiral Struble boarded a destroyer and headed for Sasebo in anticipation of a flying trip to Formosa with CincFE; Valley Forge and her screen steamed south for Buckner Bay. There they anchored on the 31st and there, on the next day, Task Force 77 received a welcome accession of strength with the arrival of the carrier Philippine Sea.
Chapter 5. Into the Perimeter
5. 7 July-2 August: Patrol Planes and Gunnery Ships

Through the hectic weeks of July, as the U.N. Command struggled to stem the enemy advance, naval operations fell into three interrelated categories. To support the campaign in the peninsula a steady stream of shipping was flowing into Pusan, while the Pohang landing, carried out by Task Force 90, permitted the rapid reinforcement of the front by the previously uncommitted 1st Cavalry Division. At the same time Task Force 77, the U.N.'s long-range weapon, worked over North Korean air strength and communications, attacked targets of opportunity like the Wonsan refinery, and attempted to support the western front against the pressure of the numerically superior enemy. As troops and supplies were fed into Korea, and as Struble’s force struck northward and struggled with problems of communications and control, the units of Naval Forces Japan were busy on both sides of the peninsula. While patrol planes covered the maritime flanks, the gunnery units escorted shipping, bombarded enemy positions, and gave fire support to the ROK forces holding the east coast road.

Like everyone else, the Fleet Air Wing I detachment had more jobs than it could easily handle. To perform the multitudinous duties of antisubmarine patrol, escort of convoy, weather reconnaissance, and shipping search, Captain Alderman had a total of eight PBM Mariner flying boats and nine P2V Neptunes. Shortly after their arrival in Japan the PBMs of VP 47 moved from Yokosuka to the RAAF base at Iwakuni, near Hiroshima on the Inland Sea. Messed, housed, and supported by the hospitable Australians, the squadron managed to extemporize a seadrome and to maintain an antisubmarine patrol of the Korean Strait, and on the 15th the arrival of the seaplane tender Gardiner’s Bay brought more ample logistic assistance.

Meanwhile the Neptunes of VP 6, which had reached Japan on 7 July and were operating out of Johnson Air Force Base at Tachikawa, were flying daily reconnaissance of the Korean east coast between 37° and 42°, and of the Yellow Sea and west coast as far north as 39°30’. But the lack of enemy seaborne traffic made the flights unproductive, while coordination with surface units was hindered by the remoteness of Johnson AFB from other naval activities. There were also certain difficulties in communications: on 20 July a VP 6 pilot spent three hours inside Typhoon Grace looking for a convoy he had been instructed to escort, only to discover on his return that the weather had kept the ships in port. On the 29th, however, the opportunities open to the Neptunes were enlarged by authorization to attack enemy shipping and installations, and two at once complied by destroying, with rockets and 20-millimeter fire, a train on the east coast line near Chongjin.

The arrival of Rear Admiral Ruble, Commander Carrier Division 15, and of his staff, enabled Admiral Joy to rationalize his air command. The Search and Reconnaissance Group was united with the other naval aviation activities in a new command, Naval Air Japan, which assumed responsibility for squadrons, aircraft, logistics, and bases. But while this improved the administrative situation, it in no way lightened the load for the 17 patrol planes and their crews, and when at the end of the month three RAF Sunderland flying boats reached Iwakuni from Hong Kong, they were most welcome.

On the east coast, day after day, bombardment of the enemy invasion route continued. Coordination with the troops ashore was improving steadily, Korean interpreters had been assigned the ships, an artillery officer had been attached to Admiral Higgins’ staff, and spotting planes were at least intermittently available.

On 18 July, as the 1st Cavalry was landing at Pohang, Mansfield and De Haven were working the coastal road in the vicinity of Samchok, while Belfast and Cossack were patrolling at the 38th parallel. In the morning, as Juneau was released from her support commitments, the others came south to join the flagship off Yongdok, where the day was spent firing on targets of opportunity and where a reported "full-scale" enemy offensive was
broken up. In the afternoon, parties of American and British naval officers went ashore to confer with the KMAG group attached to the ROK 3rd Division and to pass out radio sets in the interest of improved communications. That evening Admiral Higgins instituted a new technique, and while the main body operated off the battleline a single destroyer was detached nightly to prowl northward along the coast, seeking out and shooting up promising targets.

For the next two days *Juneau*, *Belfast*, and the destroyers operated off Yongdok, between 36°17′ and 36°30′, and although the spotting planes were grounded by the passage of Grace, the gunners’ efforts met with great success. Two days of shooting up the valley at troop concentrations in Yongdok cost the ships some 1,300 rounds and got them a radio station, more than 400 enemy troops "by actual count," and enthusiastic reports from the shore fire control personnel.

But at Yongdok, as all around the perimeter, pressure continued to be severe, information scanty, and communications inadequate. The forces defending the town had lost contact with General Walker’s headquarters: a EUSAK message advising that the general situation was critical and that the line had to be held reached the Army ashore only after relay by *Juneau*. Admiral Doyle, too, was in the dark, and on the 20th, with his second echelon scheduled to reach Pohang the next day, asked for information on the situation and prospects at Yongdok. Again the whaleboat was called away, and information brought back from shore indicated that landing operations could be safely continued, and that the ROK forces were planning the recapture of Yongdok on the morrow.

Temporarily, at least, this operation was successful. At 0600 on the 21st, after a 15-minute bombardment of the town, two star shells from *Juneau* gave the signal for the attack, and by 0717 the South Koreans had overrun Yongdok. Firing in support of the advance continued throughout the day, and *Juneau*, *Belfast*, and the destroyers expended more than 800 rounds. In the afternoon *Belfast* and *Mansfield* retired to Sasebo while *Juneau*, with *Swenson* and *Higbee*, continued close off Yongdok. On the 22nd, in preparation for further advance, 243 rounds were fired by the cruiser, but this time things went badly. The enemy counterattacked in force, the artillery observer was forced to retire, communications broke down, and weather had again grounded the spotting planes. On the 23rd, as the southward retirement of friendly forces continued, the responsibility for fire support was turned over to the destroyers and Higgins sailed for Sasebo, where early on the 24th *Juneau* moored alongside a new arrival, the heavy cruiser *Toledo*.

The growing strength of Naval Forces Japan had already brought changes in the organization of Task Force 96. ComNavFE’s operation order of early July had been modified by the addition of Task Group 96.7, the ROK Navy, and of Task Group 96.9, the submarines acquired from the Seventh Fleet. With the arrival of Admiral Ruble all aviation activities had been consolidated into Naval Air Japan, Task Group 96.2. Logistic support at Sasebo was shortly to be improved by the establishment of Service Division 31, Captain Joseph M. P. Wright, with the designation of Task Group 96.4. But before this last event took place the arrival of new gunnery strength from the United States made possible a reorganization of the Support Groups. 

The first of the units sailing from the west coast reached Japan on 23 July as Rear Admiral Hartman, Commander Cruiser Division 3, arrived at Yokosuka with *Helena* and Destroyer Division III, while *Toledo*, which had been ordered ahead, entered Sasebo. On reporting to ComNavFE, Admiral Hartman was instructed to take over command of all naval forces engaged in escort, support, and blockade, with the exception of the ROK Navy. Pursuant to these orders *Helena* and the destroyers sailed at once for Sasebo, where they arrived on the 25th and where not only *Toledo*, but *Belfast* with Admiral Andrewes and *Juneau* with Admiral Higgins were awaiting them.

At Sasebo, on the 25th, a conference was held between Admirals Joy, Hartman, Higgins, and Andrewes, and other officers of the force. The Support Groups and the Escort Group were reorganized and consolidated into Task Group 96.5, the Japan-Korea Support Group, under command of Com-Crudiv 3. On the basis of Admiral
Higgins’ reports of the ineffectiveness of 5 and 6-inch gunfire against reinforced concrete bridges it was decided to use the 8-inch cruisers for bombardment and fire support; Juneau was scheduled for transfer to the Seventh Fleet, and Higgins shifted his flag to Toledo. The new organization of Task Group 96.5, as here worked out, involved the creation of four subordinate units: two rotating East Coast Support Elements were set up, one under Admiral Hartman with Helena and Destroyer Division III, the other under Admiral Higgins with Toledo and Desdiv 91 Captain Jay was given command of the Escort Element, to which the four frigates were assigned; command of the West Coast Support Element, composed of British Commonwealth ships and the Dutch destroyer Evertsen, remained with Admiral Andrewes. In addition to his responsibility for Yellow Sea and west coast operations, Admiral Andrewes was charged with the supervision of all non-American United Nations naval forces, for which purpose he set up an administrative headquarters in a frigate at Sasebo.

Early on the morning of the 26th Admiral Hartman assumed command of the Support Group, sortied from Sasebo with Cruiser Division 3 and Desdiv III, and headed north to bombard the Korean coast. But his plans were to be rudely interrupted by the developments to the southward which had concerned Admiral Struble. At 1500 a dispatch came in ordering Hartman to proceed with Helena and the destroyers to Formosa at best speed. These instructions placed ComCrudiv 3 in a somewhat complicated situation, for he now found himself commanding two task groups in two different fleets, and charged with two missions separated by 15 degrees of latitude.

Operational control of Korean affairs was turned over to Admiral Higgins in Toledo, who was ordered to join the fire support ships off Yongdok; Helena and the destroyers reversed course and disappeared over the southern horizon; Toledo continued onward alone. But although only one of the heavy cruisers reached Yongdok, the arrival of 8-inch guns with their greater hitting power was helpful. From the 27th to the 30th, in rainy, windy weather, Toledo, Mansfield, and Collett operated off the battle line. Troops and other targets made for good shooting, and both shore and air spot were available; starshell illumination by the ships aided the artillery ashore; the destroyers continued to alternate days’ duty in running north along the shoreline to bombard targets between Yongdok and the parallel. By month’s end the pressure was diminishing.

The arrival of reinforcements and the reorganization of Task Group 96.5 greatly increased the strength available for operations in the Yellow Sea, where in the early days Alacrity had patrolled alone. Although Admiral Andrewes had assumed command of the West Coast Support Group in early July, the greater needs and opportunities of the east coast situation had made heavy demands upon his ships. Now, however, he had under his control the light cruisers Jamaica, Kenya, and Belfast, the British destroyers Cossack, Cockade, and Charity, the Australian Bataan, and the Netherlands Evertsen. On 30 July his command was further enlarged by the arrival of the three Canadian Tribal class destroyers, Cayuga, Athabaskan, and Sioux, and on 8 August the West Coast Element acquired its own air strength when Triumph, her yard period completed, reported in with Comus to Andrewes’ control. The availability of Triumph was of particular importance in view of the hydrography of the west coast, which restricted the movement of heavy ships and so made aircraft the more useful. Destroyers and cruisers could bombard, and could check traffic passing around the headlands, but the important inshore patrol had thus far been largely left to the ROK Navy.

This force had done good work. The action off Pusan at the outbreak of war had been of profound importance, and other engagements had followed. On the east coast, on 2 July, the Pohang Naval Base Detachment exterminated a small enemy force that had landed near Ulsan. In the west, where the invaders were attempting the forward movement of supplies and personnel by sea, YMS 513 sank three enemy small craft off Chulpo, south of Kunsan.

But invasion had brought disorganization: Admiral Sohn, the Chief of Naval Operations, had not yet returned from the United States, and naval headquarters at Seoul had been quickly overrun. Since a functioning Korean Navy was of prime importance, both for its resources of local knowledge and for its monopoly of types
capable of inshore operations, ComNavFE moved quickly to restore cohesion. Arriving by air from the United States, Commander Michael J. Luosey found himself designated Deputy Commander, Naval Forces Far East, and put on the first plane for Korea. On 9 July, with Lieutenant David C. Holly and five enlisted men, Luosey arrived at Pusan and assumed operational control of the Korean Navy. Six days later President Rhee formally turned over command of the ROK armed forces to General MacArthur, and on 17 July Admiral Sohn arrived with the other two PCs.

Luosey’s first days were spent in extemporizing logistic support at Pusan for U.N. ships, in establishing liaison with the Army, and in gaining the confidence of the Koreans. On the 15th, inshore patrol sectors were established along both coasts south of 37° and a detachment of Korean Marines was sailed for Kunsan by LST in an attempt to hold that port. On the next day the Marines were landed, and a large store of government rice evacuated, but possession of Kunsan was brief. Heavily engaged on the 17th by an entire North Korean regiment, the 600-odd Marines were lifted out two days later to begin a minor epic of landings, forced marches, engagements, and retreats, which by the end of the month had brought the survivors to Chinju.

Little by little order emerged from chaos. By late July coordination with the British west coast element had been established and the Korean Navy was back in effective action. On the 22nd YMS 513 repeated her earlier exploit by sinking three more enemy vessels off Chulpo, and the next day YMS 301 had a brush with small craft in the same area. On the 27th a more important encounter took place to the northward as the newly acquired PCs 702 and 703 bombarded Palmi Do and Wolmi Do in Inchon harbor, and then, during their retirement, encountered a flotilla of southbound sampans loaded with ammunition and proceeded to sink 12 of them.

The increased strength of the West Coast Support Element now permitted more ambitious efforts. On 1 August Admiral Andrewes took Belfast and Bataan into the Haeju Man approaches to bombard the shore batteries guarding this potential source of enemy seaborne supply. And by this time ComNavFE had ordered a bombardment of the Mokpo area by British warships, with patrol plane spot from Naval Air Japan.

Such a bombardment is no child’s play, for it involves a 30-mile approach through a constricted and tortuous channel where the currents at ebb and flood exceed ten knots. But on the 1st a promise of big business arrived, with a report from FEAFT of large ships and many small craft in Mokpo harbor, and on the next day the destroyers Cockade and Cossack steamed in to the attack. Docks and railroad sidings were bombarded with satisfactory results, but the FEAFT dispatch appears to have been in error: after an hour over the target the spotters in the VP 6 Neptune reported that one sunken steamer constituted the only shipping present.
Chapter 5. Into the Perimeter

6. 23 July-6 August: The Marines Arrive

In the spring of 1950, when war in Korea was still just a war of nerves, the North Koreans had put forward a unification scheme which called for all-Korean elections on 5 August. In Moscow, Izvestia had informed the Communist world that the unification of Korea was expected to take place in time to permit elections on that date. On 25 June, in military array, large numbers of would-be voters had crossed the 38th parallel headed south. But contrary, doubtless, to plan, this one-sided enlargement of the electorate had not continued unopposed. Non-Communist guardians of the polls had been hastily sent forward by sea, and as July ended and the scheduled date drew near, the Far Eastern theater had been considerably reinforced.

Boxer had reached Yokosuka on 23 July with her cargo of Mustang fighters for the Fifth Air Force, having established a new trans-Pacific record by steaming from San Francisco to Tokyo Bay in eight days and 16 hours. The carrier Philippine Sea had left San Diego on the 6th; after ten days concentrated training in the Hawaiian area she had steamed westward at speed to reach Buckner Bay on 1 August. Admiral Hartman’s cruisers and destroyers had reported in to ComNavFE, and although Helena and the destroyer division had been sent to Formosa, this detachment was only temporary. Since 8-inch guns were more useful in action in Korea than on patrol in Formosa Strait, Admiral Struble formed Task Group 77.3, composed of Juneau, the destroyers Moore and Maddox, and the oiler Cimarron, and sent it south to relieve the Helena group. On 1 August, after five days in the Formosa area, Admiral Hartman headed north again, and on the 7th was bombarding the North Korean coast.

In still other categories the situation was improving. As an offshoot of Captain Austin’s Service Squadron 3, a second logistic command had been created in Service Division 31, which opened for business at Sasebo on 1 August and which would steadily grow in strength. And other United Nations ships were coming in: in addition to those incorporated in Admiral Andrews’ west coast element, one French and two New Zealand frigates arrived on 1 August to reinforce the escort group.

By now, too, the air and ground components of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade were approaching the theater of action. The ships of Task Group 53.7, which had been assembled by the Pacific Fleet Amphibious Force to lift this contingent, had sailed from southern California ports on 12 and 14 July. During the following two weeks, as fighting in Korea increased in intensity, the task group had steamed steadily westward across the Pacific. Steadily, that is, except for a pair of near-serious mishaps. One day out of San Diego the well deck of the LSD Fort Marion had accidentally flooded, and salt water had damaged a number of tanks and a quantity of ammunition. The transport Henrico had developed serious mechanical difficulties and had been forced to put back to Oakland for repairs. Three days of urgent effort were required to put Henrico back in commission, but on the 18th she steamed out the Golden Gate and headed west at best speed in the hope of overtaking the task group.

With the brigade on its way, General Craig and General Cushman flew westward, reaching Tokyo on 19 July. There in conference with the Commander in Chief they learned the plans for their employment. It was the hope of CincFE to mount an amphibious counterstroke, and by a September landing at Inchon to seize the Seoul transportation complex and sever the invaders from their source of supply. To carry out this plan he had asked for the entire 1st Marine Division. The brigade would be held in Japan until the rest of this force arrived.

Headquarters had intended to base the ground elements of the Marine Brigade at Sasebo, and the air echelon near Kobe, some 350 miles to the eastward on the Inland Sea. In his interview with the Supreme Commander, General Craig had placed special emphasis on the importance of maintaining the integrity of his air-ground team, and had secured the promise that it would remain intact. To keep it so, and to avoid the
administrative and training problems which dispersion would impose, the Marine generals proposed to base the entire force in the Kobe-Osaka area, and on the 23rd secured approval of this arrangement. But the 23rd was also the day of EUSAK’s emergency call for carrier air support, and the developing crisis made it impossible to retain the brigade for the September landings. In the north the enemy was already inside the Naktong basin; the central front was under heavy pressure; on the west the North Korean flanking movement had reached Hadong, only 75 miles from Pusan. Nothing could now be held back. All available force had to be committed. The ships containing the Marine air echelon would continue on to Kobe to unload, but on the 25th orders went out to Task Group 53.7 to land the ground force at Pusan.

If the Marine Brigade was to be committed at once the air group had to be quickly made operational, and this required some unscrambling. The escort carriers of Cardiv 15 had been separated at the start of the emergency: Sicily, with her antisubmarine squadron, had been ordered to Guam, while Badoeng Strait had embarked the aircraft of MAG 33 and sailed in company with the transports carrying the ground personnel. Sicily reached Guam on 20 July; as the submarine menace had not materialized she there disembarked her squadron and sailed for Yokosuka, where she arrived on the 27th. Four days later, on 31 July, Badoeng Strait and the transports entered Kobe.

With the arrival of his carriers Rear Admiral Ruble was relieved of his temporary chores as Commander Naval Air Japan and began a fancy juggling act. On the 31st he put his staff aboard Sicily at Yokosuka and sailed her for Kobe to rejoin her consort. There she loaded ground personnel, spare parts, and ammunition for VMF 214, and on the afternoon of 1 August sailed for the southern tip of Kyushu to rendezvous with the destroyers Doyle and Kyes. On the same afternoon Badoeng Strait got underway from Kobe to fly off aircraft to the Itami airbase; this was completed the next day, whereupon the carrier returned to port to replenish. On the 2nd, as Sicily was joining her escorts in Van Diemen Strait, Admiral Ruble went aboard Badoeng Strait. On the 3rd the Corsairs of VMF 214 took off from Itami, landed aboard Sicily early in the afternoon, and then, as the ship steamed toward Tsushima Strait, flew off their first air strike in support of ground forces in Korea. Badoeng Strait, with the division commander on board, also got underway on the 3rd, escorted by destroyers Endicott and Thomas, to spend the next two days in refresher training for her squadron, while Sicily moved into the Yellow Sea to strike targets on the Korean west coast.

While the units of Carrier Division 15 were performing these gyrations, efforts were being made to provide the communications and control facilities so essential to the effective cooperation of air and ground components. Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 2 was split, the air defense section moving to Itami, where the night fighters of VMFN 513 were to base, while the air support section was sailed for Pusan by LST, along with ground personnel of the observation squadron. On the 2nd, four helicopters and four spotting planes of VMO 6 were flown from Japan to Pusan, and then onwards to Chinhae on the 4th, as the LST with the ground crews reached Pusan.

In the meantime the ground forces were arriving. Henrico, the tail-end transport, just made it. On the morning of 2 August she overtook the rest of Task Group 53.7 in Tsushima Strait, and in the afternoon the ships carrying the Marine Brigade steamed into Pusan. Around the Korean perimeter the situation was so bad that decisions were being made on a minute-to-minute basis, and it was not until almost midnight that General Craig learned his destination. An all-night effort by all hands got the supplies ashore and deposited with the Pusan Base Command, additional transport was borrowed from the Army, and by 0700 the troops were moving toward the perimeter. By evening of the 3rd the Marines were deployed defensively west of the town of Changwon.

By 5 August communications had been established between the brigade’s air support control personnel and the escort carriers at sea. On the 6th Sicily and Badoeng Strait rendezvoused off the southwestern tip of Korea, Admiral Ruble’s staff joined him by breeches buoy, and air and ground forces were ready to operate as a unit.
It was high time. Changwon is less than 30 miles from Pusan. Six miles or so beyond Changwon lies the town of Masan, and beyond Masan was the North Korean 6th Division. Distances in Korea, in early August, were very small.
AUGUST opened in an atmosphere of crisis. All early estimates of the Korean problem had been invalidated, anticipations of speedy victory were dead, and the U.N. Command faced the excruciating question of whether it would be able to hold on the Korean peninsula, or whether its forces would be thrown into the sea. Space had been previously traded off for time, but both commodities were now in short supply. One natural defensive line remained, the line of the Naktong River. When this was reached it would be time to turn and fight.

There were now available to General Walker five reconstituted ROK divisions, the better part of four U.S. Army divisions, and the Marine Brigade. Although contemporary estimates gave the North Koreans a heavy numerical superiority, it appears in fact that U.N. combat strength already slightly exceeded that of the enemy. But it was the estimates that formed the picture, and in any event there was a critical shortage in reserves: where the North Korean People’s Army, holding the initiative and with victory in sight, could afford to accept heavy losses in exchange for important gains, for EUSAK any loss was a matter of grave concern.

Only at sea and in the air did the U.N. have important advantages. If proper employment of Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft, and of the fire support ships could offset the enemy’s presumed superiority of numbers, it was possible that with skill and bravery the line could be held. To accomplish more was for the moment out of the question. Even the holding mission seemed problematical enough. Yet while to those in the line the problem of chasing the enemy home again was for the moment of no concern, on higher levels it was being given active consideration.

To General MacArthur it seemed that a landing at Inchon followed by seizure of the Seoul area, the hub of the Korean communications network, promised the best hope of a speedy decision. To carry out this landing, and to amputate the invaders from their sources of supply, amphibious shipping and a trained amphibious assault force were required. Repeated requests by CincFE for the early dispatch of the 1st Marine Division were finally answered in late July; the division would sail from the west coast in mid-August. But while this marked a considerable step toward the desired goal, other difficulties remained.

The objective on which General MacArthur had set his heart, however desirable strategically, presented serious tactical difficulties. The tidal range of the Yellow Sea and the hydrography of Inchon Harbor were limiting factors: to bring in and beach LSTs with supplies for the assault force required a tidal range of 29 feet, and spring tides of such a magnitude are limited to one three-day period a month. Thus strategy depended upon astronomy, and the future of the war upon the phases of the moon. One period of high tides would come in mid-September, and this date set the double problem for the United Nations Command. The Korean foothold had to be held for the intervening six weeks. The Marine Division had to arrive in time.

By early August the perimeter in which Eighth Army was to make its stand had assumed pretty much its final form. Through the latter part of July the North Korean invaders had continued their four-pronged advance, with one column in the east coast strip, two moving southeast along the main routes from Seoul, and a flanking force on the right skirting the central hill mass. Tardy discovery of this last movement, which was opposed only by small ROK detachments, had brought the misdirected call for carrier strikes in the region east of Kunsan, and the movement of a battalion of the 29th Regiment westward from Pusan to Hadong on the south coast.

The week from 29 July to 5 August saw the American and ROK forces retreating on all fronts. In the northwest the Communist armies advanced some 35 miles, streaming over the mountain wall and down into the Naktong Valley, to reach the river opposite Waegwan. In the northern hill sector the enemy pushed forward 15 to
20 miles, from Yongju to Andong on the upper Naktong. In the south, at Hadong, affairs went badly; the American battalion and associated ROK troops were overrun and, while about 100 survivors were evacuated by ROK small craft from the Chinhae Naval Base and others escaped overland, casualties exceeded 50 percent.

At the start of the week United Nations positions had run northward from Hadong to the divide between the Kum and Naktong basins, northeasterly to Yongju, and southeast to the coastal town of Yongdok. As the week ended U.N. forces held only about a seventh of the territory of the Republic of Korea, and had been compressed into an area measuring some 100 miles from north to south, and slightly more than half of that from east to west. From Chindong-ni on the south coast the line ran north along the Naktong River, and east through Andong to Yongdok, where ROK forces supported by naval gunfire still held fast.

Although the withdrawals of the previous week had diminished the area to be defended, they had complicated the problems of the defenders; paradoxically, the shrinkage of the perimeter had extended the fighting front. During the retreat phase the tactical problem had been to slow the North Korean advance along the principal communication routes. But now, with the enemy well inside the Naktong basin, his spearheads were no longer constricted by the hill masses and his freedom of maneuver was increased. In the north the advance to Andong, which brought him down into the lowlands and to an east-west highway leading to Yongdok, was followed by the eastward movement of the 12th Division to strengthen the attack on Pohang. In the northwest the descent from the saddle toward Waegwan opened lateral communications east of the central hill mass, and permitted a southward displacement of Communist strength which brought pressure along the whole Naktong River line. It also posed a serious threat to Taegu, where the South Korean government had established itself, where there was an important airstrip, and where the Fifth Air Force had set up its Joint Operations Center. With the enemy inside the landing circle the Air Force was obliged to remove its planes to Japan and the JOC to Pusan, with all the complications in communication and control that such movements entail. How agreeable a prospect this situation afforded when viewed from the north is evidenced by a North Korean I Corps operation order of 3 August, which called for the capture of Taegu and Pusan by the 6th.

In this the enemy was to be disappointed. But the more extensive road system now available permitted him to redeploy his strength and, as August wore on, to exert heavy pressure at four points around the perimeter. Two of the crucial areas were inland, at Waegwan on the main line of communications, and on the Naktong front west of Yongsan. Two were on the flanks, at Pohang on the eastern shore, and in the south between Masan and Chinju. It was in this southern area, where the enemy flanking movement seemed to pose the most immediate threat to Pusan, that General Walker planned his first counteroffensive. It was for this spoiling attack that the Marine Brigade had been ordered forward, and had been combined with two RCTs of the 25th Division into Task Force Kean.
While this southern counterattack was in preparation, U.N. naval and air forces pressed their efforts against the enemy’s lengthening lines of communication. Carried on by coastal patrol and blockade, by bombardment from the sea, and by air attack, this work would continue in increasing strength. Air Force as well as naval reinforcements were coming in, and FEAF’s daily sorties were rapidly increasing in number. In the last days of July General Stratemeyer persuaded CincFE to release some of his bombers from work below the parallel, and the B–29s were preparing to strike north against the enemy’s urban complexes and against his transportation net.

As July ended Task Force 77 retired to Okinawa for logistics, and naval responsibility for air support of the perimeter devolved upon the escort carriers. Of these Sicily was first in action. On 2 August she picked up her screening ships south of Kyushu, and on the next day the aircraft of VMF 214 arrived on board from Itami. That afternoon a first strike was flown off against North Korean troop concentrations near Chinju in the south and on the central Naktong front. On the 4th further strikes were flown against the enemy in the Chinju area, and with evening the Sicily group steamed into the Yellow Sea and headed northward.

There on the 5th an international three-dimensional evolution took place. Screened by Charity and Cossack, the cruisers Belfast and Kenya steamed up the hazardous approaches to Inchon, where with spot provided by a Neptune from VP 6 they bombarded oil storage, factories, warehouses, and gun positions. Fighter cover for the spotting plane was given by some of Sicily’s Corsairs, while others attacked transport and industrial facilities in the Inchon-Seoul region. The Marine Brigade was not yet in action and close support activity had not begun, but close reconnaissance was now put into practice. His suspicion aroused by the antiaircraft defenses of an Inchon factory, one pilot buzzed past at 50 feet, peered in the windows to observe a concentration of vehicles, and returned to deal with the situation by putting a napalm bomb into the building. On the 6th the Sicily group moved southward to strike targets at Kunsan and Mokpo and troops on the south coast, and to rendezvous with Badoeng Strait and her attendant destroyers.

On the east coast the last echelon of Pohang shipping was completing its unloading when Admiral Higgins arrived with Toledo on 26 July. There the arrival of the heavy cruiser proved a useful addition to the destroyers on duty offshore, and to the field artillery battalion and the F–5i fighter-bomber squadron which had already reinforced this isolated theater. For the aviators, as for the contending ground forces, these east coast operations constituted a private war: lacking communications with the JOC at Taegu the squadron operated from the Pohang airstrip on its own. Despite all difficulties coordination with the east coast naval forces was reasonably good, but there were still surprises: in August Helena’s helicopter and a destroyer would fish two downed F–51 pilots out of the Sea of Japan, neither of whom was aware that the ships off Yongdok were friendly.

On 27 July 8-inch guns were used for the first time against the invading army, as Toledo fired on troop concentrations, supplies, and revetments by day, and by night illuminated the battleline with star shell. By careful conservation of ammunition this support was continued for 11 days, and so effective was the shooting of the cruiser and the destroyers, assisted by a 24th Division fire control party and by air spot, that only here did the battleline remain stable. Cruising generally some 7,000 yards offshore, exchanging liaison personnel with the forces ashore by whaleboat, covering the seaborne arrival of supplies for frontline troops, and making arrangements for possible evacuation, the ships of Higgins’ element found their days full. On 4 August good work
was done at a village near Yongdok in cooperation with rocket-firing Air Force fighters. Troops were dispersed, large fires were started, and when clearing smoke revealed the fire-fighters at work the process was repeated. On the 5th, after shooting with air spot at enemy front line positions, gratifying compliments were received from both ground and airborne spotting personnel.

By this time, indeed, the situation seemed sufficiently stabilized so that Admiral Higgins, who felt 8-inch gunfire somewhat wasted in harassing troops, could request and receive permission to look for something better. The 7th of August was therefore spent 70 miles to the northward, in the neighborhood of Samchok, where the task element ranged along a 25-mile stretch of coast, firing on targets selected from aerial photographs. A bridge across a small river was destroyed, road junctions were plowed up, embankments were knocked down across the highway, and two tunnels sealed by bombardment and landslide.

Admiral Hartman’s Helena group had meanwhile been cruising Formosa Strait, where it was joined by Juneau on 30 July. Two cruisers and a destroyer division are a small force with which to prevent a large-scale invasion, especially one embarked in a fleet of almost unsinkable junks. But the issue did not arise, and in any case the Seventh Fleet Striking Force remained on call. On 1 August the task group was dissolved, Admiral Hartman headed his ships back northward, and after three days at Sasebo for logistics sailed once again for the northeastern coast of Korea, where air sightings had reported a thousand railroad cars in the region between 40° and 42°N. This time he got there.

The bombardment of the town of Tanchon in 40°28’, carried out by Helena and Destroyer Division III on 7 August, marked the furthest north for U.N. surface forces since Juneau’s early raid. Located a couple of miles up an estuary at the point where two rivers join, Tanchon offered tempting rail and highway bridge targets, a marshalling yard, and some minor industrial facilities. With a VP 6 spotting plane overhead, the force shot up boxcars in the yard and the town power plants, and inflicted a satisfactory 75 percent damage on the railroad bridge. The only excitement of the day was provided by the late arrival of a four-plane combat air patrol from Fifth Air Force, which showed no IFF and was only identified visually after batteries had been released. Having applied this pressure to the northeastern artery, the Helena group came southward during the night, and on the next day dropped a highway and a rail bridge near Sokcho, just above the 38th parallel. This work completed, Admiral Hartman relieved Admiral Higgins of his fire support responsibilities off Yongdok, and the Toledo group headed for Sasebo to replenish.

Admiral Andrewes’ element, now divided into three rotating sections of a cruiser and two or more destroyers each, was carrying out its duties of bombardment and blockade. Here the land war had swept past and no fire support was required, but the numerous islands and the shoal waters which fringe the coast made the interdiction of communications a sufficient task. On the 5th, on instructions from ComNavFE, the British commander established three barrier stations off the western headlands, between 38°8’ and 36°45’, which were kept manned as availability of ships permitted. Inshore work steadily improved as cooperation with the reviving ROK Navy was developed, and the blockade became increasingly effective.

In the south, however, new problems were arising. There on 28 July, CinfFE had ordered a round-up of small craft to deny them to the invader, and on 1 August, in consequence of the enemy advance and the defeat at Hadong, ComNavFE had instructed Admiral Higgins’ task element and Commander Luosey’s ROKN units to harass and disrupt land and water movement in the neighborhood of Namhae Island. On the 8th the importance of this task was emphasized by high level estimates which indicated that the enemy had reached the end of his supply line, that he was especially short of gasoline for tanks and trucks, and that efforts at seaborne supply were to be anticipated.

The Korean Navy, however, was already fully occupied in the west. On 3 August the ROK YMS 502 sank seven sailboats which were loading off Kunsan; four days later and 30 miles to the northward she sank two
motor-boats, while other Korean units destroyed four small junks in the Haeju Man approaches above Inchon. On the 9th an important step was taken in support of west coast operations as an LST was sailed for Ochong Do, an island 40 miles off Kunsan, to establish an advanced ROKN supply base which would eliminate the 300-mile round trip to Pusan.

Since the Koreans were busy elsewhere, U.S. and Commonwealth units were made available in the south. On 2 and 3 August the destroyer Higbee patrolled the Namhae area but encountered no enemy movement. On the night of 4–5 August underwater demolition personnel from the fast transport Diachenko attempted to blow bridges north of the railroad town of Youl, a natural jumping-off place for enemy shore-to-shore movement. But the landing force was repelled by a North Korean patrol, which arrived inopportune by handcar, and Diachenko had to content herself with a 40-minute bombardment of the railroad yards. Four days later an imaginative B–29 report of heavy junk concentrations near Yosu brought the Canadian destroyers Cayuga and Athabaskan on a flank speed sweep of the south coast, but with negative results. On the 12th the destroyer Collett, from Admiral Higgins’ task element, steamed into Yosu Gulf to bombard the town.

For the first few days of August, while these coastal activities were in progress, the Seventh Fleet Striking Force lay at anchor in Buckner Bay. During this interval Admiral Struble visited Formosa, in company with General MacArthur, to perfect planning and liaison against the chance of a Communist invasion; the carrier Philippine Sea arrived from the United States, and Rear Admiral Edward C. Ewen, Commander Carrier Division I, flew in from Pearl and reported aboard. In Tokyo, in the meantime, further efforts were being made to accomplish a workable coordination of the operations of the Air Force and of naval air.

The first step toward meshing naval and Air Force activities had been taken when FEAF requested strikes in northeastern Korea. A second shortly followed, with General Stratemeyer’s request for "operational control" of all aircraft in the theater and with CincFE’s letter delegating "coordination control" to the commanding general of FEAF; by early August further measures were in train. On the 3rd, while General MacArthur and Admiral Struble were in Formosa, a conference was held in Tokyo in which FEAF deployed four generals and a colonel to face one captain, two commanders, and two lieutenant commanders. The result was a memorandum providing that first priority for carrier operations would be in close support, second priority would go to interdiction south of the 38th parallel, and third priority to strikes on Bomber Command targets beyond that line. Coordination for attacks south of 380 was to lie with Fifth Air Force; attacks on Bomber Command targets required clearance from FEAF. Six plans, designated by letter, were devised for carrier employment, and the peninsula divided into six corresponding operating areas. Plans A through C called for the use of half the available aircraft in support of troops and half in interdiction in the designated area; plans E and F involved area attacks alone; plan D called for everything on close support.

This emphasis on the support of troops inevitably meant that the operations of carrier aircraft would fall in large degree under the control of FAFIK, Fifth Air Force in Korea, and of its Joint Operations Center. On the face of it there was nothing illogical about the arrangement, which would presumably have been successful had it only worked, and similar conditions were shortly laid upon the escort carriers by ComNavFE. But just as the problem of interdiction had raised command problems on the upper level, in the question of operational versus coordination control, so the commitment to close support was to bring almost insoluble difficulties in the tactical handling of aircraft over the lines, as doctrinal differences and the inadequacy of control mechanisms combined to frustrate the best efforts of the Striking Force. Close support turned out to work best when least needed, and when the Seventh Fleet could most profitably be employed against northern bridges and other communications targets; in times of crisis around the perimeter it worked poorly or not at all. Faced with so wasteful an employment of his very considerable strength, and not having been consulted regarding the agreement, Admiral Struble declined to accept its definition of roles and missions, and the Seventh Fleet was soon attempting to break away from the perimeter. By mid-month the primacy of close support had become a dead letter; the movements of the Seventh
Fleet were being designated by periodic dispatches from CincFE; and the concepts of plan and area, set forth in the memorandum of 3 August, were tending to separate, with the letter designation indicating only the area to be attacked.

For the moment, however, the effort was to be in support of the front. On 4 August Admiral Struble issued an operation order which called for strikes on targets previously selected and coordinated with FEAF, instructed the carrier task group to establish direct communications with the JOC at Taegu and attack enemy troops and targets in the forward areas, and established a fueling rendezvous with the oiler Cacapon for the 7th. Late in the afternoon of the 4th the strengthened Seventh Fleet sortied from Buckner Bay and headed north once more "to conduct air operations in support of ground forces."

On the morning of the 5th the force launched from a position south of Korea. Pilots from Philippine Sea, entering action for the first time, were assigned specific targets in southwestern Korea, with the emphasis on the rail and highway bridges at Iri, east of Kunsan, where cuts would hamper movement of supplies to the enemy’s southern flank. Valley Forge planes were sent off on close support missions, and while the weight of effort was concentrated on troops, supplies, and bridges in the dangerous northern sector, two Corsairs attacked enemy personnel west of Taegu and five ADs inflicted heavy casualties on troops behind the central front. But these Skyraiders reported poor control, and an eight-plane jet sweep never did succeed in reaching its assigned controller.

Dissatisfied with the operation of control procedures, Admiral Hoskins now sent four Valley Forge pilots to Taegu, for liaison purposes and to help in the direction of support aircraft. In the hope of reducing congestion the front was divided into four sectors, each of which was provided with both an Air Force and a Navy airborne controller. Although the original intention of having Navy controllers handle Navy flights gave way under pressure, and all hands took whatever came along, the sharing of the burden and the increased number of radio frequencies which resulted from the use of Navy planes led to considerable improvement. But periods of saturation continued, as incoming flights arrived in large batches instead of scheduled drips, and while this congestion was particularly difficult in the case of Air Force planes, operating at maximum range from their Japanese bases, it affected the work of the carrier aircraft as well.

The 6th of August saw the task force still south of Korea, attacking objectives assigned by air controllers and bridge and highway targets from Yosu north to Hwanggan. Once again Philippine Sea concentrated her efforts on transportation facilities, while Valley Forge flew 24 Corsair and 22 Skyraider sorties under JOC control. The emphasis, as on the previous day, was on the Chinju assembly area and on enemy lines of communication behind it; but attacks were also made on troop and transportation targets behind the central Nakdong front, in the Waegwan area, and in the important neighboring junction town of Kumchon. Claims for the day included destruction of a large supply dump, five trucks, two jeeps, and a tank, damage to a number of bridges, and many troop casualties; the distribution of effort represented a useful attempt at close interdiction, if not at close support of troops in combat.

With the day’s work completed and with pilots’ reports at hand, the situation was discussed by Admiral Struble and his carrier division commanders. To Admiral Ewen the results of the effort in close air support appeared quite simply "negligible." Admiral Hoskins felt the work handicapped by the cumbersome centralization of JOC control, which required excessive expenditure of time in checking in and securing target assignments, and by the tendency of Eighth Army to call for maximum effort and so bring saturation of control facilities. The upshot of the discussion was a pair of dispatches from Commander Seventh Fleet to ComNavFE, in which he reported an urgent request from JOC for "close support" of ground operations on the next day, expressed his doubts as to the value of such an effort, proposed that the escort carriers be given the whole job on the 8th, and stated his desire to strike the important west bridge at Seoul.

During the night the force moved into the Yellow Sea, and on the 7th, from a position west of Mokpo,
swept airfields and flew strikes against bridges, warehouses, rail yards, and vehicles in the region south of the 38th parallel. The realities of civil war were emphasized this day when the fleet, steaming some 70 miles offshore, passed through water containing many floating bodies, tied together in bundles and with their hands lashed behind their backs. At mid-day, in response to the JOC request, an effort at support of the perimeter was made by eight Corsairs and nine ADs flown in from Philippine Sea. These planes found a controller who had two tanks as a target, but who was unable to turn them over to the Navy flight as some F–80s from Japan required immediate handling. No controlled attacks, whether in close support or in interdiction, were therefore made.

The apparent wastefulness of these efforts in support of the perimeter, together with the availability of the escort carriers, now led both ComNavFE and Commander Seventh Fleet to consider springing the force loose for strikes to the northward. An afternoon dispatch from Admiral Joy suggested that, subject to especially urgent need for close support, the carriers strike coastal targets in Area F, between Chongjin and Hungnam, where many trains and much rolling stock had been recently reported, and where Helena was currently shooting up Tanchon. This message crossed one from Admiral Struble in which he reported that after fuelling on the 8th he hoped to strike northward in Area E on the 9th, returning to Area B the next day; should however the Army require support at the perimeter, the force would fly missions in Area B on the 9th and in A on the 10th.

These hopes, however, were to be deferred by a dispatch from ComNavFE, received on the afternoon of the 8th as the force was fuelling from Passumpsic and Cacapon to the south of Cheju Do. Concern for the safety of Eighth Army had led CinC FE to order the entire carrier air effort placed on close support and close interdiction from 8 to 17 August. With this order the southward displacement of Seventh Fleet operations, developing ever since FEAF’s first request for attacks in the northeastern quadrant of Korea, reached its ultimate conclusion. For the next ten days, it appeared, the carriers were to be frozen in support of the perimeter. Close support, in this context, meant support of Army units under JOC control: the Marine Brigade, with its organic Tactical Air Control Squadron and with its own aircraft operating from the escort carriers, was well cared for. But the Army needed everything it could get: the North Koreans had forced the Naktong, and had a regiment across the river at the big bend west of Yongsan.

Admiral Struble’s plan to hit targets in Area E was now perforce abandoned. The 9th of August again found the carriers west of Mokpo, flying strikes against the Inchon-Seoul area. There, for the first time, antiaircraft fire of moderate intensity was encountered; there, at Air Force request, the three-span bridge over the Han at Seoul was attacked and hit with 1,000-pound bombs. West of Taegu a four-plane flight, sent in to the perimeter from Valley Forge, discovered adequate control and destroyed a tank. At sea the larger sphere of relations between east and west was illustrated when a screening destroyer recovered five friendly floating Koreans, one of whom claimed U.S. citizenship.

On the 10th, operations continued in the same pattern, with continued emphasis on interdiction of the Inchon-Seoul complex. This was Philippine Sea’s day in close support, and 4 six-plane flights were sent in at three-hour intervals. But all were forced to attack targets of opportunity, none was used in support of troops, and two failed entirely to contact a controller owing to overloaded radio channels.

Within the force the search went on for ways and means of improving the close support situation. On the 8th, on the basis of reports from liaison pilots returning from Taegu, Admiral Hoskins identified the principal problems as the "understandable" ignorance of carrier capabilities at Fifth Air Force headquarters, the inadequate communications set-up there, and the Seventh Fleet’s desire to maintain radio silence when possible. As remedies he proposed the immediate assignment of a captain aviator, experienced in carrier and close support operations, as liaison officer with Fifth Air Force in Korea, and the establishment of communications channels which would permit, and of policies which would ensure, a continuous two-way flow of information. On the next day Admiral Ewen listed as major deficiencies the absence of reliable communications, both between the carriers and JOC and at the scene of action, and the oversaturation of aircraft at the objective. Stating that less than 30 percent of the
fleet’s potential was being used in close support, he suggested that Admiral Struble tell ComNavFE "the whole story," and urged the assignment to the air control function of aircraft with adequate endurance and reliable radio gear, and the employment of the *Mount McKinley* air support party to improve communications in the perimeter.

Commander Seventh Fleet told "the whole story," or at least a good deal of it, on the night of 9–10 August in a message to ComNavFE with information copies to CincFE, EUSAK, FEAF, and Fifth Air Force. This dispatch pointed out the "urgent and continuing need of air support for our ground forces," described the problems of control of aircraft at the objective, and reported "only partial employment" of aircraft sent in to Taegu. Recognizing that the air controllers were operating under great difficulties, and that the Navy ought to assist in any way it could with officer personnel and communications arrangements, Admiral Struble noted that the Seventh Fleet remained prepared to contribute control aircraft as it had previously done, and once again suggested that "possibly" *Mount McKinley* air control personnel could help out.

Although no specific mention was made of the problem of interforce communications, or of Hoskins’ proposed assignment of a qualified and senior liaison officer, there were possibilities here if only they were acted on. But none of the commanders to whom the dispatch was addressed seems to have followed it up, and ComNavFE’s response was not entirely helpful. Apparently as a result of semantic confusion, Admiral Struble’s report had been interpreted not as "partial employment" in close support, but as indicative of failure to expend ordnance, and the reply observed that this was "not understood" in view of the number of interdiction targets available in the south. Employment of the *Mount McKinley* Tacron was refused on the ground that it was engaged in training operations, and the other suggestions were passed back to the operating commanders. Commander Seventh Fleet was instructed to furnish airborne controllers as arranged with JOC; the Commanding General Fifth Air Force was invited to state any needs for personnel and communications assistance.

This exchange of generalities seems merely to have strengthened Admiral Struble’s desire to get away from the perimeter and strike northward. For although he at once requested information on interdiction targets from all hands, his revised intentions for the future called for strikes in Area B on the 12th, followed by a move north to attack the region between Sinanju and Pyongyang. This dispatch elicited a request from Fifth Air Force, received on the 12th as the carrier bombers struck marshalling yards near Seoul and as jet fighters swept airfields and communication lines, which indicated that all effort was still wanted in Area B. Although undertaking to comply if necessary, Commander Seventh Fleet observed in reply that he had been cleared by GHQ to strike northward the next morning, and would do so if his efforts could be spared. Apparently they could. The prospective ten-day freeze had actually lasted five, and on the 13th aircraft from both carriers ranged north of the parallel, attacking transportation targets at Pyongyang, Chinnampo, Haeju, and way stations with good results, especially in the destruction of locomotives. On conclusion of this day’s operations the force retired southward, passed *Triumph* and her escorts who were steering north to take over the Yellow Sea duty, and headed for Sasebo to replenish.

While the Seventh Fleet Striking Force was struggling with the problems of close support of the perimeter, the Marine Brigade had begun its first offensive. To contain the enemy’s south coast advance, General Walker had decided to attack westward from Masan, toward Chinju, some 30 miles beyond. Army forces were to move west along the main highway; the Marines were assigned the task of cleaning out the left flank along the coastal road through Kosong and Sachon. On the 5th, as aircraft from the fast carriers struck enemy forces near Chinju, orders were issued for an attack to begin on the 7th.

On that day, the eighth anniversary of the landing on Guadalcanal, the Marine Brigade attacked westward. In this peninsula, as on that island, the weather was hot, humid, and exhausting. Three days of heavy and confused fighting followed while the hills controlling the road junction at Chindong-ni were cleared. But coordinated employment of brigade artillery and of Marine aircraft commuting in from the escort carriers broke up the enemy formations and chased them back into the hills. Tanks, vehicles, and guns were destroyed by the
aviators from Admiral Ruble’s task group, and napalm and strafing helped to clear the heights. By evening of the 9th the Marines were on the move, with orders to capture Paedun-ni, five miles down the coastal road, before daylight.

On the 10th General Craig pushed his brigade down the road to the southwest. Sicily had retired to Sasebo for two days, but Badoeng Strait did the work of two with 44 sorties. Paedun-ni was seized early in the morning, and indications of enemy confusion brought orders to press on with all speed. In early afternoon, a couple of miles beyond the town, the van entered an ambush at Taedabok Pass. Tanks were brought forward, the Corsairs reported in, and the pass was cleared; the force bivouacked for the night on the far side of the cut and two-thirds of the way to Kosong, the first major objective. Elsewhere, however, things were more ominous: on the 8th, during the fighting at Chindong-ni, the North Koreans built up their Naktong bridgehead to regimental strength, and by the 10th the enemy 4th Division was across the river.

At 0800 on the morning of the 11th the advance on Kosong was resumed. A few shells lobbed into the town flushed an estimated hundred vehicles which headed westward out of town at high speed. Overhead a division of Corsairs from Badoeng Strait observed trucks retreating so fast that some missed the turns and rolled down the embankments; making the most of this agreeable opportunity with rockets and 20-millimeter fire, the aviators piled up rolling stock in wholesale quantity. By 1000 the town had been taken, a hill to the southward was shortly secured, and the Marines headed onward toward Sachon with their observation planes and Corsairs overhead and their tanks out front.

By this time things were going well for the brigade. The enemy roadblocks had been broken, momentum had been gained, enemy casualties were estimated as approaching the 2,000 mark, and the North Koreans appeared increasingly disorganized. Marine air and ground forces were working in harmony, and the advance was being paralleled in the third element. A Scap LST and some ROKN landing craft had been brought forward from Pusan to issue supplies and receive casualties, and General Craig had requested a destroyer to provide call fire in support of the coastal advance. But in other sectors the situation was degenerating. To the northward American counterattacks had failed to eliminate the Naktong bulge, while in the Marines’ rear the enemy had reemerged from the hills at Chindong-ni, and had cut the main supply route for Army troops advancing on Chinju. At noon on the 12th, as the Marines were nearing Changchon, the brigade was ordered to return one battalion and a battery of artillery to clean up this road block.

Afternoon of the 12th saw the Marines fighting on two fronts for the first, if not for the last time in this war. At Changchon the 1st and 2nd Battalions encountered another ambush, but the attempted envelopment brought heavy casualties to the enveloper. While this fight was going on the 3rd Battalion was being trucked back to Chindong-ni, where it arrived in late afternoon and where before dark it carried its first objective, a hill ridge commanding the main supply route.

This singular situation, in which two of the brigade’s battalions were fighting at Changchon while the third was engaging 25 road miles to the rear, was ended by orders to withdraw. On the 13th, as the 3rd Battalion continued its clean-up of hills around Chindong-ni, the others disengaged and headed back to rejoin. Although it was disappointing to be pulled back after an advance of 26 miles in four days, and after inflicting heavy damage on superior forces, there were serious reasons behind the decision. The situation in the Naktong bulge was very nearly out of control.
History of United States Naval Operations – Korea
James A. Field Jr.

Chapter 6. Holding the Line

3. 6-20 August: East Coast Interdiction, Pohang, and First Naktong

For the moment, at least, the threat to the southern end of the perimeter had been ended by the advance of Task Force Kean. On the coast the Marines had repelled the enemy with heavy loss; inland the 35th Infantry had briefly regained the heights along the Nam River east of Chinju. In this region North Korean units now faced difficult problems of reorganization and reequipment, and their long supply line was suffering increasingly from the cumulative effects of interdiction strikes.

As the second week of August was ending, the critical sectors of the perimeter were on the Naktong front west of Yongsan, in the northwest beyond Taegu, and on the east coast in the vicinity of Pohang. The response to this altered situation was quickly evident in the redeployment of U.N. naval forces. Admiral Joy had been directed to carry out demolition raids on the Korean coast, and as the Marine Brigade moved northward to the Naktong bulge the weight of naval effort shifted to the northeast and to the enemy’s coastal line of communications with the Soviet Maritime Provinces.

North of the 40th parallel the Korean coastline is precipitous, with mountains rising steeply from the sea. Constricted by this geography, the railroad for more than 40 miles runs close to the shore, and is thus accessible to naval gunfire and to landing parties. Here in the first weeks of war Juneau had carried out her raid; this vulnerable area was now to be brought under all forms of naval attack.

Execution of this work was facilitated by the arrival from San Diego of the fast transport Horace A. Bass, Lieutenant Commander Alan Ray, a destroyer escort conversion carrying four LCVPs and with a capacity of 162 troops. On 6 August a group of underwater demolition and Marine reconnaissance personnel was assigned to Bass, and the resultant package designated the Special Operations Group. Two days later a new weapon became available for raids from the sea as the submarine transport Perch, a conversion capable of carrying 160 troops and with a cylindrical deck caisson providing stowage for landing equipment, reached Yokosuka from Pearl Harbor. A British offer of a squad of Royal Marines provided Perch’s raiding personnel, and brought immediate preparations for attacks on the east coast transportation line.

To this planned schedule of raiding activity Admiral Joy now added carrier strikes. On 7 August he had noted that reports of enemy rail traffic promised useful employment for Task Force 77 in Area F; a week later, as the task force was returning to Sasebo, the continued influx of such intelligence brought similar recommendations from Fifth Air Force Headquarters in Korea. Pressure on the northern front, naval and Air Force intelligence which emphasized the importance of the east coast route, and the suggestions of the naval liaison officer led on the 13th to a request from FAFIK for carrier interdiction of Area C on the 16th, to be followed by attacks on rail and other transport facilities in Area F, between Wonsan and Chongjin.

After obtaining the views of the naval commanders CincFE ordered the execution of this plan. Task Force 77 was to strike from the Sea of Japan on the 16th and 17th, refuel on the 18th, and strike again for two days. In order further to reduce the pressure on the northern front, FEAF was instructed to put its maximum bomber effort on the Waegwan area on the 16th, while the carrier planes were striking Area C. On the 17th, as proposed by Fifth Air Force, Task Force 77 would move northward to operate against Area F.

In the meantime Admiral Joy’s surface forces had begun to converge on North Korea’s eastern shore. On 7 August the Helena group, en route to relieve off Yongdok, had bombarded Tanchon. On the 13th, in response to reports of enemy shipping at Wonsan, Admiral Hartman established blockading stations in 39°50’ and 40° 50’.

Enemy movement on shore was also receiving attention: between 13 and 16 August, while the ship employed the
daylight hours in bombardment of rail targets, the raiders from *Horace A. Bass* carried out three night landings between 41°28´ and 38°35´ which resulted in the destruction of three tunnels and two bridges. In anticipation of future attacks by *Perch*, ComNavFE had by this time established a joint zone for surface and submarine operations, Area 7, between 40° and 41° on the Korean east coast. On the 14th, as *Perch* and her Royal Marines began their training program, the submarine *Pickerel* was sailed to procure periscope photographs of selected objectives.

But while these preparations and efforts to saw up the coastal supply line were being made, a crisis had developed at Pohang. There the ROK 3rd Division had done well. With its KMAG liaison group, with artillery and fire control personnel from the 24th Division, and with the support of naval gunfire and the Pohang-based F-51s, it had held the road longer than might have been expected, and long after the cavalry division had landed and moved inland. But by now the fire control party had been transferred to another sector, while to the westward the enemy advance had uncovered lateral communications between the North Korean 5th Division and units on the inland front.

Such an eventuality had been foreseen, and preliminary planning for a water evacuation of Pohang was underway. Three LSTs were ordered up to take out Air Force ground personnel, and on the 8th the removal of heavy equipment from the Pohang airstrip was begun. By 10 August the ROK 3rd Division, outflanked on its landward side, had been forced to hole up at Chongha, ten miles north of Pohang, where it was surrounded. Having bypassed the South Koreans, the enemy advance now gained momentum, and on the 11th heavy demands were made upon the fire support ships south of Yongdok. *Helena* got four tanks this day, as her helicopter was flying KMAG personnel to Pohang to confer with General Walker, but naval gunfire was not enough. On the 12th, tank-led troops of the North Korean 5th Division fought their way into the town, where they were joined on the next day by elements of the 12th Division, switched eastward from the northern mountain front.

Little beyond naval gunfire and strikes by Air Force planes remained available for the defense of Pohang. Yet although the former was handicapped by the withdrawal of fire control personnel ashore, and although the latter were preparing to evacuate that very day, the intensity of these efforts forced the enemy to retire temporarily on the afternoon of the 13th. But so serious was the Communist threat that an emergency call was made for reinforcements. To defend the airfield American tanks and infantry and an ROK regiment were hurried north; to prevent a major breakthrough, much of EUSA’s scant reserve was ordered up to Kyongju. But the advancing columns became entangled on the way with infiltrators disguised as refugees, and progress was slow.

Such, however, was the importance attached to the east coast railroad that, in the midst of the Pohang crisis, *Helena* and two destroyers were withdrawn to bombard the bridges and tunnels at Sinchang in the north. There on the 14th the expenditure of 170-odd rounds of 8-inch and 100 rounds of 5-inch by *Helena* and *Chandler* destroyed a train and damaged two bridges. But further word on conditions at Pohang, and rumors of an enemy landing at Kuryongpo, brought Admiral Hartman back at 25 knots.

On 15 August, following reports from KMAG of the critical condition of the ROK 3rd Division, General Walker ordered its evacuation by sea. To permit the ROKs to hold their little perimeter until shipping could be assembled, fire support was essential. This support was effectively given by the *Helena* task element, which also provided medical supplies by helicopter, and motor gasoline, brought up by destroyer from Pusan, by whaleboat. Further assistance to the besieged division came from Task Force 77, which got underway once more from Sasebo on the afternoon of the 15th, and during the night steamed north to the Sea of Japan for its scheduled operations against Areas C and F.

The first strikes on the morning of the 16th were sent off, as planned, against bridges and supply dumps in Area C. But increasing pressure on the big perimeter around Taegu and on the little one at Chongha led to a switch to close support. A morning strike of eight ADs and seven F4Us from *Philippine Sea* was diverted in the air, only to have communication problems frustrate all efforts to provide the desired services. At 1115, at the
request of Fifth Air Force, all strikes were put on close support. At 1445 information on the scheduled Chongha
evacuation was received on board, the major objective became the protection of the ROK division, and although
two later Valley Forge flights destroyed trucks, supplies, and gasoline in the Taegu area, the weight of effort was
at Pohang. A noon flight of 15 planes from Philippine Sea bombed and strafed North Korean troop
concentrations, and between 1230 and 1730 Valley Forge flew 12 AD and 11 Corsair sorties into the Pohang area.

There remained some difficulties in control. In late afternoon an 18-plane strike from Philippine Sea
aborted, owing to inability to reach an air controller, and Valley Forge pilots returning from the Pohang region
reported that their controller seemed inexperienced. But if all was not perfect the results were good enough: the
attacks against targets beyond the range of naval gunfire continued throughout the day, the ROK division
maintained its perimeter, and by evening, when the Striking Force turned north, the evacuation had been
organized.

On the chance that rescue shipping might not reach Chongha in time, Admiral Hartman had prepared an
evacuation plan which contemplated removing the Korean troops on rafts towed by whaleboats and transferring
them to naval vessels offshore; fortunately such heroic measures proved unnecessary. At Pusan Commander
Luosey had managed to rustle up four more LSTs, one manned by Koreans and three by Japanese. These reached
the evacuation area on the evening of the 16th, and were met and led in by the destroyer Wiltsie, to beach with the
aid of jeep headlights ashore. Throughout the night, as embarkation proceeded, the support ships maintained a
planned schedule of harassing fire, and beginning at 0415 the LSTs cleared the beach. By breakfast time all 5,800
ROKs, the members of the KMAG liaison group, and 1,200 civilian refugees had been evacuated, along with
some 100 vehicles.

This first amphibious operation in reverse of the Korean War was thus a signal success. The ROK 3rd
Division, following its ordeal, was treated to a relaxing 30-mile sea voyage to Kuryongpo, where Admiral
Doyle’s LSTs had landed Cavalry Division gear a month before, and where in the afternoon the rescue ships
beached to put the Koreans back in the fight. By this time relieving forces from the south had fought their way
through the pseudo-refugees, ROK and American units went over to the offensive, and on 18 August the enemy
was again chased out of Pohang.

While all this was in progress at Pohang, activity was being stepped up in the north. By the 17th, when
the ROK division was taken out of Chongha, Bass had completed her three raids and had departed the area. But
Pickerel now arrived to begin her photographic work; the Toledo group, on its way to relieve off Pohang, stopped
by to bombard; for the first time in a month Task Force 77 had a chance to strike northeastern Korea.

With Mansfield, Collett, and Swenson as screen, with patrol plane spot, and with a combat air patrol from
Task Force 77, Toledo cruised the 40-mile stretch of coast, from Songjin south to Iwon, where the railroad runs
close to the sea. Targets were plentiful, and the 297 rounds of 8-inch HC expended against three railroad bridges
and several hundred freight cars were considered to have been profitably invested. At the same time the two
carriers of Task Force 77 were flying strikes against rail facilities and such minor coastal shipping as could be
discovered between the 38th and 42d parallels; in the course of this work one jet sweep found an ammunition
train, and exploded it so effectively as to bring back tangible proof in the form of fragments embedded in the
fighters’ wings. On conclusion of the day’s operations both carrier and gunnery forces headed southward,
Admiral Higgins to relieve the fire support group off Pohang, and the carriers to pass through Tsushima Strait en
route to their fuelling rendezvous south of Korea.

Some semblance of order had by now been reestablished at Pohang, but elsewhere the perimeter was
under heavy pressure. Although the close support efforts of Task Force 77 on the 16th had been concentrated in
the east, a fair number of sorties had been sent to the Waegwan front northwest of Taegu. This area had also
benefited from the attentions of the FEAF Bomber Command, which on orders from GHQ had put 850 tons of
explosives into enemy assembly areas in a carpet-bombing operation reminiscent of Saint Lo. But despite all efforts heavy enemy attacks on the 17th penetrated the ROK lines north of Taegu, and only the quickest of countermeasures succeeded in restoring the situation.

The Marine Brigade in the meantime had been moving north, first to Miryang and then westward to Yongsan, to confront the crisis in the Naktong bulge. Seven miles west of Yongsan the river curves to the westward, then south, then east again toward Pusan, to enclose an area some three miles in each dimension, commanded by a central hill mass, and protected on the eastward by ridges running north and south across its entrance. Having crossed the river on 6 August, the enemy in the space of four days had expanded his lodgment to include the larger part of the 4th Division, the unit which Task Force Smith had run up against on 5 July. Counterattacks on the 11th and on the 14th and 15th had failed to dislodge the three North Korean infantry regiments which, with artillery and tank support, now held the eastern ridges and were debouching onto the Yongsan road.

The Marine Brigade in the meantime had been moving north, first to Miryang and then westward to Yongsan, to confront the crisis in the Naktong bulge. Seven miles west of Yongsan the river curves to the westward, then south, then east again toward Pusan, to enclose an area some three miles in each dimension, commanded by a central hill mass, and protected on the eastward by ridges running north and south across its entrance. Having crossed the river on 6 August, the enemy in the space of four days had expanded his lodgment to include the larger part of the 4th Division, the unit which Task Force Smith had run up against on 5 July. Counterattacks on the 11th and on the 14th and 15th had failed to dislodge the three North Korean infantry regiments which, with artillery and tank support, now held the eastern ridges and were debouching onto the Yongsan road.

The danger was great. If the penetration could not be contained the lowland river valley route to Pusan would lie open to the enemy. The three Army regiments in the bulge, less than half-strength at the time the enemy crossed the river, had been heavily engaged for ten days. Nor were the Marines in much better case. To confront the crisis and restore the balance, three under-strength battalions were to be committed against perhaps twice their number; no replacements had reached the brigade since its arrival in Korea; the losses suffered in the Kosong offensive had not been made good; the battalions still lacked their third companies. But one British observer, watching the Marines as they moved up through Miryang, was emboldened to hope, though with "no valid reason," that the tragedy which threatened the entire Korean foothold might yet be averted.

Army units already in the area included a battalion in blocking position on the left, two battalions north of the Yongsan road, and two regiments under orders to attack from the northeast. The Marines, on their arrival, were ordered to attack westward along the road at 0800 on the 17th, with Obong-ni Ridge, running northwest-southeast across the entrance to the bulge, as their first objective. Shortage of transport had delayed the arrival of the brigade and had adversely affected the artillery preparation; a misunderstanding with the Army unit on the right led to a lack of flank support; the air strike from the escort carriers was 15 minutes late, so that the 18 Corsairs had only half their intended time to work over enemy positions. The advance uphill, against a numerically superior and entrenched enemy, was carried out with great bravery but at heavy cost: of the 240 men of the 2nd Battalion which led the attack, 142 had become casualties by mid-day. But the enemy, too, was suffering, and with the commitment of the 1st Battalion at 1300 the forward movement continued. By evening the northern end of the ridge had been taken and a counterattacking tank force destroyed; north of the road Army troops had moved up to parallel the brigade’s advanced position; in the northern hills troops of the 24th Division had reached their objectives.

Strong enemy counterattacks during the night brought bitter fighting along Obong-ni Ridge, but the North Koreans proved unable to exploit their gains, and with morning the advance was resumed. Held up by a heavy machine gun nest less than 100 yards ahead, the Marines called for help from the air. Under ground control a dummy run, a target marking run, and a strike were completed within nine minutes, and a 500-pound bomb, deposited squarely upon the nest, eliminated this obstacle and panicked enemy troops. By 0830 the ridge had been cleared.

Already the crisis had been passed. Even before the ridge line had been taken the failure of his night counterattack had led the enemy commander to order withdrawal across the river. This movement was expedited by the Marines’ seizure of their second objective, a commanding elevation half a mile to the westward, which was taken shortly after midday. With the North Koreans in disorganized retreat, artillery fire was directed at the river crossings, fighters from the escort carriers strafed troops on the banks and in the water, and the muddy Naktong ran red with blood.
While this notable slaughter was in progress the 3rd Battalion pressed forward toward the final objective, the dominating height within the bulge. Well advanced when operations were halted for the night, this attack was resumed at dawn. At 0645 on the 19th the hill was taken and the bulge secured, while west of the Naktong spreading waves of confusion, radiating outward from this setback, were expanded by attacks of strike groups from *Philippine Sea* against troop concentrations and supply dumps between Hyophon and the river. Its task completed, the Marine Brigade was detached on the next day, assigned to Eighth Army reserve, and moved back to the Masan area. There the infantry bivouacked in a bean patch, and undertook a training program for Korean Marines, while the artillery was sent back to work at Chindong-ni, where enemy pressure had again begun to be apparent.

In the three days fighting in the bulge the Marines had captured 22 pieces of artillery and large amounts of other materiel; estimates of enemy personnel losses varied between 2,500 and 4,500. Marine casualties, in contrast, totaled 345, of whom 66 were killed and one missing, an extraordinary disproportion which testifies to what professionalism can do, and to what command of the air can accomplish when exploited by a unitary air-ground force. For the invaders the elimination of the Naktong bulge and the destruction inflicted on the 4th Division constituted the greatest defeat thus far. For the U.N. the time gained by the action was beyond all price: ten days were to go by before the enemy succeeded in reestablishing this bridgehead across the Naktong.

While the forces of the United Nations were grappling with the crises at Pohang and on the Naktong, the southern end of the perimeter remained quiescent. The Kosong spoiling attack had been a success, and the enemy was licking his wounds. But while land action had diminished, activity in coastal waters was on the rise: the increasing unpleasantness of highway travel had stimulated diligent efforts by the Communists to improve their seaborne logistics, and between 13 and 20 August the Korean Navy fought five engagements in the arc between Kunsan and the peninsula’s southwestern tip. The most considerable of these took place on the 15th, a day of widespread action on western and southern coasts, when *YMS 503* encountered 45 small craft in the gut between the end of the peninsula and the offshore islands, captured 30, and sank 15.

Much of this overwater movement seemed to originate at the port of Kunsan, attacks against which had been earlier prohibited by CincFE with a view to the preservation of harbor facilities. But these restrictions had by now been lifted, and on 15 August the cruiser *Jamaica*, returning from patrol, bombarded factories and docks with satisfactory results. On the same day a third blow was struck against enemy south coast capabilities when Yosu, previously attacked by *Diachenko* and *Collett*, was bombarded so thoroughly by HMS *Mounts Bay* and HMCS *Cayuga* that no worthwhile targets were deemed to remain.

By this time the activities of ROK naval forces were no longer limited to inshore blockade. Evacuation of refugees from the south coast, and by raft and barge from the Naktong Valley, was calling forth a major effort, and on the 17th, 600 Korean Marines were landed on the Tongyong peninsula south of Kosong. There, by seizing and holding the isthmus north of Tongyong city, the ROK Marines effectively bottled enemy troops in on the landward side, and prevented their movement across the narrow water to the island of Koje, below Chinhae. And concurrently, at ROKN headquarters, plans were being made to carry the war back north.

At sea, meanwhile, the Seventh Fleet remained busy. After helping out at Chongha the carriers had moved north on the 17th to strike Area F. On the next day, prior to giving similar treatment to the west coast, Task Force 77 fuelled from *Passumpsic* and *Cacapon*, and rearmed from *Mount Katmai*, the first ammunition ship to reach the Far East. The 19th saw Admiral Struble’s force again in the Yellow Sea, giving support to the perimeter and striking targets in Areas A and B, while *Triumph*, operating independently, sent her aircraft against objectives to the southward. *Philippine Sea*’s interdiction strikes this day were concentrated on the vital railroad bridge at Seoul, which had survived repeated attacks by FEAF and carrier aircraft. Nine ADs with two 1,000-pound bombs each and nine F4Us with 500-pounders were sent against this target; the job was done, and photographs showed a span resting in the water, but at the cost of the loss of Commander Vogel, the air group
commander.

Close support duty on the 19th also fell upon Philippine Sea, and the morning launch of 18 planes brought satisfactory results. Although radio channels continued crowded, tactical air controllers were contacted as planned, and effective attacks ensued. In five separate areas between Hyopchon and the front lines large fires were started with gratifying effect, as numerous personnel ran out into the open where they could be strafed. This exploitation of the success in the Naktong bulge also accomplished the destruction of six troop-laden trucks, and of two command cars which were chased into a warehouse and there burned.

On the next day the force had another chance at the type of operation favored by Admirals Joy and Struble. From a launching point west of the Tokchok Islands strikes were flown against transport facilities and warehouses along the line Sinanju-Pyongyang-Kaesong in Area E On the evening of the 20th the carriers turned southward and headed for Sasebo, where they arrived at 1400 on the 21st.

However satisfactory to the naval commanders, this northward diversion of carrier effort was only reluctantly accepted by EUSAK. So frequent and urgent, indeed, had been the calls from Eighth Army and the JOC that Admiral Joy had asked CincFE to remind all interested commands of the complex chain through which the services of the Seventh Fleet were properly to be requested. On the 20th, in denying an Eighth Army request for permanent assignment of one of the fast carriers to the defense of the perimeter, CincFE spelled out the intended employment of naval force. Triumph and the gunnery strength of Task Group 96.5, and the escort carriers of Task Group 96.8, were at EUSAK’s disposition. But except in great emergency the large carriers were not to operate singly; future plans made necessary a replenishment period for Task Force 77; its subsequent employment would be communicated when known.
Chapter 6. Holding the Line

In the last ten days of August a lull descended upon the Korean perimeter. Repulse in the south and defeat in the Naktong bulge had forced important North Korean units to break off and reorganize, and enemy losses had also been heavy in the fighting around Waegwan and Pohang. But by now Communist preparations to renew the attack were faced with circumstances of increasing difficulty. A campaign planned for ten days was approaching the end of its second month, the informal logistic procedures of the invaders were becoming increasingly inadequate, and attempts to live off the country were producing a half-starved soldiery. Supply of more specifically military items, unavailable through confiscation, had broken down as a result of naval and Air Force attacks on lines of communication. Despite resort to hand carriage, horse and ox transportation, and movement by night, the enemy’s best efforts were insufficient to permit the maintenance of the offensive. Not only was he checked in his advance but his morale was suffering, and the growing effectiveness of U.N. operations was evidenced by the increasing number of prisoners taken.

By now, too, the question of who was encircling whom had become meaningful. In Korea there had developed the extraordinary spectacle of two contending armies, each nearly surrounded by hostile forces and each nourished from afar. For while the enemy controlled by far the greater part of the Korean peninsula, the sea around him and the air above remained the uncontested domains of the U.N. While he pressed against the Pusan perimeter, his own flanks and communications were under continuous attack. Night and bad weather were the happiest times for the NKPA, but U.N. soldiers could walk upright by day; the supply lines to the north were suffering, but Pusan was a booming port.

In this situation both sides were racing against time. To the invaders the arrival of U.N. reinforcements, with more in prospect, meant that they must win quickly or they would not win at all. For the U.N. the problem was to hold its own perimeter until the counterstroke could be prepared, and then to draw the noose and explode the Pusan beachhead. The last ten days of August, which saw the North Koreans feverishly attempting to solve their logistic problems, were marked in Tokyo by important high level decisions, followed by all-out efforts to mount an amphibious attack at Inchon by the time of the September tides. General MacArthur had taken the advice of the psalmist, to strike the enemy in his hinder parts and put him to perpetual reproach. But delivery of the blow depended upon the timely arrival of the 1st Marine Division, and upon the speed with which it could be committed.

Throughout this period of lull the work of the blockading forces continued unabated. Neither the lessened tempo of action around the perimeter nor the problems of preparing the counterstroke affected the operations of east and west coast groups and of the ROK Navy. Off the front line at Pohang fire support continued, with a heavy cruiser and a destroyer division always on duty, and with the nightly northward dispatch of a destroyer to shoot up enemy supply dumps in the rear. Yet while this work went on the coastal supply line was not forgotten, two destroyers were maintained on northern blockading stations, and the attack from the sea against enemy communication centers was again extended northward by a bombardment of the iron and steel center of Chongjin.

This city of 200,000, fifty miles beyond the northern limit of the blockade and an equal distance south of the Soviet frontier, is one of the key strategic positions on the western shore of the Japan Sea. Located on a bay which opens to the southward, Chongjin had inner harbors protected by breakwaters and equipped with railroad sidings, cranes, and warehouses. In 1945 it had been captured by Russian marines in the only amphibious assault of the Soviet’s short war against Japan; current information indicated that it was frequently visited by Russian
ships, that Soviet naval units were stationed there, and that the port was a Soviet restricted area. Now, however, its prior exemption was cancelled out and Russian security regulations were breached. On the 19th Chongjin was bombed by FEAF B–29s, and on the 20th the destroyer Swenson, from the northern barrier patrol post, arrived offshore and put 102 rounds into iron works, harbor installations, railroad yards, and radio stations, starting flames that were visible for 18 miles to seaward.

Two days later the destroyer Mansfield shot up Songjin, just south of 41°, and in a night bombardment inflicted apparently severe damage on the docks, railroad facilities, and bridges of this mineral and lumber export center. The 23rd saw Mansfield off Chongjin, compounding with 180 rounds of 5-inch the damage previously inflicted by Swenson. On the 24th Admiral Hartman, with Helena and four destroyers, arrived off Tanchon, undisturbed since the Toledo group’s bombardment of the 7th. Railroad cars and warehouses were worked over with the aid of helicopter spotting, after which the group proceeded northward to Songjin, where on the next day heavy damage was inflicted on marshalling yards and railroad cars.

Back on the line at Pohang a period of comparative quiet was followed, on the 22nd, by increased enemy pressure. On the next day a conference with Army representatives on board Toledo led to improved procedures in air spotting. These paid off on the 24th, as the cruisers’ gunners had the gratifying experience of putting an 8-inch shell in one end of a tunnel reported to contain a supply dump, and of observing smoke come out of the other. The 25th was a day of variety as enemy tanks and guns were taken under fire, and as the North Koreans in their turn attempted an amphibious movement against the town by the use of motorboats and sailboats. But this effort was beaten off by small units of the ROKN, and when Admiral Hartman and the Helena group arrived to relieve next day Pohang was still in U.N. hands. Aircraft from Task Force 77 took off some pressure on the 26th, reinforcements were again moved in by EUSAK, and from the 28th to the 31st close support was provided by the Marine airmen from Sicily. The last day of August saw friendly forces making sizable gains.

In the Yellow Sea, throughout this period, Admiral Andrewes’ units continued to man the west coast barrier stations and to interdict enemy traffic around the headlands. Here the principal excitement was the appearance of two enemy aircraft, the first in more than a month, one of which surprised and damaged the British destroyer Comus on the 22nd and the other an ROK vessel the next day. The attack on Comus produced a call for air cover from the escort carriers, which otherwise spent most of their effort during the latter part of the month in close support of Army forces on the perimeter. Despite the difficult hydrographic conditions in the west, the blockade here, as in the east, appears to have been effective: no traffic was moving south around the headlands patrolled by British units, and on 28 August Admiral Andrewes conducted a photographic reconnaissance of the entire coastline with satisfactorily negative results.

But while the enemy had abandoned his endeavors to bring supplies down from the north by sea, in the south and southwest he was vigorously attempting the forward movement of materiel and troops by small boat. This effort to improve the logistics of his southern flank led to a crescendo in the inshore operations of the ROK Navy.

Off Chindo, the island prolongation of Korea’s southwestern tip, the ROK YMS 503 found considerable activity on 20 and 21 August. Three enemy motorboats of between 30 and 100 tons were engaged, and one captured, one sunk, and the third damaged. For a few days there were only minor contacts, but the 25th brought seven engagements with enemy coastal shipping. At Pohang the North Korean attempt at a landing was repelled. Twenty miles off Inchon PC 701 sank a large sailboat. In a small estuary east of Chindo YMS 512 sank one 100-ton motorboat and another of 70 tons, and drowned full loads of enemy troops on both. Off Namhae Island on the south coast YMS 504 damaged 14 of 15 small sailboats encountered. But the big work of the day was done by YMS 514, which in three separate engagements in less than three hours sank three enemy vessels and damaged eight. Once again excitement diminished for a time, but on the 31st PC 702 sank two large motorboats and damaged another near Chindo.
Together with increasing enemy activity on the southern front, and with ComNavFE’s previously expressed concern about inshore traffic near Namhae Island, these south coast actions led to the inauguration of a new fire support station in Chinhae Man, a bay which, reaching in to Chindong-ni and Masan, gave water access to the southern end of the perimeter. On 26 August the destroyer Wiltsie was assigned to duty there in support of the 25th Infantry Division, and this service was continued by various ships in rotation until late September. Since the 25th Division had trained fire control parties, in contrast to the somewhat catch-as-catch-can arrangements at Pohang, this Chinhae effort paid off handsomely.

From 21 to 25 August, while the perimeter continued generally quiet and the coasts busy, Task Force 77 was replenishing at Sasebo. On the 22nd Admiral Sherman, the Chief of Naval Operations, and Admiral Radford, Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, arrived by air, following a brief trip to Pusan, to visit the force and to apprise Commander Seventh Fleet of his appointment to command the Inchon operation. On the 25th, as Admiral Struble left the fleet, command of the Fast Carrier Task Force devolved on Rear Admiral Ewen, Commander Carrier Division I.

Inevitably, this period in port involved further consideration of fast carrier employment. ComNavFE had by now switched over completely to the semi-strategic party and on the 22nd, in a dispatch to CincFE, argued that best results would come from strikes north of 38°, where many extremely lucrative and profitable targets" existed, even though the effect at the front would be felt with "some delay." This recommendation was accepted by General MacArthur, and a new schedule was promulgated which called for a sequence similar to that of the previous sortie: two days on the east coast commencing on the 26th, a day in fuelling and in transit, and two days of attacks in the west. On each coast the effort of the first day would be divided between close support and interdiction; throughout the operation first priority in interdiction would be given to railroad and other transportation targets. This dispatch was followed by another in which CincFE, “in view of current planning,” expressed concern about a possible enemy air buildup, as evidenced by the attack on Comus; FEAF and Task Force 77 were adjured to emphasize interdiction of air facilities, and while avoiding damage to runways, to refuse the enemy the use of airfields south of 39°. Finally, a request from FEAF for cooperation in the destruction of specified North Korean bridges was approved by ComNavFE, insofar as not inconsistent with previous arrangements.

Some consolation was provided EUSAK by the assignment of a quarter of the total effort to the support of the perimeter. But the autonomy of the carrier force was emphasized in a ComNavFE dispatch of the 24th, which reported CincFE’s decision to give freedom of action in the northern areas, both as to date of attacks and as to targets, to the task force commander. Thus by the end of August the frustrations of the perimeter and the attractions of interdiction had had their combined effect. Except in situations of real emergency, close support had been abandoned by the fast carriers, and within the context of the Korean conflict Task Force 77 had become an independent striking force.

Shortly after noon on 25 August Admiral Ewen sortied his ships from Sasebo for operations in the Japan Sea. As another consequence of the Comus episode, antiaircraft practice was conducted during sortie, but a submarine contact, later evaluated as false, brought an abrupt termination of the exercise. On the 26th enemy lines of communications were swept, attacks on targets of opportunity were carried out, and another attempt was made to provide support for the ground forces.

Three Valley Forge flights of F4Us and ADs attacked troops, tanks, and trucks with good results, and two reported that despite crowded radio channels the work of the controllers was satisfactory. For Air Group II in Philippine Sea the day started with a jet sweep which attacked troops in a tunnel north of Pohang, which was followed up by a strike of Corsairs and Skyraiders on a vehicle concentration west of the Naktong. It ended with another jet sweep led by Commander Ralph Weymouth, the air group’s new commander, which reported good results: in the hills northwest of Pohang an attack in battalion strength had been broken up by strafing; west of the
town a competent airborne controller had directed rocket and strafing runs within a hundred yards of friendly forces. Air operations were thus successfully routine, but as the force cruised the neighborhood of Ullung Do the sonarmen on the destroyers were kept jumping by numerous contacts attributed to the whales which frequent the neighborhood of that island.

During the night the carriers steamed northward, and on the 27th launched against transportation and other targets in the Wonsan-Chongjin coastal strip and shipping in Wonsan harbor. These strikes were described by the task force commander as more profitable than the previous day’s work in support of troops. Quite possibly they were, but the comments on the support effort appear to have stemmed largely from memories of earlier chaos: although pilot reports indicated improved results in routine support missions, the effort was characterized as ineffective, owing to inadequate communications, poor radio discipline, and poor control.

On the 28th, as Task Force 77 was fuelling south of Korea and recovering replacement aircraft flown out from Japan, another list of bridges was received from FEAF and a schedule for future operations from ComNavFE. The planned activities on the west coast would now be but the start of a second sequence: fuelling on the 31st would be followed by two more days of strikes, a day in replenishment, and strikes on 4–5 September.

The trend away from the perimeter was continuing. Where CincFE’s dispatch of the 23rd had called for such close support on the 29th as was desired by JOC, ComNavFE’s new message called merely for strikes on that day. In fact, no support missions were flown, and the attacks of the 29th were directed against railroad bridges, airfields, and highways in the Seoul-Inchon region and to the southward. FAFIK had hoped for more than this, and had requested four-plane sorties at 20-minute intervals throughout the day, but its dispatch, delayed by communication failure, was received too late to permit compliance. On the 30th, still enjoying their new-found freedom, the fast carriers attacked bridges, docks, shipping, and the water-works at Chinnampo and Pyongyang, and road and rail targets to the northward, and on conclusion of these operations steamed south to refuel and rearm off southwestern Korea.

Along the perimeter the operations of the 31st were on a diminished scale, as both sides continued to prepare for the future. Increased strength and diminishing pressure had permitted General Walker to relieve the 24th Division for a well-earned rest. In the bean patch at Masan the Marine Brigade was enjoying its tenth day of respite from combat, and was busying itself with the training of South Korean marines and with preparations for the next operation. At sea, activity was of a routine nature: the fire support ships at Pohang and Chinhae remained busy, the ROK Navy was fully engaged, but bombardment of the northeastern supply line had temporarily ceased. Air strength available for the support of the perimeter had also declined, as a result both of decreased enemy pressure and of the requirements of the planned invasion of Inchon. The Fifth Air Force was still operating from Japanese bases, and its daily total of support sorties had dropped well below that of early August; Sicily, after four days in support at Pohang, was en route to Sasebo, whither Badoeng Strait had preceded her and where both were scheduled to remain until 5 September; Admiral Ewen’s plans for Task Force 77 contemplated spending the next four days on railroad targets in the northwest in order to isolate the future battlefield.

But all the plans were changed and all the schedules scrapped by the development of the biggest crisis so far.
Late on the night of 31 August the enemy launched his greatest effort. Around the entire perimeter from Pohang to Haman heavy attacks began, very great forces were committed to the Naktong River front, and almost at once it was obvious that a major emergency was at hand. All troops were ordered out of reserve, all air support was urgently called for. At 0810 in the morning of 1 September the Marine Brigade was alerted, and shortly after ten o’clock the Joint Operations Center got off an emergency message to Task Force 77:

“MAJOR ENEMY ATTACK LAUNCHED ACROSS RIVER FROM TUKSONGDONG SOUTH TO COAST X
ALL AVAILABLE EFFORT FOR CLOSE SUPPORT REQUIRED SOUTHERN SECTOR IMMEDIATELY x
SITUATION CRITICAL X REQUEST ARMED RECCO FROM BEACH NORTH TO TUKSONGDONG TO
DEPTH OF TEN MILES WEST OF BOMB LINE X REQUEST IMMEDIATE ACKNOWLEDGMENT.”

Two hundred and seventy-five miles to the northwest, in the center of the Yellow Sea, the carriers had launched that morning at 0800 against transportation facilities in the Seoul complex and to the northward. Valley Forge aircraft had dropped a span of the rail bridge below Sariwon and had attacked transportation targets near Hwangju and on the Ongjin peninsula; Philippine Sea’s bombers had struck the Pyongyang railroad bridge and marshalling yards, and cars and equipment along the tracks to the northward; the sighting in the course of this activity of flatcars loaded with steel girders gave evidence of the effectiveness of previous bridge attacks. At 0935 jet sweeps from both carriers had been sent against airfields in the Seoul-Suwon region and against the harbor of Chinnampo. The fighters returned aboard at 1120, just after a second propeller strike group was flown off against North Korean bridges and marshalling yards.

Fifteen minutes after the fighters had been landed aboard, the JOC’s scream for help was received. The response was immediate. Admiral Ewen at once turned his force to the southeast and built up speed to 27 knots. Strike missions in the air north of Seoul were recalled at 1155, and the combat air patrol was vectored out to help them find the fleet in its new position. At 1233 Commander Task Force 77 advised the JOC by flash message that his first strike would be on station at 1430, and at 1315 the planes began to lumber off the decks: 12 ADs carrying three 1000-pound bombs apiece, and 16 Corsairs, each with one 1,000-pounder and four rockets. Ten minutes later the aircraft that had been recalled from the north were landed on. At 1344 a second flash message to JOC described the composition of the first strike group, and advised that it would be followed an hour later by a second of identical composition and armament.

As the task force drove southeastward, and as the strike group flew toward the perimeter, the Marine Brigade was moving north to Miryang and to the Naktong bulge. Higher levels were also bestirring themselves: at 1231 CincFE had ordered all-out support for Eighth Army, and as the carriers were completing their preparations for the second launch a dispatch relaying this information was received from ComNavFE. In Tokyo, in the course of the afternoon, FEAF informed Admiral Joy’s headquarters that as of 1245 the critical situation was in the 2nd Division sector at the Naktong bulge, asked emergency action to put both the aircraft of Task Force 77 and Badoeng Strait’s squadron, then shore-based at Ashiya, on close support, and suggested sending any required liaison officers to the JOC at Pusan and the operation of Navy control aircraft from Taegu.

At 1630 ComNavFE passed these suggestions on to Admiral Ewen; ten minutes later the Marines were ordered to deploy Sicily’s squadron to Ashiya next day to reinforce the effort in Korea. At 1800 FEAF was advised by courier that the fast carrier aircraft were already in action and that all else had been provided for. In the meantime another emergency call from JOC had requested all available effort on the 2nd against continuing
enemy pressure on the Naktong front, and shortly after 1900 Admiral Joy instructed Admiral Ewen to comply.

Within the perimeter, in the meantime, the old troubles in control had again arisen to plague the close support effort. On its arrival over the lines the 14-plane strike group from \textit{Philippine Sea} was instructed to attack a tank concentration east of the bombline; the flight leader made a preliminary low pass, observed white stars on the vehicles and no attempt to take shelter by the personnel, and called off the attack; the group then foraged for targets on its own and attacked troop concentrations and a bridge on the Naktong River. \textit{Valley Forge}'s aircraft, instructed to orbit because the controller had no targets, spent 45 minutes circling while the Mosquito called in a flight of F—51s on an enemy troop concentration. Deprived of this target, so suitable to their 1,000-pound instantaneous and VT-fused bombs, the group was finally directed to attack villages along the Naktong front.

Both carriers had launched again at 1430. This time the planes from \textit{Valley Forge} did useful work on the 25th Division front, destroying much of the town of Haman, burning trucks on the road nearby, and flattening an enemy-occupied ridge west of the town. But \textit{Philippine Sea}'s group again failed to find a controller and was obliged to seek its own targets along the river. Both ships launched jet sweeps at 1615 and again at 1745 with similar results: \textit{Valley Forge} fighters, failing to find controllers, attacked small boats in the river and trucks along the roads; those from \textit{Philippine Sea}, equally uncontrolled, returned without firing a shot.

The response to the all-out emergency was thus in large part wasted, and conditions over the perimeter were back to what they had formerly been. Not a single plane from \textit{Philippine Sea} had been used in controlled attacks, and of a task force total of 85 sorties, 43 had attacked without positive control. JOC's emergency call had received an emergency response, but the total of about 280 Air Force and Navy sorties flown on the 1st in support of the emergency along the Naktong was more than could be handled, and by afternoon, when the carrier planes reported in, the system had been overwhelmed and had collapsed. Intentions had been good, and the effort commendable, and at 1800 ComNavFE sent the force a "well done" for its prompt response and for its support of the 25th Division. Equally, however, the situation was susceptible of improvement, and the suggested dispatch of liaison officers worth acting upon. The last event of the day within the force was the launch of a night aircraft, with Commander Weymouth, \textit{Philippine Sea}'s air group commander, embarked as passenger for Pusan.

The difficulties over the perimeter had greatly exasperated Admiral Ewen, with the result that he ordered his pilots to spend no more than five minutes in attempting to gain contact with JOC or with control aircraft before proceeding to pre-briefed targets outside the bombline. Fortunately, however, the need for this procedure was considerably diminished by the efforts of Weymouth and the JOC personnel to improve communications and control: the Navy would supply the controllers for the 2nd Division front, and so get a clear radio channel; the Air Force would waive the requirement of checking all planes in through JOC. On the next day, despite deteriorating weather, the carriers sent in 127 close support sorties, to which Fifth Air Force and the Ashiya-based Marines added 201. Ninety-nine of the carrier sorties received positive direction, and the troubles of most of the other 28 were attributable to a morning ground fog over the target area.

Once the fog lifted things went well. \textit{Valley Forge} aircraft destroyed 3 tanks, 12 trucks, and 3 barges, and successfully attacked 7 troop concentrations; \textit{Philippine Sea} strike groups claimed 2 trucks and a tank, and many casualties in attacks on 11 troop concentrations. Communications with control planes were good, the controllers were complimentary about the attacks, the commanding officer of \textit{Philippine Sea} reported that "the operation was a success," and the pilots were cheered by the thought that they were getting into the war. The last strike of the day was directed against enemy troops retreating across the Nam River south of the bulge, and in this sector at least things seemed to be looking up.

The Marine Brigade, in the meantime, had been on the move, northward to Miryang on the 1st, and westward to Yongsan on the 2nd, prior to attacking once more into the Naktong bulge. There the situation was even worse than a month before: the better part of two Communist divisions was now across the river, and the enemy had broken out of the bulge and advanced about four miles eastward along the Yongsan road. Local Army
commanders wanted the Marines to attack at once, but General Craig, not wishing to commit his force until all troops had reached their assembly points or until his air control personnel had arrived, resisted an afternoon advance.

Not only were the controllers unavailable on the afternoon of the 2nd but the whole air situation was somewhat problematical. Fifth Air Force had asked ComNavFE to continue all available effort between Tuksondong and the coast, but Sunday the 3rd was fueling day for the task force, which was scheduled to meet the replenishment group west of Mokpo, and both of the escort carriers were now at Sasebo. At 2205 a dispatch from FAFIK informed Admiral Ruble that the Marines desired his air effort on the 3rd and inquired as to his availability; the message was forwarded with emergency precedence to Ashiya Air Base where both VMF 214 and VMF 323 were now located. But Typhoon Jane was nearing Japan, and at Ashiya the weather was very bad.

At Yongsan the enemy struck first on the morning of the 3rd, and a heavy attack launched at first light penetrated the Marines’ intended line of departure, a ridge occupied by the 9th Infantry about a half mile west of the town. As the brigade detrucked and moved forward the North Koreans were coming through the American lines, snipers were encountered as the troops marched through Yongsan, and as they emerged west of the town the Marines came under moderate enemy fire.

As the Army troops pulled back, heavy fire by Marine artillery, tanks, and automatic weapons halted the North Korean advance. The brigade then began to press westward from Yongsan, to clear the hills controlling the road junction and the road leading onward to Obong-ni Ridge and to the bulge. The terrain was difficult and fighting was hard, but by noon the initial objectives were in hand.

But there was no Marine air overhead for close support: Jane was centered over southern Honshu, and the fighter squadrons at Ashiya were weathered in. At 1231 General Craig sent an urgent message to ComNavFE: “NO REPEAT NO CAS A/C FROM 0900 TO 1200 X REQUEST NAVAL A/C SUPPORT THIS COMMAND X NEED EIGHT ON STATION VICINITY YONGSAN.”

Eighth Army, too, was in trouble, and at 0935 had called directly upon CincFE for the earliest possible return of the fast carriers. At 1342, in response to this plea, ComNavFE instructed Task Force 77, then refuelling and rearming southwest of Mokpo, to give all practicable support to the Army since the Marine planes had been grounded by weather; at 1404 General Craig’s message was relayed to the force. Once again all hands on the carriers doubled to flight stations, and at 1547 Admiral Ewen reported that his first strike would be off in an hour, with arrival over the lines at about 1745.

Although their arrival had not been anticipated by Fifth Air Force, these flights, like those of the 2nd, found comparatively good communications and control. Twenty-two planes from Philippine Sea worked over troops in the Masan area in close proximity to American positions. Valley Forge sent in 24 aircraft in four flights, some of which attacked Kwangju and Samchonpo, and some of which, despite bad weather, had considerable success under Marine control near Masan, where six Corsairs destroyed 2 tanks and 15 fieldpieces, damaged 2 other tanks, and strafed troops.

At Yongsan, despite the absence of air support, the Marines had continued their advance westward on the afternoon of the 3rd. By nightfall the originally scheduled line of departure had been gained or surpassed and the enemy, disorganized by the shock of this unexpected engagement, was retreating. But the front was a long one, recurving into a deep salient north of the road, and the night was made miserable by cold, driving rain.

At sea, despite the improved results in close support, the task force was again trying to shake itself loose. In preparation for the proposed landing at Inchon Admiral Struble had established and ComNavFE had promulgated a new series of carrier aircraft operating areas, M through Q, along the west coast of Korea, and had called for operations in Areas P and Q, north of 380, on the 4th, and in 0 and P, between 37° and 39° on the 5th. Pursuant to these instructions Admiral Ewen’s dispatch reporting his launch on the afternoon of the 3rd had stated that unless otherwise directed he intended to operate north of the parallel next day.
Within the perimeter, however, life was still hard, and all possible support was desired. At 2201 on the 3rd General Craig evinced his concern in another emergency dispatch in which he reported the "situation intense," and in view of the state of affairs at Ashiya requested eight carrier planes on station throughout the 4th. But ComNavFE had already confirmed the proposed operations in Areas P and Q, and although he instructed the task force to be ready to provide support on order, his answer to General Craig reported a favorable weather forecast for Japan and stated that the fast carriers were committed to other areas.

Fortunately, the fighting on the 3rd appears to have turned the tide west of Yongsan. Although fresh from garrison duty, the North Korean 9th Division, which led the advance, was deficient in training in comparison with the enemy’s original front line units and was unable to stand up to the Marine Brigade. Early morning attacks along the road to the bulge moved rapidly forward, resistance was slight, and groups of fleeing Communists were cut down by artillery and Marine air. By mid-day the advance had covered a mile and a half, much destroyed and abandoned equipment had been overrun, and much U.S. gear recaptured. Further advance was authorized, afternoon brought the gain of another mile, and by evening the Marines were dug in on the hill from which, 18 days before, they had launched their first attack in the first battle of the Naktong.

Action on the 5th started with an enemy counterattack against Army troops north of the road, which was dissolved by automatic weapons fire. Preparations were then made to continue the move westward, and during the morning, despite heavy rain and fog which hampered air operations, the Marines moved out into position for an attack on Obong-ni Ridge. But at mid-day the attack was cancelled. Although the bulge had not been cleared the situation was vastly improved; D-Day at Inchon was approaching and the brigade was needed there. On receipt of this order the Marines formed up defensively along ridges south of the road, and during the evening were relieved by elements of the 2nd Infantry Division. Shortly after midnight the brigade marched back through the rain to load into trucks and move to the Pusan staging area.

While the Marines were pressing westward from Yongsan, Task Force 77 had moved north again into the Yellow Sea. This body of water, from the viewpoint of a carrier force commander, is a somewhat restricted one. As a result of the commanding position of the Shantung Peninsula, no part of the Yellow Sea is more than 200 miles from a Communist shore; above the latitude of Seoul the operating area, less than 100 miles from Shantung, comes within progressively easier bomber range of the Soviet-occupied Port Arthur Naval Base Area. And for a carrier force dependent on the lee gauge, geography is compounded by meteorology: the prevailing light summer winds, of a mean velocity of six knots and from the northerly semicircle, do nothing to help the commander fight his way out if brought to action.

The approach to this area, therefore, had necessarily been somewhat tentative. Early strikes on North Korea had been launched from south of 37°, and operations against southern targets had been conducted from the waters west of Mokpo. But the tendency had been northward: on 20 August aircraft had been flown off in about 37°, and now on the night of 3 September Admiral Ewen took his force into the pocket, through the narrows between the Shantung Peninsula and Korea’s western tip, to launch on the morning of the 4th from a position on the 38th parallel against targets in the Pyongyang-Chinnampo region.

Morning operations were routine, but the day was to offer its full share of excitement. At 1329 the destroyer Herbert J. Thomas, on picket duty some 60 miles north of the force, made radar contact on unidentified aircraft closing from the direction of the Russian base, and reported this to Valley Forge planes passing overhead. Shortly the carrier herself made contact at a range of 60 miles, controllers on Fletcher were ordered to intercept, and a division of Corsairs which was orbiting northeast of the force was vectored out. The raid was by now estimated on course 160°, speed 180 knots, altitude 12–13,000 feet; as the fighters turned to meet it, it separated into two parts, with one retiring in the direction whence it came. Six minutes later and 30 miles north of the force the Corsairs intercepted the closing bogey and split into sections to box it in.
Here the intruder made a mistake. On sighting the fighters he nosed down, increased speed, and began
evasive action, but in turning away turned eastward toward Korea rather than westward toward China. As the
division leader, Lieutenant (j.g.) Richard E. Downs, flew over him in an attempt to identify, and reported a twin-
engined bomber with red star markings, the intruder made a second mistake and opened fire. This was reported to
base; permission to return the fire was granted. From his awkward position over the bogey the division leader
made his run and missed; turning in from the starboard, his wing man made his and hit; as the port section in its
turn began to roll inward a wing came off the bomber and it went down burning in a flat spin.

By now the force had gone to general quarters and was launching more fighters. On Thomas, where the
bogey had been tracked southward and the merged plot then followed east and north, topside observers sighted an
explosion and column of smoke in the sky followed shortly by a second explosion on the surface. Proceeding to
the spot, the destroyer recovered the body of a Russian aviator, but artificial respiration continued for a full hour
brought no sign of life.

Before the implications of this startling event could be digested, another emergency supervened. Thomas
was still picking up debris from the downed aircraft and tension within the force was still high when another
urgent call for help was received from the Joint Operations Center, asking 100 sorties a day and offering
decentralized control and two VHF radio channels. Once again all strike groups were recalled, the force was
turned to the southeast, speed was increased, and preparations were rushed to launch missions in support of the
perimeter. But this time the emergency was cancelled out by higher authority, as ComNavFE informed the JOC
that CincFE had committed the fast carriers to other business, and that the Navy was unable to provide more
support than that given by the Marine squadrons at Ashiya. Late in the afternoon a second flash from Fifth Air
Force requested, with the concurrence of EUSAK, 100 sorties on the 5th and 50 percent of naval air effort until
further notice, and asked for a representative from the task force to assist in the coordination and planning of close
support. But the reply from ComNavFE to this second appeal merely referred the originator to his earlier answer
to the JOC.

On the 5th, as an early morning weather flight disclosed unfavorable conditions over North Korea,
Admiral Ewen turned his force southward and headed for Japan. Sicily was still in the yard at Sasebo, but
Badoeng Strait was getting underway for the Yellow Sea. On the east coast a new crisis was developing with
heavy enemy pressure against Pohang. At 1120 the KMAG detachment ashore asked the fire support unit to call
for Navy air support to check an attack which had reached within half a mile of the town; an emergency dispatch
to this effect reached ComNavFE shortly after noon and was at once relayed to Task Force 77, to Admiral Ruble,
and to FEAF, with the request that all practicable help be given. But the fast carriers were 300 miles away, and
bad weather left behind by Jane prevented flight operations by Badoeng Strait.

The immediate threat was checked by the fire support ships. Five-inch rapid fire from Toledo and De
Haven broke up a tank attack and destroyed enemy artillery, while the destroyer provided further help by
vectoring Fifth Air Force aircraft onto useful targets. But heavy enemy attacks continued, Pohang was lost again
the next day, and by the 7th North Korean forces had gained the Hyongsan River south of the town, although still
failing to reach the airfield. Further inland, things were still more threatening, and a North Korean thrust which
reached almost to Kyongju forced the commitment of 24th Division units from EUSAK’s strained reserve.

But while fighting was still heavy as the first week of September ended, the forces of the Far Eastern
theater had done the job. Only in the north, in the region farthest from Pusan, had the enemy’s all-out offensive
made important gains; although there were still North Korean units east of the Naktong and south of Pohang,
pressure was again diminishing. By the second week of September it was clear that CincFE’s first essential had
been accomplished. Despite all difficulties Eighth Army had succeeded in holding the perimeter. All now rested
upon the landing at Inchon.
FROM THE first days of war General MacArthur had hoped to deliver a counterstroke directed at the Incheon-Seoul region, the strategic solar plexus of Korea. Early in the fighting he had conceived the idea of landing the 1st Cavalry Division at Inchon, and from 4 to 8 July the staff of Amphibious Group I had grappled with this problem. But the rapid advance of the enemy, which forced abandonment of this scheme in favor of the decision to land the cavalrymen at Pohang, made it plain that translation of idea into actuality would involve an assault landing, and posed a requirement for amphibiously trained troops. Not unnaturally, therefore, the 10th of July, the day the Pohang landing was decided upon, was also the day of CincFE’s first request for an entire Marine division.

Twice repeated in the days that followed, this request bore fruit on 20 July, with JCS approval of the movement to Korea of the 1st Marine Division, Major General Oliver P. Smith, USMC, with an arrival scheduled for November or December. But on the next day a most urgent request from CincFE for a reconsideration of this date was accompanied by his statement that its arrival by 10 September was "absolutely vital . . . to accomplish a decisive stroke." And on the 25th General MacArthur was informed that the 1st Marine Division, with attached air but less one RCT, had been ordered to prepare for a departure between 10 and 15 August.

That this commitment was met was in itself an extraordinary administrative accomplishment. Starting with a total Fleet Marine Force strength of 28,000, less than half of which was in FMF Pacific, it took some doing to provide a division of more than 20,000 men, not to mention the 4,000 or so additional personnel of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, without complete disorganization of the Fleet Marine Force Atlantic, and of the supporting establishment. Only the President’s decision of 19 July to call up the Marine Corps Reserve enabled the Joint Chiefs to promise the division; only Marine confidence that an expedited arrival was both desirable and feasible produced the advanced departure date; only the availability of sufficient amphibious lift permitted this confidence. By such interlocking circumstances CincFE was enabled to plan for a mid-September operation, but late July and early August was inevitably a time of controlled frenzy at Camp Pendleton, as security detachments, personnel from FMFLant, and reserves were processed and integrated into the violently expanding force. Difficult enough in itself, this work was further complicated by the need to provide replacements for the brigade in Korea, a requirement which was met beginning in mid-August by a series of troop movements flown west by MATS. Yet despite all obstacles loading of the division was begun on 8 August, two days ahead of schedule.

Up to this time the division promised General MacArthur consisted merely of a second RCT, the 1st Marines, plus supporting and headquarters troops and the balance of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. But on 10 August, as the brigade was attacking through Taedabok Pass and as the second embarkation was beginning at San Diego, the third RCT was provided and a third mobilization begun by orders to activate the 7th Marines.

The arrival of this regiment in the theater of action would constitute a striking demonstration of what can be accomplished by a force with a high degree of readiness when provided with advanced forms of transportation. One-third of the regimental strength was taken from the 2nd Marine Division on the Atlantic Coast, one-third was made up of Marine Corps Reserves summoned to active duty, and the remainder was provided by a battalion of the 6th Marines, then in the Mediterranean, and by personnel from miscellaneous posts throughout the United States. Five weeks and two days after its formal activation on 17 August, this regiment was in contact with the enemy, and the convergence upon Camp Pendleton of personnel from all over the United States had been followed by a convergence through 26° of longitude, westward from the Atlantic coast and eastward from Crete,
upon Inchon. The critical days of mid-August which saw the Marine Brigade rushed northward toward the Naktong, the departure from the west coast of the first elements of the division, and the flight westward over the Pacific of the division commander and his staff, saw also the sailing from the Mediterranean of the AKA *Bexar* and the APA *Montague* with the 7th Marines’ prospective 3rd Battalion.

By now some intellectual order had been made out of the Korean chaos, at least on the upper levels of command, by the imposition of a three-phase concept upon the operations in the peninsula. The first of these phases involved the halting of the North Korean advance, the second the reinforcement of U.N. forces in the perimeter to permit offensive action, the third the amphibious counterstroke. Yet these phases were not wholly separable: planning for phase three had to begin before the success of phase one was assured; the requirements of the first two phases had serious implications regarding the availability of forces for the Inchon landing.

This had been conceived of as a two-division operation, with the 1st Marine Division leading the assault. The timely presence of this unit in the Far East now seemed certain, but one of its RCTs was fully committed within the perimeter and one would not arrive in time for the initial landings. Given the continued shortage of forces in the theater, certain specific problems required solution before the planning could go forward. The availability of the Marine Brigade had to be assured; another division had to be found to follow the Marines across the beaches; a corps headquarters was needed to supervise the post-attack conduct of the campaign.

As to the first requirement, release of the brigade was promised by CincFE and the bad news communicated to General Walker. The follow-up assignment was given the 7th Infantry Division, Major General David G. Barr, USA, the last of the pre-war divisional units of the Far East Command, which had been first skeletonized to fill the ranks of units committed to Korea and then strengthened by the integration of some 8,600 South Korean recruits. To solve the command problem it was proposed either to borrow a ready-made organization from the staff of Fleet Marine Force Pacific, at Pearl Harbor, or to create a provisional corps headquarters from personnel available in Japan. Although the Marines were eager, the decision of CincFE was that the organization of a provisional X Corps Headquarters would be accomplished locally; command of the corps would be entrusted to Major General Edward M. Almond, USA, Chief of Staff of the Far East Command.

With the landing force provided for, it remained to get it there and put it ashore. This would be the job of the naval components of Joint Task Force 7, the combined force of which X Corps formed a part, command of which was assigned to Admiral Struble. The mission of Commander JTF 7 was to land the X Corps on D-Day at H-Hour on the west coast of Korea in order to seize and secure Inchon, Kimpo airfield, and Seoul, and sever North Korean lines of communication. This accomplished, the harvest would follow as X Corps, in conjunction with a planned offensive by Eighth Army and with the help of theater air and naval forces, would destroy the North Korean Army south of the line Inchon-Seoul-Ulchin.

Much of this preliminary planning was water over the dam by 22 August when the commander of the 1st Marine Division reached Tokyo. CincFE had published his directive for "Chromite" on the 12th, and ComNavFE’s derivative operation plan had been issued on the 20th. General Smith had previously heard only rumors of his task, but now he got the word. Two hours after his arrival, following a hasty fill-in by the Navy planners in Tokyo, the Marine commander had an audience with General MacArthur at which CincFE communicated his vision of the inevitable victory.

Click here to view table

There followed two days of conferences of an extraordinary nature. Two members of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Sherman and General Collins, had flown out from Washington; Admiral Radford and General Shepherd had flown in from Pearl; Admiral Joy and Admiral Doyle were there, along with numerous high-ranking officers from CincFE’s headquarters. In these discussions it speedily became clear that in Tokyo the amphibious techniques which Navy and Marines had brought to high perfection, and which dominant Washington opinion considered obsolete, were held in the greatest esteem. The situation, indeed, was almost embarrassing, for without
denying the strategic importance of Seoul or the desirability of its capture, naval and Marine planners could not forget the extraordinary tides and currents of the Yellow Sea, the mud banks which restricted and the islands which pockmarked the long approach to Inchon, and the absence of suitable landing beaches at the objective. Not since Admiral Rodgers sent them against the Han River forts had the Navy or Marines undertaken such a maneuver; Rodgers, at least, had not sent his landing force into the heart of a city; the last such effort, the British raid on Dieppe, had not proven an experience of a sort to inspire confidence in this type of assault.

Although the rule book says that what is tactically impossible can never be strategically desirable, the doubts of the experts were of no avail. The Commander in Chief was firm, both as to the amphibious assault and as to the objective, while the headquarters staff, seeing the strategic desirability clear, seemed to feel that tactical obstacles could be solved by the issuance of orders. Naval reservations were brushed aside, and increasingly the conferences took on the air of the attack on stout Horatius, when “those behind cried, ‘Forward!’” “And those before cried, ‘Back!’”

Navy doubts about the proposed operation had developed well before General Smith’s arrival, and had led ComNavFE’s staff to investigate some possible alternatives. In the search for a better objective the fast transport *Horace A. Bass* had been sent into the Yellow Sea and provided with fighter cover by *Badoeng Strait*; there between 20 and 25 August, and despite the presence of a full moon, her raider and UDT group had conducted night reconnaissance of possible beaches north and south of Kunsan, and of one in Asan Man, 38 miles below Inchon. But these efforts came to naught. Although preliminary plans had been developed for Kunsan, and although Admiral Sherman and General Collins both favored a landing in this area, the suggestion was ruled out by CincFE. Even General Shepherd, whose early support of Inchon had helped in the materialization of the Marine Division, had by now developed second thoughts, but his plea for the Asan Man alternative suffered the same fate.

Having felt themselves somewhat in the dark, the dignitaries from Washington had come out to see what was going on. Now they knew. At the final conference the best that Admiral Doyle could say about Inchon was that it was "not impossible." There the situation rested. None would gainsay CincFE. And while formal approval of the Joint Chiefs had still to be obtained, Admiral Sherman’s agreement to support the plan and the appointment of Admiral Struble to command the operation had already shifted the emphasis from debate to action.

At Sasebo, having learned of his large impending responsibilities, Struble had been expanding his staff. A squadron commander was lifted from the destroyers, an air planner from Admiral Hoskins’ staff, and on the 25th, leaving his flagship to follow him, Commander Seventh Fleet flew to Tokyo. There, where all principal commanders were now united, there was plenty of work for all. The west coast contingent of the Marine Division was expected to reach Kobe on the 29th. The first elements of the Attack Force were scheduled to sail on 9 September. D-Day was only 20 days away. But the Amphibious Group’s studies of Inchon provided a basis for planning, the Marine Division staff had already moved aboard *Mount McKinley*, and with the arrival of the commander of the joint force decisions could be made.

With no time for rehearsal, with only the minimum time for combat loading, Joint Task Force 7 was responsible for the execution of an extremely audacious plan. Far larger forces had been committed to far smaller objectives during the war against Japan: at Iwo three divisions had been employed and at Okinawa four; and while the opposition on those islands was of course far stronger than that anticipated at Inchon, naval strength had made it possible to isolate the objective and to deny the enemy all hope of reinforcement. At Inchon some measure of isolation of the battlefield was indeed possible, as a result of command of the sea and air and of the effort previously expended in the knocking down of bridges. But while trains and ships and even trucks might be excluded, there was no guarantee that large numbers of unfriendly pedestrians might not be concentrated by night marches against the beachhead.
Eighty years earlier Admiral Rodgers had estimated that 5,000 troops would suffice to capture a treaty. Since then things had changed. Where formerly the only signs of habitation had been the scattered fishing huts of Chemulpo there had now developed a sizable city, while the events of the preceding weeks had sufficiently demonstrated that the enemy had modernized his military techniques. The task of the 1st Marine Division, which with attached Army and Korean units would reach a D-Day strength of 25,000, was to land in and capture a city with a population of some 250,000 souls, and then advance without loss of momentum to seize Kimpo airfield, 12 miles inland, by D plus 2. The area involved was roughly comparable to that of Saipan, where three divisions had been committed to the attack with another held in reserve, where there were no great cities, where hydrographic difficulties were slight, and where the flanks of the assault force were protected by the vastness of the Pacific Ocean and the power of the Pacific Fleet.

Reinforced, beginning on D plus 2, until it would attain a strength of almost 70,000, X Corps was to press onward to capture Seoul, capital and largest city of the country, and then hold until contact was made with Eighth Army forces coming up from the southward. How long this would take was problematical in view of the great depth of the turning movement. The distance between the point of landing and the beleaguered forces in the perimeter was some 140 miles airline, roughly comparable to that from Philadelphia to Washington, more than twice that at Anzio beachhead where the link-up took four months.

Although the risks inherent in the introduction of so small a force into so large a land mass at so great a distance from supporting units could perhaps be discounted, given the wear and tear inflicted on the North Korean People’s Army and its commitment far to the south, the Inchon landing still presented some appalling tactical problems for the naval forces which had to bring it off. These difficulties stemmed principally from the extraordinary hydrography of the objective region and from the configuration of Inchon harbor. Shallow water at Inchon limited the date of a possible attack to a short three-day period each month; the rise and fall of the tide limited the time of attack to two short periods each day; the narrow and tortuous entrance channels restricted the movement of shipping for the last 34 miles of the approach, made daylight entry almost imperative for vessels of low power and poor maneuverability such as transport, cargo, and LST types, and prevented the normal night retirement of amphibious shipping from the objective area.

These hydrographic conditions had limited the development of this Korean Piraeus. Although the second port of South Korea, Inchon’s ability to sustain an army corps was marginal. The navigational hazards of the approach and the tidal silting which had bordered the city with drying mud flats had kept its cargo handling capacity small: where Pusan could handle 25,000 tons a day, Inchon could manage less than half of that. Piers were lacking, and the five berths in the tidal basin compared unfavorably with the 30 alongside berths at Pusan. Nor was the outer anchorage of a sort that could conveniently accommodate an invasion armada: at Inchon this measures about seven miles from north to south and a mile or less from east to west. Only some 50 ships can anchor here; a tidal current of two to three knots sets in and out along the long axis.

Yet before the problems of post-assault logistics could be faced, some means had to be found to get the troops ashore. This too was difficult: not only did the lack of maneuvering room within the harbor complicate the ship-to-shore movement and restrict the possibilities of the fire support ships, but there was a notable absence of suitable assault landing points.

Of these only two could be found which were in any sense adequate, Blue Beach in the southeastern section of the city and Red Beach on its western shore, and they could be called beaches only by courtesy. Located at opposite ends of the town, they were separated by a four-mile water distance; lined with piers and seawalls, their assault required scaling ladders; reentrant in contour, they were subject to enfilading fire. Nor was this the sum of the difficulties, for from between these landing points there protruded from the Inchon waterfront a causeway leading to the small island of Wolmi Do, known anciently as Isle Roze in commemoration of the French admiral whose unsuccessful assault on the forts marked the first arrival of western civilization. This
island, which with its smaller satellite Sowolmi dominated and divided the Inchon outer anchorage, was known to have been fortified by the Communist invaders. Before an assault into the city could be contemplated its capture was essential.

The necessity of first reducing this strong point and the constricted nature of the entrance channels ruled out a night approach by the transport groups and eliminated the possibility of surprise. Since an attack in two phases was required, it was decided to send a small force in on the morning tide to seize Wolmi Do and then, after the waters had receded and risen again, to bring in the main part of the Attack Force for a late afternoon assault into the city. Nor was the warning to the enemy limited to this inter-tidal period. The need for pre-invasion bombardment of Wolmi’s fortifications, which would extend the alert period, reemphasized the fact that the attack was being directed not against an isolated island but against an area which could be reinforced.

The final impact of the Inchon tides appeared in the planning for logistic support. Only small craft could negotiate Blue Beach at the southern edge of the city; only at Red Beach in the north and at Green Beach on Wolmi Do could LSTs be brought in, and there only during the high tides between D-Day and D plus 2. At low tide nothing could be landed, and behind its ramparts of yielding ooze the city lay secure. To supply the assault forces during the night of D-Day, it was decided to run LSTs ashore at Red Beach and leave them through the inter-tidal interval, accepting the possible loss of these vessels in the interests of adequate troop support. For the LSTs, high and dry and with cargoes composed largely of explosive and inflammable materials, the prospect was not enviable, but a scheme of maneuver was worked out which emphasized the fastest possible clearing of Red Beach in order to ensure, so far as possible, the survival of these ungainly vehicles and of their priceless contents.

Such were the known generalities of the situation, but again, despite American occupation of Korea, intelligence was lacking and the specifics were unknown. Would the mud banks of Inchon support tracked vehicles? The answer was available in Rodgers’ report of 80 years before, but this was safely filed in the National Archives and no recent information was at hand. How high were the seawalls? What were their implications for the lowering of ramps of landing craft, or for troops attempting to get ashore? Would scaling ladders in fact be necessary? Which piers, if any, would support heavy vehicular traffic? In the effort to acquire reliable information Army personnel who had served in Inchon were rounded up and quizzed, photographic missions were laid on, the Air Force flew some photo interpreters out from the United States, and on 1 September a naval officer, Lieutenant Eugene F. Clark, was put ashore with two interpreters, a radio, and some small arms on the friendly-held island of Yonghung Do, 15 miles below Inchon.

In the meantime, and on the basis of such intelligence as was available, the work of the planners continued. On his arrival in Tokyo Admiral Struble was briefed by Doyle’s staff on the problems of Inchon, issued orders for concurrent planning, and undertook to give oral decisions as needed as the work went on. The flagship Rochester, on her arrival, was berthed alongside Mount McKinley to keep the staffs in close proximity. On the 30th Andrews, Ruble, Higgins, and Austin flew up from Sasebo for a conference of prospective task force commanders. And while the planning proceeded the preliminary operations were begun: new operating areas and operating schedules, intended to ensure adequate preparation of the objective without an overconcentration which would alert the enemy, were made up by Struble’s staff for broadcast by ComNavFE to the carrier forces at sea.

So the concept of the operation took form. In early September, and again in the days preceding the landing, the three carrier units of Joint Task Force 7—Admiral Ewen’s fast carriers, Admiral Ruble’s escort carriers, and the British light carrier Triumph—would work over the west coast with their efforts gradually converging toward Inchon. Prior to D-Day a destroyer and cruiser bombardment of Wolmi Do would be carried out. On the early morning tide of 15 September a battalion landing team of the 5th Marines would assault Wolmi in order to secure that commanding position. On the afternoon tide, at about 1700, the main attack into the city would be carried out by the 5th Marines’ remaining two battalions and by the 1st Marines. While the two Marine
regiments moved rapidly to expand their holdings to Kimpo airfield and the Han River line, the 7th Infantry Division (Reinforced) and corps troops would be landed administratively and would then operate as ordered by the corps commander. Throughout the operation bombardment and fire support would be provided by cruisers and destroyers, and air cover, air strikes, and close support by carrier aviation. So far as the air was concerned Joint Task Force 7 was self-sufficient: complications of coordination or control during the landing phase were fended off by the proviso that except at the request of Admiral Struble no FEAF aircraft would operate in the objective area subsequent to D minus 3, while for the later stages of the campaign X Corps was provided with its own Tactical Air Command, composed of Marine aircraft and commanded by a Marine brigadier general.

Such was the plan for the operation as worked out by the staffs of Seventh Fleet, the Amphibious Group, and the Marine Division. For Inchon, as for Pohang, the planning was necessarily carried out in violation of all the rules and in record time. By 2 September, when the Joint Task Force operation plan and the Amphibious Group’s operation order were issued, Marine planning was nearing completion, and on the next day Admiral Doyle and General Smith sailed in Mount McKinley for Kobe, where the bulk of the Marine Division had just arrived from the United States.

This speed in planning, essential as it was, also brought its problems. There was no time for joint training, no possibility of rehearsal. Division and Attack Force staffs had to plan for lower echelons without benefit of comment or opinion from the subordinates, and completed plans made their appearance as hand-outs to the regimental and task unit commanders involved. The risks of high speed concurrent planning for so complex an enterprise were illustrated by difficulties in shipping allocation: owing to lack of information on the characteristics of available vessels, the 34 transport and cargo types which MSTS WestPac had been requested to nominate for the invasion turned out to be too few, and on 9 September, D minus 6, Captain Junker was called upon for a further 11 ships. Yet despite the necessarily authoritarian nature of the procedure, and the pressures under which it was carried out, there were few mistakes. On 7 September Admiral Struble flew to Sasebo and Kobe to confer with his principal subordinates and to tidy up loose ends. The most important of these, an overly ambitious commitment of the fast carrier air effort, was rectified in the 40-minute briefing which was all that could be given Admiral Ewen on his part in the operation.

Although two divisions were a small force with which to enter a large enemy-controlled land mass, the Inchon landing was nevertheless an operation of a certain magnitude. To transport, protect, and put ashore a force of this size calls for a considerable investment in shipping and in personnel, and "Chromite," despite the expected absence of air and sea opposition, placed a heavy load upon the Navy. The total strength of Joint Task Force 7 amounted to some 230 ships of all shapes and sizes, from APDs of 2,100 tons full load displacement to transports of ten times that size. Except for a few gunnery ships held back to support the flanks of the perimeter, it included all combatant units available in the Far East. Fifty-two ships were assigned to the Fast Carrier, Patrol and Reconnaissance, and Logistic Task Forces; the remainder went to make up the Attack Force, Task Force 90, under Admiral Doyle. Of these, more than 120 were required to lift X Corps, while the rest were involved in gunfire and air support, screening, minesweeping, and miscellaneous other duties.

That so sizable an amphibious lift could be so rapidly assembled was remarkable, the more so in view of the preexisting policies of economy and of down-grading the amphibious function. In 1945 the assembly of such a force would have seemed simple enough; by 1952 it would have become quite feasible; but 1950, the year that it was needed, was the year of the drought. Inevitably, therefore, the armada that eventuated was a somewhat heterogeneous one, and of the 120-odd units assigned to lift X Corps less than half were commissioned vessels of the U.S. Navy. Thirty of the LSTs assigned the operation were Scajap ships, manned by the hardworking and loyal enemy aliens, and, of the vessels collected by MSTS WestPac, 13 were MSTS-owned, 26 were American cargo ships on time charter, and four were chartered Japanese Marus.
With completion of the planning phase, a stage in the operation had ended. Shipping was available, and a movement schedule had been worked out to lift X Corps to the objective area; a scheme of maneuver had been developed to overcome the natural difficulties of Inchon; supporting forces were on hand to deal with foreseeable contingencies. One minute after midnight on 11 September the Joint Task Force 7 plan was placed in effect for operations. Some of the slower shipping had already set sail.

But any military plan is based on certain assumptions, and "Chromite" was no exception. Underlying the basic concept were not only the postulates that phases one and two of the Korean campaign would be completed, but also that there would be no important change in the disposition of enemy forces, and that the greater portion of the invading army would remain committed to the Pusan perimeter. That this should be the case was fundamental to CincFE’s plan, which could be described in the words of Wee Willie Keeler as to "hit 'em where they ain’t," or in the more martial analogy employed by General MacArthur himself, to follow the example of Wolfe in his approach to the Plains of Abraham.

By early September these assumptions appeared to have been fulfilled. The perimeter was holding, Eighth Army had been reinforced, and the North Korean People’s Army was deep in South Korea. Large and effective though this force had proven itself to be, it possessed the defects of its virtues. Chief of these was an inflexibility in the realm of movement and logistics, which had by now been greatly accentuated by the effect of air and naval attacks on the Communist supply lines. The North Koreans could still push hard against the perimeter, but the problems of rapid and flexible redeployment were almost insuperable.

Last and in some ways most important of CincFE’s assumptions was the postulate that the enemy would receive no important reinforcement. In Korea the intervention of the United Nations had wholly changed the strategic picture, and had first delayed and then threatened with frustration a campaign planned as a walk-over. The assumptions of the invader had already proven false, and agonizing reappraisal had been thrust upon the planners in North Korea, and in the regions beyond the Yalu and the Tumen. To press on with the offensive, in the hope of driving the U.N. armies into the sea before the situation could be stabilized, had been the natural first reaction. But the arrival of important naval forces and the known amphibious capabilities of the U.S. Navy must necessarily have raised the specter of a landing in the rear, forced a review of the situation, and emphasized the desirability of further assistance from the Communist elder brothers.

There was thus at least a possibility that these, in their turn, would raise the struggle to a higher level, by providing the North Koreans with ground reinforcements, or with air or submarine strength. As regards the former, however, Russian ground intervention seemed hardly probable, while the concentration of Chinese Communist Forces opposite Formosa had left them poorly deployed for rapid action. And while air and submarine strength was available in quantity in the Soviet Maritime Provinces, its employment was fairly plainly fraught with risk. In the air, perhaps, the Far East Command’s air and naval contingents could have withstood a Communist offensive, but with regard to undersea warfare the situation was very different. Given the length of the seaborne supply line and the shortage of escort vessels, a serious submarine offensive would have faced the United States with a choice of accepting defeat or resorting to high-yield weapons. Quite possibly this situation was appreciated by the other side.

Since no such step was taken by the Communists, this problem was not posed, and CincFE’s assumptions were almost totally borne out. The enemy offensive was not weakened to guard against an amphibious counterstroke; although the Chinese had begun a northward redeployment, no ground reinforcements were provided the North Koreans; no aerial or undersea auxiliaries made their appearance. But on a lower level, and unknown to the U.N. commanders, a rapid reaction had already taken place in the form of a minelaying campaign designed to threaten U.N. naval forces and make Korean coastal waters untenable.

As early as 10 July shipments of mines were rolling southward down the east coast railway from the Vladivostok region. One week later Soviet naval personnel had reached Wonsan and Chinnampo and were
holding mine school for their North Korean friends. This reaction, which wholly justified Admiral Joy’s concern with the northeastern railroad route, was sufficiently rapid to get the mines through before the limited Seventh Fleet and NavFE forces could be brought to bear. Some 4,000 mines were quickly passed through Wonsan, and by 1 August mining had been begun at that port and at Chinnampo. In time Russian naval officers ventured as far south as Inchon, shipments of mines were trucked down from Chinnampo to Haeju, and before the bridges were knocked down consignments had reached Inchon, Kunsan, and Mokpo by train.

This effort to counteract U.N. control of the sea went undetected. In mid-August search planes had reported enemy barges and patrol craft at Wonsan and Chinnampo, but while in retrospect these were believed to have been engaged in minelaying, the intelligence was not so interpreted at the time. The operation plans of ComNavFE, Commander Seventh Fleet, and Commander Attack Force, while crediting the enemy with limited mining capabilities at Inchon, stated that available information indicated no mine-fields in that area.
Chapter 7. Back to the Parallel

2. 15 August-21 September: North to Inchon

While "Chromite" was still in preparation the return to the north had begun. Although heavily engaged along the coast and busy with refugee evacuation, the ROK Navy had been able to mount offensive operations. Commander Luosey, who as CTG 96.7 operated this inshore fleet, was not privy to the Inchon planning, but the basic strategic situation was as clear to those in Pusan as it was to those in Tokyo, and the increasing probability that the perimeter would be held emphasized the value of deep flanking positions, whether for raids, landings, or the infiltration of agents. On 15 August, therefore, CTG 96.7 advised ComNavFE of his intention, if not otherwise directed, of seizing the Tokchok Islands in the Inchon approaches as a base for intelligence activities and future operations.

No countermanding instructions were received, help was promised by the west coast Commonwealth units, and on the 17th Operation Lee, named for the commanding officer of PC 702, was begun. With two YMS in company Lee, put a 110-man force ashore on Tokchok To; on the next day Athabaskan turned up to support the effort and the island was secured. On the 19th Lee’s force landed on Yonghung Do, in the Inchon approach channel, and in the days that followed expanded its control to other islands in the west coast bight. On the 20th a landing party from Athabaskan destroyed the radio gear in the lighthouse on Palmi Do at the mouth of Inchon harbor. By 1 September, when Lieutenant Clark arrived at Yonghung Do, considerable information concerning the defenses of Inchon had been collected by intelligence teams under Lieutenant Commander Ham Myong Su, ROKN. And reports from the British indicated that the seizure of Yonghung Do had caused the enemy to shift forces southward to guard against a possible mainland landing.

So far, so good, but on 1 September, as the invasion plans were moving to completion, there came the enemy’s last and greatest effort to crush the Korean beachhead. In this hour of crisis Eighth Army needed all the help that it could get, and again phase one threatened to interfere with phase three. Not only did enemy pressure bring emergency calls for the retention of Task Force 77 in close support; it also threatened to make the Marine Brigade unavailable for the Inchon landing. Previous orders to release the brigade on 4 September were cancelled on the 1st, and for the second time the Marines were committed to the Naktong front.

Faced with the danger that EUSAK’s needs might prevent the release of the brigade, General Almond proposed to replace it at Inchon by a regiment of the 7th Division. To the Navy and Marine commanders the assignment of this unit, untrained in amphibious operations and with a large infusion of South Korean recruits, would force abandonment of the two-beach assault for one in which the infantry would be landed in column behind the 1st Marines, with all the implications that this might have for the success of the operation. But the issue was fortunately resolved by Admiral Struble who, while insisting on the release of the brigade, observed that Eighth Army’s need for a reserve could be met by embarking a regiment of the 7th Division and moving it to Pusan, where it could be either landed in support of the perimeter or sailed to rejoin its parent organization at Inchon.

On this basis it was settled. Release of the brigade was rescheduled for evening of the 5th. The requests for Task Force 77 were turned down by ComNavFE. For all of its magnitude the Communist offensive had succeeded neither in breaking the perimeter nor in diverting important forces from the impending counterstroke.

Although the fast carriers had withdrawn to Sasebo on 5 September, following the strikes against the Pyongyang area, naval activity continued along Korea’s western shore. Between Kunsan and the 38th parallel,
aircraft from *Triumph* and *Badoeng Strait* scoured the land, concentrating on railroad bridges, rolling stock, and electrical transformer stations. While continuing to interdict coastal traffic, Admiral Andrewes’ surface ships found opportunity to bombard Inchon on the 5th and Kunsan the next day. On the 7th, *Triumph* departed to the east coast for two days of operations off Wonsan, but with the arrival of *Sicily* on the 8th two-carrier operations were resumed. On the 10th, the last day on station prior to departure for replenishment, Admiral Ruble’s Marine squadrons were ordered to burn off the western half of Wolmi Do. Double loads of napalm, to a total of 95,000 pounds, were ferried in during the course of the day, with resultant destruction of 90 percent of the top cover in the designated area, and presumable discouragement of the garrison.

It might be thought that an attack of such unprecedented nature against a terrain feature of such localized strategic importance would have alerted the enemy to what was in prospect and given him five days for emergency redeployment. Perhaps it did, but his capabilities in this direction were limited, and in any case the larger security picture for the Inchon landing was problematical at best. In Japan, where there were plenty of enemy agents and no censorship, the situation was a highly compromising one, and the arrival of the Marines and the assembly and loading of troops were matters of common knowledge.

Some efforts to delude the Communists were indeed carried out. *Triumph* was briefly shifted to the east coast. After dropping a bridge on the 9th at Kanggu Hang, below Yongdok, *Helena* and her destroyers ran north to 40° to shoot up shipping and trenches at the island of Mayang Do. At Pusan the Marine Brigade was lined up and given a semi-public lecture on the hydrography of Kusan; after replenishment at Sasebo, *Triumph* would concentrate her efforts in the vicinity of that port, as would the Fifth Air Force; in this region, where Bass’ earlier beach survey had been detected by the enemy, a raid was scheduled by an Anglo-American force embarked in HMS *Whitesand Bay*. But the basic cover and deception appears to have been accomplished by CincFE himself, by his insistence on so improbable an objective and by his pressure for speed. The enemy, it would seem, concurred in the views of those who questioned the depth of the turning movement and the hydrography of Inchon. South of 38° the heaviest days of his mining effort were at Mokpo and Kusan on the west coast, and in the neighborhood of Chumunjin in the east. At Inchon the effort was too little and too late.

In Japan, meanwhile, the skill and devotion of the implementers had succeeded within the allotted time in matching the vision of the strategist. While Wolmi Do was burning on the 10th the slower elements of the Attack Force were getting underway. A portion of the pontoon movement group, with gear for the expansion of Inchon’s port facilities, had already departed Yokohama, as had the rocket ships which would bombard the beaches. The tractor movement elements of LSTs and accompanying ships were getting underway from Kobe. At Kobe, at Sasebo, and at Pusan, the transports were preparing to set sail in accordance with the movement schedule. Shipping from Yokohama and Kobe would pass south around Kyushu and then steer to the northwest, to be joined south of Cheju Do by units from Sasebo and Pusan. Passing through predetermined points at predetermined intervals, the pieces that made up Task Force 90 would be reordered and reshuffled, moved onward into the Yellow Sea, and funneled into the Inchon approaches according to a rigidly determined plan. Once begun, so elaborate an operation is difficult to postpone or modify, and at Inchon the tides forbade delay. No delay, it is true, was anticipated from hostile action, and in any case precautions against such interruptions had been taken. What could not, however, be planned for was the hostility of the elements.

From a meteorological point of view, a war in Korea presents a problem to the maritime power, for most of the peninsula’s weather is manufactured over the continental land mass. Yet there is some compensation in the fact that the typhoons which afflict the area, and which provide the greatest single threat to military operations, are of oceanic birth, and can be tracked in their passage northwestward from the Marianas. Their season, which begins in June and extends to mid-September, had thus far precisely coincided with the war. Grace, who had caused some difficulties at the time of the Pohang landing, had been followed by two milder sisters, but
September brought more trouble. On the 3rd, Jane had forced the evacuation of patrol squadrons from Japan to Okinawa, and had slashed through Kobe bringing gusts of up to 10 knots, damaging ships and gear assigned to the Marine Division, taking a full day from an already tight loading schedule, and depriving the brigade of air support from Ashiya. One week later, as the Attack Force was preparing to sortie, Kezia was reported moving up from the Marianas, with a predicted arrival in Tsushima Strait on the 12th or 13th, just as the amphibious shipping was scheduled to cross her path.

Since the loss of the Duke of Medina Sidonia’s Armada, the influence of weather on great naval operations has profoundly affected the history of the west; in the Orient an equally illustrious precedent is provided by the Kamikaze, the Divine Wind of 1281, which threw back the second Mongol invasion of Japan. That modern fleets are also vulnerable to such hazards was made evident in the Second World War: in the invasion of North Africa Admiral Hewitt had to balance advice from his force meteorologist against pessimistic reports from afar; the landings in Sicily were complicated by weather; "Overlord" itself had to be postponed; and two typhoons caused serious trouble for Admiral Halsey’s Third Fleet. Now the same question faced Admiral Struble, and in even more excruciating form: Admiral Hewitt had been provided with alternative invasion beaches inside the Mediterranean, but here there were no alternatives; General Eisenhower had been able to put off "Overlord," but the Inchon tides permitted no postponement. On the assumption, perhaps better on the hope, that the storm would recurve, Struble ordered the assault shipping out of Kobe a day ahead of schedule, and in the early morning darkness of the 11th sortied in Rochester from Yokosuka. Later in the morning Admiral Doyle sailed from Kobe in Mount McKinley and headed southwestward for Van Diemen Strait. In the evening, while passing east of Kyushu in heavy seas, Doyle learned that the Transport Group had reversed course to the eastward; this was promptly countermanded again in order to outrun the storm, while Mount McKinley headed for Sasebo to pick up CincFE and the other GHQ spectators. Prospects were still unclear, however, for on the morning of the 12th the light cruiser Manchester, proceeding singly from the United States, located the typhoon center 150 miles south of Kyushu, and radar tracking showed it moving at seven knots in the direction of the Yellow Sea. But fortune favored the brave. Kezia did indeed recurve, and by the time she passed over the southeast corner of Kyushu on the afternoon of the 13th the Attack Force was well clear.

The departure of the escort carriers after the burning of Wolmi Do had left the waters off Inchon tenanted only by Commonwealth and ROK blockading forces, and by a single patrol plane which, being relieved on station, maintained 24-hour supervision of the Yellow Sea. But the ROK Navy remained busy: Operation Lee was continuing; PC 703 sank a mine-laying sailboat off Haeju on the 10th, and on the 12th got three more small craft in the Inchon approaches. And now, as the Attack Force plowed forward through heavy seas and the Marines in the troop compartments cursed their fates, the tempo of operations in the objective area began to increase.

Even here Kezia had made herself felt, for the Japan-based patrol planes had been evacuated to Okinawa, and where plans called for increased antisubmarine search around the approaching Attack Force, no such sorties could in fact be flown. But the 12th, D minus 3, saw Task Force 77 back at work in the Yellow Sea, operating in an area 120 miles west by south of Inchon. On the 12th and 13th strikes designed to seal off the objective area were flown against ground installations and lines of communication in Area 0, while the jets swept airfields to the northward. On the 13th, D minus 2, a special combat air patrol was provided for the Wolmi Do bombardment group.

On the 14th, as Transport and Tractor Groups were approaching the objective and as the bombardment of Wolmi Do continued, carrier-borne aircraft were in operation and on call along the entire western coast of South Korea. Triumph was working over the Kunsan region while maintaining four fighters ready for immediate launching as combat air patrol for transports south of 36°. Carrier Division 15 was back on station, and in addition to keeping fighters on call to cover shipping north of 36° was providing spotting aircraft and combat air patrol for the Wolmi Do bombardment ships. From the middle of the Yellow Sea the fast carriers maintained a tactical air
coordinator over the Inchon area from dawn to dusk, and provided him with three strikes, morning, midday, and afternoon, of 16 ADs apiece.

The little island of Wolmi Do, the object of much of this solicitude, forms an equilateral triangle slightly more than half a mile on a side, with its eastern edge running north and south, and with a spit extending from the northern corner. From the base of the spit a 900-yard causeway leads northeastward to the Inchon shore; from the western corner another of roughly equal length runs southward to the islet of Sowolmi. Wolmi Do was known to be defended by enemy artillery, and was thought to be heavily so. Although much of the top cover had been burned off by the Marine pilots of Cardiv 15, and although very considerable air strength was available to support the assault, preparation by naval gunfire was deemed essential.

If the war in the Pacific had demonstrated anything, it was the virtue of naval gunfire in preparation for an assault against a defended objective. Given the nature of Japanese island fortifications, no substitute existed for slow, deliberate, aimed fire directed at specific targets and delivered at short-range, and from Tarawa on progress in this technique was notable. So far as the assault troops were concerned, the longer the preparation the better, but in any given operation the time available for such preliminaries was subject to various and often conflicting considerations. At Inchon this was again the case: in view of the mainland nature of the objective it was at least possible that more time in preparation would mean more resistance subsequent to landing. A preliminary decision for a single day of effort was followed by further discussion among the parties concerned, and on the 10th Struble modified his operation plan by dispatch. Bombardment would commence on D minus 2, and would be repeated the next day if necessary.

The operation plan assigned the responsibility for this bombardment to Admiral Higgins’ Gunfire Support Group, Task Group 90.6; the narrow waters of Inchon harbor placed the main burden on Captain Allan’s destroyers. Hydrographic conditions also led to the decision to come in with the flooding tide and anchor, so that the ships would lie head to sea during the bombardment, and retirement in the event of damage would be simplified. At 0700 on the 13th the destroyers started up the channel in column, Mansfield in the lead, followed by De Haven, Swenson, Collett, Gurke, and Henderson. Behind the destroyers came the cruisers: Rochester with Admiral Struble embarked, Toledo with Admiral Higgins, Jamaica, and Kenya. Overhead there orbited a combat air patrol from Task Force 77, while to seaward that force was preparing to launch a strike which would hit the island shortly before the arrival of the destroyers. At 1010 the Support Group entered the approaches to Inchon outer harbor.

The decision to come in on the flooding tide proved advantageous in more ways than one, for at 1145 a string of watching mines was sighted off the port bow, in the area from which the British cruisers had bombarded the port ten days before. Here was a threat for which the bombardment group was ill-prepared. The first positive mine sightings had been made on 4 September, southwest of Chinnampo, by the destroyer McKean; three days later British units heading north through these same waters had encountered many floaters; on the 10th the Korean PC 703 had sunk a mine-layer off Haeju and had reported that the mouth of Haeju Man had been mined. In Tokyo, on that same day, Admiral Struble had discussed the mine problem with CincFE: if contact mines had been placed in the Inchon approaches, it was the opinion of Commander Joint Task Force 7 that the Attack Force could be pushed through; if the approaches had been salted with modern influence mines the situation was more doubtful; all that could be done was to go on up and see. A conference with ComNavFE led to a recommendation to CincPacFleet for the earliest possible reactivation of more AMS; on the next day Admiral Radford passed this request to CNO and himself started additional sweepers to the Far East.

But reinforcements would be long in arriving, the invasion had to go forward, no sweep had been planned, and the seven minesweepers present in the theater were two days astern with the Transport Group. Before nightfall they would be ordered to the objective area at best speed, but for the moment the best that could be done was to make do. There might be more mines further up the channel; there was no way of knowing.
Henderson, the tail end destroyer, was detached to sink as many as she could by gunfire before the tide covered them, and the other destroyers continued on toward Wolmi Do.

It was just past noon, and the air strike was still on, as Mansfield and her followers moved through the harbor to their assigned positions, some less than half a mile from the fortified island. Anchoring at short stay, the ships swung around to head southward, into the flooding current, and trained their batteries out to port. There was boat traffic in the harbor, activity in the city was visible, but on Wolmi Do there was no sign of life.

Shortly before 1300 the five destroyers commenced deliberate fire on the island’s batteries and on the Inchon waterfront. Some minutes of undisturbed bombardment followed, and then the enemy batteries opened up. Communist fire was concentrated on Swenson, Collett, and Gurke, the ships nearest the island, and in the course of the next 20 minutes scored on all three. Collett received the heaviest damage, taking nine 75-millimeter hits, one of which disabled her computer and forced her to fire in local control. Three hits were made on Gurke; a near miss killed an officer on Swenson; total casualties were one killed and five wounded. For nearly an hour the engagement continued until at 1347, after the expenditure of about a thousand 5-inch shells, the destroyers weighed and proceeded down channel. Five minutes later the cruisers opened from the lower harbor against the Wolmi batteries, and with one intermission for an air strike continued shooting until 1640, when the task group retired seaward.

The bombardment had been a destructive one. On the other hand the enemy had been alerted: during the day U.N. headquarters had intercepted a North Korean dispatch which reported the bombing of Wolmi Do, the approach of naval vessels, and "every indication that the enemy will perform a landing." The response of Wolmi’s defenders had been vigorous, and the island’s gunners were still firing as the destroyers departed. For Captain Allan’s ships this persistent opposition merely implied another trip in next day for a repeat performance, but for some in the higher echelons news of the enemy reaction proved unsettling. On board the command ship Mount McKinley, now steaming northward through the Yellow Sea, one highly placed observer noted that among those who had counted on an unopposed or lightly opposed landing "a certain measure of pessimism appeared."

Up front, however, the problems were problems of detail. In the evening Higgins and Allan went aboard Rochester for a conference with Admiral Struble. The decision was taken to do it again the next day. Collett was detached because of her damage, and told off along with the tug Mataco to finish the destruction of the mines. Some crystal trouble with aircraft radios, which had made difficulties for air spotting and air coordination, was dealt with by a change in the frequency plan. Otherwise all was routine, and in the morning the other four destroyers, joined by Henderson and supported by the cruisers, again filed up the channel.

At 1050, as an air strike against the Wolmi Do and Inchon gun emplacements was beginning, the cruisers anchored in the lower bombardment area. Twenty minutes later they commenced firing on Wolmi Do, and shortly after noon the destroyers were deployed to their anchorages in Inchon harbor. There, following another air strike, they began their pointblank bombardment of the island, firing from 1255 to 1422, and expending some 1,700 rounds. Another strike from Task Force 77 came in as the destroyers moved down channel; for another hour the cruisers continued their work. Enemy fire, this time, was late, sparse, and inaccurate, and no ship was hit. Air spotting had been considerably improved, and the itemized claims of destruction and damage inflicted by the two-day effort were encouraging. Together with the work of Task Force 77, the gunfire appeared to have done the job. Wolmi Do was ready for the Marines.

Two approaches from the Yellow Sea lead inward to Inchon, So Sudo or Flying Fish Channel to the westward, and Tong Sudo or East Channel close inshore. Although its currents are the stronger, reaching four and a half knots on a rising tide and almost seven on the ebb, So Sudo offers fewer hazards to navigation, and had been selected as the route of approach for the Attack Force. Shortly after midnight on the 15th the Gunfire Support Group again entered So Sudo and headed north, accompanied this time by the Advance Attack Group, Captain Norman W. Sears, with the 3rd BLT, 5th Marines, embarked. Following the destroyers came the LSD
Fort Marion, with three tank-loaded LSUs in her capacious maw, and the fast transports Bass, Diachenko, and Wantuck; the cruisers, now joined by Mount McKinley, again brought up the rear.

As the ships coasted in on the flooding tide, navigating by radar up the tortuous passageway, the light at the harbor’s mouth went on: having found the beacon on Palmi Do still operative, Lieutenant Clark had heeded the Oriental proverb that it is better to light a candle than to curse the darkness. Offshore in the pre-dawn gloom, Task Force 77 flew off the first of the combat air patrols, barrier patrols, and deep-support strikes which it was to provide throughout the day, while Admiral Ruble’s group launched ten Corsairs for the pre-landing attack on Wolmi Do. The gunfire spotter, the combat air patrol, and the deep support group were all on station by 0528, when the first strike group reported in to the Air Direction Center in Mount McKinley.

By this time the Advance Attack Group had reached its destination in Inchon inner harbor, and Wolmi, no longer a menace, was put to constructive use: anchoring with the island between them and the city’s shore batteries, Captain Sears’ ships were able to boat their troops undisturbed. The signal "Land the Landing Force" was executed at 0540, and by 0600 the assault troops had been embarked and the landing craft were circling while awaiting the coming of L-Hour. High overhead the leader of the first air strike rolled his plane over and started down.

L-Hour, set for 0630, was preceded by 45 minutes of bombardment. To the north of Wolmi Do Mansfield, De Haven, and Swenson fired on the island and on the northern shore of Inchon; south of the island Collett, Gurke, and Henderson concentrated on Wolmi, Sowolmi, and on the city’s southern shore. From the southern fire support area Toledo and Kenya divided their efforts between northern Inchon and the Blue Beach area, while Rochester and Jamaica took the region behind Blue Beach and on the right flank. Any enemy reaction at the Inchon end of the Wolmi Do causeway would be dealt with by De Haven and Collett, who were assigned to cover this region with VT-fused ammunition.

While the bombardment continued Marine Corsairs from the escort carriers bombed and rocketed the island. At 0615, L minus 15, the three rocket ships, each with an allowance of 1,000 5-inch spin-stabilized rockets, moved past Green Beach on Wolmi’s northern tip and let go. At 0628, as the three LSMRs moved clear, the first wave of landing craft crossed the line of departure and headed in, while the cruisers and two of the destroyers ceased fire to permit the pre-landing beach strafe by the Corsairs.

At 0633 the first troops were ashore in a scene of smoke, dust, and devastation, and were moving forward against negligible resistance. Thirteen minutes after the first wave had touched down, the three LSUs from Fort Marion reached the beach with supplies for the assault force, and began to disgorge their ten tanks. Thirty minutes after the initial landing the northern half of the island was controlled by the Marines.

Admiral Struble was just going over the side for a small boat reconnaissance of the situation when a visual signal was received: "The Navy and the Marines have never shone more brightly than this morning. MacArthur." Pausing only to relay the message to the fleet, the force commander boarded his boat, stopped by at Mount McKinley to pick up CincFE, and proceeded into the inner harbor to survey Wolmi Do. The day was warm and pleasant, everything was going well, no action was needed. By 0807 the dominating heights on Wolmi had been secured; before mid-day Sowolmi had been assaulted across the narrow causeway and had been taken with the aid of an air strike from the orbiting Corsairs. Total Marine casualties were 17 wounded; the small price paid for this essential objective, with its 400-man garrison and its fairly elaborate system of defensive works and armament, reflects the effectiveness of the advance preparation.

By noon, then, the objective had been secured and fighting had ceased. By noon, too, the waters had receded. On Wolmi Do, in the September sunshine, the Marines gazed across the half-mile causeway and the mudflats toward the silent city and its invisible garrison. In the approach channels the Transport and Tractor Groups were moving in, bearing the forces for the main assault. But until the moon brought back the tides no
further advance was possible.

Yet though ground action had been halted by the intertidal lull, the supporting arms were still at work. In the outer harbor the hastily summoned minesweepers were busy checking the anchorage areas. Over the harbor, from dawn to dusk, circled two tactical air observers from the escort carriers, keeping the commanders informed. Throughout the day, at 90-minute intervals, eight Marine Corsairs reported in to process the Inchon defenses with napalm and 500-pound bombs. From the fast carriers there arrived, again at 90-minute intervals, 12-plane deep support strikes which, after delivering their armament, relieved their predecessors as barrier patrol. To this effort, in the two hours preceding the landing, Task Force 77 would add three formidably armed strikes, each composed of eight ADs. In one flight the aircraft would carry three 500-pound bombs, in the second three 1,000-pound bombs, in the third two 500-pounders plus a napalm tank, and all had maximum loads of high velocity aircraft rockets.

Fire support was also an all-day proposition. The interval between the morning and afternoon landings had been divided into two periods, the first extending to H minus 25 and the second to H minus 5, for which roughly equivalent ammunition allowances were provided. Target assignments were similar to those of the morning, but with the weight of fire shifted inland: Toledo’s main battery was responsible for northern Inchon, Rochester had the area north of the tidal basin and Blue Beach, Kenya and Jamaica were given the region to the south and east of the zones assigned their sisters. From the enfilading peninsula north of Red Beach through the tidal basin, the salt pan, and on beyond Blue Beach, the water front was assigned to the destroyers and to the cruisers’ secondary batteries.

Not least of the problems stemming from the decision to land at Inchon was the difficulty of avoiding non-military damage to the city and injury to the population. Destruction of necessity there was, but Admiral Struble had enjoined the utmost accuracy and had warned against unnecessary devastation. All air strikes were controlled; within the areas assigned the fire support ships, the known military targets had been conspicuously marked, and only these were to be fired on without air spot and positive identification.

Slowly the waters rose again. By 1300 the transports and the LSTs were standing in, and as afternoon wore on they began to boat their troops. At sea Task Force 77 had been reinforced by Boxer, that veteran oceanic commuter, who after delivering her load of Air Force F–51s had returned to the west coast, embarked an air group which had been flown across country from the Atlantic Fleet, and again recrossed the Pacific. Having fought her way through Kezia, Boxer now arrived, accompanied by Manchester and two destroyers, in time to launch for the beach preparation strikes. But three fast ocean crossings had taken their toll, the long-promised yard period had been indefinitely postponed, and that very morning a reduction gear failure had limited the carrier to steaming on three shafts.

At 1615 the strike groups from the fast carriers reported in and began the beach preparation work. By 1700, as the bombardment was about to begin again in earnest, more than 500 landing craft were churning the waters of Inchon harbor. Rain squalls drifting across the water mingled with smoke from fires in the city to diminish visibility as the armored LVTs with RCT I started in for Blue Beach, the faster LCVPs with RCT 5 headed north past Wolmi Do to the Red Beach boat lanes, and the DUKWs with two artillery battalions moved toward Wolmi Do. Then at H minus 25 the three rocket ships once more came into action. LSMR 403, with a load of 2,000 rockets, fired on Red Beach and the flanking area to the left while the others, with similar allowances, bombarded the tidal basin, Blue Beach, and the right flank area. Here the LVTs were set northward by the flooding tide, and LSMR 401 was forced to fire over some of the boat waves, an operation both impressive and discomfiting to the embarked Marines. At 1725, as scheduled, the bombardment ceased, the strafing planes came down, and the boats went in.

At Red Beach the two battalions of the 5th Marines got ashore on schedule to be opposed by scattered rifle, automatic weapon and mortar fire. Enemy resistance delayed clearing the beach area for a time, but in little
more than an hour it had been overcome, the Marines were working their way in through the town to the dominating high ground, and tanks and troops from Wolmi Do were crossing the causeway to join in. At Blue Beach vigorous mortar fire had greeted the approaching LVTs, and before being silenced by Gurke and the rocket ships had destroyed one LVT by a direct hit. Congestion caused by the difficult entries to the landing areas converted the first wave into a column, while diminished visibility from smoke, rain, and approaching sunset caused some confusion in the follow-up waves and some dispersion along the shoreline. But here too the landing force advanced inland without serious difficulty.

As the Marines disappeared from the beaches into the darkening city they were not forgotten by the supporting arms. Air spot remained available for an hour or more, and call fire in direct support of the landing force was provided by the gunnery ships. For post-landing gunfire support Toledo’s batteries were at the disposal of division headquarters, the 5th Marines controlled Rochester and the 1st Marines Jamaica, while each battalion was assigned a destroyer with which it was in direct communication. Night illumination fire, which had proven extremely valuable during the Pacific War, was limited on D-Day by the configuration of the harbor: the destroyers were too close in for satisfactory employment of star shell and the cruisers too far out. But on subsequent nights this situation did not obtain, and illuminating missions were most successful.

Within the city fighting continued through the hours of darkness, but by midnight the landing force had reached its initial phase lines. The 5th Marines controlled the hills commanding Red Beach, and thus the source of their logistic build-up, and had advanced southward as far as the tidal basin; the 1st Marines had reached the designated high ground north of Blue Beach and commanding the main road to Seoul. The price of D-Day was 174 casualties, including 20 killed in action, 1 missing, and 1 dead of wounds.

As had been expected, Inchon was not strongly garrisoned. Enemy strength within the city amounted only to some two thousand men of the 226th Marine Regiment, a comparatively new and ineffective unit. Weak to begin with, the forces defending the objective area had been further weakened by their southward displacement in response to Operation Lee and the ROKN landing on Yonghung Do. This move culminated, on the day of the Inchon landings, in a classic blow in the air, as a North Korean force was landed on that island and the outnumbered ROK garrison was taken off by PC 701. Next day the Communists woke up to what was going on to the northward, and departed hastily for the mainland.

With the Inchon assault successfully accomplished the problem of the Attack Force was to maintain momentum for the advance inland, and this was inevitably a matter of logistics. Armies still march upon their stomachs; problems of supply, though often hidden by the smoke of battle, are always governing; at Inchon their impact was more than usually immediate. To support the landing force during the intertidal darkness LSTs had to be brought in; to bring in LSTs the landings had to be made at the height of the spring tides; to protect these ships Red Beach had to be cleared with all possible speed. An estimated six LST loads of ammunition, water, rations, vehicles, and fuel were needed; eight had been provided in the hope that six would survive. Recently recommissioned, outfitted with pick-up crews, in poor material condition and prone to breakdown, all eight had nevertheless reached Inchon, and beginning at H plus 60 went in at five-minute intervals. On Red Beach rifle and machine gun fire still continued, and the LSTs came in shooting, not always accurately; one had a minor collision with an ROK PC during the run in, and some were hit and holed by enemy fire. But all eight made it, and four more were put up on Green Beach on Wolmi after the DUKWs had landed the artillery and withdrawn.

Historically, some of the most vexing problems of amphibious warfare had been those concerned with the organization and administration of beachhead areas, and with the handling of assault supplies. In the course of the Second World War the employment for these purposes of details of combat troops, and of sailors from the amphibious shipping, had early proved unsatisfactory. The result had been the organization of commissioned Naval Beach Groups, and of Marine Shore Party Battalions, which while exacting the costs of specialization in terms of administrative overhead and shipping space had by now developed a considerable expertise. At 1840, H
plus 70, Commander Naval Beach Group 1, Captain Watson T. Singer, landed in LST 883 and set up his command post on Red Beach. All through the night his men and the Marines of the 1st SPB labored to empty the LSTs so they could retract with the morning tide and make room for others to be brought in. At the same time another all-night exercise was taking place on Wolmi Do, where the Beach Group’s construction battalion was installing a pontoon dock, and where the supplies from the Green Beach LSTs were being unloaded for further delivery by way of the causeway. No effort was made to put important amounts of cargo in through Blue Beach owing to its inferior hydrography and intractable approaches; there material for immediate consumption only was sent in by small craft, and the beach was closed at 2100 on D plus 1.

Despite all geographic and hydrographic complications, the logistics of the assault phase turned out well. The early morning tide of the 16th saw all first echelon LSTs retracted and nine more run up on Red Beach; on the evening tide seven more were withdrawn and six put in; by 2100 almost 15,000 personnel, 1,500 vehicles, and 1,200 short tons of cargo had been put ashore. On D plus 2 Rear Admiral Lyman A. Thackrey, Commander Amphibious Group 3, who had just arrived from San Diego in the AGC Eldorado, was put in charge of port operations, and moved ashore with members of his staff. There his presence proved helpful in coordinating the efforts of the undermanned Beach Group in its three non-contiguous unloading zones, in setting up an unloading schedule, and in getting the inner harbor into operation. Here speed was essential, for with the end of the spring tides on D plus 3 the beaches would become inaccessible to LSTs, and here speed was obtained. On the 16th heavy cranes were landed on Wolmi Do, and moved across the causeway to the tidal basin, where unloading began on D plus 2, far sooner than had been anticipated.

All first echelon shipping had been emptied by D plus 4. Three days later 53,882 persons and 6,629 vehicles were ashore, and the 25,512 tons of cargo unloaded more than doubled the X Corps target figure for that date. Figures like these doubtless make arid reading; it takes an act of the imagination to translate tonnage into ammunition, water, rations, and plasma; but figures like these also make for victories. By the time the Army’s 2nd Engineer Special Brigade assumed control of the Inchon port area the limitations on the supply of the front, far from being hydrographic, were a function of the availability of motor transport.

There were, of course, logistic problems afloat as well as ashore. The movement of the Attack Force to Inchon and the extended and extensive activities of the other units of Joint Task Force 7 placed new loads upon the Service Force organization. In the weeks prior to the invasion the resupply of combatant ships had been increasingly concentrated at Sasebo, which by now had taken on the characteristics of a major fleet base. But with the transfer of so large a portion of theater naval strength to the west coast of Korea, the job of backing up at Sasebo was turned over to Captain Wright’s Service Division 31, and Servron 3, which had moved up from Okinawa in early September, was deployed forward to the objective area.

Four task groups had been created for the logistic support of "Chromite." To meet the needs of Task Force 77 a Mobile Logistic Service Group with two oilers, a reefer, and Mount Katmai, still the only ammunition ship in the Far East, was on station in the Yellow Sea. For towing and salvage work the tug Mataco and the salvage vessel Bolster were ordered up to Inchon, along with the oiler and five cargo ships of the Objective Area Logistic Group with fuel, ammunition, food, and stores. For follow-up resupply and maintenance ComServron 3 brought forward the Logistic Support Group: one oiler, one gasoline tanker, two destroyer tenders, two repair ships, two more cargo types, and a reefer. In-port nourishment of the Attack Force was complicated by the crowding of the anchorage, the tides and currents which made alongside loading of ammunition risky, and the shortage of lighters which made transfer by boat a time-consuming affair. Hard work was required of both the givers and the receivers, but everything necessary was accomplished and nobody went short.

From D plus 1 the campaign for Seoul moved rapidly forward. By the end of this day the Force Beachhead Line, some seven miles inland from the landing points, had been secured, In Inchon the Korean Marines were mopping up the last defenders. On the main road to Seoul five oncoming enemy tanks had been
destroyed, two by Corsairs from Sicily, three by the 1st Marines. The transfer of control from ship to shore was underway: an observation plane strip was in operation, shore tactical air control parties had begun to take over some of the business previously handled by the Tactical Air Direction Center in Mount McKinley, and at 1800 the division command post displaced forward from Wolmi to Inchon and General Smith assumed control of operations ashore. Marine casualties for the first two days totalled 222, of whom 22 were killed in action, 2 were reported missing, and 2 had died of wounds; as against these figures, far below those anticipated by the medical planners, some 300 prisoners had been taken and an estimated 1,350 additional casualties inflicted on the enemy.

Although the North Koreans were by now reacting vigorously, D plus 2 was also a day of rapid progress. After repelling heavy early morning counterattacks the 1st Marines, supported by Corsairs from Sicily, pushed eastward along the Seoul highway toward the village of Sosa. Four tanks were destroyed during the advance, but resistance continued strong, and at 1415 the tactical air people put out an emergency call for all possible support. Badoeng Strait was fuelling destroyers, but with Sicily’s aircraft already committed she turned to, cast off her customers, and had all planes airborne by 1558. By evening the 1st Marines were within 1,500 yards of Sosa, while the 5th Marines had gained a great strategic prize. Turning left off the main highway behind the 1st Marines, RCT 5 had barrelled up the road toward Kimpo airfield, with support from the air and from cruiser gunfire, and by nightfall had occupied the high ground east of the field and had pushed troops out onto the landing area itself.

Behind the front, reinforcements were beginning to arrive and transfer of control ashore continued. At Inchon the 32nd Infantry, first of the 7th Division’s units to reach the objective area, arrived on D plus 2 and at once began its administrative landing. At 1800 that evening the shore-based TADC assumed control of all close air support, and next day the division Fire Support Control Center took over responsibility for the integration and control of air support, artillery, and naval gunfire.

For the next three days the 1st Marines pressed eastward against stubborn opposition. At Sosa, on the 18th, there was more heavy fighting, but the objective, a commanding hill northeast of the town, was gained with the help of the escort carriers’ aircraft and of the cruisers’ guns. Here was the half-way mark between Inchon and Yongdungpo, the industrial suburb of Seoul which lies on the south bank of the Han, and here enemy organization began to improve and enemy artillery was first encountered. Nevertheless the advance continued: by morning of the 20th the regiment controlled the high ground overlooking Yongdungpo and the Seoul-Suwon corridor, and had swung left to reach the banks of the Han, while the 32nd Infantry was moving up along the right flank.

For some reason the enemy had chosen to defend Yongdungpo in force. Air strikes from Badoeng Strait and artillery fire were called down upon the town, but when the attack was launched on the 21st the Marines met heavy resistance. Forward elements, finding themselves overextended, were forced to disengage under cover of strafing and bombing by Sicily’s Corsairs, some of which was directed within 30 yards of the front lines. But Communist counterattacks were beaten off, and the end of the first week of fighting found the 1st Marines 16 miles inland from their landing point, with one company deep in Yongdungpo making trouble for the city’s defenders, and with the rest of the regiment preparing for the final assault into the town.

While RCT I was advancing on Yongdungpo the 5th Marines were preparing for the attack on Seoul. Having overrun Kimpo airfield, RCT 5 fanned out on the 18th and 19th, sending patrols along the banks of the Han and eastward toward Yongdungpo, and clearing terrain features overlooking the river. An attempted night surprise crossing of the Han aborted when the first swimmers encountered enemy forces on the far shore, but early on the morning of the 20th the 3rd Battalion crossed in LVTs against only light resistance. Covered by Marine aircraft from Sicily, the other battalions followed apace, and the regiment moved southeast along the railroad track toward Seoul. By the 21st the 5th Marines had reached within a mile and a half of the capital, and were approaching the ridges that guard its western border.

The seizure of Kimpo airfield on the evening of D plus 2 had been promptly exploited. On the afternoon
of the 18th, with enemy artillery still within range and with enemy dead still unburied, the engineers reported the
field ready to receive aircraft. On the 19th General Cushman, the X Corps Tactical Air Commander, set up his
headquarters at Kimpo; the Corsairs of VMF 212 and the F7FNs of VMFN 542 were flown in from Japan; the
aircraft of FEAF’s Combat Cargo Command began a notable effort in lifting in aviation gasoline and ammunition.
Thus within four days of the landing the air strength of X Corps had been increased by two new squadrons, one
with a night capability, handily based within ten miles of the front lines on the best airfield in Korea.

Air support, air strikes against approaching enemy columns, and air cover for shipping were still being
provided by the carriers, and the Kimpo-based squadrons began operations on the 20th. The only enemy air
reaction in the entire operation had come on D plus 2 in a dawn attack by two Yaks directed against Rochester
and Jamaica, anchored in their fire support positions south of Wolmi Do. One 100-pound bomb bounced off
Rochester’s aircraft crane and failed to explode, and seven others were near misses; one man on board Jamaica
was killed by strafing, and one of the Yaks was shot down by the British cruiser.

With the artillery in full operation, and with air support increasing, naval gunfire had begun to decline.
By D plus 3 the destroyers had been outranged, and while the cruisers had supported the fighting around Sosa, the
crossing of the Han and the advance toward Yongdungpo had taken the Marines beyond the range of 8-inch guns.
But both cruisers and destroyers continued to provide support for operations against bypassed enemy units on the
Kumpo peninsula, north of Inchon, which were being pressed by an Army airborne battalion and by one of
Korean Marines.

Unloading of 7th Division and of corps troops meanwhile continued steadily. The 32nd Infantry
Regiment had landed on the 18th, the 31st Infantry came ashore on the 20th, and the 17th Infantry, earlier
designated as the floating reserve at Pusan, was soon to follow. At 1700 of D plus 6, with the 1st Marines entering
Yongdungpo, the 5th Marines on the western borders of Seoul, and with units of the 7th Infantry Division
advancing on the southern flank, General Almond assumed control of the land campaign and Joint Task Force 7
was dissolved. At Inchon, their various travels completed, the 7th Marines were coming ashore from transports
and cargo ships which a month before had been part of the Atlantic Fleet, and were moving forward to the Kimpo
area. With this arrival the 1st Marine Division at last acquired its full complement of three regimental combat
teams. The deployment begun with the July sailing of General Craig’s brigade had been completed.
Within the perimeter, 140 miles to the southeast, the tide had turned. The invading army, already suffering from serious logistic difficulties brought on by unexpected opposition and by attacks on its supply lines, now found the supply spigot turned hard off. The weeks of Air Force and naval effort had taken heavy toll; the occupation by the aircraft of Joint Task Force 7 of the airspace over the main Korean transportation nexus had pretty well brought things to a halt; the Inchon landing demanded the local concentration of all available Communist strength. If the effect of supply shortages on this hand-carrying austerity-type Oriental army was less immediate than it would have been upon a western force, the end result was nevertheless the same. Having come close to *Triumph*, the North Korean People’s Army now faced irredeemable disaster.

Behind the Naktong front phases one and two of the Korean campaign, strengthening the defense and building up for the counterattack, had proceeded concurrently, aided in the final stages by Kezia, whose rains had flooded the Nam and Naktong and isolated the North Korean spearheads from their support west of the rivers. As the enemy threat subsided, the Eighth Army, now composed of two ROK and two U.S. corps, and with the latter including both British and Korean troops, made ready to take the offensive. The attack was scheduled to begin on D plus 1.

Despite the great naval investment in the Inchon landing some fire support remained available for the flank forces in the perimeter. On 12 September, pursuant to a suggestion from Admiral Sherman, the various task groups operating under ComNavFE had been consolidated, and the Korea Support Group, Task Group 96.5, upgraded into Task Force 95. Overall command of the United Nations Blockading and Escort Force was assigned Rear Admiral Allan E. Smith; the West Coast Support Group, now Task Group 95.1, continued under control of Admiral Andrewes, and east coast operations under Admiral Hartman. In preparation for Eighth Army’s offensive, and as a diversionary move coordinated with the Inchon landing, Hartman’s ships bombarded Samchok on 14 and 15 September, where on the latter date *Helena* and *Brush* were joined by *Maddox* and by *Missouri*, first battleship to reach Korean waters. Five years before, as one of 23 active battleships in the U.S. Fleet, *Missouri* had lain in Tokyo Bay to receive the surrender of an empire; five weeks before, the single active unit of her class, she had been lying at Pier 88 in the North River with a load of midshipmen on a summer training cruise. Now in a different hemisphere she was demonstrating the demolition capabilities of the 16-inch gun, and with the expenditure of 52 HC shells destroyed one Samchok railroad bridge and damaged another.

In anticipation of the impending offensive ROK Army units below Pohang had been again provided with fire control parties. But help from the sea was curtailed during the first days of the operation as a result of an abortive amphibious landing independently undertaken by Eighth Army. An attempt on 15 September to land ROK guerillas at Chongsadong behind the enemy lines, went awry: the Korean merchant marine LST broached and was holed while landing; the troops, after seizing their first objective with the help of extemporized fire support from *Endicott*, retired upon their stranded vessel and called for help. Not until the 19th could rescue ships be obtained from Pusan, and to prevent the destruction of this force in the interim required a considerable bombardment effort from Admiral Hartman’s force.

On the 16th, as planned, Eighth Army attacked all along the line. The North Korean radio had been conspicuously silent on affairs at Inchon, but the U.N. Command made every effort, by leaflet drop and otherwise, to give the enemy the word. Early progress, however, was negligible, and Communist resistance
remained strong. On D plus 2, fearing that "Chromite," despite its tactical brilliance, had failed in its strategic purpose, General MacArthur directed Admiral Doyle to begin planning for a second landing at Kunsan. But if CincFE’s mercurial temperament was for the moment cast down, the southern offensive soon began to roll, and as things turned out the only naval consequence of this order was a beach reconnaissance, carried out by Bass’ UDTs on the 22nd, at the mouth of Chonsu Man north of Kunsan.

On the east coast, on 17 September, ROK troops crossed the Hyongsan River south of Pohang with the help of 298 16-inch persuaders from Missouri, captured the city, and pressed onward toward Yongdok. Two days later Struble began morning and evening air reconnaissance of the roads south of Seoul, and alerted Task Force 77 to the possibility of a big strike against forces retiring northward from the perimeter. On the 20th, D plus 5, the North Korean II Corps, which manned the northern sector of the perimeter, began its retirement. By the end of the first week the pursuit of July had become the pursuers of September as the 24th Division forced the Naktong and started up the road to Seoul. On the south coast, by this time, U.N. forces had advanced halfway to Chinju, and the Chinhae fire support destroyer had finally been released. On 25 September, D plus 10, orders were issued by the enemy for a general withdrawal.

In the north, however, resistance to the advance of X Corps had been stiffening, as Communist reinforcements were rushed down from Wonsan, Chorwon, and Sariwon. Despite all efforts at interdiction six or seven thousand troops had reached the capital by the 20th, to reinforce an original garrison of perhaps 10,000. And although these newcomers lacked much of their heavy equipment, hard and costly fighting was taking place in Yongdungpo and in the outskirts of Seoul.

Appropriately enough, despite its situation in the western lowlands and on the estuary of the Han, the capital city of Korea is surrounded by its country’s omnipresent hills. From a peak five miles to the northward a ridge descends to the 2,000-foot level, then divides east and west to end in wooded 1,000-foot outcroppings which cover the northeastern and northwestern approaches to the city. From the northwestern foothills broken ridges, some 300 feet in height, run south to the Han, guarding the city against intrusion from downstream. On the southeast, between the city and the river, South Mountain rises to an altitude of 1,000 feet. Within this eastward-facing amphitheater the ancient city arose, protected by walls connecting peak with peak and enclosing an area about five miles by three. But by the latter 19th century these ramparts had been outgrown, and Seoul had begun to sprawl outward, southward between the western ridges and South Mountain and eastward between South Mountain and the northern hills.

By 22 September the 5th Marines had reached the western ridge line and were knocking at the back door to Seoul. Here the enemy had established his main line of resistance, and here heavy opposition was encountered. Despite close support from the escort carriers and the Kimpo-based Marine squadrons, the advance was slow and costly. Progress through the ridges was measured in yards, the enemy fought bitterly and launched numerous counterattacks, and heavy air and artillery concentrations were replied to by artillery, phosphorus, and mortar fire.

The 1st Marines, in the meantime, were battling their way through Yongdungpo. Having reached the banks of the Han opposite the capital, they were ordered on the 23rd to throw two battalions across the river in the rear of RCT 5. This movement, accomplished by midday of the 24th, was followed by the crossing of two battalions from RCT 7. By afternoon the 1st Marines were moving southeastward, to a position on the right flank between RCT 5 and the river, while the 7th Marines were deploying on the left.

On the 25th, with this accretion of force, the enemy’s main line of resistance was broken. Attacking into the southwestern corner of the city, the 1st Marines gained a mile and a half in house-to-house fighting; in the center RCT 5 broke through the ridge line, killing almost 2,000 of the enemy in the process; in the north the 7th Marines patrolled the covering hills to prevent the arrival of enemy reinforcements; to the southward the noose was tightened as the 32nd Infantry crossed the river and climbed South Mountain. For this attack the close support effort was carried to a high pitch: Badoeng Strait was loading ammunition in Inchon harbor, but Sicily provided
five aircraft on station every two hours, and VMF 212 at Kimpo set a new record for combat sorties. But the 25th was a bad day for the X Corps TAC: three squadron commanders were shot down and one, Lieutenant Colonel Walter E. Lischeid, USMC, of Sicily’s squadron, was killed.

On 26 September the advance inside the city continued against house-to-house resistance. An evening order from X Corps directed a night attack against enemy forces thought to be fleeing Seoul, but the presumption proved erroneous: the darkness was fully occupied in repelling strong enemy counterattacks backed up by self-propelled guns and tanks which had been brought down from Wonsan. By morning, however, these had been disposed of, and the Marines pressed on through road blocks and sniper fire deep into the burning city. Although progress remained slow the enemy was noticeably weakening, and the city had been declared secured by X Corps. On the 28th organized resistance in the capital was finally broken, although small pockets of enemy troops remained to be dealt with and enemy counterattacks continued on its outskirts.

The 7th Division, in the meantime, had moved forward on the right flank to Osan, where 12 weeks before Task Force Smith had engaged the invading army. There on the 27th it made contact with a small force of the 1st Cavalry which had raced northward along the main road. On the 29th General MacArthur turned the capital back to President Rhee. All that remained was to seal Seoul off from the north, and this was done in the early days of October as the 1st and 5th Marines took blocking positions northeast and northwest of the city, and as RCT 7 was advanced northward to Uijongbu.

By this time the ground situation was both fluid and favorable in the extreme. The last days of September saw the collapse of enemy resistance in South Korea, as Communist troops were herded into prisoner of war pens or dispersed into the hills. As the U.S. I Corps moved northwest toward Seoul, the IX Corps crossed the peninsula from east to west, driving a column to Kunsan, where cut-off enemy troops had been shelled by Athabaskan and Bataan. In the central mountains the ROK II Corps was moving northward; in the east the ROK I Corps pressed rapidly up the coastal road. Here the advance was paced by Admiral Hartman’s fire support ships, but their efforts were seldom required and then only against minor resistance. Paying the fire support group the ultimate compliment, the enemy had abandoned the shore road and was retiring along inland tracks: in its move north to the parallel the ROK I Corps bypassed three North Korean divisions.

Throughout this period the Korean Navy remained active along the coastline. In the west, following the Inchon landing, Operation Lee had continued. From Kunsan in the south to the Sir James Hall Archipelago on the 38th parallel, the clearance of islands was pressed, with the result that when on 2 October higher authority got around to implementing Operation Comeback for the recovery of these positions, the job had in effect been done. On the south coast ROK naval forces cooperating with Eighth Army took Namhae Island on the 27th and Yosu on the 29th, and on 3 October a landing at Mokpo, supported by PC 703 and some smaller units, secured that important port.

North of the parallel in Communist country the east coast naval units were also busy. On 23 September the submarine Segundo carried out a special mission in Area 7 on the northeast coast. On the 25th the submarine transport Perch sailed from Japan with its force of British Commandos to conduct demolition raids on enemy communications in this zone. But with the ground war in the exploitation phase, the sea war became suddenly costly as the enemy’s countermeasures began to take effect.

On 26 September the destroyer Brush, patrolling in company with Maddox off Tanchon, hit a mine; 13 members of the crew were killed, 34 wounded, and the ship was badly damaged. Two days later the ROK YMS 509 was mined off Yongdok, with 26 killed or missing and 5 wounded. Two more days had gone by when Mansfield, nosing her way into the harbor of Changjon in search of a downed Air Force pilot, struck a mine which blew off most of her bow and wounded 28 of her men. While sweeping near Yongdok on 1 October the AMS Magpie, recently arrived from Guam, hit a mine, blew up, and sank with the loss of 21 of a crew of 33. On the 2nd the Korean YMS 504 was mined at Mokpo.
The loss of one ship and heavy damage to four, not to mention the casualties to personnel, made this the most costly week of the war for the U.N. naval forces. For the enemy it was profitable well beyond the damage inflicted. Serious problems were raised regarding future operations, the East Coast Support Group was instructed not to operate inside the 100-fathom curve, and Perch, en route to strike the North Korean line of communications, was ordered to stay outside of 50 fathoms and to limit her efforts to a single raid.

This attack was carried out on the night of 1–2 October. With the destroyer Thomas bombarding an adjacent target as a diversion, and with Maddox backing up, Perch sent her raiders against a section of the railroad line in 40°21’, where two tunnels adjoin. Some enemy resistance was encountered, and one Royal Marine was killed by rifle fire as the landing party was reembarking, but a culvert was destroyed by demolition charges and both tunnels were mined.

At Inchon Joint Task Force 7 had been dissolved on the 21st, as control of the land campaign passed from Admiral Struble to General Almond. Original plans had then called for Seventh Fleet units to revert to their normal organization, and for the reconstitution of remaining naval strength into the Naval Support Force under Admiral Doyle. But Struble, reluctant for reasons of interservice comity to seem hasty in departure, decided to assume the job himself, and as Commander Support Force remained in the objective area until 1 October. Naval effort in this period continued intense, with heavy movements of X Corps supplies into Inchon, logistic support of the fleet, fire support of such friendly troops as remained within range, and air operations from the carriers offshore.

Missouri had reported in from the east coast on the 19th, and next day was moved as far as possible upstream, to a berth from which her 16-inch guns could interdict the Seoul-Wonsan road, some 28 miles away. But the front was moving so fast that her effort was limited to 11 ranging rounds in four days, and the principal activity of the gunnery ships was by this time taking place elsewhere. ROKN units had reported a concentration of enemy troops on Tungsan Got, the peninsula west of Haeju Man, and on the 27th a bombardment of this region, designed to encourage belief in the imminence of another landing, was carried out by Manchester and four destroyers, assisted by a strike from Boxer’s air group. Two days later the British cruiser Ceylon put a landing party ashore on Taechong Do, in the Sir James Hall group, only to find that the reported enemy garrison had packed up and departed.

Offshore the carrier air effort had remained vigorous throughout the month. Triumph had worked over targets in southwestern North Korea until 25 September, at which time she was relieved by her sister ship Theseus and departed the area. While replenishing at intervals from Servron 3 in Inchon harbor, Admiral Ruble’s escort carriers continued until 2 October to contribute to the work of X Corps Tactical Air Command. Since the arrival of Boxer Admiral Ewen had been able to keep two fast carriers active in daily flight operations, while the third moved south to take on food and drink from the Mobile Logistic Service Group; with the capture of Seoul, Task Force 77 switched from deep support of X Corps to attacks on enemy lines of communication which continued until its withdrawal on the 3rd.

By 4 October no targets remained within gunnery range, all gunfire ships were released by X Corps, and Admiral Higgins sorted the last of his Support Group from Inchon. With customers running short Captain Austin sailed in Hector on the same day, leaving behind a reduced logistic force. On the 5th the Fifth Air Force took over from General Cushman’s Tactical Air Command, and on the 7th the last X Corps troops were relieved by units of the Eighth Army. The campaign was over.

Admiral Doyle had already departed. This officer, who with his staff had done so much to prove that "Inchon is not impossible," had been relieved by Admiral Thackrey on the 27th, the day of the ground force link-up south of Suwon, and had sailed for Tokyo to start work on the next operation.
Chapter 8. On to the Border
1. 27 September-15 October: Planning the Wonsan Landing

THE TRIUMPHANT events of September had changed the entire Korean picture. With the reconquest of Seoul, the northward sweep of Eighth Army, and the collapse of North Korean resistance, unification of the peninsula, long the aim of the United Nations and even longer the hope of the Koreans, seemed imminently possible. There were, it was true, certain legal questions to be answered and certain policy decisions to be made by the United Nations and the United States before the armies could go north, but so far as one government was concerned the decision was not in doubt. During the dark days of July President Rhee had announced his intention of unifying his country by military action, and four days after the landing at Inchon he affirmed that with or without the assistance of the United Nations his forces would continue the battle.

The objectives heretofore assigned CincFE had been more limited in scope. In August, when General Collins and Admiral Sherman had come out to talk about Inchon, General MacArthur’s goal had been the destruction of North Korean armed forces. But it had also been agreed that pursuit of this aim would not necessarily be limited by the 38th parallel. In mid-September permission was granted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to plan for operations in North Korea, and on the 27th CincFE was authorized to carry out such operations in order to complete the destruction of the armed forces of the aggressor.

This permission reflected the view of the government in Washington that the Security Council resolution of June provided a sufficient legal authority for crossing the parallel. Equally, however, the message from the Joint Chiefs demonstrated the government’s determination to keep the conflict localized, both to prevent a worldwide shooting war and to avoid, within the framework of the existing world-wide war of maneuver, an over-commitment of forces to the Far East. If Chinese Communist units were encountered south of the parallel, CincFE was instructed to continue action so long as success seemed probable. But the authorization to go north was qualified by the proviso that no major Soviet or Communist Chinese forces should have entered North Korea, or have announced their intention of entering North Korea, or have threatened military action. Under no circumstances were U.N. forces to violate the Manchurian or Russian borders; none but Korean ground forces were to be employed in the border region.

One day before this authorization was received, General MacArthur instructed his planners to come up with a concept for future operations, modeled on that of "Chromite," in which Eighth Army would make the main effort on one coast while X Corps carried out a second amphibious envelopment on the other. The request found the planners prepared. Dusting off some earlier staff studies, they produced on the 27th, the day of the U.N. link-up south of Suwon, a tentative operation plan. In mid-October, as soon as the necessary logistic build-up could be accomplished, Eighth Army would move northwestward from Seoul against Pyongyang, the North Korean capital. X Corps, in the meantime, would reembark and sail for Wonsan on Korea’s eastern shore, 115 miles north of Seoul and 95 miles east of Pyongyang. There, following an assault landing, General Almond’s units would attack westward across the narrow Korean waist, link up with Eighth Army, and encircle enemy forces retreating from the south. This operation was christened "Tailboard."

Although this plan involved the occupation of half of North Korea, and the better half at that, it also reflected the caution so evident in the Joint Chiefs’ message of the same date. Occupation of territory was incidental to the liquidation of the enemy’s remaining strength; the assumption that neither Communist Chinese nor Soviets would intervene, openly or covertly, was explicit; a restraining line was drawn below the 40th parallel, from Chongju in the west to Hungnam in the east, beyond which no non-Korean forces would advance.
On the 28th a brief of the plan was sent the Joint Chiefs, accompanied by the comment that there were no present indications of the entry into North Korea of major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces.

On 29 September, the day of liberation ceremonies in Seoul, General MacArthur outlined the new plan to the commanders of Eighth Army, X Corps, NavFE, and FEAF. Shooting was still going on in the capital and Eighth Army had not arrived, but CincFE was still driving his people: the D-Day of 20 October which he set for the Wonsan landing was but three weeks away, and left even less time for preparation than had been available for Inchon.

Over and above the shortage of time, the idea of another two-coast operation raised some serious difficulties. The capacity of Pusan and Inchon, the only major ports available, remained critical, and the mounting out of "Tailboard" was to require remarkable feats of planning and preparation. Despite the obstacles of nature, X Corps had succeeded in getting in through Inchon, but the competition of incoming supplies for Eighth Army made it harder to get out. In this situation it was decided to transfer some of this competition ashore, and to send the 7th Infantry Division south by road and rail for embarkation at Pusan, while the Marines went aboard ship at Inchon. But even this division of effort required further modification, for the 7th Division’s tanks and heavy equipment could not be moved overland, and had to be loaded at Inchon and sent down by LST.

Even with the decision to send the 7th Division south by land, the preparations for the Wonsan landing put Eighth Army and the Fifth Air Force in a serious logistic bind. General Walker was scheduled to attack northward before the landing at Wonsan took place, and had to accumulate supplies for this new movement; in order to support these forward operations Fifth Air Force was struggling to bring up its squadrons and supporting organizations. But road and rail communications north from Pusan, attacked throughout the summer by U.N. aircraft, were not what they used to be, and were also carrying southbound 7th Division traffic; the embarkation schedule required that the Marines be given priority in the use of Inchon’s limited facilities. To top it all, the pressure of time was increased to an almost ludicrous degree as General Almond attempted to move the Wonsan D-Day forward to the 15th.

These complications raised the question of an overland approach to Wonsan. Some Army commanders preferred this route, although General Almond was firm in his belief in the superior economy of water lift. Admiral Joy and some of his senior officers opposed the amphibious operation, although this time on grounds of necessity rather than of feasibility. But the case, if debatable, does not appear clear-cut: the corridor from Seoul to Wonsan is narrow and mountainous, there were hostiles in the hills, and the idea of supporting a two-pronged advance on Pyongyang and Wonsan from the Inchon-Seoul area raised a whole new set of logistic problems. And in any event it appears that none ventured to dispute the matter with CincFE.

With acceptance of the new concept by the Joint Chiefs, things began to happen. As October opened the mimeographs were whirring and the plans were flowing forth. ComNavFE issued his operation plan on the 1st; the U.N. Command’s overall operation order appeared the next day; on the 5th Joint Task Force 7 was reactivated and Admiral Struble published his orders for preliminary operations. Elsewhere in the world other statements of intention were also beginning to multiply. General MacArthur had been authorized to call upon the enemy for surrender; on 1 October the message was broadcast, but answer came there none. One day earlier Chou En-lai, foreign minister of Communist China, had observed that his government would not tolerate the crossing of the 38th parallel, and "would not stand aside" if North Korea were invaded. On the 3rd Chou was reported by the Indian Ambassador at Peking as stating that if non-Korean forces crossed the parallel the Chinese would send in troops.

This thunder out of China was of no effect. In the U.N. General Assembly a debate on Korean policy ended with a vote that since "unification...has not yet been achieved" all appropriate steps should "be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea." If the language was a little vague this resolution was of great importance, for it signalled a change in the mission of the U.N. forces from repelling aggression, and inferentially
destroying enemy forces even if north of the parallel, to one of uniting Korea by force of arms and ensuring
stability by territorial occupation. The point was emphasized by General MacArthur’s statement that if
cooperation in establishing a unified Korea was not forthcoming from the north, military action would be taken
"to enforce the decrees of the United Nations." And on the 9th the Joint Chiefs went some distance to qualify their
earlier caution concerning threatened Soviet or Chinese intervention. The threat, it would appear, had now been
made, but a message of the 9th merely rephrased previous instructions concerning possible contact with the
Chinese: should such forces now be met with "anywhere in Korea,” CincFE was to continue the action so long as
success seemed probable.

For the amphibious half of the new encirclement, the responsibility again fell upon Admiral Struble, as
Commander Joint Task Force 7. For the Wonsan landing the planned course of events was very similar to what it
had been at Inchon. As in September the arrival of the Attack Force in the objective area would be preceded by
the activities of the patrol planes, of carrier aviation, and of the gunfire and minesweeping units. Once again Joint
Task Force 7 had its own organic air force, both afloat and ashore, and its private theater of air operations. Within
a line run inland from Kosong at the southern end of the Korean Gulf, north along the mountain spine, and
eastward to enclose Hungnam, the carriers of JTF 7 and the shore-based aircraft of X Corps Tactical Air
Command would operate without disturbance from FEAF, except for air transport and specially requested
missions.

Click here to view table

But while the externals were similar, the internal organization of the joint task force was considerably
modified. The upgrading of the mine menace, following events at Inchon, made it essential to extend the
preparatory period of the operation, and to send the sweepers and their supporting ships in well ahead of the
Attack Force. A jelling command structure and the diminution of enemy pressure made more commanders and
staffs available for the planning phase. The consequence was the separation of the Advance Force and of the
Escort Carrier Group from the Attack Force, in conformity with more usual practice, and a sharing of the planning
load. While Doyle and his staff concentrated on the landing itself, the directives for the Covering and Support
Group were written by Admiral Smith, and the minesweeping plan was worked up in Tokyo under the supervision
of Admiral Struble.

The new objective of Joint Task Force 7, the city of Wonsan, occupies one of the most important
strategic positions on the Sea of Japan. This location had long made it an object of international interest, a fact
reflected in the more than oriental splendor of place-name confusion which afflicts the charts and sailing
directions for the area. Of this problem in geographic nomenclature, a hazard both to military planner and to
historian, the following may serve as example.

The approach to Wonsan leads through the Japan Sea and into the Korean Gulf, once Broughton Bay,
then Chosen Kaiwan, and now known as Tongjoson Man. At the southwestern extremity of this body of water lies
Yonghung Man, sometime Yungching Bay or Eiko Wan, the northern entrance point of which is Taegang Got (ex-
Nan Kaku, ex-Desfosses Point) at the end of the Nakhimova Peninsula (later known as Koto Hanto and now as
Hodo Pando). South of this point two islands obstruct the mouth of Yonghung Man: of these Ung Do (or Ko To,
or Kuprianova Island) should be left to starboard, and under no circumstances confused with Yo Do, formerly Rei
To, which may be passed on either hand (or indeed with Song Do, or An Do, or Sa Do, or Worhyon Am [also
Woreniru To, Getsukuen Gan, and Orupyon Pao] which lie immediately beyond). Once past these obstacles to
sanity and navigation, the mariner may head north to anchor in capacious but shallow Port Lazaref, subsequently
Shoden Wan and now Songjon Man, or southward to Genzan Ko, now known as Wonsan Hang, the objective of
the X Corps planners.

Seen from the sea, the Wonsan shore appears precipitous. But although the coastal plain is small there
does exist, in the delta of the Namdae River east of the city, a sufficient area for an amphibious lodgment. The
port itself is perhaps the best on Korea’s eastern coast. Silting between a harbor island and the southern shore had led to the formation of Kalma Pando, a two and a half mile long peninsula with a rocky head and a flat body, which protects a harbor three miles wide at the mouth with the city at its southwestern corner. Despite the bombings of the summer the Wonsan docks remained to all intents undamaged, and these facilities, protected by Kalma Pando on the east and by a breakwater to the north, included a 900-foot concrete wharf with sheds, railroad sidings, and cranes, and with four fathoms or more alongside, as well as piers for smaller vessels. The town had rail and road connections with the east coast route, with the Seoul corridor, and with Pyongyang. And as a final bonus the base of Kalma Pando held an excellent airfield, originally developed as a Japanese naval air station. Taken together, the facilities of Wonsan constituted a prize that any military planner would value.

At Uijongbu, on the far side of the peninsula, the last units of the Marine Division were relieved on 7 October and moved to the Inchon assembly area. There they began loading on the next day, under the direction of Commander Amphibious Group 3, Rear Admiral Thackrey, and while embarkation progressed planning was expedited. A scheme of maneuver was worked out which called for a landing on the seaward side of Kalma Pando, where there was an excellent beach handicapped only by a shallow gradient which placed the two-fathom curve some 300 yards offshore. No help in beaching could be expected from the tides: in notable contrast to Inchon, the tidal range at Wonsan is about one foot.

For the Wonsan landing planning was both concurrent and dispersed. The troop commanders were in Korea, but Struble, Doyle, and Smith were working up the naval side of things in Japan. Once again much of the problem involved the rapid assembly of the necessary shipping: before Admiral Doyle could concern himself with routing and loading of ships these had to be procured from Scajap and MSTS by way of NavFE headquarters. On 30 September a first call was made upon MSTS for 20 APs and 25 AKs; by D-Day the requirement had been increased to a total of 66 vessels which, with the Amphibious Force units and the Scajap LSTs, proved sufficient to do the job. But no sooner was the X Corps lift provided for than a further transport problem arose: CincFE had originally designated the 3rd Infantry Division as theater reserve; now a decision to employ it in eastern North Korea brought instructions to CTF 90 to employ his shipping, once unloaded at Wonsan, to bring this reinforcing unit in from Japan.

Beginning on 4 October the lift for the Wonsan invasion was assembled at the two Korean ports of embarkation. At Inchon the Marines embarked in assault shipping, APA and AKA types, LSTs and LSDs, filled out with six time-charter vessels. At Pusan the 7th Division was loaded in transports and cargo ships while its heavy gear—tanks and the like—was brought down from Inchon by sea in Scajap LSTs. Although Admiral Doyle was still at work in Tokyo, he had sent his flagship Mount McKinley back to Inchon to embark the headquarters staff of the Marine Division. On the 11th he followed by air and relieved Admiral Thackrey of his Inchon responsibilities, whereupon the latter proceeded to Pusan to oversee the 7th Division movement.

By this time the question of D-Day had settled itself. General Almond had based his choice of the 15th on the assumption that X Corps would be relieved on the 3rd, but although the 7th Division had started south to Pusan by that time, the Marines had been held in the line until the 7th. Subsequent preparations were handicapped by shortages of maps and other intelligence material, by a shortage of motor transport ashore created by the requirements of the overland movement to Pusan, and by the complications of embarking the Marines while unloading high-priority incoming cargo in a port where activity was restricted to short bursts at periods of high tide. In the event, therefore, although pressure for speed continued, the best that could be done was to stick with the original date, and to schedule the assault for the 20th.

But just as the date was settled, the objective became uncertain and the entire concept of the operation became subject to review. Although three North Korean divisions had survived the debacle in more or less organized form, their respect for U.N. naval gunfire and air activity had led them to hole up in the mountains south of Wonsan and make no attempt to dispute the coastal road. ROK forces on the east coast consequently...
moved forward almost unhindered, crossed the parallel on 1 October, and by the 7th were within a few miles of Wonsan.

This development led CincFE to propose changing the objective of the Marine Division from Wonsan in the southwest corner of the Korean Gulf to Hungnam in the northwest. But while this scheme promised to catch more enemy troops, it also modified the original strategic concept by placing the division further from the intended junction with Eighth Army. This was, of course, a problem for the highest level, but there were other difficulties of immediate naval concern. Maps, intelligence material, and time were critically short for so considerable a change; there were insufficient minesweepers to clear two harbors at once; the 7th Division was loading in large transports which could not be accommodated at the Wonsan docks, and its landing plans had been predicated on the availability of the amphibious craft which accompanied the Marines. Although these difficulties were expounded by Struble and Doyle to ComNavFE, and by ComNavFE to General MacArthur, they were at first of little effect. CincFE was always a hard man to argue with, but in this instance Joy persisted, and on the 10th the decision to land the entire X Corps at Wonsan was confirmed.

These revolutionary last minute propositions were still being put forward and evaded as the operation entered its preliminary stages. East coast activity had begun, even before the relief of the Marines, with two night raids on the northeastern coastal railway by the fast transports Bass and Wantuck with their Royal Marine Commando, supported by the destroyer De Haven. The first of these attacks, on the night of 6–7 October, was directed against a tunnel in Kyongsong Man, less than 20 miles south of Chongjin; the target of the second was a tunnel and bridge four miles below Songjin. Both were apparently successful, and the demolition charges were seen by the retiring raiders to explode.

While the raiding group was approaching its first objective the mine-sweepers of JTF 7, Task Group 95.6, departed Sasebo with a scheduled arrival off Wonsan on the 10th. On the 8th the PBM patrol planes which had been hunting mines in the Yellow Sea shifted their activities to the east coast. On the 9th the carriers Leyte, Captain Thomas U. Sisson, and Philippine Sea, the former a recent arrival from the Mediterranean by way of Norfolk and the Panama Canal, sorted from Sasebo in company with Manchester and 11 destroyers, and headed north to provide air support. On the 10th Admiral Hartman departed with Helena, Worcester, and Ceylon, and on the next day Admiral Struble sailed in Missouri, accompanied by Valley Forge and screening destroyers.

Early on the morning of the 10th the Minesweeping Group reached the objective area and began its work. From their operating area a hundred miles offshore, Leyte and Philippine Sea sent in a combat air patrol for the sweepers and aircraft for interdiction strikes and preparation of the objective. Possible military installations on the island of Yo Do in the harbor entrance were worked over repeatedly, and some useful support was provided the advancing ROK troops, who entered the city this day and who captured the airfield on the 11th.

On the 12th Admiral Struble arrived off Wonsan in Missouri, joined up with Admiral Hartman’s cruisers, and headed north for a bombardment of Chongjin. With a screen composed of one Canadian, one British, and one Australian destroyer, and with combat air patrol and air spot provided by the fast carriers, Missouri and the cruisers conducted a deliberate and sustained bombardment of warehouses, rolling stock, and marshalling yards. Although the spotting provided by the carrier pilots was less than wholly satisfactory, owing to a lack of common grid charts, an absence of specialized training, and some serious communication difficulties, the bombarding ships reported the results as excellent.

The offensive naval strength deployed off Korea’s eastern coast, three carriers, a battleship, some cruisers, and numerous destroyers, had by now reached a very respectable level. Of the Far East Air Forces and of the Army in the peninsula, the same could be said. Taken together with the collapse of the North Korean People’s Army, this prosperity raised the question of how to end the war without redundant fighting. To this question, one of the most difficult of modern times, World War II had offered no apparent answer, and the war against the Axis had been fought out to its destructive conclusion. No ready answer was apparent in Korea either, and here the
problem was still more difficult: where the Axis nations had been led by irresponsible dictators, the enemy in Korea was a dictator’s front man only doubtfully possessed of authority to treat.

FEAF, in its approach to this problem, had wished to give authority to CincFE’s call for surrender by burning down Pyongyang, the enemy capital, in an all-out early morning incendiary attack. But the proposal was rejected by higher authority, and this approach to the problem of surrender seems in any event to reflect a misunderstanding of the anatomy of Communist society. Even assuming they were masters in their house, the North Korean bosses could be presumed to be comparatively indifferent to burning citizens, yet it was on the bosses that pressure had to be exerted.

A more specifically military effort to bring pressure on the enemy was, however, carried out by CTF 95. Admiral Smith had recommended that the Chongjin shoot be followed by public announcement of the next day’s targets, and on Friday the 13th the list was attacked as scheduled. In the Yellow Sea Admiral Andrewes’ ships bombarded Haeju while Theseus flew strikes against the city of Chinnampo. On the east coast Admiral Hartman’s group, joined by Toledo and the destroyer H.J. Thomas, separated to shoot up five coastal targets along a 120-mile stretch south from Chongjin. Together with the work of the aviators of the U.N., this seemed a sufficient demonstration of the fact that while the Communists might still control some mountain real estate, their writ no longer ran along their coasts or in the air above. But the political impact, so far as could be told, was nil.

Although the Attack Force had not set sail, and although minesweeping had barely begun, the capture of the Kalma Pando airfield by ROK troops had opened a door to Wonsan. On the 13th, therefore, Major General Field Harris, USMC, the X Corps Tactical Air Commander, flew in, and after looking things over ordered up two Marine fighter squadrons. These arrived the next day and at once began operations in support of the ROK I Corps, while being themselves supported by Marine transport aircraft, by the planes of FEAF’s Combat Cargo Command, and by a USO troop led by Bob Hope. At sea as well as on shore the air strength available for east coast operations was increasing: Valley Forge had arrived on the 12th, and two days later, after docking at Yokosuka to have her frozen propeller removed, Boxer also reported in. For the first time since 1945 four Essex-class carriers were operating in a single force, and on the 15th Admiral Ewen celebrated by sending forth 392 sorties to press the northern offensive and harry the enemy in the hills.

In the west, in the meantime, Eighth Army had begun its advance, and had crossed the parallel north of Kaesong. Enemy resistance in the hills beyond that town, together with continuing logistic difficulties, slowed progress for a few days, but by mid-month the jam was beginning to break. At Inchon, at the same time, the problems of outbound traffic had been surmounted, and the LSTs of the Wonsan Attack Force sailed on the 15th. By 0800 of the 17th the last transport was clear and Mount McKinley, with the big brass embarked, was getting underway. If the departure seemed anticlimactic, in view of the previous capture of the objective, it was still necessary. The need for an assault landing no longer existed, but the need for X Corps in eastern North Korea was undiminished.
Chapter 8. On to the Border

2. 11 September-30 November: The Opening of Wonsan and Chinnampo

The campaign of October, like that of the previous month, involved large-scale operations by both Eighth Army and X Corps. But unlike the period of the Inchon landing and the breakout from the perimeter, the obstacles to movement were now primarily those of space and time, geographic and logistic rather than military. The sporadic resistance of the remnants of the NKPA was never dangerous, but problems of resupply at times seemed well-nigh insurmountable. All supplies for Eighth Army and Fifth Air Force had to pass the bottlenecks at Pusan and Inchon, and the restrictions of port logistics were compounded by those of land transport. Korean roads, never good, had been made worse by war, and throughout the summer rail and highway bridges had been favored objects of air attack. North of Seoul important bridges were down, and everything sent forward by rail had to be trucked around these breaks in the line.

These difficulties of land transport reemphasized the need for seaborne supply, and the extent to which war in the peninsula depended on the use of the surrounding sea. For although the North Korean Army had penetrated far into South Korea without benefit of coastal traffic, such an advance was much more difficult for the forces of the United Nations. Over and above the problems of victualling and munitioning, the complex requirements of the highly mechanized American contingent imposed a heavy load, and the tremendous demands for movement of heavy equipment, petroleum products, electronic gear, spare parts, ice cream, and comic books were reinforced by the national disinclination to walk when riding was possible.

Theater naval forces were consequently faced with an urgent requirement for expansion of the available port facilities and for the opening, on both coasts, of new ports to the northward. But at the same time the events of September had signalled a new problem: the discovery of contact mines in the Inchon entrance channel had been followed by the discovery of magnetic mines ashore, and between 26 September and 2 October five ships had been mined. As both ComNavFE and Commander Seventh Fleet noted in their operation plans for Wonsan, it seemed highly probable that the Communists had worked to deny their ports to the U.N. by a vigorous mining campaign.

Historically it was wholly appropriate that the Korean conflict should have come to involve mine warfare, for it was in Far Eastern waters that the submarine mine, an American invention, was first used with significant success. In the Russo-Japanese War the navy of the Czar lost important vessels to sea mines; that of the Mikado lost two battleships, four cruisers, and three other ships. These successes, in effect their only successes in that war, were not lost upon the Russian Navy, which whatever its politics had in the following half century placed heavy emphasis on mine warfare.

But however apt historically, the circumstance was operationally awkward for the United Nations’ naval forces. Although in the First World War the United States Navy had conceived and largely executed the enormous project of the North Sea mine barrage, in the interwar period the problems of oceanic conflict with Japan had relegated mine warfare to a position of unimportance. During most of the Pacific War the mine was little used, although the seeding of Japanese home waters, with mines provided by the Navy and dropped by Army Air Force B–29s, had proven extraordinarily effective.

In the European theater it had been otherwise. There the belligerents were in close proximity, the British Isles depended wholly on overseas supply, and the Germans ran a considerable coastal traffic along the shores of occupied Europe. In this context, not dissimilar to the Korean situation, the mine had from the start proven a
devastating weapon. German mining forced Great Britain to sustain a very large minesweeping effort; the British, for their part, employed mine warfare with conspicuous results. Of this success one example will suffice: in the first half of 1942 the RAF sank three times the enemy tonnage by mining as it did by direct attack on ships, and this with 40 percent of the sorties and at 40 percent of the cost in aircraft. Impressive as these statistics are, they by no means show the total impact of the mining campaign, for such an effort, even if it sinks no ships, dislocates maritime transport, overloads alternative routes, and imposes a requirement for costly and complex countermeasures.

Like all American military activities, and indeed more than most, the mine warfare branch of the Navy had suffered from the postwar stringencies. The type command, Mine Force Pacific Fleet, had remained in existence for a year and a half after V–J Day, with a flagship and a reduced force; among its commanders was Rear Admiral Struble. This situation was ended by the budget for Fiscal 1948, which forced dissolution of the type command and further decrease of active minecraft. The lack of a coordinating authority and the strategic dispersion of the remaining mine-sweepers had adverse effects on readiness, and materiel and training fell below par. In the fleet at large, paravanes had been abandoned; degaussing, the method of reducing to a minimum the magnetic field beneath a ship to guard against magnetic mines, had not been kept up to date; there was no degaussing range west of Pearl Harbor.

The minesweeping force available to ComNavFE on the outbreak of war in Korea consisted of the six wooden-hulled AMS of Mindiv 31 and of the four steel-hulled AMs, one in commission and three in reserve, of Mindiv 32. These ships were grouped in Minron 3, Lieutenant Commander D’Arcy Shouldice, a unit which enjoyed a high state of training and readiness as a consequence of the mine situation in Japanese waters. Other than these units the Pacific Fleet contained a dozen active minesweepers, of which the two AMS of Mindiv 52 were stationed at Guam and the remainder were divided between Pearl Harbor and the west coast.

Activation of the AMs in reserve in Japan had been approved early in the conflict. Nothing could be done about Mainstay, owing to unavailability of replacement parts, but by mid-August Pirate and Incredible were in operating condition. Ordered out from the west coast, the destroyer mine-sweepers Endicott and Doyle had reached Far Eastern waters in late July, but in the absence of enemy mining they had been diverted to other duties, in the first instance as screen for Cardiv 15 and subsequently in fire support. In August Admiral Joy had asked for a further increase in minesweepers, but the request was denied on the ground that other types had higher priority. With the discovery of enemy mines all this was changed. On 11 September CincPac started the three AMS of Mindiv 51 west from Pearl Harbor. Four days later the Chief of Naval Operations revised the schedule for activation of mothballed ships to include nine AMS. From Guam, on the 16th, Magpie and Merganser of Mindiv 52 were sailed for Korean waters, where the former was promptly mined and sunk and the latter incorporated into Mindiv 31. On 2 October Thompson and Carmick, the two remaining DMS of the Pacific Fleet, were ordered west from the continental United States, and the remaining three AMS of Mindiv 53 were sailed from the west coast for Pearl Harbor. In late October these reinforcements would reach Sasebo, and in time the ships ordered for activation would become available. But the immediate need for assault sweeps and harbor clearance placed a heavy overload on theater forces, while the emergency reinforcement of the Far East had brought the transfer of every available active unit, and had denuded Guam, Pearl Harbor, and the west coast of all protection.

There were, it is true, an estimated 213 minesweepers in Asiatic waters belonging to other member nations of the U.N. But almost half of these, including 50 ex-U.S. motor minesweepers, belonged to the Soviet Navy, whose current role was as provider of mines rather than of sweepers; as for the others, no offer of their services was received. Still, there did exist one ray of sunshine from an outside source. The mining of Japanese home waters, so successful as to keep the Japanese sweeping ever since, now paid an unexpected dividend as ComNavFE obtained authority from General MacArthur, in his capacity of Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers, to employ 20 contract Japanese sweepers (JMS) for work in Korea, initially below the 38th parallel.

Faced with the need to open North Korean harbors, Admiral Joy now found his force increased by the two activated AMs, by one AM from Guam, and by two DMS from the west coast. For the opening of Wonsan these units had been assigned to Joint Task Force 7 and organized into Task Group 95.6, the Minesweeping and Protective Group, with Diachenko, the repair ship Kermit Roosevelt, and eight contract Japanese sweepers. Command of the task group, to which four U.N. frigates and some ROKN YMS would in time be added, was assigned to Captain Richard T. Spofford, who had relieved Shouldice as ComMinron 3 in August, and who was embarked in the destroyer Collett.

In addition to the units of Spofford’s own task group, a considerable amount of supporting force was at hand. Admiral Higgins was offshore with Rochester and some destroyers to provide gunnery support, and Rochester had a helicopter available; the aircraft of the fast carriers were on call; the mine search efforts of the PBMs had been shifted to the east coast, and the seaplane tender Gardiner’s Bay was preparing to establish an advanced seadrome at Chinhae. But the coordination of these diverse forces had not been wholly solved by the time the sweep began, and a considerable amount of time was consequently to be expended in trial and error.

The nature of the situation at Wonsan remained unknown. Clearance of an approach from the 100-fathom curve to the beaches on Kalma Pando called for the sweeping of a 30-mile lane, and of an area of more than 50 square miles. ComNavFE’s operation plan had noted the "strong probability" that North Korean ports and landing beaches had been mined; on 1 October he had called for the sweep to begin on D minus 5. Struble’s estimate of the situation, which assumed the existence of fields of moored Russian mines, possibly supplemented by more modern types, envisaged the possibility of clearance within five days; alternatively, if bad weather were encountered, or if influence mines had in fact been laid, postponement of the scheduled D–Day might prove necessary. On the 6th he advanced the date for beginning the sweep to D minus 10.

The first problem which faced the minesweepers was to select the route. Six miles out from the landing beaches the sentinel island of Yo Do guards the harbor entrance. Although the Sailing Directions permit Yo Do to be left on either hand, it was known that Russian practice had been to use the northern entrance, and some thought was consequently given to conducting the sweep in that channel. But the final decision was to take the direct route south of the island, and on the morning of 10 October work was begun, with the three AMs in the lead, the AMS buoying the swept area astern, and Rochester’s helicopter searching ahead. By late afternoon good progress had been made, a ten-mile channel had been swept to the 30-fathom curve, and 18 mines had been destroyed. But the general feeling of satisfaction was suddenly dashed when the helicopter reported first one, then two, and finally five lines of mines directly ahead of the sweepers.

This discovery cancelled out the whole day’s work and raised again the possibility that the sweep could not be completed within the allotted time. In an effort to turn the flanks of the mine lines the direct route to the beaches was abandoned, and on the 11th work was begun in the Russian channel, with a new emphasis on the search function. Overhead a PBM from VP 47 circled, seeking out the mine locations, which were then plotted and communicated to the forces below. From Diachenko, UDT personnel were sent in to Yo Do and Ung Do to scout for evidence of controlled minefields. Personnel in Wonsan were urged to seek out charts of the minefield and individuals who had assisted in the lay. Arrangements were made with Task Force 77 for a countermining effort by bomb drop from carrier aircraft. Sweeping went well on the 11th, and a lane was cleared and buoyed to within about four miles of the entrance islands.

Early on the next morning the attempt at countermining took place, as 39 carrier planes, armed with 1,000-pound bombs fused to explode at a depth of 20 feet, flew in to bomb a five-mile lane past Yo Do. For the pilots the exercise was a novel one: proper spacing of the bombs proved difficult owing to lack of control procedures and malfunction of smoke floats, and the results, although spectacular in the amount of water thrown up, were only briefly encouraging. Following the drop, the sweepers headed on through the bombed area for the
turn around Yo Do toward Kalma Pando. In the lead, echeloned to port in normal sweep formation, were *Pirate*, *Pledge*, and *Incredible*. No paravanes were streamed since there were none to stream, there had been no small boat exploration ahead of the sweep, and the searching helicopter could communicate with the sweepers only by relay through the DMS *Endicott*. At 1112 unswept waters were entered; as the sweepers came left around Yo Do many mines were cut and bobbed to the surface; at 1200 as the helicopter reported three lines ahead, underwater contacts were obtained on *Pirate*’s sound gear.

Then came the blow. At 1209 *Pirate* hit a mine, blew up, capsized, and sank in four minutes. *Pledge*, the second ship, slowed and stopped, cut loose her gear, and lowered a boat to pick up survivors. In this awkward situation fire was opened on the sweepers from previously undetected batteries on Sin Do, and was replied to by *Pledge* and *Endicott*. As rescue operations were pressed the gunnery duel continued, while overhead the circling PBM spotted the gunfire and called on Task Force 77 for an air strike. Ten minutes had gone by when at 1220, in an attempt to turn back into cleared waters, *Pledge* came left out of the swept lane, and in her turn hit a mine and began to sink. Two ships had been lost, 13 men were missing or dead, and 79 wounded. The rest of the day was spent in picking up the pieces and trying to decide what to do next.

When news of the sinkings reached the bombardment forces off Chongjin it brought impressive reinforcement, as Admirals Struble and Smith boarded the destroyer *Rowan* and steamed southward at best speed. But admirals cannot do the work of minesweepers, and with no replacements for the lost ships, safe sweeping had become essential. Further emphasis was laid on searching, by patrol plane and helicopter, to permit a route of approach that would turn the mine lines. Mine disposal was accomplished by strafing and by UDT personnel from *Diachenko*, assisted by the inhabitants of Ung Do, who were rewarded for their enthusiasm by the issue of rations and by medical assistance. In this wise, progress continued, the channel was cleared of contact mines, and on the 14th magnetic sweeping was begun. How long this would take was anybody’s guess.

When news of the sinkings reached the bombardment forces off Chongjin it brought impressive reinforcement, as Admirals Struble and Smith boarded the destroyer *Rowan* and steamed southward at best speed. But admirals cannot do the work of minesweepers, and with no replacements for the lost ships, safe sweeping had become essential. Further emphasis was laid on searching, by patrol plane and helicopter, to permit a route of approach that would turn the mine lines. Mine disposal was accomplished by strafing and by UDT personnel from *Diachenko*, assisted by the inhabitants of Ung Do, who were rewarded for their enthusiasm by the issue of rations and by medical assistance. In this wise, progress continued, the channel was cleared of contact mines, and on the 14th magnetic sweeping was begun. How long this would take was anybody’s guess.

By 18 October, D minus 2, the sweepers had reached the beaches of Kalma Pando. The only further incidents had been the loss of one JMS off the southern shore of Yo Do, and damage to a small ROK freighter which took an unauthorized shortcut through the minefields. Although four days of magnetic sweeping had brought only negative results, information from prisoners ashore on the 16th indicated that ground mines had been laid. Next day this report was contradicted, but on the 18th confirmation was gained both by land and sea. Ashore a sample coil was recovered from the railroad station master; off the beaches two detonations arose astern of the minesweepers, and then, in a great explosion, the ROK YMS 516 disappeared in a cloud of water and smoke. Faced with this proof of the presence of influence mines, and with further sweeping obviously necessary, Admiral Struble recommended postponement of D-Day, and his view was concurred in by higher authority. Although it proved possible, beginning on the 19th, to beach landing craft with urgently needed supplies for the Marine squadrons on Kalma Pando, it was another week before the channel could be declared clear for the Attack Force.

One must credit the Russian naval personnel who had been assigned to mine Wonsan with the achievement of a considerable success. Prior to their departure in early October, these gentlemen had not only held mine school for the North Koreans but had assembled the magnetic mines, planned the minefields, and supervised their planting. The effort had been an extremely economical one. Barges towed by motor sampan had been employed as minelayers, and local labor used both to load the barges and to roll the mines off the stern. With this negligible investment in training, equipment, and personnel, more than 2,000 of a planned 4,000 mines had been planted in the harbor, four ships had been sunk, and a delay of six days imposed upon the Attack Force.

Arduous though it had been, the opening of Wonsan was but part of the job which faced the minesweepers. Other east coast ports demanded clearance, while in the west the need for seaborne supply was urgent. There the advance of Eighth Army, although only lightly opposed, had been carried out under circumstances of considerable logistic difficulty. Daily requirements were on the order of 1,500 tons; the rail and
truck shuttle above Seoul could produce only half that figure; and as the best efforts of the airlift could not make up the deficit, every mile of northward movement increased the troubles of the overworked quartermasters.

So far as capabilities permitted, efforts to open west coast ports had already begun. Returning from Inchon in early October, one AM and six AMS had stopped by at Kunsan, and in the course of a sweep to the docks had destroyed four mines and located another two score. In mid-October, as Eighth Army was moving on Pyongyang, the Japanese contract sweepers were ordered to clear the entrance to Haeju, an operation which would make available a 2,000-foot quay with four fathoms alongside and with road and rail connections to the north. By 1 November the work was done, but by this time the front had reached the Chongchon River, and with the Army’s needs increasing, the effect was marginal. Autumn comes suddenly in North Korea: at Pyongyang the monthly mean temperature drops from 40° in October to 23° in November, and the nights are cold. Short of rations, short of fuel, and with both men and machinery urgently in need of winterizing, Eighth Army was under heavy pressure from CincFE to expedite its advance. In this situation, and in the absence in the north of suitable LST beaching sites, anguished cries arose from EUSAK for the opening of the port of Chinnampo.

Situated ten miles up the tidal Taedong River, Chinnampo is to Pyongyang as Inchon is to Seoul. Like Inchon it suffers from the disability of its location on the eastern shore of the Yellow Sea. For 30 miles or so islands and drying mud banks line the approach; inside the headlands the channel shrinks to a mere quarter of a mile in width in the narrows of Pido Sudo; tidal currents in the river reach three and a half knots on the flood and four a half on the ebb. The port itself had a dredged basin which could accommodate a few ships, along with railroad spurs and some unloading equipment; there were beaches which could take a few LSTs. But damage had been suffered from air strikes, there was an extreme shortage of lighterage, and the maximum capacity of the port was less than half that of Inchon. Still, with all its faults, Chinnampo was unique. No alternative existed. Its opening was mandatory.

The appeals from Eighth Army for the opening of Chinnampo were sympathetically received by Admiral Joy. But his slender force was fully committed at Wonsan, and although on 21 October he promised to commence the clearance at the earliest possible date, his estimate of the time required for completion was a pessimistic three weeks. But, even if forces are unavailable, orders can always be issued, and ComNavFE had already ordered Admiral Smith relieved of his duties at Wonsan in order to prepare plans for the earliest possible sweeping of Chinnampo. On the afternoon of the 22d, CTF 95 was so released.

Although the disposable force immediately available to Smith consisted of himself, it was soon to be augmented. Two visiting officers, Commanders Stephen M. Archer and Donald N. Clay, who had come out from CincLantFleet and CincPacFleet headquarters to look over the mine situation, were put to work. Clay was at once constituted an intelligence team, and sent off to Chinnampo to investigate the enemy lay; Archer was ordered to Sasebo, where CTF 95 was attempting to scrounge a sweeping force.

In point of fact prospects were not as bad as they seemed at first sight. On the 22d the two remaining Pacific Fleet DMS, Thompson and Carmick, reached Japan, to be followed on the next day by the three AMS of Mindiv 51 from Pearl Harbor. These were at once ordered forward to the Yellow Sea: Thompson and Carmick sailed on the 27th, to be shortly followed by the AMS and by the destroyer Forrest Royal, a new arrival from the Atlantic Fleet which Smith had obtained as Archer’s flagship. Together with various later acquisitions these units made up Task Element 95.69 which was to do the job.

With Wonsan open the PBMs were switched back to west coast mine hunting, assisted by the RAF Sunderlands. Efforts in the Yellow Sea were complicated by the many large jellyfish, four feet or more in diameter, gray in color, and floating a few feet below the surface, which gave rise to numerous false alarms. But despite this distraction good work was done. Three days of search brought 34 mine sightings, and 16 sinkings by strafing, and a subsequent attempt to blow magnetic mines by depth charging met with some slight success, although at a considerable cost in ordnance. On 29 October the air effort was strengthened by Worcester’s
helicopter, temporarily based on the British carrier *Theseus* which also provided combat air patrol. And in due course the work of the patrol planes was simplified, and more time on station made possible, with the reestablishment of the Inchon seadrome by Gardiner’s Bay.

Since the entire Yellow Sea is of mineable depth, the point of origin of the sweep was arbitrarily located some 30 miles off the channel entrance and 69 miles from the docks. The approach sweep was begun on the 29th, as *Thompson* and *Carmick* headed in from the west and turned south inside the outer mine line to reach the channel entrance near the island of Cho Do. On the 31st Commander Archer arrived in *Forrest Royal*; on 1 November the three AMS turned up, along with *Bass* and her UDT detachment, two ROK YMS, and a Scapa LST which would relieve *Theseus* as helicopter base. By 2 November Commander Clay and Lieutenant (j.g.) Hong, ROKN, had discovered the pattern of the minefield: 217 moored and 25 magnetic mines were reported to have been laid, with five lines across the main channel north of Sok To and one across the passage south of that island. Although this southern channel, Sok To Myoji, is a shallow draft affair with a least depth of two and a quarter fathoms at low water, its lighter protection made it for the moment the channel of choice. Here the effort was pressed.

The predominant lesson of the Wonsan experience had been to search before you sweep. At Chinnampo, where this lesson was faithfully followed, the hunt was simplified by the tidal characteristics of the Yellow Sea, which tended to expose mines at low water. Searching at low tide by patrol plane, helicopter, small boat, and swimmers was emphasized; sweeping was done at high tide with the aim of clearing a not too devious route around rather than through the fields; on 3 November a Korean YMS made a safe passage into Chinnampo. Two helpful arrivals took place on the 4th and 5th in the form of high winds, which shook loose some of the moored mines, and of the LSD *Catamount*, which after unloading Marines at Wonsan had been loaded at Sasebo with small boats and extra gear and sent west to act as mother ship. On the 6th an ROK YMS took a convoy of tugs and barges in the Sok To channel, five small *Marus* were put through the next day, and with the arrival on the 10th of a Scapa LST the western approach and southern entrance could be considered clear.

With Sok To Myoji opened, Commander Archer’s force shifted its effort to the deep water entrance and to Cho Do Sudo, the coastal route of approach from the southward. A dozen Japanese sweepers had by now arrived, accompanied by two mother ships, and were checksweeping the already opened channels. By 17 November 14 ships had reached Chinnampo; three days later 40,000 tons had been unloaded and the opening of the deep channel celebrated by the arrival of the hospital ship *Repose*. Already the Army’s logistic situation had been greatly improved, and General Walker was looking forward to a resumption of the northward advance. By month’s end unloading had reached a rate of 4,800 tons a day, and the sweepers were working north along the coast to clear a channel for possible use by fire support ships or by LSTs supplying the northern front.

Like so many things in human life the opening of a mined harbor is easier the second time. At Chinnampo, in contrast to the events at Wonsan, no lives had been lost and no ships damaged. Of the 80 moored mines swept or destroyed, 36 were credited to patrol planes and 27 to the underwater demolition personnel; 12 had been broken loose by storms; only 5 had been cut by sweepers. Better and earlier intelligence, different tidal conditions, and experience had all been helpful.

Yet if the sweep had been successful, so once again had been the mining; as at Wonsan, considerable delay had been imposed. Shallow draft shipping had been put in to Chinnampo within ten days, but for larger vessels ComNavFE’s estimate of three weeks had proven accurate. The result of these experiences, and of the promise of more trouble in the future, was to give mine warfare, for the first time in years, a high priority in U.S. naval thinking.

The continuing shortage of sweepers now brought a speed-up in their activation: on 16 October the Chief of Naval Operations gave overriding priority to the nine AMS previously scheduled for recommissioning, and added four AMs to the list. The history of the Wonsan sweep, begun in one channel and completed in another, and
carried out first by large sweepers, then by small boats and swimmers, and finally by the minesweepers again, showed the need both for improved tactical organization and for better procedures in mine location and mine clearance. In the United States a research and development program was begun. In Japan steps were taken to provide a suitable mother ship by conversion of an LST to carry supplies, accommodate small boats, and serve as helicopter platform. In the administrative sphere ComNavFE in late October had recommended the reestablishment of the Mine Force type command, and had urged that pending this step a flag officer be assigned to administer mine warfare in the Far East. These recommendations were approved, and on 11 November the Minesweeping Force Western Pacific was activated under the command of Admiral Higgins.
Chapter 8. On the Border

3. 19 October-20 November: Operations in Eastern North Korea

"The neighborhood of Wonsan," says the old guide book to North China and Korea, "heavily forested and with mountains rising from the sea, is extremely picturesque. To the southwest lie the Diamond Mountains, whose watercourses, forests, and famous monasteries have earned them the appellation of the Jewel of Korea. Here tiger, leopard, bear, wolves, and wild boar may still be found, as well as various species of deer, pheasant, and bustard. The natives, hardy in the chase, employ falcons in their pursuit of small game."

Having prepared for their assault into this tourist wonderland, the Marines, embarked in the ships of Task Force 90, had left Inchon in time to make the 20 October D-Day. But the capture of Wonsan by ROK forces made the assault landing unnecessary, and eased the problem of introducing X Corps into northeastern Korea. Although the forests hid more dangerous game than tiger or bear, in the form of sizable North Korean units moving along the inland mountain tracks, no really serious opposition was anticipated, while the Kalma Pando air strip and the decks of the carriers at sea held larger and more lethal birds than falcons.

While the dangerous and tedious work of minesweeping went forward, the ships of the Attack Force were moving south through the Yellow Sea and east through the Korean Strait. At Pusan the 7th Division and corps contingents were preparing to sail. But on the 18th the discovery of influence mines off the Wonsan beaches brought the decision to delay entrance until a thorough magnetic sweeping could be accomplished. Admiral Thackrey was instructed to hold the later echelons in port, and the projected movement of the 3rd Division from Japan to Korea was postponed.

On the afternoon of 19 October the Transport and Tractor Groups arrived in the Korean Gulf. The flagship Mount McKinley, with the Attack Force and Marine Division staffs embarked, moved in and anchored in the swept channel, but the rest of the force was ordered to reverse course and so maneuver as to return at daylight of the 21st. Further delay brought repetition of these instructions, and until morning of the 25th the Attack Force steamed back and forth, first south and then north again, through the Sea of Japan. This evolution, designated Operation Yo–Yo by the crowded and disgruntled Marines, had some serious implications: food threatened to run short; ideal conditions were presented for the spread of epidemic disease. Only a few days earlier, dysentery had hit the crews of two cruisers of the Formosa Patrol; during "Yo–Yo" it broke out in epidemic form on the MSTS transport Marine Phoenix, afflicting 700 of the 2,000 embarked troops and a like proportion of the crew. But terms in purgatory are by definition limited, and "Yo-Yo" in due time came to an end. Beginning at 1500 on the 25th the ships of the Attack Force moved in column through the swept channel to drop anchor in southern Yonghung Man.

Five LSTs were beached at once with engineer and shore party materiel, and at daylight on the 26th general unloading began. In accordance with the original assault plan the 1st Marines went in across Yellow Beach and the 7th Marines across Blue Beach, with RCT 5 following on the next day. As a result of the shallow gradient, landing craft grounded some distance offshore, personnel had to wade the last few yards, and the rapid handling of inanimate objects waited on the construction of ramps and causeways. But work was pushed: of the more than 25,000 men in the division and attached units, well over half were ashore by evening of the 26th, along with more than 2,000 vehicles and 2,000 tons of cargo, and five days later the operation was completed. While the Marines were coming ashore over the Kalma Pando beaches and deploying outward, the mine-sweepers had moved on into the inner harbor. Although local information indicated that this had not been mined, nobody wanted to take chances. But the informants proved correct, and by 2 November the port was pronounced clear.
The landing had been delayed six days. First on to so many beaches, the Marine Division had this time been preceded by its Aircraft Wing and by a USO troop. But except by the mining effort and the Sin Do batteries, the operation had been unopposed, and so economical. A major port had been seized and opened, an important force was ashore in eastern North Korea, and more was on the way. For the Marines the only casualties were those 84 dysentery victims who had to be hospitalized, and even when the losses of the minesweeping force were reckoned in, the bill in military terms was small.

Throughout the period of Operation Yo-Yo Eighth Army had been advancing in the west. In the central mountains the Korean II Corps had continued northward. Moving onward from Wonsan, ROK troops had entered Hamhung and Hungnam on 17 October; by the time the Marine Division came ashore the front was more than 50 miles to the northward, and was still moving. On the 17th Helena and Worcester had bombarded transportation targets at Songjin, but from that time on the work of the gun-fire ships was largely limited to standing by. Since its preinvasion strikes in the Wonsan region Task Force 77 had been sending its flights northward, in support of the South Koreans and in attacks against a diminishing number of targets beyond the bombline; soon the fast carriers would be withdrawn to port. On the entire coast the only really busy units were the minesweepers and the ships of the Amphibious Force, on whom devolved responsibility for opening new ports, bringing in more forces, and providing logistic support for X Corps as it sprawled out over eastern North Korea.

In these circumstances General Almond’s force found its mission changed. The speed of advance into North Korea had obviated the need for a westward thrust by the units of X Corps; the U.N. resolution of early October had shifted the emphasis of the campaign from the destruction of the enemy army to the pacification of North Korea. A new scheme of maneuver had consequently been developed by GHQ, and five days before the Wonsan landing X Corps received orders to advance to the north.

On 25 October, with Wonsan at last open to the invasion fleet, Struble, Almond, and Doyle met to consider the implications of this change for the operations of the Joint Task Force. To speed the northward movement it was decided to land one or more of the regiments of the 7th Division at Iwon, 90 miles to the northeast, on the coastal strip which had been the summer target of NavFE surface forces. North and south of this small administrative center the bombardment ships had carried out their work, and landing parties from Juneau, Bass, and Perch had gone ashore to raid the railroad. But Iwon, and its port town of Kunson, had remained undisturbed, and between 25 and 27 October Endicott, Doyle, and one AMS swept an 18-mile channel and an anchorage area without discovering any mines.

The landing of the 7th Division at Iwon was entrusted to Admiral Thackrey. Having supervised the operation of the port of Inchon and the early stages of the reembarkation of the Marines, ComPhibGroup 3 had since 11 October been administering the loading of 7th Division and corps troops at Pusan. On the 26th he arrived at Wonsan in Eldorado, and next day sailed for Iwon, where debarkation began on the 29th. The lack of amphibious craft in the 7th Division convoys, the absence of local lighterage, and the need to improvise a beach party made the operation a slow one; everything in the transports and cargo ships had to be offloaded into LSTs and smaller craft, a process which resulted in considerable superficial topside damage owing to swell in the unprotected anchorage. But by the 30th one regiment had landed all its personnel and vehicles and much of its gear. By 8 November the entire lift of 29,000 men had been put ashore, and the division was backtracking down the coast in preparation for its move to the north.

Although it too was shortly to move northward, the Marine Division, following its landing at Wonsan, found, itself for the moment involved in blocking and protective missions. One battalion was moved in over the mountains to cut off enemy troops retiring up the Imjin valley road, while a second was ordered to Kojo, some 30 miles back down the coast to the southeast. The assignment to the Kojo area, where the situation map showed a patchwork of North Korean and ROK units, was not wholly unexpected. On the 21st, while the Marines were still cruising the Sea of Japan, General Almond had asked for the immediate landing of a battalion there to ensure the
protection of an ROK supply dump. The request had been denied by Admiral Struble, owing to the possibility of unswept mines, but on the 24th the task was reassigned to the Marine Division. Since a Marine air strike in this region had discovered and attacked an estimated 800 enemy troops, the idea seemed a reasonable one.

On the 24th, in preparation for this move and to ensure the possibility of support from the sea in the event of an enemy descent upon the coastal road, the fast minesweepers *Endicott* and *Doyle* swept and buoyed a channel into Kojo, and two days later a battalion was sent down from Wonsan by train. At Kojo all seemed peaceful on arrival: the sea was blue, the town undamaged. But on the night of the 27th the battalion was surprised and hit hard by troops of the North Korean 5th Division, and a call for helicopter evacuation of casualties, for air and gunfire support, and for tanks quickly brought forth a miniature example of standard amphibious support procedures.

*Sicily* and *Badoeng Strait* had arrived off Wonsan on 18 October and had been covering the minesweeping operations. Now, in concert with the squadrons on Kalma Pando, they stepped up their sorties against enemy troops, and heavily attacked the town of Tongchon, reported to contain the enemy headquarters. Helicopters were provided to fly out the more seriously wounded, and the fast transport *Wantuck* was ordered down from Wonsan with a surgical team. The destroyers *Hank* and *English* took the enemy troops under fire, *LST 883* got underway from Wonsan with a load of tanks, a reinforcing battalion was sent down to Kojo by rail, and the situation was soon under control. The whole affair was a somewhat confused one, for the supply dump which provided the rationale of the operation turned out to have been removed before the first contingent of Marines arrived. But in any event the Kojo effort was shortly terminated: on the 31st a battalion of Korean Marines arrived from Samchok by LST to take over the job of policing the area.

As the Koreans were relieving at Kojo a second minor amphibious operation was getting underway. Sixty miles below Wonsan, at the southern end of the Korean Gulf, sizable and aggressive guerrilla forces were reported operating in the hills behind Kosong. Under the supervision of Captain Robert C. Peden, Commander Tractor Group, Korean troops were loaded into two LSTs, and sailed on 1 November for this area. The two destroyer minesweepers made a sweep which discovered no mines, and on the morning of the 3rd an unopposed landing was successfully executed. A few days bushwhacking brought the situation under control; on 8 November two LSTs were sent down to bring the Koreans back again, and by the 10th they had been returned to Wonsan.

There more strength was now arriving to take over the responsibility for local defense and to relieve the Marine Division for its move to the north. With the Wonsan landing completed, and with the 7th Division going ashore at Iwon, Admiral *Doyle* had sent six ships to Pusan to bring back one of the regiments of the 3rd Infantry Division. Units of this group began returning to Wonsan on 5 November, and by the 8th the movement was completed and the regiment was ashore. In the meantime a larger task element, composed of nine transport and cargo types, some MSTS shipping, and some LSTs, was formed and ordered to Moji, on Shimonoseki Strait, to lift the balance of the 3rd Division.

All troop movements were now provided for, but there was still work for the Navy, for the northward reorientation of the campaign required both a reshuffling of forces already ashore and the opening of another port. General Almond had selected the city of Hamhung as the site of X Corps Headquarters, the Marines were moving north from Wonsan, and the new problem for the minesweepers, who had opened Wonsan to the southward and Iwon to the north, was to clear the neighboring harbor of Hungnam in anticipation of a consolidation of east coast logistic activities there.

The city of Hungnam, manufacturing center as well as seaport, lies in the northwestern corner of the Korean Gulf near the delta of the Songchon River. Although Hamhung, its inland satellite, is an important road and railway center, Hungnam is the larger of the two, with a population in 1950 a third again that of Wonsan. The bay on which the city lies is open to the south, but the inner harbor is protected by a 2,200–foot wharf” with four fathoms of water and by a breakwater. Other smaller wharves existed, as did heavy loading equipment, developed
to handle the products of the city’s chemical industry. As at Wonsan, the 100, fathom curve runs 30 miles offshore, and the approaches are easily mined.

Since intelligence reports indicated that over a hundred moored mines had been planted at Hungnam, a serious sweeping effort was required. A destroyer minesweeper, seven AMS, and supporting units were made available, and on 7 November clearance was begun. Small boat and helicopter search was employed to the utmost; an approach was chosen which would detour the minefields by passing close under the eastern point; so successful was the reconnaissance that the only mines swept were well clear of the entrance lane. A sweep was made for magnetic mines, but none was discovered, and the port was declared open on the 11th. On the 14th Admiral Doyle turned affairs at Wonsan over to Commander Transport Group, Captain Samuel G. Kelly in the attack transport Bayfield, and sailed for Hungnam in Mount McKinley.

One more harbor clearance was necessary to provide the desired accessibility to eastern North Korea. To simplify the logistic support of ROK troops advancing up the coast, General Almond on 3 November had requested the opening of Songjin, 35 miles beyond Iwon. On completion of the job at Hungnam the sweepers were ordered onward, and between 16 and 19 November the seven AMS swept a channel and an anchorage area at Songjin without discovering any mines. This, for the moment, completed the minesweeping task. In time, it is true, the continuing northward progress of Korean troops would bring a call for the opening of Chongjin. But for reasons beyond the sweepers’ control this request would not be implemented.

For the ships of Task Force 90 and for Captain Spofford’s sweepers the weeks following the Wonsan landing had been busy ones. Three divisions had been put into North Korea through two ports; support had been provided for two small operations against remnants of the North Korean Army; five harbors had been swept for mines. By mid-November pressure was decreasing, but there remained some chores to be performed. Although the personnel of the Army’s 2nd Engineer Special Brigade, which was to operate the port of Hungnam, had been moved down from Iwon by rail, some of the heavy equipment could not pass the tunnels and had to be reloaded and brought down by sea. A considerable amount of X Corps cargo, initially landed at Wonsan but now needed at Hungnam, also required water transport, and this movement was accomplished by LST shuttle service in the closing days of the month. So far as the movement of forces into eastern North Korea went, however, a terminal date could be assigned, for on 20 November the final elements of the 3rd Infantry Division reached Wonsan from Moji. This day was also made memorable by the landing on the Wonsan airstrip of the Secretary of the Navy and an inspection party. Apprised of this prospect, Admiral Doyle had sailed down from Hungnam the day before to meet the distinguished visitors and to welcome them aboard his flagship. There, in the course of a short speech delivered to the ship’s company, the Secretary observed that this was the first visit he had ever paid to any ship of the U.S. Navy.

Much game has been made by later writers of the incumbent of this office during the Grant administration, who was said to have been surprised by the discovery that ships were hollow. The events of the 20th on Mount McKinley should perhaps also be recorded as a footnote to history, and as memorializing a Secretary who, in office for more than a year and a half, had never bothered to find out.
For all but the minesweeping crews afloat and those with logistic responsibilities ashore, October had been a happy month. On land, at sea, and in the air it was a harvest time, a period of exploitation of a great victory, in which the steady advance of U.N. forces brought visions of a speedy end to hostilities. On the 15th, having found time to fly to Wake Island for a conference with the President of the United States, CincFE opined that organized resistance would end by Thanksgiving. The likelihood of Russian or Chinese intervention, a matter of concern at Washington and Lake Success, was very small; if the Chinese did attempt to enter Korea it could only be with comparatively small forces which would be "slaughtered" by U.N. air strength. With the war over by Thanksgiving, Eighth Army could be withdrawn to Japan by Christmas, while X Corps remained as an occupation force for the month or two necessary to prepare and hold elections throughout Korea.

The military situation, as of the moment, went far to bear out CincFE’s optimistic picture. Resistance on the ground, steadily decreasing, had by mid-month practically ended. On 19 October, as the Marine Division was rounding the Korean peninsula, Eighth Army entered Pyongyang, to the pleasure of the acquisitive American soldiery who liberated quantities of red flags, portraits and busts of Stalin, and other desirable impedimenta. Entrance into the capital was followed by a parachute drop in regimental strength 30 miles to the northward, and the drop by a CincFE statement to the press that the war was coming to an end. Shortly the forces of the U.N. pushed on across the Chongchon River, and on 26 October ROK troops reached the banks of the Yalu.

While the armies advanced almost at will, the navies of the United Nations cruised undisturbed along the Korean coasts. Across the vast Pacific transports and cargo ships steamed without let or hindrance, bringing the necessities and luxuries of war. Step by step, as sweeping progressed and ports were opened, the ends of the seaborne supply line closed up on the advancing front, to lighten the burdens of the logisticians.

In the air, too, the war was uncontested, and U.N. air strength was moving forward. At Wonsan, 70 miles above the parallel, Marine squadrons were ashore; at Yonpo, near Hungnam, a second modern airfield was available; in the west Fifth Air Force had advanced its JOC to Seoul and was preparing to activate northern airfields; in the Yellow Sea and in the Sea of Japan the carriers still sent forth their planes. But increasingly the air-men of all services found themselves hard up for targets, and as the month wore on the sortie rate diminished.

Already the cheerful prospect of an imminent end to the fighting had been reflected in the activities of Naval Forces Far East. This change was first apparent in the activities of the planners, whose working day embraces future time, and even before the Wonsan Attack Force sailed, Admiral Joy’s staff had turned its attention to post-war redeployment. Estimates were made of desirable post–hostility force levels in the Far East, and of the size of the shore establishment in Japan; planning was undertaken for future assistance to the ROK Navy and Marine Corps. So far indeed had things progressed that Operation Plan 114–50, which listed naval missions in support of the pacification of North Korea and contained an annex on the homeward movement of forces, was issued on 19 October, the day of entry into Pyongyang, and plans for the redeployment of the Marine Division reached General Smith while he was still en route to Wonsan.

Nor were the operating forces unaffected. Although the minesweepers were working overtime, and although Task Force 90 still had plenty to do in getting X Corps ashore, elsewhere the tempo of the campaign diminished. With less and less to shoot at, some of the fire support ships were returned to port, while the functions of the remainder were reduced to patrolling and covering operations. From the west coast the British carrier *Theseus*, with no more targets in hand, was sailed for Sasebo for onward routing to Hong Kong. Off Korea’s
eastern shore a major redeployment of naval strength was begun.

More carrier strength was now available than could be profitably employed. With elimination of the Joint Task Force’s Wonsan objective area by advancing ROK troops, there again arose the question of the assumption by FEAF of operational or coordination control of carrier air. The always present possibility of a new intervention from the north posed questions as to the readiness of antisubmarine forces. To meet or minimize these problems a reduction and modification of theater naval strength seemed desirable: on 22 October Philippine Sea and Boxer left the operating area for Yokosuka; one week later Valley Forge and Leyte retired to Sasebo. On her arrival in Japan Boxer was routed onward to the continental United States for navy yard overhaul; Valley Forge was scheduled to return to the west coast in late November; plans were made to withdraw the escort carriers from Korean waters, and to send Eldorado to Guam to reembark her antisubmarine squadron. On 28 October Admiral Struble forwarded his appreciation to ComNavFE: recent experience showed that the Seventh Fleet should not revert to the status of a one-carrier force, but should remain a balanced fleet with amphibious and minesweeping capabilities; to emphasize the mobility of naval forces, and to strengthen the impact on the doubtful of the United Nations’ success in Korea, he proposed at the earliest moment to take his command to southeast Asian waters to show the flag and to conduct training exercises. Three days later Joint Task Force 7 was dissolved, and the flagship group retired to Sasebo.

Only Admiral Higgins’ minesweeping groups and the Military Sea Transportation Service continued to grow in strength. Reinforcements for the former were still arriving as November came, while the latter had not yet reached its peak. Having entered business on 1 July as the proprietor of 25 small ships, Captain Junker’s command had undergone an explosive expansion, until by the time of the Wonsan landing it controlled 243 vessels. The requirements of the advance to the north brought a further slight increase, and the week of 8 November saw 263 ships under MSTS WestPac control. But then, with X Corps well established ashore, the decline began, and by mid-month the total would be down some ten percent. Similar considerations affected the Amphibious Force, but by mid-November Admiral Doyle could contemplate a redeployment of his hard-worked shipping for respite and training in Japan.

The diminishing activity of Naval Forces Far East was quickly reflected in reduced expenditure of important commodities. Naval consumption of aviation gasoline, which had reached a peak of 187,000 barrels in August, was down in October to 130,000. Ammunition expenditure, more than 2,100 short tons in the week of 19 September, had declined by October’s end to less than a sixth of that amount. Navy cargo lifted from the west coast, POL excepted, had fallen radically from the 107,000 measurement tons of the week of 21 August; in October it dropped steadily from 29,000 tons per week to a mere 11,000. What the naval effort had amounted to in terms of transfer of force may be seen from the extraordinary expansion of NavFE–supported personnel, U.S. and U.N., which from a mere 11,000 in June had reached 40,000 by early August, 69,000 in late September, and 79,000 by mid–October. But there it stopped, homeward deployment was begun, and the coming of November saw the total naval population down to 75,000.

Not only had intensity of effort diminished, following the defeat of the North Koreans, but the entire concept of operations had been changed. The late September plans for the encirclement of retiring enemy remnants had called for a landing at Wonsan, followed by a westward thrust of X Corps to a junction with Eighth Army in the neighborhood of Pyongyang. Completion of this movement would have resulted in control of the Korean waist south of the restraining line, and of the Pyongyang-Sinanju-Hungnam–Wonsan quadrilateral. Here the axial range is lowest, the mountains rarely rise above 3,000 feet, and here are found the best transverse communications in the entire peninsula. Harbors on both coasts are useful to a force sustained by sea, and the area’s industrial towns are linked by a road net of considerable density in Korean terms, and one at least marginally adequate for western forces.

But the successes that had crowned his arms, and the U.N. mandate for Korean unification, had caused
General MacArthur to lift up his eyes unto the hills. On 17 October, following his return from Wake, CincFE had issued orders that if Pyongyang fell before the Wonsan landing was completed, X Corps should no longer strike westward across the peninsula, but instead continue on to the north. The restraining line, beyond which non-Korean forces were not to pass, would be swung to the northwest, and parallel zones established, separated by the central mountain range, through which Eighth Army and X Corps would advance. With the capture of Pyongyang, entered by Eighth Army on the 19th and declared secure two days later, these new orders became effective.

With this change the forces of the United Nations faced the task of occupying a very different geographical province. The new restraining line, moved forward in the east some 60 miles, now lay in the watershed of the Yalu, beyond the northern divide, and in its course from east to west crossed mountains towering above 8,000 feet. In this sparsely populated high and craggy country planners could draw lines on maps, but implementers could not man the lines. Indigenous forces, lightly armed and durable, might perhaps maneuver here with some facility, but for motorized armies it was another matter. Only a handful of north–south routes existed; except in the western lowlands only narrow columns could push forward through the twisting defiles. Mutual support under such conditions was hardly a possibility, and even radio communication would be made difficult by the intervening mountains.

For a scant week this concept stayed on the books, and then on 24 October, with the bulk of Eighth Army stalled above Pyongyang by shortage of supplies and with X Corps still awaiting the clearance of Wonsan, the restraining line was abolished altogether and more trackless wastes and frozen peaks were marked for conquest. Since the September authorization of operations above the parallel had stipulated that "no non-Korean ground forces will be used in the northeast provinces . . . or . . . along the Manchurian border," this action caused some stir in Washington. But General MacArthur’s reply to a query from the Joint Chiefs described the decision as based on "military necessity," and stated that "tactical hazards might even result from other action." And once again CincFE had his way.

Whatever the nature of the "military necessity" that General MacArthur had in mind, the proposal to push through to the border with the forces available seems explicable only on the assumption that no serious resistance was anticipated, a view reflected in the diaspora now imposed on X Corps. In its entire zone only three routes led to the northern border, the coastal route by which Korean forces were advancing, and two roads through the inland mountains. Of these the eastern route, from Sinchang north through Kapsan to Hyesanjin, was assigned the 7th Division; the other, 50 miles to the westward, from Hungnam over the mountains and down the Changjin Valley to the Yalu, was given to the Marines. As if this were an insufficient dispersion, the Marine Division came ashore with orders to prepare for a move to the Manchurian border, to make ready a battalion for a possible landing at Chongjin, and at the same time to provide local security in the Wonsan region and at Kojo.

Click here to view map

Such was the situation when, in the last week of October, there came sudden signs of increased enemy activity. Large concentrations of fighter planes were reported on the airfield at Antung, on the Manchurian side of the lower Yalu, and Air Force pilots flying down the valley reported antiaircraft fire from the far shore. ROK troops which had reached the Yalu in the Eighth Army zone were roughly handled and driven back. At Unsan the 8th Cavalry Regiment was hit hard by a force which ominously included Chinese. Thirty miles above Hamhung, in the X Corps sector, ROK troops suffered a check in an action in which they captured Chinese prisoners. From Marine night fighters flying out of Kimpo came reports of extensive enemy vehicular traffic across the Yalu bridge at Sinuiju. Soon the available Chinese prisoners were talking freely, affably describing the units to which they belonged and the story of their movement into Korea. On 1 November Fifth Air Force had a tentative report of Russian MIG-15 jet fighters, a report which would soon prove only too true. Two days later a Nationalist Chinese source reported that the level of military activity in North China and Manchuria indicated an imminent
all-out effort, and expressed fears that the forces of the U.N. were in grave danger. On the 5th a PBM patrol plane disappeared in Formosa Strait. Suddenly it seemed as if the party might be getting bigger.

In the X Corps zone the Chinese captured by the ROK forces were seen on 31 October by a Marine patrol, whose report constituted the first information on the new intervention to reach Washington. Queried at the request of the President as to his assessment of the situation, CincFE observed on 4 November that it was as yet impossible to appraise the "actualities of Chinese Communist intervention," put forward a variety of possible explanations, discounted the probability of a full-scale effort, and suggested the avoidance of hasty conclusions. But the reassuring tenor of this message was in contrast to the action undertaken in Korea.

In the west, where Eighth Army’s logistic deficiencies still waited on the opening of Chinnampo, the discovery of Chinese soldiers was taken seriously. General Walker at once recalled his probing columns and formed his army up along the south bank of the Chongchon River, there to remain until the general offensive became possible. On the east coast, on 7 November, Admiral Doyle issued orders to expedite the movement of the 3rd Division from Moji to Korea by sailing ships independently as soon as they were loaded.

While these precautions were being taken on the ground, General MacArthur called upon FEAF and NavFE for their best efforts in the air. On the afternoon of 4 November CincFE’s headquarters instructed Admiral Joy to apply the "immediate maximum air effort of your forces ... in close support of ground units and interdiction of enemy communications, assembly areas and troop columns." Although the escort carriers were still at sea, supporting the 7th Division’s northward advance, this unexpected order found the fast carriers in port in Japan. Action was immediate: Cardiv 15 was transferred from Admiral Doyle’s control to that of Admiral Struble; the prospective return of Valley Forge to the United States was cancelled; task force personnel were rounded up from the pleasure spots of Japan, and on the morning of the 5th, with Commander Seventh Fleet in Missouri in company, Admiral Hoskins sortied Valley Forge and Leyte from Sasebo. Although winds to 50 knots were met en route, the next day found them back at work in the Sea of Japan, where they were joined on the 9th by Admiral Ewen in Philippine Sea from Yokosuka. They were to be there a long while.

A similar maximum effort was called for from FEAF, which on 5 November was instructed to fly its crews "to exhaustion if necessary" in a two-week effort "to destroy every means of communication and every installation, factory, city and village" below the Yalu River, the hydroelectric complex only excepted. So important was this effort deemed to be that the prohibition of incendiary attacks on inhabited areas, effective since the beginning of the conflict, was now rescinded.

Faced with the requirements of this offensive, and with the increasing probability of jet opposition, General Stratemeyer on 7 November urgently requested reinforcement of his fighter strength by something with higher performance than the F–80. On the next day he was promised a wing of F–84s and one of F–86As; on the 14th these began loading at San Diego on the escort carrier Bairoko and the light carrier Bataan. By 6 December some of these high-performance fighters were flying Korean missions, and once again the availability of carrier decks had made possible a demonstration of the "inherent mobility" of air power.

In Washington the news of the maximum air effort and of a projected B–29 attack against the Yalu bridges had caused another flurry. An order from the Joint Chiefs to suspend attacks within five miles of the border was coupled with a request for the reasons behind the air offensives. The reply elicited by this dispatch was couched in very different terms from CincFE’s message of the 4th, which had discounted the likelihood of full-scale Chinese intervention. Now on the 6th General MacArthur reported "men and material in large force" pouring across the Yalu bridges and threatening "the ultimate destruction of the forces" under his command. Cancellation of the bridge strike might "well result in a calamity of major proportions"; the sole means of preventing enemy reinforcement was destruction of these bridges and of "all installations in the north area
supporting the enemy advance."

Next day, however, the alarm was muted. In response to a request for an estimate of the situation, CincFE on 7 November struck an average of his previous messages. While emphasizing the importance of Communist air operations from beyond the Yalu, and requesting instructions which would permit him to deal with this development, General MacArthur observed that his early belief that the Chinese were not intervening on a major scale had been confirmed. In reply to these dispatches the Joint Chiefs authorized attacks against the Korean ends of the Yalu bridges, and against other targets up to the river’s bank, while reemphasizing the necessity of avoiding violation of Manchurian territory or airspace.

Winter had now reached the Sea of Japan. There, back on location, Task Force 77 was maneuvering to avoid snow storms, sweeping and drying the carrier decks with the blast of jet engines, and putting forth its best efforts in interdiction of the area east of 126°40’E and south of a line five miles below the Manchurian border. At midday on the 8th a new priority target was added, as a flash message from ComNavFE informed Admiral Struble that CincFE had determined to destroy the first overwater span on the Korean side of all bridges leading to Manchuria. Since FEAF’s Bomber Command was fully committed to attacks on the downstream bridges at Sinuiju, those at Chongsongjin at the lower end of the Suiho Reservoir, where Air Force pilots had reported heavy vehicular traffic, had been assigned the Navy. Consistent with instructions from Washington, these strikes were to be carried out under restrictive ground rules: the target was the first over-water span, and that only; Manchurian air space was not to be violated; the hydroelectric plants and associated facilities were to remain untouched. Two days later the assignment was generalized by instructions to Task Force 77 to destroy the seven major bridges from Sinuiju eastward, through Chongsongjin, Namsan-ni, and Manpojin, to Hyesanjin at the headwaters of the Yalu.

These were extremely difficult targets. Since the approach had to be made either up or down stream, all attacks had to be carried out through predetermined airspace and subject to unimpeded antiaircraft and fighter opposition from the Manchurian side. To hit a single span, while crossing the narrow dimension of the bridge, was difficult for horizontal bombers owing to the intervals within their sticks of bombs; since crossing the bends in the river was forbidden, it was difficult for the B–29s to get a satisfactory aiming run. For the dive bombers this approach meant that any error in range, normally greater than that in deflection, would ensure a miss, while the attacks involved flights of over 220 miles, across high mountains and through winter weather, which called for the most accurate navigation.

Nine B–29s attacked the Sinuiju bridges on 8 November, while 70 more destroyed 60 percent of the town; next day the carriers flew strikes against the bridges there and at Chongsongjin. Three more days of carrier plane attacks were followed by a day of rest; on the 13th and 14th both B–29s and Task Force 77 returned to the fray. The week of the 15th brought four more carrier strikes, and in the last ten days of the month seven B–29 raids were mounted against the bridges.

The bridge attacks by carrier planes were made by groups of upwards of eight ADs, armed with one 2,000-pound bomb or two 1,000-pound bombs apiece, accompanied by Corsairs with VT-fused bombs and rockets to discourage antiaircraft fire from at least the Korean side of the river. For top cover, necessitated by the newly invigorated Communist air opposition, eight or more Panthers accompanied the attack planes. From their launching point in the Korean Gulf the piston-engined aircraft crossed the mountains at 10,000 feet with the Corsairs on top, climbed to 13,000 feet for a high-speed approach, and then, overhauled and joined by the jets some 60 miles short of the target, started their run in. At the objective the Corsairs went down first, to strike the defending gun emplacements, and were followed by the heavyweight ADs, while the F9Fs stepped down to protect against attacks from the rear.

This protection was needed. The enemy jets were real. On the 8th, in the first all–jet air battle of history, an Air Force F–80 fighter pilot had destroyed a MIG; on the 9th, during the attack at Sinuiju, a Navy pilot
duplicated the feat, as Lieutenant Commander W. T. Amen of *Philippine Sea* chased one from 4,000 to 15,000 feet and down again before the enemy spun in. No more than the Air Force F–80s could the Navy fighters match the agile MIG in speed, maneuverability, or rate of climb, but training and gunnery worked to outweigh these adverse factors.

Faced with the double problem of aerial opposition and of antiaircraft gunfire from the sanctuary across the river, Admiral Ewen recommended that members of the U.N. Korean Commission, together with representatives of the Soviets and of the Communist Chinese, be sent up in a transport plane to orbit over and observe the border, and that permission be obtained for hot pursuit of unfriendly aircraft and for attacks on Manchurian batteries which opened fire. Nothing was to come of these suggestions, but the problems which gave rise to them remained, and on the 18th two more MIGs were shot down by pilots from *Valley Forge* and *Leyte*.

So far as it went the result of these engagements was encouraging, but the purpose of the strikes was to destroy the bridges, and here the bombing was spotty and the results disappointing. The carrier pilots succeeded in dropping the highway bridge at Sinuiju and in taking out spans at Hyesanjin; the B–29s broke one or two more. But the Communists demonstrated great vigor and ingenuity in improvising repairs, and as November wore on the Yalu ice was thickening to the point where even heavy equipment could be moved across it.

As the airmen in Korea were flying against the bridges, and as the capitals of the world were considering the implications of Chinese intervention, headquarters estimates of Chinese forces in Korea were on the rise. On 2 November the estimated total was 16,500; by mid-month, when 12 divisions had been identified, it was of the order of 100,000. Total enemy strength, including North Koreans, was estimated at about 145,000 as of the 15th, a figure which was adhered to with little change until the 23rd when it developed a considerable spread, postulating either a minimum of 142,000 or a maximum of 167,000. Whether one accepted the minimum or the maximum or struck an average, this still implied a lot of Chinamen, and their presumed presence in the mountains of central North Korea brought further modification to the mission assigned to General Almond’s forces.

These, since early November, had been pressing forward toward the Manchurian border. After concentrating in the neighborhood of Hamhung, the Marine Division had moved out to the north along the narrow road which leads to the Chosin Reservoir. One brisk fight with Chinese forces took place at Sudong, following which, as in the west, the opposition had disappeared. By the 10th the Marines were over the pass and had reached the headwaters of the Changjin River at Kotori; five days later they had gained the reservoir at Hagaru. To the eastward the advance had been still more rapid. ROK forces moving up the coast were approaching Chongjin. The 7th Division had captured Kapsan on the 12th and was moving toward Hyesanjin on the Yalu; although narrow mountain roads and subzero temperatures made progress arduous, no Chinese had been encountered.

Here in the northern mountains, 90 miles above the Wonsan–Pyongyang corridor, the concept of X Corps assistance to Eighth Army was revived by a directive of 15 November, which instructed General Almond to reorient his attack to the westward so as to facilitate the advance of General Walker’s force. Instead of continuing north to the Manchurian border, the Marines were to strike west for 40 miles against the enemy’s supply line. In the works for ten days, the orders for this flattering operation, in which one division was to clear the way for an army, were issued on the 25th, and required the Marine Division to move west from the reservoir to Mupyong-ni, and thence north through Kanggye to the Yalu.

By this time Admiral *Doyle* had finished off his east coast job. The harbors were open, the logistic situation was satisfactory, and the X Corps rear, firmly based upon the sea, was secure. Rather less, however, could be said for the advanced units, for the Yalu River towns of Manpojin and Hyesanjin, the ultimate objectives of the Marines and of the 7th Division, are 120 miles by air, and perhaps half as much again by mountain road, from the Hungnam base. The concept of the operation is a puzzling one, for while the reorientation of the Marines’ thrust was predicated on the need to help Eighth Army, its extent implied an expectation of non-
resistance, and seemed based less on assumptions regarding Chinese capabilities than on assumptions of intent which, if correct, would make the effort hardly necessary.

In the west, since first contact with the Chinese, Eighth Army headquarters had entertained serious doubts about the future. Early in November Admiral Joy had begun to fear that the war would last out the winter; by mid-month he had come to feel that the Chinese had the manpower to expel the U.N. from Korea, and was keeping his fingers crossed against a third World War. Dubious of this winter campaign, General Smith had earlier suggested holding merely the territory covering Hamhung and Wonsan, and even the ever–sanguine Almond had been concerned. But at GHQ, where the strategic art was cultivated in its pure form, optimism appeared to have returned, and lack of contact with the Chinese to have brought the belief that they would fade away. On 18 November General MacArthur concluded that the all-out air effort had isolated the battlefield and restricted enemy supply; this and the logistic improvement which had followed the opening of Chinnampo led him to fix the 24th as the date for Eighth Army’s offensive.

At sea, as on land, this was a period of contradictions. Following the strikes against the Yalu bridges the airmen had again found targets short: on the 18th the escort carriers were withdrawn; on the 19th Valley Forge and two destroyers were detached and ordered to the United States for overhaul. On the 22nd, as the day for the advance approached, Commander Weymouth flew to Seoul to confer with Fifth Air Force on the desired employment of the air groups of the remaining two fast carriers. This was not much. No close support was wanted, whether for Eighth Army or for X Corps. Seventh Fleet aircraft, with those of FEAF’s Bomber Command, were to concentrate their efforts on bridges and communications within a 15-mile strip along the Yalu.

To Commander Task Force 77 the proposal for interdiction flights in western Korea from carriers in the Sea of Japan seemed uneconomical. As a better employment of available force, he suggested that he assume responsibility for supplemental close support of X Corps. But the proposal was turned down.

On 19 November, Moscow broadcast promises of a great offensive which would destroy the U.N. armies. On the 20th CincFE issued orders regarding the etiquette for U.N. forces at the border. Its sanctity was to be meticulously preserved; only small elements would be advanced to its immediate neighborhood; the hydroelectric plants, which served both North Korea and Manchuria, would be kept in uninterrupted operation. On the 24th the opening of the offensive was announced in confident terms. Again it appeared to some that the war was about to end, if not by Thanksgiving at least by Christmas.
Chapter 9. Retreat to the South

1. 24 November–6 December: Defeat in the West

IMPORTED, sustained, brought forward, and now at last supplied by sea, the multinational ground forces of the U.N. made ready for the final offensive. On 24 November, as Chinese Communist representatives were arriving at Lake Success to complain of American aggression in Formosa, Eighth Army attacked north from the Chongchon River. On the left the II Corps moved forward through the coastal plain; in the center the IX Corps, with the 2nd Infantry Division on its right, advanced northward up the valleys of the Kuryong and the Chongchon; at Tokchon in the central mountains the ROK II Corps, under General Walker’s command although not part of Eighth Army, was under orders to establish contact with X Corps to the northeast. The advance of the Army was supported by Fifth Air Force, while aircraft of Bomber Command and Task Force 77 patrolled a 15-mile strip below the Manchurian border. Progress on the 24th was satisfactory all along the line.

Across the peninsula to the northeast, supported by the fighter squadrons of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and by an Air Force fighter-bomber group, General Almond’s X Corps was again preparing to act as the right arm of the pincer. Up in the high country, 65 mountainous miles from Tokchon, the 7th Marines were moving west from Hagar to Yudam-ni, where they arrived on the 25th after meeting only light opposition, and where next day they were joined by RCT 5. No more than their predecessors did the 5th Marines have trouble on the road, although interrogation of Chinese prisoners and information from local inhabitants indicated that three Chinese divisions had reached the area. In compliance with the revised plan for X Corps operations General Smith intended to pass the 5th Marines through RCT 7, and to attack westward from Yudam-ni on the morning of the 27th.

But while operations at the reservoir were of a routine nature, things were happening in the west. There on the 25th heavy pressure had developed on the right at Tokchon, and the 2nd Division had been engaged by Chinese Communist forces. By the next day the ROK II Corps had broken before the CCF assault, the right flank was exposed, and the Turkish Brigade and the 1st Cavalry Division were ordered up to bolster the threatened IX Corps. Before the westward thrust from Yudam-ni was scheduled to begin, Eighth Army’s offensive had been stopped.

On the morning of the 27th, following a night of zero temperature and high winds, the 5th Marines nevertheless led out to the west. But the advance was limited to less than a mile by strong Chinese forces entrenched in the hills overlooking the road. With darkness very heavy attacks were launched by two Chinese divisions against the 5th and 7th Marines, while east of the reservoir three Army battalions were assaulted by a third. At Yudam-ni, where violent fighting continued throughout the night and into the morning, the enemy was ultimately repelled. But casualties were heavy, and in the rear, between Yudam-ni and Hagar, the Chinese controlled the road, and had cut off and surrounded two companies. Further advance was out of the question, and in the afternoon General Smith issued orders halting the movement to the west.

Across the peninsula in the western lowlands things were even worse. On 27 November, as enemy pressure increased, advanced forces on the coastal plain were ordered back across the Chongchon. By the next day Eighth Army was in full retreat and the 2nd Division was desperately trying to extricate itself from a position of the gravest peril. With evening of the 28th Generals Walker and Almond were summoned to Tokyo for a conference with CincFE who, after authorizing Eighth Army and X Corps to withdraw, reported to Washington that the U.N. Command had met "conditions beyond its control and its strength," that he had gone over to the defensive, and that "we face an entirely new war."
Subject only to the deletion of the adjective "entirely," the statement appears correct. Once again an intervention from outside had changed the scale of the Korean conflict, and had removed control of their destinies still further from the inhabitants of the peninsula. The original elder brother had returned, and his forces, it was now sufficiently clear, were not limited to a sprinkling of volunteers but included important components of two field armies. Shortly some 30 Chinese divisions would be identified in North Korea, totalling perhaps 250,000 men, and the imaginative expansion of the NKPA remnants to a strength of 180,000 which was quickly accomplished by GHQ intelligence was not necessary to the proposition that the enemy was once again formidable. In the air the situation had also changed, and fighter planes of very advanced design were operating from the Manchurian fields across the Yalu River. Unlike the situation in June the prospect of U.N. reinforcement was dim: the commitment of very considerable forces to the theater of action had left practically nothing in reserve; the greater part of the Pacific Fleet was in the forward area and Army strength in the continental United States was down to a single division.

Yet not everything was new and different; in some respects the pattern was familiar. The new enemy, like the old, was based on the Asiatic mainland; the forces of the United Nations were still sustained by sea. Again intelligence had been available, again there had been surprise. As had been the case five months before, rapid enemy successes brought rapid retirement by the ground forces of the U.N. At sea, where enemy strength was still conspicuous by its absence, Naval Forces Far East retained the responsibility for any necessary evacuation of friendly nationals, a responsibility now greatly enlarged. As before, enemy offensive efforts in the air were negligible; as before, the full employment of U.N. air strength was hindered by circumstance. In July the problem had been one of range, and the lack of advanced airfields had placed a premium on available carrier strength; in November a dearth of identifiable targets had limited the effectiveness of Air Force and naval aviation alike; in December the forced abandonment of forward bases would bring the range problem back to the fore. Once again a period of emergency would raise problems of Navy-Air Force coordination. New war, in many respects, was just old war writ large.

Even before General MacArthur had reported his shift to the defensive, the Navy had begun to react. At Admiral Joy’s headquarters, where the possibility of a general emergency had been kept steadily in mind, the first appearance of the Chinese had caused concern. Planning had been expedited, and Operation Plan 116–50, laying down procedures for an emergency evacuation of U.N. forces from Korea, had been issued on 13 November. Enunciating the concept that any such operation "should be based upon the principle of an ‘assault in reverse,’” this plan provided detailed hydrographic and loading information for Korean and Japanese ports, gave figures on troop capacity of both commercial and combatant shipping, and established a command structure in which CTF 90, supported by other theater naval forces, would control naval and air operations in evacuation areas. Rarely, it would seem, have the routine precautions of the planners proved of such immediate value. At 1534 on 28 November ComNavFE alerted Admiral Doyle for a possible general emergency which would require redeployment of the ground forces from Korea to Japan.

On receipt of this dispatch CTF 90 and his staff at once worked out preliminary plans for the deployment of half the Amphibious Force to west coast operations under Admiral Thackrey and half to the Wonsan-Hungnam area. Next day the operation order was promulgated, all ships were alerted to the possibility of air attack, Task Force 90 was placed on six—hour notice, amphibious shipping in Korean waters was held there, and all units at Yokosuka were ordered down to Sasebo.

As the first steps were being taken to prepare for the ultimate emergency other action was underway to prevent its development. On the 28th, in response to a Fifth Air Force request, Task Force 77 had expanded its area of armed reconnaissance southward, and throughout the day Philippine Sea and Leyte had kept eight Corsairs and six ADs over the newly enlarged border strip. But reports of the apparent crisis which confronted EUSAK led Admiral Ewen to feel that more could and should be done, and that circumstances called less for armed
reconnaissance than for support of troops. On conclusion of operations on the 28th he proposed to Admiral Struble that the six flights scheduled for the next day be routed to check in with the Fifth Air Force Tactical Air Control Center and offer their services in close support before proceeding to the border zone, and that consideration on the highest level be given the assignment to EUSAK of Marine tactical air control parties for the handling of available naval aircraft. In the evening Commander Seventh Fleet passed the first of these suggestions to Fifth Air Force.

For the present this offer of assistance by the two Seventh Fleet fast carriers was all that could be done to provide increased support to the armies in the peninsula. For the future, despite the heavy deployment to Far Eastern waters, some further accretions of force could still be called for. To the British at Hong Kong went an urgent call to hurry back, and on 1 December Andrewes sailed for Sasebo in Theseus, to be shortly followed by Kenya. From Formosa Strait the cruiser Manchester was ordered up to Korean waters. Destroyer Division 31, on route to the west coast for overhaul, was ordered to reverse course. The sailing of the APA Bexar for the United States was cancelled. Sicily and her antisubmarine squadron had just reached Japan from Guam; once again she was directed to unload in order to embark Marine fighter planes. The light carrier Bataan, with her load of high-performance Air Force jets, was just arriving at Yokosuka, and the escort carrier Bairoko was on the way; shortly ComNavFE would request permission to retain these ships so as to have decks available for more Marines should the Wonsan and Yonpo airstrips be overrun. First of the carriers to see action in the summer war, Valley Forge was now halfway across the Pacific on her way home; she was instructed to expedite her movement to the United States, exchange her air group for that of Boxer, and return at once.

This evolution, however, would take time, and for the moment Task Force 77 contained only two carriers. That earlier reinforcement would prove possible was due to the existence of the mothball fleet, and to the reactivation program previously begun. On 25 July the Chief of Naval Operations had ordered the activation of the fast carrier Princeton, then in reserve at Bremerton. Recommissioned on 28 August, under command of Captain William 0. Gallery and with a crew largely composed of recalled reservists, Princeton had completed her period of shakedown training, had embarked Rear Admiral Ralph A. Ofstie, Commander Carrier Division 5, and had sailed from the west coast in early November. On the 25th she departed Pearl Harbor for the Western Pacific; on the 27th, on orders from CincPacFleet to proceed at maximum safe speed, she went up to 30 knots; on the 30th ComNavFE instructed her to proceed directly to the operating area.

On 29 and 30 November Eighth Army continued its retreat across the Chongchon River. On the left disengagement proceeded without great difficulty, but there was trouble in the center, and on the right the situation was very bad. The Turkish Brigade, moved forward following the ROK collapse, was roughly handled, while the 2nd Division, after a difficult crossing of the Chongchon, became entangled in a five-mile roadblock north of Sunchon. Cut off and cut up, swept with fire from the hills along the road and blocked by its own vehicles, the division became disorganized, and in a two-day ordeal lost some 40 percent of its personnel and most of its guns and gear.

That these losses, great though they were, were not still greater, was due in considerable part to an all-out effort by Fifth Air Force against the attacking Chinese, an effort to some degree assisted by the air groups of the fast carriers. On the morning of the 29th, pursuant to his suggestion of the previous evening, Admiral Ewen sent seven Corsairs and five ADs across the peninsula to offer their services in close support. Passed from hand to hand for a time, they were finally instructed to circle Kunu-ri in the 2nd Division trouble zone; there, after a 25–minute wait, they were directed onto a troop concentration north of the town. This qualified success, together with Air Force acceptance of his offer of the 28th, led CTF 77 to route all armed reconnaissance flights for the 30th through a point in 39°30'N 126°E, near the big bend in the Taedong and just east of the pass in which the 2nd Division was engaged in dubious combat, to offer their loads for close support to any controller they could reach. But by the time these instructions were issued new claims on the fast carriers had developed.
Up on the plateau, following the attacks of the 27th and 28th, comparative quiet reigned, but the enemy controlled the roads and Marine and Army units had been separated into a series of isolated perimeters. In this situation General Harris, the Marine air commander, had strongly recommended to ComNavFE a sustained effort by the fast carriers in the X Corps zone, and had stated that Fifth Air Force concurred in this proposal. But an evening dispatch from FAFIK on the 29th indicated that such concurrence applied only to that day’s operations, and asked, in view of the "critical condition" in the EUSAK area, a divided effort for the next few days. And a message from ComNavFE, confirming that close support had priority over all other commitments, prescribed such distribution of carrier air effort.

The sorties of the 30th were consequently so divided, and the schedule of operations stepped up by the addition of five jet flights of four planes each. Thirty–nine sorties were sent up to the reservoir while 74, including 23 jet sorties, were dispatched on armed reconnaissance with instructions to report en route to any available Air Force control agency. As always in emergencies there were difficulties. In X Corps zone, communications were overcrowded and radio discipline poor, but the coherence of Marine units had not been broken and most flights found control. In the west, by contrast, the state of affairs was chaotic: the Fifth Air Force had already been forced out of its forward staging fields at Sinanju on the Chongchon, some advanced control parties had been overrun, irreplaceable control equipment had been lost, and evacuation of the Mosquito control planes from the Pyongyang airfields was in progress.

The effects of this situation were apparent in difficulties of aircraft control. Of four jet flights to the EUSAK zone three made no contact. Of the heavily-armed strike groups of Corsairs and Skyraiders that were dispatched to the west, one was weathered out, one failed to find a controller, and one found good control. There were delays, and when one flight came across to the west, after failing to make contact in the X Corps area, the ADs were incomprehensibly detached from attack to road reconnaissance. But control once gained was fair to excellent: the two propeller strikes which did make contact put 14 Corsairs and 5 ADs with more than 14 tons of napalm and 5 of bombs onto troop concentrations in the crucial 2nd Division area; the jet flight, after being directed against entrenched troops south of Tokchon, ran the roads north to Manpojin.

Considering the conditions under which advanced Air Force units were working this was not too bad a performance, but to Admiral Ewen, lacking detailed information on the state of affairs in the west, it seemed that the situation of early September was repeating itself. At 2230 on the 30th he informed Commander Seventh Fleet that while all missions sent to X Corps had been successful, about two-thirds of the effort in the EUSAK zone had been wasted, and asked him to pass the word to Fifth Air Force. This Struble did in a midnight emergency dispatch in which he reiterated his desire to help, stated that in view of unsatisfactory control in the west he would adjust his distribution of effort, and asked to be advised when the situation improved.

By now the successes of the Chinese had ended all possibility of coordinated effort by Eighth Army and X Corps, and in the two theaters of action very different types of operations were developing. In the west, as December opened, the remnants of the 2nd Division had at last reached Sunchon, and Eighth Army was disengaging and moving south toward Pyongyang. But in the X Corps zone, where the Marine Division had been fragmented and cut off, the situation was one of beleaguered strong points. On the plateau maximum air support was needed; across the peninsula, movement requirements took precedence over those for firepower.

These conditions governed the distribution of Task Force 90. On the 30th, with the ground situation steadily deteriorating, Admiral Doyle put all ships in port on two-hour notice and began to deploy his shipping to Korea. Transports were divided on a 50—50 basis, with four APAs and two AKAs being ordered to Inchon and a like number to Wonsan. But the apparently more critical situation of Eighth Army, together with the problems of handling large ships in west coast ports, led to the assignment of two-thirds of other amphibious types to Admiral Thackrey’s Task Group 90.1. Thackrey himself had flown to Inchon with General Walker on the 29th to inspect and advise on port operations. On the next day two members of his staff went up to Chinnampo to look things...
over, and the APA *Bexar*, the LSD *Catamount*, and two LSTs were added to his command. On 1 December, as Thackrey reported aboard *Mount McKinley* at Hungnam to confer with Admiral Doyle and to plan for the future, his flagship *Eldorado*, two more LSDs, and the fast transport *H. A. Bass* were ordered west, along with ten Seajap LSTs.

In eastern North Korea, where the ground battle was still developing, X Corps on 1 December ordered a retirement upon Hungnam. Since only the forces on the plateau had been engaged, the concentration of the other units from such widely dispersed points as Wonsan, Hyesanjin, and Chongjin would be successfully accomplished by routine land and sea movement. But while no requirement for emergency evacuation as yet existed, the situation of the Marine Division and of the Army battalions at the reservoir was such as to cause the greatest concern. The division which had been moved forward to aid the advance of an army was now surrounded, and the army was in no position to return the favor. With the MSR cut, with supplies running short and casualties accumulating, air supply, air evacuation, and the maximum possible air support were urgently required.

Although retirement rather than advance was now the order of the day, the Chinese attack had put X Corps back in the kind of beachhead situation that had existed at Inchon and had been planned for at Wonsan. The collapse in the west had forced Fifth Air Force back to fields at Seoul and beyond, and local air support depended upon the two east coast air strips and upon embarked aviation. Recognizing this situation, FAFIK on 1 December cut existing red tape, gave General Harris autonomy in the conduct of air operations in support of X Corps, and instructed him to proceed without reference to Fifth Air Force except when reinforcements were needed. And the first days of December saw a steady shift of the fast carrier effort toward complete concentration in the X Corps zone.

Commander Seventh Fleet’s relay of Admiral Ewen’s complaint had elicited an emergency reply. On the morning of the 1st, Fifth Air Force reported that many of its TACPs appeared to have been lost to enemy action in the fluid situation then prevailing, that every effort was being made to provide replacements, and that instructions had been issued to give naval flights priority of employment. And as had been proposed by someone in one or another service in every crisis since early July, the Air Force now suggested that for better coordination CTF 77 should provide a representative at the JOC and should establish a direct radio link.

In part for technical reasons, in part because of the complex structure of the U.N. Command, communications between Fifth Air Force and the fast carriers had long presented a problem. But somewhere, in some corner of the JOC, there did in fact exist a direct CW radio circuit, activated on 6 November at the persistent urging of the task force communication officer, over which for two days drill messages had passed with gratifying speed. What was wanted by the Air Force, however, appears to have been a voice circuit rather than a manually-keyed one, and this was provided a few days later, by which time Commander Weymouth had once again been flown in to the JOC. And once again, under the lash of necessity, coordination began to improve.

On 1 December the weather over eastern Korea was very bad. Morning flights from the carriers met a solid overcast over the plateau and were diverted to the EUSAK area, where three missions totalling 23 aircraft found satisfactory control, successfully attacked large concentrations of enemy troops and abandoned friendly equipment, and blew an ammunition dump at Sinanju. But the weather which had altered their employment also prevented their return to base, for the task force had been obliged to cease flight operations late in the morning. Unable to get home, the aircraft landed at Wonsan, were kicked out again owing to rumors of a deteriorating ground situation in the neighborhood, and finally spent the night at Kimpo.

Next day the fast carriers again split their efforts, sending 28 sorties to EUSAK and half again as many to the Chosin area. In the west two flights with 10 aircraft had good success, while three totalling 18 found no controllers. But these were the last sorties sent to the western front, where EUSAK had by now disengaged, and
where fears of being outflanked and forced back upon Chinnampo had ended all thoughts of holding a line at the
waist along the Pyongyang-Wonsan road. On 3 December, as the Fifth Air Force was completing the first stage of
its redeployment to South Korea and to Japan, General Walker’s command post displaced from Pyongyang to
Seoul, and service units began packing up for the move south. Two days later the North Korean capital was
abandoned to the enemy.

The rapid southward movement of Eighth Army, which threatened momently to leave Chinnampo
uncovered, called urgently for the evacuation of that port. The urgency was nothing new, for in five months of
war in Korea emergencies had become routine. Surprisingly, however, the sequence of planning and execution,
although often greatly condensed, had not previously broken down; the organizational framework had remained
intact, and operations had tested the technical competence of juniors in the execution of orders rather than their
initiative in crisis when orders failed to come. Now for the first time the collapse in the west, and the short
interval between defeat on the Chongchon and retirement from Pyongyang, put the job up to those on the spot.

In the course of the movement of amphibious shipping to Korea, Transport Squadron 1, Captain Kelly in
*Bayfield*, had been assigned to Task Group 90.1 and ordered to Inchon. On 30 November and 1 December these
ships—the APAs *Bayfield*, *Bexar* and *Okanogan*, and the AKAs *Algol* and *Montague*—had sailed independently
from Japanese ports. On the afternoon of the 3rd, while heading northward into the Yellow Sea, Kelly intercepted
a message from ComNavFE to CTG 90.1 which reported an urgent EUSAK request for the dispatch of these ships
to Chinnampo, but which expressed doubts as to the possibility of loading and protecting so many large units
there. But Admiral Thackrey was still on his Korean travels, his flagship was at sea, and his staff was slow to act.
For five hours, as Bayfield steamed northward, Captain Kelly puzzled over the tone of ComNavFE’s message
and the lack of implementing instructions. At 2200 he decided to wait no more but to sail to the sound of the guns,
and ordered his dispersed units to join him off the Chinnampo swept channel in the morning.

Others were swinging into action too. At 0330 on the 4th *Bayfield* intercepted a message from Admiral
Smith to Thackrey which reported that the six west coast destroyers of TE 95.12, Captain Jeffrey V. Brock, RCN,
in *Cayuga*, were available to protect the transports, and that *Ceylon* was being started from Sasebo for the west
coast. Unknown to Kelly, still more help was on the way, for Admiral Andrewes, after a hasty return from Hong
Kong to Sasebo, was preparing to sail with *Theseus* and four destroyers for the Yellow Sea.

Naval units already at Chinnampo consisted of the DE *Foss*, Lieutenant Commander Henry J. Erickson,
which was providing the city with electric power, and a small Korean naval base command with three motor
launches; off the mouth of the Taedong River the minesweeping group was still at work. These too were standing
to their posts. Offshore the sweepers took station to guide incoming ships along the tortuous channel. At 0236 of
the 4th Erickson reported that the situation in Chinnampo was shaky, but that he would keep the power on as long
as possible, evacuate Eighth Army personnel, and then at the last, if still senior officer, would form a convoy and
get the shipping out. Shortly the Korean base commander advised his superiors that EUSAK had ordered him to
redeploy at once, and that with 100 sailboats and 50,000 refugees on hand he would try to send 30,000 out by sea
and the remainder overland.

Through the night the transport group steamed on. By 0425, when orders to proceed to Chinnampo were
finally received, Kelly’s initiative had gained him more than six hours, and by 0930 all but *Bexar* had reached the
outer end of the 84-mile swept channel and were standing in. Despite requests for information no word had been
received on the size and shape of the units to be evacuated, the tactical situation ashore, the availability of ground
or air support, or on who was to command the operation. But they had their orders, they believed that beleaguered
army units were awaiting them, so on they went. At noon Kelly issued his operation order: man all guns, lower all
boats, commence loading at once, keep steam up to the throttles. And then, at last, dispatches began to arrive:
Brock’s destroyers were heading his way; *Theseus* would have air cover there next day; he was in charge.

The anchors went down, the boats were launched. The call for help had been answered. Having thrust
their heads into the lion’s mouth it was discouraging to the transport crews to discover that the only EUSAK units in the Chinnampo area were the 1,700 men of the port logistics group, that these had their own shipping on hand, and that while perhaps 6,000 Koreans—wounded soldiers, government workers, military and political prisoners, police and boy scouts—had some official claim on transportation, the number was hardly enough to fill the transport group. There was no need for Bexar, who had reached the entrance channel at 1830, but it was too late to stop her: her commanding officer had smelled powder too, so single screw, low power, and all, in she came through the dark and snow.

All transports were now in and loading was in progress. The remaining problem was to get out. Quite apart from the hazards of navigation, Chinnampo is a poor place to be caught in, for the reverse slopes of the hills that front the harbor are within mortar range of the anchorage. Word from the Army ashore indicated an 80-mile gap in the lines to the north, the enemy was reported in Pyongyang and heading for Chinnampo, no combat forces were available, and the service troops manning the road blocks were to be withdrawn at midnight. In this situation a dispatch from Captain Brock, inquiring as to the state of affairs and offering to come in in the dark if needed, was very welcome, and the offer was accepted. Off the mouth of the Taedong the destroyers got the word at 2100 and started in at once, and this time the passage took its toll. Warramunga grounded but got off later with little damage; Sioux fouled a screw in a buoy cable and turned back; but by 0240 of the 5th Cayuga, Athabaskan, Bataan, and Forrest Royal were anchored with their guns trained on the Chinnampo waterfront.

With the destroyers on hand things looked better. Throughout the morning, as loading continued, sailboats packed with refugees slipped down the river. Foss kept the power on, the ROKN shore party guarded the docks while their small boats patrolled the harbor, and in the afternoon aircraft from Theseus appeared overhead. Beginning at 1230 the transports were sailed independently, and by 1430 the beach was being cleared. A late influx of refugees had left 3,000 at the docks, but their problem was providentially solved by the unexpected arrival of an MSTS vessel which had failed to receive notice of its diversion to a safer destination. Ceylon, now standing in the entrance channel, was ordered to stay outside, and at 1730 Bexar, last of the transports, headed downstream escorted by Foss. In the harbor the LSTs with the port logistics personnel anchored for the night, and the destroyers bombarded oil storage, harbor cranes, and railway equipment. One final emergency developed when Bexar, having made both inward and outward voyages in darkness, grounded north of Sokto. But she got herself off without damage, and with morning the destroyers and LSTs made an uneventful downstream passage to reach Cho Do at noon and anchor in a blinding snowstorm.

As in the first days of the summer war, a west coast port had been evacuated. As in July the armies were retiring and the situation was a gloomy one. General MacArthur had earlier planned to remove Eighth Army from Korea by Christmas, leaving X Corps as an occupation force; and in an unanticipated fashion it seemed that much of this plan was coming true. Eighth Army was almost clear of North Korea, and consideration was already being given to the abandonment of Seoul and the fortification of the Naktong River line; the X Corps area of occupation, however, was a diminishing one, and the Marines were still outnumbered, surrounded, and far from the sea. Again, as in the summer, visibility was poor, and none knew what would happen next. On 29 November CTF 95 had warned west coast units of the possibility of air attack from across the Yellow Sea; on the next day a special antisubmarine patrol had been instituted off Sasebo. At NavFE headquarters the intervention of the Chinese had expanded planning responsibilities from matters of postwar redeployment to problems of more pressing concern, and from Korean waters to the entire coast of Asia. Momentarily an invasion of Formosa seemed imminent as a Navy patrol plane reported a fleet of junks heading eastward from the mainland. An unconfirmed intelligence report indicated that the Soviets were preparing an all-out air attack against Japan. On 6 December, in view of possible contingencies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent out a general alarm to American forces throughout the world.
Chapter 9. Retreat to the South
2. 14 November-10 December: The Campaign at the Reservoir

Fifty miles north of Hungnam, at an altitude of 3,400 feet, lies the Chosin Reservoir. For 13 miles from north to south and 8 from east to west its narrow arms extend into the mountain valleys. At Yudam-ni at the western extremity there are a few square yards of flat land; at Hagaru at the southern tip there is rather more; but in general the shores are steep, and the hills which rim the water’s edge are ringed at a distance of five or ten miles by mountains rising 3,000 feet above the reservoir. The country is barren and sparsely populated; the vegetation a none-too-plentiful mixture of fir, aspen, and brush. Between Hungnam at the sea and Hagaru, where the Marine Division had established its advanced base, a single road, narrow, twisting, inadequate to heavy traffic, and with bridges of only light construction, provided the MSR.

On their way up-hill the Marines had encountered two new enemies, the Chinese and the cold. Between 2 and 7 November vigorous resistance had been offered in the neighborhood of Sudong by CCF units with tank and artillery support; there was evidence that two more Chinese divisions were operating to the westward; a further build-up was suggested by pilots’ reports of troops approaching from the northwest and north. But with air support the Chinese roadblocks were broken, Koto-ri was entered on 11 November and Hagaru on the 14th, and aerial reconnaissance indicated that the enemy was straggling to the northwest. Yet if the Chinese had for the moment gone, winter had come. Intermittent snowfall, encountered during the advance up-hill, had by now blanketed the plateau. As early as mid-November canteens were freezing and bursting, while by December night temperatures would at times reach 25° below zero. Climatically, at least, the Marines did face a new war.

Through this extreme cold, which brought frostbite and respiratory disease to personnel, adversely affected the operation of weapons and equipment, and made foxhole digging in the frozen earth a six to eight-hour affair, the northward advance had continued. By late November the entire Marine Division was strung out along the 75 miles of road from Hungnam to Yudam–ni. Two regiments were in the Yudam–ni area, division headquarters and an infantry battalion were located at Hagaru, while on the MSR the villages of Koto-ri and Chinhung–ni were garrisoned by something more than two battalions. A total of about seven days’ supply had been dumped on the plateau. Against this force, divided and far from base and with a strength of slightly more than 25,000, there would be committed during the next two weeks eight divisions from three Chinese Communist armies whose strength totalled some 60,000 men.

Chinese movement into Korea had begun in mid–October, as the Eighth Army was approaching Pyongyang, with the passage of the Yalu by leading elements of the Fourth CCF Field Army, General Lin Piao. As he deployed to oppose General Walker’s advance, Lin had detached his 42nd Army to cover his left against the intrusions of X Corps; this unit had been the source of the opposition against which the Marines had run up at Sudong. Following the movement of the Fourth Field Army, the 9th Army Group of General Chen Yi’s Third Field Army had crossed over into Korea to oppose X Corps; Lin’s units had retired to the westward, and had been replaced at Yudam–ni by four divisions of the 20th Army. The intention of this force, according to prisoners, was to bypass the advancing Marines and cut the MSR to the east and south.

Other Chinese movements were also in progress. As the 20th Army approached from the northwest, two divisions of the 27th Army moved down on the reservoir from the north and there divided, with one moving onward against Yudam-ni and the other coming down the eastern shore. With completion of these movements in the last days of November the two Marine regiments at Yudam-ni found themselves engaged by two divisions, one from the 20th Army and one from the 27th; a second division from the 27th Army had attacked the three
battalions of the 7th Infantry Division east of the reservoir; bypassing the American forces, the three remaining 20th Army divisions had moved onward to cut the road east of Yudam-ni, to attack the advanced base at Hagaru, and to operate against the Hamhung road in the neighborhood of Koto-ri.

On the plateau, as in the west, Chinese tactics were to permit, indeed to encourage, a maximum extension of U.N. forces, and then to cut the MSR, press against the column from all sides, fracture, fragment, and destroy it. Such procedures had been effective on the Chongchon River, but although the Marines were far deeper in enemy country, and had a far more precarious line of communications, the success was not to be repeated. Rather than extending itself along the road, the Marine Division formed the modern equivalent of the square and, with firepower maintained through air supply and multiplied by air support, accomplished the extrication of its units and the destruction of its enemies. By night the Marines, concentrated and dug in in tight perimeters, presented heavily-armed strong points on which the Chinese impaled themselves in the attack. By day, with close support aircraft on station and with flanking forces clearing the heights along the road, they formed moving fortresses which brushed the Communists aside, while over the hill, beyond artillery range, the extension of fire power by Marine and Navy aircraft kept the enemy down.

The coming of the Chinese onslaught had found the fast carriers still committed to armed reconnaissance. On 28 November the forces available to General Harris consisted of MAG 12 with two fighter and one night fighter squadrons at Wonsan, MAG 33 with one fighter and one night fighter squadron at Yonpo and a fighter squadron in Badoeng Strait, and the Air Force’s 35th Fighter-Bomber Group at Yonpo. There were plenty of calls on the services of these units. At Chinhung-ni, in the southern sector of the MSR, Chinese probing attacks had begun on the 26th; west of Koto-ri, next day, Marine patrols had encountered the new enemy; on the night of the 27th heavy fighting had broken out in Yudam-ni and east of the reservoir. On the 28th liaison pilots reported that the enemy controlled the road between Yudam-ni and Toktong Pass, between the pass and Hagaru, and between Hagaru and Koto-ri, and in addition to thus segmenting the Marine Division into four groups had surrounded the Army forces east of the reservoir. In all these areas enemy pressure continued, but the central problem, on which the future of all units on the plateau depended, was the defense of Hagaru.

At Hagaru there were located three irreplaceable commodities. There the Marine Division had set up its command post, there supplies had been laid down for the developing campaign, and there, on one of the few flat pieces of ground in North Korea, was an incipient airstrip, begun on the 18th with the intention of providing facilities for twin–engined transport aircraft, which by the 27th was about a quarter completed. But the defensive force available for the protection of this investment was very limited, and consisted merely of one rifle battalion, two batteries of artillery, and service and division troops. General Smith had ordered reinforcements up from Koto-ri, but the Chinese did not await their coming and on the night of 28–29 November committed two regiments against the perimeter. Violent fighting continued throughout the frozen darkness and the line was more than once broken, but the enemy proved unable to exploit his gains. Although pressure remained heavy on the 29th the first crisis had been surmounted.

With Hagaru still holding out, the second phase of the campaign began. Control of the Army forces at the reservoir was passed to General Smith, who was directed to concentrate all units at Hagaru in anticipation of a further move to the southward. Pursuant to these instructions the forces at Yudam-ni were ordered to fight their way back, and on the afternoon of 1 December, after a day of preparation, the 5th and 7th Marines disengaged and started south for Hagaru.

Orders from X Corps had contemplated the employment of one of these regiments to bring out the beleaguered 7th Division units from Sinhung-ni on the eastern shore of the reservoir. But some time would elapse before this would be possible, and no other forces were available for this task. The reinforcements ordered up from Koto-ri had had a difficult time of it on the road, only a part had managed to get through, and the night of 30 November brought further heavy attacks at Hagaru and against the Army battalions. On the morning of 1
December, therefore, the Army troops were ordered to break out to the southward at the earliest possible time, and were advised that while no troop assistance could be given, owing to the situation at Hagaru, maximum air support would be provided.

The air strength available for the support of X Corps had by this time been considerably increased, as a result of the eastward shift of the fast carrier effort. On the 30th, following General Harris’ first request for carrier air, Task Force 77 had sent 39 sorties to the reservoir, of which 14 struck at Chinese troops surrounding the isolated Army units while 25 attacked the enemy in the hills about Hagaru. By bad luck, however, the next day brought bad weather both at the reservoir and in the Sea of Japan. Although aircraft from Badoeng Strait and Marine shore-based squadrons got through to napalm the Chinese enemy, the early flights from Task Force 77 were weathered out of the reservoir, and in late morning the force was obliged to cancel operations. At midday the Army troops began their southward movement with 20 fighters overhead, but in the course of the afternoon a combination of heavy attacks and enemy roadblocks fragmented the column, most officers and key NCOs became casualties, and as darkness fell the force dissolved. It had almost made it in: the disintegration took place only four and a half miles from Hagaru; but although a number of stragglers was brought in across the frozen reservoir, total casualties reached almost 75 percent.

Tragic though it was, this was to be the last such enemy success. It was not only in the eastward movement of carrier effort that the support situation was improving. A plan on the part of the patrol squadrons to provide air supply and evacuation by flying boat had been abandoned when the first flights disclosed that the reservoir was frozen solid. But air drops had been begun on the 28th by Marine and Air Force transport planes, and Combat Cargo Command, by notable efforts, had by 1 December increased deliveries from 70 to 250 tons a day. Despite the violent Chinese attacks, work on the Hagaru airstrip had been pressed around the clock; almost half-completed by the 1st, it was consequently declared operational, and four Air Force C–47s flew in with supplies. On the same day MAG 12’s three fighter squadrons moved north from Wonsan to Yonpo, thus concentrating nearer the area of action. On the 3rd the Fifth Air Force would offer its entire light bomber effort for the support of the campaign.

The 2nd of December was the last day on which the carriers split their effort between eastern and western theaters. As the 5th and 7th Marines continued their move toward Hagaru, Task Force 77 put two-thirds of its sorties into the reservoir area, attacking troop positions at Toktong Pass and to the southward, and providing fighter cover to transports flying supplies into Hagaru. Although hampered by excessive radio chatter, and by a difference in scale of grid charts held by controllers and controlled, the day’s work seemed generally successful. Following a Marine request for night hecklers over the Yudam-ni road, where many thousands of Chinese were reported active, the work was continued on into the darkness.

Chinese attacks on the moving column continued heavy throughout the night and into the next day, but without disorganizing the advance. The Marines, by contrast, had a considerable impact on their enemies, as did the very large amount of air support provided. Throughout the 3rd, observation planes circled over the column, warning of enemy positions ahead; a total of 117 sorties flown by the five Marine squadrons at Yonpo and the sixth in Badoeng Strait were devoted to support of the movement; Task Force 77 put an additional 80 sorties into the reservoir area. The 45 flights of 197 aircraft made available to the close support section of MTACS 2 at Hagaru were parcelled out as needed among the various control agencies, most of them at the battalion level. Of the carrier aircraft involved 32 attacked the enemy near Yudam–ni and in the rear of the column, 23 struck targets along the flanks from Toktong Pass to Hagaru, and 25 worked over Chinese forces east of the reservoir and south of Hagaru. Once again excessive radio chatter was reported, but despite this, and despite snowstorms in the objective area, the desired results were obtained, and by evening the lead elements of RCT 7 were inside the Hagaru perimeter. On the 4th the weight of air support increased still further as 68 flights of 238 aircraft came up
to the reservoir. By afternoon the entire Yudam-ni movement was in.

The first step in the concentration had thus been successfully accomplished, but the campaign had hardly begun. Others beside the Marines were heading for Hagaru. On 4 December a morning flight from Leyte sighted and attacked an estimated thousand troops at the northern end of the reservoir; in the same area, later in the day, another Leyte flight reported troops moving south on all trails. But whatever these newcomers might intend, it was reasonably clear by now who was in charge. General Almond had earlier authorized General Smith to destroy any equipment which would delay his withdrawal, but the Marine commander had observed that he intended to bring out all that he could. On the 5th, Major General William H. Tunner, USAF, whose Combat Cargo Command had done such vital work in air supply and casualty evacuation, flew into Hagaru with an offer to lift the troops out, only to discover that the Marines held different views and had been flying in replacements. If movement was not impeded by anything more than Chinese forces, and if air support and air supply continued as before, the Marine Division could operate at will. Still, it was a long and slippery downhill road that stretched from Hagaru to Hungnam.

General Harris had flown up to Hagaru on the 4th and had watched the Yudam-ni Marines come in. That night, in a dispatch to Admiral Ewen, he observed that they could not have made it without air support, and asked for all possible help in covering the downhill march, front, flanks, and rear. Next day MAW 1 brought out its air support plan designed to accomplish these ends. From dawn to dark, 24 close support aircraft would be on station over the column, while the surplus worked the hills flanking the roads; through the hours of darkness, night hecklers from the carriers, from Marine F7F squadrons, and from Fifth Air Force, would harass the enemy.

By this time the concentration of fast carrier effort in the X Corps zone had been made official. FEAF, on 2 December, had asked a resumption of attacks against the Yalu bridges, but the request had been turned down by Admiral Struble in view of the pressing need for air support on the plateau. In effect, if not in form, this marked the end of fast carrier support to Eighth Army’s withdrawal, for although two flights were instructed to proceed to the EUSAK area if not urgently required at the reservoir, all were in fact employed in the north. On the 3rd, as ComNavFE confirmed that close support remained the primary responsibility of Task Force 77, General Harris made another try, and "urgently" recommended the assignment of the main carrier effort to the support of the Marine Division. On the 4th FEAF concurred in this recommendation.

In other ways supporting strength continued on the rise. Although the Air Force fighter-bomber group had redeployed south from Yonpo by air and by LST, General Almond had put in a bid for B–29 strikes against command posts and troop concentrations in towns outside the immediate zone of action. Sicily was expected momentarily, and on the morning of 5 December an important reinforcement took place as Princeton, escorted by four destroyers, joined Task Force 77 and began launching aircraft. The result was a record 248 sorties controlled by the close support section of MTACS 2 at Hagaru.

As quantity was important, so was quality. The presence of the fast carriers provided types of force not otherwise available. Only the carrier air groups operated the heavily-armed AD whose load, greater than that of the World War II Flying Fortress, made it the outstanding attack plane in Korea. Defensively, too, the Seventh Fleet’s contribution was unique: with no Marine jets yet in Korea, and with the nearest Air Force squadrons 200 miles away at Kimpo, only the fast carriers could attempt to provide a jet combat air patrol over the area of operations. This CAP, a precautionary measure of some importance in view of the MIG concentration across the Yalu, had been earlier discontinued in the interest of fuel economy and sustained flight operations, but with the arrival of Princeton it was re instituted.

On 6 December the Marines started south over the winding road. Disengagement at Hagaru required hard fighting, for the troops previously sighted to the northward had now arrived, and two divisions of the Chinese 26th Army had taken up position on the eastern side of the MSR. Morning air operations were prevented by a
ground fog, but this in time lifted, and the hundred offensive sorties sent up by Princeton, Leyte, and the Marine squadrons provided strikes against troops in ridges along the road as well as a jet CAP. All day and throughout the night the march continued; in mid-morning of the 7th, as the rearguard was preparing to move out from Hagaru, the lead elements entered Koto-ri. For a brief period the convoy extended over the entire 11-mile distance between the towns, but air support kept the Chinese under control until the movement was completed.

By now the exigencies of the situation had led to innovation in the form of an airborne close support control center. At the suggestion of the MTACS personnel with the Marine Division, whose work would be made difficult with radios packed for march and shielded by the surrounding hills, a Marine R5D had been hastily modified for this task. An extra radio, a chart board, and a situation map were installed; extra oxygen and cabin fuel tanks gave both personnel and plane the required endurance; three controllers were flown out from Hagaru to man the aircraft. From dawn to dusk from 6 to 10 December this very large Mosquito orbited over the moving column to provide, in addition to the basic necessity of reliable VHF communications, the bonus of sustained visual observation of the entire area of action.

On the 7th the three fast carriers continued operations, and Badoeng Strait was joined by Sicily. In the course of the day, and despite bad weather in the afternoon, Philippine Sea, Princeton, and Leyte put 125 offensive sorties into the Koto-ri area, more than half the day’s total of 216. Of the 49 flights handled by the airborne control center, one was assigned to the 3rd Infantry Division and eight to the control parties of the 5th Marines, notably to the 2nd Battalion, rearguard during the disengagement at Hagaru. The remaining 40 were employed on search and attack missions against troops in the hills along the road, troops and horses east of the reservoir, and villages in the hills near Koto-ri.

These villages had by now become prime targets. The discrepancy between infrequent air sightings of the enemy and persistent reports from local inhabitants of vast quantities of Chinese had been resolved by the discovery that the CCF soldiers had been crowding by day into all available housing for shelter both from air attack and cold. Reports from the dispossessed Koreans of this invasion of their homes had been followed by requests for the destruction of their villages, and thus of the invader. Once begun, these attacks produced eruptions of surprising numbers of Chinese soldiery, and bombing and frostbite multiplied enemy casualties.

The Marines had reached Koto-ri on the 7th. But the roughest stretch was still to come, in the march across the divide and down to Chinhung-ni. On this route, described by General Shepherd as "a defile through which no military force should ever have to fight," cliff sides are steep, with drops of more than a hundred feet from the road’s edge; the road itself abounds in hairpin turns; opportunities for road blocks are unsurpassed. Midway through the gorge there was a bridge, three times blown by the enemy and twice restored by Army engineers, on whose further replacement depended the division’s ability to bring out its vehicles. On the 6th a request for airdropped treadway bridge material had been made to Combat Cargo Command, and the next day this unprecedented operation was successfully accomplished.

The move south from Koto-ri began on 8 December, while a battalion of the 1st Marines attacked up-hill from Chinhung-ni to gain control of the lower half of the road. The bad weather which had limited carrier operations on the afternoon before had now really arrived: the attacks were begun in a swirling snowstorm, throughout the day zero visibility prevailed, the carriers were unable to operate, and of 5 flights of 15 aircraft which got off the ground at Yonpo only one reached the zone of march. But on the 9th, with the fast carriers back at work, X Corps sorties mounted to a record 479, half of which were assigned to the airborne control center. This abundance of riches permitted large diversions to search and attack; a wide area east and north of the reservoir was covered, and in addition to numerous troop concentrations the bag of targets included such unlikely items as switch engines and a horse corral. On the ground the chasm was successfully bridged: by great good fortune the enemy had blown only the bridge and not the road, and by afternoon of the 9th the division trains were leaving Koto-ri.
On 10 December, two weeks to the day after the Chinese onfall at Yudam-ni, the leading elements of the Marines reached Chinhung-ni and the command post was flown down to Hungnam. At a cost to the enemy immeasurably greater than that to itself, the Marine Division, under its canopy of Marine and naval air, had been extricated from an impossible situation. The Chinese were still hovering on the flanks, and there were minor reverses in the rear that night; but from Chinhung-ni it was all downhill, and on the 11th all units reached the staging area at Hungnam. After reaching the sea, according to a later chronicler, the Marines set up a trophy and sacrificed to Hermes. Doubtless some of them did, if only metaphorically, but they might better have devoted their offerings to Poseidon. The division had received harsh treatment from the god of roads, but once again in touch with the friendly sea all things were possible.
The 2nd Division was still in the gantlet, the Marines were still up on the hill, and the deployment of Task Force 90 to Korea was just beginning, when on 30 November General Almond’s headquarters issued orders for a retirement upon Hamhung. For the next ten days, while Eighth Army retired southward and the Marines fought their way down from the reservoir, the concentration of X Corps in the Hamhung–Hungnam area continued by land and by sea.

The instructions of 30 November found Almond’s command widely dispersed. Three battalions of the 7th Infantry Division were with the Marines at the Chosin Reservoir, while the rest of the division was stretched out along the road to Hyesanjin. From its base at Wonsan the 3rd Division was expanding its holdings westward across the narrow part of Korea. On the eastern flank the ROK I Corps had a division at Hapsu and another on the coast, near the outskirts of Chongjin, where its advance was being supported by Commander Cruiser Division 1, Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, in *Saint Paul*, with the destroyer *Zellars*.

Implementing orders went out the following day. At the same time that the Marines were instructed to concentrate at Hagaru, the 3rd Division was ordered to reassemble at Wonsan, and the 7th Division to withdraw southward from the Manchurian border to Hamhung. Up the coast to the northeast the ROK I Corps was ordered to retire on Songjin, and to prepare for further movement by land or sea. On 2 December, after firing night harassing missions north of Chongjin, *Saint Paul* and *Zellars* moved south to Kyongsong Man to support the withdrawal of the ROK Capital Division.

No serious pressure was to be exerted against the ROK corps. Except for the battalions at the reservoir the retirement of the 7th Division was unhindered by the enemy. But at Wonsan apprehensions of enemy attack had prevented the aircraft from Task Force 77 from staying the night of 1 December, and X Corps reported that road and rail communications with Hungnam had been cut. Since here, if anywhere, it seemed that an emergency evacuation might be necessary, Admiral Doyle requested Commander Seventh Fleet to order *Saint Paul* and *Zellars* down for fire support. The message got a rapid response, and although the destroyer was held in the north until a relief could be provided, Admiral Hillenkoetter at once headed southward. By mid-day of 3 December *Saint Paul* had anchored in the harbor of Wonsan.

There she was shortly joined by a transport group of four APAs, two AKAs, and an APD, Captain Albert E. Jarrell in *Henrico*, which had previously been ordered forward from Japan. On the afternoon of the 3rd, Doyle instructed Jarrell to commence loading the 3rd Infantry Division on arrival, advised Admiral Joy’s headquarters of his estimate of shipping requirements for the lift, and himself sailed for Wonsan to supervise the out-loading. But the emergency had been somewhat exaggerated: loading had begun by the time CTF 90 arrived on the 4th, but no enemy pressure was in fact being exerted; most of the division was already moving north to Hamhung by road and rail, and only an estimated 4,000 men and 12,000 tons of gear remained to be removed.

This situation permitted a downward revision of the Wonsan requirements and freed some shipping for use elsewhere. On the 5th Captain Michael F. D. Flaherty in *Noble* was detached from the Wonsan group with a couple of merchantmen and ordered to Songjin to outload elements of the retiring ROK I Corps. Unlike the harbor at Iwon, Task Force 90’s previous farthest north, the mineral and lumber export center of Songjin had reasonable loading facilities: behind a sheltering peninsula an 1,800-foot quay with depths of more than 27 feet permitted large ships to lie alongside. At Songjin the transports were joined by one Scajap and one Korean LST, everything went according to the book, and on the 9th, as the destroyers *Moore* and *Maddox* arrived to cover his departure,
Flaherty finished loading up his task element and sailed his ships for Pusan.

At Wonsan, in the meantime, embarkation of the 3rd Division remnants continued, assisted by a Marine shore party battalion. On the 5th one Army battalion and two of Korean Marines formed a defensive perimeter, and Saint Paul, Zellars, Hank, and Sperry fired a short mission against a reported enemy troop concentration. But although the ships continued throughout the operation to provide night harassing and interdiction fires, little opposition developed. While loading was in progress Captain Jarrell carried out a search for enemy installations on the principal harbor islands; on Yo Do an observation post was destroyed, while Sin Do produced four 76-millimeter guns and a couple of ammunition dumps.

Except for one ROK Marine battalion, assigned to cover the removal of MAG 12 equipment from Kalma Pando, all friendly forces were clear by the 7th. There remained one empty Victory ship, and into this, during the day, Korean refugees were jammed to a total far in excess of normal capacity. With covering fire from Saint Paul and the destroyers, the final withdrawal took place on the evening of the 9th, and by 2215 the beach was clear. Everything had been taken out, no destruction of supplies or gear had been necessary, and the total Wonsan lift—3,800 troops, 7,000 refugees, 1,146 vehicles, and 10,000 tons of cargo—exceeded that removed from Chinnampo. On the morning of the 10th, as the last transport cleared the harbor, Admiral Hillenkoetter headed Saint Paul and Hank back to the northward, to provide fire support at Hungnam. All that remained at Wonsan was a salvage group in the outer harbor working over the hulks of Pirate and Pledge.

For ten days divers from the rescue ship Conserver had been attempting to remove classified gear from the sunken minesweepers. But the work had been hampered by heavy swells, by the bottom mud which partially covered the hulks, and by water temperatures in the cool low 50’s. On 5 December Diachenko was placed in charge of the operations, and next day the decision was taken to demolish what remained of the minesweepers. Covered by Zellars and Sperry the work continued, depth and demolition charges were used to dismantle the wrecks, and on the 13th the job was done.

Two east coast evacuations had by now been completed, and a third was shaping up. General MacArthur’s first reports of the emergency created by the Chinese intervention had limited themselves to a description of the “new war” and to a request for Chinese Nationalist reinforcement, but on 30 November he had forwarded to Washington his strategic concept for dealing with the altered situation. As was perhaps natural for a commander whose devotion to a maritime strategy had forced through the Inchon and Wonsan landings, this called for the retirement of Eighth Army on Pyongyang and Seoul, and for the concentration of X Corps in the Hamhung–Wonsan region, where it would present a flanking threat to a Chinese southward movement.

At Tobruk, in the North African campaign of 1941, the British had for eight months held a lodgment against heavier metal than the Chinese could be expected to bring forward. During his withdrawal from the reservoir General Smith had expected that a perimeter would be formed and maintained in the Hamhung region; General Almond felt that a position on the coast could be defended throughout the winter; Admiral Doyle and others held similar views. But this possibility seems to have fallen victim to the larger scene. The usefulness of such an advanced position depends largely on the moves in prospect for supporting forces, and these were for the moment retrograde. Impressed by CincFE’s description of the emergency, oppressed by their world-wide responsibilities, the Joint Chiefs on 1 December had pointed out the dangers of the central mountain gap, and had instructed General MacArthur to withdraw X Corps and coordinate it with Eighth Army. And a second dispatch from CincFE, in which he declared himself unable to hold the line at the waist of Korea, brought orders to consolidate his forces into beachheads.

The crisis in Korea had by this time produced another trans-Pacific migration of the high command. General Shepherd had come out from Pearl, and on his arrival on the 6th had found CincFE’s demeanor “not optimistic;” General Collins had been flown out from Washington. On the 7th discussions were held in Tokyo between Generals MacArthur, Collins, and Stratemeyer, Admirals Joy and Struble, General Shepherd, and others,
concerning the proposed new U.N. plan, which called for holding Seoul as long as possible prior to retirement upon Pusan, and for ferrying X Corps back south and integrating it into Eighth Army.

Since General Walker’s command had already reached the area of Seoul, action was for the moment required only of X Corps. Following the Tokyo discussions the responsible conferees adjourned to Mount McKinley at Hungnam, where Joy, Shepherd, Struble, Doyle, and Higgins considered both the problem of defending a perimeter and the more probable alternative of withdrawal. But the uncertainty was ended on the 9th by JCS approval of General MacArthur’s revised plan, and by announcement of the decision to redeploy to the southward. On his arrival from Koto-ri next day, General Smith learned that the Marines would go out first, and embarkation was begun.

For the previous week CTF 90 and his staff had been preparing for contingencies. To enlarge usable harbor space and to provide lanes for fire support ships a second minesweeping operation had been undertaken at Hungnam. Plans had been sketched out both for the defense of a perimeter and for the evacuation, not only of X Corps, but of west and south coast ports as well. Now, with the decision to withdraw, Admiral Doyle had to halt all operations in support of X Corps, put his organization into reverse and accelerate again. A shift to seaborne logistics was at once commenced: floating dumps of POL and ammunition were established, along with a floating evacuation center and a floating prisoner of war camp. A large order was put in for life jackets, cargo and floater nets, debarkation ladders, and the like, and once again a redeployment of Amphibious Force shipping was begun. Admiral Thackrey was directed to send all available APAs and AKAs together with one LSD from Inchon to Hungnam; Admiral Joy was requested to provide ten empty cargo ships daily at Hungnam until further notice; the instructions of the Wonsan and Songjin evacuation groups were altered.

At Wonsan Captain Jarrell had originally been ordered to sail his ships to Pusan for unloading. On the 9th, however, this directive was modified by orders to transport Marine shore party and MSTS shipping control personnel to Hungnam for service in another evacuation. Some reloading was required to consolidate these units in a single LST, but this was accomplished in routine fashion. At Songjin the situation was more complicated.

Captain Flaherty had also been directed to send his ships to Pusan, and had done so on the afternoon of the 9th. But as midnight approached, nine hours after his two LSTs had departed for the south and six hours after the transports had got underway, a message was received changing the destination to Hungnam. Ordering his merchant ships to proceed there independently, Flaherty began to search the ocean darkness for the vanished LSTs, and in time managed to find one by radar and to raise the other on 500 kcs. On arrival at Hungnam one ROK RCT and the Capital Division’s artillery were offloaded to strengthen the defenses of the perimeter, and the task element then continued to Pusan.

The events of 9 December marked the beginning of what later became known, following the concept of ComNavFE’s operation plan, as an amphibious operation in reverse. The image is a useful one, and one can envisage the proceedings in terms of a film run backward. On shore, supplies are packed up, moved down to the beach, and lifted out to the anchored cargo ships; from the steadily shrinking perimeter the troops retire on the embarkation points; the landing craft return to the transports; the transports put to sea. But in two ways, at least, one of which complicated and one of which facilitated the operation, things were different.

On the debit side this backwards operation involved great problems in the compression of space and time. Troops and supplies that had reached the theater through three ports and troops that had arrived overland now had to be funneled out a single harbor; personnel and gear that had come in over a period of two months were to be removed in the space of two weeks. With a winter campaign in prospect, General Almond had been authorized a 30 day supply level for his forces, and while this had not yet been achieved, X Corps was considerably oversupplied for an evacuation. The extension of operations from Wonsan to the Manchurian border had led to a dispersal of supply dumps; some tergiversation regarding the employment of the 3rd Infantry Division had complicated administrative procedures; air operations at Wonsan and Yonpo had brought the
accumulation of large stocks of gasoline and aviation ordnance. Initial estimates of the task at hand called for the removal of between 110,000 and 120,000 men, some 15,000 vehicles, and about 400,000 measurement tons of cargo. No such lift had been required since Okinawa, and although here the distances were fortunately shorter, the limited amount of available shipping necessarily called for multiple turnarounds.

On the credit side, however, there are advantages to the amphibious departure. In contrast to an arrival from the sea, control organizations can be established before work is begun, and without the complications of enemy action. At Hungnam the problem of matching outgoing troops and supplies with incoming ships was accomplished by two such organisms, one ashore under Colonel Edward H. Forney, USMC, Deputy Chief of Staff of X Corps, and a special organization set up in Task Force 90 by Admiral Doyle.

As control officer, Colonel Forney, with his staff, selected the units to be loaded on the basis of available tactical and administrative information, and assigned shipping in consultation with the operations section of Task Force 90. Port operating units were then advised of dockside requirements, the loading section ground out its plans, the movement section got the traffic down to the water, and the rations people laid down these useful items alongside.

While the outbound units were moving to the docks, shipping from over the horizon was being put in to meet them by the Task Force 90 control group. Two frigates in the offing guided vessels through the swept channel to the control ship near the harbor entrance. There they were boarded and their characteristics ascertained for relay to the operations section, and there they were instructed, as conditions warranted, either to anchor in the outer harbor or to continue in. Here too shipping was separated by category: APA and AKA types from the Amphibious Force were anchored close in for loading by small craft from the beach, while merchant ships and LSTs were sent on into the inner harbor.

Inside the main pier and breakwater there were beaching slots for 14 LSTs, while four concrete wharves provided seven workable alongside berths. Bad winter weather, which restricted lighterage outside the sheltered area, brought the expedient of double-banking cargo vessels and loading the inboard one from the wharf and the outboard one by lighter. The result was that twice as many ships could be worked, whatever the state of the sea, the run from the loading beaches was greatly reduced, and men could be marched from the wharves across the inboard vessels to those on the outside.

At the docks and on the beaches outgoing soldiers and incoming shipping met. The port was operated by the Army’s 2nd Engineer Special Brigade, reinforced by elements of the Marine shore party battalion which had been brought up from Wonsan. Winch operators were provided by the ESB and stevedoring by 1,200 Japanese, who had arrived in late November and who were housed in the mother ship Shinano Maru. It would be hard to imagine a more joint or combined operation: Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Merchant Marine, Americans, Koreans, and Japanese worked expeditiously together and to excellent purpose. During the Second World War there had been some unedifying exhibitions on the part of merchant mariners in forward areas, but none developed here, and the performance of the crews of the time-charter vessels was uniformly excellent.

Administrative arrangements had been pretty well completed by 10 December, when the Marines began to arrive, and although no corps operation order was as yet available, the Marine Division began to load at once. In planning for the evacuation General Almond had been faced with the problem of whether to conduct a simultaneous withdrawal of elements of all units from their pie–shaped sectors of the perimeter, or a retirement by divisions which would require side–slipping the remaining units to fill the emptied gaps. But the choice turned out to be largely illusory; the decision was forced upon the corps commander, both by his instructions, which called for the earliest possible outloading of the ROK Corps, and by the battleworn condition of the Marines. As promulgated, therefore, the plan called for the immediate evacuation of the Marines, followed in order by the Koreans, and by the 7th and 3rd Divisions. And step by step, as troops were taken out and the perimeter
diminished, responsibility for the foothold would be transferred to the Navy.

With embarkation planning under control, it remained to erect defenses against possible enemy attack. Unlike the amphibious entrances into Korea which had preceded it, this amphibious exodus was conducted without the organization of a Joint Task Force, and indeed the command arrangements, derived from the NavFE Op Plan of 13 November, were rather odd. The possibility that Soviet intervention would follow upon that of the Chinese, which had already led Admiral Joy to reinstitute the submarine patrol of La Pérouse Strait and to intensify his air search, made him feel that the Seventh Fleet should be kept free to move upon an instant’s notice. The result was to place Commander Seventh Fleet in a supporting role: Admiral Struble was to provide air and gunfire support as feasible, while continuing carrier operations against the enemy in coordination with Fifth Air Force. Admiral Doyle’s instructions, by contrast, were very far-reaching, and charged him not only with the responsibility for Korean redeployment, but for control of air and naval gunfire in embarkation areas, gunfire support of friendly units, protection of shipping, and maintenance of the blockade. And a final complication was provided by the presence of General Shepherd, Commanding General Fleet Marine Force Pacific, as ComNavFE representative "on matters relating to the Marine Corps and for consultation and advice," and, as he later described the situation, with oral instructions from both CincPacFleet and ComNavFE to take command of the naval phase of the evacuation should he consider it desirable. But if the possibilities for confusion here were infinite, the individuals involved were fortunately able to make things work.

At sea the enemy remained quiescent. No submarine threat developed, and shipping was sailed independently in steady procession from Hungnam to Pusan and back again. But on land, as from the beginning, and now also in the air, the enemy had capabilities which deserved consideration. The attentions of the supporting naval units were consequently focused on the perimeter, on the mountainous hinterland behind Hungnam, and on the airstrips beyond the Yalu.

Large numbers of high-performance jets were now operating from these Manchurian fields; quite possibly advanced types of attack planes had also been made available to the Chinese. The large quantities of troops and shipping concentrated at the Hungnam beachhead offered an inviting target, and it was at least conceivable that the enemy’s success on land might tempt him to offensive action in the air. Against this threat X Corps and its supporting naval forces were on their own; no help could be expected from Fifth Air Force, whose nearest fighter group at Kimpo was as far away as were the Antung MIGs. So long as Yonpo airfield remained operational the Marines would provide combat air patrol, and on the 10th this defensive effort was strengthened as the first Marine jets to reach the Orient flew in from Japan. But shrinkage of the perimeter would uncover the airstrip and force their departure three days later, from which time Admiral Ewen’s F9Fs would form the mainstay of the defense against air attack.

In the absence of an overall commander, the air plans were drawn up in consultation by representatives of Task Force 90 and Task Force 77, and Commander Seventh Fleet was advised of what was required of his carriers. Air support duties imposed upon the escort carriers called for four fighters on station throughout the day for close support, and for the provision of tactical air observers and airborne controllers. The fast carriers were assigned responsibilities in air defense, deep support, and interdiction, and for night heckler missions and night combat air patrol. This last requirement amounted to something of an overload, but as congestion in the harbor area and the all-night air traffic at Yonpo made defense by antiaircraft gunfire undesirable, the task force undertook to do what it could. Since air control was complicated by the hills north of Hungnam, which blanketed the radars of ships in harbor, the destroyer Duncan was assigned as radar picket ship and stationed 50 miles to seaward. All arrangements were completed by the 11th, at which time Admiral Doyle assumed responsibility for air defense of the Hungnam embarkation area.

Estimates of enemy capabilities indicated that the Chinese could throw between six and eight divisions
against the perimeter, all of which, however, were thought to have been seriously weakened in their encounters
with the Marines. Against this threat Task Force 77 would fly offensive strikes upcountry, and in emergency
would augment the escort carrier effort in close-in work. The embarkation plan was designed to leave as much
artillery on shore as long as possible. Fire support ships were assigned to reinforce the corps and regimental guns,
and their efforts, with those of the close support aircraft, were tied in through the Corps Fire Support Coordination
Center, a dominantly Marine-staffed outfit with a naval member as gunfire officer.

Fire support planning was also tidied up on the 11th, in a conference between General Almond, Admiral
Hillenkoetter, and a representative of Task Force 77. Stations for the fire support ships were established in the
swept channel, which by now extended ten miles on either side of the port; the defensive positions ashore were
laid out to permit naval gunfire to bear upon an attacking force; control of. Gunfire was assigned to Anglico and
Marine personnel attached to the 3rd and 7th Divisions. In addition to his flagship Saint Paul, and the destroyers
and LSMRs of Task Group 90.8, Admiral Hillenkoetter had the services of Rochester, Admiral Higgins’ flagship,
and of two destroyers from Higgins’ group. On the 16th the planned total of two cruisers, six destroyers, and three
rocket ships was met, as Zellars and Sperry reported in from Wonsan.

Although the ship in which he hung his hat was doing duty in the fire support group, Admiral Higgins’
responsibilities lay elsewhere. Upon him and upon the remaining units of Task Groups 95.2 and 95.6 lay the
multitudinous responsibilities of blockade, control, escort, and minesweeping, which among other tasks involved
maintaining two destroyers on coastal blockade to the northward, a frigate patrolling off the Wonsan swept
channel, and three more handling traffic in and out of Hungnam.

The directives for these supporting operations, originally issued separately, were consolidated on the 13th
in Admiral Doyle’s Operation Order 20-50. The arrangements had been made, the forces deployed, the evacuation
was already underway. That these defensive preparations were in the end hardly required would seem to prove
their wisdom. No serious effort was made against the perimeter by the Communist enemy, whose casualties had
been very great, and at Hungnam, as on other occasions in history, the availability of arms made their
employment largely unnecessary.
By 11 December, when the Marines reached Hungnam, amphibious and MSTS shipping had begun to arrive. Having off-loaded at Pusan following his evacuation of Chinnampo, Captain Kelly had been ordered back to Inchon; no sooner had he reached that port than new orders flowing from new decisions directed him to Hungnam, where he arrived on the 11th to take charge of the movement of the Marine Division. By the 14th the Marines had loaded in one APA, one AKA, 3 APs, 13 LSTs, 3 LSDs, and 7 time-chartered merchant ships, and next morning Kelly sailed his convoy for Pusan. As soon as the Marines were clear the loading of the 7th Division was begun, to continue through the following week.

While these evolutions were in progress Admiral Doyle and his staff found themselves faced with a requirement for a small amphibious landing. In order to block the east coast route General Almond had requested that the ROK I Corps be put ashore in the area of Samchok, 40 miles below the parallel, where Juneau had carried out the first bombardment of the war. The undertaking was accepted, and on the basis of corps’ estimates shipping was assigned to lift 12,000 men and a few trucks, an allocation which in the end had to be more than doubled as 25,000 ROKs and 700 vehicles turned up. Preparation for the operation involved intelligence studies and photo reconnaissance; the port of Mukho, just north of Samchok, where break-waters enclose a small harbor area, was selected as the landing site. Between 15 and 18 December Captain Spofford’s ships swept and buoyed a channel in from the 100–fathom curve, and on the 16th the operation was turned over to Captain Jarrell, who had by now returned from Pusan. In addition to Henrico, one APA, one AKA, three chartered merchantmen, and two LSTs were included in the movement group, while reports of Chinese penetrations south of the parallel brought the assignment of the DMS Endicott and the destroyer Forrest Royal for fire support. At noon of the 17th Captain Jarrell sailed for Mukho, the landing was uneventful, and this important position was quickly secured. By the 20th the destroyers were back on station at Hungnam.

There loading had continued day and night, hindered only by the vagaries of nature. Bad weather inland on the 16th, which limited fast carrier offensive sorties to a mere 41, reached Hungnam on the following day; the temperature dropped below freezing and the sea worked up. As westerly winds reached 40 knots, four LCMs went adrift and were blown out into the minefields, and from 1700 until after midnight small boat traffic had to be halted. This was the worst day, but throughout the operation the continuing cold created problems for materiel and personnel alike: working around the clock and exposed to cold, spray, and wind, many of the coxswains had to be carried aboard their ships after returning from long trips.

It was the hope both of those ashore and of those afloat to get everything out; not just personnel and loaded vehicles, but everything, and they very nearly did. To deprive the enemy of salvage possibilities even broken-down vehicles were outloaded, a lift of inoperative machinery which in the end filled four Liberty ships. In the bulk categories of POL and ammunition Colonel Forney found his responsibilities steadily increasing: an original count of 5,000 drums of POL ended up in the outloading of 29,500 drums, with 200 left behind; almost 9,000 tons of ammunition was taken out, and of the 1,000 tons remaining, half was frozen dynamite too dangerous to handle. Ultimately, in any event, these left-over commodities were put to use in the final demolition of the port.

On water as on land, salvage problems presented themselves. Considering the amount of traffic at this small port, at all hours and in all weathers, mishaps were extraordinarily few, but three which did occur well illustrate the importance of the salvage organization. Standing out of harbor late on the night of 10 December the
Enid Victory, a chartered MSTS vessel, cut the eastern point too close and ran aground. Here the one-foot tide of the Sea of Japan, otherwise so agreeable, proved disadvantageous, but by next afternoon the ARL Askari, the fleet tug Tawakoni, and two harbor tugs managed to get her off, and she continued to Pusan. A more intractable proposition had been presented a few days earlier when Senzan Maru, a Japanese time-charter laden with 50,000 bags of flour, missed the entrance channel in the morning darkness and hit a mine. Damage was serious, but although flooded forward, eight feet down by the head, and with only two feet of freeboard remaining, she made it in, whereupon divers from Askari investigated the damage and the ship doctors prescribed. The flour paste was jettisoned from the forward hold and the rest of the cargo shifted, bulkheads were shored up and flotation provided by filling the hold with empty oil drums, and after ten days work Senzan Maru was sailed in company for Moji where she arrived safely.

Last and most difficult of these problems was that presented by a Korean LST, which fouled a shaft with manila line and was unable to retract from the beach. The snarl was cleared and repairs to the main engines were provided by personnel from the rescue ship Conserver, after which the LST docked again and on her second attempt to get underway fouled both shafts. By this time her troubles were snowballing: more engine repairs were needed and the gyrocompass had broken down; there were eight turns of 11 8-inch wire around the port shaft and many of 8-inch manila around the starboard one; a food and water shortage had developed, which was the more serious in view of a reported 7,400 refugees on board. Despite difficulties from the cold, the port shaft was freed by divers from Conserver; Askari contributed 26,000 gallons of water; 1,500 loaves of bread and a quantity of cooked rice were procured from other ships in harbor, and eight tons of food from Army sources ashore. There was no time to do more, and on 19 December the invalid was sailed for Samchok, accompanied by Diachenko and another Korean LST, both rigged for towing. She got there.

As in all overseas operations, but more visibly than in most, the key problem at Hungnam was the availability of shipping. Here the time of turnaround was crucial. At Pusan, where scant notice had been received of the impending arrivals, unloading capacity proved for a time unable to match the rate of outloading in the north, and the resulting congestion brought diversions to Japan, where progress was even more leisurely. In this situation, and as reports from Eighth Army indicated that evacuation of Inchon might become necessary before Hungnam was cleared, Admiral Joy twice found himself obliged to call upon CincFE to prevent ships being sent east of Moji for unloading, to order port authorities to work ships 24 hours a day, and to have idle shipping in Japan emptied to provide reserve.

There was also, as in any amphibious operation, the special problem of the availability of LSTs. These for a time were scarce. Counting Scajap and Korean vessels, a total of about 40 ultimately became available, but some were slow in arriving, 13 had sailed with the Marine Division, and 2 more had been committed to the ROK lift to Mukho. Bad weather and congestion at Pusan had delayed the return of those which had lifted the Marines, and the resultant shortage had slowed the outloading of engineer troops and gear. But by the 18th they were beginning to arrive again, within two days a score had been loaded and sailed, and again the problem of availability arose. With an estimated 22 needed to lift the last elements from the beachhead, and on the basis of an assumed five-day turnaround between Hungnam and Pusan, Forney began stockpiling LSTs on the evening of the 20th. By this time the port of Pusan was operating in high gear, unloading was also in progress at Masan and Ulsan, and Liberty and Victory ships as well as LSTs were being emptied in time for a second run. In the end enough LSTs became available, and indeed there were a couple to spare.

In the air the defenses of Hungnam grew steadily stronger. Through the period of concentration and outloading, the Marine squadrons were conducting a complicated series of redeployments and more carriers were mustering offshore, with the remarkable result that air strength in the Hungnam area, far from diminishing as the evacuation progressed, actually increased. On 1 December the three fighter squadrons at Wonsan had moved up to Yonpo. On the 3rd the Air Force fighter-bombers left for the south, and next day one of the Corsair squadrons
was flown out to Itami for embarkation on the light carrier *Bataan*, but these deficits were more than made up by the arrival of *Princeton* on the 5th. On the 6th *Sicily* reached Hungnam, loaded the personnel and gear of VMF 214 in an all-night evolution, and took the planes aboard in the course of the next day’s operations. On 10 December the Yonpo air garrison was reinforced by a squadron of Marine Panther jets, which had come out along with Air Force fighters in the escort carrier *Bairoko*, and which operated from the shore strip until the 13th, when they were flown south to Pusan. After unloading her cargo of Air Force fighters at Yokosuka, *Bataan* proceeded to Kobe, embarked VMF 212, and sailed for the Sea of Japan where she joined Task Force 77 on the 16th.

On the 14th the three Marine squadrons still at Yonpo were flown to Itami. Following this departure CTF 90 relieved the Marine Aircraft Wing of air control within a 35-mile radius of Hungnam, and General Harris’ headquarters moved aboard an LST, to assume on the 17th the duties of standby Tactical Air Direction Center. On 22 December *Valley Forge* arrived from the United States and the evolution was complete. Click here to view table

The virtues of the movable floating air base and of carrier training for Marine pilots had again been demonstrated. Where embarked aviation had at first been limited to two fast carriers and one escort carrier, much more was now on hand, and the total of Navy and Marine squadrons operating in the X Corps area had risen from 15 on 1 December to 22 as the evacuation was ending. For a brief moment Task Force 77 reached a peak strength of 4 attack carriers, one battleship, 2 cruisers, and 22 destroyers, and except for snow on deck and ice on the forecastle it began to look like old times.

Throughout the period of embarkation carrier air operations continued. Over Hungnam the jet combat air patrol was maintained, but with gaps: owing to the limited endurance of the F9F and the spacing of task force launching times it proved impossible to relieve patrols on station. For the rest, the focus of air operations narrowed steadily from the northern hills to the embarkation area. In mid–December, as outloading was begun, attacks were being flown against troops and horses along the reservoir road, abandoned equipment in the Songjin area, and targets near the Fusen Reservoir. A tunnel on the narrow gauge railroad leading up to Hagaru was hit with 11–inch Tiny Tim rockets; to the westward armed reconnaissance flights struck at enemy troops moving south across the Wonsan–Pyongyang road. Ten days later, as the date of final departure approached and with a perimeter which covered only the city of Hungnam, the situation was very different. Although lacking in armor and artillery, enemy troops had reached the suburbs in sizable numbers; and while perhaps a third of the sorties were still employed upcountry, the greater part was used within the 35–mile circle. Troop movements on the roads approaching the town were hit; fuel drums and a rocket dump, overlooked in the sweeping-up process, were attacked and destroyed; an enemy command post in Hamhung and buildings on the western edge of Hungnam were bombed. And by this time the guns of the fire support ships had come into play.

Admiral Hillenkoetter began shooting on the night of the 15th, as *Saint Paul* commenced 8-inch call fire for deep support and for interdiction of enemy movements. On the 17th *Rochester* took the 8-inch duty, and nightly thereafter cruisers and destroyers delivered prearranged harassing and illumination fire, while responding to requests from ashore by day. To supplement the flat–trajectory fire of the cruisers and destroyers, and to put plunging fire on reverse slopes, the three rocket ships had been maintained on station; on the 21st they let go their first barrage against a reported troop concentration in the hills along the eastern flank.

Gunfire support more than met all tests, although these, it should be said, were not severe. There was some difficulty with control arrangements resulting from an unfortunate choice of radio channels, and from intervention by X Corps in the assignment of missions to specific ships. The success of the departing artillery battalions in using up the local ammunition oversupply had imbued commanders ashore with large ideas; the resultant pressures led to an extravagant volume of fire, and this in turn, given the limited capacity of ships’ magazines, to a replenishment problem. But the needs were met by the Logistic Support Group, which kept an AKA and an LST loaded with ammunition on station in Hungnam harbor, with delivery to the firing ships...
accomplished by off-loading into the AKL *Ryer*, one of the small cargo vessels which MSTS had inherited from the Army. By these expedients the impressive total of 18,637 rounds of 5-inch and 2,932 of 8-inch was fired during the evacuation phase, an increase respectively of about 70 and 27 percent over expenditures in the Inchon landing. The investment was perhaps excessive, in view of the paucity of targets, but it was written off as a contribution to troop morale.

By now the perimeter had diminished to a radius of about 5,000 yards from the center of town, outposted for another thousand yards, and the evacuation was entering its final stage. On 18 December Captain Kelly returned from the south, and was placed in charge of the shore-to-ship movement of the remaining corps and 3rd Division troops. Early on the afternoon of the 19th Major General Robert H. Soule, USA, commander of the 3rd Division, took charge of the ground defenses; General Almond and his staff moved aboard *Mount McKinley*; and responsibility for the defense of Hungnam passed to Admiral Doyle. Next day the 7th Division completed embarkation, and at first light on the 21st was sailed to the southward. On shore there remained three RCTs with their tanks, six battalions of artillery, and three antiaircraft battalions. Loading of corps and division troops was being pressed; the tempo of naval gunfire was going up as artillery began to be withdrawn; and D-Day had been tentatively set for the 24th.

One aspect of the operation which had by now developed wholly unanticipated proportions was the problem of the Korean refugees. In a sense this problem was not new. In July, as the North Korean armies pressed southward, the countless civilians fleeing before them had created grave difficulties for the U.N. forces. In late October the combination of ROK and Marine forces at Kojo, and of Communist units in the hills, had produced a similar if smaller phenomenon, as thousands of Koreans had descended from the hinterland upon the port. With the intervention of the Chinese and the reverses of the U.N. the spectacle of displaced masses of humanity again developed.

In the first week of December thousands of North Koreans, fleeing the Chinese armies, had sailed from Chinnampo. At Wonsan, where Captain Jarrell had arranged a screening of civilians so that those whose lives would be endangered by the Communists could be removed, an anticipated thousand refugees had multiplied beyond belief. With 7,000 aboard, and with the ships filled to capacity, the transport crews had been confronted with the tragic sight of another 20,000 trying to break through the barbed wire barriers, and had concluded that about twice the population of Wonsan had gathered there in the hope of escape. At Hungnam it was still worse. For the inhabitants of North Korea the miseries of war had been compounded by the arrival of an alien army from across the Yalu. Villagers on the Chosin plateau, their houses taken over by the Chinese, had requested the Marines to call down air strikes upon the invader; their wishes had been granted them, and their villages had been burned from the air. Thus twice dispossessed, and preferring the invader from overseas to the invader from the north, the tide of humanity flowed southward toward Hungnam. As the Marines moved down from Hagaru the thousands of civilians followed, huddling outside the perimeter by night and moving onward when the march resumed, presenting both tragic spectacle and military menace.

At Hungnam an original estimate of 25,000 refugees requiring evacuation had quickly to be abandoned. Early in the operation Colonel Forney found himself with 50,000 in hastily constructed camps and more pouring in; at Hamhung more than 50,000 had attempted to board the last refugee train for Hungnam. In the light of these numbers the few vessels furnished by the Republic of Korea were wholly inadequate, and other shipping had to be committed at an early date. The exodus involved an incredible packing of humanity: LST loads were never less than 5,000, and in one case reached 10,500; a total of about 14,000 was taken out in the chartered *Meredith Victory*. On the 23rd, as preparations to close down were being completed, a temporary surplus of shipping developed, and Forney brought in three Victory ships and two LSTs on which he loaded 50,000 Koreans. In the end the record showed 91,000 taken out, not counting children in arms, in knapsacks, or in utero. If this was a remarkable accomplishment no one congratulated himself overmuch, for, as the report concludes, "at least that
number had to be left behind for lack of shipping space, and riot among these was only prevented by subterfuge."

Heavy Chinese pressure had been expected from about the 20th, but although from time to time night probing attacks were reported, the perimeter remained generally quiet to the last. With loading ahead of schedule, and with sufficient shipping on hand, 4,000 tons of ammunition and 13 boxcars were added to the scheduled lift. On the 22nd the 3rd Division began loading everything but the infantry and artillery, while excess transport from these units was put on board during that day and the next. As zero hour approached, air support was increased, and the offensive sorties from Task Force 77 went up from 105 on the 21st to 161 on the 23rd. General Almond had repeatedly suggested bringing in Missouri from Task Force 77, and Struble had planned to do so for the final phase. So in she came on the 23rd, as the last battalion of corps artillery was being taken off. That night naval gunfire increased by a factor of three.

The 24th of December dawned clear, and by 0800 all was in readiness. To lift the remaining 9,720 personnel, LVTs had been put up on the flanking beaches, and seven LSTs along the Hungnam waterfront. During the morning the gunfire ships maintained a zone barrage covering a mile-wide area outside the 3,000-yard perimeter. At 1100, as the troops began to pull back, embarkation was begun. Everything went as planned. The enemy made no appearance. The only difficulties were caused by an accidental explosion of an ammunition dump, which destroyed some landing craft and resulted in a number of casualties. By 1405 all beaches were secured. At 1410 Admiral Doyle ordered the UDT personnel to blow the place, demolition charges were set off, and the piers, cranes, and walls of the inner harbor disappeared in an eruption of smoke and flame.

By 1436 all hands were off and Captain Kelly was preparing to sortie the amphibious shipping. Overhead in the cold sky there orbited the last combat air patrol from the fast carrier task force. Along the docks the explosions had stopped, but fire was licking at the ruins, and from the harbor of Hungnam, briefly one of the world’s busiest ports, a column of smoke rose high into the air. Three miles inland, as the gunfire ships were getting underway, some Chinese troops were observed coming over a hill, and a few Parthian salvos were let go at these individuals, who by their temerity thus achieved the distinction of receiving the last rounds of the campaign.

The statistics of the evacuation are worth noting: 105,000 U.S. and Korean military personnel, 91,000 refugees, 350,000 measurement tons of cargo, 17,500 vehicles. The available shipping had proved sufficient, although most vessels had to make two trips, some made more, and the loads involved totalled 6 APAs, 6 AKAs, 13 T–APs, 76 MSTS time-charters, 81 LSTs, and 11 LSDs. As for comparisons with other operations, none seems very fruitful. Dunkirk comes first to mind, but circumstances there were very different: 338,000 troops were taken out, but many remained behind, hardly any equipment was saved, and the ships involved suffered grievously from air attack. But such questions concerning the degree of enemy opposition and the size of the lift tend to obscure the central point, that freedom to come and go depends upon control of the sea. The Athenians at Syracuse, Cornwallis at Yorktown, the Axis forces in North Africa lacked this control. In those armies no one escaped captivity.
Evacuations, doubtless, can hardly be counted victories, but the conduct of the December campaign in northeastern Korea was nevertheless impressive. Despite the suddenness of the Chinese onslaught, the extraordinarily exposed position of the Marine Division, and an enemy numerical superiority of more than two to one, the situation never quite escaped from control, and from the time the Yudam–ni Marines reached Hagaru there was little question as to who held the initiative. Under the severest possible conditions the march to the sea was successfully accomplished; only the barest minimum of equipment and supplies had to be destroyed; the evacuation, with no air or submarine opposition and with little pressure on the ground, was a deliberate, orderly, and controlled process.

This is not to say that the campaign was cheap. With a strength slightly exceeding 25,000, the Marine Division between 27 November and 11 December suffered 556 killed, 182 missing, 2,872 wounded, and 3,648 non-battle casualties, the last largely from frostbite. But for the Chinese Third Field Army the campaign was a disaster. The 60,000 men of the eight divisions committed by the 9th Army Group were later estimated by the Marine Corps to have suffered 37,500 combat casualties, a little over half inflicted by the ground forces and the rest by air attack. Of estimates such as these everyone must be his own judge, but the order of magnitude appears not far from the mark. Total casualties, indeed, would seem to have been still greater, for the Chinese had been engaged not only with the Marine Division and with naval and Marine aviation but had also had to fight the cold, and for them General Winter proved a more redoubtable enemy than for the Americans. Poorly clad, poorly fed, without hospitalization or air evacuation, the Chinese froze to death in quantities: the CCF 27th Army, which had put in two divisions at the opening of the campaign, alone complained of 10,000 non-combat casualties.

Whatever the precise figure of their losses, doubtless also unknown to them, it seems fair to say that in forcing the Marine Division down off the plateau the 9th Army Group committed military suicide. Much concern, following the evacuation, was evinced in U.N. command circles over the possibility that Chen Yi’s divisions might move south to reinforce the Fourth Field Army, and on 2 January Commander Seventh Fleet and CTF 95 were urgently instructed to report all information on the location and movements of this force. But not until mid-March, three full months later, was the 9th Army Group again identified in action.

In the west, in contrast to the campaign at the reservoir, action had been brief. Contact with the Chinese was broken in the first days of December, as Eighth Army retired rapidly on Seoul; for more than three weeks the ground forces were out of touch; and the only war in progress was that carried on by Fifth Air Force, whose attacks inflicted heavy casualties and soon forced the enemy to confine his movement to the hours of darkness. But the fact that Communist success against Eighth Army was limited to the first days of combat, and that the march to the sea and the evacuation of X Corps were handled in masterly fashion, should not operate to conceal the effects of the Chinese onslaught. Strategically and psychologically the enemy’s success was great. In the long run Chinese intervention would entail abandonment of the objective of Korean unification, and a return to the original U.N. aim of repelling aggression; for the moment, however, it seemed that it might force the evacuation of Korea. Since a concern for the integrity of China had been a major plank in American foreign policy for more than half a century, and a fundamental reason for the embroilment of the United States and Japan, this accomplishment of the new Chinese regime ranks high among the ironies of history.

Throughout December the planning of the U.N. Command was retrograde to a degree; having suffered one reverse it prepared rapidly for more. The plan of 7 December had envisaged resistance in the area of Seoul,
with subsequent retirement upon Pusan, and the results of this concept were manifest in efforts to fortify the Naktong line and in the assignment of Navy underwater demolition teams to a survey of beaches in South Korea, Tsushima Island, and western Japan in preparation for an emergency withdrawal. At Inchon Admiral Thackrey was scouting the Tokchok Islands as a possible refuge in an emergency redeployment; on 6 December, with the evacuation of Kimpo in prospect, he had asked Admiral Struble for carrier air support; on the 7th, two days before X Corps was ordered to redeploy south from Hungnam, he was instructed to start the removal of Army supplies from Inchon. Soon Eighth Army would pose a requirement for naval gunfire support along the entire western coast of South Korea.

On 8 December there came an astonishing report from EUSAK of a 20-ship Chinese convoy en route from Shanghai for a landing in Korea; by the 12th this had grown to a fleet of 100 ships headed for Ongjin; on the 14th Theseus was held back from replenishment by a report of 20 AKs approaching Sinanju. But these shortly shrank to fishing boats, and the convoy never appeared. By midmonth air raid alarms were a daily occurrence in the Seoul area; on the 14th a Navy helicopter was attacked by MIGs which had ventured south to within a few miles of Haeju. Four days later FEAF closed down its electronic navigational installation on Tokchok To, and men and gear were taken out by LSU. As yet there were no positive indications that the Chinese would cross the 38th parallel; equally, there was little evidence of a firm intention to defend the capital. President Rhee and his government had refused to leave for the southward, but by the 20th Eighth Army headquarters had been withdrawn to Taegu, where it was joined by Fifth Air Force on the 22nd.

In these gloomy circumstances General Walker was killed in a road accident, like General Patton before him, and Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, USA, was ordered out from Washington to take over Eighth Army. Both in the capital from which he departed, and in the peninsula which was his destination, it might have seemed that Ridgway was being appointed receiver in bankruptcy: CincFE’s early dispatches had produced an atmosphere of depression in Washington; the Truman-Attlee talks of early December concerned themselves, among other things, with the question of seeking a cease-fire; and U.N. efforts in this same direction ended only with Chinese rejection of the terms proposed. Efforts to increase the nation’s armed strength were redoubled, and on 15 December the President declared a state of national emergency. But results would take time, and the available reserve within the continental United States remained at one Army and one Marine division.

Unable, in the circumstances, to honor General MacArthur’s request for reinforcements for the defense of Japan, the Joint Chiefs began to consider withdrawal from Korea to the Japanese islands. These deliberations resulted in a new directive of 29 December, which may be taken as a measure of the Chinese Communist success. The safety of the U.N. Command and of Japan were given precedence over support of the Republic of Korea, the enemy was conceded the capability of forcing a U.N. evacuation, and instructions now called for defense in successive positions and for the infliction of maximum damage on the Communists.

Of this estimate of Chinese capabilities, as seen through the dark glass of CincFE’s dispatches, time would be the test. But if General Ridgway had indeed been nominated as receiver in bankruptcy, he acquired upon his arrival in Korea certain welcome assets. The Fourth Chinese Field Army, victor in the battle of the Chongchon, was suffering in its southward progress from logistic inadequacy and from the efforts of the Fifth Air Force. Completion of the Hungnam evacuation had provided a considerable Christmas bonus, and the land and naval forces which had demobilized the Chinese 9th Army Group were now available for the defense of South Korea.

On Christmas Day the command of Task Force 77 changed as Admiral Ewen, after four months of strenuous operations, was relieved by Admiral Ofstie, and sailed with Philippine Sea and Leyte for Japan. Fifty days had passed since CincFE’s alarm had summoned the Seventh Fleet from port, and throughout that time, in bitter winter weather, an intense air effort had been maintained, without return to port, and with all needs cared for by the mobile replenishment groups. Two fast carriers now remained on the line, voice and CW
communications with the JOC were at last functioning effectively, and on the same day Admiral Struble advised Fifth Air Force that his ships would resume air operations on the 28th, and would provide from 75 to 100 Corsair and Skyraider sorties daily. On the 27th, in a conference between FEAF and NavFE, it was agreed to use the carrier aircraft in support of the eastern front, with pilots pre—briefed for armed reconnaissance should no CAS targets be available. On the next day operations began as scheduled, directed principally against troops and troop shelters in the central mountains along the 38th parallel.

On 26 December, as General Ridgway arrived in Korea, X Corps was integrated into Eighth Army. At Pusan the last of the Hungnam forces were going ashore. On the east coast the sweepers were hard at work clearing an inshore lane for the destroyers, now back at their summer’s task of supporting ROK units on the coastal road. At the western end of the line, where an enemy drive on Seoul was momentarily awaited, reinforcements from Hungnam were also arriving. In response to earlier requests from Admiral Thackrey, Sicily and Badoeng Strait had started west on Christmas Day; on the 27th they relieved Theseus in the Yellow Sea operating area and began to fly missions in support of Eighth Army. On the 29th Admiral Hillenkoetter arrived at Inchon with, to join Ceylon and the Australian destroyers Warramunga and Bataan in the support of forces on the Kumbo peninsula.

As yet, however, the Chinese had not resumed the attack, a situation which raises some interesting problems in relative motion. The Fourth Field Army had entered Pyongyang on 5 December while the Marine Division was still up on the hill at Hagaru. By the time the Chinese had covered the ninety miles from Pyongyang to the parallel, X Corps had been concentrated, evacuated, and relanded in South Korea, and ships which had covered the evacuation had rounded the peninsula to help confront the expected western offensive. These facts say something about floating weapons systems, most notably perhaps in the case of embarked aviation, for while the Air Force was shortly to be forced out of Kimpo and Suwon, and by 5 January would have no operating base forward of Taegu, the carriers were now working off both ends of the battle line. They say something also about the rudimentary nature of Chinese logistics, the effectiveness of Fifth Air Force’s December effort against the advancing enemy, and the validity of the estimates which conceded to the Chinese the ability to throw the U.N. armies into the sea.

With orders to defend important positions, inflict maximum damage, and preserve its major units, Eighth Army awaited the enemy on a line running from the Han Delta up the Imjin, and eastward through the razor-backed mountains of central Korea, to Yangyang on the Sea of Japan. Here, in the northern basin of the Han, strategic virtue lies not in the western coastal plain but in the valley routes of the interior. With the water barriers of the Yesong and the Imjin, the road from Pyongyang is easy to defend, but to the invader from the north all streams flow onward to the Han and all roads lead to Seoul. Once at the headwaters of the northern tributaries, movement is all downhill: south from Chorwon to the capital, southwest from Chunchon to the Pukhan Valley, through Hongchon to the Han Valley road, west from Wonju to take the capital in the rear. In the presence of so many flanking routes, the defense of Seoul depends less on holding the west coast road than on plugging the valleys to the northeast; failing in this the position becomes untenable.

The enemy arrived with the New Year. On the left three Chinese armies pushed down the northern approaches to the capital; in the center another heavy thrust was delivered north of Wonju. Further retirement seemed necessary, and on 4 January Seoul was abandoned, the Han bridges were blown, and the army started south again. At Inchon all ships were put on one-hour notice, and on orders from ComNavFE the destruction of the port was begun.

There, as the enemy offensive broke, Admiral Thackrey had at his disposal his flagship Eldorado, one AKA, two APAs, two LSDs, one APD, two U.S. Navy and nine Scajap LSTs; in Japan MSTS was holding 15 empty Victory ships and transports as a reserve. Although Eighth Army intended to retire by land rather than
redeploy by sea, the staff of Task Group 90.1 had worked up plans for all contingencies, including an emergency outloading of up to 135,000 troops by shuttle service to the off-shore islands. But these precautions proved unnecessary, and the principal withdrawal from the Seoul area was carried out, as planned, by road.

The sea lift from Inchon was nevertheless a sizable one. The original estimates from EUSAK, which had called for the sailing of between 3,000 and 5,000 personnel, had been surpassed by 18 December, and the total lifted out during the month amounted to 32,000 troops, more than 1,000 vehicles, and 55,000 tons of cargo. Completion of the Hungnam evacuation brought six more Scajap LSTs together with some MSTS vessels, and the advent of the Chinese speeded the work. On 5 January port facilities were blown, somewhat purposelessly, it would seem, in view of U.N. control of Korean waters, and as the Chinese entered the town Thackrey sortied his shipping. In these last five days a few hundred more vehicles, a few thousand more tons of supplies, and another 37,000 military personnel had been taken out. In vehicles and cargo the Inchon evacuation was far smaller than that at Hungnam; in personnel, however, the addition of 64,200 Korean nationals to the 69,000 military yields a not unimpressive figure. But the accomplishment had to be its own reward: of the large number of press correspondents currently accredited to the U.N. naval forces, all but one had elected to cover Hungnam.

As in the previous summer, major ports were now in short supply. With Inchon gone only overloaded Pusan remained, and there the larger ships were sailed. But there was still the problem of supporting the western flank without overwhelming the Pusan port organization and the rail and road systems, and this time it was met by the opening of a seaport where none had existed before. Twenty-five miles north of Kunsan, at the mouth of Chonsu Man, the town of Taechon lies at the head of a drying bay; from Taechon a road and single-tracked railroad run northeast, joining the main line at Chonan, behind the new-formed front. Here in September CincFE’s momentary apprehensions about Inchon had brought the UDTs from Bass to seek a second landing place; here in December, as a precautionary measure, Thackrey had swept a major anchorage area; here in January, following a check-sweep by Carmick and Swallow, the Inchon LSTs were beached and their men and stores unloaded. On the 8th, a convoy came up from Ulsan with artillery and tanks of the 3rd Division, and between the 9th and 12th this support was continued by 13 Scajap LSTs, which brought POL and other urgently needed cargo from Pusan to Taechon and Kunsan.

Throughout the period of retirement the naval forces of the U.N. did what they could to help stem the Chinese tide. On the east coast the destroyers worked to help the ROK defenders, while Admiral Ofstie’s carriers flew strikes against enemy concentrations in the central mountains and westward to the area of Seoul. At Inchon Rochester, Kenya, and Ceylon supported the withdrawal across the Han and the evacuation of the port, and bombarded Kimpo airfield. From the Yellow Sea the Marine fighter pilots embarked in Sicily and Badoeng Strait flew in to provide protective patrols, strike the advancing enemy, and burn quantities of abandoned supplies at Kimpo. On 1 January EUSAK’s wish for more support brought a request for increased carrier strength, and two days later Bataan arrived to join the west coast group. For a brief period, from 30 December to 3 January, the possibility of a diversionary landing at Haeju was under active consideration.

In the Sea of Japan on 7 January Philippine Sea and Leyte returned to action; but while Princeton retired to Sasebo for upkeep, such was the magnitude of the Communist offensive that Valley Forge was held on station. For the next two weeks three carriers were kept on the line, working in the triangular pattern which permitted daily operations by two while the third replenished. But their effectiveness, as indeed that of all supporting forces, was severely limited by the January foul weather, which on 12 days brought winds exceeding 30 knots. On the 7th, in a snowstorm, the Thai frigate Prasae went aground on the east coast, behind the enemy lines, and despite prolonged attempts at salvage had ultimately to be destroyed. From 6 to 10 January low clouds and heavy snow prevented carrier operations; on the 10th things were so bad that all land-based aircraft were grounded; and from the 11th to the 13th Task Force 77 was forced to operate south of the peninsula where the visibility was somewhat better.
The coming of the bad weather coincided with a shift of enemy pressure to the central front. In the west on 7 January U.N. patrols had moved north without opposition to the neighborhood of Inchon, but in the center very heavy fighting continued, infiltrating Chinese forces reached south to the 37th parallel, and reviving North Korean guerrillas raided supply lines inside the Naktong Basin. On 9 January the Marine Division was ordered out of Army reserve and moved up to prevent enemy penetrations south of the Andong-Yongdok road. On the 11th, with clearing weather, aircraft from Task Force 77 attacked large troop concentrations southeast of Wonju, at Kangnung on the east coast, and as far south as the headwaters of the Naktong.

As snowstorms swirled through the mountains of central Korea, where the battle for Wonju was in progress, the weather was bad in other high places as well. To a CincFE message of 29 December, which had posed the alternatives of expanding the war or evacuating Korea, the Joint Chiefs on 9 January replied with a repetition of earlier instructions to defend, inflict maximum damage, and withdraw if the safety of the command and of Japan so required. On the next day CincFE reiterated that lacking either reinforcement or an expansion of the war the position in Korea was untenable, and urged, in the absence of overriding political considerations, as rapid a withdrawal as possible. This view, together with his observations that his troops were embittered and that the defense of a beachhead would be costly, led to more gloom in Washington and to a new directive. On the 12th, while emphasizing their desire for time to permit military and diplomatic consultations, the Joint Chiefs accepted the view that holding for a protracted period was infeasible. At Lake Success a second effort at a cease-fire was begun on the basis of a plan which, in exchange for a U.N.-approved administration of a unified Korea, would include the government of Communist China in an agency designed to settle the issues of Formosa and of Chinese membership in the United Nations. But in turn the Chinese now overreached themselves, and insisted that admission to the United Nations and the commencement of Korean negotiations precede any cease-fire.

By the time this diplomatic fumble took place the Korean balance was beginning to tilt the other way. On the west coast, behind enemy lines, carrier aircraft had reported ROK flags flying in the coastal villages, and the governor of Hwanghae Province had asked for ammunition; on 13 January CTF 95 recommended to ComNavFE the arming of the estimated 10,000 patriotic volunteers in this area. At EUSAK, far from looking over his shoulder toward Pusan, General Ridgway was directing his gaze northward. On the 16th a reconnaissance in force had penetrated as far as Suwon; soon diminished contact in the center would bring more ambitious efforts. By the 20th General MacArthur was demonstrating a qualified optimism. By the 23rd ground fighting was limited to bushwhacking in the south, where the Marines were rounding up guerrillas. On 25 January the northward movement of Eighth Army began against only slight resistance. Ten days later the Chinese commander had decided to retire beyond the 38th parallel.
BY LATE JANUARY the immediate crisis was over, but as the armies started north again it was still a new war. Not only had the arrival of the Chinese made it difficult to see the conflict as a mere police action against a minor league aggressor; it had also forced the United Nations and the United States back to the original aim of repelling aggression, and in doing so had changed the nature of the fighting. Avoidance of defeat at the Pusan perimeter had been followed by a resort to an amphibious strategy and to larger goals, and by four months of rapid movement up and down the peninsula. But this was history. By January the objectives had been revised, no plans for great amphibious operations existed, X Corps had been integrated into Eighth Army, a more or less continuous front now stretched from sea to sea. Although the focus of action had always been on land, the campaign in Korea in the first half of 1951 was more than ever a ground war.

Depending upon one’s preconceptions, one could look at the Korean War as a land campaign with amphibious aspects or as an amphibious war with resemblances to a continental struggle. Whatever the precise nature of this hybrid conflict, which indeed varied with the passing of time, it posed difficult problems of marrying the divergent histories of the Pacific and European theaters of operations, and of coordinating forces which postwar military doctrine had attempted to separate. These difficulties had been briefly apparent during the defense of the perimeter in the previous August; inevitably, with the coming of a stabilized front, the question of how to integrate a naval force into a land campaign again arose. This question had implications for almost all the subdivisions of Naval Forces Far East.

The fate of the Marine Division, designed, trained, and so far largely employed as a force to bridge the gap between control of the sea and large-scale operations ashore, was paradoxical. The postwar years had seen the Marines repeatedly accused of trying to develop a "second army," and much effort had been expended within the Defense Department to reduce the corps to guard functions and to prevent its again developing a force of the size and sort so useful in the war against Japan. Now, however, in the existing stringency of Army units, the Marines were integrated into Eighth Army along with the rest of X Corps; after a period devoted to guerrilla-chasing in the neighborhood of Andong they would find themselves committed by higher authority to sustained land combat. Although there was no question of their competence to perform such duty, this continued employment on inland work made it difficult to maintain their special skills, divorced as they now were by distance from the Amphibious Force and naval gunfire support, and by doctrine from their Aircraft Wing.

In July CincFE had promised General Craig that the integrity of the Marine air-ground team would be preserved. But circumstances alter cases, and this situation did not outlast the Hungnam evacuation. With a single front in existence, and with ground commanders eager to share the benefits of Marine close air support, MAW I was absorbed by the Fifth Air Force and employed in accordance with Air Force doctrine. The wing’s commanding general found himself bypassed in the operational chain of command, and efforts by the division to have their own planes assigned to their support were turned down. The long history of cooperative training and the great fund of recent experience acquired at Inchon and at the reservoir were to a considerable degree sacrificed, and so far as air support in the line was concerned the Marines now had to take pot luck with everyone else.

The Amphibious Force, perhaps the most important single weapons system of the war so far, and the one whose capabilities had governed both advance and retreat, was still on hand, but commitment of the landing force to the ground front had greatly limited its future possibilities. As the new year opened, the principal activity of
Admiral Doyle’s units was in preparation for a possible large-scale emergency evacuation of the Korean peninsula. Surveys of Korean and Japanese beaches, begun in anticipation of a forced and hasty departure, were continuing at a rapid rate, and by June would have provided essential information on some 40 miles of strategically located shore line. The single untoward incident to mar this operation occurred on 19 January, halfway between Kunsan and Mokpo and far south of the battle-line, when some apparent civilians, previously engaged in conversation with Basset’s survey party, produced concealed weapons, killed two, and wounded three.

This hydrographic work, however, required the participation of but a fraction of the force. The greater part of Task Force 90 was consequently divided into three roughly equal groups, and an employment schedule worked out which assigned one to amphibious training of Army troops in Japan, and one to upkeep and maintenance at Yokosuka, while the third remained on call for services to the forces in the peninsula. On 15 January the job of transporting refugees and prisoners to Koje Do and Cheju Do was assigned CTF 90, and five days later an AKA lifted the first load of refugees from Pusan. This was the last task imposed upon Admiral Doyle. At Pusan, on the 24th, he was relieved by Rear Admiral Ingolf N. Kiland, in a ceremony which numbered CinCPacFleet, ComNavFE, and Commander Seventh Fleet among those present.

Along the coastline matters were less changed, and in both Yellow Sea and Sea of Japan the Blockading and Escort Force continued to perform its duties. If fire support of amphibious operations was no longer required of the gunnery ships, the blockade remained important, and there were coastal targets to bombard. In the east, where the enemy had been checked at Mukho, the front was still susceptible of support by naval gunfire. But the fighting was less intense than in the previous summer, and as both sides increasingly concentrated their weight of effort in the central mountains, the pace of action on the coastal road diminished.

For the minesweepers, however, nothing had altered. Their work continued as before, and their tasks remained arduous, uncomfortable, and dangerous. The short winter daylight hampered operations; the winter weather, with high winds and freezing spray, made small ship work particularly uncomfortable. There was always the chance of new minefields or of the replenishment of those previously swept; the continued possibility of influence mines increased the load; intelligence reports indicated that the enemy was preparing a new mining campaign. Minesweeping capabilities, nevertheless, had been increased, and something better than the shoestring force of the previous autumn was now on hand. The four DMS, oversized for their task, had proven only marginally useful, and two were shortly to be returned to the United States, but 13 AMS and 2 AMs were now available, and 2 more of the latter were en route. Although the LST conversion to headquarters ship and helicopter base was still in the works, the force was profiting from the support of the LSD Comstock. In the naval establishment at large the efforts in updating and improving mine warfare, begun following the unpleasant experiences at Wonsan, were being pressed. Technological development was being expedited, and the coordinated tactical employment of patrol plane and helicopter search and of underwater demolition teams was moving forward. With the reestablishment early in the year of the Mine Force Pacific Fleet, and the appointment of Admiral Higgins as type commander, the sweepers at last acquired a home of their own and an administrator who cared.

In January, in addition to routine checks of vital areas like the Chinhae entrance channel, the main effort of the minesweeping forces was devoted to the clearance between 36° and 38°40’, of an inshore lane, for the east coast fire support ships. This work, which permitted more effective support of the ROK I Corps on the coastal road, was completed by early February, but again at a cost. On 2 February the AMS Partridge hit a mine about a mile off Sokcho, just north of the parallel, and sank in ten minutes with a loss of ten killed or missing and six severely wounded.

With the completion of this sweep, fire support activities were stepped up. Along the eastern coast four of the eight destroyers of Task Group 95.2 were continuously on station, with one pair patrolling the 100-fathom curve north to the limit of the blockade, while the second provided fire support to the Korean troops. At Mukho,
and at Yongchu Gap to the southward, ROKN forces had established minor operating bases, from which their small craft sortied to collect intelligence from behind enemy lines, and to tighten the blockade through control of North Korean junk traffic and of South Korean fishing.

Although the hydrography of Korea’s western shore greatly limited the possibilities of naval gunfire, Task Group 95.1 was also active. In the west the prevalence of islands permitted the establishment of useful advanced bases, and the advance of 1950 had brought possession of holdings off Incheon and Haeju, of the Sir James Hall Group near the 38th parallel, of Cho Do and Sok To off the Taedong estuary, and of islands in the Yalu Gulf. Most of these islands were informally controlled by guerrilla groups, and employed as bases for intelligence activities and for raids behind enemy lines. But responsibility for three of them—Ochong Do off Kunsan, Tokchok To in the Incheon approaches, and Taechong Do off the Ongjin peninsula—had been assigned to Admiral Andrewes’ West Coast Group, and these islands had been given ROKN garrisons in January. Inshore patrol of the shallow coastal waters was provided by four groups of Korean ships, supported as necessary by Andrewes’ surface units, which otherwise continued to maintain their designated blocking points, patrol northward into the Yalu Gulf, and bombard targets of opportunity.

For the carriers of Naval Forces Far East the deployment of January was little changed. With stabilization of the front and the passing of the emergency a reduction of Seventh Fleet strength from four carriers to three seemed feasible, and arrangements for regular maintenance desirable. Leyte, present in the Far East on loan from the Atlantic Fleet, was consequently headed homeward late in January, and a rotational schedule established which would send a third of the force at a time to Yokosuka for a ten-day stay. Taken together with the similar deployment of the ships of Task Force 90, this made for a considerable eastward shift in the logistic center of gravity, and for a corresponding reorientation of Service Force effort from Sasebo to Yokosuka.

The departure of Leyte left the Pacific Fleet with four fast carriers, Valley Forge, Philippine Sea, and Princeton in Korean waters, and Boxer under overhaul at San Francisco. But the reactivation of mothballed ships was proceeding apace, and more were coming. Bon Homme Richard and Essex were on the way, with arrivals in Far Eastern waters scheduled for May and August; shortly Antietam would be removed from the Reserve Fleet for arrival in October. By autumn the Pacific Fleet would contain seven operational fast carriers, compared with the three of the preceding June, and units on duty in the forward area could be rapidly and heavily reinforced.

Although Badoeng Strait and Sicily had left the Yellow Sea following the evacuation of Inchon, and had subsequently off–loaded their squadrons and sailed for the United States, west coast carrier operations did not lapse. The work of Triumph and Theseus had shown the need for carrier aircraft to enforce the blockade, to provide air strikes, aerial photography, and close support, and to spot gunfire for west coast surface units. On 7 January, as the escort carriers departed, Theseus again assumed the load, and following representations by Admiral Andrewes a continuity of effort was assured. The CVL Bataan, which had operated with the escort carriers during the critical period of the Inchon evacuation, was assigned by Admiral Struble to Task Group 95.1, and began to alternate ten–day periods of duty with Theseus as the principal unit of Task Element 95.11.

Something new had by now been added in the field of embarked aviation with the activation of an antisubmarine warfare task group, established by ComNavFE in view of the possibility that the intervention of new armies might be followed by an intervention of new weapons. An antisubmarine squadron was embarked in Bairoko, the escort carrier which in December had brought Air Force and Marine jet fighters to the Far East, and two destroyer divisions were added to make up Task Group 96.7, operating out of Yokosuka under the control of ComNavFE. Since enemy submarines did not in fact appear, this Hunter–Killer Group confined itself to training duties with the destroyers that were rotated through it from the other forces in Far Eastern waters.

Yet while the deployment of carrier strength remained the same, the problem of optimum employment was again much to the fore. Having been used first in long-range interdiction and emergency close support, and then in two landings and an evacuation, Task Force 77 now found itself faced with the long haul. In January its
work had been principally in support of the battleline and in attacks on southward moving Chinese forces, a function of great importance in view of the withdrawal of shore-based squadrons to Japan. But as the ground situation stabilized, and the move back north began, the question of the relative usefulness of close support and interdiction arose once more.

For both these types of operation Task Force 77 had certain advantages not shared by other U.N. forces. Historically, naval aviation had been more sympathetic to close support than had the Air Force; the tradition was reflected in pilot training and doctrine, in tendencies in aircraft design which permitted heavier loads and more time on station, and in techniques of accurate dive bombing derived from a generation of training for attack on maneuvering ships. Although the communications problem, central to the close support difficulties of the early months, still remained, the Army’s situation was so far improved that the normal air request net worked adequately in periods of relative inactivity, if not in time of crisis. Coordination of the carrier effort with that of Fifth Air Force had also shown some progress: daily by noon the air plan for the morrow was passed to JOC, while problems arising from crowded radio channels and last minute changes were reduced by the dispatch of a communications relay plane ahead of each strike, to shop for a controller and then brief the strike leader on a clear channel. All things considered, air support was going reasonably well.

Yet in interdiction, which in the context of the moment meant primarily the destruction of rail and highway bridges, the carrier air groups also had solid advantages. Even when based in Korea and modified by tip tanks, the F–80 Shooting Star, for the moment the standard Air Force fighter-bomber, lacked sufficient range and lift to accomplish much north of the Pyongyang-Hungnam radius, while from Japanese bases its load rarely exceeded two rockets and a tank of napalm. The F–51 Mustang had excellent lift and endurance, but was considered too vulnerable to the increasing threat of jet fighters for employment far to the north. The B–26 and B–29 had the lift and range, but were unsuited to attacks on small targets and were vulnerable, respectively, to antiaircraft and fighter opposition. Such opposition, of course, presented problems to the carrier planes as well, but approach routes and attack tactics were more flexible than those of horizontal bombers, the movable base and the built-in range of its aircraft permitted escorted strikes to the uttermost ends of Korea, and the load and accuracy of the AD made it uniquely effective against bridge targets.

As to the choice of employment one could find all opinions in all services. Although as a result of the earlier campaigns there had developed a strong Army school, particularly within X Corps, which favored the Navy-Marine system of close support, Admiral Struble’s Christmas Day offer had elicited a request from EUSAK for interdiction of the northeastern transportation network. Doubtless a doubled carrier force, with half assigned each function, would have suited the Army best, but the postwar military establishment had not been designed with an eye to this. In its absence, and as operations went on, there ensued a period of debate and discussion which lasted through February.

In December, following the Chinese intervention, FEAF had prepared a new interdiction plan; in January, reports of rail activity in the northeast had led General Stratemeyer to inquire about the capabilities of the fast carrier task force in this regard. If the effort in close support were not to be diminished these capabilities were limited: only in the presence of Valley Forge, whose lack of jet squadrons was made up by a surplus of F4Us, could a two-carrier force take on the added load; with Valley Forge present, or with all three carriers in the line, two strikes a day could be sent northward on interdiction missions without prejudice to the support of the battleline. In response to FEAF’s inquiry such an effort was begun, although both ComNavFE and Commander Seventh Fleet reaffirmed their view that given only suitable control facilities, close support was the most effective contribution the carriers could make, and urged that it remain the primary function. But in reply FEAF again put forward the need for interdiction to forestall a renewed Chinese offensive.

On 18 January the issue was discussed in a meeting at Taegu between Admiral Struble, the other major commanders in Korea, and the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff, out once again from Washington. Whatever
the views of the other services, the Navy remained on the side of close support. After conferring with his carrier commanders, following his return to the fleet, Admiral Struble observed that an assignment to armed reconnaissance would be executed to the best of his capability, but reiterated his opinion that support of the line was more effective, and was punishing the enemy more severely, than was generally realized.

By this time the Chinese had broken contact and, following the reconnaissance to Suwon, General Ridgway had ordered a two-divisional advance toward the Han River. To assist this operation, known as "Thunderbolt," Yellow Sea forces were strengthened by the dispatch of Saint Paul, escorted by two destroyers, to provide 8-inch gunfire at Inchon. On both coasts, as the armies moved forward, the carrier air groups continued to contribute to the support of troops in the line.

With planning for the future still in flux, with the Marines chasing guerrillas in the southern mountains, and with Task Force 90 dispersed, there was no possibility of a flanking amphibious operation. Yet intelligence indicated an extreme Chinese concern with the landing in the rear, and if no such stroke was possible one could always pretend. As Eighth Army advanced and as ROK forces on the eastern shore were also moving forward, Admiral Smith conceived the notion of assisting their progress by an amphibious feint in the Kansong–Kosong area, some 50 miles beyond the front lines, where a slightly expanded coastal plain and a road through the mountains to the central front provided a logical objective for an assault from the sea. For this enterprise, Operation Ascendant, CTF 95 borrowed two AKAs, two LSTs, and a couple of rocket ships from the Amphibious Force, secured a promise of assistance from the fast carriers, and set sail on 29 January in his flagship, the destroyer tender Dixie, with his gunnery ships in company.

At 0700 on the 30th the bombardment group, Missouri, Manchester, and their screening destroyers, opened a vigorous fire on the Kansong area, and throughout the day the minesweepers, landing craft, and rocket ships went through their paces. After retiring seaward during the night, the force reappeared next morning off Kosong to repeat the bombardment effort. If the effectiveness of these maneuvers on enemy troop dispositions was largely unassessable, the operation was at least unique in the presence of a destroyer tender as flagship and participant in beach bombardment. Since such an event may never recur, let the record show that at 1400 on the 31st Dixie commenced firing on the beaches at Kosong, and expended 204 rounds.

At Inchon, where Saint Paul had arrived on 25 January, a second deceptive operation was scheduled to follow. There Admiral Hillenkoetter had been greeted by some short salvos from Wolmi Do, but with the assistance of an air strike from Theseus, and gunfire from Ceylon and some destroyers, the Wolmi batteries were neutralized and the Kimpo-Kumpo area subsequently kept under intermittent bombardment. On 6 February Admiral Andrewes sailed from Sasebo in Belfast to administer the pretended landing, and two days later, after some shooting in support of ROK troops at Kangnung, Missouri was started west.

Captain Kelly reached Inchon on the 8th, with two AKAs and an LSD, to simulate pre-landing operations; on the next day Missouri arrived and began to bombard enemy positions; a demonstration involving two transport divisions was planned for the afternoon tide of the 10th. But the affair was cancelled as a result of successes ashore: enemy resistance in the west, which had stiffened at the start of the month, gave way suddenly on the 9th, and the Chinese retired from the area; on the afternoon of the 10th Inchon was occupied by a party of ROK Marines from Tokchok To, and by nightfall American troops had reached the banks of the Han.

The reoccupation of Inchon was more than welcome. For the past month, as in the previous summer, Pusan had been a madhouse, as the difficulties of supplying the armies through a single port were compounded by the need to plan a complete and to accomplish a partial evacuation of Korea. Unfortunately, however, the advantages of a second port could not at once be realized. Not only would operations necessarily remain limited until the security of Inchon could be assured, but the demolitions of the previous month had to be cleared, a situation which raised some questions as to the wisdom, for the side which enjoyed command of the sea, of the
policy of "blow and go" which had governed the evacuations. To accomplish the necessary restoration of facilities, and to get the port in working order, Admiral Thackrey had sailed from Yokosuka on 10 February with an amphibious task group carrying the Army’s 2nd Engineer Special Brigade. He arrived on the 15th just as a new emergency was developing. The advance to the Han and the recovery of Inchon had been followed by hard fighting in the center. There the move north from Wonju had begun on 5 February, and there, while giving way in the west, the enemy had reinforced his defenses. On the 11th the Chinese pushed a heavy attack down the valley north of Wonju, punched a hole in the ROK lines, and brought about a local collapse in which for four days large gaps existed in the front. One river valley to the eastward, similar difficulties arose from a thrust aimed south at Chechon, while between Wonju and Seoul an enemy column struck southwestward toward Suwon. Such was the pressure in the center that on the 14th the Marine Division was relieved of its anti-guerrilla efforts in the south and ordered up to Wonju, while in the west the threat to Suwon brought an alert from Eighth Army for a possible evacuation of Inchon.

As a result of this alert, received just as the effort to open the port was beginning, Admiral Thackrey decided to avoid drying out LSTs on the mudflats, and to limit his rate of unloading so that no more would be put ashore than could be packed up inside of 12 hours. With time the situation improved, but for the rest of February a truck shortage limited EUSAK’s acceptance of cargo to a mere 500 tons a day, while a 48-hour withdrawal notice remained in effect for a full month. Considerable congestion resulted, as the ships of Task Group 90.1 being used to work the port and those held against the possibility of evacuation were joined by new arrivals with supplies for Eighth Army, and by early March, Thackrey was crying "Hold, enough!"

Prompt reinforcement of the menaced sectors checked the mid-February threat, and by the 18th the Communists had given up and were retiring. General Ridgway now resumed his advance with Operation Killer, a move forward by IX and X Corps in the center which would bring them abreast of the line in the west, and would clear the Wonju-Kangnung road. On 21 February the Marine Division led out from Wonju, and for the remainder of the month Eighth Army moved forward against varying resistance and through abominable terrain, its movement hindered by the beginning thaw and by heavy rains which turned all roads into mudholes. By the end of the month, however, the Marines were approaching Hoengsong and the objectives of "Killer" were in hand, while on the Sea of Japan the maritime flank had been pushed forward in a great bound.

There Admiral Smith had had his eyes on the strategic islands north of the parallel, and in his concept of operations for February had noted that their occupation would be "of inestimable value," both for control of enemy junk traffic and minelaying and to provide potentially valuable staging areas. In order to undo, at least to some extent, the effects of the abandonment of northeastern Korean footholds, he proposed a heavy bombardment of Wonsan, to take place with or immediately after that at Inchon, and to be accompanied if possible by seizure of the islands of Yo Do and Ung Do which guard the harbor entrance. The idea seemed good and the execution proved better, when enemy reaction to the bombardment stimulated the seizure of an island even further in.

At sea February was a rough month, and on 13 days the blockading ships found their operations seriously hindered by foul weather. On the 12th, nevertheless, the minesweepers went in to check the Wonsan channel, and four days later two destroyers entered to bombard the port. On the 18th, in a return engagement, the destroyer Ozbourne was hit by artillery fire, apparently originating from the island of Sin Do, two miles off the tip of Kalma Pando. The result of this impudence was an air strike from Task Force 77 that very day, a bombardment by Belfast on the 19th, and the appearance on the morning of the 24th of two destroyers, a frigate, and an ROK LST with an assault party of 110 Korean Marines. Lacking a shore fire control party, the arrangements to support the Sin Do landing were somewhat complex: the Koreans had been given a portable radio, but the only interpreter was on the cruiser Manchester offshore, and messages to the supporting destroyers had to be relayed; Manchester’s helicopter, which provided aerial observation, was in communication with the destroyers but not the
landing party. But all went well: two hours of bombardment were followed by an unopposed landing, and the
island was soon declared secure. United Nations forces were back at, if not in, Wonsan.

With these February operations the tempo of naval gunfire began a rapid rise. Where ammunition
expenditures in December at Hungnam had set a new record, those of January had plummeted. But with clearance
of the coastal fire support lane and with seizure of the Wonsan islands there came a radical increase, and by
March the expenditure of 5-inch ammunition had become phenomenal. That this fluctuating consumption
imposed heavy problems upon the logistic agencies may be seen from the statistics in Table 15.

For the Seventh Fleet carriers February was a period of transition. Close support of the battleline
continued, as did intermittent strikes against transportation targets, but the generalized nature of FEAF’s basic
request for interdiction led to duplication of effort with Bomber Command. Yet the problem remained and,
following repeated reports of heavy movement on the Hoeryong-Wonsan line, FEAF directed Fifth Air Force to
attack a group of bridges in the northeast. But to ask this was to ask too much. On 15 February General
Stratemeyer advised Admiral Joy that the withdrawal from forward air bases had made operations in northeastern
Korea difficult for Fifth Air Force, occupied as it was by commitments to the support of Eighth Army, to bomber
escort, and to interdiction in the northwest. Stating that "naval air could greatly assist interdiction" by covering the
northeastern route, he requested a ten-day effort against important bridges and proposed, if this were agreeable, to
reschedule the work of Bomber Command, both to prevent duplication in the northeast and to improve coverage
in the northwest. The proposition was accepted by ComNavFE, and Commander Seventh Fleet was instructed to
apply his principal effort for the next ten days to the Hoeryong-Wonsan railroad.

As this work began the Chinese again disappeared from the front, and Eighth Army resumed the
advance. The generalized chaos and the very large number of dead that U.N. troops discovered on their way north
from Wonju went far to bear out Admiral Struble’s feeling that close support had hurt the enemy more than was
generally appreciated. On the other hand the altered ground situation emphasized the desirability of cutting the
flow of supply and reinforcement, so as to prevent Communist recuperation. On 20 February Admiral Joy moved
to coordinate the efforts against the east coast transportation line by providing the carriers and gunnery ships with
a list of rail and highway bridges accessible to naval gunfire, 13 in the Wonsan area, 23 in the north on the shores
of Kyongsong Man, and 25 in the region south of Songjin which had been the target of earlier attacks by raiders
from Juneau, Bass, and Perch. As the dispatch went forth it was already being implemented, for Missouri, now
returned from her west coast bombardment duties, was dispensing 16-inch shells against the multiple bridges
which span the double river at Tanchon. On the 22nd and the 23rd this enterprise was continued, and the
expenditure, with helicopter spot, of an average of 166 rounds a day effectively subdivided these overwater
structures.

The assignment of the fast carriers to rail interdiction had originally been scheduled to run through 25
February; on that date ComNavFE ordered it continued; by month’s end it had become the primary task. To
Admiral Ofstie it so commended itself, in view of the preoccupation of Fifth Air Force in the northwest and of the
greater effectiveness of Bomber Command in attacks on marshalling yards and supply areas; on 28 February he
proposed that his force apply its main effort to interdiction, set up a schedule for future operations, and made
recommendations for more effective coordination with the work of the bombardment ships.

Essentially this shift from close support to interdiction was the result of differential capabilities, deriving
in large measure from the existing air base situation. For the United Nations, at this time, Korea formed a large
beachhead, in which inward or outward deployment followed the fortunes of war. The retirement of the armies
from North Korea and the redeployment of the greater part of land–based air strength to Japan had returned the
peninsula to the stage which, in a normal amphibious operation, precedes the introduction of garrison air. In these
circumstances Fifth Air Force found itself obliged to abandon the interdiction function, and on 26 February, as
Task Force 77 began its extended stint in the northeast, the responsibility for northwestern Korea reverted to the B–29s of Bomber Command.

Difficult though the situation still remained, it was about to improve. The Army had started north the latter part of January; as March opened, the objectives of "Killer" were in hand and the U.N. line, both stable and relatively straight, extended eastward from the lower Han through Hoengsong, and thence northeasterly to Chumunjin. In these circumstances it was possible to return evacuated air units to Korea: in early February the Marines had moved three fighter squadrons in from Japan, and by month's end Fifth Air Force squadrons and supporting units were preparing to return. At Wonsan in the east, and from Inchon to the Yalu in the west, U.N. forces held islands off the enemy shore. Along both coasts, from the battleline to the northern limits of the blockade, the surface units of Task Force 95 patrolled and bombarded. The effort of the fast carriers had shifted northward, and was focussed on the rail lines leading down from Manchuria. Eighth Army was preparing a new offensive.
Chapter 10. The Second Six Months
2. March-April 1951: On to the Parallel

On 2 March the Marine Division, spearheading the drive up the center, captured Hoengsong. With the aims of "Killer" accomplished, EUSAK now planned a further advance, Operation Ripper, which by pushing onward through Hongchon to Chunchon would outflank Seoul, and gain a line in the neighborhood of the 38th parallel. This new move would take General Ridgway's armies through the region of the enemy's January offensive, and as it had for the Communists, so now for the United Nations the topography of the area would pull the armies to the right and away from the axis of the peninsula. As Eighth Army moved onward through the central hill country the valley roads would lead not toward Pyongyang but north through the mountains to Kansong, Kojo, and Wonsan on the eastern coast. In this situation, and as the battleline had now acquired a national compartmentation with U.N. and Chinese forces in the west and center, and with the eastern flank remaining an all-Korean affair, it was hoped to split the Chinese off from their indigenous subordinates. Finally, as in the operations of February, General Ridgway intended to inflict maximum attrition on the enemy, and by keeping the pressure on to inhibit his preparation of a new offensive.

To assist the planned advance EUSAK had again asked for an amphibious demonstration in the Yellow Sea. Feeling that the speed of earlier efforts had not given the sluggish enemy sufficient time to react, Admiral Andrewes now planned for deliberate fraud. Beginning on 27 February the air activities of _Bataan_ were increased and localized; for two days the DMS _Carmick_ , the frigate _Alacrity_ , and two Korean YMS swept northward along the coast and into the mush ice of the Taedong estuary; there followed a cruiser and destroyer bombardment. On 3 March the amphibious element of three APAs and two AKAs appeared, escorted by two destroyers, to steam northward along the shore. Half way to Cho Do the transports reversed course and retired to Inchon, whence they made an ostentatious departure on the 5th to continue the effort at mystification.

After a heavy artillery preparation, Operation Ripper was launched on 7 March, and began a steady progress up the center of the peninsula. Seoul this time was captured not on the beaches of Inchon but on the Pukhan: as the 25th Division forced the Han near its junction with that river and moved on to the north the capital was outflanked, and on the 15th was reoccupied without a fight. But two conquests and two liberations had taken a frightful toll, and hardly a tenth of the city's original population still skulked amid the ruins.

On the east coast, as "Ripper" began, the destroyers continued to provide fire support; at Inchon the heavy cruiser _Saint Paul_ remained on station, her 8-inch guns closely tied in with I Corps artillery. But with the flanks holding and the center advancing, and with Task Force 95 concentrating on the disruption of enemy transport and supply, gunfire support was for the moment of secondary importance and the trend of naval activity continued northerly. Task Force 77 was working over east coast transportation targets; east coast bombardment efforts were centered at Wonsan and Songjin; in the northwest _Belfast, Kenya_, and associated light units shot up enemy positions at the mouth of the Taedong estuary.

Since 16 February Wonsan had been under siege, and of the 31 days of March found itself subjected to gunfire on 31. As April opened, all important harbor islands had been occupied by the U.N., the record for continuous naval bombardment, established at Vicksburg almost a century before, had been surpassed, and a long and uninterruptedly difficult future lay ahead of the town. Enemy response to these operations involved a build-up of artillery and garrison forces, and a persistent small-scale effort to remine the harbor: of the 28 mines swept in March—some of them new and shiny—20 were swept at Wonsan. Despite frequent and increasing artillery opposition, the sweepers worked persistently to enlarge the bombardment lanes, while the gunnery ships,
beneficiaries of the effort, supported them by counterbattery fire and bombardment. On 1 March Korean agents reported that the enemy was unloading Soviet mines at the Kalma railroad siding, and on the 7th a bombardment of this target by the light cruiser Manchester brought a gratifying high order detonation of a boxcar full.

The precaution of arranging for east coast intelligence sources proved rewarding in other ways. On 15 March, in response to reports from ashore of enemy troop concentrations, a special event was laid on. Rapid fire bombardment of reported assembly areas in the neighborhood of Wonsan by Manchester and the destroyer Lind brought reports of 6,000 and 2,000 casualties respectively, and follow-up information from agents ashore indicated that the civilian population had fled the city and that morale among the military was not good. Pressure from the sea nevertheless continued undiminished: an enemy effort to land by sampan on ROKN-occupied Tae Do, off the end of Kalma Pando, was repelled; on the 24th a fire control party was put ashore on Tae Do by the destroyer English, with beneficial results in the spotting of bombardment.

At Songjin, 120 miles to the northeast and halfway to the Siberian border, a similar if less intensive siege had meanwhile been commenced. Mine reconnaissance of Songjin, carried out in the first days of March, was followed by daily bombardment of the port and of rail bridges neighboring the town, and in the first week of April a major minesweeping effort was undertaken to provide increased maneuvering room for the firing ships.

In addition to the work at the bomblines, and at Wonsan and Songjin, intermittent bombardment of bridge targets was conducted in Kyongsong Man to the northward. On three days in mid-March, from the 14th to the 16th, Missouri was in action against east coast transportation targets in the Chongjin area, after which she moved southward to fire on the coastal rail line in the neighborhood of 40° and to shoot up Wonsan.

By this time the efforts against enemy transportation targets were beginning to develop into a concentrated and coordinated campaign. The Communists, of course, had long since lost the use of the sea; seaborne import of useful objects from Vladivostok or from China ports had been eliminated, along with coastal traffic, in the first days of war. Enemy logistics therefore depended on the two principal land transport nets, the western rail and road complex, in which the lines from the lower Yalu and from Manpojin joined in the area north of Pyongyang, and the eastern route, in which the tracks south from Hoeryong and southeast from Hyesanjin met at Kilchu and continued down the coast to join the transpeninsular line below Hungnam. In the west the mission of interdiction had been assumed by Bomber Command; the eastern rail and road lines, more distant from U.N. bases, became the responsibility of the Navy.

These tasks would of course have been far simpler had only the position at Wonsan been maintained. Given the topography of east central Korea, and the resulting configuration of the rail and road net, such a foothold would have blocked enemy supply of the eastern front, while Marine fighter-bombers based on Kalma Pando would have had the entire transpeninsular line and a major portion of the western transportation system within the 100-mile circle. As it was, however, the evacuation of X Corps, the result of fears for Eighth Army rather than of doubts as to the feasibility of holding a perimeter, led to the imposition for the remainder of the war of a heavy and continuing burden upon the carrier and gunnery forces.

In the circumstances, however, it was fortunate these forces existed. With them, in the continued absence of air and submarine opposition, targets 400 miles from the nearest U.N. airstrip could be kept under dive bomber attack, and coastal targets 300 road miles behind the lines subjected to naval gunfire. The importance of such action had been emphasized in early 1951 by intelligence of a strenuous impending enemy logistic effort on the east coast route, by the knowledge that some reorganized North Korean divisions were scheduled for rail movement south from Hoeryong, and by expectations of an important secondary traffic from Manpojin through Kanggye by rail, across to the Chosin Reservoir by truck, and thence down to Hamhung. It was in the context of this intelligence that ComNavFE had accepted FEAF’s request to put the fast carriers on interdiction, and had moved to shift the efforts of Task Force 95 from control of the sea approaches to the interruption of land transport by providing the list of rail and highway bridges.
Such target information was most helpful, but for a number of reasons effective interdiction of Communist supply lines remained extremely difficult. This was so in the first instance because of the enemy’s logistic austerity. As compared with a figure of 50 pounds per day for the individual in the U.S. Eighth Army, and of 64 pounds per man-day with the Fifth Air Force in Korea’s heavy logistic requirements figured in, the best available estimates indicated that the Communists subsisted on a supply basis of ten pounds per man per day. Measured against this requirement, which worked out at about 50 tons per day per division, the North Korean transportation net was more than adequate, although its peacetime capacity had been gravely diminished by damage to rails and rolling stock and by limitation to night movement. In early March the capacity of the west coast rail line was estimated at between 500 and 1,000 tons per day, and that of the east coast railroad at about 500, while highways in the west and east were capable of transporting 1,000 and 500 tons per day respectively. In these circumstances it appeared that the enemy could support half a million troops, with something over a third dependent on the east coast rail and road nets.

Interdiction of these routes depended, at least in the first instance, upon bridge demolition, and modern reinforced concrete bridges, hard to hit and hard to destroy, requiring the hitting power of battleship or heavy cruiser main battery fire, or of the AD attack plane. Experience gained as the campaign progressed showed force requirements of about 60 rounds of 16-inch gunfire or of 12 to 16 AD sorties per bridge destroyed, so that for battleship and carrier alike, two a day was the average capability. Knocking down the bridges was therefore well within the realm of possibility, but while the rail net could be thus fragmented the effect on highway travel was less decisive: a truck can be detoured more easily than a train, and the supply of trucks from north of the border was a continuing one.

In his dispatch of 28 February Admiral Ofstie had proposed to rotate the efforts of his force between the area north of Hamhung, the complex south and west of Hamhung-Wonsan, and the route between Hamhung and the Chosin Reservoir, and had observed that better coordination with the gunnery ships would be helpful to the enterprise. The proposed procedure for Task Force 77 was approved by Admiral Struble; with reference to the comments on naval gunfire, however, Commander Seventh Fleet somewhat sourly observed that coordination between Task Force 77 and Task Force 95 was in the hands of ComNavFE. Passing upward through the chain of command, CTF 77’s plan received the blessing of NavFE headquarters; arrangements for exchange of information between Bomber Command and the carriers were worked out; and the force set to work in the area east of a line drawn south along 127°E, and thence through Yangdok to Kumwha. Ultimately the coordination with Task Force 95 would also come.

Within the carrier task force the campaign was carefully planned. Since the 395 major bridges in eastern North Korea afforded a surplus of targets, a research effort was undertaken which cut the list to 48 "key bridges," structures in difficult terrain which were hard to bypass, and which once destroyed would have to be rebuilt. Attack on these key bridges was to be supplemented by track breaking, by destruction of minor bridges in areas where no key structure existed, and by surface gunfire at specific points along the coast, of which Kyongson Man, Songjin, and Iwon were of primary importance. The backbone of the striking force was provided by the ADs, lifting three 2,000-pound GP bombs apiece, and accompanied by F4Us for fighter cover and flak suppression, each with a 1,000-pound bomb for added striking power. The entire campaign was backed up by a comprehensive and continuing program of aerial photography. Maximum economy of effort was derived from careful briefing, and no pilot was sent off without one or more photographs of his target.

Through March and into April the carrier planes ranged over northeastern Korea, covering the four degrees of latitude from the 38th parallel north to beyond Chongjin. As the three complexes named by CTF 77 were attacked in regular succession, the box score grew and the impact upon the enemy became severe. The effectiveness both of the bridge strikes and of Communist efforts to undo the damage may be seen in the history...
of the most famous of east coast structures, the bridge below Kilchu, where the railroad crosses what came to be known as Carlson’s Canyon.

Of the valley named in his honor, Lieutenant Commander Harold G. Carlson, commanding officer of VA 195 in *Princeton*, was the Vespucci rather than the Columbus, exploiter rather than discoverer, for the bridge that crossed it was first sighted by a shipmate, Lieutenant Commander Clement M. Craig, while flying homeward on the morning of 2 March from a strike on Kilchu. Eight miles southwest of that town the rail line, tunnelling through the hills, emerges briefly to span a gully and then disappears again underground. Twin tunnels had been dug in preparation for double tracking, and two sets of piers erected, but only a single track had been thrown across the chasm on a six-span bridge, 650 feet long and 60 feet high. The tunnels made it difficult to bypass; its height made it difficult to repair. That afternoon a strike was flown off which damaged the southern approach.

Next day Commander Carlson led a second flight of ADs against the bridge. As a result of this event one span was dropped, a second damaged, two more shifted out of line, and the site rechristened by Admiral Ofstie in honor of the strike leader. Four days later, on 7 March, a follow-up attack dropped the northernmost of the previously shifted spans.

The attacks on the railroad bridges quickly resulted in pile-ups of supplies at breaks in the line, in concentrations of vehicles to truck material past the choke points, and in energetic efforts at repair. By 8 March the Corsairs were loading with 100 and 250-pound bombs for employment against these accumulations of supplies and vehicles, while the ADs and the heavy ordnance were reserved for the interdiction targets proper. At Carlson’s Canyon the vigor of the enemy effort was revealed on the 14th by photo plane inspection which showed rough but effective repairs in the form of wooden cribbing, built up to replace the missing spans. Strike 4 followed the next day, knocked down all new construction, dropped another span at the southern end, and damaged the northern approach; but within two days large piles of wooden ties had been assembled in the gully preparatory to re-reconstruction. The extraordinary persistence of this engineering effort, paralleled at all important broken bridges, testified to the importance of the east coast rail net, demonstrated the availability of repair crews and materials, and imposed upon the task force the requirement of rephotographing all key targets at four-day intervals.

Following the strike of 15 March Admiral Ofstie recommended to ComNavFE that Bomber Command be asked to inhibit repair activity by seeding the gully with long-delay bombs. In spite of JOC concurrence FEAF’s first reaction was adverse, but a study of photographs provided by the task force showed the site to be a prime objective for this combination of naval and Air Force capabilities; on the 24th a B–29 was sent out with a bomb load fused for long and varying delays, and three days later the effort was repeated.

Despite this useful contribution, the enemy continued to press the work with great determination. On 20 March photographs again revealed large piles of construction material. By the 30th, cribbing of the four central spans and the northern approach had been completed, transverse members had been installed, and only the rails were lacking. On 2 April, therefore, Admiral Ofstie sent off Strikes 5 and 6 which destroyed the whole works, knocking down all rebuilt cribs and spans and leaving only the concrete piers.

If it did not discourage the enemy, this destruction at least forced him to change his plans. Reconstruction of the bridge was abandoned and the labor force put to work on the building of a four-mile serpentine which would bypass bridge and tunnels alike. This bypass required eight new bridges of its own, but all were short and low; although a number were knocked out in April, the new simplicity of repair made the site no longer an attractive one, and the attention of the force was shifted southward to the area of Songjin. There, after first breaking some low bridges north of the city, CTF 77 turned to the area south of the town, where the bridge-tunnel-bridge sequence was three times repeated close to the water’s edge, and where gunfire from the besieging destroyer could delay the rebuilding of structures taken out by air attack. Already once destroyed and once repaired, these bridges began to receive the concentrated treatment on April Fool’s Day, and here through June
the same sequence of destruction, cribbing, destruction, and bypassing would take place.

On 4 April, after 38 days of concentrated effort in interdiction, Admiral Ofstie turned over tactical command of the force, and Princeton sailed for Yokosuka for an overdue period of rehabilitation and maintenance. In this period 54 rail and 37 highway bridges had been rendered inoperable, 44 more had been damaged in varying degree, and the railroad tracks had been broken in more than 200 places. For much of the Korean War, pilots’ claims are difficult to assess, and statistics of attacks against such evanescent targets as personnel, rolling stock, and guns must be taken as approximations only. But of these bridges it is possible to speak with some confidence, for in Task Force 77 "inoperable" meant that photographs showed one or more spans destroyed.

Enemy response to this extremely destructive campaign was not limited to the effort in reconstruction. Antiaircraft defenses of key points were rapidly increased, and there developed an extraordinary increase in truck traffic which brought April air sightings of vehicles to more than four times the January total. Since trucks and antiaircraft, unlike bridges, were available on requisition from the north in practically unlimited quantity, it was soon apparent that interdiction could hardly be absolute, and that to maintain its effectiveness would require continuous effort. Nevertheless the work of the fast carriers had been fruitful: the east coast rail system, which had carried two-thirds of North Korean traffic in February, in March moved less than half the total and in April less than a third, and east coast enemy road transport was likewise proportionately reduced.

Despite the virtues of modernity, as exemplified in bombing and bombardment, it remains true that the surest way of getting explosives where you want them is the old-fashioned one of putting them there by hand. With this sometimes forgotten truth in mind, ComNavFE in mid-March had conceived the idea of assisting the interdiction of the east coast rail line by a commando raid. A special task organization, Task Force 74, was set up under Admiral Hillenkoetter; 250 men of the Royal Marine Commando were embarked in the LSD Fort Marion and a UDT detachment in the APD Begor. Following rehearsals at Kure these ships set sail for Sorye Dong, eight miles south of Songjin, with a somewhat elaborate supporting force composed of Saint Paul, two destroyers, and six minesweepers.

The operation took place on 7 April. Owing in part to the directive, and in part to limited communications facilities in the participating ships, command arrangements were rather unorthodox. The landing itself was the responsibility of Captain Philip W. Mothersill, commanding officer of Fort Marion and Commander Amphibious Group, and Admiral Hillenkoetter controlled only the supporting ships. Instead of awaiting an expression of readiness on the part of the landing force commander, transfer of control ashore was to take place automatically the moment the troops hit the beach, although, oddly enough, fire support and air control personnel were to remain subordinate to the Amphibious Group. Shore fire control personnel from a Marine Anglico had been offered but declined; the SFCP, composed of ship’s company from Saint Paul, was inexperienced in troop fire support and lacked direct communications with the landing force.

To the distress of the landing force commander, who felt that it would reveal intentions and gain him a warm welcome ashore, a conspicuous minesweeping effort had been arranged. The landing itself, scheduled to take place in the pre-dawn darkness, was to be preceded by UDT beach reconnaissance, but pea soup fog frustrated the latter and delayed the former until 0800. Beach intelligence, based on few photographs and faulty interpretation, had promised a sandy shore with suitable exit for tracked vehicles; in fact no exit existed and the beach was fouled by boulders which, but for the fortunate absence of swell, would have ripped the tracks off the LVTs.

In these circumstances it was well that opposition was negligible. Operations proceeded deliberately, the demolitions were satisfactorily accomplished, and by 1600 the landing force had reembarked. But the whole
comedy was labor lost: the point of attack was just south of some of Task Force 77’s favorite bridges, the rails were red with rust, and local inhabitants reported that for 40 days and 40 nights no train had passed through Sorye Dong.

By this time the ships, the commanders, and the crews who had carried the burden during the early months of the war were being rotated homeward. Hoskins, Hartman, Higgins, and Doyle had already moved on to new commands, and as spring came more and more new faces blossomed in Korea. Naval reservists, who had earlier come forward in drafts and as individuals, now began to arrive in organized units: the first weekend-warrior aviation unit, a PBM patrol squadron, had reached Japan in mid–December; in late March the first reserve air group arrived when Boxer, her long-delayed overhaul at last completed, returned to relieve Valley Forge. Also embarked in Boxer was Rear Admiral William G. Tomlinson, Commander Carrier Division 3, whose impending arrival at last permitted Admiral Ewen to go home. But Philippine Sea, his long–time flagship, remained, and her flag quarters were taken over on 25 March by Vice Admiral Harold M. Martin, who three days later relieved Admiral Struble as Commander Seventh Fleet.

This shift in the principal naval operating command was followed, in early April, by changes in subordinate echelons and by a major structural revision of Naval Forces Far East. Admiral Andrewes, who following promotion to vice admiral earlier in the year had for six weeks commanded Task Force 95, was relieved by Rear Admiral Alan K. Scott–Moncrieff, RN, and command of the Blockading and Escort Force reverted to Admiral Smith. Service Force units, previously organized in separate Seventh Fleet and NavFE groups, were consolidated into Task Force 92; with the departure of Captain Austin, who had run the logistics for Inchon, Wonsan, and Hungnam, command of this force devolved upon Captain Wright, formerly ComServDiv 31. And with these changes Admiral Martin got something that Struble had repeatedly sought without success, when on 3 April Task Force 92, Task Force 95, and all U.S. Navy destroyers in the Far East were assigned to his operational control.

With this consolidation only the patrol planes, the submarines, the Hunter–Killer Group, and the Amphibious Force remained directly under ComNavFE, and these would be assigned to Seventh Fleet as need arose. One result was a considerable simplification of command relations and of the associated communications problem as between Eighth Army, Fifth Air Force, and theater naval forces; another was an improved coordination of carrier and gunnery units in the east coast interdiction campaign. Admiral Ofstie had earlier commented on the economy of effort to be derived from such coordination, then requiring action at the NavFE level, and while exchange of information had been improved the results were not yet wholly satisfactory. Following the reorganization of 3 April, however, Commander Seventh Fleet assumed responsibility for the interdiction campaign. All heavy ships were absorbed into Task Force 77, while Task Force 95, composed of two U.S. destroyer divisions, the ROK Navy, and units of other U.N. member nations, became in fact as in name the Blockading and Escort Force. Shortly Admiral Martin would delegate responsibility for east coast interdiction, gun-fire as well as air, to CTF 77, and by instructing him to make recommendations for supplementary commando raids ensure that there would be no more Sorye Dongs.

Through March, while the aviators were breaking down the bridges, Operation Ripper had continued, with U.N. forces pressing onward through the razor–edged mountains and precipitous valleys of central Korea. Although winter had ended, the spring thaws and heavy rains continued to make movement difficult, while to the delays imposed by nature were added the delaying operations of small enemy groups. Only in mid-month was variety provided by a singular operation in which the remnants of the North Korean 10th Division, which the Marines had earlier been chasing through the upper Naktong Basin, moved northward, fought their way through the ROK lines from the rear, and disappeared into the distance.

The escape of these people was regrettable, but was compensated for by more important developments. The advance of IX and X Corps in the center had freed the flanks for rapid movement, and in the west, following
the reoccupation of Seoul, the I Corps moved rapidly to the Imjin River. There by month’s end the line had been
pushed forward to the 38th parallel, while on the east coast ROK forces had again crossed into North Korea.

In the west, too, the logistic situation was easing. At Inchon, by mid-March, the MSTS representative had
opened his office ashore, and on the 17th EUSAK lifted its 48-hour evacuation notice. On the 25th, with the
Army engineers ashore and with unloading proceeding at a rate of over 3,000 tons a day, Admiral Thackrey
closed down his operations and departed. Although the delay had been considerable, it was less than that in
exploitation of the neighboring strategic prize, for Kimpo did not become fully operational until May.

With the armies of the U.N. astride the 38th parallel, the question of how far to press the advance again
presented itself, this time to be answered on tactical grounds. For some time intelligence had indicated that the
Chinese intended to hold at the dividing line, while preparing for a major offensive in May. Since there was
plenty of evidence, not least the Communist diligence in bridge repair, to show that these preparations were being
earnestly pressed, this intelligence was taken seriously. To hinder the enemy build-up and to maintain pressure on
the Communist armies, EUSAK had planned a further move. The Imjin River would remain the western anchor,
but the remainder of the front would be advanced across the parallel, to shorten the line and to provide a labor-
saving ten-mile water frontage at the Hwachon Reservoir. This movement, Operation Rugged, began on 5 April.

In the air, too, the enemy was growing stronger. In late March Communist air strength was estimated to
have reached a total of some 750 aircraft of all types, and B–29 attacks on northern targets were meeting heavy
MIG opposition. Ominously, on 29 March, a twin-jet bomber was sighted over central North Korea; equally
ominously, efforts were underway to rehabilitate the North Korean airfields.

This threat found the forces of the United Nations in an extremely vulnerable position. Nine months of
exemption from the dangers of air attack had taught bad habits. On shore, camouflage discipline was nonexistent,
housing and equipment were disposed in orderly rows about the Korean landscape, stockpiles were open and
conspicuous, aircraft were parked in close formation on unrevetted airfields. Along both coasts blockading ships
operated without air cover, which in any event could hardly have been provided, and skills in air defense had
rusted. For the naval forces the danger was emphasized on 15 April, when the ROK frigate Apnok, straggling in
somewhat undisciplined fashion from a force returning from the Yalu Gulf, was attacked by three enemy
propeller-driven aircraft. Apnok fought back well, and shot down one of her attackers, but her topsides were
chewed up by strafing and near misses, and there were numerous casualties among the crew.

FEAF, in the meantime, had been watching the Communist airfield reconstruction, and on 13 April
began a neutralization campaign which, for the balance of the month, would see a dozen B–29s sent off daily to
crater the runways and seed them with delayed–action bombs. As a further precautionary measure, an agreement
had been concluded between FEAF and NavFE which provided that in the event of an emergency the air defense
commander would have control of all shore-based naval and Marine fighter planes. For the Air Force, still
desirous of gaining operational control of naval air, this seemed little enough, and the exemption of embarked
aviation as “an integral part of the fleet” from this prior commitment was disappointing. But reasons for retaining
this freedom of action shortly became apparent.

The commitment of the Marine Division to the mountain front had limited the offensive capabilities of
the Amphibious Force to the conduct of feints and demonstrations. This, however, was a game at which two could
play, and resurgent Communist activities in the Formosa area now had impact on Korean naval operations. Since
the summer of 1950 the Formosa Strait patrol had been continued by long-range search planes and by a small
destroyer force. But with the new year intelligence of troop and junk concentrations in mainland ports suggested
the possibility of an invasion attempt when the April good weather came. In mid-February Struble had again
visited Formosa, and an improved and expanded Formosa defense plan had been prepared. Late in the month
ComNavFE took cognizance of the situation, and inaugurated a series of experiments to determine the optimum
choice of weapons against a junk fleet.
In warfare between forces of radically different technological capabilities the advantages are not all on one side. In Korea the virtues of primitivism in conflict with technology had been clearly demonstrated in the difficulties that had beset Eighth Army, mechanized, heavily equipped, and road-bound, when locked in combat with the lightly armed, ridge-running levies of North Korea and Communist China. The difficulties of successfully interdicting the supply lines of an army whose logistic requirements per man were about a sixth of those of U.S. forces had reinforced the lesson, which promised also to apply to action between naval air and gunnery forces and fleets of wooden junks.

Such fleets present numerous small targets, hard to hit, impossible to sink, and whose destruction may prove excessively costly in ammunition expenditure. On 24 February, therefore, with the Formosan question in mind, ComNavFE directed Admiral Thackrey to provide some samples at Yokosuka for practice purposes. Eight 60-foot Korean junks Were salvaged at Inchon and brought across in the LSD *Tortuga*; a sunken Chinese 100-foot 600-tonner presented more difficulties, but in time was floated, beached at Wolmi Do, and embarked in the LSD *Colonial* for delivery to Japan. In March and April extensive tests were conducted under the direction of Rear Admiral Edgar A. Cruise, commander of the Hunter-Killer Task Group. But his report on ordnance selection was not completed until May, by which time the Communist build-up in Formosa Strait had already had strategic effect.

The intelligence from the south and the coming of the invasion season made a show of force appear in order. On 8 April, therefore, with Admiral Martin in *Philippine Sea* and Admiral Tomlinson as OTC in *Boxer*, Task Force 77 left Korean waters and steamed southward through the East China Sea. On the 13th Admiral Martin flew in to visit the Generalissimo at Taipei, and an air parade was flown over Formosa to strengthen Nationalist morale; two days earlier a similar demonstration had been made along the three-mile limit off the Chinese mainland *pour encourager les autres*; on both days high-altitude photography of selected coastal staging areas was carried out. On the 14th the force again headed northward and on the 16th resumed its efforts in interdiction of the northeastern transportation net. But while the demonstration may have had value in Formosa, it had proven costly in Korea: although *Bataan* and *Theseus* had been shifted from the Yellow Sea to the east coast, their weight of effort had proven insufficient, and the eight-day hiatus in fast carrier operations had left the interdiction program almost out of hand.

Important though they were, these workaday problems were for the moment overshadowed by events on a higher level, for following a series of public and private disagreements concerning Far Eastern strategic aims President Truman on 11 April relieved CinCE of his commands. Where the military had already had to adjust to an Amphibious Force without a Marine Division, to a Marine Division without its Aircraft Wing, and to a United Nations force shorn of its amphibious capability and limited in strategic aim, the world now faced the problem of adjusting to a Far East Command without General MacArthur. "New war" had required a new commander.

The manifold responsibilities of Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Commander in Chief United Nations Command, Commander in Chief Far East Command, and Commanding General, U.S. Army, Far East, now devolved upon General Ridgway, who was in turn relieved at Eighth Army by Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet, USA. Having been concerned with the implementation of the Truman Doctrine in Greece, a country also in large part surrounded by sea and troubled by visitors from beyond the northern mountains, General Van Fleet found himself in a not unfamiliar strategic situation. Under its new commander Eighth Army continued its northward advance, while preparing, in anticipation of a CCF offensive, for a fighting retirement which would inflict maximum punishment on the enemy. By the third week of April the Hwachon Reservoir had been reached, and from the Imjin to the Sea of Japan the line ran some ten miles north of the parallel.

At sea as on land, operations continued in routine fashion. On the east coast the sieges of Wonsan and Songjin went on, with daily bombardment and daily minesweeping. For the sweepers, life had been eased by the arrival of *LST 799*, whose conversion to minesweep tender and helicopter base had been completed; her presence
also proved a boon to U.N. pilots, who could now ditch damaged planes in Wonsan harbor in confidence of expeditious rescue. In early April a new technique was developed by the Wonsan besiegers when an Air Force night intruder pilot employed his previous experience in the artillery to coach ships’ gunners on to targets they could not see. This happenstance was followed by a visit of the Task Force 95 gunnery officer to the pilot’s parent squadron, and by a developing coordination of gunfire illumination with air bombardment, strafing, and spotting, which was limited in its prospects only by the number of available intruder aircraft.

In the northeast, where the interdiction campaign was now the sole responsibility of Task Force 77, the fast carriers had resumed their effort, and while the rotating emphasis on different sections of the transportation net continued, the focus, with Carlson’s Canyon bypassed, was on the bridges south of Songjin. In the Yellow Sea the carrier element worked over western Hwanghae Province, the surface ships continued their missions of bombardment and patrol, and guerrilla raiding forces were put ashore. In all services all hands had been alerted to the impending attack, which indeed the enemy had advertised, in his press and on his radio, as one designed utterly to destroy the forces of the U.N. This time, at any rate, there would be no surprise.
History of United States Naval Operations – Korea
James A. Field Jr.

Chapter 10. The Second Six Months
3. April-May 1951: The Communist Spring Offensive

The enemy offensive broke on the evening of 22 April with a thrust down the center by the Chinese 20th Army. South of Kumwha the ROK 6th Division collapsed under the weight of the attack, and as the enemy poured through the gap between the Marines and the 24th Infantry Division, General Van Fleet ordered a withdrawal. Four days went by before the assault was checked, and in this interval, with the enemy out in the open and moving, more than a thousand close support sorties by Fifth Air Force and carrier-based aircraft inflicted very heavy casualties.

The attack in the center and the U.N. retirement which followed had opened the valley of the Pukhan and the Chunchon-Seoul road. On the 26th, therefore, the Communists launched their main effort in an attempted double envelopment of Seoul, in which one prong was pushed down the Pukhan valley, while in the west an attempt was made to ferry troops across the Han onto the Kumpo peninsula. Both moves failed. The eastern threat to the capital was checked by the 24th and 25th Divisions, while on the Han a busy day of strafing by aircraft of the West Coast Carrier Element limited the arrivals to a number easily dealt with by the ROK Marine battalion defending the Kumpo peninsula. In the end the enemy advance in the west central sector reached a maximum of about 30 miles; east of the Hwachon Reservoir the Communists captured the town of Inje on the Hongchon-Kansong road; on the east coast they moved forward some five miles. But despite casualties estimated at ten times those of the U.N. no decisive advantage had been gained, and by the 29th the front was stabilized once more.

Once again the enemy offensive brought an immediate response from U.N. naval forces. On 23 April Task Force 77 began a ten-day sustained effort in support of the battleline. On the next day the first of a series of amphibious feints was carried out. On the 26th the threat to Seoul brought another evacuation alert at Inchon: cruiser Toledo was sent in to provide 8-inch gunfire support and once again Admiral Thackrey was ordered up to take charge. By the 1st of May, as redeployment shipping was beginning to arrive, some 200,000 refugees had clustered in the Inchon area.

The Chinese breakthrough in the center posed urgent requirements for air support, but the Korean airbase situation remained difficult. In April, in addition to the 5 Marine squadrons in Korea, only 3 of the 18 Air Force groups committed to the conflict could be based in the peninsula; in May runway difficulties at Taegu forced the closing of that field and the return of its F-80s to Japan. Over and above the airbase problem the operations of both carrier and land-based squadrons were complicated by the seasonal bad weather. Fog was reported at sea on 17 days in May, rain and low ceilings were prevalent, and visibility in the combat area was further restricted by smoke haze from brush fires set by the enemy for protection against air attack.

These circumstances called for the immediate shift of fast carrier operations from interdiction to close support, and for the greatest possible weight of effort. To avoid the loss of a day in four in refueling and rearming, Admiral Ofstie on 24 April began a schedule of daily replenishment. For ten days the force joined the logistic ships in late afternoon to load until midnight, and while this made for a long working day, it also made it possible to keep pace with the high rate of expenditure of aviation gasoline and ordnance.

To this shift in carrier employment and this intensification of operations there was also added an increase in strength. On 1 May, as Boxer returned from Yokosuka, the retirement of Philippine Sea was delayed, and for three days three carriers were kept on the line. On the same day, as the result of pressure in the west, Bataan’s replenishment period was cut short, her pilots were recalled from leave, and she was sailed from Sasebo for the Yellow Sea. There she joined HMS Glory, recently arrived as relief for Theseus, and there from 2 to 6 May the
two ships worked together to strengthen the west coast effort.

Although close support was for the moment the primary task, the most striking carrier operation of the period was the attack on the Hwachon Dam, which by impounding the waters of the upper Pukhan both provided a barrier to movement and held back water usable for tactical purposes. In January, in the hope of impeding enemy progress, Eighth Army had asked FEAF to hole the dam, but an attack by a couple of B–29s with 6-ton guided bombs had failed of success. On 9 April, as Eighth Army was moving northward, the enemy had turned the trick, and by opening the gates had flooded the Pukhan and decommissioned some bridges. Two days later a small and hastily organized force of cavalrymen and rangers failed in an attempt to capture the dam; on 21 April the KMC Regiment had seized it, only to be ordered back as the Chinese broke through the line on the left. Now at April’s end, as the Chinese lunge expended itself, EUSAK again developed the desire to break the dam, wet down the Communists, and prevent them from using the water as a weapon.

On the afternoon of 30 April Admiral Ofstie received a photograph of the dam, with a notation requesting that two or more sluice gates be knocked out, and was informed that EUSAK was the requesting agency and wanted it done at once. At 1600 six ADs were flown off with two 2,000-pound GP bombs apiece, accompanied by five Corsairs for flak suppression, and a dive bombing attack was carried out which produced a hole in one gate. A request from EUSAK for another try and a night’s consideration led to a change in ordnance selection: on the next day eight ADs were launched with torpedoes set for surface run, and at 1100 the Skyraiders went in on this now unfamiliar mission. One torpedo was a dud and one erratic, but the remaining six ran true. One flood gate and the lower half of a second were removed, the dam’s western abutment was holed, and the enemy deprived of control of the waters.

Click here to view map

By April’s end the offensive had been contained, and in the first two weeks of May, as Eighth Army probed northward and the enemy prepared for a second try, U.N. aircraft renewed their efforts in interdiction. This interlude brought a temporary expansion of the work of the fast carriers as the result of a request from the Joint Operations Center for help in the interdiction of the western rail lines. In response Rear Admiral George R. Henderson, who had just relieved Admiral Ofstie as CTF 77, advised the JOC that on 11 May he would strike railroad bridges in the triangle which connects Pyongyang, Sunchon, and the transpeninsular line to the east. On the morning of the 11th 32 ADs carrying two 2,000-pound bombs apiece, and accompanied by 32 F4Us for flak suppression and 16 F9Fs for top cover, attacked four of these bridges and dropped spans in three. This success elicited a further request from Fifth Air Force for the destruction of bridges in the rail quadrilateral which links Pyongyang with Sinanju, Kaechon, and Sunchon.

In reply to this message Admiral Henderson observed that while he would be glad to help out from time to time, existing obligations prevented his assuming any permanent responsibility. But the request for such a "substantial and continuing commitment" of the fast carrier effort brought ComNavFE to his feet, and on 16 May he informed Commander Seventh Fleet that such proposals should pass through appropriate service channels for action by higher authority. But by the time this dispatch was on its way the enemy was on the move again: on the 18th, EUSAK called for maximum effort in close air support, and when interdiction again came to the fore the situation had changed.

The failure of the Communists’ first attack, and their evident intention to try again, raised the question of the possible employment of new weapons and brought steps to guard against surprise. Where the first five months of war had produced 80 reports of possible submarine contacts, the second five months had brought a mere 16, a change which could be interpreted as either a threat or a promise. In the air, by contrast, there was no question as to the magnitude of the Communist build–up across the Yalu, nor as to the earnestness of the effort to rehabilitate North Korean airfields. Although no air commitment had accompanied the April offensive, the possibility remained, and on the 29th Commander Seventh Fleet again warned of the chance of surprise air or submarine
attack.

For the carrier force, which could operate from beyond MIG range and fight off attacks from other aircraft types available to the enemy, the submarine presented the major hazard, but for the units of Task Force 95 the air question was the serious one. Admiral Smith had alerted his force in April; now on 10 May he advised his ships that the next ten days would be critical with regard to enemy commitment of air strength, credited the Communists with a capability of 300 offensive sorties a day, issued instructions as to procedures to be adopted under attacks of varying weight, and instructed replenishment vessels to avoid anchoring in forward locations.

In the event, although subsequent evidence indicated that the Chinese had hoped to provide their armies with air support, neither menace developed. FEAF’s attacks on North Korean airfields had kept the rehabilitation effort down, and on 9 May, following reports that 40 fighter planes had been sighted at Sinuiju, on the Korean side of the Yalu, Fifth Air Force sent up 250 Air Force and 56 Marine aircraft to deposit more than 40 tons of bombs on the airfield. In the air, despite promises to his troops, the launching of the second spring drive found the enemy no better off than had the first.

The weight of the April thrust toward Seoul had led General Van Fleet to bolster his forces in the western lowlands. Contrariwise, while this movement was in progress, the Chinese were shifting eastward to the central mountains, where on the night of 15 May they attacked in strength. On the Soyang River, southeast of the reservoir, the brunt of the attack was again borne by ROK divisions; again these dissolved, and in the exploitation phase the Communists advanced 25 miles down the valley and across into the upper waters of the Hongchon. To the eastward, in the Sorak Mountains, enemy units overran the ROK III Corps and filtered down to the southeast; on the coast the ROK I Corps withdrew south to Kangnung. In the west Chinese divisions crossed the Pukhan below Chunchon, and on the 17th opened a drive down the valley toward the Han.

As the ground forces struggled to check the attack the supporting arms again stepped up their action. Fifth Air Force increased its effort in close support; on the 17th, after being weathered out for two days, Task Force 77 began another stint of operating by day and replenishing by night; following an appeal from EUSAK for all possible support, *Princeton* delayed her departure for Yokosuka to permit another period of three-carrier operations. At Inchon, where the enemy was again within range of *Toledo*’s guns, the drive down the Pukhan brought another redeployment alert, and Admiral Thackrey, who had retained some Scap LSTs for such a contingency, put in a request for further shipping against the chance that he would have to evacuate the city and the Kumpo peninsula.

This precaution proved unnecessary. In the center the 2nd Division, which had come a long way since the hard times on the Chongchon River, did what was necessary: although under pressure on three sides it maintained its integrity, held while so instructed, reopened its supply line, and retired on order, with minimum casualties to itself and maximum to the enemy. Three days of violent fighting in the Pukhan Valley saw the Chinese thrust turned back by the 25th Division. In the Sorak Mountains, some 20 miles below the parallel, the enemy was checked at Soksa by the 3rd Division, rushed eastward from Army reserve. By 21 May the Communists had been stopped all along the line. Despite a gain of 30 miles in the eastern mountains, and a considerable penetration in the Pukhan valley, nothing decisive had been accomplished, and the price had been higher than before. On the 23rd Admiral Thackrey began to release shipping from Inchon; on the 25th the evacuation alert was ended, all restrictions on stockpiling ashore were removed, and *Toledo* was at last relieved of her fire support duties.

The Communist spring offensive had brought about a sudden spate of simulated pre-landing operations by units of Task Force 90 and Task Force 95. The first of these, carried out on short notice on 24 April, consisted of a two-hour bombardment of Kosong by *St. Paul, Helena, Manchester*, and four destroyers. Five days later, on the 29th and 30th, *Helena, Manchester*, four destroyers, two attack transports and an attack cargo ship made a demonstration in the Kojo area, in the hope of taking pressure off Eighth Army. On the evening of 4 May General Van Fleet asked for another such affair on the 6th and 7th at Kansong; ComNavFE passed the word to Seventh
Fleet to do what it could on short notice, and on the 5th Kosong was added as a target at the request of CincFE. On the desired date *Helena* and four destroyers bombarded as requested; fortuitously, their arrival coincided with a heavy enemy attack, and the bombardment, according to KMAG’s flatteringly redundant description, saved the ROK forces from "complete annihilation.” On the 13th Eighth Army called for another demonstration at Kosong on the 18th and 19th; this request was cancelled two days later, but a west coast event already underway continued to its conclusion.

Feeling, as had his predecessor, that previous demonstrations had been too short and too transparent to produce the maximum reaction, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff planned this with some finesse. Rumors of an impending landing were spread by agents of Leopard Force, a west coast guerrilla organization, and so successfully that aircraft from *Glory*, flying cover for the minesweepers, reported a large sign near the landing area which read "Welcome, U.N. Army." By 20 May the preliminaries had been completed and *Toledo* and Commonwealth ships were on hand to provide fire support. In the afternoon a dozen LCVPs, three loaded with Royal Marines and the others empty, were put up on the beach opposite Cho Do, and the Marines made a brief unopposed excursion inland prior to reembarking.

The popularity of these small demonstrations with Army commanders, and the frequency with which they were requested, led to some study of their actual effectiveness and of measures which might make for greater realism. That the enemy, after the events of the previous autumn, was fully aware of the amphibious capabilities of the United States Navy was unquestionable: information from various sources indicated that special pains were taken to keep track of the movements of the Marine Division. But with the Marines in the line, and given the slow reaction time of the Communist armies, there remained the question of whether much was actually accomplished. Admiral Andrewes had been skeptical; after the operation of 20 May Admiral Scott-Moncrieff remained dubious, feeling that enemy communications were so poor that two or three days might pass before headquarters got the word. EUSAK, on the other hand, estimated that the Inchon feint in February had fixed two Communist divisions, and that the March operation off the Taedong had moved one; following the Cho Do affair in May reports were received of troop movements across the Taedong River into previously undefended areas of Hwanghae Province. Although it seems unlikely that enemy response to any particular demonstration was very impressive, their repetition did serve to emphasize existing possibilities, and to reinforce a real concern about a possible major assault in the Wonsan area. With the passage of time it also brought an increasing concentration of defensive force along the coasts, opposite Cho Do in the west and between Kojo and Hungnam in the east.

This concentration was heaviest at Wonsan, where day after day the siege continued. Uninterrupted bombardment and frequent air attack had obliged the Communists to commit large numbers of personnel to defense and to repair work and had curtailed enemy transport, but although the railroad had been stopped, road traffic was harder to inhibit, and some 500 trucks were thought to pass through nightly. Attempting to take the pressure off, the enemy moved in increasing amounts of artillery and the Wonsan garrison stepped up its shooting; in late April an unsuccessful attempt was made to recapture one of the ROK-held harbor islands. Whether this enemy reaction amounted to a good return on the effort invested was another matter. CTF 95 had earlier advocated emplacing artillery on the harbor islands, but no such step had been taken and the responsibility for dealing with the shore batteries remained entirely upon the ships; additionally, the original offensive purpose of the siege had been undercut by the decision not to attempt a return to Wonsan. The absence of any very clear objective and the size of the commitment proved disturbing to Commander Seventh Fleet, who felt the entire concept of the operation needed some rethinking. Pending such clarification the cruiser previously assigned the Wonsan task unit was withdrawn, and the garrison situation rationalized by the assignment of a Marine officer to Yo Do as commander of the island’s defenses.

As the enemy’s second offensive slowed, the harassment of his seaward flanks was stepped up, and the Cho Do raid was followed by activity in the east. At Wonsan, following vigorous efforts by enemy artillerists
which had damaged a destroyer and bounced a shell off one of the turrets of the recently arrived New Jersey, the rocket ships were sent in for two night bombardments of known gun emplacements. Plunging fire of 7,700 rockets delivered by LSMR 409 and LSMR 412 on 23 and 25 May had impressive results: intelligence agents reported that the enemy was clearing the harbor area of personnel; for three weeks the batteries remained silent. In the north, too, the pressure was maintained: in an interval between bridge bombardments in Kyongsong Man the, destroyer Stickell destroyed a 70-foot motor junk, and followed up by putting a landing party ashore to blow three more with hand grenades.

Even before the second Chinese push was halted General Van Fleet was preparing his reply. On 18 May he ordered all forces from the Marine Division westward to prepare to attack to the north; next day, with the situation in the eastern mountains improving, he included X Corps in this planned general advance across the parallel. On the 22nd the battle of the Soyang River entered its offensive phase as the Marines and the 2nd Division attacked to the northeast against vigorous resistance. In the west, at the same time, I Corps moved steadily northward toward the so-called Iron Triangle, the important and heavily defended area bounded by the towns of Chorwon, Kumwha, and Pyonggang. Since seizure of the Iron Triangle would open the corridor to Wonsan, this movement held great possibilities.

The advance up the Soyang valley toward Inje threatened to cut off the Chinese in the Sorak Mountain salient, and opened the possibility of a thrust through the mountains to Kansong which would trap the enemy forces on the coastal strip. To provide logistic support for such a move some Scap LSTs, released from Inchon, were assigned to meet the advance at Kansong and establish an advanced supply base. But the threat at Inje made the operation unnecessary, the enemy pulled back, and on 29 May, with minesweeping completed and gunfire about to begin, ROK forces regained control of the Kansong area. By the end of the month the armies of the U.N. were back at the Hwachon Reservoir, and in firm possession of the line from which they had been dislodged by the attacks of April.

The two Communist thrusts and the U.N. counteroffensive had brought the enemy out into the open, and had provided profitable targets for air attack. The response to this opportunity had been vigorous: Fifth Air Force had stepped up its sorties in support of Eighth Army; Task Force 77 had shifted to continuous operations and daily replenishment; in times of crisis all three fast carriers and both light carriers had been put on the line. The statistical results were impressive: the Air Force claimed 21,536 enemy personnel "destroyed" in April and May; Task Force 77 aircraft claimed 1,400 killed on 29 May; on 4 June, following attacks by carrier planes, the advancing ground forces counted more than 1,000 dead.

Whether all this effort, indubitably severe in its effects on the enemy, amounted to efficient close air support was another matter. In his report for this period Admiral Martin observed that while three fast carriers had been employed at Army request, the calls for close support had never exceeded the capacity of two, the controllers had once again been swamped, and much ordnance had been dumped. Nor were the Marines more satisfied. In the later phases of the battle of the Soyang River the division, advancing at a rate of three miles a day against continuing stiff resistance, wanted and needed support from the air, and on two days requested all available aircraft. But advance requests, submitted on the previous day conformably with Air Force practice, were only about half–fulfilled. And while the use of special emergency requests produced a sortie total approximating that originally called for, processing delays were such that time from request to receipt of aircraft averaged 95 minutes.

Such delays, varying unpredictably from one to two hours, have obvious effects on the momentum of attack and on the health of the attackers. To those accustomed to getting strikes in 10 to 20 minutes from aircraft orbiting on station, they were unacceptable, and led to loss of confidence in air support on the part of front line commanders. On 31 May the division commander made the inadequacies of the situation the subject of an official report to X Corps, and such was the feeling within the division as to bring an investigation by the Commanding
General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, once again in Korea on an inspection tour. After working through the numerous and sometimes contradictory allegations, and attempting to separate fact from fancy, General Shepherd concluded that the JOC processing time, the remoteness of airfields from the front lines, the struggle between Mosquito aircraft and ground parties for control of strikes, and the unwieldy nature of the Army–Air Force system, which forced communications to parallel the chain of command all the way to the top and back again, added up to excessive and unacceptable delay. In March he had raised the subject with Fifth Air Force, but to little purpose; now he went to the top, and on 24 May discussed the close support question with CincFE. With General Ridgway’s view that it was improper for Marine air to support the Marine Division exclusively, General Shepherd concurred; for this problem, inevitable when a division with a private air force specializing in troop support was operating in company with air-starved Army units, no other answer was possible. But the basic difficulty was less the identity of the aircraft than the nature of the system, with all its built-in delays.

In June, as the Marine Division continued on the offensive east of the Hwachon Reservoir, two changes were made. Permission was secured from Fifth Air Force to keep four Marine aircraft on alert at an advanced airstrip, and to notify them of requirements by messages paralleling those to JOC. But direct communication with the airfield remained prohibited, the policy of scrambling and reporting was not permitted, and takeoff still had to await word from JOC. At the same time, in view of the radical discounting of routine requests in May, the Marines adopted a policy of submitting special requests only. But this proved self–defeating, as the resultant saturation of JOC communications facilities tended to offset other efforts to diminish delay time. This indeed was decreased in June to an average of 81 minutes, but the percentage of requests fulfilled dropped from 95 to 74 in good weather, and to 65 for the month as a whole, and nobody was much the happier.
By the 1st of June the ground forces had regained the line of the Hwachon Reservoir. Only in the eastern mountains, where the desired front turned sharply northward, were the Marines still fighting hard for their objectives, and there the drive up the valley of the Soyang was completed in mid-month. Since instructions from the Joint Chiefs had by now limited the advance to the neighborhood of this line, although permitting local action to gain more commanding terrain, General Van Fleet prepared to fortify his positions while at the same time pushing forward I and IX Corps into the Iron Triangle.

This operation continued throughout the first half of June. By the 11th both Chorwon and Kumwha at the base of the triangle had been taken, and two days later Eighth Army briefly entered Pyonggang at the northern apex. Northeast of Kumwha IX Corps units moved up to Kumsong, where the enemy was attempting to establish defensive positions, and in mid-month attempted to outflank the town on the east, a move which in the absence of JCS limitations might have opened the Wonsan road and liquidated enemy forces to the eastward. Given these restraints, however, the effort was not pressed, and Kumsong remained in enemy hands. Except on the shores of the Sea of Japan, where ROK divisions moved onward to the outskirts of Kosong, this June advance to Pyonggang and Kumsong marked the farthest north for the remainder of the war.

As before, operations on the east coast were assisted from the sea. As the forward movement of the ROK I Corps took it into the difficult hill country at the mouth of the Nam River, gunfire support became extremely active. On 4 and 5 June the heavy cruiser *Los Angeles*, a recent arrival in the theater, provided support at the bombline; on the 6th, joined by *New Jersey*, she bombarded enemy positions in the vicinity of Kosong; on the 7th, as the result of an emergency call from the KMAG party ashore, received while she was replenishing, she had the interesting experience of loading 8-inch ammunition from an AKA over one side while unloading it out the guns over the other.

In the east as in the west, the long Korean coastline invited efforts to make trouble in the enemy rear. For some time the APD *Begor* had been putting agents ashore by night along the northeastern coast, and while security was imperfect—one occasion the ship’s departure from Pusan was announced by the North Korean radio the same evening—all the landings were successful. These nocturnal enterprises ranged from Chongjin in the north to Kojo, south of Wonsan, where on the night of 2–3 June *Begor* and her UDT complement landed 235 ROK guerrillas on an islet less than half a mile from the northern arm of the harbor. But this cloak and dagger business was a two-way street: 30 miles back down the coast, at the same time that the guerrillas were going in at Kojo, an ROK intelligence team, surrounded and hard-pressed by the enemy, was departing Kosong under cover of gunfire from an ROK PC and the destroyer Rush.

As the end of the U.N. offensive approached and the intensity of ground action diminished, the attentions of the gunnery forces shifted northward and fire support again gave way to bombardment. The communications centers of Wonsan and Songjin remained daily on the receiving end of gunfire from everything from LSMRs up to the battleship *New Jersey*. Far in the north the blockade of Chongjin was maintained, and the road and rail bridges leading south from that city subjected to frequent bombardment. On 8 June the efforts of the light ships were supplemented as Task Force 77 sent in *Helena*, now on her second tour of Korean duty, for three days work on transportation targets in the Songjin, Iwon, and Kyongsong Man areas, and ten days later *Toledo* gave Songjin a repeat performance.

In the operations of Task Force 77, where *Bon Homme Richard* had relieved *Philippine Sea* on the 1st of
the month, a similar shift was apparent. Although support continued to be provided for the Marines east of the reservoir and for Army forces in the Iron Triangle, interdiction again became the primary task. A sufficient effort was committed to the northeastern rail bridges to keep them broken down, and an ambitious new inter-service effort, Operation Strangle, was begun.

Admiral Ofstie’s spring campaign had pretty well stopped the eastern railroad. But despite the efforts of Navy, Air Force, and Marines alike, truck traffic had continued to increase, and the daily average of North Korean vehicle sightings had risen spectacularly from 236 in January to 1,760 in May. Analysis of these sightings indicated that the enemy possessed some 20,000 trucks, a tenth of which arrived nightly in the combat zone, and suggested the difficulty of interdicting this logistic effort; it also brought a request from General Van Fleet to Fifth Air Force and to Task Force 77 to make the attempt. The importance of the problem was emphasized in early June by a GHQ announcement of the record vehicle sightings of the preceding month and, despite some skepticism within the Air Force as to its feasibility, the program was accepted on an experimental basis.

In the planning for "Strangle" the main north-south road routes behind the enemy lines were identified and parcelled out among the services. Three routes south and southeast of Pyongyang were taken by the Air Force; the two central routes, from Yangdok down the upper Nam and from Majon-ni south along the upper Imjin, went to Task Force 77; the Marines were assigned the roads running down from Wonsan and Kojo. Where defiles or watercourses made bypassing difficult, "Strangle Areas" were set up for cratering and for seeding with delayed-action and antipersonnel bombs.

From the very start the task was difficult, owing to the greater ease of bypassing by truck than by train, and to the fact that while almost all enemy movement was now night movement, all services were very limited in night capability. All hands nevertheless did their best, although the force requirements to keep the "Strangle Areas" strangled turned out to be somewhere between twice and five times those necessary to maintain an equal number of rail cuts. Dawn and dusk sorties were flown by the carriers, in addition to their normal daytime load, and the Air Force kept its B–26 intruders busily on the job. Best of all, perhaps, was the ingenious system evolved by the Marines, which teamed their night fighters with flare-dropping Navy patrol planes, and although these operations were extremely hazardous, owing to the restricted maneuvering room inside Korean valleys and the effect of the flares on night vision, good work was done. But in mid-June, after 13 days of "Strangle," a preliminary Air Force assessment indicated that while movement past the cut-points had been almost entirely stopped, and the enemy inconvenienced by being forced onto secondary roads, total north-south vehicle sightings remained about the same and arrivals in the front line area showed little ascertainable change. The conclusions were hardly encouraging, but as no obvious alternative presented itself "Strangle" was continued on into the summer.

Naval operations during the period of the enemy spring offensive and the United Nations advance to the north had not been without cost. The increasing strength of enemy antiaircraft was being felt: combat losses from April through June totalled 3 F9Fs, 8 ADs, and 19 Corsairs, and on 18 May Task Force 77 had its worst day of the war thus far when 6 planes failed to return. Enemy coastal batteries were also increasing in number, and not only in Wonsan. On 7 May the frigate *Hoquiam* was hit off Songjin, and on 14 June the DMS *Thompson* met trouble in the same area: having closed to 40–millimeter range of the beach and slowed to search for targets, *Thompson* was surprised when the enemy suddenly wheeled four guns out from under cover, opened fire, and scored 13 hits before the ship got clear.

The continuous efforts of the sweepers had by now largely conquered the minefields, but the threat remained, and on 5 May the first loss since February took place when the ROK *JML 306* was sunk off Sok To. More serious than the anchored fields was the problem of drifting mines: not only were the Russian moored mines fused to remain armed after breaking loose, but many had apparently been launched as drifters, to take advantage of prevailing southerly currents. Increasing reports of floating mines came in from the Sea of Japan and from the
North Pacific; in June the destroyer *Walke*, steaming some 60 miles offshore as part of the carrier task force screen, ran upon a floater which exploded on the port side aft, inflicting serious damage and killing 25; by autumn more than 300 mines would have been recovered on Japanese shores.

For the U.N. divisions in Korea the bill had of course been higher, although ground force casualties in April and May were less than half those of November and December, less even than those of January and February. But for the armies of Communist China the spring offensive had proved disastrous. United Nations’ estimates of casualties inflicted on the enemy claimed 70,000 for the April push, 90,000 for the week ending 23 May, and 147,000 for the two-week period from 20 May to 3 June; GHQ intelligence summaries estimated a total for April and May of 283,000, with 72,000 more in June. Figures like these do not, perhaps, inspire complete confidence, but unquestionably Communist losses were extremely severe, and while the impact of this bloody attrition on the manpower of China was minimal, its impact on the available total of trained military personnel was not. There was also a perceptible effect on morale, and prisoners began to surrender in unprecedented numbers: 3,000 Chinese were taken between 16 and 22 May and another 10,000 in the following week.

As the defeated Communists retired northward, with Van Fleet’s armies hard on their heels, command changes continued throughout the forces of the U.N. Subsequent to the attack on the Hwachon Dam, Admiral Ofstie had been relieved of command of Task Force 77 by Admiral Henderson, and on 17 May had taken over as Chief of Staff to ComNavFE. In April Major General Gerald C. Thomas, USMC, had relieved General Smith in command of the Marine Division; late in May General Cushman, who had come out with the brigade, succeeded General Harris in command of the Aircraft Wing, to be himself relieved two months later. With the ending of the threat to Inchon Admiral Thackrey went home; in June, Task Force 95 got a new commander in the person of Rear Admiral George C. Dyer. In the other services the same was true: the Army command had changed in April; in June command of FEAF was assumed by Lieutenant General Otto P. Weyland, USAF, previously vice-commander for operations; at Fifth Air Force, General Partridge was replaced by Major General Frank P. Everest, USAF. Of major force commanders present in the Far East when the troubles began, only Admiral Joy remained, and he was shortly to receive some temporary additional duty which would occupy his whole attention.

At home, meanwhile, the United States had resumed its peculiar custom of conducting foreign policy by congressional hearing. In 1949 the unification investigation had demonstrated, through its exposition of military capability and strategic intent, that the only war contemplated by the United States was a big war in defense of Europe, and had opened the door to aggression by proxy in Asia. Now in the MacArthur hearings the details of strategic planning were again spread upon the public record, to reaffirm beyond a shadow of a doubt that the United States, unwilling to become fixed in a secondary theater, neither intended to expand the war in Asia nor to attempt the forcible unification of Korea. This separation of the political aim of Korean unification from the military objective of repelling aggression was reaffirmed by the President in May, and by the Secretary of State and the Secretary General of the United Nations in early June.

Since the United States did not propose to advance farther into North Korea, and since the Communists were in no condition to advance southward, an agreement to disagree seemed possible, which, while leaving the world and Korea divided much as before, would at least liquidate the fighting. On 23 June the Russian representative at the Security Council, whose fortuitous absence a year before had permitted U.N. action, made a radio address in which he indicated that the chief string-pullers would look favorably upon negotiations for an armistice.

Soundings in Moscow confirmed the official nature of these views, and the offer was taken up. General Ridgway was instructed to invite the Communists to meet with U.N. delegates on board the Danish hospital ship Jutlandia in Wonsan harbor for discussion of an armistice. With the selection of Admiral Joy as senior delegate for the United Nations, Admiral Ofstie took over in Tokyo as acting ComNavFE, and Naval Forces Far East were alerted to support the armistice discussions. On 30 June the invitation was broadcast to the enemy.
The reply came the next day: while agreeing to meet for talks, the Communists suggested that the location be changed to the city of Kaesong, 35 miles northwest of Seoul. This counterproposal doubtless reflected the symbolic difference between a meeting in one of Korea's historic cities, within Communist lines yet south of the 38th parallel, and one at sea on board a United Nations ship. Since the progress of negotiations would impede military action in the immediate neighborhood, it may also have indicated a desire to block the main road to Pyongyang. Possibly the Communists merely wanted the last word. The suggestion was quickly accepted, presumably in anticipation of an expeditious settlement, but in time the U.N. Command would regret this easy complaisance. On 8 July, following further communications, there was a meeting of liaison officers, and on the 10th, ComNavFE and his delegation confronted the Communists at Kaesong.

To the peoples of the non–Communist world the commencement of armistice discussions was heartening. Although Syngman Rhee went at once on record against all compromise, and demanded a continuation of the war for unification, elsewhere the hope that rational solutions would be quickly found produced a lifting of the spirit. These hopes were doubtless highest among the Americans, with their inbred belief in the value of the spoken and written word and their congenital distrust of the gloomy lessons of history. But even in the United States there were perhaps some whose experience encompassed negotiations with the Communists, and who could see the omens in the meeting at Kaesong.

The presence at the conference table of Chinese generals and an American naval officer called to mind the earlier discussions between Shufeldt and Li Hung-chang concerning the future of Korea, a future which intervening decades had done little to clarify. The antiquity of American concern with the welfare of the Koreans was recalled in the persons of the American interpreters, Lieutenants Horace G. Underwood, USNR, and Richard Underwood, AUS, grandsons of that Underwood who 66 years before had founded the Presbyterian mission to Korea. If these echoes of the past did not sufficiently suggest the intractability of the Korean question, and a likelihood that no speedy settlement would be reached, a contemporary incident, passing almost unnoticed, could have served as evidence that wars do not end all at once. On 30 June, on a little island in the northern Marianas, 19 Japanese soldiers and sailors, who for six years had refused to believe that their war was over, finally surrendered to the U.S.S. Cocopa.
IN A SMALL bronze shrine in the forum of ancient Rome the image of Janus, god of beginnings and endings, looked both east and west. It was the custom of the Romans, upon the outbreak of war, to throw wide the doors of this temple, and to shut them up again with the return of peace. In the summer of 1951 the commencement of Korean armistice talks seemed to promise an imminent end to the fighting, and a return of the struggle to the diplomatic plane. It seems a propitious moment to emulate the two-headed god, and to look, before the doors are closed, forward and backward in time, and east and west toward distant horizons.

In a year of Korean fighting the forces of the United Nations, with those of the United States in great preponderance, could be said to have won two wars. Successively, following initial surprise and early reverses, the armies of North Korea and of Communist China had been defeated. But the policy adopted following the second victory differed strikingly from that of the autumn before: rather than press on to the northward, and to possible involvement with yet another previously uncommitted force, it was decided to stabilize the situation, and to abandon the aim of a military unification of Korea. Yet though success was therefore limited, and though the cost had not been cheap, fulfillment of the original aim of repelling invasion made the Enterprise worthwhile.

Those mindful of earlier unchecked Axis aggressions who had taken the momentous decision to intervene could properly feel themselves justified, the more so in view of the implications of the fall of an undefended South Korea.

That so much had been accomplished, given the unexpected nature of the conflict, appears remarkable. If war, as someone has said, is a matter of surprise and movement, the first year of fighting in Korea certainly qualifies. The invasion of South Korea had come as a decided and unpleasant surprise to the United States; the intervention of the Chinese surprised the U.N. Command. Equally, it may be presumed, the rapidity of American diplomatic and military reaction in the summer of 1950 surprised the enemy, as did the recovery of the Eighth Army after the low point of the winter campaign. Most surprised of all, perhaps, were the members of the prevailing school of American military thought, with their emphasis on single-weapon single-theater strategy. War had come but not in Europe, nor, at least formally, with the "one possible enemy." Despite the view that held the assault from the sea to be a thing of the past, the pattern of the conflict had been shaped, not by the heavy bomber with its atomic weapon, but by the Amphibious Force and its projectile, the Marine Division.

For this there were a variety of reasons. The agreed and publicized strategic plan had found, hardly surprisingly, an enemy intelligent enough to circumvent it. Despite the impact of budgetary considerations on defense planning there remained, if narrowly, enough conventional force to permit a descent from fancy to fact and the conduct of a land war supported by sea and air. The nature of the theater, the ground rules which came to govern the campaign, and the importance of collective action all militated against employment of the atomic bomb and in favor of rational warfare. And lastly, the choice between accepting defeat and employing nuclear weapons was never finally posed.

In any event the atomic art, in those far-off days, was still somewhat primitive. Only eight nuclear explosions had been set off by the United States, and none since 1948. There had been no development of low-yield tactical weapons. In the Air Force the delivery of the bomb still rested on the capabilities of piston-engined aircraft: the first production B–47 only took the air the day the North Koreans crossed the parallel. In the Navy only the three large carriers—Coral Sea, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Midway—had any kind of atomic capability, and all were assigned to the Atlantic Fleet.
The Russian explosion of the previous year had, it is true, expedited work on both the hydrogen bomb and tactical weapons, and the coming of war in Korea spurred the effort. Preparations for new tests at Eniwetok were underway at the time of the invasion of South Korea, and 1951 saw 16 U.S. explosions which, with two more by the Soviets, doubled the total of the preceding years. While the threat to the perimeter was at its height, and again in the dark days of December 1950, there was some talk of tactical use of existing atomic devices; some training runs were carried out in the course of the war by the Air Force, and by the Navy after the arrival in 1952 of the converted Oriskany and Kearsarge. But that was all. The war was fought to its end with conventional weapons. The Strategic Air Command turned out to be the shield rather than the sword of strategy, and as a limiting rather than an expanding agent wholly justified, if in an unexpected manner, its great cost.

As things worked out, therefore, the war in Korea developed as a classic exercise in sea power reminiscent of earlier times. The similarity, it is true, was to some extent concealed by differences in the society that supported the campaign, for to Americans of the mid-20th century the struggle was confusing and at times distressing. If a war, it was one which had never been declared by Congress; if a police action, it was of a magnitude without precedent since the affair with Tripoli; for those whose lives had spanned periods of presumed peace punctuated by world-wide conflict, the concept of limited war took some getting used to. At home, life went on as usual, with no restrictions on civilian consumption, with no apparent all-out national effort, and with administration policy subjected to increasing criticism. But however limited the war, for the individual in the armed forces—regular, recalled reserve, or draftee—there was no limit on the strain, hazard, or boredom of the conflict. Although mitigated by a purposeful program of rapid rotation, this situation, acceptable in 19th century wars fought by regulars, inevitably created problems of morale for those on the fighting line, as shown by conduct after capture by the enemy. Inevitably, too, it created serious tensions at home, which were not diminished by the cooperative nature of the U.N. effort, with its incumbent need to defer to allies whose contribution at times seemed minimal.

Back of all this, however, the historic pattern remained. As in earlier days the entire Enterprise rested on control of the ocean highway, by which the troops were transported from the metropolis to the theater of action, and there supplied, supported, and assisted by the Navy. But here too time had wrought its changes. Where in the expeditions to Mexico and the Crimea, to the Sudan and South Africa, free use of the seas had been the prime enabling factor, in Korea the nature of the theater and the development of modern weapons gave the Navy important influence throughout the conflict. For the first year of war, above all for the first six months when the elements of surprise and movement were most apparent, this influence was so great as to be almost described as controlling.

The maritime aspect of the campaign first showed itself in the concentration of forces to meet the unexpected emergency, a concentration so rapid as to surprise friend and foe alike. To MSTS lifts of Army units from Japan, Okinawa, and the continental United States, to the Amphibious Force’s management of the Pohang landing and the trans-Pacific movement of the Marine Division, to the high-speed delivery of Air Force fighter-bombers by aircraft carrier, and to logistic support of the entire U.N. effort, there was added a rapid and extensive reinforcement of naval fighting strength.

This speed of concentration was vital, given the shortage of force which in the summer of 1950 affected all services alike. Although the Army was to commit almost everything it had to the narrow Korean front, and although numerically large ROK contingents were available, it was necessary to employ the Marine Division as an infantry force throughout the war. From beginning to end the Air Force felt itself operating on a shoestring, with limited strength, obsolescent types, and a very marginal supporting organization. For the naval forces of the U.N. the situation was the same. While the speed and size of reinforcement were impressive, base facilities in the Far East were marginal; and while all available ships were committed to the Korean theater, these proved no more
than sufficient for the war that did develop. Delayed deployment would have meant the loss of the Korean foothold; further opposition would have meant a very different war.

So speed of movement to a large degree made up for shortages, and weakness on the ground was counterbalanced by supremacy at sea and in the air. Together with the work of the Air Force, the northern strikes by Task Force 77, the close support provided by both fast and escort carriers, the blockade of the Korean coast, the bombing and bombardment of enemy transportation facilities, and the gunfire support of the ends of the perimeter made it possible for Eighth Army to stabilize a chaotic situation. This done, the forces of the U.N. assumed the initiative, and with the landing at Inchon commenced three months of rapid movement up and down the peninsula. The two landings and the evacuations of this period of triumph and tragedy demonstrated that in a theater of combat washed by the sea the forces of the West possessed a flexibility, a speed of movement, and a strategic freedom for which the enemy had no answer. Yet while this rapid movement derived entirely from naval capabilities it should be noted that the Navy, skeptical of the proposed amphibious operations, sailed somewhat reluctantly to glory.

Of the decision to invade Inchon, pushed through by General MacArthur in the face of generalized doubts, it seems profitless to inquire whether it was in fact strategically sound. A success of such a magnitude would seem to justify even unjustifiable risks, and in any case once the decision had been made the risks, as always, began to seem smaller. But regarding the argument that the landing was unnecessary and that a better solution would have been for Eighth Army merely to shove against the perimeter, some comment may be in order. Doubtless this unimaginative strategy would have worked in time, but a victory so won would have been more costly, less elegant, and less decisive, and America at that moment had great need of a decisive victory. One should, it would seem, play from strength: so long as the U.N. fought its own kind of war, and used its advantages at sea and in the air, in sophisticated control systems, and in more efficient transport, the enemy was at a disadvantage. When these factors were neglected, and the North Koreans and Chinese given time to play it their way, the consequences were less happy.

Criticism has also been directed against CincFE’s decision for a second amphibious landing. Both at the time and since, the overland movement by way of the Seoul-Wonsan corridor has been urged as the preferable alternative, and the anticlimactic nature of the Wonsan operation has seemed to lend weight to this view. But the fact that South Korean forces got there before the Marines appears less an indictment of "Tailboard" than testimony to the extraordinary effectiveness of "Chromite." If some in both Army and Navy urged the overland route, it was still true that the road was a difficult one, and that, as the affair at Kojo showed, there were enemy forces in the flanking hills. It is, of course, undeniable that the reembarkation of X Corps wrought considerable confusion in the logistic sphere, and slowed the preparations of Eighth Army and Fifth Air Force for the advance on Pyongyang. Equally, however, the problem of supporting both X Corps and Eighth Army through Inchon and Seoul would have been far from child’s play. And whatever the decision as to the route, the harbor of Wonsan, strategically essential, had to be swept and opened to shipping before further moves could be undertaken.

As X Corps was floated up first one side of the peninsula and then the other, and as Eighth Army pressed on to seize the enemy capital, none foresaw the impending disaster. Yet it was in their response to the Chinese onslaught that the forces under Admirals Joy and Struble made perhaps their greatest contribution. The size of the attacking Chinese forces, the collapse in the west, and the widely dispersed condition of X Corps combined to bring about a major emergency and to return the initiative to the other side. But the crisis was met, and previous conscientious staff work was implemented with zeal and competence, to assist the retreat of Eighth Army, to help the Marines down from the hill, and to accomplish the redeployment of X Corps. Indeed the work of the Marine Division, of the Marine and naval aviators, of the gunnery ships and of the Amphibious Force may well have done still more, for one may wonder whether in the event of a major tragedy in northeastern Korea the war could have been kept limited. It is at least conceivable that the enemy, as well as the U.N., had in this instance cause to be
grateful for the capabilities of the United States Navy and Marines.

Thus in the space of six months a scheme of maneuver made possible by rapid overseas deployment and based on the maximum use of naval capabilities had halted one invasion, defeated one enemy, and saved the day when a second intervened. But the period of a dominantly maritime strategy ended with the old year. The numerical strength of the new enemy required the retention of all ground forces in the line, and when the armies of the U.N. again moved north it was without benefit of the amphibious encirclement.

Yet while land operations henceforth held the center of the stage, the strategic situation was little changed. Korea was still a peninsular war, and supporting naval action was still of prime importance. On both coasts the blockade continued, while the lessons of history were brandished before the enemy in a series of amphibious feints. In the east, as it had from the beginning, naval gunfire continued to support the movements of ROK troops. In the interdiction of enemy transportation routes and along the battleline the work of naval air remained essential. Pusan port was still the basis of the campaign; the reopening of Inchon had greatly eased logistics in the western lowlands; in forward coastal areas and on the offshore islands, ground forces were supplied by LST. Underlying all was the Pacific Ocean supply line, by which rations, rounds, and gaiter buttons reached the free world’s Asiatic toehold. Whatever the specific reasons for his selection, the choice of Commander Naval Forces Far East as chief of the U.N. Armistice Delegation was symbolically wholly appropriate.
Chapter 11. Problems of a Policeman

2. Operating Problems

Seen in the large, therefore, the struggle in Korea greatly resembled the classic overseas campaigns of previous times. But within this framework the Korean War, like all wars, was unique, and the questions that faced those charged with its prosecution were questions of the moment. Daily, as is always the case in war, problems presented themselves, their nature governed by the immediate situation, and were faced, solved, evaded, or lived with as the ingenuity of man permitted.

In Korea the collective nature of the effort to repel the aggressor led, in notable contradistinction to most small wars of the 19th century, to the development of international forces on land, at sea, and in the air. Although the United States provided by far the largest part of the U.N. naval contingent, and although the second contribution derived from Britain and the British Commonwealth, units from the navies of Colombia, France, the Netherlands, and Thailand also took part. And special notice should be taken of the accomplishments of the ROK Navy and Marine Corps in developing, in circumstances tragic for them and amidst almost indescribable difficulties, into forces of considerable size and efficiency.

Within the structure of the U.N. Command the Korean Navy remained a separate task group. All other foreign units were assigned for administrative purposes to Rear Admiral Andrewes’ West Coast Group, and at an early date that commander was confiding to his war diary his need for the gift of tongues, as described in the Acts of the Apostles, and his relief at not having acquired, at least as yet, any recruits from Phrygia or Pamphilia. Inevitably some "very original problems" arose owing to language difficulties, the absence of common codes, varying degrees of training and expertise, and differing dietary preferences. Yet to the credit of all participants no insoluble difficulties developed, workable solutions were invariably thrashed out, and command relations remained excellent.

The rapid assembly of sufficient strength made the waging of a campaign possible. The nature of the campaign was largely governed by that of the assembled force. For the navies of the U.N. the lack of new construction, the limited funds available for modernization, and the restricted aircraft procurement programs made it inevitable that the war would be fought with ships, gear, and personnel largely left over from World War II. This situation, generally applicable to first-line units, was emphasized with time, as aging ships were removed from the mothball fleet, hastily refurbished, and deployed forward manned by aging reserves.

In all areas of naval operations, although in varying degree, problems of obsolescence presented themselves. Radar capabilities had not kept up with advances in aircraft performance; the limitations of World War II sonar were becoming critical; the unloading rates of APA and AKA types had fallen behind the needs of the times; everywhere maintenance was becoming an increasing problem. But it was in the carrier forces that the pressures of change and progress were most acute.

There the march of events was dramatized in the operation, side by side and throughout the war, of the first jet fighters, the last and finest of the piston-engined attack planes, and the F4U Corsair, in active service ever since the campaign in the Solomons. Continued dependence on this ancient aircraft was made possible by the existence of large numbers of preserved leftovers; in the circumstances prevailing in Korea it gave excellent service, eased the problems of transition, and made possible the useful work of escort and light carriers throughout the war. Yet even with the F4U, operational requirements pressed against the limits of the capabilities of these smaller ships: the low wind conditions of summer in the Yellow Sea made the speed limitations of the escort carrier critical; although the CVL had the speed, its limited bunker capacity restricted the fuelling of
screening ships and limited endurance. And in the fast carriers, despite the cushioning effect of the presence of these old friends, the advent of new types presented difficulties.

The takeoff and landing characteristics of the newer aircraft posed needs for more powerful catapults and for improved arresting gear. The advent of the jet fighter, essentially a flying gasoline barrel which paid for increased performance in phenomenal fuel consumption, raised difficult logistic problems, as did the great lifting capacity of the AD: each jet sortie cost the parent ship a minute in replenishment alongside a tanker; each three-ton bombload that left the deck meant a couple of minutes alongside an AE. And month by month these difficulties became more pressing, for as the efficiency of carrier operations increased, as the jet complement grew from one squadron to two, and as the jets in turn began to be launched with bombs, full-scale operations could exhaust certain types of ammunition in a day and use up the aviation gasoline of a non-converted carrier in less than two.

Thus the problems consequent to the introduction of new aircraft, while impinging directly upon the carriers and their crews, radiated outward to affect the work of their replenishment and screening ships. A more general difficulty, particularly apparent in the carriers owing to the complex nature of their operations but affecting all ship types, was the congestion brought about by new equipment: larger catapult machinery and magazine spaces in the carriers, more elaborate electronic and communications gear in all ships. Such installations take up space, but shipboard space is finite; their operation calls for personnel; with less space and larger crews comes undesirable crowding, or a diminution of military capabilities, or both. For this generalized tendency of modern war toward greater and greater complication the obvious theoretical answer was newer and larger ships; a more immediately practical one was the modification of existing hulls. This, for the fleet carriers, took place in stages: a first modernization of units of the Essex class brought various improvements, most notably more powerful catapults and larger fuel capacity, but at the cost of space for five aircraft; the second stage, reached late in the war, produced the "converted" Essex carrier with additional aviation fuel capacity, reinforced flight decks, and other new developments. There remained the angled deck, which began to appear after the Korean armistice, but this marked about the limit of what could be done with old hulls, and further progress waited upon new construction.

These tendencies toward specialization, elaboration, size, complexity, and cost, apparent throughout the fleet, placed a great premium upon versatility, and emphasized the value of any multipurpose instruments that might come along. Two of these, one new and one old, were of such importance as to deserve special mention. These were the helicopter and the LST.

The helicopter, here receiving its first test in combat, proved of transcendent value as plane guard for carrier operations, as platform for observation and for gunfire spotting, in the location of underwater mines, in providing courier and transport service between ships at sea and across difficult terrain ashore, in the rescue of pilots down behind enemy lines, and in the rapid evacuation of the wounded. The aging and awkward LST, with its ability to beach where ports were lacking and to load and discharge by the bow without the need of winchmen and stevedores, was wholly indispensable. In addition to filling their primary amphibious role, and so greatly speeding both advance and retreat, Scajap and Amphibious Force LSTs provided logistic support across the beaches to units dispersed along the length of the peninsula and among the outlying islands. In December 1950, in a report to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Joy expressed his belief that the 38 Scajap ships had made the difference between holding and losing the Pusan beachhead, and observed that "the LST has possibly made the greatest single contribution to the success of the U.N. forces in Korea."

Within the operating forces the demonstrated versatility of both helicopter and LST led quickly to insatiable demands. For the minesweeping groups the marriage of these two instruments produced an unmatched combination of reconnaissance base, headquarters, and small boat mother ship. From all ships of sufficient size arose appeals for the installation of helicopter landing platforms. From numerous commands came urgent
recommendations for the construction of new and improved LSTs.

Interacting with these problems of technological change and suitability were those posed by the nature of the theater and the actions of the enemy. Of these, one never before encountered on any scale and looked forward to with some apprehension, was that of cold weather carrier operations. But winter in the Sea of Japan proved no great obstacle, and despite low temperatures, stormy seas, and snow and ice on the flight deck, the carrier force continued as before with but a slight reduction in sortie rate.

Night carrier operations, however, were another matter, for in the air, as elsewhere, western-style war had been generally unable to adapt to the hours of darkness. In the war against Japan no permanent solution had been found, and the Pacific Fleet had wavered between employment of special night detachments and the assignment of individual carriers to night work only. In Korea the enemy’s predilection for night attacks, and his dependence on nightly truck convoys for logistic support, raised the problem in an acute form for the aviators of all services.

In the Navy the handful of specially-configurated carrier aircraft soon proved inadequate, and from the beginning of the conflict carrier commanders commented on the lack of night capabilities. At home, by early 1951, the Chief of Staff of the Operational Development Force was urging the assignment of a fleet carrier to night work. In April 1952 Admiral Ofstie observed that "until effective techniques for night attacks are available, interdiction will be at best only marginal." But since carrier decks were in short supply and techniques left much to be desired, the deficiency remained for the duration, in embarked as in shore-based aviation.

With the single exception of the mining campaign the enemy made no effort at sea. But this stroke hit where economy had been compounded by disinterest, and the difficulties at Wonsan demonstrated the outstanding naval deficiency of the conflict. Despite all efforts to improve the situation the mine remained a most effective weapon, costly in time and effort, and one which would have been more so had the Soviets chosen to commit advanced types. As it was, the lessons of previous wars were reaffirmed, the importance of the mine reemphasized, and a research program of considerable magnitude undertaken for the development of efficient methods of detection and removal.

Two other areas of potentially serious trouble went untested by the enemy. Without question a Communist submarine offensive would have changed the entire nature of the war. Harbor defense installations had enjoyed a low priority in planning and were but tardily completed; destroyers and frigates were in short supply. Although the early efforts to provide minimum cover for convoys in Tsushima Strait were soon terminated, and the escorts assigned to blockade duty, the total number of antisubmarine types was never more than sufficient to provide a minimum sound screen for the carrier task force and to meet the requirements of blockade. No effort was ever made at trans-Pacific escort of convoy, and this was perhaps just as well, for the half-dozen oilers and escort carriers and the hundred–odd escort types needed for such an Enterprise were nowhere to be found.

Almost equally, a determined enemy air offensive would have raised grave problems, at sea as well as on shore. Here too the destroyer shortage was important, limiting as it did the strength of antiaircraft screens for major vessels and the employment of radar picket ships. Against propeller-driven attack planes the fast carriers could doubtless have given a good account of themselves, but operation within the range of enemy jets was complicated by various factors. Since the World War II electronic identification devices were known to the Russians, and since newer systems were only gradually becoming operational, there was a serious recognition problem. Shipborne radar capabilities were inadequate, owing both to postwar concentration on resolution rather than range, and to the concurrent arrival of the jet airplane, in which higher speeds and operating altitudes accompanied a reflecting surface greatly diminished by absence of a propeller. To cap all there was the lack, at the outset not peculiar to the Navy, of a plane which could meet the MIG on anything approaching even terms. But although in late 1950 the Air Force received, in the F–86 Sabre, a fighter of comparable performance, no such
carrier-based jet was to appear in Korea.

The questions thus far considered have been principally of a technological nature. But armaments themselves are neutral, only their users give them meaning, and among the complex problems posed by war in Korea was that of personnel. In June 1950 the Pacific Fleet was manned slightly below peacetime level, and the naval population of the Western Pacific was of the order of 11,000; within the space of six months this total was to be multiplied by six, and the need for so rapid an increase raised pressing questions of where to find the men.

Finding them involved a series of emergency actions. All hands were recalled from leave, overseas tours of duty and enlistments were indefinitely extended and ship-to-shore rotation halted, shore stations were stripped of all that they could spare and more. But despite all, the situation in the early weeks was often critical, especially in the Amphibious Force. Both at Inchon and at Wonsan ships were manned well below operational requirements, and in some cases even below peacetime allowances; some of the LSTs for Inchon were recommissioned a bare two weeks before the event with but 30 percent of complement on board, and with the majority of the crews and even some of the commanding officers lacking previous experience with this type.

Great difficulties also developed in providing the staff personnel needed to direct the operations of the expanding naval force. ComNavFE’s staff had been designed for occupation duty, Admiral Higgins’ was tailored to show the flag, and others were in a similar fix. In some areas nothing existed and drastic action was necessary, as when the need for a shore-based air command brought the shanghaiing of Captain Alderman and the borrowing of Admiral Ruble. Most dramatic of the staff problems was that which afflicted Admiral Smith upon his arrival from the United States to assume command of Task Force 95: on 12 September 1950 Smith broke his flag on a tender in Sasebo with no staff at all, a condition of lonely splendor in which he continued for two weeks before anyone reported in, and for more than a month before his principal assistants were all on board.

Over and above the resources made available by emergency measures the only personnel stockpile lay in the Naval Reserve. This was immediately levied upon, both to increase existing complements and for fleet expansion. Here again, in another context, the timing of the Korean War may be said to have been fortunate: a few more years and the capabilities of the dominantly World War II Reserve would have been very doubtful.

Selective recall of reservists was at once begun, but the remedy, as always, brought its own problems. However willing to take part in a major national emergency, those recalled could hardly avoid a feeling of double jeopardy while some of their fellows, and others who had never served in uniform, remained uncalled upon. Like the population at large, the Reserve doubtless contained a handful of the politically disaffected: at one point a suspicion of sabotage on one of the fast carriers brought an investigation and the precautionary transfer of a few hands to other duty. But no serious problems ever developed, and despite the strains imposed by prosperity and lack of interest at home, morale remained generally excellent.

By the end of 1950 the personnel situation was satisfactory in total numbers, but the distribution of regulars and reserves, hastily accomplished, was extremely unbalanced. The training of many reserves was below standard. There were acute shortages in certain categories of commissioned personnel and in a number of crucial ratings. The selection and detail of those recalled to active duty suffered from the nature of mobilization planning, where once again the concept of the one big war had proven costly. In the years after 1945 an emergency service rating structure had been set up, predicated on prospective full mobilization, which divided the normal ratings into specialized subcategories to which individual reservists were assigned. But since Korea did not qualify as a general emergency no shift to the new structure was made, and reservists were called up in their general service ratings. Within these larger groupings there was ample room for misassignment, but while some of the results were sufficiently dramatic to excite attention the situation never reached gross dimensions.

Most of these difficulties could be cured in time, but in some areas famine was endemic: certain rates were short throughout the war; with the release of reservists in 1952 the shortage of reliable and experienced petty officers became increasingly acute. In November 1951 CincPacFleet warned of this impending scarcity; in
February 1952 both ComServPac and CincPacFleet felt the situation presented a serious threat to combat readiness. By the end of the year it was expected that allowances would on the average be only some 40 percent filled, and would drop as low as 25 percent in those crucial specialties—yeoman, radarman, radioman, and electrician’s and machinist’s mate—in which the armed forces were competing directly with American industry.

Dangerous though these shortages were, they seem never to have seriously affected combat readiness. A questionnaire circulated among ships in the Western Pacific, inquiring if damage or casualty had resulted from personnel shortage, produced a majority of negative answers, although a number of replies reported minor maintenance difficulties and a continued shortage of deck watch standers and of radiomen. This rating, indeed, despite the establishment of a special school at Sasebo, remained most critical of all, and these people were perhaps the real heroes of the Korean War: in many ships, particularly destroyers, a six-hour watch-and-watch schedule was the rule for weeks on end. It is, of course, a truism that burdens are never equally distributed in time of crisis, but the effect of loads like this on the inclination to reenlist needs no elaboration.
Chapter 11. Problems of a Policeman

3. Logistic Support

No one can fight unsupported. Without timely and adequate logistic backing the finest strategy is only a paper plan. In Korea, as in any overseas theater, land strategy was a function of port facilities, and the campaign developed as a series of movements based on Pusan, Inchon, Wonsan, Hungnam, and Chinnampo. At sea, as always, the capabilities of the fighting forces were similarly dependent on the effectiveness of the supporting organization. The importance of seaborne supply to the war in the peninsula has already been touched on; it remains to consider the administration of naval logistics.

Here too affairs were complicated by the absence of plans for other than major hostilities, and by the resultant need to improvise. In the Far East the lack of a naval logistic command, the general shortage of staff personnel, and the pressure of operations hampered logistic planning. Since most Pacific and Far Eastern base facilities had been either inactivated or reduced to an austerity level, support for the Korean effort had to be projected in one bound from the west coast. Lacking both high-level guidance and detailed requests from the theater of operations, Admiral Denebrink’s Service Force had, at the start, to fight its war intuitively.

With the outbreak of war the immediate problem was to provide a flow of consumer’s goods for the expanding Western Pacific naval force, a problem calling both for estimates of needs and for action to fulfill them. In such items as rations, clothing, and small and general stores, where usage is closely related to population, prediction is simple enough, and in any case fleet units can live off their fat for a time. In these categories all that was required was a rapid expansion of overseas shipments. But in ammunition and petroleum products, where usage varies unpredictably with the tempo of operations, more complicated questions arise.

The first steps in ammunition supply have been noted earlier. Until late August, when the pipeline from the United States became filled, ammunition was hurried forward from stocks at Guam and Pearl Harbor. By mid-November some 66,000 tons had been delivered to NavFE and Seventh Fleet, of which only about 15,000 tons had been expended, and except for intermittent and unpredictable spot shortages this problem was under control for the duration.

In petroleum, the lifeblood of modern war, the situation was less satisfactory. Jurisdiction over POL had been centralized in Washington in the Armed Services Petroleum Purchasing Agency, and overseas in the theater commanders. In July, as consumption skyrocketed, Service Force oilers and gasoline tankers were pressed into duty and MSTS expanded its contract tanker fleet. In the Pacific Area, despite the drain from increased transoceanic sea and air movement, petroleum stocks were adequately maintained, but in the Far East there developed a series of potentially dangerous shortages.

Although adequate storage capacity was available in the theater, the supply on hand in the summer of 1950 was not what it should have been, and the planners failed adequately to anticipate the increase in demand. In the grade of aviation gasoline used by the Navy, stocks remained relatively constant, but by October increased consumption had brought local shortages which had to be made up by shipments from the Pacific Area and from the Philippines. In Air Force grade aviation gasoline and in Navy fuel oil the situation was worse: supplies of the former declined steadily from the start of the war, and monthly from August to November there came periods of crisis; in black oil, increased usage coupled with inadequate requests produced a serious December shortage which required rapid transfers from the Pacific Area. Except for some restrictions on airlift, the fighting forces were fortunately never affected, but the margin was too close for comfort. No safety factor existed, and the loss of a single tanker from whatever cause would have seriously curtailed operations.
In two other areas of fleet support, shortages and delays developed, although again happily without ill
effect. Plans for emergency establishment of harbor defenses were lacking, and materiel was in short supply: the
laying of an antisubmarine net at Sasebo, although stimulated by a submarine alarm within the harbor in mid-
August, was begun only on 3 October. Similar troubles affected the provision of degaussing facilities, where
construction of a range at Yokosuka, begun as a routine project, was raised to the highest priority with the first
evidence of enemy mining. But here fate intervened: en route to the California port of embarkation a truck loaded
with instruments for this installation rolled off the highway, outloading was not completed until 9 November, and
not until eight months after its authorization did the Yokosuka range become operational.

As supplies and gear were hurried west, and as the Service Force moved to assume its administrative
responsibilities, service units were deployed forward to provide the maximum in floating support and to minimize
the need for expanded shore facilities. The establishment in July of Service Squadron 3 and of Service Division
31 eased planning problems and implementing responsibilities for both Seventh Fleet and Naval Forces Far East.
In the following weeks the expansion of Service Force strength in the forward area was expedited to provide
underway replenishment of operating forces, salvage services, and in-port replenishment and maintenance at
Sasebo and at amphibious objectives. By September, when this procedure received formal ratification in an
exchange of dispatches between CincPacFleet and the Chief of Naval Operations, its implementation was well
underway. Its dimensions may be appreciated from the tabulation of supporting units present in the theater.
Click here to view table

Appreciable though it was, to those involved this reinforcement seemed only marginal, as did the
projected growth of Service Force strength as a whole. The plans for naval expansion which developed over the
summer called for an increase of service vessels from 46 to 67, a growth of less than 50 percent, while the active
strength of the Pacific Fleet was slated to rise from 259 ships to 492, thus nearly doubling. With more than 90
fighting ships in the Western Pacific this allowance of repair vessels and tenders promised to be adequate only so
long as battle damage remained small, while in other logistic types day-to-day requirements threatened to exceed
the capacity of deployed units. The availability of oilers was marginal: despite the proximity of the operating area
to the Japanese base, the demands of underway replenishment were such that in-port fuelling was dependent upon
British and Scapian tankers. The lack of ammunition ships forced early recourse to the use of AKAs with specially
sheathed holds, an expedient which fortunately worked out acceptably. And of course there were never enough
LSTs.

Despite the shortage of oilers and ammunition ships, replenishment at sea was quickly begun.
Unavoidably, in the first days of action, naval units refueled and rearmed in port, the Seventh Fleet at Buckner
Bay and Sasebo, NavFE ships at Sasebo and at Pusan. But the need to keep the carriers on the line brought a shift
to underway resupply at the earliest possible date, and on 23 July Task Force 77 first fueled at sea to the south of
Cheju Do. For the rest of 1950, the expansion of the carrier force and the high rate of consumption at Inchon and
in the December crisis kept this a shoestring operation. By year’s end, nevertheless, ComServron 3’s fleet oilers,
in 72 meetings, had accomplished 100 carrier, 11 battleship, 50 cruiser, and 546 destroyer fuelings at sea, while
Mount Katmai, the reactivated Paricutin, and the sheathed AKAs had rearmed the force on 54 occasions.
Transfers during these exercises were not limited to the 1,750,000 barrels of fuel oil, the 171,000 barrels of
aviation gasoline, and the 7,665 short tons of ammunition which were delivered, but included numerous
passengers and an infinite variety of miscellaneous commodities and fleet freight. And the supply of urgently
needed items had been speeded by the institution of a daily air delivery service from Japan to Seventh Fleet
carrier decks carried out by war surplus TBM.

For the rest of the war the deployment of underway replenishment ships remained largely unchanged.
One oiler was maintained at Keelung to fuel the Formosa Strait patrol; Yellow Sea units were serviced by
independently sailed ships; to meet the larger needs of forces in the Sea of Japan two tankers and one or two
ammunition ships were kept on station, joined as necessary by storeships and reefers. By 1952 it had become possible to replenish the entire fast carrier task force in the space of nine hours, and the impact of logistics upon operations was being further diminished by resort to the hours of darkness. Night-time replenishment, once considered so dangerous as to be impracticable, now became increasingly routine as a realistic appreciation of the possibilities of radar detection brought a relaxation of darken-ship requirements and the use of screened lights. By 1952 this evolution had become standard to the extent that the first ships were alongside the tankers before daybreak. In the last months of war nightly replenishment became the rule, and the force was meeting requirements which would have seemed wholly visionary in the war against Japan, or indeed in the summer of 1950.

At no time did the underway replenishment force have much leeway. The lifting ability of the ADs and the fuel consumption of the jets strained the capacity, not only of the parent carriers, but of ammunition ships and oilers as well. One result of these steadily increasing requirements was a variety of ingenious improvisations and modifications to the equipment for transfer of POL and ammunition. Another was a vigorous debate on the future of the art, which centered on the need for replenishment vessels with more speed and longer hulls, to keep the force moving and improve handling characteristics alongside, and on the desirability of developing composite replenishment ships which could issue more than one commodity at a time.

In-port logistic support, by contrast, remained comparatively routine once the early period of improvisation was over. Replenishment and repair were handled as practicable by the floating base at Sasebo and by its smaller sister at Yokosuka, while overload requirements were contracted out to Japanese shipyards. Of the 640,000 items of material required to support a modern naval force, some 83,000 high-demand articles, enough to supply 90 percent of fleet needs, were stocked by the Service Squadron; supplies of very large items such as propellers and radar antennae were maintained ashore; more exotic objects were procured on special order, locally or from the United States. The use of Japanese sources of supply, encouraged both by price differential and by elimination of shipping costs and time, rapidly became extensive; for the Navy this reached a peak of over $1,750,000 in June 1951, and although subsequently diminishing, owing to Japanese inflation and to some instances of poor quality or delayed delivery, remained of importance throughout the war.

The value of the Japanese base, indeed, went far beyond the opportunities it afforded for offshore procurement. Although floating support was employed to the utmost, some things, inevitably, had to be done ashore. At the outbreak of hostilities ComNavFE had been faced with the immediate need to convert Sasebo from stand-by status to major operating base, and to provide some airbase facilities in Japan. The first of these requirements called for a rapid expansion of ammunition and cargo-handling capacity and of storage space; the second, urgent in view of the needs for cargo, mail, and passenger services, for carrier aircraft replacement pools, and for patrol plane bases, was solved in the early weeks through negotiations with FEAF.

But such growth tends to snowball. These new and expanded supporting activities came in due course to require support of their own, in expansion of the supply department of Fleet Activities Sasebo and of the Naval Supply Depot at Yokosuka. And in time further steps proved necessary, as needs developed for the enlargement of NavFE headquarters, of naval hospital facilities, and of ship repair capacity.

That these requirements did not make the personnel problem wholly unmanageable was owing to the availability of Japanese labor. At Sasebo, by mid-November 1950, more than 100,000 man-days of Japanese stevedoring had been used in ammunition handling alone, a contribution equivalent to that of a thousand-man labor battalion; at Inchon, Wonsan, and Hungnam, Japanese stevedores were also employed. At Fleet Activities Yokosuka, and elsewhere, nine-tenths of the jobs in the supply and similar organizations were filled by Japanese civilians. In the course of time the staffing of the Yokosuka Ship Repair Facility came to involve about 3,900 Japanese, with some 350 U.S. naval personnel engaged in supervisory work.

In all aspects of logistic support the early days were unavoidably hectic, but from November 1950 quality
and quantity improved steadily, both afloat and ashore. Indeed there were triumphs: the possible need for cold
weather clothing was anticipated in midsummer, and prompt procurement and shipment met all requirements of
the winter campaign. There were also, of course, crises: the embarkation of X Corps in December pretty well
stripped the Far East of tobacco, candy, and writing paper and required, among other things, an emergency order
for a million candy bars. But by spring of 1951 the situation was well under control: underway replenishment was
meeting all demands, floating support in Japan had been expanded by the arrival of reactivated repair ships, shore-
based activities were running smoothly. If it had required almost ten months to assemble a well-rounded logistics
command, no major crisis had developed at any point in the chain. The affair had been so managed that support of
Central Pacific trust territories and preparations at Eniwetok for the forthcoming atomic tests had suffered only
minor delays. And once the basic military requirements had been satisfied the American standard of living came
to attract the solicitude of supply officers, and a growing proportion of correspondence to be devoted to
requisitions for beer, baseballs, boxing gloves, phonographs, pinochle sets, and the like.

What this surplus implied in operating terms became apparent in August 1952, following a hangar deck
fire which caused major damage to Boxer. Although no great military urgency existed, it was decided to make
repairs locally rather than sailing the ship ahead of schedule to the United States. Needed material was ordered by
dispatch and assembled at Yokosuka or flown out from the United States while Boxer was returning from the
operating area. Following an all-hands evolution by the Yokosuka Ship Repair Facility, the repaired and
refurbished carrier was back on the line 19 days after the fire, and completed five more days of flight operations
before heading homeward.

Thus far the discussion has concerned only the naval side of the war. But before leaving the subject of
logistics some notice should be taken of the work of the Military Sea Transportation Service in providing the
trans-Pacific lift on which the entire campaign depended. With the decision to intervene in South Korea the
expanding needs of Army, Navy, and Air Force brought an immediate doubling of the load for MSTS Pacific: in
contrast to a westward lift of 812,000 measurement tons and 71,000 passengers in the second quarter of 1950, the
period from July through September saw 1,984,000 tons and 136,000 passengers carried forward. But to double
the lift, in view of the length of the supply line, the time required for the round trip, and the need for simultaneous
increase of intratheater movement, required far more than a doubling of assigned shipping: the 25 MSTS vessels
in or en route to the Western Pacific on 1 July had increased to 117 by 1 September and to 263 by 1 November.

Such an expansion inevitably had its growing pains. In Japan the recently opened Western Pacific
headquarters of MSTS was acutely short of personnel, and the first weeks were rough ones. In the San Francisco
Bay area the recruitment of merchant marine crews for contract vessels suffered some delays, while an
overestimate of requirements by continental commands resulted for a time in idle shipping. Some administrative
inefficiency developed in the Far East when CincFE, having failed to assign Army and Air Force personnel to the
MSTS Joint Space Assignment Board, complicated communications and planning by interposing a GHQ staff
section between Captain Junker and his customers. The peak loads which accompanied the Inchon, Wonsan, and
Hungnam operations strained the capacity of MSTS to the utmost.

Some questions were also raised in the course of 1950 concerning the efficiency of utilization of MSTS
shipping by the Far East Command. Here speed of cargo handling at destination is the crucial factor, and here,
despite the best efforts of theater port commands, the first months saw considerable delays. Where estimated
required port time was of the order of two weeks, the average ship reaching the Far Eastern theater spent almost a
month in harbor, and the cumulative losses worked out to such considerable equivalents as an entire month’s lift
to Korea, 32 ships assigned to the trans-Pacific run, or $8,000,000 in time charter hire. But this wastage seems
ascrivable more to tactical and geographical factors than to ineptitude in the Far East Command: port time
analyses for Japan, and for Pusan, Wonsan, and Iwon, show a utilization close to maximum; the big losses came
in the autumn at Inchon, where tidal and other limitations of the harbor were compounded by the mounting out of
X Corps units for Wonsan.

With time these difficulties were overcome, and with time operations became routine. They were also impressively large, for the Korean War absorbed the major portion of the activity of MSTS, by now the largest shipping organization in the world. What is needed to support a modern transoceanic war of even limited dimensions may be indicated by a few figures. For World War II the average monthly Pacific outbound cargo came to 1,085,000 tons; in 1953 it fluctuated between 880,000 and 1,400,000 tons. In World War II the monthly average of westbound passengers was 49,200; in 1953 this figure varied between 39,000 and 58,000. As for the shipping requirements which such loads impose, it may be noted that MSTS operated more than three-score ships within the Far Eastern theater, moving 626,000 tons and 74,000 persons a month, while the trans-Pacific figures, in "notional" ships of standard types, reached the totals indicated in Table 20.

Beyond these problems of logistic administration two factors in the Korean situation deserve attention. The first relates to the problem of petroleum procurement, and to the extent to which the ability to make war may be subject to developments independent of the belligerent’s control. The second concerns the nature of the theater of operations, and its influence upon the magnitude of military effort.

Although the POL to support the Korean campaign came, in the first instance, from American stocks, the passage of time brought increasing reliance on the Middle East. Beginning in 1952 a considerable proportion of the jet fuel used in the Far East originated in the Persian Gulf. At a fairly early date the procurement of motor gasoline was divided between U.S. and Persian Gulf sources, while at intervals recourse was had to Aruba in the Dutch Antilles. From the latter half of 1951 the sources of both diesel oil and Navy standard fuel oil were almost entirely Middle Eastern. In the last months of conflict the Persian Gulf provided the United Nations with all its black oil, about a third of the jet fuel, a quarter of the motor gasoline, and more than half the diesel oil; aviation gasoline alone remained a wholly American product. This Middle Eastern procurement afforded a considerable economy in tanker turnaround time as compared to the U.S. Gulf coast, but it also gave hostages to fortune. In the disturbed political state of the area, emphasized in these years by the quarrel between Britain and the Mossadegh regime in Iran, there was little assurance from one month to the next that this source would remain open.

While the ability to prosecute the war thus depended in uncomfortable degree upon the continuity of Middle Eastern oil supplies, the size of the military effort was in large part a function of port capacity. Throughout the war, despite the opportunities offered by the long Korean coast line, United Nations forces remained heavily dependent upon Pusan and Inchon. Such dependence placed a rigid if theoretical limit on the size of the forces that could be supported: a study of the shipping situation in 1951 demonstrated that, in view of the physical limitations of these ports and of Yokohama, a doubling of shipping assigned the Korean run would augment deliveries by a mere 31 percent, and an infinite increase by only 37 percent.

The implications of the study are of interest, applying as they do not only to Korea but to the Indo-China crisis that followed, and indeed to any theater of operations where ports are few. It may be granted that the use of a few large ports is more efficient than a resort to many small ones. But the multiplication of forward unloading sites provides offsetting advantages in economy of land transport, as shown by the difficulties of the post-Inchon advance, and in spreading of risk, as illustrated by the beach surveys of the winter of 1950-51, motivated in part by the possibility of nuclear attack against Pusan.

This whole question of the support of a campaign in a coastal area where ports are few and communications primitive would seem to pose heavy contingent responsibilities upon the Navy. Had it been desired to increase the effort at the front beyond the capacity of Pusan and Inchon, certain steps were theoretically possible. A reallocation of resources to the ground forces might have been accomplished by the shift of Air Force units to island sites, Ullung Do in the east and Tokchok To in the west, for example; an increase in the proportion of embarked aviation, which carries its own port facilities in the form of the Service Squadron, would have had
similar results; an expansion of over the beach supply would have been helpful. But none of these solutions was easily available. The rugged topography of the Korean islands was uninviting, and the islands themselves lacked ports: indeed, a Fifth Air Force desire to set up a Tactical Air Direction Center on Paengnyong Do went unsatisfied owing to presumed logistic impossibility. As for an increase in embarked aviation and in over the beach supply, such measures would have required more carriers and more LSTs, and these were not available.

These questions, however, are speculative. So far as needs and desires dictated, maritime logistics appear to have been well handled. For all forces MSTS did its job; for the Navy the system of mobile logistic support, backed by limited base development in Japan, proved adequate to all demands while obviating the need for extensive construction ashore. If the outbreak of this unexpected war had imposed sudden and sizable logistic problems upon the armed forces of the United States, the impact had not been wholly one-sided. Reports from the submarine patrols in La Pérouse Strait indicated a volume of traffic inbound for Vladivostok which greatly exceeded previous estimates, and which was on the increase.
Chapter 11. Problems of a Policeman

4. Interservice Coordination and the Air Problem

Throughout the Korean War, routine interservice problems were solved with little difficulty. The evacuation of casualties and the allocation of air and sea lift crossed service bounds. Joint planning for amphibious operations was effective. Logistic cross-servicing was generally satisfactory, as Marine aviation was provided with scarce engineering talent by the Air Force, deficiencies in Marine transport were made up by the Army, and aviation materiel was traded back and forth between the Air Force and the Navy. But there was one great exception to this generally harmonious picture.

The exception, of course, concerned the question of the proper employment of tactical aviation, a problem of very long standing and one for which no agreed solution had ever been developed. In the United States a generation of impassioned doctrinal controversy and the experiences of the Second World War had resulted in a reorganization of the armed forces in which the Army was shorn of its aviation and the Army Air Force transmuted into a separate service, while the Navy and Marines retained their organic air components. This reorganization, and the conflicting philosophies and practices which it embodied, met its first test in Korea.

Less than a year before, in the congressional hearings on "Unification and Strategy," the ancient controversy between the schools of separate and of integrated air war had reached its moment of greatest bitterness. With the invasion of South Korea the dollar aspect of the problem disappeared, but in place of budgetary pressures there developed those exerted by an enemy apparently unimpressed with air theory. The locus of tension between the services shifted from Washington to the theater of operations, where difficulties reappeared in conflict between Navy and Air Force over the control and employment of aircraft, and in controversy between Army and Air Force as well.

Given the history of the air question the reappearance in Korea of controversy and tension was hardly surprising. Nor, indeed, should the importance of these conflicts be overestimated. So much, in recent years, has been blamed on service rivalries as to raise the suspicion that some of the talk is used by civilians, whether taxpayers or administrators, to camouflage their own derelictions. And it should be remembered that equally vigorous if less publicized controversies exist within the individual services. In the Navy there was friction between surface and air, and disagreement as to the proper structure of the command organization. In the Air Force such matters as the control of airlift, the coordination of Bomber Command, and authority over service units provided bones of contention for FEAF and Fifth Air Force. Doubtless the Army had its problems too.

Nevertheless the interservice difficulties deserve some comment, if only because the greatest tactical surprise of the Korean War was its demonstration of the limited effectiveness of "air power."

The argument that strength in the air is the sufficient precondition of victory, and that an air force which commands the skies inevitably commands all below, had in the years since World War II commended itself to many. Yet although in some respects persuasive, this argument had been less than wholly substantiated by the experience of the wars with Germany and Japan, to say nothing of the Italian campaign. In Korea it was to be quickly refuted.

In the first six months of war, although enjoying almost complete command of the air, the aviation of the U.N. was unable to prevent reverses on the ground, deny the enemy the use of his own territory, isolate the battlefield, or detect the assembly of large enemy forces. The defense of the perimeter had been a very close thing; in the disastrous battle of the Chongchon and the subsequent retreat to the south every aircraft in the sky was friendly; in the later stages of the war a costly and sustained effort to isolate the battlefield by the interdiction
of enemy supply lines was to fail of its anticipated success.

Yet where proper control procedures were available the employment of aircraft in direct support of troops had tremendous military effectiveness, as was amply demonstrated by the operations of the Marine Brigade along the Naktong, by the campaign for Seoul, and by the movement of the Marine Division from the reservoir to the sea. In a different context the essential interdependence of air and surface activity was reaffirmed when the failure of interdiction was attributed by air commanders to the diminished enemy consumption which followed stabilization of the front. Paradoxically indeed, the first test of the new service concerned with air war pure resulted in a striking reaffirmation of the great degree to which, in a non-nuclear environment, success in the air depends on events below.

For this lesson the services were unequally prepared. The divergent histories of Air Force and naval aviation had by 1950 produced very different patterns in training, equipment, and control mechanisms. The geography of the plains of North Africa and Europe and the ideology of independent air power had made that "inherent flexibility" of which enthusiasts prated a macroflexibility. For the conduct of the air campaign, control was centralized at the highest possible level and preplanned operations were the rule, with the result that while a large effort could be switched from day to day along an extensive battle front, control at the target had been neglected. From this structure had developed a communications system with large capacity for routine transmission of orders and reports between central command post and operating air bases, but with limited provision for tactical communications at the scene of action.

The Navy and Marines, by contrast, accustomed to attacks against such easily defined targets as fleets and airbases, and to operations within the constricted beachhead, tended to rely on doctrine supplemented by brief orders, and on delegation of control to those on the spot. Provision of tactical aviation in ground warfare was looked upon as a service to the forces involved rather than as part of a separately controlled campaign, as a la carte rather than a table d’hote proposition. The consequence was a command communications system of high reliability but comparatively small capacity, lacking in such automated devices as the radioteletype, but balanced by an emphasis on discrimination at the objective expressed in liberal provision of ground controllers and in the design of tactical communications equipment. As compared to the four VHF channels in the radios of Air Force fighter-bombers, the sets in naval and Marine aircraft had ten.

The incompatibility of these systems was forcefully demonstrated in Korea. As in the Southwest Pacific in the war against Japan, Air Force verbosity in communications swamped the less capacious naval circuits, and indeed, at times, FEAF’s own: an extreme example was the grandfather of all radio messages, received by Task Force 77 in November 1950, which took 8,000 encrypted groups to set forth the air plan for one day, and which required over 30 man-hours for processing. Contrariwise, scene of action requirements for precise and deliberate control of aircraft in situations tightly packed in the air and fluid on the ground went far beyond the capacity of Air Force tactical communications. Both services, in a sense, were right in this matter, and both wrong: the land campaign, if only from problems of target description, is unavoidably wordier than war at sea; the compression of space and time brought about by the speed and power of modern weapons has made all tactical situations increasingly approximate the tightly-packed beachhead.

In the months before the war some efforts at improvement of joint communications had been made by Seventh Fleet. With an eye to the need for cooperation in a possible emergency, a series of drills and exercises with Western Pacific Air Force units had been attempted. But success had been only moderate, and the reports had emphasized the "real and urgent" need for action at the Washington level in the interest of efficient interservice communications. Somewhat similar conditions existed in Japan, where Air Force efforts at joint exercises and Air Force tentatives toward establishment of a Joint Operations Center had met little response from the Army. The whole situation points up a failure at Department of Defense level to place sufficient emphasis on joint matters, a failure apparently consequent not only to budgetary pressures and to the primacy in planning for
war in the North European plain, but also to the well-meant efforts to prevent "duplication" by writing down exclusive rather than cooperative roles and missions.

With the arrival of the Seventh Fleet in Korean waters the problems of coordination assumed immediate practical importance, and on 8 July General Stratemeyer asked CincFE for operational control over all naval aircraft operating from Japan or over Korea. But this request, which involved authority to select carrier operating areas as well as targets, was resisted by Admiral Joy. Quite apart from the echoes of Air Force imperialism and from technical questions of capability, the felt hazards of Communist submarines and the contingent responsibility of Seventh Fleet for the defense of Formosa made the proposal undesirable, and after a meeting of interested parties the phrase "coordination control" was substituted. Although the term had enjoyed some use in prior planning for analogous situations, the Air Force was later to profess itself unsatisfied with such limited authority. But difficulties deriving from phraseology were less important than those arising from the structure of the Far East Command, and from incompatibilities of doctrine, equipment, and training.

While the early employment of Task Force 77 on northern strikes posed few problems, the air situation, as General Shepherd noted in July, was full of paradox. As a result of the pressures of the moment, B–29s were employed on tactical targets to the dissatisfaction of all concerned; jet lighters, with a fuel restriction limiting them to 15 minutes in the combat zone, were assigned to troop support; despite a wealth of close support opportunities carrier aircraft were committed against semi-strategic objectives. With the passing of time, however, the imperative needs of the perimeter brought a steady southward displacement of carrier operations which culminated with CincFE’s order of 8 August to put everything on close support. This development made necessary the coordination of Seventh Fleet operations, not only with FEAF, but with the Air Force and Army commands in the peninsula as well. On paper the question was dealt with by FEAF and NavFE representatives in the 3 August memorandum on "Proposed Target Arrangements with Navy." In actuality it had hardly been faced.

Arriving in circumstances of great emergency to lend a hand, the carrier aviators found themselves faced with difficulties which frustrated their best efforts. Common maps and common grids were lacking, so that location and designation of targets on an interservice basis was almost impossible. The command structure, presided over by the distant genius of the Dai Ichi Building and overcentralized in Tokyo, made no provision for a field commander charged with the coordination of forces, and little for direct dealing between Eighth Army, Fifth Air Force, and Seventh Fleet. But perhaps the greatest problem was that of communications.

In the first days of fighting, requests for air support had gone through GHQ and FEAF; only on 7 July did Stratemeyer gain CincFE’s permission to have the Army in Korea call directly upon Fifth Air Force. The entry of the carriers into support of the perimeter led to further complications, and in late July, in the hope of bringing order into chaos, Admiral Hoskins sent a representative to Taegu to establish communications with the Joint Operations Center. But incompatibility of facilities limited the success of this effort, as did the command structure, since direct dealing was authorized only for "coordination of air operations previously scheduled by higher authority." What this meant, in terms of emergency calls for close support, was that a dispatch originating at battalion level was supposed to travel normal infantry channels to Army at Taegu, thence to JOC, thence by relay to FEAF in Tokyo, and there from FEAF to NavFE for broadcast to Commander Seventh Fleet.

Under such restrictions it seems unlikely that the most elaborate communications system could have done the job, and the net that actually existed was rudimentary. On 15 July FEAF set up a circuit linking its Tokyo headquarters with FAFIK and with Seventh Fleet; ten days later Admiral Struble was still having difficulty in direct communications with FEAF; on 4 August, as a result of the pressure of other needs, FEAF was obliged to secure this circuit, thus further complicating an originally marginal situation. And even in the autumn, when circuits had been successfully established, slow internal handling of messages on the part of shore-based commands continued to impose delays.

In the air over Korea communications also presented difficulties. Confronted by the requirement of
converting a defensive fighter force into one which could participate effectively in the land battle, Fifth Air Force had begun an heroic effort in improvisation. Two tactical air control parties were in the field by the end of June; a small combat operations section reached Taegon in the first week of July; late in the month a Joint Operations Center of sorts had become operational at Taegu. But by this time attrition of the TACPs had forced resort to airborne control of support strikes, while saturation of inadequate Army communications had encouraged the relaying of requests for air support through the orbiting Mosquito control planes.

This practice made a bad situation worse. Of the four VHF channels to which most Air Force planes were limited, only two were common to the various types of aircraft in the theater and to the jeep–mounted radios of tactical air control parties. Since Air Force procedures required incoming flights to report to JOC for assignment, and then to be passed through division to a regimental TACP or Mosquito, a considerable amount of talk was involved. As a result of this insistence on the part of JOC on acting as control as well as scheduling center, channels were so jammed that to drown out competing chatter a reporting aircraft had to come within 10 or 15 miles, a situation which at times imposed as much as 200 extra flight miles on carrier planes coming in from the west. Over the lines, meanwhile, the passage of information between attacking aircraft, Mosquito control plane, and ground party was confined to a single channel on which more than a dozen controlling centers were talking simultaneously, all this against a background buzz of conversation between the JOC and other flights. When to these circumstances was added a general indiscipline in voice communications, the difficulties encountered became quite understandable.

Both at command and tactical levels, therefore, the communications system proved inadequate to effective joint operations. One result was uncertainty in Task Force 77 as to the real nature of the emergency when calls for help came in, and in commands ashore as to its availability for support; a second was the frustrating inability of aviators to gain adequate control over the battleline. In time this situation would lead to attempts to break away from the perimeter, and to find more constructive employment for the air groups of Seventh Fleet; more immediately, it brought a number of unsuccessful efforts to short–circuit the established system. On 23 July an urgent plea from EUSAK for carrier support led to protests from Fifth Air Force, which had failed to receive its copy of the message. Two days later an attempt by Admiral Struble to bypass the Tokyo echelon and operate in consultation with EUSAK and the Joint Operations Center brought reproaches from ComNavFE. In early August a move by the commanding officer of Sicily to avoid the communications jam and gain more time over target by sending flights directly to the front was slapped down as "not acceptable." Late in the month, in an effort to reduce direct calls for naval air and gunfire from the forces in the field, ComNavFE got CincFE to remind all hands that any request involving changes in naval planning, or action against Bomber Command targets, had to be arranged through Tokyo.

In this situation effective control of close support proved impossible to attain. While the forces defending the perimeter could hardly have managed without the support they got, its quality, judged by any serious standard, was generally poor. The exception to this generalization, which shone the brighter in contrast to the general confusion, was in the support of the Marine ground forces by Marine and naval aviation, where the complexities of integration of ground and air were competently solved. In the southern spoiling offensive and in the battles on the Naktong the Marine aircraft from the escort carriers, exempted from the requirement of reporting in through JOC, checked in directly with their own people and did the job they had been trained to do; in the operations of Joint Task Force 7 at Inchon and of X Corps in northeastern Korea a similar situation prevailed. Much of the credit for these successes was due to pilot training based on a long history of air-ground cooperation; still more, perhaps, to effectiveness of control.

Here some statistics may be in order. Of 668 "close support" sorties sent in from the fast carriers between 26 July and 3 September, 28 percent were not controlled; for 299 such sorties at Inchon the proportion was 2 percent. In the crisis of 1 September some 280 sorties were put into the Naktong front between Tuksongdong and
the south coast, an effort beyond the capacity of the JOC control system and which resulted in its collapse. On D-
Day at Inchon, by contrast, the Tactical Air Control Squadron in *Mount McKinley* handled 302 Navy and Marine
sorties without difficulty. On 3 December, with a daylight working period three and a half hours shorter than that
of early September, X Corps’ Marine controllers at Hungnam processed 359 sorties; of these 197 were passed on
to the tactical control section at Hagaru, where four-fifths were employed in the ten-mile sector between Hagaru
and Yudam-ni under the direction of six ground parties. On 23 December the *Mount McKinley* Tacron handled
247 sorties in close and deep support of the shrunken Hungnam perimeter. If none of these figures matches the
amphibious set-pieces of the latter part of World War II, in which upwards of 60 aircraft an hour were fed into
restricted beachhead areas, they nonetheless reflect the virtue and the necessity of sophisticated and decentralized
control systems.

The failures of air support in the summer of 1950 had sizable repercussions. The operations of the
Marine Brigade and of Marine and naval aircraft had shown Eighth Army some of the possibilities in this area; in
the campaign for Seoul and in northeastern Korea the Army units assigned to X Corps had their education
continued; within the Air Force there was considerable soul-searching. In Korea this led to an influx of dignitaries
from Washington to study the situation, to the convening of various boards of investigation, and to a discussion of
the proper relationships between air and ground forces which lasted throughout the war. In the United States the
Tactical Air Command reappeared as a major functional unit of the Air Force. In the Defense Department rumors
were afoot that General Collins was contemplating an attempt to recover Army control of tactical aviation, a
possibility which, in view of the nature of the earlier Collins Plan for reorganization of the armed forces, was not
devoid of humor.

In the end this ferment was to have certain constructive results. For the short term, however, and under
the tension of the campaign, the effects were exacerbating. In late August the troubles reached the press, with
publication in the Baltimore *Sun* of a news story supported by editorial comment based on the views of the
frustrated aviators of Task Force 77. One result was a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations and a
memorandum from ComNavFE adjuring naval personnel to keep their criticisms inside the family and out of the
newspapers. Another was a rejoinder from a nationally syndicated columnist who alleged that, far from being of
superior effectiveness, the Navy and the Marines had been lying down on the job in Korea, and that their air
support system was good only for butchering friendly troops.

This last effusion brought a letter from General Stratemeyer, expressing his regret for such unwarranted
criticism and assuring Admiral Joy that the staff of FEAF was not responsible; earlier, in the flurry caused by the
*Sun* articles, he had inquired of ComNavFE whether, in his opinion, the derogatory allegations about the Air
Force were true. In reply, while regretting that accounts of "these deficiencies" had reached the press, Admiral Joy
observed that with regard to air-ground cooperation he thought they were, but that allegations that the Air Force
was unresponsive to suggestion were wholly false; to Stratemeyer’s expressed desire that problems be thrashed out
between the two of them, ComNavFE replied that tactical air was a difficult problem and that perhaps they should
have got together sooner on it.

With this conclusion we may leave the subject. While the failure to provide adequate support for the
Army in the perimeter was undeniable, it would seem that more help might have been given by the Navy. The
analyses of the situation by Struble, Hoskins, and Ewen, and the remedies that they proposed had been perceptive,
but despite an apparently hospitable attitude on the part of FEAF toward naval participation in close support and
the use of Navy controllers, their implementation was never pressed. Requests from the Army in Korea and
recommendations from the Seventh Fleet for the commitment of the Anglico and of the Tactical Air Control
Squadron from *Mount McKinley* were denied; assignment of Navy planes to share in the control function was the
exception rather than the rule; although all services would have benefited from strong naval representation in the
JOC, and although the visits of Weymouth and others had proved helpful, no serious attempt to make this a truly
joint *Enterprise* took place.

To some degree the atomistic nature of the Tokyo command, where General MacArthur had retained his World War II structure despite directives to establish a unified staff, can be held responsible; to some degree instructions from Washington limited the freedom of action of local commanders in all services. Within the forces afloat there seems to have been insufficient understanding of the appalling difficulties under which Fifth Air Force labored, not all of which were due to faulty doctrine, and some failure to give credit where credit was due, as in the rapid increase of jet fighter bombloads. Not fully appreciating the necessarily deliberate nature of close support, the pilots of Task Force 77 were at times overly impatient of delay. And finally, there existed at certain levels of the naval command a distrust of the Air Force and a desire to keep at a distance not wholly explicable by the submarine problem and the Formosan responsibility, and this defensive attitude, however understandable, was perhaps the saddest consequence of the interservice battles of the preceding years.

With the movement to Inchon and the separation of naval and Air Force operations, relations became easier, and by early 1951 things had improved. Communications between Task Force 77 and the JOC were at last working effectively; air group commanders from the fast carriers were being sent in in rotation to handle the liaison function; in due course a permanent assignment would be made. With the passage of time and the discounting of the submarine, Task Force 77 had taken permanent station in the Sea of Japan and was no longer puzzling Air Force officers by its mobility. From this time on division of labor was to be largely geographical, with operations coordinated by JOC on the basis of daily submission of the task force air plan. In this favorable situation cooperation developed by natural growth: by war's end the installation of radioteletype had enabled the carriers to master the communication load, while the replacement at JOC of the naval liaison officer by a full-fledged naval member, the so-called NMJ, confirmed the joint nature of the enterprise.

In the controversial question of close support doctrinal differences remained. Overcentralization at JOC, where aircraft allocation was controlled and where all requests had to be approved, kept the system vulnerable both to enemy action and to communications saturation at times of peak activity. Air Force unwillingness to assign forward air controllers below the regimental level left this function largely in the hands of the Mosquitos, most effective in the stable situations in which least needed. But with calls for close support diminished by the static nature of the front, and with the carriers committed to interdiction, the problems inherent in the system could be ignored, and only in the final weeks of war did there develop a repetition of the confusion of August 1950.

In August 1953, 12 days after the signing of the Korean armistice, an interservice board assembled at Seoul to consider the problems of joint air-ground operations. The conclusions of the board reflected adversely on the rigid administrative procedures which in Korea had limited the effectiveness of air in fast-moving tactical situations. The need for better communications, both in the request net and at the scene of action, was emphasized. The excessive delays resulting from reliance on ground alert aircraft for attack against fleeting targets were noted; the employment of flights orbiting on station or diverted from preplanned missions was urged; and it was made clear that the Mosquito was no substitute for ground control of strikes against targets close to the MLR. For effective joint action in future comparable situations the establishment of a Joint Operations Center, 1953 model, was recommended, and the proposal, dating back to the summer of 1950, that the Navy provide a quota of forward air controllers was revived. This report marked a real step toward a meeting of minds in this complex and vital area: only in the question of providing air controllers at battalion level did the Air Force members disagree with the representatives of the other services. And all hands agreed on the "urgent requirement" for an established joint air support doctrine and procedure.

But Korea was far from home, and the victories of peace are different, if no less renowned, than those of war. Pursuant to the urgent recommendation of the conference the job of developing an agreed joint doctrine for air support of ground forces was quickly undertaken. On 28 August, only a week after adjournment of the Seoul
meetings, this task was assigned the Joint Tactical Air Support Board "as a matter of priority," but with the proviso that if "inter-service divergent views" were encountered, these should be referred to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force for resolution at department level.

The hint, if hint it was, was quickly taken. The Air Force members of the board broadened the discussion to discover areas of difference, insisted that joint action take place on the highest rather than the lowest echelon, and looked with disfavor upon joint activities below the level of the area commander. The separateness and co-equality of air was stressed at the expense of integrated action, the need for joint task force organizations for airborne or amphibious operations was denied, the concept of joint planning conferences was evaded, and heavy emphasis was placed on the necessity of adhering to "the operational procedures which have worked with outstanding success in World War II and in Korea."

The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps members, for their part, while attempting to keep the discussion on the track, expressed some doubt as to the "outstanding success" of existing methods, and urged that development be not restricted by a blind adherence to the past. But agreement between the representatives of these three services was of no avail. In December 1953 the split report was forwarded to Washington for resolution at department level and there, presumably, suitably interred. In any event there is still no joint doctrine.
Despite its violence and drama the struggle in Korea was but one aspect of a larger whole. While the tide of battle flowed up and down the peninsula, the war of maneuver, diplomacy, and subsidy continued all along the frontiers of the divided world. Unquestionably there were great differences between the operations in the Korean sector and the course of affairs elsewhere: as General MacArthur, who felt this most keenly, observed, "here we fight Europe’s war with arms while the diplomats there still fight it with words." But words are weapons; the aims and stakes were everywhere the same; Europe remained of primary importance and the boundaries of the shooting war subject to change.

For the armed forces in the Far East, most of all, perhaps, for the Navy, the existence of Communist nations on both flanks, the commitment to defend Formosa, and the international nature of the high seas obscured the borders of the conflict. Of the possibilities inherent in the conduct of operations in an area flanked by unfriendly powers, both possessed of military air forces and one with a sizable submarine fleet, the most dramatic example had been the destruction of the Russian bomber in September 1950. But while the chance of similar incidents was ever present, it was with regard to the submarine that the question of when properly to engage an unidentified intruder was most puzzling.

Early in the conflict Admiral Joy had advised his forces that "unidentified submarines may be attacked and driven off by any means available in self-defense or when offensive action against our forces is indicated," and that "continued submergence of an unidentified submarine in position to attack . . . is considered to indicate offensive action." Since submarines can detect an approaching surface force before being themselves discovered, and so enjoy a period of time in which to make their presence known, "continued submergence" was narrowly interpreted and sound contacts were invariably attacked at once. Such attacks were frequent in the first months of fighting, both in Korean waters and in the Ryukyu—Formosa area, but most targets were ultimately evaluated doubtful and some as positively non-submarine.

The air action in the Yellow Sea was not repeated, and no submarine attacks developed. But there remained, most notably in the Formosa area and along the patrol plane tracks in the Yellow and Japan Seas, the possibility of chance encounters with Chinese Communist or Soviet forces. In the Yellow Sea, except for the loss of a patrol plane to North Korean antiaircraft, no incidents took place until summer of 1952, when two PBM s were attacked and damaged by Communist jets. In the Sea of Japan, however, in November 1951, a P2V failed to return from a northerly search, and subsequent information indicated that it had been shot down off Cape Ostrovnoy by Soviet fighters. Here in the north the Air Force also engaged in reconnaissance, and with similar results: in October 1952, a year after the loss of the P2V, a B–29 was shot down off Hokkaido by Soviet fighters; in March 1953 an RB–50 was attacked, although without damage, over the sea to the east of the Kamchatka Peninsula.

In Formosa Strait, the region of Seventh Fleet’s contingent responsibility, the situation remained generally quiescent. The alarm of late July 1950 had brought the hasty diversion of Helena and a destroyer division from Korea, followed within a few days by Juneau. Early in August Admiral Struble formed Juneau, two destroyers, and an oiler into Task Group 77.3, based at Keelung and shortly to be reinforced by Worcester and another destroyer from the Mediterranean. By month’s end Rear Admiral Thomas H. Binford, who in 1942 had commanded the old four-stackers in the Java Sea fighting, had arrived from the United States in the heavy cruiser Saint Paul to assume command of the Formosa Patrol. Although the crisis of December brought the surface units
north the task group was shortly reconstituted, and throughout the war surveillance of the strait was continued by Seventh Fleet surface units and by patrol planes.

Here, too, as in the north, long-range naval aircraft working the area from their bases in the Pescadores, at Buckner Bay, and on Luzon, had intermittent brushes with the Communists. As early as 26 July 1950 a P4Y was attacked by fighters in northern Formosa Strait, but escaped without damage; ten days later a PBM was fired on by antiaircraft batteries in the neighborhood of Amoy. On November a PBM failed to return from southern Formosa Strait, and although searches were persistent they were also negative and the cause of loss remained unknown. Two generally peaceful years followed, but in the autumn of 1952 there developed a number of antiaircraft actions with shore batteries and small warships, and on two Occasions patrol aircraft were attacked by MIGs. But no plane was lost until January 1953, when a P2V was shot down by gunfire from a coastal island and a Coast Guard PBM, sent to rescue the crew, itself crashed and sank while attempting takeoff in heavy seas.

So despite all hazards the war remained circumscribed. Although planning for larger things had followed the intervention of the CCF, the blockade of mainland China was never implemented and mainland target folders stayed on the shelf. The intensity of action diminished rapidly with distance, and except for minor incidents shooting was limited to Korea and to Korean waters. In the northern Sea of Japan the units of the Soviet Far Eastern Fleet maneuvered, undisturbed and undisturbing. Through the waters of the Western Pacific, Soviet and Chinese Communist merchant ships continued on their way, subject only to the photographic efforts of search planes and submarines. But while the area of actual combat remained small, related events of great importance were taking place throughout the world.

In the United States, in September 1950, a controversial career ended as Louis Johnson, in part the architect and in part the victim of the Truman administration’s defense policies, departed Washington, and General Marshall, again recalled from retirement, reigned in his place. Already, however, the policies had changed. With the invasion of South Korea the $14 billion ceiling vanished overnight, and budgeting and planning officers labored to keep up with administration willingness to approve and congressional readiness to appropriate. In the fiscal year 1949–50, the year of interservice quarreling and the B–36 hearings, naval appropriations, originally voted at slightly over $5 billion, had been cut by the Johnsonian ax to less than $41/2 billion. For 1950–51 they totaled more than $12 billion, and in the following fiscal year monies appropriated for the Navy alone would exceed the earlier three-service ceiling, while the total defense budget would approach $60 billion.

It is, of course, easier to appropriate than to spend, and the events of immediate significance were less the dollar votes than the recall of reserves, the expansion of selective service calls, and the reactivation of fleet units and base facilities. But with the passing of time expenditures also rose dramatically: the $14 1/2 billion spent by all services in fiscal 1950 rose to $38 1/2 billion in 1952; for the Navy alone the increase was from $4.1 billion to almost $10 billion. The effects on the national economy were not disastrous.

For the Navy’s operating forces two principal consequences followed this dollar flood: an immediate expansion of the fleet through reactivation of mothballed ships, and its subsequent strengthening by conversion of existing units and by new construction. Reserving the latter subject for later treatment, it may be noted here that fleet expansion took place in all categories from attack carriers of the Essex class down to yard craft and liberty boats. The extent and speed of this expansion may be inferred from a tabulation of major combatant ships in active service in June and October 1950.

The 50 percent expansion of the Pacific Fleet, while sufficiently impressive, is perhaps less remarkable than the fact that the Atlantic Fleet should have expanded at all, while at the same time contributing heavily to the increase of Far Eastern naval strength. From this Fleet, by way of the Suez and Panama Canals, there came in the early months a battleship, a fleet carrier, a light cruiser, a destroyer squadron and an escort destroyer division, a
hospital ship, three attack transports, three attack cargo ships, and two LSDs. This was no inconsiderable
collection, yet it was dwarfed by that of the Fleet Marine Force Atlantic, which for a time almost disappeared as
a result of the need to reinforce the 1st Marine Division for Inchon. In the period between June and mid-August,
when FMFLant hit its low point, on–board personnel, officer and enlisted, diminished from 18,470 to a mere
3,196.

Notable as was this westward shift of force, it was controlled and limited. Great though they were, the
exigencies of the Korean situation were not permitted to overthrow the broad lines of accepted strategy. The
defense of Europe remained the primary task; the larger portion of the Navy remained in the Atlantic. And as a
precautionary measure, since none could read the future, the outbreak of fighting in Asia was soon followed by a
forward deployment on the other side of the world.

In the Mediterranean Sea, where geography affords the opportunity to reach behind the Iron Curtain and
to sustain the independence of the nations of Southern Europe and the Near East, the Navy maintained its Sixth
Fleet. This fleet, lineal descendant of the Naval Forces Mediterranean of World War II days, had received its
current designation in early 1950. Its existing deployment dated from the previous year, at which time the Atlantic
Fleet had organized three carrier task forces, one of which was at all times kept on station in the Mediterranean,
along with an amphibious element embarking a Marine battalion and miscellaneous supporting units. Spring of
1950 had seen this force, built around the carrier Leyte and the cruisers Salem and Worcester, engaged in routine
exercises. With the invasion of the Republic of Korea its strength was to be more than doubled.

Escorted by a division of destroyers, the large carrier Midway, which already enjoyed a limited nuclear
capability, was speedily sailed for the Mediterranean, where she arrived in mid-July and where she was joined
shortly by her sister Coral Sea. With the striking force thus strengthened, Worcester and a destroyer division were
detached to the Far East by way of Suez, followed in mid-August by Bexar and Montague with the Marine
battalion, while Leyte was returned to the United States for further transfer to the Far East by way of Panama.
There remained in the Sixth Fleet the 2 large carriers, 3 cruisers, and 14 destroyers, and in September the force
was further strengthened by an antisubmarine group formed about the escort carrier Mindoro. But with the period
of triumph in Korea the crisis seemed to have been surmounted, tension diminished, and Sixth Fleet was cut back
to normal size.

The reduction, like the triumph, was to prove short-lived. As the emergency which followed Chinese
intervention in Korea brought a second hasty reinforcement of the Far East, so too it governed movements in the
Atlantic. In January a new augmentation of the Sixth Fleet was begun, as a light carrier, a destroyer division, and
two fast minesweepers were ordered forward. With the apparent imminence of a major spring crisis the scheduled
May relieving group of one large carrier, 11 destroyers, and ancillary units was sailed to reach the Mediterranean
in March; at the same time an amphibious task element with a Marine battalion was sent forward to provide, for
the first time since the previous August, a limited amphibious capability. Following the arrival of these
reinforcements the ships already on station were kept on through early May, with the result that these months saw
the largest concentration of American naval power in the Mediterranean since the end of World War II.

The expected crisis did not come, but little relaxation resulted. Over and above the necessity of
strengthening its striking force in Mediterranean waters, and of contributing to Far Eastern naval strength,
manifold responsibilities weighed upon the Atlantic Fleet. During the warm months resupply convoys had to be
sent up to the Arctic. Spring of 1951 brought the need to transport and land the newly established Iceland Defense
Force. An arduous and continuing schedule of training in convoy work, mine warfare, amphibious operations, and
air defense had to be maintained. The strains of rapid expansion, brought about by reactivation of mothballed
ships and the activation of new aviation units, imposed a heavy load in personnel training and administration as
on-board complement expanded in the space of two years from 107,575 to 235,426. Nor was non–shooting war
without its costs: the greatest single tragedy of the period of the Korean conflict took place in the Atlantic, when
in April 1952, in the course of night air operations, the DMS Hobson got in front of the carrier Wasp and was run down and Sunk with a loss of 176 lives.

So war in Europe, if still in CincFE’s phrase only a war of words, absorbed large quantities of naval strength. And in diplomacy, as in the military establishment, the sense of urgency deriving from aggression in Korea was employed to strengthen the defenses of the West. This process was most notable in the fleshing out of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, where the treaty of April 1949 had been followed by requests for American military assistance and these, in October, by the Mutual Defense Act. More paperwork and negotiation followed, but in March of 1950 shipment of materiel began with the sailing of a load of naval aircraft on the French carrier Dixmude, a vessel of appropriately international background which, begun as an American merchant ship, had been converted to an auxiliary aircraft carrier, lend-leased for wartime service to Great Britain, and ultimately transferred to the French Navy.

The NATO powers had by now agreed on broad strategic concepts, and the wheels of implementation were grinding. The pace, however, remained leisurely: Russian forces in the satellites outnumbered those available for the defense of Europe by perhaps five to one, and the latter, of widely varying quality, were maldeployed, malsupported, and without a coordinating command structure. But Korea changed all this. In the new atmosphere came new effort, and on 15 September, as the Marines were going over the seawalls at Inchon, the North Atlantic Council voted to create an integrated force under centralized command. In December the call went out for General Eisenhower to return to the scene of his earlier triumphs; in January the organization of a headquarters was begun; on 2 April 1951 SHAPE assumed operational control of NATO forces.

Although much remained to be done, General Eisenhower’s hand had already been strengthened by the arrival of new Army and Air Force contingents, as well as by expansion of the Sixth Fleet. Following the invasion of South Korea an increase of jet fighters and B–50 bombers had trebled Air Force strength in the United Kingdom. In the course of 1951 the Air Divisions there and in Germany were expanded into Air Forces, the southern flank was strengthened by acquisition of North African airbases, and four more Army divisions reached Europe to join the two already there. There was also reinforcement from within: in Europe as in America defense expenditures rose steadily, and while the American contribution continued to predominate, the outlays of European NATO members more than doubled between 1949 and 1952.

While the defenses were going up in Europe the right flank was pushed forward through the Mediterranean. Here geography and naval power permitted both the development of advanced airfields in Tripoli and Saudi Arabia and the extension of NATO planning to include Greece and Turkey. These were hardly Atlantic states, and their accession was consequently opposed by some, but the sea road that connected them with the Atlantic made possible their support against pressure from the north. These facts of life were emphasized and western power made tangible in the summer of 1950 by the appearance of the Sixth Fleet at Phaleron Bay, just east of the Piraeus; by amphibious exercises in Crete; and by an aerial demonstration staged over Lebanon at the request of the Lebanese government. Late in the year Greece and Turkey were invited to associate themselves with NATO planning, and in early 1951 the Sixth Fleet again called at Phaleron Bay. In May the United States proposed formal NATO membership for these countries, and in July Coral Sea and her attendant ships dropped anchor at Istanbul. In the fall the formal invitation to accede was issued, and early in 1952 the transaction was consummated.

Naval diplomacy was by this time in full swing, and the fleet was showing the flag in a new area. The adherence of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization greatly emphasized the importance of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav Army. Here cooperation had been facilitated by the end of civil war in Greece and by Tito’s break with Russia. Subsequent to these developments crop failures had forced this Communist country to turn westward and, despite many protestations to the contrary, to start edging into the position of a constructive member of NATO. By early 1951 Yugoslav preparations to receive assistance were in progress and in February
food and credits began arriving. In April former German military equipment was provided by France and Britain, to be followed, with poetic justice, by Russian gear captured in Korea. Before the year was out military missions had been exchanged with the United States, and in December Sixth Fleet units visited a Yugoslav port. In 1952 this developing cordiality brought a task force built around *Coral Sea* to Split, finest of Adriatic harbors, where Marshal Tito was himself embarked and edified by a demonstration of flight operations.

By early 1952 the NATO naval command structure had been completed, and arduous efforts in the coordination of multinational forces were beginning to flower in large-scale naval exercises. In November a six-nation operation was carried out; in the following March a large NATO maneuver was held in the Western Mediterranean; in the autumn of 1953 the Sixth Fleet would sortie to the North Atlantic, to join the forces of that ocean in the greatest combined exercise to date.

So in Europe, as in Korea, the line was held, and even slightly improved. As always the imperfect world contained sufficient difficulties: despite SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, the unsettled conditions of Southeast Asia and the Near East continued to resist treatment. Still, it could be said that the events set in train by the invasion of South Korea had reacted, on balance, to the detriment rather than the advantage of the Communist world. The North Korean People’s Army had been destroyed and the forces of Communist China heavily punished. Japan had been protected; the Republic of Korea had been liberated; Formosa had not fallen. In Europe NATO had been built up. The United States, keystone of the entire structure, was to a considerable degree rearmed.

All this, of course, had been accomplished by way of reaction. That so much had to be credited to the North Koreans rather than to the conscious and purposeful initiative of the West was perhaps cause for philosophical regret. But the response, for the moment at least, had been a notable one.
Chapter 11. Problems of a Policeman

6. Into the Future

The fighting in Korea was accompanied, for those who had ears to hear, by ominous rumblings offstage, as the nuclear powers labored to perfect and expand their arsenals. The explosions of 1951 marked but the start of a period of accelerated development in which tests were carried out by the United States at Eniwetok and in Nevada, by the British in Australia and in the Pacific, and by the Soviets within the Asiatic land mass. Before peace came to the embattled peninsula a whole new spectrum of weapons had been developed: at one end there lay the hydrogen bomb, with its appalling implications for victim, neutral, and user alike; at the other the need for an explosive return proportionate to the rising costs of delivery was bringing warheads for missile, artillery, antisubmarine, antiaircraft, and infantry use.

The possibilities of the world struggle and the actualities of Korea, so important in forwarding the nuclear research and development programs, had important results in other spheres. The shock effect of the North Korean mining campaign gave mine warfare an unaccustomedly high priority, both in research and in the Navy’s building program. The immediate response to the emergency involved the installation of underwater search gear in a number of infantry landing craft, to permit their use as mine locators, and the conversion of four motor launches to shoal-water sweepers. But these expedients, like the many World War II minesweepers, had been largely obsoleted by the magnetic mine. Subsequent development of the mine-hunters involved the conversion of wooden-hulled YMS and the construction of wooden-hulled minesweeping boats, while the need for larger sweepers led to the construction of new non-magnetic types. Of these, three were developed: the MSO, an ocean minesweeper, 171 feet in length and of 750 tons full load displacement; the MSC, a somewhat smaller coastal minesweeper, 144 feet overall; and the MSI, a 112-foot inshore minesweeper.

The building of truly non-magnetic ships is no simple matter, involving as it does, in addition to wooden hull construction, the design and procurement of much special equipment including engines of non-magnetic stainless steel alloys. Yet, despite the complexities of the task, production was not inconsiderable. Of the MSOs, which began launching in 1952 and commissioning in the next year, more than 100 were projected, while almost 150 MSCs and about 50 inshore sweepers were planned. Such quantities, of course, were more than enough for the U.S. Navy, but the United States was now supplier to the whole free world. With the anti-Communist alliance dependent on the uninterrupted use of the seas, and with a mine threat which knew no geographical limitations, something more than half this new construction was slated for transfer, under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, to countries along the entire maritime arc from Norway in the west through the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean to the Western Pacific and Japan.

In amphibious warfare, too, the Korean experience had consequences for new construction. The extraordinary usefulness of the LST resulted in an immediate program for 15 of the 1156 series, a development of earlier experimental types, longer (384 as compared to 328 feet), faster (15 as opposed to 11 knots), and of larger capacity than their elder sisters; these began launching in mid-1952. The next step came two years later with the laying down of the first of seven Suffolk County class LSTs—442 feet overall, 7,100 tons full load displacement, 17 knots—which would carry 20 amphibious vehicles and 700 troops in air-conditioned spaces.

This, it appeared, was about as far as the type could go, despite the enthusiasm of some officers who, on the basis of Korean experience, appealed for clouds of these ships to replace rather than supplement the APA and AKA types. Since problems of design placed unavoidable limits on beaching ability, further progress tended toward the elaboration of the dock landing ship, also of great use in Korea. Eight new LSDs of the Thomaston
class were undertaken and these, like all new construction, were larger (11,270 tons full load as against 8,700 tons) and faster (24 knots as compared to 15 1/2) than their World War II predecessors. The direction this development was taking became apparent a few years later with the completion of plans for the LPD, a transport designed on the *Thomaston* hull, in which the increased troop and cargo space gained by the use of a smaller well gave a capacity approximating the AKA or APA.

Other than the LST, the most prominent all-purpose workhorse of the Korean War had been the helicopter. So necessary had these contraptions suddenly become that landing platforms sprouted throughout the fleet and were designed into all possible new construction, while their further implications for amphibious warfare attracted the interest of the Marines. As the tactical possibilities of vertical envelopment were clarified, there came proposals for the conversion of escort carriers to helicopter work and the projection of the helicopter amphibious assault ship (LPH), which would carry a Marine battalion, its supplies, and the helicopters necessary to land it. And a final contribution to the welfare of those who have to land on beaches came in late 1952, with the laying down of *Carronade*, the first rocket ship specifically designed for the purpose.

While the virtues of flexibility of movement over the beaches and over the hills were being worked out, through development of LST and LSD types and of helicopter employment, concurrent advances took place in more conventional areas. Since in addition to the problems of minefields and beaches the Korean War had emphasized those of supply, a share of new construction was allocated to logistic support units. Early in the conflict three 20-knot passenger ships, already building for the American President Lines, were taken over and completed as troop transports for MSTS, which also acquired some new cargo types with roll-on roll-off loading systems and with hulls strengthened for use in ice. Under the stimulus of war the Maritime Commission undertook the construction of a number of 20-knot Mariner class cargo ships, of which one was early acquired by the Navy for conversion to an AKA and others in due course for conversion to attack transports. The shortage of reefers in Korea brought the inclusion of two 18-knot vessels in the post-Korean construction program. The problems of underway replenishment and of accelerated consumption of fuel and ammunition led to experimental work with an ex-German U—boat supply ship to test the theory of one-stop replenishment, and to planning for a composite type which would carry ammunition, petroleum products, and miscellaneous cargo as well. But this development would take time, and more immediate help came from the construction of six new 20-knot fleet oilers, 100 feet longer than any previously available, of which the first was launched in late 1953, and from the five new ammunition ships of the *Suribachi* class, built from the hull up for this purpose, and providing higher speed, new methods of storage, and new and faster handling machinery.

Essential though they were, these advances in mine and amphibious warfare and in logistic support of overseas operations were overshadowed by developments in the striking forces. In carrier aviation the lessons of Korea, the availability of more money, and the implications of the future led to a dramatic reversal. In July 1951, only two years after cancellation of the supercarrier *United States*, a contract was awarded for the first of six vessels of the *Forrestal* class, ships more than 1,000 feet in overall length and with a full load displacement almost twice that of the *Essex* carriers. On these colossal hulls, in addition to machinery for speeds upwards of 33 knots, the new class of carrier provided larger fuel capacity, larger hangars, more powerful catapults, more elevators, and an angled deck layout which would permit the handling of almost 100 of the larger and higher performance aircraft soon to become available.

As construction of these behemoths was getting underway an extensive conversion program for existing aircraft carriers was begun. Here the most significant new step was the incorporation of the angled deck, a British development, which permitted simultaneous launching and landing and at the same time removed the hazards of the barrier crash. With success of an experimental installation on *Antietam*, other *Essex*-class ships were put into the works to emerge in due time with the new deck configuration, modernized elevators, new steam catapults, and other improvements, and in 1954 similar modernization of the three *Midway*-class carriers was begun.
What all this implied in terms of aircraft performance may be seen by a few comparisons. For the Korean war the best available Navy fighters were the Grumman F9F Panther and the McDonnell F2H Banshee with maximum speeds of something over 600 miles an hour; the AD attack plane, last and finest flower of the piston-engined line, lumbered along at a mere 365 miles an hour. But as the war was ending the Douglas F4D Skyray, a supersonic fighter capable of speeds up to about 750 miles an hour, was commencing its fleet trials. The A3D twin-jet heavy attack plane, with a top speed roughly equivalent to the F9F, was already in production. The prototype of the still faster A4D light attack plane was building and a contract had been let for the Chance Vought F8U–2, an advanced fighter which on completion would set some records with speeds exceeding 1,000 miles an hour.

Paralleling these advances in fighter and attack aircraft, the continuing trend toward complexity of equipment and size of vehicle was bringing multi-engined antisubmarine aircraft to the fleet. These larger planes required larger decks: in 1953 half the Essex class was assigned to antisubmarine warfare, and with this step the light carrier and the escort carrier reached the end of the road. After a short period in training duty the last CVL followed her sisters into inactivity, while those CVEs not destined for the scrap heap were reclassified as aircraft transports or as helicopter carriers.

The advent of new high-performance aircraft and the proliferation of nuclear weapons inevitably revolutionized the air defense problem. To increase the range of radar detection, early warning aircraft and radar picket submarines were given high priority. In fighter planes the machine gun gave way to the target-seeking missile, while aboard ship the antiaircraft gun began to disappear. Although the first group of post-Korean destroyers—one of which was to be christened Turner Joy—mounted new 3-inch automatic antiaircraft batteries, this was but a brief transitional phase. In 1955–56 the heavy cruisers Boston and Canberra were modified to carry two twin launching mounts for Terrier, a beam-riding antiaircraft missile with a ten-mile range. The next step was the conversion of the destroyer Gyatt to carry a Terrier mount, and of six Cleveland-class light cruisers, three to carry Terrier and three Rays, a larger missile with a slant range of up to 65 miles. And in due course there followed a program for guided missile destroyers of new design.

Although in Korea the submarine had been only a threat, new developments promised it a considerable future. In the years before 1950 some new construction and conversion had been undertaken with an eye to increased submerged speed, and some of a specialized nature for antisubmarine work. But the great developments came in the course of the Korean conflict, with the construction of Albacore, a wholly streamlined boat which compensated for awkward handling on the surface by extraordinary speed and maneuverability in the depths, and with the laying of the keel of the nuclear submarine Nautilus. Marriage of the speeds possible with the new hull form and the almost unlimited endurance bestowed by nuclear propulsion was to give wholly new dimensions to undersea warfare, while with the advent of the offensive guided missile the submarine gained awesome potentialities for action against land targets.

Naval development of the surface-to-surface guided weapon, begun shortly after World War II, first took operational form in 1951 with the flight of Regulus I, a subsonic missile with a range of 575 miles. Designed originally for launching by submarine, Regulus proved versatile, and in the course of time was embarked in aircraft carriers and cruisers as well. By 1958, when production ended, a supersonic longer-range successor was on the way, and submarines specifically designed for missile work were under construction.

While much had been said of push-button warfare in the years after World War II, all this, when war came to Korea, was still largely talk. But before the decade had ended changes of a truly revolutionary nature had indeed developed. Nuclear-powered submarines were in operation and more were building; nuclear-powered cruisers and frigates were in contemplation; surface ships as well as submarines were carrying long-range missiles; as an outgrowth of the Forrestal class an even larger carrier was under construction.

This was Enterprise, 1,100 feet long and with a flight deck 252 feet wide, displacing 85,000 tons full
load, defended by missiles, powered by eight nuclear reactors. This new dispensation in propulsive machinery would give her a maximum speed of 35 knots and an estimated endurance of five years; by eliminating the need for oil storage and stacks it would provide twice the aviation fuel capacity of her largest predecessors and permit the installation, on the sides of the island structure, of fixed radar antennae of advanced design. This astounding vessel marked the culmination of the Navy’s development of shipboard aviation, a development begun within the service lives of many still on active duty with the conversion, in 1922, of the old 15-knot collier Jupiter into the Langley as an experimental aircraft carrier. But Enterprise was not alone in manifesting the possibilities of the new technology, for work was simultaneously going forward on a series of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, whose displacement would approximate that of a small light cruiser and whose armament had a projected range of 1,500 miles.

What these developments of Promethean man promised for the future of warfare was by no means clear, least of all for the kind of limited war that had taken place in Korea. Despite a change of administration at home and ultimate agreement on a Korean armistice, military policy was to continue much as before. At the Pentagon the bad old chiefs departed and the good new chiefs came in, a change chiefly significant for the promulgation of the "New Look" which, with its emphasis on the size of the bang, harked back to pre-Korean days. On the level of higher policy the concept of "massive retaliation," with its promise of converting all small wars into big ones, seemed a denial of all Korea had stood for and a return to the position of 1949. With the end of the Korean fighting, the Bureau of the Budget regained its ascendancy in military affairs, dollar problems returned to harass and divide the services, and the only difference was that this time it was the Army, which had borne the heat of the day in Korea, that suffered most.

Yet however predestined, all this was in the future in July of 1951 as the delegates gathered for the commencement of Korean armistice talks. At 1100 on the morning of the 10th Admiral Joy led his colleagues into the teahouse at Kaesong to confront the emissaries of the enemy. Among the correspondents present to observe proceedings, bets were being made on how long it would take to close the gates of the temple. The pessimists thought six weeks.
Chapter 12. Two More Years
1. July 1951-February 1952: Stabilized Front and Peripheral War

AT KAESONG the first few days of talk were not auspicious, occupied as they were by U.N. efforts to control Communist propaganda activity, by argument over the administration of the neutral area, and by procedural disputation. Nevertheless, in the course of little more than two weeks, an agenda was adopted and the delegates proceeded to address themselves to the question of a cease-fire.

Although hostilities were to continue until agreement had been reached, the commencement of negotiations made for optimism, and ComNavFE thought it necessary to warn of possible acts of treachery. Ground action, nevertheless, continued to diminish: six months of grinding frontline warfare had ended, the battleline had been stabilized on favorable ground, and except in the Iron Triangle and on the Soyang River, United Nations activity was limited to patrolling and to the improvement of defensive positions. But since the enemy was busily engaged in bringing down new units to replace those chewed up in the spring offensives, and was bending every effort to improve his logistic position, interdiction perforce continued. For the next two years, as hopes of peace continued to be frustrated, the burden of offensive action was to lie principally upon the Air Force and the Navy.

The prospect of an early armistice had already been reflected in the movements and composition of the Amphibious Force. With the departure of Admiral Thackrey in June the number of Amphibious Force flag officers in the Western Pacific dropped from two to one; at the end of the month a recommended reduction in the Far Eastern deployment of larger PhibPac ships to one AGC, seven APAs, and two AKAs had been approved by CincPacFleet; in time the allowance of LSTs would also be cut down. Concurrent with this diminution of strength, however, there arose the requirement of supporting the U.N. armistice delegation, and a special task element of one AGC, one APA, and an LST helicopter base was formed and stationed at Inchon to provide logistic and communications services. And at the same time other units of Task Force 90 were assisting in a special operation to the northward.

This affair, of the greatest importance for technical intelligence, involved the recovery of a downed Russian MIG. For although U.N. aviators were by now well acquainted with this high-performance fighter, Communist reluctance to engage in combat far from base had prevented acquisition of a specimen for closer examination, and a previous search by west coast ships for one reported on the sandbars of the Yalu Gulf had proved fruitless. On 9 July, however, word was received from JOC that a MIG was down in shoal water off the mouth of the Chongchon River; Sicily, back again in the Far East as relief for Bataan, was ordered to search, and the American officers in charge of west coast underground activities, "Leopard" on Paengnyong Do and "Salamander" on Cho Do, were instructed to alert their people. But the reported position was 15 miles in error, the weather was foggy, and the aircraft, awash only at low water, was hard to see; not until the 11th did planes from Glory find the MIG a couple of miles offshore and 33 miles north of the Taedong estuary.

This location, less than 10 minutes flying time from the enemy’s Antung airfields, was both risky and navigationally difficult. But photographs indicated that recovery might be practicable, every effort was ordered by ComNavFE, and the commanding officer of Ceylon worked out a plan. On 18 July an LSU equipped with a special crane was borrowed from CTF 90 and sent up to Cho Do in the LSD Whetstone. The next day’s effort ended with the LSU fast on a sandbar, but on the 20th, with air cover from Glory, with Belfast stationed to warn of air attack, and with Cardigan Bay on hand for fire support, a U.S. Navy helicopter operating from the British carrier buoyed the site and Glory aircraft led the LSU through the sandbars. By evening the engine had been
recovered and the major portions of the air-frame located; next morning the pieces were loaded on the LSU. In the afternoon Sicily pilots sighted 32 MIGs heading for the area, but foggy weather prevented contact, no trouble ensued, and on the 22nd the LSU and its precious cargo were embarked in the LSD Epping Forest and the MIG brought back to Inchon.

Along both coasts, as talks began, action continued. On the western shore British Commonwealth, ROK, and U.S. units carried out a number of Small bombardments and raids. At Wonsan in the east, activity increased as the enemy worked to expand his truck traffic and to develop his coastal defenses: reports from agents within the city made frequent mention of the presence of Soviet advisors, of the massing of troops, of possible shore-based torpedo firing facilities, and of the installation of batteries of impressive size, including a "Stalin gun" said to have been hauled out to Hodo Pando by 12 horses. Sufficient credence was placed in these reports to produce the "Wonsan Special" of 5 July, in which Task Force 77 helped out the bombardment group by devoting its entire day and 247 sorties to the city. And further confirmatory evidence was soon forthcoming.

At 1637 on the afternoon of the 17th, shore batteries opened on the destroyers O'Brien, Blue, and Cunningham from three sides of the Wonsan swept area. The ships at once went into the War Dance, an evasive maneuver originated in May by Brinkley Bass and Duncan, steaming in an ellipse at 22 knots and firing on batteries in each sector as their guns came to bear. As enemy fire continued heavy, Task Force 77 was called upon for air support; at 1650, and again an hour later, an LSMR was brought in from the outer channel to deliver a long-range rocket barrage against enemy gun positions. By 1830 the batteries on Hodo Pando, Umi Do, and the tip of Kalma Pando had been silenced or had checked fire, but a new group of emplacements at the base of Kalma Pando presently opened up. By this time Helena and New Jersey had been started in from Task Force 77, and HMS Morecambe Bay, en route to Songjin, had been diverted to Wonsan. At 2000 in she came to join the dance, and for another hour, until darkness descended, shooting continued. Despite many very near misses no ship had been hit, and the single casualty was treated by the application of a Band-Aid, but the more than 500 splashes observed and the far larger number of rounds returned made the so-called "Battle of the Buzz Saw" a very respectable engagement. Late that night Helena reached the outer channel, to be followed by New Jersey in the morning, and since something heavier than 5-inch gunfire seemed needed, both ships stayed on for two days of heavy-gun bombardment.

Prospects nevertheless seemed warm, and future policy deserving of consideration. To the Seventh Fleet staff the value of the Wonsan foothold seemed dependent on the future intentions of CincFE, a view which was communicated to the higher levels for comment. But there, owing to the commencement of armistice talks, planning was largely in abeyance, and answer came there none. In the absence of guidance from above, Admiral Martin decided, as an interim measure, to hold the harbor islands for bargaining purposes. It was to prove a long interim.

Offshore, despite the hindrance of the July fogs, Task Force 77 continued to provide aircraft for close support, armed reconnaissance, and interdiction. Since requests from JOC for support of the battleline seldom exceeded 30 sorties a day the main effort was invested in a continuation of Operation Strangle, the attempt to cut truck traffic between 38° 15´ and 39 15´, and in a return to bridge breaking. Here foggy weather, increased anti-aircraft, and the recent emphasis on close support had worked in favor of the enemy; the bridge cuts south of Songjin had been eliminated, and few breaks existed in the line. But by month's end things were again under control, and a new program of systematic photography was underway to provide information for a new key bridge list.

At Kaesong, following agreement on the agenda, the delegates in late July took up the question of a demarcation line. Here the Communists, who by now had suffered a net loss of territory, insisted on the 38th parallel. But since an armistice would bring an end to the blockade, and to air and naval action against enemy territory, the U.N. negotiators, for their part, sought compensation in a line north of the existing front. From this
discussion there soon arose the question of who in fact controlled the territory of the Yonan and Ongjin peninsulas, south of 38° and west of the Imjin River.

Largely untouched by war, and but lightly held by the enemy, the coastal parts of Hwanghae Province were subject at any time to descents from the sea, or to raids by partisans operating from the offshore islands. At the end of June ROK guerrillas with naval support had landed south of Yonan to destroy two ammunition dumps; in the following weeks raids were carried out against the mainland opposite Cho Do. On the evening of 24 July, as the question of the demarcation line arose, CTF 95 received a message from Admiral Joy asking for a show of strength in the Han River estuary as close as possible to Kaesong. Admiral Dyer at once committed all but one of his west coast frigates to this operation, \textit{Glory} was ordered from Sasebo to join \textit{Sicily}, and a check sweep of the \textit{entrance to Haeju Man} was undertaken to permit the entry of heavy bombardment ships.

Two-carrier operations were carried out from 26 to 29 July; from the 27th to the 29th the heavy cruiser \textit{Los Angeles} shot up targets on the western shore of Haeju Man; in the Han the Commonwealth frigates bombarded the northern bank. For these operations in the estuary the finest kind of seamanship was necessary: U.S. and British charts of the area differed widely, and none showed any very reassuring depths; the liquid medium in the Han, brown soup rather than clear water, was lined with rocks; currents reached eight to ten knots, and so poor was the holding ground that on one occasion \textit{Comus} dragged while steaming to both anchors.

Although targets for bombardment, obtained from JOC and from the Leopard organization, were generally unprofitable, and although enemy reaction was for the moment nil, the demonstration was more concerned with capabilities than with accomplishments. By early August, despite intermittent groundings, the bombarding ships had succeeded in penetrating upstream to fire on Yonan from the southeast and northward up the Yesong River; on the 17th three of the frigates found 400 enemy troops along the river bank and gave them a thorough shelling. Late in the month, on the urging of Admiral Scott-Moncreiff, a survey of the river was begun by a UDT detachment in the APD \textit{Weiss}, and the channel was buoyed by the fleet tug \textit{Abnaki}.

By this time the optimism which had accompanied the opening of armistice talks was dead. In early August negotiations had been briefly suspended by General Ridgway in protest against Communist violations of the neutral zone; late in the month, following an incident apparently fabricated to suggest that U.N. aircraft had bombed the conference site, the Communists in turn refused to talk; only in late October, with transfer of the conference site to Panmunjom, were plenary sessions resumed. These events governed the progress of the fighting. In mid-August General Van Fleet launched a limited offensive on the eastern coastal strip; with the breakdown in negotiations he ordered a larger effort east of the Hwachon Reservoir in \textit{X Corps} zone.

Once again fire support was needed on the coastal road. On 17 August a special bombardment group, Task Group 95.9, was formed to assist the ROK advance into the difficult hill country south of Kosong; composed initially of \textit{New Jersey}, \textit{Toledo}, and two destroyers, this group continued through various changes of ships and of designation to support the eastern end of the battleline through August and into September.

Once again, also, an amphibious demonstration was called for to assist the forward movement. On 27 August a minesweeping group composed of three AMS and the LSD \textit{Whetstone} moved into the objective area at Changjon, to be followed in due course by \textit{Helena}, three destroyers, and an LSMR, and on the 30th by \textit{New Jersey} and another destroyer. On the 30th and 31st the beach and adjacent troop and gun positions were bombarded and subjected to air strikes; offshore, where the transport group lay to, the boats were lowered, formed into waves, and headed for shore, before being recalled and hoisted in. But although the demonstration was more elaborate than its predecessors, it remained questionable what diversionary impact had been created, or whether anything over and above the bombardment damage had been accomplished.

The main effort, however, was inland, and there on the 31st the attack began as the Marine Division, fresh from a six–week rest, pushed northward up the Soyang Valley, while the 2nd Division pressed forward on its left. By 18 September the Marines had reached their objectives, as did the 2nd Division in mid-October. West
of the Hwachon Reservoir, IX Corps was also pressing forward, and by 21 October was looking down upon Kumsong. Seventh Fleet planners had by this time produced a follow-up plan, known as "Wrangler," which involved withdrawing the Marines from X Corps, embarking them at Sokcho, and landing them in assault at Kojo to link up with the advance of IX Corps. But on 24 October, after a month of haggling by liaison officers, the Communists asked that talks be resumed, and "Wrangler" never came off.

The northward advance of the Marines since their February commitment to the Wonju front had brought them steadily closer to the Sea of Japan. Late September found the division on the upper waters of the Soyang River where its right, though still west of the Korean divide, was less than ten miles from the sea. This proximity to tidewater raised possibilities of naval gunfire and maritime logistics which were quickly embraced.

In this extremely mountainous country the enemy, deeply entrenched on the reverse slopes, was hard to reach. Since artillery could not touch him, and since air support was in short supply and unpredictable in quality, resort was had for the first time in a year to naval gunfire. On 20 September New Jersey was sent in to provide support; on the 23rd, after liaison officers had been sent out by helicopter and radio communication had been established, ranging rounds were fired; on the next two days, and again on 2 and 3 October, 16-inch fire was called down upon the backsides of the enemy with destructive and demoralizing effect. On 17 October New Jersey returned to the task, and for five days late in the month support was provided by the heavy cruiser Toledo. Intermittently throughout the winter this work continued, with the ships firing at ranges of 11 to 16 miles, their shells sailing over 2,000—foot mountains and across the Nam River valley to embed themselves amidst the enemy’s supply concentrations and command posts.

The proximity of the sea also held logistic promise. In contrast to the ROK I Corps on the coast, always largely supported by sea, the Marines in September were dependent on their railhead at Wonju, 91 bad road miles away, a situation which required greatly increased allowances of motor transport, communications gear, and heavy engineer equipment. Now, however, encouraged by the prospect of "Wrangler," a road was cut through the mountains to the sea, Sokcho in the ROK zone was pressed into use as a supply port, and an adjacent airstrip was employed as division airhead. The impressive consequence of this shift to seaborne supply was the addition to the division’s monthly potential of an estimated 8,000 to 10,000 combat man-days.

In somewhat similar manner Marine air units attempted to base themselves on the sea. MAG 12, with its main base at Pusan West, had been increasing its output and decreasing commuting time by staging through a forward field near Wonju; in July this field was closed, and in August forward operations were shifted to a coastal strip near Kangnung. But Kangnung has no harbor, and although use of this strip greatly improved the sortie rate, the exposed nature of the coastline complicated logistics. Original plans to bring supplies in across the beaches foundered when the broaching of an LST showed the beach to be unsatisfactory. Resort was next had to unloading at Chumunjin, but at the cost of a 17-mile trucking requirement over inferior roads. In early September the construction of a pontoon causeway near Kangnung eased the situation until its destruction by winter weather necessitated further recourse to Chumunjin.

Still, if the complications of beach logistics forced the working hands to a variety of expedients, the support provided by MAG 12’s neighbors was unsurpassed. The broaching of the LST, with its vital load of POL and ordnance, brought an immediate response from the population of nearby fishing villages. Sampans were lashed together to form a causeway, and then overlaid by pierced steel planking across which the cargo was manhandled ashore. Twenty–four hours of continuous effort finished the job, and as no pay would be accepted by the Koreans the best the Marines could do was to set up a fund for the families of fishermen lost at sea.

Day after day throughout the summer the fast carriers continued the effort at interdiction. On 22 August a new face appeared in the Far East with the arrival of Essex, first of her class to enter World War II and first also to reach Korea following modernization to provide more powerful catapults, larger elevators for planes and bombs,
and most importantly a larger gasoline capacity and an improved fueling system to cope with the insatiable demands of jet aircraft. Embarked in Essex was Air Group 5 with one squadron of ADs, one of F4Us, one of F9Fs, and one of the McDonnell F2H Banshee, an excellent twin-jet fighter, larger, heavier, and superior in performance to the F9F, although still, like all U.S. aircraft except the F–86, inferior to the MIG in speed and maneuverability.

Essex’s first month in the theater was one of developmental progress. Operationally a new first in interservice cooperation was effected when 23 F9F and F2H fighters escorted 35 B–29s in a strike against Najin, a Communist storage center on the northeast coast beyond the range of Air Force fighters and but 17 miles from the Soviet boundary. In materiel also an advance took place, following a serious accident in which a damaged F2H floated over the barriers and into parked aircraft, causing a gasoline fire which destroyed 4 planes, killed 7, and injured 27. Lacking propellers to catch the barricades, floating jets had always been hard to stop, and the ultimate solution of the angled deck was still some years away; but the Essex incident brought an effective interim measure in the installation of a ten-foot barrier of wire and nylon tape as a last-resort midships arresting device.

For the most part, however, the work went on, day after day, in routine fashion. "Strangle" operations against the North Korean road net continued into September, as did attacks on key rail bridges. Across the peninsula Fifth Air Force also continued its efforts against road traffic, but with a progressive tendency to shift to a new concept, still under the rubric "Strangle," which called for the destruction of railroad trackage in the optimistic hope that this would force the enemy to wear out his motor transport. In this effort, officially begun on 19 August, the carriers soon joined; a month later, on orders from CincFE, all close support was halted to permit full concentration on interdiction; on the last day of September, following a conference between Air Force and Navy commanders, it was decided to emphasize rail cutting supplemented by the destruction of a Small number of key bridges. The Navy’s part began fast with 131 track cuts in the first three days of October, and as the enemy’s repair parties were poorly deployed to meet the new tactic, both Air Force and carrier airmen managed to stay ahead while the flying weather remained good.

At intervals throughout the fall the work of the fast carriers in the Sea of Japan was augmented by the Commonwealth light carrier. On 18 and 19 September, at the suggestion of Commander Seventh Fleet, CTF 95 put on a special two-day air, gun, and rocket effort against Wonsan, in which the air strikes were provided by HMS Glory. On 10 and 11 October a similar operation against the Kojo area, with air strikes from HMAS Sydney, and with a mixed U.S., British, and Canadian screen, was carried out by Rear Admiral Scott-Moncreiff in Belfast. Late in November Scott-Moncreiff returned again with Belfast and Sydney, and with a screen still further internationalized by the addition of a Dutch destroyer, to spend two days in banging up Hungnam.

In the east, along the 300 miles of enemy coast, the ships of Task Force 95 continued to provide fire support, to patrol and bombard, and to besiege the cities of Wonsan and Songjin. In July the Royal Marine Commando, whose varied experiences had taken it under the sea in Perch, up to the reservoir with the Marines, and into enemy country near the mouth of the Taedong River, had arrived at Yo Do for a six month’s tour of duty; after some practice raids against the Wonsan mainland the Royal Marines began a series of autumn operations, landing from an APD to attack targets along the northeastern coast. On 5 September, on orders from Seventh Fleet, CTF 95 instructed the minesweepers to clear a lane between Wonsan and Hungnam to bring the western shore of the Korean Gulf within gunfire range. One month later, as the job was being finished, New Jersey, Helena, and some destroyers bombarded the Hungnam area for the first time since the X Corps evacuation, destroying an oil refinery and some ammunition dumps. But although the clearance of Hungnam had been successful not everyone had heard the details, and on 7 October the destroyer Small got outside the swept area and was mined with considerable damage and heavy casualties.

The efforts at interdiction by Fifth Air Force in the west and Task Force 77 in the east, together with surface ship bombardment of accessible coastal pressure points, had placed a heavy load upon the Communists.
Their Department of Military Highway Administration, charged with road repair, had grown to a total of some 20,000 men, and the railroad repair organization was estimated of equivalent size. But despite all, it still seemed impossible to cut the flow of supplies below the enemy’s requirements. Persistence and diligence in repair, a determination to get supplies through, and the Small logistic requirements of Communist forces had resulted in continuous improvement of the enemy’s front line logistic situation: his soldiers were better fed than ever before, his number of tanks had increased, and his expenditure of artillery ammunition had risen from 8,000 rounds in July to 43,000 in November. For one side, at least, negotiation had proven profitable.

Not only were supplies getting through, but some 500 heavy antiaircraft guns and almost 2,000 automatic weapons had by now been emplaced in North Korea, and U.N. aircraft were suffering increasing losses. The increase in coast artillery, first noted at Wonsan, had extended along the shore, with the result that U.N. vessels could no longer move close in or lie to while firing. At sea the possible submarine threat continued to preoccupy naval commanders, while in the air enemy strength continued to grow.

Steadily increasing totals of MIG sorties were being reported by Air Force fighter pilots on northern patrols—180 on 2 October, more than 300 on 29 November—while the availability of light bombers and propeller-driven attack planes was no longer a matter of question. Following an Air Force query as to carrier jet capabilities in the northwest an F2H sweep was sent off to MIG Alley; no contact was made, and this maximum-range effort was not repeated, but the menace remained. Noting the increase in Communist air strength and the concurrent effort to activate North Korean airstrips, ComNavFE in early November informed his command that enemy aircraft had been sighted south of Pyongyang, and directed heavy ships not to operate north of Wonsan without air cover. On 27 November a flight from Bon Homme Richard was attacked by MIGs near Wonsan, and on subsequent occasions contrails were sighted high overhead. In early December, as the Amphibious Force began an interchange of Army units between Hokkaido and Inchon, CincFE instructed FEAF and the West Coast Carrier Element to provide cover for all troop movements in the Yellow Sea.

Nevertheless, despite the enemy’s increasing material prosperity, the movement of the battleline had continued northward, the U.N. retained command of the air over most of North Korea, the U.N. navies controlled the coasts, and bombardment at Wonsan, Songjin, and in the Han River estuary remained a daily affair. On 28 September CTF 95 made an inspection trip up the Han in the Australian frigate Murchison, only to be opened on by mortars, Small arms, and light field guns. Contemporaneously with this first instance of the long-awaited enemy reaction, indications that the Communists were about to abandon their insistence on the 38th parallel brought requests from the U.N. delegation and from EUSAK for more gunfire.

Admiral Dyer at once ordered the Han River operation intensified. The Yellow Sea carrier was directed to bomb the northern banks daily and to provide air spot and CAP for the bombarding frigates. On 3 October Black Swan steamed up the river to draw enemy fire, whereupon 13 F4Us from Rendova attacked the gun positions; and for the balance of the month, as carrier aircraft burned off the cover on the northern bank, the noise of the bombardment was wafted to the negotiators at Kaesong. By October’s end an effort originally scheduled for a few days had lasted a hundred, and like the destroyers at Wonsan the frigates in the Han estuary had become fixed.

On 25 October, as the enemy returned to the truce table, the U.N. negotiators proposed the establishment of a four-kilometer demilitarized zone based generally on the existing line of contact. On 5 November the proposal was accepted, together with a U.N. proviso that the line be that existing when final agreement was reached. A week later General Ridgway directed Eighth Army to cease offensive operations and commence an active defense of existing positions. By the 27th the front had been mapped and accepted by both sides, and a bait provided for the Communists by a U.N. undertaking to accept this line should the armistice be concluded within a month.

With this agreement, frigate bombardment in the Han River was terminated and ground action again
diminished. Along the entire front, from the Imjin to the sea, the Communists pressed the fortification of defensive positions. But as the ground battle tapered off into patrolling, the enemy commenced an offensive effort in a new sphere, and the seat of war was transferred to the offshore islands.

These islands, acquired during the U.N. advance in late 1950, had since that time been employed as bases for raids and for intelligence activities. On the eastern shore the picture was a fairly simple one: except for those in Wonsan harbor only four islands of importance lie along this coast, and of these the two largest, Mayang Do on the 40th parallel and Hwa Do off Hungnam, were enemy controlled. Northeast of Songjin, however, the Yang Do island group, two miles offshore, accommodated intelligence personnel moving in and out of North Korea, and in time would become an ROKN PT operating base; off the bomb line on the 39th parallel the little island of Nan Do was employed as a base for Task Force Kirkland, a EUSAK unconventional warfare organization.

In the west the situation was more complex. On Tokchok To, off Inchon, the Air Force navigational equipment evacuated in December had been reinstalled in February, and similar gear had been emplaced on Paengnyong Do on the 38th parallel. Along the southern shore of Hwanghae Province, from the Han estuary to Korea’s western tip, numerous coastal islets were employed as bases by partisan groups, of which Leopard Force was the most notable. Off the Chinnampo approaches, the important islands of Sok To and Cho Do supported guerrilla and clandestine operations, and an Air Force desire to install radar facilities and rescue helicopters on Cho Do waited only on improved security. To the northward in the Yalu Gulf a group of islands, seized by the ROK Navy in November 1950, contained numerous anti-Communist guerrillas.

The number of independent agencies on these islands led at times to situations of considerable complexity. In August 1951 one observer noted that Yo Do in Wonsan harbor was crowded with uncoordinated delegations from nearly every organization operating in Korea, and that the masses of amateurs commuting to and from the mainland created hazards for the skilled agents. In the west a FEAF outfit which operated its own private navy, and the organizations controlled by Leopard at Paengyong Do and by Salamander at Cho Do, cooperated well with the blockading force. But other groups, too mysterious to mention, were less considerate, and when NavFE headquarters proved unable to influence the state of affairs, Admiral Scott-Moncreiff ordered the apprehension and detention of all unidentifiable travellers. By autumn this particular situation had improved, but by this time the enemy was showing interest in the islands, while the armistice talks had adversely affected the morale of anti-Communist North Korean guerrillas.

Giving thought to their future status in the event of a cease-fire, many of these now became double or triple agents, or went over to the Communists. At Sok To a mutiny of the garrison and landing force was caught in the nick of time by Leopard, and 300 prisoners were removed to the southward. On 30 August Royal Marines and stokers from *Ceylon* made a descent upon a west coast target designated by Leopard Force; Leopard himself accompanied the raiders and no trouble was expected, but someone had leaked and the opposition was waiting. On Cho Do, in early September, an attempt on the life of Salamander was made by one of his own ex-agents. But not all developments were adverse. On 24 September, supported by gunfire from *Comus*, Leopard’s Sok To agent led a Small raid against the Amgak peninsula, and returned with nine prisoners including a North Korean colonel and his concubine. The colonel, recently transferred from Wonsan, reported that he was fed up with the war; the comments of his lady have unfortunately not been preserved.

In this situation of tension and uncertainty the enemy, in early October, began to exert pressure. On the 9th, 600 invaders from the mainland landed on the large Yalu Gulf island of Sinmi Do, and although the garrison held for a time with support from *Cossack* and *Ceylon*, reinforcements arriving across the tidal mud flats forced withdrawal on the 12th. On the 30th Cayuga reported receiving a hundred rounds of artillery fire from the Amgak peninsula opposite Sok To; in the Yalu Gulf the island of Taehwa Do, where friendly forces had concentrated, was attacked by aircraft on 6 November in the first confirmed enemy employment of light bombers in Korea. That night Ka Do and Tan Do, two of the Smaller northern islands, were seized by the Communists in a night
Since the U.N. delegation hoped to use the islands as counters to trade off against the Kaesong area, these events served to stimulate some interest. From Commander Seventh Fleet came a request for an inventory of west coast islands, and from EUSAK a hope that Taehwa Do would be held. Although he felt the northern islands were not worth the effort required to defend them, Admiral Scott-Moncreiff on 9 November ordered a destroyer to patrol the area during the hours of darkness. Shortly Commander Seventh Fleet appeared in the Yellow Sea on an inspection tour; on the 12th, with air spot from HMAS *Sydney*, his flagship *New Jersey* fired her final Korean bombardment and her 3,000th 16–inch round of the war at troop concentrations reported by Leopard Force.

Winter by now had come again bringing strong winds, cold, and the first snows to the northern Yellow Sea. Nightly, nevertheless, ships of the blockading force went up to Taehwa Do; in the course of the month guerrilla raids supported by naval units were conducted against enemy–held islands in the Yalu Gulf; but the proximity of these positions to enemy airfields prevented daylight surface support or carrier air patrol. On 27 November the subject of the offshore islands came up for discussion at Panmunjom, and at once the Communists stepped up their efforts.

Although the enemy carried out a successful raid against Hwangto Do in Wonsan harbor on the night of the 28th, his principal effort was in the west. On 30 November, as CincFE warned that the islands had become critical to the negotiations and adjured his island commanders to make preparations for defense, Fifth Air Force fighters intercepted a formation of 12 twin-engine bombers heading for Taehwa Do with an escort of 16 propeller fighters and 50 MIGs, and destroyed the greater part of the bomber force. Nevertheless the island was lost that night to a well-planned amphibious assault supported by artillery from Ka Do, and of some 1,200 guerrillas and inhabitants only about a quarter got out. This affair was followed almost immediately by further enemy shore-to-shore attacks which seized six Small coastal islets in Haeju Man, and by reports of extensive troop movements in Hwanghae Province. These events brought a review of the island situation.

Responsibility for island defense was at this time somewhat obscure. Tokchok To and Paengnyong Do had for almost a year been charges of CTG 95.1; other islands where U.S. intelligence activities or equipment were operative were under the control of CincFE; the Korean-occupied islands were pretty much on their own. The loss of Taehwa Do had brought increased patrolling by west coast ships and a request for reinforcement of the Cho Do, Sok To, and Paengyong Do garrisons; on higher levels various proposals for the institution of Small boat patrols, reinforcement of the islands by air, and the like, were bandied about; in the south ROK Marine units were alerted for movement to the threatened islands. On 7 December Admiral Dyer received the loan of *Manchester* from Commander Seventh Fleet, and followed by *Ceylon* proceeded west at speed to Cho Do. But the attitude of higher echelons remained obscure, no reinforcements were available from EUSAK, and Commander Seventh Fleet was reluctant to become too deeply involved.

At Cho Do and Sok To, Admiral Dyer found morale improved by the news that the islands would be defended, but the situation was still precarious. Island commanders, intelligence officers rather than Marine or Army line, were inexperienced in organizing defenses; since the guerrillas were all natives of North Korea, security was inherently poor; conversation with Leopard indicated the great desirability of getting the refugees out and the ROK Marines in as fast as possible. An LSD and some AMS were brought in to keep the Sok To anchorage swept and to strengthen the Small craft patrol, and arrangements were made for the LSTs bringing up the ROK Marines to remove the refugees. With this much accomplished, and with an apparently growing Small boat menace to the Wonsan harbor islands, CTF 95 proceeded to the east coast.

Hardly, however, had he reached Wonsan when word was received of attacks on two Small islands inboard of Sok To, and between 16 and 18 December, despite support from U.N. ships and aircraft, an enemy force of about 600 overran these positions. With the situation apparently still deteriorating, CTF 95 again headed west, and on the 18th took over as officer in tactical command on the west coast. By the 20th the ships on anti-
invasion duty near Cho Do included Manchester, Ceylon, and two destroyers, and the question of responsibility for island defense was at last beginning to jell.

Despite the fact that all islands north of 38° were conceded by the U.N. negotiators on 21 December, failing an armistice agreement the defensive requirement remained. On 6 January responsibility for the overall defense, local ground defense included, of designated islands on both coasts, was assigned the Navy and delegated to CTF 95. So far as east coast islands were concerned only Nan Do, off the bombline, had not previously been a naval responsibility; in the west, however, Sok To and Cho Do in the Chinnampo approaches, Taechong Do in the Sir James Hall group, and Taeyongpyong Do south of Haeju were added to the list. On the 9th an Army-Navy-Air Force island defense conference was held aboard Wisconsin, following which the West Coast Island Defense Element was organized with a U.S. Marine officer in command, with headquarters on Paengnyong Do, and with two battalions of ROK Marines distributed among critical islands.

Already the LSTs of Task Force 90, which had brought the defenders in, had begun to evacuate refugees: by 22 December about 9,000 had been lifted out and by late January some 20,000 had been transported south to Kunsan. Constant patrolling of the threatened areas was undertaken, and an LST with armed Small boats was provided for inshore work. In mid-January, in an effort to suppress the artillery effort against Cho Do and Sok To, CTF 95 went north in Rochester to bombard the Amgak peninsula in coordination with a Marine air strike from Badoeng Strait. By early February the enemy had retired from a number of the captured islets in Haeju Man and off the Ongjin peninsula, in part apparently owing to bombardment by rocket ships, in part to inability to support his forces. By March these islets were being reoccupied by anti-Communist partisans and a number of enemy efforts to attack across the mud flats had been thrown back by naval gunfire.

The period following naval assumption of responsibility for island defense brought two actions of some importance. On the northeast coast, after a month of careful preparation, the North Koreans mounted a raid on the Yang Do group by some 250 troops boated in sampans. Shortly after midnight on 20 February the New Zealand frigate Taupo, the DMS Endicott, and the destroyer Shelton were patrolling to the northward when an emergency dispatch reported Yang Do under fire from the mainland and invasion apparently imminent. Steaming at flank speed the ships reached the islands to discover bombardment continuing and fighting in progress ashore, but by this time radio contact had been broken. With daylight, however, the island commander came back on the air: all invaders on Yang Do had been either killed or captured, those on East Yang Do were departing for the mainland. There followed a spirited engagement in the two-mile strait in which Taupo and Endicott engaged some 15 sampans, destroying 10 and damaging the rest, and were themselves engaged by artillery from the mainland, while Shelton put up counter-battery fire. This was all very well, but on the west coast the enemy fared better, and in a successful assault on the night of 24 March seized a Small island between Cho Do and Sok To and eliminated its defenders.

Although reports of enemy offensive plans continued to come in, and although artillery fire was persistently directed against Cho Do, Sok To, and their supporting ships, as well as against the islands at Wonsan, the enemy island offensive was limited in its success to the elimination of the foothold in the Yalu Gulf. At Cho Do improved defensive arrangements were followed by the installation of radar and antiaircraft weapons in February, and in March by a helicopter detachment; these facilities, together with naval patrol of the surrounding waters and a rescue B—29 which orbited overhead, made the Cho Do area a useful bail-out and rescue zone for pilots from the Yellow Sea carrier and from the Fifth Air Force. Elsewhere the offshore positions continued to provide bases for intelligence and guerrilla activity, while at Wonsan possession of the harbor islands paid an unexpected dividend. Some concern had been caused the U.N. Command by events such as the Sok To mutiny, and by reports that guerrillas were surrendering in response to an enemy offer of amnesty. But at Wonsan, on 21 February, reassurance was gained when at 0630 in the morning Brigadier General Lee II, NKPA, reached Tae Do in a stolen sampan, with a briefcase full of top secret papers, a head full of top secret plans, and a strong desire to
make himself useful.

As the war continued among the islands, along the coasts, and in the air over North Korea, so did the talks at Panmunjom. There, with agreement on the demarcation line, discussion had turned to arrangements for a cease-fire and to the question of prisoners of war. December and January brought abandonment by the U.N. of the northern islands, of the right to air reconnaissance over North Korea, and of a previously proposed limitation on Communist rehabilitation of airfields. But with the New Year the sticking point appeared in the question of forced repatriation of prisoners. Despite further U.N. concessions all progress ceased, while continued enemy pressure against the islands was indicative of no speedy peace.

Through the winter cold and winds and snow, naval and air operations went on. The Amphibious Force was engaged in further troop lifts between Korea and Japan. The units of Task Force 95 continued as before, the monotony interrupted only by a brief resumption of the Han River patrol, by rumors of a Soviet submarine in the northeastern coastal area, and by the loss with all hands of an ROK PC, presumably by mining, at Wonsan. On the east coast the detachment of the ROK Capital Division to chase guerrillas in the southern mountains imposed additional burdens at the bombline, but the assignment of a heavy ship and of another destroyer to duty there enabled the remaining forces to hold the road while the extermination campaign went on. The load of the minesweepers was increased by the decision of CTF 95 to sweep the east coast from Kansong to Songjin every two weeks. As for the aviators, they were still working on the railroad.

Click here to view table

In the north the frugal and ant-like enemy continued to accumulate supplies and, as the table shows, to maintain with roughly half the logistic means of the U.N. a larger military establishment. At year’s end total U.N. strength in Korea was of the order of 600,000, and that of the Communists a third as much again, while EUSAK credited the enemy with the ability to launch a general offensive with a force of more than 40 divisions.

So spring came.
Chapter 12. Two More Years
2. March 1952-February 1953: Stalemate

Watch after watch, day after weary day, the war went on. The cold of winter passed, to be followed by
the thaw and rains of spring, the haze and fog and steaming heat of summer, and the clear days of early autumn.
In steady succession carriers and their air groups crossed the Pacific to take their tour of combat and depart; from
the west coast of the United States destroyers crossed the ocean and from the Atlantic coast the world, operated
for their allotted period, and returned again. In the Atlantic and Mediterranean the larger half of the U.S. Navy
was also working on an accelerated schedule in a situation that was neither peace nor war. Throughout the
establishment and on both sides of the world effort was called for from all hands, and particularly from the career
personnel, laboring to accomplish an acceptable minimum of training while watching the steady disappearance of
rated men and qualified reserves into the welcoming arms of American industry.

Stalemate existed, but stalemate brought no rest. Readiness had to be maintained; crews had to be
trained; the enemy, ensconced in the northern half of the peninsula, had to be harassed, and if possible brought to
terms. Day after day the F–86s went up to the Yalu, Air Force fighter-bombers and carrier aircraft ranged over
North Korea, the gunnery ships continued on patrol, mines were swept. But month after month went by, and
increasingly the question of what leverage to employ upon the enemy became more puzzling and more frustrating.

For the supporting forces and for the NavFE shore establishment, as well as for those on the line, life
continued arduous under the twin pressures of operational load and Parkinson’s Law. The hazards of the sea
continued to manifest themselves in run-of-the-mill casualties and breakdowns calling for the attention of the
Service Force, while April brought a major tragedy when an explosion in Saint Paul’s forward 8-inch turret took
30 lives. In some areas, however, appropriate savings were effected: to economize on pilots and aircraft, pull-out
altitudes were raised and passes over a target limited; to economize on fuel and ammunition Commander Seventh
Fleet would soon restrict speed in transit and unobserved gunfire. Expenditure of aviation ordnance, however,
continued apace, aided by the load-carrying characteristics of the AD, with the surprising result that by May 1952
Navy and Marine usage in Korea equalled their total for the entire war against Japan. In communications, too,
economy was hard to come by, and multiplied circuits and augmented personnel struggled bravely but vainly
against the loquacity of the human animal. The message count of late 1950, when great operations were afoot,
was up by half again in 1952 though all remained routine; in the autumn an amphibious feint would double the
peak reached during the amphibious strokes of two years before.

For the enemy, too, the war went on, the seasons passed. To a country hardly worth more devastation,
and to men whose lives held little value for their rulers, U.N. aircraft and ships and artillery brought destruction
and death. What the Communists thought they were accomplishing remains unknown. Their inability to deal with
the situation in constructive terms, either for themselves or for the world at large, remained unimpeachable.

Once more in 1952 the coming of spring brought changes to the Far East. In Europe General Eisenhower
gave up his command at SHAPE, and returned home to begin a career in politics. Summoned to succeed him,
General Ridgway was in May relieved of his commands by General Mark W. Clark, USA, who had struggled in
Italy with the problems of peninsular war and in Austria with those of negotiating with the Communists. This
change at the top of the U.N. Command was paralleled throughout the echelons of Naval Forces Far East: the
Marine Division and the Marine Aircraft Wing received new commanding generals; with the arrival of Rear
Admiral Burton B. Biggs the Logistic Support Force got a flag officer at its head; in April the first of a new
generation of carrier division commanders arrived in the person of Rear Admiral Apollo Soucek; in May Vice Admiral Joseph J. Clark become Commander Seventh Fleet and Rear Admiral Frederick W. McMahon, for four months ComCarDiv 5 in Valley Forge, relieved Admiral Ofstie as Chief of Staff of Naval Forces Far East.

Although rotation and relief had brought multiple changes in most Far Eastern billets there remained two commanders who had seen it all. Now, at long last, replacements for these veterans arrived. On 1 June Commander Luosey, who since the earliest days had administered the ROK Navy, was relieved. In May, after ten months of negotiations, Admiral Joy was succeeded as head of the truce team by Major General William K. Harrison, Jr., USA; in June, after nearly three years in peace and war as Commander Naval Forces Far East, he turned over his Tokyo command to Vice Admiral Robert P. Briscoe.

As the faces changed so did the problems faced. In mid-March the command structure of the Western Pacific was modified by presidential order, and military responsibility for the Philippine-Formosa-Marianas area transferred from CincFE to CincPac; local responsibility, however, remained with Commander Seventh Fleet, in his capacity as Commander Formosa Defense Force, and standing orders dating from Struble’s time, to proceed to Formosa at best speed in the event of a serious invasion threat, continued in effect. In April the Japanese peace treaty became effective and that war, at least, was formally over. For Naval Forces Far East this had a variety of implications. Along with their sister services in Japan they had to transmute themselves from occupation forces into guests, a process facilitated by war in Korea which both demonstrated the virtues of available force and provided a sizable infusion of dollars for the Japanese economy. With the peace treaty came also the disestablishment of Scajap, the Navy-administered Japanese-manned shipping concern which had performed such yeoman service in support of the Korean campaign, and the transfer of its LSTs to MSTS contract operations. For the future, ComNavFE acquired new responsibilities in helping the Japanese to organize a Coastal Security Force, and in supervising the transfer of frigates and landing craft to Japanese control.

Within Korea, spring of 1952 brought a change of some importance in the move of the Marine Division from the Soyang River sector to the Imjin front. On the tactical level this shift was occasioned by concern at EUSAK for the defenses in the west; strategically, it reflected the final abandonment of plans for an east coast amphibious envelopment. For most of the troops this 160-mile movement across everyone else’s supply lines was carried out between 18 and 25 March by road, but the tanks, amphibian tractors, and much of the engineering equipment were lifted out from Sokcho by two AKAs, three LSDs, and ten LSTs from Task Force 90. The arrival of the Marines west of the Imjin, where they relieved the ROK 1st Division, made it for the first time possible to hold this position against determined attack, while their transfer to a coastal sector produced an extra dividend as an amphibious retraining program, conducted throughout the summer in the Tokchok Islands, was apprehensively observed by the enemy.

The continuing amphibious threat, together with U.N. occupancy of islands off the enemy’s shore, had by now brought the assignment of three North Korean corps and three CCF armies to coast defense. In March and April, enemy raids across the mud flats of Haeju Man against Yongmae Do were repulsed by gunfire from Commonwealth naval units; on the east coast enemy batteries on Mayang Do fired on minesweepers and patrolling ships. U.N. forces, for their part, continued to exploit the islands for their opportunities in evasion and escape, and as bases for guerrilla operations. Attacks by APD-borne detachments against the east coast rail line were resumed, but with diminishing dividends; in the west, coastal raids and incursions into the Haeju area were supported by the Yellow Sea carrier and by gunnery ships.

At Cho Do and Sok To, which with their valuable radar, weather, and helicopter detachments had become the Wonsan of the west, a series of intermittent engagements took place between ships, carrier and Fifth Air Force aircraft, and enemy coastal batteries. In July there was a brief flurry in the Yellow Sea as an island close to the tip of the Ongjin peninsula was invaded by a North Korean force embarked in junks and outboard motorboats. As Belfast and Amethyst converged to assist the defenders, and as Marine fighter planes from Bataan
answered the call, other west coast ships manned anti-invasion stations off Cho Do and Sok To; within two days only 5 of the 156 invaders were missing and unaccounted for. More troublesome than the enemy were outbreaks of typhus on Cho Do and Paengnyong Do, but the epidemics were quickly controlled by a naval medical unit.

With the front remaining relatively quiet, the most conspicuous ground action of early 1952 was the campaign of Koje Do. On this island, 30 miles southwest of Pusan, camps had been erected to hold the more than 100,000 prisoners of war. Early in the year a screening program, intended to separate civilians from bona fide soldiers, had culled out some thousands of the former, who were then lifted by LST to mainland ports; it had also been violently resisted by organized prisoner groups. With the commencement of a second screening cycle, designed to separate those desiring repatriation from those who would resist it, disorder and violence increased; within the Communist-controlled pens the prisoners reigned supreme, and by their riotous activity provided grist for enemy propaganda mills. In May the capture of the camp commander by his charges provided embarrassing evidence of a need for reinforcement.

Five ROKN Small craft were ordered to Koje to prevent escape by water; elements of the 187th Airborne Regiment were hastily flown from Japan to Pusan and lifted out by LST, while the rest of the regiment with its heavy gear was brought across by sea. For Task Force 90 the sudden calls resulting from the crisis on Koje Do meant that scheduled maintenance had to be foregone and training schedules modified, but in due course the campaign was won. New island sites for camps were selected by aerial reconnaissance, beach surveys for LST slots were carried out by the UDTs, Army engineers and equipment were lifted to the new locations to construct new compounds. On 10 June a new camp commander imposed control upon his intransigent wards, and in July Task Force 90 carried 37,000 prisoners to their new decentralized homes.

At Panmunjom no progress remained the order of the day. Enemy insistence on freedom to reconstruct the North Korean airfields, on a limitation on rotation of forces in Korea, and on crippling restrictions for the proposed Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission sufficiently impeded agreement. But the insuperable barrier to progress, which no concession could apparently move, was the reluctance of Communist prisoners to return home and the insistence of their governments on forced repatriation.

Behind his fortified front, his stubbornness in negotiation, and his vigor in propaganda, the enemy continued to increase his strength. In March, interrogation of prisoners indicated that great operations were impending. On 1 April the biggest air battle of the year occurred when 186 F–86s took on some 350 MIGs. Late in the month piles of construction material at the Pyongyang airbase evidenced continued intentions of rehabilitation. In May an unparalleled 4,000 vehicle sightings a night betokened an extremely active logistic effort. In the weeks that followed, increased aggressiveness brought the MIGs south as far as Sinanju.

On the east coast, as well, the growth in enemy capabilities was apparent. There, where the ships of Task Force 95 continued to patrol, bombard, and besiege, enemy gunfire steadily increased. From Kojo north to Chongjin the installation of radar, together with such devices as anchored ranging buoys, led to continued improvement in Communist fire control. March brought the heaviest shooting since the previous July, and April’s fall of shot was double that of March. Reports from captured and defecting personnel, which suggested that an assault against the Wonsan islands was in preparation, gained at least superficial confirmation from the discovery that the boatbuilders of the area had been mobilized, and that the bays west of Hodo Pando contained a large and increasing number of small craft.

By June the greatest troop and supply accumulations of the war were in evidence behind Communist lines, and intelligence indicated the imminence of a general offensive. There was also a rumor circulating, derived from POW interrogation, that the enemy proposed to kidnap the U.N. armistice delegation on the 25th, the second anniversary of the outbreak of war. No one can feel very safe when dealing with such people: as far back as April the Marines had formed a covering force to protect the truce team should the talks break down, and the new rumors brought further preparations. But June passed without difficulty and the anticipated offensive never came.
The naval siege of Wonsan was now well into its second year. Begun in order to take some pressure off Eighth Army and to get the gunnery ships on the offensive, it had by now become institutionalized: the officer in tactical command afloat enjoyed the additional honorific title of Mayor of Wonsan, and with changes of command there passed also a large gilt key to the city. But here too the passage of time, the size of effort, and the difficulty of damage assessment led inevitably to questioning. Certainly the extensive installation of shore batteries and antiaircraft, and the reported presence in the neighborhood of almost 80,000 troops, gave evidence that the effects had been considerable. On the other hand a sizable force was required to maintain the siege, defend the islands, and prevent remining of the harbor: in addition to four or five minesweepers, their tender and a tug, two or three destroyers were maintained permanently on station, and the expenditure of ammunition, much of it unobserved and unspotted, had been heavy. Demonstrable damage to the enemy hardly made up for this investment, which could only be justified by the argument that it held down large enemy forces, and by such incidental advantages as the flow of information gained through the infiltration of agents. Some now came to argue that the siege should never have been undertaken, but its long history made it difficult to abandon without apparent admission of defeat.

But the enemy, too, was concerned about Wonsan. One indication of the extent of his worries was provided by captured records of a war game conducted by North Korean division commanders in early 1952. This problem was concerned with a defense against a four-divisional assault at Wonsan, accompanied by subsidiary landings at Kojo and Hungnam, and by a northward thrust of Eighth Army through the Iron Triangle and the eastern mountains. Against this hypothetical maneuver, which bore a not too remote resemblance to U.N. planning, there were available to the North Koreans the two mobile artillery brigades which manned the Wonsan shore, three infantry divisions in the near neighborhood, and Chinese forces further inland. Interestingly, the exercise conceded inability to prevent a U.N. lodgment, and the scheme of maneuver emphasized an all-out counterattack on D plus 4. Interestingly also, and showing that spies are everywhere, the problem included among the assaulting units the 40th and 45th Infantry Divisions which, at the time the exercise was prepared, had just finished amphibious indoctrination in Japan and were preparing to be lifted to Korea.

Since the Navy, like it or not, appeared to be committed, steps were taken to improve the position at Wonsan. Island fortifications were strengthened; a clear statement from CTF 95 defined the primary mission of ships at Wonsan, as at Yang Do and Nan Do, as the defense of those positions; construction of an emergency airstrip on Yo Do was undertaken. This enterprise had been suggested the previous autumn, when the increased effectiveness of Communist antiaircraft had forced a number of damaged planes to ditch in Wonsan harbor. In the absence of a regular naval construction unit in the area the proposition had been put up to the Army and Air Force, in whose custody, in view of the continuing hopes of an armistice, it had languished for six months. In May 1952, however, permission was secured for the employment of Task Force 90’s Amphibious Construction Battalion, and ComNavFE obtained the approval of CincFE. On 9 June a detachment of 3 officers and 75 men from ACB I was landed by LST, and began work under intermittent bombardment from Hodo Pando and Umi Do. The planned 2,400-foot runway had been estimated to be a 45-day project, but the Seabees did better than the planners, and in 16 days the strip was finished. The commanding officer of the construction battalion had predicted that salvage of one plane would more than offset the expense of the project, and if his cost accounting was correct the dividends were enormous: eight Corsairs from Task Force 77, damaged or low on fuel, were brought in safely in July, and in time twin-engined transports would arrive bringing the sinews of war and lady war correspondents. This success stimulated jealousy in the west, where the condition of the emergency beach strip on Paengnyong Do was such as to cause frequent damage in landing, and from the commanding officer of Badoeng Strait came a request for the provision of separate but equal facilities.

Along the familiar stretch of coast from Hungnam to Songjin the campaign against the east coast rail line continued. The effort had been simplified, early in the year, with the designation of 16 target areas, 5 of which
were to be dealt with initially by carrier air and then kept out by surface gunfire, while the rest were assigned to heavy gun bombardment. As before, the targets were principally bridges, vulnerable tunnel entrances, embankments, and slide areas along the precipitous shore. As previously, the effort was comparatively successful: in the first half of 1952 less traffic passed along this stretch of railroad than along any other line north of Pyongyang–Wonsan. With time, however, and as the employment of Task Force 77 shifted from interdiction to strikes against strategic targets, the responsibility devolved increasingly upon the gunnery ships, while in the interest of economy in ammunition expenditure the shooting up of trains replaced the shooting up of track.

By now, indeed, the interdiction campaign had become the despair of all concerned, and at Air Force headquarters the publicity given the code name "Strangle" was bitterly regretted. Rails could be broken, trains shot up, bridges knocked down, and truck formations harassed, but the enemy continued, largely through night movement, to accumulate supplies in the forward areas. In this situation the inadequacies of U.N. night air capabilities rose again for discussion, and new efforts were undertaken to improve night work.

In May, Task Force 77 put on a series of night attacks, Operation Insomnia, in which six aircraft were launched at midnight and six more at 0200 for a time this tactic permitted unopposed attacks on heavily defended areas; on one occasion 11 locomotives were trapped for later destruction by day strike groups. By July, in an effort to provide all-night operations without overloading ships’ companies, three teams of hecklers were being launched at dusk, of which one worked until midnight while the others landed ashore for later takeoff. But by autumn the lack of personnel to man key posts on a 24-hour basis, and the view of Commander Seventh Fleet that unless a special night carrier could be provided the emphasis should be on daytime operations, had led to diminished effort. Owing to the world situation and the shortage of operating carriers no such ship was ever made available, although an abortive attempt was to be made at war’s end to do this locally, and the lack of night capabilities remained a major U.N. deficiency.

Through the spring of 1952 Task Force 77 had drifted slowly away from rail interdiction. Although in March the force was still averaging 133 rail cuts per operating day, increased attention was being given to Small boat demolition so as to inhibit attempts to recapture offshore islands. In April a series of coordinated air-gun strikes on coastal cities was begun: at Chongjin on the 13th, 246 sorties from Boxer and Philippine Sea deposited 200 tons of bombs while Saint Paul, escorted by three destroyers and with spot from the carrier planes, kept up a daylong bombardment. In May a three-day effort, equally divided between Chongjin and Wonsan and supported by Iowa, was conducted in two installments when the original plans were frustrated by sea fog. But deserving targets were limited, and in June the work of the carrier air groups was shifted inland beyond gun range.

Diminishing and discouraging returns from interdiction and disillusion with the progress at Panmunjom had also led the staff of FEAF to seek alternative employment. Since the enemy was now amply supplied for offensive action, and since any offensive would bring him into the open and subject him to heavy damage, FEAF’s planners proposed to concentrate on maintaining air superiority in MIG Alley while maximizing the cost of war to the other side. In May, therefore, in a move somewhat parallel to the air–gun strikes by Task Force 77, Fifth Air Force sent large fighter-bomber attacks against concentrations of supplies, facilities, and equipment in the enemy rear.

This attempt to maximize enemy costs inevitably raised the question of the hydroelectric complex, the one important untouched target system in North Korea. These generating plants and their related distribution facilities had been brought to high development during the period of Japanese occupation. At Suho on the Yalu River the world’s fourth largest hydroelectric plant, with an output of some 300,000 kilowatts, supplied power both to Korea and Manchuria; up in the mountains, in what had once been X Corps territory, the Chosin, Fusen, and Kyosen Reservoirs together produced an even larger quantity for the cities of the eastern coast. In the summer of 1950 proposals to attack the power complex had very sensibly been turned down on the ground that the bill for reconstruction would fall upon the American taxpayer; subsequently, in the effort to avoid Chinese intervention,
the importance of the Suiho plant to Manchurian industry had led these targets to be placed off-limits. But as the
armistice negotiations stretched out into 1952 the question was again raised by FEAF, as on a lower level by CTG
95.2, who was desirous of turning off the lights at Wonsan by shooting up the substation.

The timing was appropriate. In late April, in an effort to compose remaining differences at Panmunjom,
Admiral Joy had offered to waive restrictions on airfield rehabilitation if the Communists would accept voluntary
repatriation of prisoners and the exclusion of the U.S.S.R. from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. But
this offer was violently rejected, all progress ceased, and the meetings degenerated into propaganda about POW
riots and bacteriological warfare. In this situation, comparable to the period in World War II when water barriers
separated the principal belligerents, a turn to attritional bombardment, the slowest of all methods of war, was
almost inevitable.

Early in June, FEAF put the proposition up to General Clark, and was given permission to plan the
destruction of all hydroelectric plants except Suiho, which was still off-limits without JCS approval. But with the
Chinese carrying the burden of the war for the enemy, the earlier rationale had disappeared, and since damage to
Suiho offered a method of making trouble in Manchuria without crossing the border, approval from Washington
was forthcoming. In Tokyo a date was selected which would permit the maximum carrier contribution and on 18
June FEAF alerted Fifth Air Force for strikes on the 23rd or 24th, weather permitting.

Since late January, four fast carriers had been present in the theater, working in teams of two. For the
power plant attacks, arrivals and departures in the operating area were overlapped to provide, for the first time
since December 1950, four on station at once. In another way the situation was a reminiscent one, for not since
the strikes on the Sinuiju bridges in November of that year had the carrier attack planes crossed Korea to hit
targets in MIG Alley. Joint planning between Task Force 77 and Fifth Air Force was begun at JOC on 21 June; on
the 22nd flight schedules and ordnance plans were made up and navigational details worked out. The Suiho strike
was to be a joint operation in which the carrier pilots had the place of honor; the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing was
given the two Chosin installations; the Kyosen plants were assigned to other task force strike groups; those at
Fusen were divided between the Navy and Air Force. Since Suiho, where heavy MIG opposition was expected,
was the critical target, the other attacks were timed to follow it by a few minutes.

Early on the 23rd Boxer and Princeton were joined by Bon Homme Richard and Philippine Sea.
Preparation for the launch was halted when the Air Force put off the strike owing to anticipated adverse weather.
But in the course of the day the operation was rescheduled, H-Hour was set for 1600, and at 1410 the force began
launching 35 ADs with 4,000 and 5,000-pound bombleads for the Suiho attack. Forming up at 5,000 feet, the
Skyraiders crossed the coastline at Mayang Do and then, keeping low to the mountains to avoid radar detection,
headed straight for the target. Fifty miles from Suiho they were overtaken by 35 F9Fs which had taken off 50
minutes later. Eighteen miles from the target a high-speed approach was begun.

At 1600, precisely on schedule, the first squadron of Panthers dove on the gun positions on the Korean
bank, closely followed by the ADs and by the other flak-suppression jets. Release altitude was at 3,000 feet and
pull-out at 1,000; within a space of two and one half minutes the attacking aircraft delivered 81 tons of bombs. At
the power house which was the main target red flames filled the windows, secondary explosions were reported,
and photographs taken by the last ADs to drop showed smoke pouring from the roof. The anti-aircraft batteries had
opened as the attack began, heavy weapons and automatic fire was moderate and machine gun fire intense, but the
defenses were overwhelmed. No plane was lost, and the only Skyraider to suffer serious damage made a
successful wheels–up landing at Kimpo. Everyone else was back aboard by dinner time.

As the carrier group departed the attack continued with interservice cooperation of a high order.
Beginning at 1610, 79 F–84s and 49 F–80s of Fifth Air Force, which had come up from the south to continue the
pummeling, added a further 145 tons of bombs. Downstream, between Suiho and Antung, a total of 84 Sabre jets
gave top cover against enemy MIGs. But while the Antung field is only 35 miles from Suiho, none of these gentlemen put in an appearance, and of 250 reported on the ground by Air Force pilots, two-thirds disappeared into interior Manchuria during the attack, a tactic for which, on the U.N. side at least, no firm explanation was ever devised.

While the attacks at Suiho were in progress the Chosin plants received the attentions of 75 aircraft from the Marine Aircraft Wing, a second group of 90 planes from Task Force 77 hit the Fusen plants along with 52 Air Force F-51s, and 70 carrier aircraft went in on Kyosen. These efforts were followed up the next day by carrier, Air Force, and Marine attacks on all three complexes, and on 26 and 27 June the Air Force returned to Chosin and Fusen. Then the picture taking and the photo interpretation began, but in North Korea and Manchuria the lights had already gone out.

The results appear to have been first-class. Something in the neighborhood of 90 percent of North Korean power production had been disabled; for two weeks there was an almost complete blackout in enemy country; even at year’s end a power deficit remained. But if liaison between the Air Force, Navy, and Marines was well nigh perfect, on the upper levels someone had forgotten to pass the word. The British had not been advised of the contemplated attacks, and in Parliament some ructions developed among the opposition.

Admiral Briscoe had requested a detailed breakdown of the strikes, and ten days later his operational intelligence officer provided it. The extent of the naval contribution revealed by this tally was such as to give ComNavFE cause for pride. Total Task Force 77 sorties against the plants on 23 and 24 June exceeded those of Fifth Air Force and Marines together, as did the weight of bombs dropped. On a service basis breakdown, Navy and Marine sorties were of the order of 700, as compared to some 400 by the Air Force, and Navy and Marine bomb tonnage amounted to more than two-thirds the total. These figures, however, are in a sense delusive, for they take no account of the F—86 top cover provided at Suiho, nor of the later Air Force attacks at Chosin and Fusen. Since FEAF had performed the preliminary planning, and since final preparations had been joint, it seems proper to conclude that all hands had done a good job to excellent purpose.

In the course of the summer of 1952 three more large interservice air operations took place. On 11 July 822 Air Force, Marine, and Navy planes, led by 106 from *Bon Homme Richard* and *Princeton*, struck Pyongyang gun positions, supply and billeting areas, and factories. Although weather prevented the carriers from launching more than one strike group and hindered shore-based operations, the demolition of designated targets was extensive, and encouraging reports were received of direct hits on a Communist brass hat air raid shelter. On 20 August a sizable combined Navy-Marine-Air Force effort was conducted against a large west coast supply area, and nine days later the enemy capital was subjected to the largest air attack of the war.

The seven weeks since the first joint strike on Pyongyang had seen renewed movement of troops and guns into the North Korean capital. To get these targets, as well as to provide food for thought in Moscow where Chou En-lai was conferring with the Soviets, another attack was laid on. On 28 August warning leaflets were scattered over Pyongyang, and on the next day 1,080 aircraft descended on the luckless city. Everyone and his cousin got into the act this time, for in addition to aircraft from Fifth Air Force, Task Force 77, and the Marine Aircraft Wing, the British carrier and the ROK Air Force also took part.

Over and above these cooperative efforts, the work of the fast carriers during the summer consisted principally of maximum-effort strikes against targets in eastern North Korea. These, insofar as possible, were directed against objectives which, like the hydroelectric system, had importance on both sides of the North Korean border. In July strikes against the Small Funei complex near Musan, the Smallest grid in North Korea, finished off the power plants within the Navy’s zone. Late in the month the Sindok lead and zinc mill, reportedly a considerable exporter to Iron Curtain countries, was three-quarters destroyed, and the magnesite and thermoelectric plants at Kilchu heavily damaged by *Princeton* strike groups.

The course of the war by this time had brought a northward displacement of remaining North Korean
industrial facilities, and a concentration of new development along the Manchurian and Russian borders. In early August Rear Admiral Herbert E. Regan, ComCarDiv 1, had commented on the build-up of new industry near Aoji in the far northeast, and had urged attack upon these targets. One month later, in response to this request, the Joint Chiefs suspended for a single event their rule against air operations within 12 miles of Soviet territory. On 1 September, in the biggest all–Navy strike yet, morning and afternoon deck loads from Essex, Boxer, and Princeton went up to the north, and while the jets worked over oil storage and an iron mine at Musan and targets at Hoeamdong, the attack planes destroyed synthetic oil production facilities at Aoji. Other attacks in the far north followed at the border town of Hoeryong, at the Yalu bridge town of Hyesanjin, and on a munitions factory near Najin. On three days in October task force aircraft teamed with B–29s in strikes against North Korean objectives. By winter most known targets had been eliminated.

Taken in connection with the increasing boldness of enemy fighter pilots, the northward movement of carrier operations raised the prospect of collision. On the west coast, during the summer, aircraft from the British carrier and the American CVE had clashed repeatedly with MIGs; during the west coast strike of 20 August Princeton F9Fs had an inconclusive skirmish south of Sinanju; on 10 September a Marine flyer had made history by becoming the first pilot of a piston-engined aircraft to shoot down an enemy jet. On 13 September a two-carrier strike against Hoeryong, though unopposed, produced large numbers of bogeys orbiting 50 miles to the eastward over the Siberian border. On the 26th MIGs were sighted over eastern Korea, and in the first week of October two Corsairs were lost in the course of a series of engagements south of Hungnam.

This situation led to some excitement on 18 November as Kearsarge and Oriskany were again striking Hoeryong. The force was operating in 41°30´, about 100 miles south of Vladivostok, with the cruiser Helena and a destroyer on search and rescue station halfway in to Najin. During the morning Helena tracked numerous high–speed radar contacts to the north-ward, which seemed to be flying a barrier patrol under ground control. At 1329 Raid 20, estimated at 16 to 20 aircraft, was approaching from the north, distant 35 miles. This contact or a part of it, estimated at eight aircraft, was also detected by Oriskany, and a four-plane division of F9Fs, which had descended to 13,000 feet owing to fuel pump failure in the leader’s aircraft, was vectored out with instructions not to engage unless attacked.

Having overshot its mark the patrol was turned back to the southwest while the bogey, in its turn, reversed course to close. At 1336, 45 miles north of the force, Lieutenant E. Royce Williams, leader of the second section, reported seven vapor trails high overhead and identified the aircraft as MIGs. As the jets passed over to the northeast they turned, split, came down below the contrail level, and were lost to sight; ordered upstairs by Oriskany controllers, Williams’ section of F9Fs reversed course to the northeast and began a full-power climb. Turning again at 26,000 feet, the section leader sighted four aircraft approaching from ahead and to port; as they opened fire he rolled into them in a hard turn, came out to find the trailing MIG in his sights, fired, and saw the adversary smoke and spiral downward.

All seven MIGs had now joined the fray, the two Americans had become separated, and from below a third Panther was climbing to join them. But just as help was arriving Williams’ plane was hit: with a MIG on his tail and able to maneuver only by zooming, diving, and popping his brakes, he headed for an undercast ten miles to the southward while his partner, ammunition exhausted, flew wing on the enemy in the hope of scaring him off. Coming out of a turn the pilot from the section below sighted this extraordinary procession and dove toward it, was engaged by another head-on attacker, and after a brief engagement saw a plane going into the water. Far below a flash of silver indicated another target, and he dove, only to find a parachute which he orbited and reported to base.

Williams, by this time, had reached cloud cover. The MIGs had broken off. Return to base was uneventful. But within the force, which was now at general quarters, some tension had apparently developed, for as the section leader brought his cranky plane in over the screen one of the destroyers briefly opened fire on him.
Considering the disparity in aircraft performance and number, and the fact that the Americans allowed themselves to indulge in an uncoordinated melee, the results of the engagement—two MIGs down and one damaged in exchange for damage to one friendly aircraft—were highly gratifying. Control and communications in the force were adjudged good, although with less justification: Helena’s attempts to report the approaching raid had been unsuccessful; the effort to fix the parachuting pilot met with no success; two divisions of airborne CAP were not vectored into the fight. For the next hour the force had almost constant radar contacts in the northerly quadrant at ranges down to 40 miles, and at 1510 a slow-speed bogey in the general area of the engagement suggested the presence of a rescue plane. Twice again fighters were vectored out as contacts closed; one sighting was made but the MIGs turned away; by 1625 the screen was clear.

In addition to the strikes against northern industrial areas, some routine attacks on seacoast cities, and a minor continuing interdiction effort, summer and fall of 1952 brought a few operational novelties. In the latter half of July Admiral Soucek took Philippine Sea and Essex to the Formosa area for air parades over the island and along the China coast, and for some high-altitude photography. In North Korea the expansion of the enemy radar net stimulated efforts by the carrier airmen to locate and demolish these installations. Some experiments were run with guided missiles in the form of war-surplus F6F drones, explosive-laden and guided by television, which were flown against a variety of targets in an inquiring frame of mind. In the west the Yellow Sea carrier took steps to salt up the rice paddies by bombing sluice gates on the Yonan peninsula. In September a new technique of rail interdiction was introduced in which, after a full deckload had beaten up a mile or two of track, a two-plane CAP was employed by day and ship’s gunfire by night to inhibit repairs.

Like the earlier interdiction programs, the maximum-effort strikes soon reached the stage of diminishing returns, and with the approach of autumn the activities of Task Force 77 returned gradually to the bombline. No support of ground forces had been provided by the fast carriers in the first six months of 1952. By August, however, an average of 12 sorties a day was being flown in support of X Corps and the ROK I Corps on the eastern front, and with increasing ground action this contribution was to grow. Mid-summer had seen some enemy raids, September brought assaults on U.N. outposts and increased artillery expenditure, and with October came the hardest fighting in more than a year. On the 6th the Chinese commenced a week of heavy pressure in the area west of the Iron Triangle, the next day brought 93,000 rounds of artillery and mortar fire into U.N. positions, and the last half of the month saw bitter action in the hills above Kumwha. With these developments what had originally been undertaken as a training exercise gained operational importance, and by October the effort was averaging 22 sorties a day. With the emphasis on support of troops there came again complaints about inadequate control, and the situation was further obfuscated by the development of the so-called Cherokee Strike.

This operation, the brain child of Commander Seventh Fleet, and so christened in celebration of Admiral Clark’s descent from that civilized tribe, was developed to fill the vacuum left by the abandonment of interdiction and the elimination of industrial targets. Having observed exposed U.S. supply dumps, and reasoning that the enemy must be similarly vulnerable, Clark, on 5 October, put his main effort on the destruction of supplies, artillery, and troops behind the enemy lines. Four days later, after arrangements with X and IX Corps, 91 aircraft were launched against troop and supply areas just beyond artillery range. They could not have come at a more confusing time.

Ground force discontent with Air Force support procedures had been simmering since the early days of the Korean conflict. Following a request by General Almond in June 1951 for a reexamination of the system, General Van Fleet had attempted to persuade Fifth Air Force to place fighter-bombers under corps control, and had subsequently asked CincFE to explore the advantages of decentralization of air. With the departure of General Ridgway these problems were inherited by his successor, with the result that on 11 August 1952 there appeared a CincFE discussion of air–ground operations in which, at one and the same time, criticism of the system was described as inadequately justified, current doctrine was upheld as sound, and numerous methods of improving
matters were put forward, including some non–doctrinal experiments in delegation of control after the Marine fashion. To these proposals, as to Van Fleet’s earlier request, the reaction of the Air Force was strongly adverse, and the debate was further complicated by the development of the Cherokee Strike, a method of supporting the battleline which differed from Air Force techniques in that arrangements were made directly with corps, from the Navy and Marine system in being pre–briefed and remote from the line of contact, and from both in being uncontrolled. The touchy question, however, was that of direct negotiation with corps, and there followed a minor eruption.

By November, however, agreed procedures had been worked out which pushed these strikes back beyond the bombline and into the category of deep or general support. From late autumn through January the Cherokee Strikes absorbed more than a third of the Seventh Fleet air effort, concentrated in heavy blows against enemy supplies and equipment. A large bomb tonnage was ferried in, many explosions resulted, and as one carrier division commander observed, the strikes "can’t help but be doing a lot of damage." Doubtless not, but target selection and damage assessment were difficult, and any verdict as to the results was largely a matter of faith. It was a strange type of warfare in which naval aviation was now engaged. The close support control system could not handle a large effort in proximity to friendly aviation; the enemy’s antiaircraft strength made deliberate individual attacks costly; interdiction had been tacitly abandoned by its most ardent protagonists; industrial targets were now notable by their absence. For want of something better to do the carrier air groups were hauling explosives in and dumping them in the general neighborhood of the front. Volume had been substituted for accuracy, and the only indisputable dividends were the approval with which the Army greeted the effort, and the morale boost provided the frontline troops by the noise and smoke which rose from the enemy’s back yard.

Elsewhere at sea patrolling, minesweeping, and bombardment continued in arduous but monotonous routine. The number of ships damaged by enemy action diminished from 23 in the first half of 1952 to 19 in the second six months. But in August, for the first time since February 1951, a U.S. ship was lost when 

Sarsi, a fleet tug, was mined and sunk at Hungnam, an event followed by discontinuance of the bombardment unit off this marginal target port. Three weeks later the problem of armed drifters was again emphasized when the destroyer 

Barton, steaming in Task Force 77 some 90 miles east of Wonsan, hit one which blew a five-foot hole in her side, killed five, and wounded seven. No further losses to this agency would be sustained, but with war’s end the feeling that the floaters were no accident, strong since the first sightings in September 1950, was confirmed. In contrast to frequent reports of loose mines while fighting was in progress, the five months following the armistice produced but one.

One exception to the tedious routine came in September when HMCS Nootka captured an enemy "naval vessel," a 25-foot sampan propelled by oarsmen, which had been laying magnetic mines in the swept channel south of Cho Do. Another, which brought together in momentary reunion the gunnery ships, the Amphibious Force, and the aircraft carriers, was a major amphibious demonstration. Conceptually an outgrowth of "Wrangler," and staged off Kojo in mid-October, this affair was the last and biggest of the war, and stemmed from the suggestion by CTF 90, Rear Admiral Francis X. McNerney, that routine troop movements between Japan and Korea might be employed for training and deception. With approval of the scheme by General Clark, Commander Seventh Fleet was designated Commander Joint Amphibious Task Force 7, and in mid–September planning was begun. Two alternative assault plans were worked up, one for a landing by two divisions in column and one for an attack by a single RCT. The wide discrepancy in scale complicated the paperwork, and as only the highest echelons knew that a bona fide operation was not intended, the troubles of the planners were real. In little over a month, nevertheless, all was in readiness, and the amphibious ships carrying the 8th Cavalry Regiment sortied from Hokkaido. On 12 October, D minus 3, a rehearsal was carried out at Kangnung, hampered by winds of 25 knots which led to the loss of four LCVPs after broaching on the beach.

While the rehearsal was going on, the Advance Force, similarly handicapped, appeared off Kojo to
sweep and to bombard. One battleship, two heavy cruisers, and a batch of destroyers worked over the landing
area; four fast carriers operating in the Sea of Japan provided air strikes, including a remarkable 667 sorties on D
minus Sicily and Badoeng Strait were both on hand, the former for air spot while the latter, as Hunter-Killer
carrier, cruised the area in search of submarines and briefly thought she found one.

By this time the demonstration had become an interservice affair. FEAF and Fifth Air Force stepped up
their operations, a mock parachute landing was set up, and on the night of 13–14 October Eighth Army launched a
two-battalion attack near Kumwha. By dawn of D-Day, the 15th, more than a hundred ships were off the Kojo
beaches, and control procedures were getting a serious test. The aerologists, however, had already failed theirs,
for the weather had continued to degenerate: poor visibility and low clouds delayed the bombardment, while
winds freshening to 50 knots kicked up high seas. At 1400, nevertheless, seven waves of landing craft were sent
in from the transport area to pass the line of departure and then retire, seaward. Owing to the heavy seas no troops
were boated; owing to the skill of the coxswains no boats were lost or seriously damaged. But two mine-sweepers
had been hit by shore fire and five carrier planes lost to antiaircraft.

So ended what some proclaimed to have been the largest-scale fraud in military history. Again a
deception ended with a question as to who had been deceived. No troop movements of magnitude had been
detected ashore, although in the weeks that followed some shifts were noted in the KojoWonsan area. What was
certain, however, was that most of the participants had been fooled, and when the true nature of the operation
became known some were very angry. The feeling that at last the war was getting off dead center had produced a
tension and degree of effort that made the let-down in morale the greater, and one carrier commanding officer
strongly protested the internal secrecy which had led his pilots to take risks of a sort appropriate to a landing but
not to an exercise. Of Kojo, as of earlier and Smaller demonstrations, it seems proper to conclude that an enemy
incapable of quick response cannot be very profitably hoaxed.

The Kojo feint had been planned prior to the enemy’s October pressure, on which, indeed, it had little
apparent effect. But this Communist ground activity proved both limited and temporary, and the war continued
much as before. Since in the circumstances of the fighting in Korea neither side could inflict unacceptable damage
upon the other, the locus of decision had long since come to lie elsewhere. At Panmunjom, following a summer of
deadlock, the U.N. negotiators had declared the meetings indefinitely recessed. At the United Nations, efforts to
break the stalemate were renewed, and the Indian government busied itself with the attempt to provide the
Communists with a face-saving solution to their prisoner of war problem. In the United States an election
campaign was underway which interacted with the campaign in Korea: in America the Republican candidate
undertook to visit the scene of action; in the Far East electioneering seems to have motivated the enemy’s autumn
effort. In addition to heavy fighting in the area of the Iron Triangle, September and October brought an increase in
incidents around the periphery, in a rash of antiaircraft actions between Chinese gunboats and Navy patrol planes
in Formosa Strait, and in the loss of a B–29 to Soviet fighters off Hokkaido. But following election day the
pressure decreased rapidly, and the record 93,000 rounds of artillery fired on 7 October had a month later
diminished to a mere trickle.

In the United States the elections of November were followed by a change of administration in January.
In the next month President Eisenhower "unleashed" Chiang Kai-shek, a measure of very limited effect on the
Formosan situation and on the operations of the Formosa Patrol. No similar change took place in Korean policy,
which remained one of willing-ness to settle on almost any basis that would not require forced repatriation. But as
all other possible concessions had long since been made, deadlock continued, and again it was made clear that
while one side can start a war it takes two to make a bargain. Progress toward such a bargain remained impossible
pending another change in administration, which took place on 5 March 1953 with the death of Joseph Stalin.
Chapter 12. Two More Years
3. March-July 1953: Progress, Crisis, Conclusion

Not since the war with Tripoli, a century and a half before, when year after passing year Dale and Morris and Preble maneuvered their squadrons off that other distant shore, blockading and bombarding an enemy they could not reach, had Americans fought a war like this. And as 1953 began, and stalemate still continued, it seemed increasingly possible that this war would outlast that one. In February, however, General Clark moved to break the jam on the repatriation question by proposing an immediate exchange of sick and wounded personnel. The answer was delayed, doubtless owing to difficulties in Moscow concerning the devolution of power, and the interval between letter and reply was marked by heavier than usual enemy pressure. But on 28 March an answer was received which both accepted the proposal and indicated a disposition to proceed further.

The enemy’s March doings produced an increasing effort in troop support, both by the West Coast Carrier Element and by Task Force 77. There were, of course, diversions: Oriskany in mid–March put on a big effort against a mining complex up-country from Songjin; on the night of the 27th three volunteer Corsair pilots made a moonlight attack on the Hamhung highway bridge, one of the most heavily defended targets in Korea, and dropped the center span before the enemy could open fire; the Wonsan batteries, the city of Songjin, some residual power plant targets, and a number of militarized villages also received attention. Pilot morale was boosted by a strike on a North Korean rest camp, which reportedly accommodated heroes of the Communist forces credited with shooting down U.N. planes, and by the accomplishment of two night hecklers who chased two trains into opposite ends of a short and single-tracked tunnel, to be rewarded by gratifying amounts of steam from both entrances. A pleasant custom, instituted early in the year, involved the rotation of one carrier at a time to Hong Kong, to provide both a show of force to the southward and a new liberty port. Late in April the force celebrated Boy–San Day, on which the airplane drivers picked their own targets without interference from higher authority.

Nevertheless the emphasis was on the bombline. In March almost half the offensive sorties were assigned to Cherokee Strikes and troop support, and while this figure dropped in early April it subsequently rose again. Repetition of Cherokee Strikes against the same area over a period of days was now the custom, a measure felt both to limit the effectiveness of antiaircraft and to result in greater destruction of targets. As always, damage assessment remained the problem, but POWs reported results in excess of the pilots’ estimates and Eighth Army officers were high in their praise.

For the Amphibious Force the early months of 1953 were occupied by routine training exercises, minor troop lifts, and logistic support work. For the gunnery ships, however, as for the soldiers in the line, March and April brought increased action. The number of mines encountered rose radically, from 14 in March to 31 in April, and as usual most were floaters. Increased artillery fire directed against the minesweepers required special attention to the employment and positioning of gunfire support ships. Interdiction of train traffic along the eastern shore continued. Off the bombline, destroyers and heavy ships continued to keep the enemy down and, through their ability to fire upon him from the rear, forced him to keep his targets defiladed both from artillery and from the sea. But the principal problem of the spring months was the need to keep the duty heavy cruiser or battleship on notice at all times for immediate movement to Wonsan.

There pressure against the harbor islands continued to increase. In December a CincPacFleet appreciation had foreseen a Communist attempt to recapture these positions, and this prospect was emphasized by the events of early spring. The record 523 rounds which fell upon the islands in March doubled in April, while another 553
were aimed at U.N. ships. The volume did not compare with the Battle of the Buzz Saw, but accuracy was up: from March through May five destroyers and the cruisers Los Angeles and Bremerton were hit, and casualties were incurred both by their crews and by the island garrisons.

In the west the situation was similar. The two rounds fired at Cho Do and Sok To in February by the Wolsa-ri and Amgak batteries, and the 16 rounds of March, increased in April to 440, while ships of the blockading force observed more work in progress on the Wolsa-ri cliff positions. Small-caliber counterbattery fire remained of slight effect; a strike from Glory and a series of Air Force sorties accomplished little more; and a moonlight attempt by the frigate Cardigan Bay to eliminate the guns after closing to within 1,000 yards of the shore proved unsuccessful.

These events brought further reconsideration of the island problem. At Wonsan the commanding officer of Saint Paul recommended an invasion of Hodo Pando, to eliminate the threat of gunfire from the north. At Cho Do the commanding officer of Cardigan Bay, fearing that the Wolsa-ri batteries might force abandonment of the anchorage and relocation of the island’s radar station, suggested a raid to seize the peninsula for 24 hours while guns were spiked and gun positions destroyed. Neither suggestion was approved by higher authority, but taken in conjunction with a proposal by CTF 95 to abandon Yang Do in the northeast, on the ground that the defensive investment was out of proportion to the profit from intelligence activities, they indicate the imminence of a crisis. But for whatever reasons the crisis never quite came.

Click here to view map

On the west coast, April bombardments by the British cruisers Newcastle and Birmingham knocked down chunks of the Wolsa-ri cliffs and silenced the guns for a month, but the Amgak batteries overlooking Sok To continued lively. To counter this pressure 90-millimeter guns were brought in and emplaced on Sok To and on Cho Do, and in late May New Jersey was sailed around from the east coast to bombard. At Wonsan Communist artillery remained active, and with the coming of an enemy ground offensive in June the bombardment ships found themselves extremely busy. Between the bombline and Wonsan harbor ruts were worn in the sea, as the heavy ships steamed back and forth in response to emergency calls. Gun strikes by New Jersey and Bremerton in May were followed up in June by Saint Paul and Manchester; and although for a time it seemed that the destroyers might be driven out, the position was maintained. On both coasts, at the end of June, enemy harassment of the island footholds markedly declined.

For the islands, in any event, the days of U.N. occupation were numbered by the approaching armistice. The resumption of plenary sessions on 26 April, which followed the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners and ended a recess of 199 days, ushered in a period of progress which, in comparison with what preceded, could only be described as extremely rapid. By 8 June the thorny question of repatriation had been settled and hopes again rose high.

Since the armistice would prohibit further removal of the inhabitants of the northern islands, CincFE on 12 June directed the outloading of all civilians and all excess supplies from the Wonsan islands and from Yang Do. On the west coast, following the updating of plans, the evacuation of partisan forces, their dependents, and other refugees from islands north of the parallel was begun. In the east the dimensions of the problem were Small, but in the Yellow Sea this last tragic displacement brought the departure, after their cattle had been slaughtered and their dwellings razed, of 19,425 persons from the islands above the demarcation line.

Although the line mapped and agreed to in November 1951 remained acceptable to the United Nations Command, the Communists insisted on renegotiation. Reasons for this attitude had for some time been evident in continued enemy troop and vehicle movement and in ostentatious stockpiling of supplies, and on 10 June anticipations were fulfilled as a heavy attack was pushed down the valley of the upper Pukhan against the ROK II Corps. The local collapse which followed required a considerable reshuffling of units on the part of Lieutenant General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA, who in February had relieved General Van Fleet at Eighth Army. But by the
18th the front had been stabilized, at the cost of a few miles of inhospitable terrain above the Hwachon Reservoir and of a little ground on the east coast. As the Chinese impetus declined hopes rose again, only to be dashed by an entirely unexpected development.

At Panmunjom General Harrison and his aides had for months been walking the knife edge between Communist obduracy and South Korean intransigence. Chinese and North Korean disinclination to admit reluctance on the part of their nationals to return to the Communist paradise found its counterpart in the unwillingness of the Rhee government to accept any armistice at all and so forego the last chance of forcible Korean unification. The signing on 8 June of the final agreement on repatriation had been followed by threats and fulminations from the ROK government, and by a period of tension in its relations with the U.N. Command.

In this crisis President Rhee found himself in a strong position. Not only did he control the territory of South Korea, the theater of U.N. operations, but he also controlled, in the ROK Army, the largest single contingent of anti-Communist forces, well-trained, well-equipped, 15 divisions strong, and manning two-thirds of the battleline. Given his fierce opposition to an armistice, the possibility that he might order these forces to attack, independently and in defiance of the U.N. Command, raised the specter of a three-cornered conflict within the peninsula, and of a situation of almost unimaginable complexity.

This he did not do, but on 18 June, without warning and despite prior assurances, the Korean government engineered a mass escape of upwards of 25,000 anti-Communist prisoners, in the apparent hope of causing a Communist break-off of negotiations. The result was an interruption of plenary sessions at Panmunjom, an embarrassing period of Communist harangues, uncertainty as to the security of U.N. forces in Korea, and apprehension as to what might happen next. Again, as on the outbreak of war three summers before, more strength was urgently needed. Again help came by sea.

To the normal commitments of Task Force 90, spring had added a variety of tasks. In April the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners had been carried out; in May two landing exercises had been held, beach surveys continued, preparations for island evacuation begun, and a lift of LCVPs made to the French in Indo-China, where another war was in progress and where, a year later, another demarcation line would be drawn. These responsibilities were increased in June as the result of floods in southern Japan, which imposed requirements for evacuation, relief, and for shipping to replace disrupted land communications. At the same time the apparent imminence of the armistice made it necessary to be ready on short notice to repatriate large numbers of enemy prisoners.

In preparation for the movement of almost 100,000 enemy personnel, a task group of 2 APAs, 6 AKAs, 20 LSTs, and minor units had been assembled, although at the cost of delaying the scheduled return of a number to the United States. On 12 June Task Force 90 was alerted for this operation, all units were placed on 24-hour notice, and ships were ordered to Pusan for installation of wood and wire cribbing which would permit the movement of fractious prisoners in manageable groups. Eleven LSTs and one AKA had been fitted with these cribs when there arose the wholly new requirement of a major emergency troop movement.

On 21 June, three days after the ROK release of prisoners, CincFE ordered the immediate airlift of the 187th Airborne RCT to Korea; two days later 2,100 soldiers and 1,500 tons of gear had been flown in by the Air Force and three LSTs and two LSMs were bringing in the heavy equipment. On the 26th orders were received to lift the equipment of one RCT of the 24th Infantry Division from Japan to Korea; shortly CincFE alerted the entire division for movement by air and sea; by 2 July some 4,000 troops had been flown across, other units had been added to the planned movement, and the emphasis had shifted from air to surface transport. In anticipation of instructions to redeploy the division, Rear Admiral Walter E. Moore, CTF 90, now ordered the removal of security cribs from his amphibious shipping; on 3 July, following receipt of orders, he dispatched three task units to Japanese embarkation ports.

These operations coincided with the centenary of a memorable event, for it was in July 1853 that
Commodore Perry had entered Tokyo Bay to attempt the opening of Japan. For the Black Ships Festival, staged by the Japanese in celebration of the anniversary, Task Force 90 dispatched an AKA to Shimoda, long the residence of Townsend Harris, first American consul in Japan, and an APD to Kurihama, where Perry first set foot on Japanese soil. But even this limited representation was hard to spare, for the 14th of July, the centenary of Perry’s reception at Kurihama by the Prince of Idzu and the Prince of Iwami, found his descendants in the gray ships of the Amphibious Force working under heavy pressure.

The movement of the 24th Division, so suddenly called for, required not only the diversion of all available amphibious shipping but the requisitioning of LSTs and cargo ships from MSTS; numerous modifications to CincFE’s plan had brought confusion and a communications overload; weather and the lack of adequate harbor facilities forced some extemporization in loading; at one port difficulties with Japanese customs officials bizarrely delayed embarkation. By 9 July, nevertheless, one RCT was in Korea and the others were loading, when suddenly the situation was complicated by a whole new series of directives.

The double requirements of the Korean crisis and of the impending armistice, with its prohibition of further reinforcement, now produced an eruption of orders from Supreme Headquarters. On 13 July CTF 90 was instructed to transport the Army’s 2nd Amphibious Support Brigade, an amphibious tank battalion, and elements of Naval Beach Group I from Japan to Korea. Two days later, as embarkation of these units was beginning, came orders for the movement of a regiment from Pusan to Koje Do. On the 16th, as this lift was commenced, as the last elements of the 24th Division were sailing for Korea, and as loading of other units was continuing in Japan, transfer of a second regiment from Koje up the coast to Sokcho was ordered. On the 17th there came an emergency call to move a battalion from Cheju Do to Inchon, and on the next day, to complete this planner’s nightmare, there arose the possibility of further redeployment of elements of the 24th Division.

One day before the anniversary of Perry’s landing, and while these hasty maritime movements were in progress, the Chinese attacked again, in greater strength than in the month before. Whether this second blow had been long planned, and coordinated with peace table procrastination, or whether it was an afterthought intended to chastise a belligerent Syngman Rhee remained obscure. Again the blow fell on ROK forces, this time in the area south of Kumsong and just west of the June breakthrough, where four divisions were thrown against the junction of IX Corps and the ROK II Corps. Again there came collapse, followed by the development of a fluid situation and accompanied by pressure on the east coast strip. In response to the new emergency General Taylor moved two American divisions into the gap and brought reinforcements forward from Pusan; by 17 July U.N. forces were counterattacking; by the 20th some lost ground had been regained and a new line established which would be held until the armistice. Again some miles of mountain territory had been given up, again Chinese casualties were thought to have been extremely heavy. But the weight of the attack and the temporary disorder which ensued had brought a final period of frantic activity on land, at sea, and in the air.

Fire support off the eastern shore had been stepped up in early June when Communist seizure of Anchor Hill, a key ROK position south of Kosong, ushered in a period of heavy fighting. Two destroyers and the heavy cruiser Saint Paul were busily at work, and New Jersey was sent in to provide, for the first time since February, 16-inch gunfire at the bomb-line. Although the war against the railroad continued, as did the operations at Wonsan, the center of action in the final weeks was at the battle–line, where one destroyer remained permanently on station, backed up for 13 days by New Jersey, and at other times by Manchester, Bremerton, or Saint Paul, Ammunition expenditure off the bombline in July totalled more than 6,000 rounds.

So, as the end approached, the gunnery forces on the eastern shore were back where they had been at the beginning, and the task that fell upon Rear Admiral Clarence E. Olsen, CTF 95 for the last five months of the war, was the task that had faced Admiral Higgins. The emphasis on interdiction of supply and transportation, strong during the period of stalemate, had given way at the last to the requirement of again supporting ROK forces on the coastal road.
For the naval aviators, as well, a cycle had been completed, and war’s end found them back at the job that had once confronted Valley Forge and Triumph. Again the enemy was attacking; again the carriers, now four Essex-class ships plus a light unit in the Yellow Sea, were supporting the ground armies under the control of JOC. Some differences had indeed come with the passage of time: representation at JOC had been institutionalized and communications improved; movement from coast to coast and retirement for replenishment had long since been given up; the risks of air and submarine attack had been accepted, the advantages of mobility and surprise forgone, and the force, with its replenishment ships, was operating as a permanent air base in 39°N 129°E.

Upon this air base, upon its flying personnel, and upon the Logistic Support Force, the events of the final weeks imposed severe demands. Early in June Eighth Army called for 48 close support sorties a day, and for a large additional effort in Cherokee Strikes. On the 6th orders were received to put the entire piston-engined effort into the support of ground forces, while dividing the jets between Cherokee Strikes, road sweeps, and reconnaissance. Late in the month the lull between Communist attacks brought a limited revival of interdiction, but on 14 July Commander Seventh Fleet put all propeller planes back into support of the armies. In the last five days three very large raids were made against seven enemy airfields in the eastern half of North Korea.

With this final period of emergency there developed the most intense flight operations of the war. On 11 June, the day after the opening of the first Communist offensive, Princeton joined Philippine Sea and Boxer on the line, and two days later Lake Champlain, fresh from the Atlantic Fleet, reached the operating area. Four-carrier operations were continued through the 19th, and three carriers were kept on station until the 27th. On 14 July, with the second enemy breakthrough, a third carrier joined the force, and on the 17th the fourth, and so it continued until the end of the war.

Flight operations were hindered by the usual weather difficulties of the Korean summer. In the interior mountains the monsoonal air masses condensed into heavy fog and rain; at sea, fog and low overcast prevailed. For Task Force 77 the period was marked by a continuous search for clear areas, and by the conduct of full-scale operations with ceilings down to 100 feet and visibility of only a mile and a half. Despite this remarkable performance a large proportion of scheduled sorties was weathered out; despite these cancellations new marks for carrier operations were repeatedly set. The June record of 554 sorties flown on the 13th went by the board in July, with 592, 600, and 746 on three successive days. Total sorties rose steadily from 4,343 in May to 6,423 in July; close support sorties went up from 256 to 1,690; aircraft ordnance delivery rose from 2,835 tons in May to 4,606 in the final month.

So massive an offensive called for hard work from all hands, and for an heroic effort on the part of the Logistic Support Force. On 9 June fueling days were abolished, and from that date nightly replenishment, carried out in a mixture of fog and darkness that often required the use of towing spars and searchlights, continued to the end of hostilities. Owing to the coming of the jet airplane and to the increased bomb-carrying capacity of carrier attack planes, the requirements far exceeded anything accomplished or even contemplated in World War II. The increased expenditure of ordnance strained the capabilities of the ammunition ships; the consumption of aviation gasoline, which for a time reached 9,000 barrels a day, forced the recall of an oiler from other scheduled operations. Yet somehow all needs were met.

On men and machinery alike the strain of these final weeks began to tell, until as time went on bad weather came to seem almost a godsend. For the aviators the working day was a long one: good weather or bad, flying or not, they were on the alert and under strain; when the weather was operational the average jet pilot spent some four hours flying and another five in preparation, while propeller-plane pilots were airborne almost seven hours a day. When twilight brought an end to the long flight schedule it was time to go alongside the waiting replenishment ships, pass lines and hoses, and fuel and load far into the night. Here the immediate impact was on the ships’ companies, who after arduous days had to manhandle and stow large quantities of stores and ammunition, but the pilots suffered too, their sleep disturbed by the clanking of handling machinery on the hangar
Under such pressure, maintenance suffered and gear began to fail. Electronic equipment became temperamental, *Lake Champlain* experienced breakdown of both catapults, *Princeton* was out for a few days with shaft vibrations, and *Philippine Sea* had similar troubles. These casualties to her sister ships made it necessary to hold *Boxer* on the line long after her scheduled date of departure, with the result that on 23 July she set a new fleet record with her 61,000th landing.

In this situation something had to give, and what gave was a plan for intensified night work which had been developed in May. At last long it had seemed possible to put air operations on a 24-hour basis, by transferring all night-configurated aircraft to *Princeton* and providing her with a Small screen for independent night operations. But the May casualty to her shafts forced postponement of the scheme, and the subsequent need for maximum effort prevented the assignment of a carrier to night work only. So heavy, indeed, was the daytime schedule, that ordinary night heckling was first diminished and then discontinued, and the hours of darkness were conceded to the enemy.

Nevertheless night brought one *Triumph*. Beginning in April the Communists had cast further doubt upon the virtues of modern design by the employment of fabric-covered training planes—Po-2 biplanes, or Yak-18 monoplanes—in a series of night air raids against the Inchon-Kimpo-Seoul area. Employed either singly or in masses of a half-dozen or so, these ancient 80-knot floaters, too low for antiaircraft fire and too slow for jet interceptors, for two months flew with impunity through the interstices of the air defense organization, damaging parked aircraft, burning a fuel dump, shaking up the residences of the President of Korea and of the gentlemen of the press, and causing generalized confusion and frustration. But in June a detachment of Corsair night fighters was sent in from the fleet, and within a month Lieutenant Guy P. Bordelon had disposed of five of the intruders, to become not only the first ace in this particular category but the Navy’s only ace of the Korean War.

The enemy offensive of June and July gave the close support control system its first real test since the beginning of the stalemate. As before, the system of pre-planning strikes proved useless in emergency; as before, requests for help could not be promptly answered. Although communications capacity far exceeded that of 1950, this improvement was more than offset by the vastly increased sortie capability: the close support request net clogged almost at once, and despite resort to extemporized and non-doctrinal direct communications, strikes followed requests by as much as 17 hours. Again, as in the summer of 1950, the control system collapsed as JOC duty officers, remote from the situation but wishing to help, rammed aircraft in large numbers into the threatened sectors. Once more the lack of forward air controllers below the regimental level put the main responsibility on the Mosquitos which, in the fluid situation, once more demonstrated their inability to keep track of friendly positions and important targets. Inevitably, therefore, rather than hitting troops in the open and on the move, close support and Cherokee Strikes attacked supply and billeting areas, gun positions, and trenches, and much waste ensued through jettisoning of ordnance.

These difficulties, experienced for the first time by the personnel involved, although not for the first time in Korea, were compounded by the adverse weather. Large-scale Cherokee operations, sufficiently problematical in themselves, were forced by reduced visibility to operate under ground radar control. In June 577 sorties, some 30 percent of Task Force 77’s support effort, were so employed, bombing in level flight from altitudes between 10,000 and 15,000 feet, and by July this was the rule rather than the exception. In their turn the radar facilities became overloaded, and many flights had to be diverted to secondary targets, or directed to dump their loads somewhere north of the bomeline.

This situation, which would have scandalized the explosive Ewen, surprisingly seems to have brought little complaint from Navy commanders. A year on interdiction had been followed by a time of only token close support, and this, taken with the rotation of carrier and air group personnel, had permitted interests to change and skills to wither. With strike results unavailable or unassessable, the magnitude of the effort tended to be
emphasized, and maximum support of Eighth Army became a trucking operation in which, as often before in air warfare, statistics of sorties flown and ordnance dropped acted to conceal the central question of whether the drops hit anything worthwhile.

Only the Marines still chafed under a system, incapable of effective operation in the fluid situations where it was most necessary, whose failures were then used to support the doctrinal position that close support was an uneconomic use of air strength. But this chafing was largely theoretical. No very heavy attacks were thrown against the division which, with the bulk of its support supplied by the Marine Aircraft Wing and controlled at battalion level, found itself in a reasonably satisfactory situation, and good use was made of the final months in working out techniques for searchlight-directed night close air support.

For the Wing, too, the situation was improved. Relations between the Marine liaison officers and their Air Force colleagues at JOC had become exceptionally harmonious, and in February the Commanding General had at last regained operational control of his own squadrons. But the Marines' final views on the Korean situation made no bones about the inadequacy of prevailing concepts, the inferior quality of close support rendered the armies, and the unwieldy, inflexible, and unsatisfactory methods of control which resulted from over-centralization, inadequate communications, and the lack of forward ground controllers. Still, the Marine Aircraft Wing had done its best, and if it had been unable to make experience prevail over theory, it had solid accomplishments to show. Throughout the war the Army had demonstrated its great appreciation of such Marine support as it could get; Marine night fighters had proven in certain respects superior to all others in the theater; a Marine pilot on exchange duty with the Air Force had become a jet ace; following the armistice the MAG 12 softball team became the champions of the Fifth Air Force and subsequently, disguised in Air Force uniforms, went onward and upward to become FEAF champions in September.

So, with the emergencies of the final weeks, the war had come full circle, and the ships and aircraft of Naval Forces Far East were back at the tasks of 1950. Within the naval service at large another cycle was also ending. In the expansion of the past three years, priority had been given the operating forces; the shore establishment had remained undermanned, and ComNavFE had long been hoping for an increased allowance of personnel. But here the truth expounded by Clausewitz, that war is but the extension of politics, was once again brought home. As the Chinese were mounting their last offensives, proposals were being made in Congress for reduction of the armed forces, and a May dispatch from CNO had directed a 10 percent reduction in complement for shore activities.

But at last the end was at hand. On 19 July, with the halting of their final offensive, the Communists again evinced a willingness for progress, and on the morning of the 27th the armistice was signed to take effect that evening. The final line of contact ran from west of the Imjin River northeasterward through the Iron Triangle, east to the headwaters of the Soyang River, and thence northerly to the coast below Kosong. On both shores, according to the agreement, islands beyond the demarcation line were to be evacuated by the U.N., with the exception of Paengnyong Do and the others of the Sir James Hall Group, and of Yonpyong Do and U Do off the mouth of Haeju Man.

For Task Force 77 the final day involved strikes on northern airfields; at Wonsan Bremerton and Saint Paul fired the last missions; the Amphibious Force busied itself in preparation for the repatriation of prisoners. At 2200, as the troops came out of their holes across the Korean peninsula, the ships in Wonsan harbor turned on their lights. On the harbor islands, on Yang Do and Nan Do in the east, and on Cho Do and Sok To in the west, the garrisons began to demolish their installations and pack their bags. Three years, one month, and two days after the North Korean People’s Army had burst south across the parallel the war was over. Aggression had been repelled; Korea, like the rest of the world, remained divided.

If armistice there was, it was an uncertain one. Communist violation of provisions regarding reinforcement commenced almost at once; beyond the demarcation line the Neutral Nations Supervisory
Committee was frustrated in its activities; men’s lives were still at hazard. Up by the Yalu on the last day of action an Air Force fighter pilot had destroyed a twin-engined transport. The aircraft turned out to have been Russian; the event shortly produced a diplomatic protest, and still more quickly a reaction in another sphere. At 0615 on the 29th an Air Force RB–50, flying an easterly heading over the Sea of Japan, was shot down by Soviet MIGs some 30 miles south of Cape Povorotnyy. All but one of the crew parachuted into the sea, where during the afternoon several were sighted by low-altitude search planes, as were a number of Soviet ships and aircraft. In the afternoon Navy assistance was requested, and at 1745 Task Force 77 launched 13 aircraft to search to the northeast. At 1900 rescue ships were called for and a force composed of Bremerton and five destroyers headed north at speed. At 0300, as this group was approaching the area where survivors had been sighted, two night fighters were sent up from the carriers, to be followed by other aircraft throughout the day. Spread out in scouting line and with a helicopter on each flank, Bremerton and the destroyers swept the waters off the Russian doorstep throughout the 30th, covering an area of 3,300 square miles. But despite all efforts only a single survivor could be found.

So ended in a shaky truce America’s first 20th-century war for limited objectives. To some in the armed services, Army, Navy, and Air Force alike, this ending, with little permanently resolved, was less than satisfactory. Something seemed to have been forgone when truce negotiations with a beaten enemy had been commenced; the repeated concessions at Panmunjom had appeared unnecessary; and while none, perhaps, could satisfactorily define the victory he would have liked to gain, the Communist employment of negotiations as a shield for reinforcement and a forum for vituperation seemed infinitely repugnant.

But for this too there was a precedent. To the first John Rodgers, the peace of 1805 which ended the war with Tripoli was so distasteful that he offered to ransom the prisoners with funds raised from the officers of the squadron, if only the war could go on. Yet it may be that such an attitude, whether in Korea or in Tripoli, reflects an excessive emphasis upon the paper provisions of a settlement and an underestimation of the more substantial factors which govern the relations among nations. Unsatisfactory the Treaty of 1805 may well have been, but throughout the 19th century the United States maintained, in its Mediterranean Squadron, a body of armed force appropriate to the situation, and little more was heard from the Bashaw of Tripoli.
A Note on Source Materials

THIS ACCOUNT of the Korean War is based largely on official records of the U.S. Navy, supplemented by those of the other armed forces and by published material. The most important sources are discussed below; there then follows a listing by chapter and section of items of particular relevance to any given phase of the campaign.

By all odds the most important single source for the history of Naval Operations in Korea is the series of six Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, "Interim Evaluation Reports," the product of an unprecedented effort in large-scale concurrent evaluation of Naval Operations. This project was conceived by Rear Admiral Ralph A. Oftie in August, 1950; recruitment of personnel had commenced by early September, while U.N. forces were still struggling to hold the Pusan perimeter; the evaluation group was officially constituted by an order of 20 September from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet; by mid-October the group was at work in the Western Pacific under the direction of Rear Admiral Lucian A. Moebus.

Admiral Sherman’s letter had directed CincPacFleet to conduct a continuing evaluation of combat techniques, weapons employment, and logistics; to submit conclusions and recommendations for current training and Operations or for desirable new developments; and to prepare an analysis and record of Naval and Marine combat Operations. More specifically, the evaluation group was directed to concern itself with all types of air Operations, antisubmarine warfare, blockade and escort work, gunfire support, amphibious Operations, joint aspects of ground warfare, and logistic matters.

This was a large order. Interpreting this directive, Admiral Moebus’ group set itself the task of recording in detail the happenings within the various operational and administrative commands, of identifying the various difficulties and problems as well as the successes which developed, and of undertaking detailed staff studies of functional components of the Navy and of naval weapons systems with a view to recommendations for improvement. The first result of its efforts, "Interim Evaluation Report No. 1," covering the period from 25 June to 15 November 1950, was completed in early 1951, and was described by Admiral Moebus as "awesome in size." So it was, extending to 3,292 pages, with 928 pages of project studies on various forms of naval action supported by more than twice that amount of narrative annexes from both operational and administrative commands. The results were doubly fortunate: without the prodding of the evaluation group it seems certain that much of the record of the early days of crisis would have never been set down; as a result of the wide net cast by the CNO directive, much material was included for which the normal naval reporting system makes no provision. Special note, in this connection, should be taken of the annexes to the first Report which deal with the Operations of Commander Air Force Pacific Fleet, Commander Service Force Pacific Fleet, Commander Western Sea Frontier, the various Pacific MSTS offices, and the Marine Corps administrative commands, without which the narrative of the assembly and movement of force, so central to the entire campaign, would be almost impossible to develop.

The second Evaluation Report, covering the period from 16 November 1950 to 30 April 1951, was also sizable, but the format was considerably changed. Here the chronological narratives of the various commands have disappeared, to be replaced by extensive excerpts from action reports and from various special studies (notably of close air support and interdiction) by sundry groups and boards within the several services. By this expedient the work was reduced to 1,874 pages. By the time of the third Report, routine had been well established, procedures had been institutionalized, and from this time on the product, while still of first importance, becomes less interesting to the historian. But then, of course, so does the war. The end product of the
enterprise, six Reports totalling almost 10,000 pages, remains a mine of information, preserving much that would otherwise be lost or inaccessible. As perhaps the only individual to have read the entire work, I owe a personal debt of gratitude to Admiral Moebus and his colleagues.

It might be thought that so sizable a compendium would prove a sufficient source for the history of the war. But since, except in the appendices to the first Report, the approach is analytical rather than narrative, resort is necessary for the chronology of day-to-day activity to the Operation Plans, Operation Orders, Command Reports, Action Reports, and War Diaries at all levels from CincFE and Commander Naval Forces Far East down to the single ship or squadron. These items, stored in the custody of the Director of Naval History, total something over 50 file-cabinet drawers.

This material suffers from two principal weaknesses. Owing to the pressure of Operations on the undermanned ships and staffs, the record of the crucial early months is often scanty. Owing to the nature of the Navy’s reporting system, these reports are too frequently arid and uninformative. This reporting system, in Korea as in World War II, called for the submission by all operating commands of a War Diary, a running account of day-to-day movements, supplemented after battle by an Action Report. But Korea was a War Diary war: there were no important naval engagements, and except for the landings and evacuations of the first six months, no large set-piece Operations. In such a situation the instructions for preparation of the War Diary left much to the initiative of the individual commander, and while some rose to the situation, expanding and contracting their Diaries with the varying tempo of action, many did not. And the American tendency toward the depersonalized report (or, alternatively, the overwritten press release) leaves the historian to infer the atmosphere of any given period from a simple record of movements, orders, and ammunition expenditures. The sense of urgency, the rising hopes, the dashed anticipations of war rarely appear.

In this our British cousins appear to have the advantage of us, especially as regards the reports of commanders of task group level and above. In the Second World War no American reports from commanders of whatever service provide a satisfactory equivalent to those dispatches of British commanders published in the *London Gazette*. Similarly in Korea, the Reports of Proceedings by the Flag Officer Second in Command Far Eastern Station (Commander Task Group 95.1) are in many respects the most informative command reports of the war. This was noted by Admiral Dyer who, while commanding Task Force 95, forwarded FOSICFES’ "Report of Proceedings" for September 1950–November 1951 with the suggestion that U.S. Navy procedures might be modified to approximate the British. The historian can but reiterate this recommendation.

The limited coverage of the early months, while wholly understandable, also presents problems. At the level of command reports, nothing was forthcoming from the hard-pressed staff of Commander Naval Forces Far East until nine months of warfare had gone by. Information on the course of events in Tokyo in July and August is limited to a scanty annex to the first CincPacFleet Evaluation Report. By March 1951, however, it proved possible to produce a report covering the previous December; this was followed by reports for the early months of 1951, and from May of that year to the end of the war regular monthly reports are available. But July and August 1950 remain unrecorded, while the report covering the crucial months of September through November 1950 was not prepared until 1954. These ComNavFE "Command and Historical Reports," on the order of 70 to 80 pages each, provide summaries of the month’s air and surface Operations digested from Action Reports and War Diaries, together with comments on personnel, logistics, aerology, communications, shore activities, and medical matters. Though rather cut and dried in nature, they are nonetheless useful for chronology and statistical information.

For Seventh Fleet, the principal command afloat, the story is much the same. Throughout the period of Admiral Struble’s command, the staff was undermanned and overworked, and although by July 1951 Action Reports had been submitted for Inchon, Wonsan, and for the period of the evacuation of northeastern Korea, one could wish for more. For the latter part of the war the reports of Admirals Martin and Clark, which summarize the
Operations carried out under their command, are generally adequate.

On the next level down things were not quite so difficult. Since the Operations of the Amphibious Force Far East were necessarily intermittent, time was available between events to write the story down. One useful result was the detailed historical narrative of events from 25 June 1950 to 1 January 1951, in ComPhibGru I’s "Report of Operations," included as Appendix AA to CincPacFleet "Interim Evaluation Report No. 1." The War Diary of Task Force 95, the Blockading and Escort Force, although of variable quality, is important for the period from late 1950 through into 1952.

But the early period is the bad period, for the historian as for those who were on the job. Most fortunately, therefore, the Carrier and Cruiser Division Commanders, whose work was so important in the first weeks, kept reasonably full and complete War Diaries, and in addition two notable documents were produced in widely different and complementary spheres.

The first of these is Commander Carrier Division I (Rear Admiral E. C. Ewen), "Report of Task Force 77 Operations During the Korean Campaign (25 June 1950 to 19 January 1951)." This report of 616 pages (also available as Appendix R (Vol. 13) of CincPacFleet’s "Interim Evaluation Report No. 1") contains a narrative of Operations, a detailed analysis of the close air support situation as seen from the sea, a discussion of communications problems, and 303 pages of appendices which reproduce dispatches, bombline maps, orders, memoranda, and reports for the entire period, few of which are easily available elsewhere.

The second document of particular importance is the War Diary of the Republic of Korea Navy (Task Group 96.7/95.7), which provides a careful and detailed narrative of the campaign as viewed from Pusan and Chinhae. Although primarily important as the single source of information on the ROK Navy and its inshore Operations, this War Diary is also a unique repository of information on the organization of naval support of the perimeter, the arrival of ground forces, logistic arrangements, intelligence of enemy movements, and such matters.

Over and above the periodic reports of participating units, some other naval records have proven useful. The Office of Naval History has a considerable body of miscellaneous material from the files of the Chief of Naval Operations and of Commander Naval Forces Far East, which includes occasional material of importance. The personal papers of Admiral Joy and of Admiral Ofstie, deposited in the Office of Naval History, contain some useful items. Various summaries and statistics can be found in the OpNav publication "Combat Activity of Naval Aviation," which appeared monthly from October 1950 to June 1951, and quarterly thereafter. There are some scattered articles of interest in the monthly Review of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

The principal lacuna in the naval sources, and one which is reflected in the narrative, concerns the control and direction of the naval campaign. For Korea, as for the Second World War, information on such evanescent matters as the availability of intelligence, estimates of the situation, concepts of employment of own forces, and relations with the other services and with allies, must be sought in the dispatch traffic between the flag officers involved. But this remains an unexplored field. Although the availability of all pertinent naval sources was a condition of my undertaking this history, I have been unable to gain access to this material.

Doubtless it has never been possible to write naval history in isolation; certainly this is the case for the Korean War, where the various arms of the defense establishment were so intimately and continuously associated. Equally, however, the problem of unified history is a difficult one, and the attempt to produce a "Report from the Secretary of Defense to the President of the United States on Operations in Korea during the period 25 June 1950 to 8 July 1951," ultimately bogged down. This effort, nevertheless, did give rise to a "Secretary of Defense Committee Final Draft," a mimeographed document of 265 pages containing a large amount of usefully summarized information on all services. At the level of the U.N. command in Tokyo, I have made intermittent use of the CincFE-CincUNC monthly Command Reports, which have all the usual large-scale virtues and defects of major headquarters compilations. And GHQ Tokyo also produced a useful "History of the North Korean Army."
At the individual service level the following may be noted. The Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, has published two preliminary narrative volumes, *Korea 1950* (Washington, 1952), and *Korea 1951–1953* (Washington, 1956) on which I have relied heavily. A number of detailed studies are in progress, of which the first, Roy E. Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu* (Washington, 1961) was published while this book was going to press. To Stetson Conn and John Miller, Jr., Chief and Deputy Chief Historians of OCMH, I owe thanks for perceptive criticism and helpful suggestion.

For the Navy, two published works are available. Walter Karig, Malcolm W. Cagle, and Frank A. Manson, *Battle Report, The War in Korea* (New York, 1952), a continuation of the popularly written series of World War II, takes the story through the evacuation of Hungnam. A follow-up effort by the last two named authors, *The Sea War in Korea* (Annapolis, 1957), deals with the entire period of the Korean conflict. The files of the United States Naval Institute *Proceedings* are worth investigation.

Of a projected five volumes on Korean Operations, the Marine Corps has published three. These volumes, *The Pusan Perimeter, The Inchon-Seoul Operation*, and *The Chosin Reservoir Campaign*, by Lynn Montross and Nicholas A. Canzona, are detailed and painstaking studies, extremely useful for the period covered; surprisingly, however, in view of Marine organization and doctrine, they devote little attention to the Operations of Marine Corps aviation and to its interrelations with the ground forces.

For the Operations of the Air Force in Korea I have relied on the three volumes of *U.S. Air Force Operations in Korea* (U.S.A.F. Historical Studies 71, 72, and 127), publications of the U.S. Air Force Historical Division, Air University, Maxwell Field. From these basic studies the author, Robert F. Futrell, has distilled an unclassified history of Air Force Operations, which I have been privileged to read in manuscript form. And I am under further obligation to Mr. Futrell for courteous and helpful response to requests for information and amplification. Various aspects of the Air Force experience in Korea have been discussed in the Air University Quarterly Review; some of these articles are reprinted in J. T. Stewart (ed.), *Airpower—The Decisive Force in Korea* (Princeton, 1957).

For the conduct of foreign relations in the period of the Korean War the two volumes of basic documents published by the State Department, *American Foreign Policy 1950—1955* (Washington, 1957) are useful. On military and diplomatic policy, the records of two congressional hearings are crucial. The tensions in the Defense Department, and the nature of military planning in 1949, are considered in the hearings of the House Committee on the Armed Services, 81st Congress, 1st Session, on *Unification and Strategy*; how it all turned out may be seen in the hearings of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, *The Military Situation in the Far East*. In connection with the subject here at issue I have profited from the use of two draft studies of the 20th Century Fund Project on Civil-Military Relations: Paul Y. Hammond, "Missions of the Services" (to be published as "Super–Carriers and B–36 Bombers: Appropriations, Strategy, and Politics"), and Martin Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," which were most generously made available by Harold Stein, the project director, and by the authors.

So much for sources of a specialized nature. There exists, of course, in the public domain, a large literature on problems of current foreign policy, the cold war, and national defense, much of which is in one way or another germane to this study. Works of a historical nature are necessarily fewer, but some are of particular importance. For the unification of the armed forces, Walter Millis (ed.), *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York, 1951), is important. Material on the Korean War and on subsequent developments in the Department of Defense appears in Matthew B. Ridgway, *Soldier* (New York, 1956), James M. Gavin, *War and Peace in the Space Age* (New York, 1958), Maxwell D. Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet* (New York, 1960), and John B. Medaris, *Countdown for Decision* (New York, 1960). Naval officers, it appears, do not commit themselves to paper on these matters; the pre-Korean views of the Air Force may be traced through the pages of the *Reader’s Digest*, December 1948—April 1949. The historical background is well treated in Walter Millis, *Arms and Men* (New York, 1956); assisted
by others, the same author has grappled with the recent scene in *Arms and the State* (New York, 1958). Robert E. Osgood, *Limited War* (Chicago, 1957) has some perceptive comments on the Korean experience.


On the fighting in Korea, and how it seemed to those involved, six books come to mind: S. L. A. Marshall, *The River and the Gauntlet* (New York, 1953) and *Pork Chop Hill* (New York, 1956) are concerned with Army small unit actions; James M. Michener, *The Bridges at Toko-ri* (New York, 1953), is a saccharine treatment of carrier aviation; Andrew Geer, *The New Breed* (New York, 1952) takes the Marines from the Pusan perimeter up to the reservoir and down again, as do the photographs in David D. Duncan, *This is War!* (New York, 1951); Martin Russ, *The Last Parallel* (New York, 1957) is the personal narrative of a member of the 1st Marine Division.

**Chapter 1. To Korea by Sea**

Of the large bibliography concerning American relations with the Orient the following have been most useful:


**Chapter 2. Policy and Its Instruments**

1. **Divided Korea**


2. **Unified Defense**


3. **The Estimate of the Situation**
Chapter 3. War Begins

1. The Decision to Intervene
   Secretary of Defense Report; Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees, Hearings on
   The Military Situation in the Far East; Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back"; Truman, Memoirs; Department of
   State, American Foreign Policy 1950–1955; A. L. Warner, "How the Korea Decision was Made," Harper’s
   Magazine, June 1951.

2. The Far East Command
   Secretary of Defense Report; CincPacFleet Evaluation Report, I; Department of the Army, Korea 1950;
   USAF Histories; USMC Operations, I; War Diaries of CarDiv 3, CruDiv 5.

3. The First Days of Naval Action
   Secretary of Defense Report; CincPacFleet Evaluation Report, I (Vol. 6, Surface and Covering
   Operations; Annex A, ComNavFE Staff History); Department of the Army, Korea 1950; USAF Histories; NavFE
   Operation Orders 4–50, 5–50, 7–50, 8–50; Seventh Fleet Operation Order 6–50; War Diaries of ROK Navy,
   CarDiv 3, CruDiv 5, Juneau, DeHaven, Mansfield; Action Reports of Juneau (24 June–6 July), Suisun.

4. Air Strikes, Coastal Bombardment, Flank Patrols
   Secretary of Defense Report; CincPacFleet Evaluation Report, I (Vol. 6, Surface and Covering
   Operations; Annex A, ComNavFE Staff History; JJ, ComSubPac Submarine Operations); Department of the
   Army, Korea 1950; USAF Histories; NavFE Operation Order 6-50; Seventh Fleet Operation Plan 1–50,
   Operation Orders 6-50, 7–50; War Diaries of CarDiv 3, CruDiv 5, Juneau; ComCarDiv 1, Report of Task Force
   77 Operations During the Korean Campaign (hereafter ComCarDiv 1 Action Report); Action Report of Juneau
   (24 June–6 July).

Chapter 4. Help on the Way

2. Troops and Supplies
   Secretary of Defense Report; CincPacFleet Evaluation Report, I (Annexes FF, ComWestSeaFron
   Narrative; GG, DepComMSTSPac Report; HH, DepComMSTSWestPac Report); Department of the Army, Korea
   1950.

3. Fighting Ships
   Secretary of Defense Report; CincPacFleet Evaluation Report, I (Annexes T, U, ComAirPac Reports;
   EE, ComServPac Evaluation); War Diaries of CruDiv 3, Helena, Badoeng Strait, Sicily.

4. Naval Logistics
   CincPacFleet Evaluation Report, I (Vol. 7, Logistics; Annex EE, ComServPac Evaluation), II.

5. The Marine Brigade
Chapter 5. Into the Perimeter

1. The Korean Theater

   In hydrographic matters, here and throughout the book, I have relied on Sailing Directions for the Southeast Coast of Siberia and Korea (Hydrographic Office Publication 122B, Washington, 1951) and on the relevant H.O. charts; for Korean topography I have used the maps of the Army Map Service, Corps of Engineers, to the scales of 1:1,000,000 and 1:250,000. Korean place names have been employed throughout, with but a single exception: up in the high country I have followed the Marines in referring to the Chosin (rather than the Changjin) Reservoir, and in calling the town Hagaru (instead of Changjin).

   Secretary of Defense Report; Department of the Army, Korea 1950; USMC Operations, I.

2. East Coast Bombardment


3. The Pohang Landing

   Secretary of Defense Report; CincPacFleet Evaluation Report, I (Vol. 5, Amphibious and Ground Operations; Annexes AA, ComPhibGru I Report; HH, DepComMSTSWestPac Report); USAF Histories; NavFE Operation Orders 9–50, 10-50; War Diary of PhibGru I.

4. Seventh Fleet Operations


5. Patrol Planes and Gunnery Ships


6. The Marines Arrive


Chapter 6. Holding the Line

1. The Perimeter Takes Form
Chapter 7. Back to the Parallel

1. Preparing the Counterstroke


2. North to Inchon

Chapter 8. On to the Border

1. Planning the Wonsan Landing

Secretary of Defense Report; CincPacFleet Evaluation Report I (Annexes B, ComSeventh Fleet Narrative; AA, ComPhibGru I Report); NavFE Command and Historical Report, Sept.—Nov. 1950; Department of the Army, Korea 1950; USMC Operations, III; USAF Histories; Senate Hearings on The Military Situation in the Far East; Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back ;" Goodrich, Korea; NavFE Operation Plan 113–50; Seventh Fleet Operation Order 16-50, Operation Plan 10–50; Amphibious Group 1 Operation Order 16-50; Commander D. N. Clay, Trip Report, 18 Oct. 1950; War Diaries of Bass and Wantuck; Action Reports of Seventh Fleet (JTF 7); Perch, Report of Raid.

2. The Opening of Wonsan and Chinnampo


3. Operations in Eastern North Korea


4. New Plans and New Problems

Secretary of Defense Report; CincPacFleet Evaluation Reports, I (Annex AA, ComPhibGru I Report), II; NavFE Command and Historical Report, Sept.—Nov. 1950; Department of the Army, Korea 1950; USMC Operations, III; USAF Histories; Goodrich, Korea; Truman, Memoirs; Senate Hearings on The Military Situation in the Far East; Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back;" FOSICFES Report; War Diaries of ROK Navy, Philippine Sea, Bataan, Badoeng Strait, Sicily; Action Reports of Seventh Fleet (1 Nov.—26 Dec. 1950), ComCarDiv 1, Valley Forge, Philippine Sea; Joy Papers.

Chapter 9. Retreat to the South
1. **Defeat in the West**


2. **The Campaign at the Reservoir**


3. **Concentration in the East**


4. **The Evacuation of Hungnam**


5. **The Second Chinese Offensive**


### Chapter 10. The Second Six Months

1. **Back to the Han**


2. **On to the Parallel**


3. **The Communist Spring Offensive**

4. North to Kaesong


Chapter 11. Problems of a Policeman

1. Operating Problems

The functional organization and the systematic arrangement of conclusions and recommendations in the CincPacFleet Evaluation Reports make these the most useful single source; some of these reports have extensive special sections on personnel problems. The NavFE files and the papers of Admirals Joy and Ofstie contain relevant items.

2. Logistic Support


3. Interservice Coordination and the Air Problem

The most inclusive sources are the CincPacFleet Evaluation Reports, especially I (for close support), II (for interdiction), and VI; the classified and unclassified Air Force Histories; and the Action Report of ComCarDiv 1. The NavFE files contain a series of letters and memoranda on the close support question, as do the papers of Admirals Joy and Ofstie. The action reports of Tacron 1 for Inchon and Hungnam, and of Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 2 for the Chosin Reservoir campaign are important. The end of the story may be investigated in: "Report on Joint Air-Ground Operations Conference held at Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, Seoul, Korea, 8–22 August 1953," and in Joint Tactical Air Support Board, Fort Bragg, N.C., "Special Report Pertaining to Project No. 2–53 ‘To Establish Joint Doctrine and Procedures Governing Command, Employment, and Control of Tactical Air Forces in Support of Ground Forces.'"

4. The Larger Picture

On the Formosa patrol: Seventh Fleet Operation Order 15–50; War Diaries of ComCruDiv 1, Juneau, Fleet Air Wing 1. For the submarine problem, see the CincPacFleet Evaluation Reports; the NavFE files contain reports of ASW actions and correspondence on this subject. For patrol plane Operations see the relevant sections of CincPacFleet Evaluation Reports. On the other side of the world, Annual Reports of CincLantFleet; H. L. Ismay, NATO, the First Five Years, 1949–1954 (Paris? 1954?); Cinc- NELM, Report of Operations, 1 July–1 November 1950. The Office of Naval History has compiled a chronology of Mediterranean Naval Operations subsequent to World War II.

5. Into the Future

Almost all this information on ship and aircraft development is available in unclassified sources, notably Jane’s Fighting Ships and All the World’s Aircraft. The Joy and Ofstie papers contain some correspondence on the implications of the Korean experience for new construction.

Chapter 12. Two More Years

The important general sources for the entire chapter are the 4,612 pages of CincPacFleet Evaluation Reports, III–VI; the ten file–drawer inches of monthly NavFE Command and Historical Reports, July 1951–July 1953; and the Reports of the two Seventh Fleet commanders, Admirals Martin and Clark, covering the periods 28 March 1951–3, March 1952 and May 1952–July 1953. For the other services, Department of the Army, Korea
1951–1953, and the USAF Histories. For the armistice negotiations, Vatcher, Panmunjom.

1. Stabilized Front and Peripheral War


2. Stalemate

The NavFE files contain a study of the interdiction question of 28 April 1952, made in response to a CincFE query of 12 March; material on interdiction also exists in the Ofstie papers. On the transfer of the Marine Division, War Diary of Amphibious Group 1; on the Kojo demonstration, Action Report of Amphibious Group 3; on the engagement with the MIGs, Action Reports of Oriskany, Kearsarge, and Helena, and an account in the ONI Review, February 1953.

3. Progress, Crisis, Conclusion

1. Ships

The designations of the various types of U.S. naval vessels are derived by compounding an initial letter indicative of general category (thus A, auxiliary; C, cruiser; D, destroyer; L, landing; P, patrol) with one or more modifiers descriptive of the particular species (thus C, command or craft; D, destroyer or dock; E, explosive or escort; H, hospital or helicopter; O, oiler or ocean; P, transport (i.e., personnel); T, tracked, tank, or torpedo; V, aviation). Type designators employed in this book are as follows:

- **AD**: Destroyer tender
- **AE**: Ammunition ship
- **AF**: Refrigerated stores ship
- **AGC**: Amphibious force flagship
- **AH**: Hospital ship
- **AK**: Cargo ship
- **AKA**: Attack cargo ship
- **AKL**: Light cargo ship
- **AM**: Fleet minesweeper
- **AMS**: Motor minesweeper (formerly YMS)
- **AN**: Net tender
- **AO**: Oiler
- **AOG**: Gasoline tanker
- **AP**: Transport
- **APA**: Attack transport
- **APD**: Fast transport (destroyer escort conversion)
- **ARG**: Internal combustion engine repair ship
- **ARH**: Heavy hull repair ship
- **ARL**: Landing craft repair ship
- **ARS**: Salvage vessel
- **ASR**: Submarine rescue vessel
- **ATF**: Fleet tug
- **AV**: Seaplane tender
- **AVP**: Small seaplane tender
- **BB**: Battleship
- **CA**: Heavy cruiser
- **CL**: Light cruiser
- **CLAA**: Antiaircraft light cruiser
- **CV**: Aircraft carrier
- **CVE**: Escort aircraft carrier (merchant ship hull)
- **CVL**: Light aircraft carrier (cruiser hull)
- **DD**: Destroyer
- **DE**: Destroyer escort
DMS                   Fast minesweeper (destroyer conversion)
DUKW               Amphibious truck (manufacturer’s designation)
JMS                    Japanese minesweeper (YMS type)
LCVP                 Vehicle and personnel landing craft
LPH                    Helicopter amphibious assault ship
LSD                    Dock landing ship
LSMR                Rocket ship (medium landing ship conversion)
LST                    Tank landing ship
LSU                    Utility landing ship
LVT                    Tracked landing vehicle
LVTA                 Armored tracked landing vehicle
MSC                   Coastal minesweeper (non-magnetic)
MSI                    Inshore minesweeper (non-magnetic)
MSO                   Ocean minesweeper (non-magnetic)
PC                      Submarine chaser
PCEC                 Amphibious control vessel (patrol escort modification)
PF                       Frigate (patrol gunboat or corvette)
PT                      Motor torpedo boat
T-AP                 Transport assigned to MSTS
T-APc                 Small coastal transport assigned to MSTS
YMS                   Motor minesweeper (World War II designation)

2. Aircraft

Aircraft of the U.S. Navy are designated by a first letter indicative of functional category and by a second
which identifies the manufacturer; to distinguish second and subsequent designs in the same category by the same
company an intervening number is employed. Suffixed numbers and letters indicate changes to the basic model
and special uses and configurations. Important categories of aircraft are:

A                      attack
F                      fighter
H                      helicopter
U                      utility
P                      patrol
PB                     patrol bomber
R                      transport

Relevant manufacturer’s designators are:
D                      Douglas
F                      Grumman
H                      McDonnell
M                      Martin
O                      Lockheed (former)
S                      Sikorsky
U                      Chance Vought
V                      Lockheed (current)
To illustrate, the AD is the first naval attack plane produced by Douglas after the Attack designation was set up by the Navy in September 1946; the F9F is the ninth Grumman-designed shipboard fighter; the F4U-5N is the night-configured version of the fifth modification of the fourth naval fighter plane designed by Chance Vought.

In the Air Force a different series of letter prefixes is used to indicate function (B, bomber; C, cargo and transport; F, fighter; L, liaison; R, reconnaissance, and so on); these letters are followed by numbers running consecutively in each category, and in the event of model changes by a letter suffix. Thus, for example, the F-86A Sabre is the first modification of the basic design of the eighty-sixth in the sequence of Air Force fighters.

Soviet aircraft, regardless of type, are referred to by the designer’s model number: thus MIG for products of the establishment presided over by Artem Mikoyan and Mikhail Gurevich; Yak for Aleksandir Sergeivich Yakovlev.

### 3. Miscellaneous

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACB</th>
<th>Amphibious Construction Battalion (Navy)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADCOM</td>
<td>Advance Command and Liaison Group (Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglico</td>
<td>Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (Navy-Marine)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Armor-piercing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLT</td>
<td>Battalion Landing Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Combat air patrol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cardiv</td>
<td>Carrier Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Close air support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CincFE</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Far East Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CincLantFleet</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CincPac</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CincPacFleet</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CincUNC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, United Nations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNO</td>
<td>Chief of Naval Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Com</td>
<td>Commander (in compounds), as</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ComNavFE</td>
<td>Commander Naval Forces Far East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crudiv</td>
<td>Cruiser Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTF</td>
<td>Commander Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTG</td>
<td>Commander Task Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CW</td>
<td>Continuous wave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desdiv</td>
<td>Destroyer Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>Economic Cooperation Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESB</td>
<td>Engineer Special Brigade (Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSAK</td>
<td>Eighth U.S. Army in Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAFIK</td>
<td>Fifth Air Force in Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEAF</td>
<td>Far East Air Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEC</td>
<td>Far East Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLAW</td>
<td>Fleet Logistic Air Wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMF</td>
<td>Fleet Marine Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOSICFES</td>
<td>Flag Officer Second in Command, Far Eastern Station (British)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/S</td>
<td>Fire Support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
GCA                   Ground control approach
GHQ                   General Headquarters
HC                      High capacity
IFF                      Electronic identification device
JapLogCom       Japan Logistical Command
JCS                   Joint Chiefs of Staff
JOC                   Joint Operations Center
JTF                   Joint Task Force
KMAG               Korean Military Advisory Group (U.S. Army)
KMC                 Korean Marine Corps
Lant               Atlantic (in compounds)
MAG                  Marine Aircraft Group
MATS                 Military Air Transport Service
MAW                 Marine Aircraft Wing
MDA(P)             Mutual Defense Assistance (Program)
Mindiv            Minecraft Division
MLR                   Main line of resistance
MSR                   Main supply route
MSTS                 Military Sea Transportation Service
MTACS              Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron
NAF                    Naval Air Facility
NATO                  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NavFE               Naval Forces Far Fast
NCO                  Non-commissioned officer
NKPA               North Korean People’s Army
NMJ                   Naval Member, Joint Operations Center
OCMH               Office of the Chief of Military History (Army)
OpArea               Operating Area
OPLR                 Outpost line of resistance
OpNav               Office of Naval Operations
OpPlan              Operation plan
OTC                   Officer in tactical command
Pac                  Pacific (in compounds)
PhibGru          Amphibious Group
POL                  Petroleum, oil, lubricants
POW                  Prisoner of war
RAF                     Royal Air Force
RAN                 Royal Australian Navy
RCN                 Royal Canadian Navy
RCT              Regimental Combat Team
RN                  Royal Navy (Gt. Britain)
RNZN            Royal New Zealand Navy
ROK                 Republic of Korea
ROKN            Republic of Korea Navy
Scajap      Shipping Control Administration, Japan
SEATO          Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
ServPac      Service Force, Pacific Fleet
SHAPE        Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe
SPB          Shore Party Battalion (Marine)
TAC          Tactical Air Command
TACP         Tactical air control party
Tacron       Tactical Air Control Squadron (Navy)
TADC         Tactical air direction center
TE           Task Element
TF           Task Force
TG           Task Group
UDT          Underwater Demolition Team
UNC          United Nations Command
USNS         U.S. Naval Ship ("in Service", i.e. non-commissioned vessel of MSTS nucleus fleet)
VHF          Very high frequency
VT           Variable time (radar-controlled) fuse
VMF          Marine Fighter Squadron
VMFN         Marine Night Fighter Squadron
VMO          Marine Observation Squadron
VMR          Marine Transport Squadron
VP           Patrol Squadron
The Sea War in Korea
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson

Foreword: The Navy’s Role in Limited War

When the Communists invaded Korea on 25 June 1950, the United States was neither expecting nor prepared to fight in that remote area. They apparently had analyzed United States willingness, readiness, and ability to fight and concluded that we would simply watch and complain, but not fight. The Communists apparently saw an opportunity to seize some additional free world territory with little risk and at little cost.

The United States Army had no troops in Korea, the United States Air Force had only a few wings in the Far East, and the United States Navy had only one cruiser, four destroyers, and a few minesweepers in the Sea of Japan.

With so few combat forces initially available, control of the seas (taken for granted as is too often the case) was a prerequisite in implementing the United Nations decision to resist aggression against the Republic of Korea. Without the capability to use the seas, the decision to intervene on a rocky peninsula half-a-world away would have been meaningless and unenforceable. With control of the seas, the decision was sound and reasonable.

Once the decision was made, ships of the free world navies converged on Korea from every one of the seven seas—combatant ships, oilers, supply ships, ships loaded with troops, ammunition, guns, tanks, and aircraft; ships from the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Pacific, the Atlantic, and from the far-away Mediterranean.

Control of the seas gave the United Nations the advantage of mobility—the opportunity to consolidate and combine the free world’s economic and military strength. Seapower brought American troops, first from Japan, later from the United States. Seapower defeated the initial aggression with the classic amphibious assault at Inchon. Seapower made it possible to redeploy the U.S. forces from Hungnam. Seapower helped to limit the conflict.

Use of the seas was denied to the Communists. This placed serious limitations on their ability to build up military power in Korea. It exposed the land flanks of the North Koreans (and later the Red Chinese). It denied them easy resupply by sea.

The Communists’ attempt to seize Korea by military action was a failure. But this failure does not mean an abandonment of military adventures by the Communists. They will try again whenever other means fail or when they see a weakness they can exploit or find a vacuum they can fill.

The Communists have stated repeatedly that any means may be used to attain their goal of world domination, including war. The most important tenet of Communism—the one given most stress in their doctrine—is that Communism must continuously strive to possess all power, and conversely to destroy all rival power. This proposition is basic to Communism. It must be borne in mind constantly when dealing with Communists. Their tenet and their goal do not change.

There are many other explosive areas in the world. They are explosive because of this standing threat and this goal of Communism.

While the Korean War was unusual in many respects, it nevertheless has great meaning and significance for the future. In 1957 terminology, it would be called a “limited war.” In the thermonuclear age, as major nations of the world improve their capability to wreak mutual destruction upon one another, the probability of all-out nuclear war is diminished. The probability of limited war is increased. It is important that the Korean War receive careful study. It is the first limited war the United Nations have fought against Communist totalitarianism.

The naval history of the Korean War is outlined in this book in great detail. The authors have distilled from it the lessons, results, and significance of the Korean War. This effort should be of great interest and benefit to every student of international or military affairs.
Of the many lessons of the Korean War, three stand out above all others:

1. The military forces of the United States must be vigilant and ready to defeat aggression in any area and in any form, whether it be large or small, atomic or conventional. Our hope, of course, is that our visible, vigilant strength will discourage Communist aggression. To do so, we must be capable of effective counteraction, ranging from the use of a squad of Marines to the use of atomic-tipped ballistic missiles. Our Navy must have many different arrows in its quiver.

2. Control of the sea is prerequisite to victory in modern war, whatever its size, type, or scope.

3. The Korean War was a limited war. A limited war is the type of war most likely to occur in the thermonuclear age.

--Adm. Arleigh A. Burke, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D.C., 1 May 1957
The Sea War in Korea
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson

Preface

Four years have passed since the end of the Korean War. Other international emergencies have come and gone, and some are still with us. The period from June 1950 to the present has been one of intense pressure upon every conscientious naval officer in the Fleet. Ships have toiled long hours, days, weeks, and months, to raise and maintain the readiness of the Fleet. Only in the war colleges, and to a restricted degree there, has it been possible for even the career officer, who makes the study of war his life's work, to assimilate the many lessons and the deep significance of the Korean War.

In passing time, as the U.S. Navy moves away from the Korean War, it becomes increasingly obvious how that war wrought tremendous changes upon naval thinking, naval developments, naval strategy, and naval policy. In every field—amphibious, logistical, aviation, operational and planning—the impact was monumental. Korea was a naval proving ground. Its lessons, some still undigested, and its significance, yet largely unappreciated, are still unconsciously erupting, and disrupting the Fleet.

Yet, strangely, there is a tendency in military circles to dismiss the Korean War as one so artificial, anachronistic, unorthodox, and hedged with restrictions that any study of it is unprofitable, and more likely to impress the student with wrong conclusions than right ones. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is indeed true that the Korean War was artificial and unique in many respects. So, indeed, is every war. None is standard. To accept the Korean War as a standard pattern for future war would be as imprudent as it would be to prepare solely for an atomic-blitz type war.

The Korean War taught many lessons of the highest significance; it initiated progress in the field of amphibious warfare which had been stalled by between-the-wars events; it revitalized naval aviation; it reemphasized the importance of mine warfare.

This book is not written as history alone. The authors hope it is also, and more importantly, history plus significance, a form of rigorous introspection and self-analysis. Only by measuring the lessons of the past can we forge a yardstick for the future. Only by interpreting the lessons of the Korean War can we logically prepare for the future wars.

This book seeks to distill the essence of the naval portion of the Korean War in a readable, concise, and interesting manner, with three objectives in mind: First, to teach and transmit the many naval lessons of that war; second, to record and preserve the splendid accomplishments of the United States Navy in the seas surrounding that beleaguered peninsula; third, to document the conclusion that the advent of the atomic age, whether it brings large or small wars or an indefinite period of tense preparedness, has not diminished, but rather has increased, the need for a strong and adequate Navy.

This book is therefore dedicated to all the officers and men of the United States Navy, who, in their service in Korea, advanced the Navy's skill, and who are today maintaining the Navy strong, vigilant, and ready in the continuing task of keeping our beloved country safe and secure.
The Sea War in Korea
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson

Chapter 1: Gathering War Clouds
The Diplomatic Background of the Korean War

War was to erupt suddenly in the remote Land of the Morning Calm on 25 June 1950, not because of any local or long-standing differences between North and South Koreans, but as a result of an ideological struggle being waged between two global camps of adversaries, the freedom-loving nations versus the Soviet dominated countries—a struggle over which the Koreans themselves had little control. As the curtain for a fantastic tragedy was about to rise on the macabre stage of war, neither North nor South Korea was to be a major player.

After emerging from 35 years of Japanese occupation, the unfortunate people in North Korea found themselves completely engulfed beneath a Red sea of communism. The people of South Korea, on the other hand, were similarly overwhelmed by the freedom and responsibilities of a democratic system which was new and unfamiliar.

The war between North and South Korea was not merely a civil clash. On top of it was piled an international war which involved 25 nations, and which brought five million men from around the globe to a small Asian peninsula. In no sense was it a “small” war; rather, in the words of Vice Admiral Struble, “it was a major war confined to a small area.” The conflict was outwardly ignited by a few North Korean political puppets whose strings were actually responsive to Soviet hands. These same hands also held numerous other strands both east and west of the Russian periphery. Thus, the Korean battlefront was but a small wedge in an arc of global conflict that had developed between the victorious allies of World War II.

To bring into focus the sea struggle as sailormen were to see it, it is first necessary to take a long-glass view of the international events which preceded the war.

The Communists of Russia are skilled in speaking from both sides of their mouths at once. From one half, they announce that their avowed purpose is to dominate the world. From the other half, they contend that it is they who are the peace lovers, that it is they who are under siege, and have been for more than 250 years. The most recent example of this never-ending siege, they say, is the tide which only subsided when Hitler’s armies were pushed out of Stalingrad and from the very doors of Leningrad and Moscow.

Leaders of the free world agree that a siege is on, to be sure, but that it is the free world which is standing on the defensive against a series of planned aggressions in the Soviet’s seemingly interminable master plan for world conquest. To support this thesis, they point to a map of the world. Except for sections of Korea and Indochina, the Communists had expanded their frontiers to control the entire Pacific coastline of the Asian continent. On the other side of the world, from Stettin in the Baltic to Albania in the Adriatic, the piratical hands of Stalin and his heirs had drawn a political line that virtually isolated East from West.

Within these hemispheric arcs lay all the capitals of central and eastern Europe’s states as well as the ancient cities of the Orient. Such cities as Berlin, Prague, Shanghai, Warsaw, Vienna, Peiping, Budapest, Pyongyang, Bucharest and Sofia had been enclosed within the Soviet sphere of influence, all subject to control from Moscow. Additionally, Communist fifth columns were established in every country in the world, working in complete harmony with and obedience to transmissions from the Kremlin.

Stalin, with astonishing defiance, blithely disregarded many of his Yalta promises almost before he had made them. For instance, he bluntly repudiated his pledge to permit Allied airmen the wartime use of certain airfields near Budapest; he denied free elections to the Poles. On the very day (27 February 1945) that Prime Minister Churchill told the British House of Commons that it was his Yalta impression that the Soviet leaders wanted to live in honorable friendship with the Western democracies, Stalin issued a two-hour ultimatum to
Rumania’s King Michael to dismiss his Prime Minister, General Radescu. Subsequently, on 3 March—the day President Roosevelt brought Congress an optimistic report on Yalta—Stalin ordered King Michael to appoint Patru Groza, the Rumanian Communist leader, as the new Prime Minister.

So flagrant were the Soviet dictator’s violations of Yalta that President Roosevelt, 12 days before his death, cabled Stalin that he could no longer conceal his concern for the lack of progress being made in carrying out the Yalta decisions. He stated that even if a thinly-disguised Communist government continued in Poland, the American people would consider Yalta a failure.

Stalin, of course, ignored President Roosevelt’s objections; his military-political offensive rolled on unabated. While the Western nations, spurred by Soviet-inspired propaganda, demobilized their military forces, the Soviet Union, in startling contrast, maintained her armed forces at full strength, and, in fact, began to expand her navy.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Government tightened her political web inside the Baltic and Balkan countries. In May of 1946, Stalin’s forces crassly overthrew the legally constituted government of Czechoslovakia.

At this point, the Western Powers took heedful note.

In an historic step which must mark the point when the tide of international communism commenced to recede, President Truman obtained Congressional approval for the Marshall Plan to bolster the economic fronts of Western Europe. The Treaty of Rio de Janeiro was signed in 1947, committing the United States to resist any attack upon her neighboring republics to the south. European regional alliances began to take shape. Such national groupings as Benelux[1] and the Western Union[2] were born.

Stalin retaliated by blockading all highways and rails leading to Berlin from Western occupation zones. By 24 June 1948, he had blockaded every communicating link except the one corridor he could not close without gunfire: the international airways. Two days later, the Berlin airlift was organized by the United States and Great Britain. For 15 months (until 30 September 1949), the airlift operated with such psychological and military success that the Soviets reluctantly withdrew the blockade. Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Berlin blockade was the fact that it alerted the Western Powers to the aggressive and militant nature of the Soviet Government and the imminent gravity of the Soviet threat. Even before the blockade was lifted, the Western Powers had signed, on 4 April 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO)[2A] in Washington.

In this treaty, the NATO members stated that an armed attack against any one member would be considered as an attack against all. This was followed by various military assistance bills being extended to practically all of the NATO countries, and to many countries in South America and Asia, through which medium the United States agreed to extend commercial credits, provide new military equipment, and modernize old Allied equipment in areas where it could be most profitably used.

The Mutual Defense Bill, passed by the U.S. Congress on 6 October 1949, specifically authorized that military equipment, technical and trained assistance, machine tools, and industrial equipment could be sent to Allied areas.

It was during this period of Allied build-up in Western Europe that the Soviet Union made the decision to open an active battlefront on the Korean peninsula. It seems reasonable that the Soviet shift of the scene of action from West to East was largely intended to counteract and negate the embryonic plans of the free nations of NATO.

At Potsdam, on 26 July 1945, the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Republic of China had pledged, as they had similarly done at Cairo in 1943, that Korea would become a free and independent country, ending more than three decades of Japanese occupation.

Upon entering the war against Japan in 1945, the Soviet Government had publicly declared its intention of adhering to the Potsdam Declaration. An official USSR news release on 8 August 1945 stated: “Loyal to its Allied duty, the Soviet Government has accepted the proposal of the Allies and has joined in the declaration of the
Allied Powers of 26 July.”

Later, on 27 December 1945, in Moscow, the Soviet Government reaffirmed this pledge in a meeting with the Foreign Ministers of the United States and the United Kingdom. The Soviet Government agreed that a provisional democratic government should be established for all Korea until the Koreans themselves could permanently organize an independent and united country. This was yet another of those solemnly written promises made by the Soviet Government which was to be broken.

The 38th parallel—a boundary line that was to become as famous as the Chinese Wall and the Iron Curtain—was first given official prominence on 11 August 1945, in connection with the surrender of Japan. On that day the Secretary of War of the United States submitted to the Secretary of State a draft of a surrender document that was to be known as General Order Number One. By this order General Douglas MacArthur, as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, would supervise the surrender of the Japanese Government to Allied forces.

Following approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and President Truman, General Order Number One was telegraphed to General MacArthur in Manila on 15 August 1945. Simultaneously, it was radioed to the British Government, and to Generalissimo Stalin. Stalin suggested certain amendments to the General Order, all of which were acceptable to the United States; but he made no mention of its provisions having to do with the surrender in Korea which stated that, as a matter of convenience, Japanese forces north of the 38th parallel would surrender to the Soviet Commander and forces south of that line would surrender to the American Commander. General Order Number One was issued by General MacArthur on 2 September 1945, three weeks after Soviet forces had first entered North Korea.[3]

With the 20-20 hindsight that is conveniently available to historians, it is clear that the Soviet Union actually tipped its hand on its future interest in Korea at the Potsdam Conference. It was there (according to General T. S. Timberman’s testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs) that the Russians asked the Americans to cooperate with them in the reduction of Japanese forces in Korea.[4] General Marshall replied that this would be impossible since the United States would require its total military strength in capturing the Japanese homeland. The Russians then asked if the Americans would assist them with an amphibious operation in Korea. Again General Marshall demurred, stating that all U.S. amphibious lift would be needed in the invasion of the Japanese homeland.

Under these circumstances of demonstrated Soviet interest and actual Soviet troop deployments, Soviet forces might very well have occupied the entire Korean peninsula before the arrival of U.S. troops on 8 September 1945. The nearest U.S. military forces had been bivouacked at Okinawa, 600 miles from Korea, and in the Philippines, some 2,000 miles distant. It seems very probable, therefore, that the establishment of the 38th parallel for surrender purposes may have kept the southern half of Korea free, saving two-thirds of its population from immediate Communist domination.

In any event, the Allies neither envisaged the 38th parallel as anything more than a convenient line of surrender, nor did they foresee that it would give rise to a permanent split in the political and economic life of Korea. The 38th parallel was merely a fortuitous line brought about by the exigencies of the war.

Even though little importance was attached to the 38th parallel by United States officials, it was soon apparent that the Soviet forces occupying North Korea considered it much more than a “line of convenience.” The Reds quickly hung a “no trespassing” sign on the 38th parallel and prohibited passage across it except by the express permission of the Soviet military commanders. Thus, with signs, a very complex international problem was created.

The physical division of the Korean peninsula at parallel 38 made it abundantly clear that Red Army commanders had been ordered to create a permanent delineation between the two military zones. Henceforth, the 38th parallel assumed increasingly ominous significance.
Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, the American occupation commander, fully realizing that such a physical barricade which neatly divided the industrial north from the agrarian south would eventually paralyze any future chance for uniting Korea, continued to urge his opposite number, Soviet General Chistiakov, to remove the barrier. Unless this was accomplished, as both the United States and the Soviet Union had solemnly promised, he said, Korean unity and Korean freedom were doomed. The Reds remained synthetically sympathetic, always willing to discuss the situation but never agreeable to doing anything which might ameliorate the problem which they themselves had created.

In accordance with terms of the Moscow Agreement of 1945, the Soviet Government had agreed to establish a joint United States-Soviet commission to work out a temporary four-power trusteeship for Korea as a prelude to the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of national independence for Korea. Among the rather general instructions issued by the three ministers in Moscow to the joint commission was a provision “that the Joint US-USSR Commission consult with Korean democratic parties and social organizations in preparing their proposals to their respective governments concerned.” Whether such loosely-worded instructions were deliberately written into the Commission’s instructions by the Communists is not known. In any event they served the Soviet purpose of reaching an impasse.

In the joint commission the Soviet delegation took the position that the occupying powers should confine consultations to those Korean groups who had agreed fully and consistently with the Moscow declaration. This was tantamount to showing favor to the representative of the communist groups.

The Soviets took the position that before any Korean “political or social organization” could qualify and be considered acceptable for consultation with the Joint Commission, the party or organization had to be acceptable to them. Secondly, the Soviets hotly disputed the definition of what constituted “a social group.” Thirdly, without bringing specific charges, the Soviets arbitrarily accused all non-communist Korean political parties of bad faith in that all of them were opposed to the trusteeship idea.

The United States, on the other hand, took the position that all Korean parties were innocent until indicted and proven guilty; that their present attitude was more important than their past record; furthermore, if the Joint Commission restricted its consultations to the degree insisted on by the Soviets, the Commission would never get a fair sampling of Korean opinion; it would therefore lack the rudimentary knowledge for making recommendations to the Four Powers concerned.

The difference was composed by a formula which limited consultation to those groups which were democratic in principle and which agreed to uphold the aims of the Moscow declaration and also abide by the Commission’s decisions.

Then the Soviets raised a new objection: they insisted upon barring consultations with any individuals who had expressed opposition to the Moscow trusteeship provisos. The United States delegation said that such a restriction was at odds with the ostensible purpose of the commission to establish a democratic government.

Thus went Soviet-United States deliberations for some twenty-four months—words, words, words—ad nauseam, ad infinitum. Meanwhile, legal passage across the 38th parallel remained as restricted as ever.

Finally, the United States recommended in a letter of August 26, 1947, since she and the Soviet Union could not end their stalemate with regard to the functioning of the Joint Commission, that secret elections be held in both North and South Korea to form provisional legislatures in each zone. Representatives from these legislatures would constitute a national provisional legislature which in turn, would meet in Seoul to establish a provisional government for a united Korea. This recommendation might have been acceptable to the Soviets had it not included what the Reds thought was a joker; the United States proposal specifically provided that representatives of the United Nations should be invited to watch the balloting to assure the world and the Korean people “of the wholly representative and completely independent character of the action taken.”

Molotov, Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R., politely tabled the free election idea in a note signed 4
September 1947, and stepped forward with a counterproposal. The US-USSR Joint Commission, he said, was still far from exhausting all its possibilities for working out agreed recommendations; and besides, such elections would only further divide Korea, and this would be contrary to the vital task at hand: “the establishment of a single, even though provisional, organ of authority.”

On 9 October 1947, about a month after Molotov had, in effect, accused the United States of trying to further divide Korea by holding free elections, he came up with still another proposal. Since the United States delegation in Korea had made impossible the formation of a provisional Korean democratic government, Molotov suggested that both the American and the Soviet troops get out of Korea and let the Koreans organize a government for themselves. Soviet troops, he promised, would be ready to leave simultaneously with the Americans.

By now it was plain to the United States Government that further bilateral talks with the Soviets were futile. The alternatives were weighed. The United States had these choices: (1) she could apply military pressure against the Soviet Union for her refusals to carry out her diplomatic promises; (2) she could abandon all of Korea to the Soviets; (3) she could establish what might amount to a United States’ protectorate over South Korea; or (4) she could provide the South Korean people with assistance and guidance so that they, through their own efforts, might progress toward their goal of freedom and independence.

After weighing the alternatives, the United States chose the last course. This course would permit the South Koreans at least to start laying the foundation for a free and independent country. At the same time it would permit the United States to reduce progressively her Korean commitments of manpower and resources in accordance with the necessities of her own contracting military strength.

Meanwhile, on 17 September 1947, the United States Government placed the Korean question before the United Nations General Assembly in order that the inability of the two powers to reach an agreement should not further delay the early establishment of an independent, united Korea.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union made their recommendations to United Nations. The United States proposed the following: “(a) Elections in the two occupation zones of Korea by March 31, 1948, under observation of the United Nations ‘as the initial step leading to the creation of a National Assembly and the establishment of a National Government of Korea’; (b) creation of a national security force by the Korean National Government immediately upon its establishment, early transfer to that Government of the governmental functions exercised by the occupying powers, and early arrangements between it and the occupying powers for the withdrawal of their forces; (c) creation of a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea to oversee the elections and to be available for consultation on each of the steps proposed for developing self-rule in Korea and the end of occupation in that country.” [5]

The Soviets opposed the United States recommendation. They reiterated the position that the United States alone had violated the Moscow agreement and had blocked the independence of Korea. They viewed the Korean question as one concerning the peace terms and, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of the United Nations. They offered a counter proposition for mutual withdrawal of occupying troops as the first step and organization of a national government as the second.

Although it was to have little practical effect, the UN General Assembly decided—on 14 November 1947—to approve the United States’ recommendation that the Korean question was a matter for the Korean people themselves to decide, that the matter could not be resolved without the full participation of representatives of the indigenous population. The UN Assembly passed a resolution that the Korean people should have the opportunity to elect representatives, draft a democratic constitution, and establish a national government. To insure that this was done properly, they decided to send a UN Temporary Commission with representatives from Australia, Canada, China, El Salvador, France, India, Philippines, Syria, and the Ukrainian Socialist Republic. The Temporary Commission, minus the Ukrainian delegate, arrived in South Korea 8 January 1948, and held its
first meeting four days later. The Soviet Union protested that a matter such as the establishment of a Korean
government did not fall within the jurisdiction of the United Nations. Furthermore, she would not permit the
Temporary Commission to enter North Korea. The Soviet military commander even refused to receive a
communication from the Commission proposing a courtesy call. After meeting numerous rebuffs from the Soviet
commander, the Temporary Commission referred the matter back to the UN.

What next?

On 26 February, the United Nations instructed the Temporary Commission to proceed to carry out the
UN program “in such parts of Korea as are accessible to the Commission.”

As a consequence, the only free election and free government established in Korea would of necessity be
confined to the southern half.

The first election was accordingly held 10 May 1948, and the government of the Republic of Korea was
established 15 August 1948.

The new government of South Korea was recognized by the United States and 31 other nations. It was
accepted by the UN as the legally elected and lawful government. It was not recognized, however, by the Soviet
Union, who created in North Korea what it termed the “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” This puppet
regime was proclaimed 8 September 1948. Claiming jurisdiction over the entire country, it was destined to live as
it was created: in complete defiance of the United Nations.

Such is the diplomatic history of an ethical government trying to deal with distortionists on the single
issue of Korea.

During the years of 1948 and 1949, the Soviet-controlled North Koreans did everything possible to
promote disorder and confusion along and south of the 38th parallel. Subversives infiltrated southward in great
numbers. Communist terrorists made threats, incited rebellion, and actually participated in armed raids across the
border.

By the fall of 1948 the security of the Republic of Korea was endangered. A riot in the port of Yosu in
October involving 3,000 people, including a regiment of the Republic of Korea Army, cost the lives of 500 loyal
police and army troops and left the city in ruins.

Meanwhile, the North Koreans took the diplomatic initiative by requesting troop withdrawals by both the
United States and the Soviet forces. This was agreeable to the United States; and on 1 July 1949, the Department
of the Army announced that all U.S. troops had been withdrawn from Korea after nearly four years of occupation.
Of the 50,000 United States troops that had originally been in Korea following VJ-Day, a scant 500 were left as a
provisional military advisory group.

Following withdrawal of the U.S. troops, North Korean subversive agents stepped up their operations. In
two years of guerrilla warfare the South Koreans lost an estimated 500 dead. Between 9 and 20 September 1949,
intensive fighting took place near the 38th parallel, with casualties on both sides.

On 4 August, North Korean forces invaded the Ongjin peninsula but were repulsed after heavy fighting.
In mid-October, a new offensive was begun by North Korean forces in the Ongjin peninsula, and severe fighting
continued for several days. So violent did the raids become that, in March of 1950, the UN Secretary General
ordered eight UN representatives then in Korea to observe the guerrilla actions along the 38th.

“I always believed,” said Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, Commander Naval Forces, Far East, “that the
guerrilla activities and raids were deliberately planned and directed by the North Korean Government to promote
unrest and disorder in South Korea with a view toward eventual Communist control of the entire peninsula
through civil war.”
Chapter 1: Gathering War Clouds


Against this ominous diplomatic backdrop in Korea, the United States was developing a post-World War II military strategy, the validity of which was soon to be tested in the Korean War. Before any study of the naval portion of the Korean War can be made, therefore, an analysis of what this military strategy was, and how it had been reached, is necessary, so that in a final chapter a judgment of that prewar strategy can be rendered in the light of wartime experience.

After the end of World War II, the goals which the United States set for itself, while commendable, were actually beyond realization within the self-imposed limits. The United States was trying to maintain a military posture, assimilate the lessons of World War II, accommodate the facts of the atomic age and jet propulsion, and simultaneously reduce military forces to peacetime levels despite expanding overseas commitments.

As the national strategy took shape, some of it was old and some of it was new. It was old in the sense that it preserved the basic rights of the individual as well as the sovereignty of the United States without impinging on the rights of other nations. It was new in the sense that the Government of the United States had determined that it could no longer be insulated from world events; that by virtue of its greater moral and physical strength, it must play a strong hand in organizing, unifying, and leading the political, economic, spiritual, and military efforts of all freedom-loving nations. Only by combining the several resources of free nations could freedom be preserved and encouraged to spread and flourish among less fortunate peoples.

If the United States was ever to succeed in such a noble mission, it was patent that she herself must unify her strength in a practical plan that would accommodate her aspirations. Never again could she afford the prodigal military wastage that had characterized her World War II efforts. In the future she must carefully evaluate her preparedness for conflict and know both her assets and liabilities. She must evaluate every aspect of her national strength: her industrial productivity and potential, her access to and the availability of raw materials, her educational needs (particularly in the fields of science and engineering), and her manpower levels. The military program which resulted would have to dovetail neatly with the political and economic realities of the postwar world.

Altogether, these factors called for military unification—unification of national resources and national strengths. The trouble with unification came in the military sphere. How could it be accomplished most effectively? What military weapons and strategy would best implement the national policy? What roles and missions should be assigned to the individual military services? What type of defense organization would most likely assure the United States of a peaceful and secure future?

All military leaders initially favored unification of the Armed Services; both Army and Navy officials supported this view in the findings of a joint board headed by Admiral James Otto Richardson which had been ordered to study the problem of postwar defense. Before any laws were passed, however, many outstanding naval leaders began to voice serious doubts as to the wisdom of military unification. Many thought that merger of the Armed Services would stultify competition and progress. The heart of naval doubt was found in a statement made by Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King in October 1945: “Sea power will not be accorded adequate recognition because the organization contemplated would permit reduction of the sea power by individuals who are not thoroughly familiar with its potentialities. . . .”

After considerable naval opposition and much heated Congressional debate, the National Security Act of 1947 was passed and signed by the President on 26 July of that year. This new union continued to find, in the
words of a subsequent report rendered by the House Armed Services Committee, “a Navy reluctance . . . an overardent Army, a somewhat exuberant Air Force.” [7]

The concept of the first unification law was federation, not merger, of the Armed Forces. It had created, in effect, a coordinator of three executive departments: a Secretary of Defense and a Defense Department.

The first Secretary of Defense, Mr. James Forrestal, stated in his first annual report to the Congress: “I would be less than candid . . . if I did not underline the fact that there are still great areas in which the viewpoints of the Services have not come together.” He went on to state, “It is out of the competition inherent in the division of the total funds allocated to the National Military Establishment that the controversies arise.” More specifically, Mr. Forrestal pointed out that “balancing of these two aspects of air power (Air Force and Navy), and seeing to it that adequate, but not unnecessary, funds are allocated to each, is one of the most difficult tasks of the Secretary of Defense.” [8]

Meanwhile, the interservice struggle intensified—both in private and in public—principally between the Navy and the newly-created Air Force. Books and magazine articles with such provocative titles as Disaster Through Air Power, The Strategic Bombing Myth, and The Case Against the Admirals appeared in public print. Influential editors and publishers took sides in the highly emotional controversy. Many military officers continued to voice their convictions publicly and before Congress. It was only natural that the nation’s military leaders, who had fought vastly different wars in different parts of the world, should hold basic differences on matters involving weapons systems and techniques for their employment. But as General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower pointed out when he was asked for his views: “We are dealing with distinguished Americans, people who have their country’s good at heart, and, therefore, we should not be too critical or too ready to call names on either side; above all, we should not be too ready to question motives.” [9]

By the summer of 1949 the controversy had reached a climax. Governmental leaders, both in the executive and legislative branches, were now offering opinions; industrialists, specialists, and neo-experts joined the arguments in everything from weapons design to tactics.

The fireworks actually began 23 April 1949, when the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Louis A. Johnson, announced that work on the Navy’s new aircraft carrier, the USS United States, would be discontinued. This decision was made while the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. John L. Sullivan, was out of Washington. Three days later Mr. Sullivan resigned. He stated that he could no longer serve as Secretary in view of the manner in which the decision had been made.

By April’s end, unofficial reports were circulating that the Marine Corps’ integral aviation was to be transferred to the Air Force; that naval air was to be further cut and perhaps also transferred to the Air Force. Rumors that the Marine Corps was to be abolished and the Navy reduced to a convoy-and-escort force became so widespread in the spring of 1949 that Mr. Carl Vinson, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, queried the Secretary of Defense. [10]

Secretary Johnson replied on 28 April 1949 that these things could not be done under the National Security Act, that they had not been contemplated; and furthermore, before any such steps were seriously considered, he would ask permission to discuss the matter with Congress. [11]

Charges and countercharges mounted, some of them involving political matters, until eventually a full-scale Congressional investigation was ordered. [12]

In the subsequent twelve days of testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, the differing viewpoints of the postwar military strategy of the United States emerged.

As the Armed Services Committee hearings opened, Chairman Vinson stated: “These disagreements involve such basic subjects affecting the national defense that this committee could not properly ignore the situation.”

What should the national defense program of the United States be? What strategy should it follow? What
kind of wars would be fought in the future? Would there be global wars, peripheral wars, limited wars, atomic or non-atomic wars? What weapons would be most effective in fighting such wars?

It could scarcely be expected that dedicated professional men with varied wartime experiences, varied strategic concepts, a myriad of interests, and varied technical knowledge would agree on what they saw as they gazed into the crystal ball of future war.

The Air Force concept was expressed by Secretary of the Air Force W. Stuart Symington: “... the Air Force believes that the atomic bomb plus the air power necessary to deliver it represents the one most important visible deterrent to the start of any war.” Mr. Symington repeated a statement once made by General Hoyt Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff: “The only war you really win is the war that never starts”.[13]

“Secondly,” continued the Air Force Secretary, “if war comes, we believe that the atomic bomb plus the air power to deliver it represent the one means of unloosing prompt, crippling destruction upon the enemy, with absolute minimum combat exposure of American lives. If it is preferable to engage in a war of attrition, one American life for one enemy life, then we are wrong. That is not our way. That is not the way in which the mass-slaughter of American youths and invasion of Japan was avoided. . . .

“We can hope, but no one can promise, that if war comes the impact of our bombing offensive with atomic weapons can bring it about that no surface forces ever have to become engaged. Disregarding such an illusory hope, we do know that the engagement of surface forces will take place with much greater assurance of success and much fewer casualties to the United States and its allies if an immediate, full-scale atomic offensive is launched against the heart of the enemy’s war-making power.”[14]

Mr. Symington said that the United States should continue to “concentrate on America’s greatest asset—quality of product, superior weapons capable of development, and mass production in our system of free economy—weapons like the B-36 with its intercontinental bombing range without refueling, and other modern bombers and planes with their projected intercontinental range with refueling.”[15]

General Hoyt Vandenberg followed the Secretary, and his testimony included his military estimate of what types of weapons were most needed to perform such future military jobs as could be foreseen from his vantage point. The Air Force Chief of Staff said he was “in favor of the greatest possible development of carrier aviation to whatever extent carriers and their aircraft are necessary for fulfillment of a strategic plan against the one possible enemy we may have to face. Less than this would be unsound. More than this would be an unjustifiable burden upon the American taxpayer. . . .”

General Vandenberg said he was “not only willing but insistent that the types of carriers which can help meet the threat of an enemy submarine fleet shall be developed fully and kept in instant readiness. The sea lanes must be kept open. There is no dispute on this matter.” He went on to say, “I do not believe there is justification for maintaining large carrier task forces during peacetime unless they are required by the strategic plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In my judgment they are not required by those plans. . . .

“My opposition to building it[15A] comes from the fact that I can see no necessity for a ship with those capabilities in any strategic plan against the one possible enemy.

“Any war we may have to fight in the future will obviously be unlike the Pacific war against Japan. It will tend to resemble the war against Germany, though with certain differences. There will be the same problem of killing submarines. . . . There will be the same problem of protecting Atlantic Ocean supply lines, although the threat to our shipping will come almost wholly from the submarine, since the potential enemy has no surface units of the character of the Bismarck and the Tirpitz. There may or may not be amphibious landings, but if there are, they will not be like the landings in North Africa and Normandy, and probably unlike most of the landings in the Pacific islands.

“Finally,” said General Vandenberg, “the industrial heart of the potential enemy lies not on any seashore, not on any island, but deep inside the Eurasian land mass. It is to that type of war we must adapt all of our forces,
All of the witnesses, including naval men, were agreed that air supremacy was vital to future military success, but the unity-splitting question was how to achieve air supremacy.

Protagonists of the Air Force felt that the B-36 (the long-range, land-based bomber) and the just-cancelled aircraft carrier *United States* were duplicative; that both of them were designed to accomplish the same purpose: strategic air warfare. They felt that United States taxpayers could not afford the heavy expenditures involved in providing two similar weapons systems.[16]

Since the Air Force had been assigned the mission of strategic air warfare, they felt the sounder procedure for most of the money to be budgeted into the Air Force’s plan of accomplishment. By so doing, they claimed, the United States could assure itself of the best possible deterrent to war, and, if war came, the cheapest and the easiest victory. The Air Force backers argued for a strategy based on hitting the heartland of the most probable enemy with intercontinental land-based bombers, on the logic that this was the best possible means at this particular time of getting there “fustest with the mostest” atom bombs.

The Army position in the hearings was stated by General Omar Bradley, who spoke both from his Army background and from his position as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Bradley agreed with the Navy that he did not believe our country should rely solely on strategic bombing or on atomic weapons. Properly balanced land, air, and sea forces were required. However, he doubted there would ever be any campaign similar to the Pacific campaign. He also doubted that there would ever again be large-scale amphibious operations.[17] General Bradley also recalled his own participation in two of the largest amphibious landings in history—in Sicily and Normandy—and that in neither were there any U.S. Marines.

As far as national military strategy was concerned, General Bradley pointed out that “our basic concept for defense includes protection of the United States and this continent, in case we are attacked. It provides for early retaliation from bases which we hope to have ready at all times.

“This concept includes a decision that we shall have to be ready to seize other bases that we may need and hold those bases against enemy attack, so that we may attack the enemy country at shorter ranges, and, at the same time, deny him bases close to this country from which he could attack us.

“Ultimately, however, we will have to carry the war back to the enemy by all means at our disposal. I am convinced this would include strategic bombardment and large-scale land operations.”

General Bradley went on to say, “In addition to the concept I have just outlined, we must go back to the realization that the first prize for any aggressor in the world today is Europe, with its industrial potential and its market for goods.”[18]

Naval strategists, led by Admiral Arthur W. Radford, then Commander in Chief, Pacific, and destined to relieve General Bradley as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, opened the Navy’s case by stating that the major issue of the investigation “deals with the kind of war for which this country should be prepared.”[19] He pointed out that it was difficult, in fact impossible, to predetermine a fixed concept for fighting a war. Admiral Radford testified: “An aggressor nation can set the time and place for initial military operations, and hence may strongly affect early defense measures.”

Further, he pointed out: “A potential enemy can be expected to make sound estimates of our military strength. He does not depend entirely on what he reads in the papers. If the armed forces of this Nation are unsoundly organized and improperly equipped, they will not be fully effective as a deterrent to aggression. They even invite it.”[20]

Radford went on to say that the issues were much broader and much more important than the B-36 program, that a strategy—atomic retaliation—was being overemphasized, a strategy which most military men did not accept as sound.

In discussing future war, Radford stated that “at some critical phase of future war—and that phase may
come early—the security of our country may substantially depend on a mobile air power required to insure control of the air in vital areas.

“We have in the United States developed mobile air power to such an extent that we can project it anywhere in the world where there is enough water—and that is quite a large part of the world—and no other country can do that. As I told you, air power is the key to victory in any military operation from now on—all kinds of air power. The United States has the unique capability to project air power to get control of the air in vital areas of operation. No one else has it. The Navy today must be built not to meet an enemy navy but with the idea, after evaluation, of the need for air power in theaters of war and parts of the world where we can’t get air power any other way.”[21]

The testimony of another Navy witness, Captain “31-Knot” Arleigh A. Burke, whose future seemed foreordained to be as exciting and challenging as his past, had strong appeal to the nations of such coalitions as NATO, whose bonds were no stronger than the sea catalyst which brought them all together.

“If war develops,” said Captain Burke, “one of the first duties of our maritime country will be to gain and hold command of the sea. We must do that before we can send assistance to our allies and our overseas forces and bases. If we fail to command the seas, we cannot support our war effort overseas. In such a case, all forces operating from bases which must be supplied by sea would be cut off from adequate support.” In other words, every U.S. airfield and U.S. division stationed overseas was a vote of confidence in the U.S. Navy’s ability to supply and maintain it.

“The United States needs a navy which can prevent the enemy from denying us the oceans in which we want to operate.”

If the Navy could not assure the safe arrival of raw materials from overseas, the U.S. economy, both civilian and military, would quickly perish. Specifically, Burke testified, “Whatever it takes to exercise that command of the sea, I think that this country must have it because we are a maritime nation. We must import materials, we must get our forces overseas. If we can’t do that, we will fight our wars in this country....”[22]

General Clifton B. Cates, Commandant of the Marine Corps, reinforced the Navy’s position in forceful language.

“... Without a well-trained landing force, the Fleet is not a balanced implement of warfare,” said the Commandant. Marine forces, he said, “are possessed of great utility in augmenting the national defense—if they are permitted to do so.”

Discussing future war, the Commandant said: “In view of the enormously increased scope of this Nation’s international responsibilities, I am convinced there is even greater likelihood of a recurrence of need for such emergency forces (the Marines) poised and ready to proceed in company with the Fleet, to the scene of crisis. ... We are confronted with the possibility of a war in which our opponent would hold the initiative. We must prepare to meet his moves with promptness and with whatever force we can muster.”

The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, pointed out that naval forces could help discourage aggression either on a large or a small scale: “... The presence of our Fleet in the eastern Mediterranean has effectively contributed to keeping local conflicts from degenerating into global war.”[23]

He pointed out further that “operations of carrier task forces, through application of the principle of mobility and surprise, have repeatedly demonstrated the ability to concentrate aircraft strength at any desired point in such numbers as to overwhelm the defense. No other force and no other nation possesses this capability to a like degree.

“We have a lead of more than a quarter of a century over any probable enemy. Let us not squander it for any false doctrines—any unsound concept of war. That would be the real extravagance.

“... The Navy’s ultimate function in war is to exert the steady, unrelenting pressure of our Nation’s military might against the homeland of an enemy.” He went on to say, “The Navy must be organized in peacetime
as a balanced force capable of . . . underseas warfare . . . amphibious warfare . . . including many highly specialized groups . . . underwater demolition teams, high-speed minesweeping groups, teams to control air and gunfire support, joint communications, and many others.

“. . . The properly balanced Fleet must have as a major component a Fleet Marine Force of combined arms, including its close-support tactical aviation. The inclusion of such a force permits a fleet commander a degree of initiative and flexibility in his operations not otherwise obtainable. He can seize advanced bases as required by the development of the campaign, or, if the situation dictates, be assured of adequate defenses for those bases already in his possession.”

Little did Admiral Denfeld, who was soon to be relieved as Chief of Naval Operations, realize that within less than a year his words would read like prophecy.

Another Navy witness to put his finger on the core of the problem was Vice Admiral Robert B. Carney, at that time head of naval logistics, and later to become Chief of Naval Operations.

Admiral Carney pointed out that “To settle on a concept of sustained intercontinental bombing or a program of procuring costly intercontinental bomber types could only be justified by overriding considerations of the greatest urgency, because, logistically, in terms of treasure and effort, there are better ways of conducting strategic bombing.”[24]

He stated that the only basis for the country’s relying on intercontinental bombing would be “absolute assurance of its decisive character,” and he cautioned that it should not be pursued to the point that other elements of the military machine were starved into impotence.

The issue, concluded Admiral Carney, is for the nation to decide “whether the American Air Force power in its present form is needed to the extent of accepting deterioration and inadequacy of other essential components of the military team. I believe that is today’s Number One military problem.”

The naval concept of future war thus boiled down to this: The United States could not anticipate what kind of a war would be fought or where, or when, nor could she safely predict what weapons would prove most effective. These matters were of necessity to be determined by time, the enemy and by circumstance. Naval leaders thought that the national strategy should avoid a fixed concept of future war; that the country should be prepared to fight in many differing areas, with many types of weapons. They thought it folly for this nation to arbitrarily restrict itself either in concept or in method. Fleet Admiral Halsey summarized the Navy’s views about a future war when he said: “It will be started by a foreign aggressor—at the time, at the place, and in the manner he desires.”[25]

The United States, argued the Navy, should retain flexibility and balance in her armed forces; she should retain the mobility, versatility, built-in defenses, the concealment, and the qualities of concentration, dispersion, and surprise inherent in the Navy’s floating airfields; for the Navy held that no single Service or no single weapon would ever win the war.

Naval officers contended that “the Nation’s long-range objective is a stable world society—and that this objective must underlie the Nation’s preparations for war and govern the methods by which it wages war; otherwise, according to the testimony, the Nation may thwart its objectives, although winning the war waged to achieve those objectives.”[26]

As the Congressional hearings progressed, there was much heated debate. At times the hearings were less strategic in nature than technical and tactical. At times tempers flared. One distinguished soldier suggested that “this is no time for ‘fancy-dans’ who won’t hit the line with all they have on every play, unless they can call the signals.”[27] One Congressman told a witness that he had been “farther back under my barn hunting for eggs than some generals have been away from home.”[28]

The Chairman of the Committee, Mr. Carl Vinson, said at one point in the hearings that one of the troubles had been that the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force had not been around Congress very much recently.
“We hardly know what is going on,” said the Chairman, “and it is not often that we and the country have the benefits of such statements as are being made right now. . . . I think these hearings are going to help the Services. I think they are going to let the country know something about what the Services stand for and what the Services represent.” The Chairman voiced a popular sentiment among the Congressional committee when he stated that he “did not want any strategy drafted . . . which is going to deny to the country an efficient and effective arm to play its proper role in the defense of the country. We don’t want to keep one strong member of the team sitting on the bench too long.” [29]

To summarize the two viewpoints, the Air Force held the view that warfare in the atomic age gave overriding importance to air power. The missions of ground and naval forces, in their view, had been relegated to collateral tasks. The safest way to prevent a future war was to concentrate preponderant strength in atomic weapons and superlative aircraft to deliver them.

The Navy, on the other hand, held the view that while it was indeed true that air power held the key to victory, our potential enemy held the power of initiative and could choose the time, the place, the size, and the scope of a future war. Our national military forces, therefore, should be mobile, balanced, and flexible, capable of handling a variety of military contingencies. Ground and naval forces were quite as vital in the age of the atom as they had ever been in the past.

These conflicting views which emerged in the House Armed Services Committee hearings were in only nine months to be tested by the war in Korea.
Why Soviet leaders ordered the commencement of a war in Korea is a mystery still locked inside the walls of the Kremlin. The most logical explanation, perhaps, is that Soviet leaders miscalculated the American reaction. Any analysis or poll of our national attitude toward the Far East during 1948-49 would have reached the same conclusion that the Soviets must have made: America would stand idly by as Korea was invaded. This estimate was fortified by such public announcements as the one that our defensive perimeter no longer included Korea. On 12 January 1950, the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Acheson, speaking before the National Press Club in Washington, D. C., defined a United States defensive perimeter in the Far East which did not include either South Korea or Formosa.

The defensive perimeter, said Secretary Acheson, “runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukus . . . from the Ryukus to the Philippine Islands. . . . So far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack. But it must also be clear that such a guarantee is hardly sensible or necessary within the realm of practical relationship.”

Secondly, Soviet strategists certainly noted that the U.S. Government had not only removed occupation troops from Korea, but had earlier removed its U.S. Marines from the Shantung peninsula in China. U.S. military forces were obviously withdrawing from the Asian mainland. Any military move by the Communists into South Korea would probably be unopposed.

Thirdly, any military men, including the Soviets, could deduce from the just-completed Navy-Air Force debate before a Congressional committee that the U.S. military strategy was drifting toward preparation for only one kind of war—a global atomic one. The constant reduction being made in both the U.S. Army and Navy made it a calculated and acceptable risk to the Soviet leaders that the U.S. would not—or could not in time—interfere in a local, ground-type war in Korea.

In a speech before the American Legion convention at St. Louis on 2 September 1953, the United States Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, gave his opinion of why the Korean War started:

“The Korean War began in a way in which wars often begin,” Secretary Dulles said, “—a potential aggressor miscalculated. From that we learn a lesson which we expect to apply in the interests of future peace.

“The lesson is this: If events are likely which will in fact lead us to fight, let us make clear our intention in advance; then we shall probably not have to fight.

“Big wars usually come about by mistakes, not by design . . . It is . . . probable that the Korean War would not have occurred if the aggressor had known what the United States would do.

“The Communists thought, and had reason to think, that they would not be opposed, except by the then small and ill-equipped forces of the Republic of Korea. They did not expect what actually happened.”

At a press conference on 2 February 1955, President Eisenhower stated that the Korean conflict started because we failed to make clear to the Soviets that we would defend South Korea.

That a military invasion of South Korea by the North Korean puppet government was possible or even imminent was evident in the intelligence despatches coming into Washington:

“8 December 1949: North Korean government and their Chinese allies are under complete domination of Russia. Soviets will not permit the indefinite existence of a noncommunist state in the Korean peninsula. . . . Patterned on the master plan, the North Korean government is merely a puppet of Soviet Russia. Acting as an overseer is a Soviet mission of 300 persons in Pyongyang. . . . The army is composed of four to eight divisions
and Inf. Brigades and possesses normal infantry weapons, howitzers of 76-mm. and 122-mm. calibers, 30 to 40
tanks, model T-34, and 36 to 70 aircraft. All equipment is of Soviet origin. Recent influx of Chinese communist
troops makes up an (unidentified) divisional unit. . . . Capitalizing upon (the) weakness of the democratic system,
the Communist-dominated South Korean Labor Party is the instigator of practically all civil disturbances (in
South Korea). . . . North Korean sponsored guerrilla forces are creating fear and unrest in the South Korean
populace. . . . To the Communist, an armed invasion of South Korea is probably considered as the final resort to
gain control of the peninsula. . . . With the conclusion of the Chinese Communist campaign in China, more troops
and supplies may be channeled into North Korea. (The) danger to the Southern Republic will mount at that time. . . .
Climatic conditions have passed (December). (The) next favorable period for (any such) action will occur in
April and May 1950.

“5 January 1950: North Korea has set March and April 1950 as the time to invade South Korea. Such
threats should be viewed in relation to military activities. By this criterion, the movement of the 3rd North Korean
Division into the western 38th parallel, the arrival of Chinese Communist personnel, the southward displacement
of the North Korean 2nd Division and expansion of Border Constabulary seem significant in terms of military
action in the spring.

“10 March 1950: North Korean People’s Army will be prepared to invade South Korea by fall or
possibly by spring of this year (1950) as indicated by armed forces expansion and major troop movements. . . .
Soviet intentions in Korea believed closely related to the Communist program in Southeast Asia. If checked in
their operations in these countries, Soviets may divert their efforts to Korea. . . . Latest reports received that the
North Korean People’s Army will invade South Korea in June.[31A]

“15 April 1950: In mid-March, the Communist government ordered evacuation of all civilians residing in
an area within three miles of the 38th parallel. Vacated housing in latter area then occupied by troops and
guerrillas. Purpose reported as ‘preparation for war and to interfere with South Korean Intelligence operations.’

“25 May 1950: National Inspection teams have completed field inspections of all units of the armed
forces in North Korea (as preparatory war measures). Positive identification of seven Army divisions. . . . Note
the existence of several regular Army divisions, located roughly in a cross-country belt between the 38th and 39th
parallels. . . . Previous evidence of the entry from Manchuria of trained Communists of Korean ethnic origin
would furnish the necessary manpower (for additional divisions). In addition, there is continuous compulsory
recruitment; estimates indicate as many as 100,000 to 150,000 of North Korean youths.”[32]

Despite such despatches, coming in from various intelligence agencies throughout 1949 and the first half
of 1950, there was, in Secretary Acheson’s words, agreement that the outbreak of war “did not appear imminent.”

The Korean War actually commenced without warning at 0400 of 25 June 1950. A 45-minute artillery
bombardment by North Korean batteries across the 38th parallel was followed by rapid assaults of Communist
infantry and armor, composed of six North Korean divisions of infantry, three Border Constabulary Brigades,
supported by approximately one hundred Soviet-made T-34 and T-70 tanks, ample heavy artillery, and the North
Korean Air Force. The total strength of the attacking units was later estimated at 100,000. The North Korean
Army rapidly advanced against light forces of the Republic of Korea which were unprepared and ill-equipped for
any such assault.[32A] Along the east coast, a Border Constabulary Brigade, numbering 10,000 troops, carried
out two amphibious landings at Kang-nung and Samchok.

On 26 June, two more North Korean divisions moved south across the parallel, and on 28 June the enemy
entered Seoul, the capital of the Republic of Korea, without effort. In four full days of almost unimpeded
Communist success, the Republic’s forces were driven steadily down the peninsula without being able to rally
even for temporary resistance along the Han River, 32 miles from the 38th parallel.

First official word of the assault, a report from Ambassador Muccio in Seoul made at 11:25 a.m. of 25
June in Korea, reached Washington at 9:26 p.m. on 24 June.
“According to Korean Army reports which are partly confirmed by Korean Military Advisory Group field adviser reports, North Korean forces invaded Republic of Korea territory at several points this morning. Action was initiated about 4 a.m. Ongjin was blasted by North Korean artillery fire. About 6 a.m. North Korean infantry commenced crossing the (38th) parallel in the Ongjin area, Kaesong area, and Chunchon area, and an amphibious landing was reportedly made south of Kangnung on the east coast. Kaesong was reportedly captured at 9 a.m., with some ten North Korean tanks participating in the operation. North Korean forces, spearheaded by tanks, are reportedly closing in on Chunchon. Details of the fighting in the Kangnung area are unclear, although it seems that North Korean forces have cut the highway. I am conferring with Korean Military Advisory Group advisers and Korean officials this morning concerning the situation.

“It would appear from the nature of the attack and the manner it was launched that it constitutes an all-out offensive against the Republic of Korea. (Muccio)”

The war was now seven hours old. The United Nations was informed immediately. At 3 a.m., 25 June, Washington time, the United States Government requested a meeting of the United Nations Security Council in the following words:

“Dear Mr. Secretary-General: I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the message which I read to you on the telephone at three o’clock this morning, June 25, 1950.

“Will you be good enough to bring the message to the immediate attention of the President of the United Nations Security Council.

“Faithfully yours,

“Ernest A. Gross (Deputy Representative of the United States to the United Nations)”

When this meeting took place at 2 p.m. that day, a report of the invasion sent in by the United Nations Commission in Korea was at hand.

“Government of Republic of Korea states that about 04:00 hours 25 June attacks were launched in strength by North Korean forces all along the 38th parallel. Major points of attack have included Ongjin Peninsula, Kaesong area and Chunchon, and east coast where seaborne landings have been reported north and south of Kangnung. Another seaborne landing reported imminent under air cover in Pohang area on southeast coast. . . .

“At 17:15 hrs. four Yak-type aircraft strafed civilian and military air fields outside Seoul, destroying planes, firing gas tanks and attacking jeeps. Yong-dung-po railroad station on outskirts also strafed.

“Commission wishes to draw attention of Secretary-General to serious situation developing which is assuming character of full-scale war and may endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. It suggests that he consider possibility of bringing matter to notice of Security Council. Commission will communicate more fully considered recommendation later. (The United Nations Commission to Korea to the Secretary-General.)”

By a vote of 9 to 0—with one abstention, and with the Soviet representative absent, as he had been since January 1950—the Security Council took action by resolution, as follows:

“The Security Council,

“Noting with grave concern the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea,

“Determines that this action constitutes a breach of the peace,

“I. Calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities, and

“Calls upon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel;

“II. Requests the United Nations Commission on Korea

“(a) To communicate its fully considered recommendations on the situation with the least possible delay;

“(b) To observe the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the thirty-eighth parallel; and
“(c) To keep the Security Council informed on the execution of this resolution;

III. Calls upon all members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities. (Resolution Adopted by the Security Council, June 25, 1950.)”

On the evening of the same day, as a result of a Blair House[32B] meeting of the President with representatives from the State and Defense Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff notified General MacArthur: “Assist in evacuating United States dependents and noncombatants (names to be furnished by the United States Ambassador in Korea). MacArthur authorized to take action by Air and Navy to prevent the Inchon-Kimpo-Seoul area from falling into unfriendly hands.”

General MacArthur was also told to furnish to the Korean Government additional military supplies under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, and to dispatch a military survey group to Korea to obtain first-hand information on the assistance required by the Republic of Korea to meet the Communist attack.

By 26 June it was apparent that the North Koreans had the capability of taking Seoul within a short time and that their advance might interfere with the completion of the evacuation task. Another conference of representatives of the State and Defense Departments was held at Blair House with the President presiding. Following this conference, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised General MacArthur: “. . . at the direction of the President, the Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE) is authorized to utilize Navy and Air Force elements of the Far East Command to attack all North Korean military targets (troop columns, guns, tanks) south of the 38th parallel in order to clear South Korea of North Korean military forces. . . . he is authorized to use naval forces of the Far East Command in the coastal waters and sea approaches of Korea without restriction. . . .”[33]

The following day, 27 June, the United Nations Security Council adopted a second resolution:

“The Security Council,

“Having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace,

“Having called for an immediate cessation of hostilities, and

“Having called upon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel, and

“Having noted from the report of the United Nations Commission for Korea that the authorities in North Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed forces to the 38th parallel and that urgent military measures are required to restore international peace and security, and

“Having noted the appeal from the Republic of Korea to the United Nations for immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security,

“Recommends that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.”[34]

On this same day, President Truman issued a statement:

“In Korea the Government forces, which were armed to prevent border raids and to preserve internal security, were attacked by invading forces from North Korea. The Security Council of the United Nations called upon the invading troops to cease hostilities and to withdraw to the 38th parallel. This they have not done but on the contrary have pressed the attack. The Security Council called upon all members of the United Nations to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution. In these circumstances I have ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support.

“The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war. It has defied the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations issued to preserve international peace and security. In these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the
Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area.

“Accordingly I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. . . .”

On 7 July, the United Nations Security Council adopted a third resolution:

“The Security Council, having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace, having recommended that members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area,

“(1) Welcomes the prompt and vigorous support which governments and peoples of the United Nations have given to its resolutions of 25 and 27 June 1950 to assist the Republic of Korea in defending itself against armed attack and thus to restore international peace and security in the area;

“(2) Notes that members of the United Nations have transmitted to the United Nations offers of assistance for the Republic of Korea;

“(3) Recommends that all members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States;

“(4) Requests the United States to designate the commander of such forces;

“(5) Authorizes the unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating.

“(6) Requests the United States to provide the Security Council with reports, as appropriate on the course of action taken under the unified command.”[35]

Seven countries voted for the resolution: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, Cuba, Ecuador and Norway.

Three countries abstained: Egypt, India and Yugoslavia.

One country was absent: the Soviet Union.
Chapter 2. Retreat to Pusan
Holding the Bridgehead

The war which neither the American people nor the United States Navy expected to fight—and, for that matter, the war which neither the Russians, Chinese Communists, nor the North Koreans expected us to fight—found the following ships of the United States Navy in the waters around Japan on 25 June 1950:

In Tokyo, the staff of Commander Naval Forces, Far East, Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, numbered 29 officers.

In an interview at Tokyo in October 1950, Admiral Joy said:

“My main peacetime mission had been largely one of promoting the recovery and rehabilitation of Japan. Operations involving the U.S. Navy were relatively minor. Instead, my staff supervised the mine clearance work and the Japanese merchant marine and shipbuilding program. My staff also supervised the naval stations at Yokosuka and Sasebo.

“The one cruiser, four destroyers, and six minesweepers assigned to me had a variety of peacetime tasks: patrolling the Tsushima Straits to prevent smuggling between Korea and Japan; periodic patrols around Hokkaido; the showing of our flag in the various Japanese ports; various training operations; and patrols along the Ryukyus to prevent smuggling by the Chinese pirates.

“When the word of the invasion of South Korea reached me, I felt that we should oppose the aggression, but I didn’t think we would. Consequently, when the United Nations took action, and American forces were ordered into Korea, I was quite surprised. This was the general impression among all of us in Japan.

“General MacArthur was likewise surprised, and commented that this action was a complete reversal of our Far East policy. He and I agreed that opposing the invasion was the correct action, but we were surprised that it happened. As a consequence, we had no plans for this type of war.

“At first, the Army estimated that Korea would be overrun within six weeks. Also, there was great concern lest the civil war in Korea prove to be merely the starting point for World War III.

“For this reason, I ordered the Seventh Fleet into Okinawa rather than Sasebo. Sasebo was too near Russian airbases.”

General MacArthur told the authors that the United States-United Nations decision to intervene in the Korean conflict was a surprise, and added: “The military policy of the United States as communicated to me up to that time was to avoid action on the Korean Peninsula—and I was not consulted with regard to the decision to intervene before it was taken.”

The units of the Seventh Fleet were divided among Sanglely Point, Subic Bay, and Hong Kong. Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble, the Seventh Fleet Commander, was in Washington, and Rear Admiral J. M. Hoskins, Commander Carrier Division Three, was acting.

Seventh Fleet (VADM A. D. Struble)
ComCarDiv 3 (RADM J. M. Hoskins)
1 CV: Valley Forge (CAPT L. K. Rice)
1 CA: Rochester (CAPT E. L. Woodyard)
8 DDs: Shelton (CDR C. B. Jackson, Jr.)
   Eversole (CDR C. E. Phillips)
   Fletcher (CDR W. M. Lowry)
The Fleet’s peacetime mission had largely been that of showing the flag around the Orient; in fact, the planes of Air Group Five had flown in parade over Inchon and Seoul on 5 April from the decks of the *Valley Forge*. A few days later they had appeared over Hong Kong.

“At the end of May, the Seventh Fleet had held large scale exercises between China and the Philippines,” said Admiral Struble later.[1] “These Fleet exercises had taken place during the turn-over period when a greater number of ships were present, and when Admiral Joy’s forces could be present. For the rest of the summer, I planned to have the Fleet pay a visit to Manila on 4 July, then a visit to Hong Kong, and a summer trip to Japan.

“In mid-June, I flew up to Manila to confer with the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Louis Johnson, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Bradley. We talked about many problems: the Huk problem in the Philippines, and the many probabilities of what might happen in other areas—Formosa, Indo-China, and Japan. Although Korea was in the Seventh Fleet area of responsibility, the subject of that country was not brought up.

“On 18 June I left Manila for Pearl Harbor and Washington for talks with Admiral Radford and Admiral Sherman, and to attend the wedding of my daughter.

“Therefore, I was in Washington on Sunday, 25 June, when the Korean War started. I raised the question of my departure time, and Sherman told me to wait until the next day after conclusion of the talks he was having with the President and other senior officials.

“I did so, and upon my departure Admiral Sherman assured me that U.S. forces would definitely be committed in Korea.”

The free world could consider itself fortunate that the Seventh Fleet and the NavFE (Naval Forces, Far East) ships were within fast cruising distance of Korea, and that they were well prepared and in a high state of readiness. The *Valley Forge*, with Air Group Five aboard, was the number one carrier and jet-trained air group of the Pacific Fleet. Cruisers *Rochester* and *Juneau* were likewise well trained. The ships of the Destroyer squadron and division were old hands in the Orient.

Two other circumstances proved fortunate as the war intensified. First, Amphibious Group One (RADM James H. Doyle, USN, aboard the *Mount McKinley*) was in the area conducting amphibious training exercises in Japanese waters. It was, perhaps, the most seasoned group of amphibious experts in the Pacific Fleet. Second, Mobile Training Team Able of the Troop Training Unit, Amphibious Force, Pacific (Officer in Charge Colonel Edward H. Forney, USMC) was engaged in indoctrinating the U.S. Eighth Army in Japan.

The presence of these naval ships, the amphibious group, and the Marine training team were of critical importance to the maintenance of a toehold in Korea. The first eighty-two days of the Korean War—from 25 June until the Inchon landing on 15 September 1950—were a retreat to a defensible perimeter and a desperate holding action. All military efforts—Army, Navy, Air Force—in these critical days were devoted to a single objective: maintaining a Korean bridgehead around the port of Pusan and preventing South Korean and American soldiers from being overrun, outflanked, cut off, captured, or eventually thrown into the sea.

With this perspective, the naval history of the early days of the Korean War can be divided into four principal efforts: the flights of the carrier aircraft of Task Forces 77 and 96 on close air support, armed reconnaissance, and interdiction missions; the naval gunfire support and bombardment efforts of the cruisers and destroyers along the east coast; the timely amphibious landing at Pohang, and the amphibious evacuation of the Third ROK division in July and August, respectively; and the timely arrival of the U.S. Marines.

None of these efforts can lay exclusive claim to the salvation of the peninsular toehold by the UN forces.
In combination, however, these several naval events powerfully contributed to holding the Pusan perimeter. Had these naval events not been successfully executed, Korea could certainly not have been held.
Initial Orders to an Assembling Fleet

On Sunday, 26 June, Washington time,[1A] in a teletype conference between the principal military figures in Tokyo and Washington, the following orders regarding U.S. naval forces were issued:

"... CINCFE is authorized to take such action by air and Navy to insure safe evacuation U.S. dependents and noncombatants. ... Seventh Fleet is ordered to proceed immediately to Sasebo and report to ComNavFE for operational control. ... While the foregoing decisions are geared to the protection of dependents and noncombatants, further high-level decisions may be expected as military and political situations develop. ..."

Simultaneously, in a despatch from the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, to Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, the order to ready other ships for duty in the western Pacific was issued:

"... In an orderly manner and as soon as practicable organize another task group plus appropriate support for the western Pacific. . . ."

At 0800, 27 June, Rear Admiral J. M. Hoskins sortied the Seventh Fleet from Subic Bay and Hong Kong, and headed for Sasebo. En route north in the vicinity of Formosa, Valley Forge planes (which had departed Hong Kong 24 June) flew through the Straits of Formosa and over the city of Taipei on 29 June. For the first few days of the Korean War, the sole task of the Seventh Fleet was the neutralization of Formosa in accordance with the Presidential order.

As the Seventh Fleet steamed northward at high speed, Vice Admiral C. T. Joy, Commander Naval Forces, Far East, ordered Hoskins to pull into Buckner Bay, Okinawa, rather than Sasebo, Japan. Here the Fleet would be close to Formosa, it would be close to Korea, and yet not too close to either Soviet or Chinese air bases. In the hectic initial days of the Korean War, no one knew whether or not the eruption was the first evidence of a local war or a global one. The news of the “incident” in Korea was only hours old when Secretary of State Dean Acheson alerted both diplomatic and military circles in Washington with the following despatch:

"Possible that Korea is only first of series of coordinated actions on part of Soviets. Maintain utmost vigilance and report immediately any positive or negative information. . . .”[2]

No orders to the Fleet had yet been received from General MacArthur’s headquarters, and no authority to attack north of parallel 38 had been issued from Washington. At this early stage, there was even some hope that the mere prospect of involvement of American airplanes and ships in accordance with the UN resolutions might cause the North Korean People’s Army to cease and desist.

Meanwhile, on 27 June, Vice Admiral Joy ordered Rear Admiral Higgins to take his flagship Juneau and the destroyer De Haven, and patrol the coastal waters south of the 38th parallel and oppose any hostile landings. De Haven and Mansfield had just completed the Navy’s first task, the evacuation of American nationals from Inchon and Pusan. Juneau and De Haven had also escorted the ammunition ship Sergeant Keathley from Tokyo to Pusan, while Collett and Mansfield were escorting the Cardinal O’Connell. Both the Keathley and the O’Connell were carrying badly needed ammunition and military supplies to Korea.

With so many tasks to perform, and so few ships with which to accomplish them, the receipt of a message from Admiral Sir Patrick Brind, RN (Commander in Chief, Far East Station, Hong Kong) on 28 June was most heartening and welcome to Admiral Joy:

“I shall be very glad to know of any operations in which my ships could help,” Brind radioed. “Present dispositions are Task Group 96.8 in South Japan under Rear Admiral Andrewes consisting of Triumph, Belfast,
Jamaica, two destroyers and three frigates. . . .”[2A]

The Australians and New Zealanders were equally prompt:

“Her majesty’s Australian ships in Japanese waters are placed unreservedly at your disposal as you wish.”

“Two New Zealand frigates will be ready to leave Auckland 3 July. Further ships later.”

Joy replied that these ships were needed very badly indeed. The carrier, cruiser, and two destroyers could join the American Striking Force, the other ships the escort and blockade force.

The naval preliminaries were thus completed. American nationals and noncombatants had been evacuated from Korea. Urgently needed military supplies requested by the South Koreans had been delivered. Fighting ships had assembled. The ships of the blockade force were joined by British and Australian ships. The Seventh Fleet in Okinawa’s Buckner Bay was joined by the British cruiser *Belfast* (flagship of Rear Admiral W. G. Andrewes, RN), carrier *Triumph*, and destroyers *Cossack* and *Consort*.

“Upon my arrival in Okinawa from my conference in Tokyo,” said Admiral Struble subsequently, “RADM Andrewes reported to me, saying that he was very anxious to have his ships join the first expedition into the Yellow Sea. Although the *Triumph* was slower than the *Valley Forge*, and there were other operating difficulties, these were successfully solved. I decided to include them in the Task Force 77 organization.”

And lastly, orders for the offensive employment of the assembling fleet north of the 38th parallel were received by General MacArthur from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington:

“The Seventh Fleet is assigned to your operational control. You are authorized to extend your military operation into North Korea against . . . purely military targets if and when in your judgment this becomes necessary.”[2B]
Upon his arrival in Tokyo on 29 June, Vice Admiral Struble immediately conferred with Admiral Joy and Generals MacArthur and Stratemeyer. Where could the striking power of the carrier Valley Forge best be utilized? After consultation and study, the military targets in the North Korean capital of Pyongyang were selected: principally, the airfield and aircraft upon them; secondly, the Pyongyang railroad yards and bridges, over which a major portion of the enemy’s munitions were being transported into South Korea.

Task Force 77 sortied on the evening of 1 July for the west coast of Korea with Pyongyang as its objective. As the combined British-American fleet steamed northward, the benefits of previous combined US-UK (United States-United Kingdom) training were noted by RADM Andrewes.[3]

“During the passage of Okinawa,” recorded the British Admiral, “United States tactical signals were brought into force on 30 June. A large proportion of our commanding officers and communication personnel had, of course, had previous experience of United States procedures during World War II, but the combined exercises with the United States Fleet in March 1950 proved of value. As a result of these exercises, we were already in possession of the United States books and many of us had had recent experience with their use. . . . It all seemed familiar, joining up in Formation Four Roger, as it was just what we had done so often during the exercises in March with very similar forces. We didn’t feel out of things. . . .”

Task Force 77 Tactical Organization

TF77 Striking Force[3A] (VADM A. D. Struble, USN)
TG77.1 Support Force (RADM W. G. Andrewes, RN)
HMS Belfast (CAPT Sir Aubrey St. Clair-Fox, Bt, RN, DSO)
USS Rochester
TG77.2 Screening Group (CAPT C. W. Parker, USN)
Shelton
Eversole
Fletcher
Radford
Maddox
S. N. Moore
Brush
Taussig
HMS Cossack
HMS Consort
TG77.4 Carrier Group (RADM J. M. Hoskins, USN)
Valley Forge (CAPT L. K. Rice, USN)
HMS Triumph (CAPT A. D. Torless, DSO)

As the task force steamed northward, a series of messages from Commander Naval Forces, Far East, was received:

“CINCFE authorizes you to continue strikes past the first day in view of the rapidly deteriorating Korean situation. Highest priority to be given to rail facilities in vicinity of Kumchon, Sariwon, and Sinanju. . . .”

In the pre-dawn of 3 July, commencing at 0545, the Triumph launched twelve Fireflies and nine rocket-
loaded Seafires for attacks upon hangars and installations at the Haeju airfield with railway traffic and bridges as secondary targets. The flight returned at 0815 without casualty except minor flak damage. 

*Valley Forge*’s attack group—sixteen F4U Corsairs from VF-54, led by Lieutenant Commander D. K. English, and twelve AD Skyraiders from VA-55, led by Lieutenant Commander N. D. Hodson—were off at 0600. The Corsairs were loaded with eight 5-inch rockets, the Skyraiders with two 500-pound bombs and six 100-pounders. Shortly thereafter, eight F9F2 Panthers were catapulted from *Valley Forge* led by air group commander Commander Harvey P. Lanham. Although the jets (being used in combat for the first time by the U.S. Navy) departed behind the propeller-driven strike group, they would overtake and climb above them, and arrive just ahead in order to catch North Korean planes on the ground. 

While the en route weather was poor, the weather over Pyongyang was good. The jet sweep’s first pass across the Pyongyang field accounted for three planes: Commander Lanham’s guns fired a transport plane on the ground, Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Leonard Plog and Ensign E. W. Brown, Jr., each destroyed an airborne YAK fighter.[4] The second pass accounted for two more aircraft on the ground—one by Lieutenant (junior grade) Donald L. Christianson, the other by the U.S. Air Force exchange officer, Major Edward F. Connor, USAF. 

Concurrently, while the jets were igniting the hangars, ammunition dumps, and revetments, the propeller strike group arrived overhead. The twelve ADs made a high-speed approach, and a final pushover from 7,000 feet, closely followed by the Corsairs. 

The pattern of the bombs and rockets was excellent, and little of the Pyongyang airfield’s installations escaped damage. One bomb was a direct hit on the field’s fuel storage farm; all three of the hangars were demolished; the runways were liberally cratered. 

The enemy antiaircraft fire was meager and inaccurate, and no hits on the naval aircraft were reported. The afternoon flights were similar, with the Pyongyang railyard and rail and road bridges across the Taedong River as primary targets. Rockets and bombs exploded in the roundhouse, the repair sheds, the station house, and the tracks; fifteen locomotives were destroyed, ten others damaged; many boxcars were bombed, strafed, and set afire. Although several bombs were close enough to qualify as “hits,” the bridge was left standing. 

However, Hodson’s VA-55 pilots destroyed a span on the 4 July Independence Day attacks, as well as destroying ten locomotives. Small ships in the nearby river (thought to be gunboats because of their return fire) were also attacked and put out of action. Four aircraft, all Skyraiders, were struck by antiaircraft fire during these attacks but all succeeded in returning safely to the “Happy Valley.” One of the damaged ADs, unable to reduce speed by lowering its flaps, made a high and fast approach, took a cut, landed wheels first and bounced over the protecting barriers into the planes parked forward. One AD and two F4Us were totally destroyed while three ADs, one F4U, and two F9Fs were damaged. 

The initial two days of carrier strikes on the airfields and rail facilities of North Korea’s capital city had been highly successful. The American-British fleet had worked together with the greatest harmony, and Struble congratulated Andrews’ ships. In addition to wrecking the city’s rail center, dropping a span of the key Pyongyang bridge, and demolishing the airfield and its installations, the Seventh Fleet aircraft had destroyed eleven enemy aircraft and had damaged one. 

In the month of July, as a matter of fact, *Valley Forge* pilots claimed thirty-eight aircraft destroyed and twenty-seven damaged, all except two on the ground. This performance was undoubtedly a major reason for the failure of the North Korean air force[4A] to play an important role in the subsequent fighting. 

As Rear Admiral E. C. Ewen recorded later:

“It is quite possible that the early appearance of the Panthers (the F9F-2 jet aircraft) over northern Korea on 3 July had a quieting effect on Russian and Chinese plans to provide North Korea with large numbers of obsolescent propeller-type aircraft.”
The Sea War in Korea, Ch 2, The Pyongyang Strikes (3-4 July 1950)
The Sea War in Korea
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson

Chapter 2. Retreat to Pusan
The Landing at Pohang

To appreciate the contribution and timeliness of the Pohang landing in holding the Pusan perimeter, a brief résumé of the ground fighting is needed. The map on page 40 illustrates the rapidity of the North Korean drive southward.

On 7 July, only seven hundred-odd men of the U.S. 24th Division were in action. These had been hastily flown from Japan to Korea. General MacArthur summarized the desperate situation thus:

“The immediate problem presented is that of blocking the advance of enemy ground and flanking units now advancing on every highway and trail in Korea from coast to coast. Our estimates continue that the North Koreans are employing a total force of nine divisions supported by attached armor. The morale of their forces is extremely high and is being spurred by a continuous advance southward. Nothing that we have been able to do currently has sufficed to take the edge from the victorious ardor of the North Koreans.”

On 10 July, the badly-outnumbered American and Korean troops in Korea took up defensive positions in front of Taejon, a city of 37,000 and an important communications center. Four enemy divisions, supported by heavy artillery and tanks, waded the Kum River on 14 July, attacked advanced elements of the U.S. 24th Division [5] (commanded by Major General William F. Dean), and drove toward Taejon from several directions.

The thin ranks of the 24th Division, committed piecemeal into action, were shredded by the heavy pressure. Each of the 24th’s three infantry regiments had only two battalions instead of the standard three, making the defense of so wide a front impossible. The 24th was also short of artillery, having only two instead of three batteries in each artillery battalion. And the few American tanks which were available were light ones, badly outnumbered, and no match for the Soviet T-34s. In addition, the American 2.36-inch bazookas proved ineffective against the Soviet tank armor.

The enemy, moreover, refused to attack in conventional patterns. His high state of training was demonstrated on the night of 16 July when a coordinated night attack struck the 24th. The attack was four-pronged—a strong frontal attack and an enveloping attack on each flank, plus infiltrating attacks from the rear. Large numbers of Red troops, disguised as refugees and with disassembled weapons hidden in innocent-looking bundles, passed through the UN lines, assembled in the rear areas, and began to harass the 24th Division from the rear.

With the ROK (Republic of Korea) forces all but collapsed, the salvation of Korea depended on getting the maximum number of American troops into action in the shortest possible time. However, getting troops from Japan to Korea was no easily-solved problem. Only limited amphibious lift was available, the main port of Pusan was already congested and confused, and the roads from Pusan to the front lines were horribly jammed by traffic and refugees, mostly southbound.

On 18 July, the prospects for holding the peninsula were ominously poor. Despite a series of brilliant rear-guard actions, the 24th Division could not hope to check the coordinated attacks of four enemy divisions in its front. Fortunately, the 25th Division was arriving, having been sea-lifted by a Military Sea Transportation Service shuttle from Kyushu to Pusan, and was getting into action. But even its hastily-arriving strength was insufficient.

The swollen, refugee-jammed dirt roads from Pusan to Taejon could accommodate no more troops or trucks. If Korea was to be saved, other reinforcements had to come by sea—and quickly.
In retrospect, it is clear that the unspectacular and unpublicized amphibious landing at Pohang-dong on 18 July did as much to preserve the perilous Korean toehold as any single event.
The Sea War in Korea
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson

Chapter 2. Retreat to Pusan
The Selection of Pohang

By good fortune, on the day the North Koreans smashed across the 38th parallel, Rear Admiral James H. Doyle, USN, was ordering his Amphibious Group One ships to get under way from Yokosuka, Japan, to conduct amphibious training exercises with the embarked troops of the 35th Regimental Combat Team (25th Infantry Division) on Chigasaki Beach, Sagami-Wan.

Thus, a program of amphibious familiarization for the Eighth Army troops had been begun in May. While the Army units were not thereby prepared or well trained, certain rudiments of the amphibious art had been transmitted. The brief training given to the Army units would be of later value in the several amphibious landings in the next six months of the Korean war: Pohang, Inchon, Wonsan, Iwon, and Hungnam.

More important, however, was the on-the-spot availability and know-how of Amphibious Group One’s amphibious shipping for rushing Army troops to Korea.

The selection of Pohang was one of simple expediency. In early July, Doyle and seven selected members of his staff had been ordered to Tokyo for consultation with Joy and MacArthur’s staffs in connection with the planning of an offensive amphibious operation with the First Cavalry Division. Following these conferences, MacArthur had directed that plans be made to land the division at Inchon, or, alternatively, at Kunsan on the west coast. Planning to do so went forward until 9 July. In the words of Doyle’s planning officer, CDR John V. Noel, Jr., USN: “The nine days between 4 July and 13 July were controlled pandemonium. The expression used at the time was that Inchon would be the ‘anvil’ upon which the First Cavalry Division would land, hammer, and destroy the North Koreans. These rosy dreams were quickly shattered by the rout of the South Koreans. . . .”

The rapid deterioration of the ground fighting in Korea made it apparent that another landing site, one on the east coast, had to be found for the defense of the Pusan perimeter. Doyle suggested Pohang as the most likely objective. This was accepted on 10 July.

The village of Pohang, 15,000 inhabitants, lay 70 miles north of Pusan. On 10 July it was still a safe distance from the advancing front, thanks in great measure to the sharp-shooting efforts of Rear Admiral Higgins’ cruiser and destroyer naval gunfire support. The city had a useable airfield, fair anchorages, and a thousand-yard strip of sandy beach which would facilitate an amphibious landing. Better still, a single track railroad ran westward into Taegu, whence northwesward to Taejon; this could rapidly transport the First Cavalry to the central front.

While Pohang looked ideal, much vital data was needed before a landing there could be sensibly planned. Accordingly, reconnaissance group flew into Pohang on 11 July. The party consisted of three men from Amphibious Group One staff (LCDR Jack Lowentrout, CAPT Vincent J. Robinson, USMC, and LTJG George Atcheson, III), plus members from Major General Hobart Gay’s First Cavalry Division staff. This reconnaissance party returned on 13 July with valuable information on the conditions of the proposed beaches, depths of water, unloading facilities, and general capabilities of the port.

The urgent need to deposit the First Cavalry Division in Korea at the earliest moment disclosed other problems. The first of these was the shortage of suitable amphibious assault shipping. Two former Military Sea Transportation Service ships, Oglethorpe (AKA-100, Captain Paul D. Heerbrandt) and Titania (AKA-13, Captain Frank D. Giambattista) were rushed into Yokosuka and fitted with hastily pre-fabricated boat skids. Other needed equipment, such as boat servicing gear, towing bridles, and boat and vehicle slings, was quickly manufactured.

In addition to getting the so-called AKAs ready, six LSUs were reactivated at Yokosuka. These six ex-
Japanese vessels, under the command of Doyle’s Chief of Staff, Captain Norman W. Sears, would perform the lion’s share of the unloading work at Pohang.

The final shortage was personnel; boat crews, hatch crews, and communication personnel were particularly short. This problem was solved by the Amphibious Base at Coronado, California, which rushed additional personnel westward by the first available air transportation.

The assault forces for Pohang were underway from the Tokyo-Yokosuka area on 15 July to the strains of an Army band playing “Anchors Aweigh.” As the Fleet sailed, no one was certain whether the fighting front would be north or south of Pohang upon their arrival. The troops might have to fight their way ashore, or they might be able to debark unopposed. Situation reports coming into the Mount McKinley told of a battle along the coastal road only seven miles north of Pohang. Could the Third ROK Division hold the town until the First Cavalry got there? One hopeful harbinger came from the ships of Mine Squadron Three (LCDR D. V. Shouldice) which had swept the approaches and harbor on 15-17 July. No mines were present.

With the departure of the ships, an advance party from the staffs of Admiral Doyle and General Hobart Gay, commanding the First Cavalry, flew to Pohang in order to furnish last-minute intelligence on the enemy situation and to make all possible preparations for the landing.

The naval forces arrived in Pohang’s harbor at 0500 on 18 July after dodging a capricious typhoon called “Grace.” All was well. The battleline was still north of Pohang.

Accordingly, at 0558, Doyle hoisted the signal, “Land The Landing Force,” and executed his alternate “No Opposition” landing plan. Ships anchored in the inner transport area, and began landing men and equipment at the docks in the inner harbor. “This was very fortunate,” said CDR Noel, “because the beaches we had planned to land on were not at all satisfactory.”

Troops and vehicles unloaded as rapidly as possible. As the first soldiers stepped ashore, they were heartily welcomed by Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, Commanding General, Eighth Army. Trains were standing by to rush them and their equipment to the front.

By midnight the same evening, 10,027 troops, 2,027 vehicles and 2,729 tons of bulk cargo had been unloaded. At noon the next day, General Gay had his command ashore and had assumed responsibility for them.

Less than forty-eight hours later, the first units of the First Cavalry Division had joined the landing force; and a week later, this Division was blunting the enemy’s drive down the Taegu-Pusan highway.

“I do not believe the perimeter could have been held without the timely reinforcement of our forces by the First Cavalry Division,” said VADM Joy.
By the early morning of the 18th, it was apparent that the amphibious landing at Pohang would be administrative (i.e., unopposed). Accordingly, shortly before H-hour, Admiral Doyle released the Seventh Fleet aircraft from their support role.

Admiral Struble ordered the Seventh Fleet northward into the Sea of Japan.

“While I was in Tokyo discussing the Pohang operation,” said Admiral Struble later,[6] “I had several long conferences with General Stratemeyer and his FEAF staff.

“It was understood that the Seventh Fleet would cover the Pohang landing. That was our job. Even though the Air Force had planes operating from northern Kyushu, it was recognized that they didn’t have the communications.

“During the course of our discussions, I told General Stratemeyer that after the landing I was going to take the Fleet and conduct air strikes north of the 38th parallel, striking targets of opportunity. If we found anything appropriate, we’d hit it. There was no objection and no mention made of what we should or shouldn’t hit.”

The Valley Forge, therefore, launched planes to strike targets in North Korea. A morning flight of seven Panthers, led by Commander A. D. Pollock, commanding officer of VF-51,[7] swept up the northeast coast past the harbor of Wonsan. Prominent along the curving shoreline on the south side of the city was an oil refinery which looked untouched and in operation.

At 1700, twenty-one planes from the Valley Forge were launched. The eleven AD Skyraiders, each carrying one 1,000-pound bomb, one 500-pound bomb, and two HVAR[7A] rockets were led by LCDR N. D. Hodson (Commanding Officer, VA-55). The ten F4U Corsairs, each carrying two rockets and full belts of 20-mm. ammunition, were led by LCDR W. R. Pittman (Commanding Officer, VF-53).

“The oil refinery,” recorded LCDR Pittman, “stood out like a sore thumb. It was a tremendous installation, and we all recognized it immediately. My Corsairs started firing their rockets in pairs from 4,000 feet, with LT Carl E. Smith’s team taking the southeast side and my four the northeast side. . . .

“Hodson followed us down and spaced his planes so as to cover the whole refinery. His squadron’s bomb pattern was excellent. . . .

“When the attack was finished, it was difficult to see the target or to distinguish portions of the plant that were not destroyed due to the tremendous clouds of belching smoke from the refinery. . . . There were constant explosions as the fires steadily spread to the unbombed areas. The entire coast appeared to be on fire.

“As we went back to the ‘Happy Valley,’ from an altitude of 3,000 feet we could still see the smoke of that attack 60 miles away. In fact, it was still burning the next day (Note: It actually burned for four days, and it gave all our pilots an excellent navigation aid.).”[8]

After the capture of Wonsan in October 1950, the president of the Wonsan Oil Refinery Factory, Mr. Cho Byung Kwi, his chief accountant, and four of his engineers were interviewed. The six North Koreans told how the refinery had been attacked by aircraft five times prior to the Valley Forge’s strike on the 18th of July. On these attacks, only three bombs had fallen inside the refinery in a storage area. The remainder had dropped without damage in nearby fields. No bombs had hit any vital area, and production had not been affected.

Regarding the naval air strike of July 18th, however, the group told how this attack had started fires which covered the entire area, both factory and storage. Direct hits and near misses saturated every vital area. The
refinery engineers stated that further operation of the plant after July 18th was impossible, that it was turned into a mass of twisted steel and rubble. Twelve thousand tons of refined products had gone up in smoke. Not one building was fit for occupancy. Streets throughout the plant were running six inches to two feet deep in oil following the attack; many roads were impassable because of rubble. The main power plant, the water tanks, the storage building, the cracking plants, the boilers, air compressors, and coke furnaces were virtually all destroyed.

In retrospect, the attack on the Chosin oil refinery (the biggest in Korea, having an estimated annual production of 1,700,000 barrels) was a target for “strategic warfare,” according to the roles and missions which had been given the Armed Services in 1948 by the Key West Agreement.[8A]

However, in the tension and confusion of the Korean fighting, when American lives were at stake and everything possible was being done to halt and hurt the Communists, the academic question of who was supposed to do what received scant consideration. On many occasions during the war, in fact, the Navy was asked to perform tasks which, according to the Key West Agreement, were not among its primary responsibilities. General MacArthur’s request that the Navy strike the Yalu River bridges (November 1950), the request that the Navy assume the responsibility for the interdiction of northeast Korea (January 1951), the several emergency requests for “close air support” by Task Force 77 (July-August 1950), the destruction of the Yalu River hydroelectric plants (23-24 June 1952), and the Aoji oil refinery strike (1 September 1952) are cases in point.

The destruction of the Wonsan Oil Refinery was the first instance which illustrated the inherent flexibility displayed by the Navy during the Korean War.
On 23 July 1950, as the heavily-outnumbered UN forces were pushed slowly and steadily backward toward Pusan by the savage and cunning attacks of the Communists, an urgent plea for close support help from the carriers was received.

Eighth Army’s dispatch, tagged with that awful precedence prefix “emergency,” was multiple-addressed to every major commander in the Far East theater: MacArthur, Joy, Struble, and Stratemeyer.

“Request information as to possible naval air employment in close and general support role in Korea... urgent requirement exists west coast Korea commencing 23 July...”[9]

This sudden request for naval air assistance commenced a two-month period of participation by Task Force 77 in a “close air support” effort which, until the Inchon landing, would occupy the major portion of the aircraft carriers’ time and energy.

This period would also highlight a fundamental difference of opinion and disparity in doctrine regarding close air support between the Navy and Marines on the one hand, and the Air Force and Army on the other.

But most important, the air support rendered by the Task Force 77 carriers would prove a major factor in the salvation of the Pusan perimeter.

Before commencing the narrative of this effort in behalf of the Pusan perimeter, however, it is first necessary to define and describe “close air support,” for this term had a different meaning for each of the main parties in Korea.

In the military lexicon, “close air support” is defined as “air action against hostile surface targets which are so close to friendly targets as to require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.”[10]

In laymen’s language, close air support is simply the use of the armament of an airplane in behalf of, and near to, the soldier on the ground.

Simple definitions notwithstanding, the concepts and technique of providing close air support can be exceedingly complex and difficult, as will be seen. The close air support system developed and perfected by the Navy and Marines (the system least used in Korea) was substantially different from the system developed by the Air Force and the Army (the system most used in Korea).

To achieve a better understanding of how close air support influenced the course of the Korean war, and particularly the outcome of the battle to save Pusan, it is helpful to know how, why, and under what conditions the two differing systems were developed.
The seed of close air support, as practiced by the Navy and Marine Corps, was planted in the 1920’s during Marine Corps action in Nicaragua, Haiti, and Santo Domingo. In these Caribbean countries, airplanes and infantry functioned as a team for the first time in military history.

As an outgrowth of these primitive efforts, serious consideration was first given by Marine and naval planners in the mid-thirties for using the airplane in conjunction with the then-developing art of amphibious warfare to strengthen a weak link in the amphibious assault chain. At the vital moment when the first wave of Marines was charging across a hostile beach, naval gunfire had ceased and artillery was not yet ashore. Could not the firepower of the airplane strengthen this critical period when an amphibious assault was at its most delicate stage? Might not the guns and bombs of the airplane take the place of artillery during the initial landing?

This simple need—to contribute to the success of an amphibious assault—was the genesis of the Navy-Marine system of close air support.

The actual Navy-Marine system of close air support was perfected during World War II. In the early days of the Pacific campaign, it was recognized that properly controlled air attacks would be a major asset, even a necessity, in the successful prosecution of an amphibious advance across the Pacific. Navy and Marine officials believed that airplanes could be a valuable “supporting weapon” to help ground troops advance against the Japanese.

The Navy-Marine doctrine of close air support had its battle test during the Tarawa campaign in November 1943. For the first time in combat, front-line units were accompanied by air-liaison parties whose main duty was to assist unit ground commanders in selecting suitable targets and in transmitting this target information and instructions for attack to the airplanes overhead. At Tarawa, also, liaison aircraft were flown by senior experienced aviators who were conversant with the ground plan, and who were in radio contact with the close air support airplanes.

Following Tarawa, the Navy-Marine system was further improved under fire at Iwo Jima. The final innovation, however—the direction of attack aircraft by frontline ground units—was not extensively used until the Battle of Okinawa, at which time sufficient portable radio communication equipment made air-ground communications reliable.

Thus, by the end of World War II, the Navy-Marine system of close air support had been fully developed and battle-tested. The Navy-Marine system had proved itself time and time again—at Guam, in the Philippines, at Iwo Jima, and especially in Okinawa. Naval and Marine aircraft, under the control of foot soldiers, had learned to quickly and effectively deliver their bullets and bombs upon “close” targets (50 to 200 yards distant) directed by trained parties in the front lines.

This system was available and ready for use at the outbreak of the Korean war.
Chapter 2. Retreat to Pusan
Air Force Close Air Support

The system of close air support developed by the Army-Air Force and used in Korea was engendered against a different background and under a different set of conditions.

Before the European war began, the Army Air Corps, struggling even then for independence, was reluctant to embrace any concept which would tie them closer to the parent organization. The suggestion that their airplanes be used to supplement or increase the firepower of ground arms, or to support ground forces, was, if not anathema, very unpopular. Even the word “support” was displeasing since it had a subservient connotation. “Coordination” was a much preferred word since it implied equality.

Furthermore, the airmen strongly felt that any organization or employment wherein foot-soldiers exercised command over airplanes was “an attempt to shackle the air to the ground, and therefore, a failure to realize the full capabilities of air attack.”[11]

In the mid-1930’s, therefore, “close air support” in any size, shape, or form was an unpalatable concept to the embryonic Army Air Corps.

As the European war unfolded, the Army Air Corps watched Hitler’s armies stab across Poland and speed across the Lowlands and France, spearheaded by the famed dive-bombing Stukas of the German Luftwaffe. Here, airplanes were coordinated with tanks and infantry under the Luftwaffe doctrine of allowing planes to be placed under the operational control of ground commanders.

Studying the German technique, U.S. Air Force planners quite accurately saw a serious fault. The Luftwaffe was tied too closely to the ground forces as a supporting weapon. As a consequence, the Luftwaffe’s ground support aircraft had not been designed to live in the air, as well as to assist the ground fighting. To avoid this fatal error, the U.S. Air Force—and Britain’s Royal Air Force as well—concluded that tactical airplanes must not be given to ground forces. Instead, tactical air power should be centrally controlled and applied en masse for the over-all objective of gaining control of the air. Only after the air had been swept clear of the enemy’s planes and “interdiction of the battlefield” commenced, should tactical air be permitted to perform the secondary role of close air support.[12]

As for the mechanics of providing close air support, the Air Force system depended on airborne controllers. A light liaison-type plane would circle the frontlines area to spot enemy targets and to direct the bombs and gunfire of other planes upon them.

Two other factors were present in World War II which had their effect upon the differing systems of close air support that were developed.

The first of these was the differences in geography and terrain. The war in Europe was fought across a continent where rapid movement was common and, except in Italy, where battlelines were fluid. In contrast, the Pacific war was fought across an ocean, from one island group to another. The terrain of these islands was rugged and limited and made large movements of ground forces unnecessary.

The second influence which contributed to two different systems was the difference in the enemy. In the European war, the enemy was the German soldier, fighting a Western-style war. In the Pacific, however, a fatalistic, even suicidal enemy had to be blasted from his defending positions, foxhole by foxhole, cave by cave, and from one line of resistance to the next line of resistance. Such a war demanded “close” air support at its best.

When the Korean War began, the Air Force system of close air support was not immediately ready, for two reasons. The first and fundamental reason was that an earlier high-level decision reached in Washington
(discussed in Chapter I, “Gathering War Clouds”) had given far greater importance and priority to Strategic Air than to Tactical Air. The second reason was the fact that the mission to train for close air support types of operations was not included in either Far Eastern Air Force or Eighth Army missions. The Fifth Air Force in Japan had as its primary mission the air defense of Japan, while the Eighth Army’s primary responsibility was the ground defense of Japan.

For these reasons, prior to the start of the Korean War, there had been no effort made in Japan to erect a tactical air control system, to train ground liaison officers, to stockpile equipment, or to conduct training operations in which air-ground operations were stressed or employed.

One of the early naval missions, in fact, was a special trip by the USS Boxer to Japan on 23 July to bring 145 F-51 prop-type aircraft for the Far Eastern Air Force. Boxer made the transpacific run in eight days and seven hours.

Thus, the start of the Korean War saw two different systems of close air support in being.

The Air Force system had largely been developed in the European theater. There, the exercise of command over aircraft was not given to frontline units; employment of aircraft was jointly coordinated at the Army level by two officers—one air, one ground. Strike planes did not orbit the battlefront, but were assigned to a particular mission as approved by the joint operations center (JOC). Upon arrival at the scene of conflict, planes would be directed and controlled by airborne, liaison-type aircraft, not by ground parties. Close air support targets were considered to be those within the immediate battle zone, as much as ten miles away.

At the time of the outbreak of the Korean war, this system was not immediately ready.

The Navy-Marine system, on the other hand, had largely been developed in the Pacific war as an indivisible part of an amphibious assault. A certain number of aircraft were committed for use and control by the ground commander, who could use their services as and where he saw fit. A few planes constantly orbited the battlefield, ready to strike “close air support” targets that were within 50 to 200 yards of the immediate front lines. The pilots received guidance and information for their attacks from a trained crew directly in the front lines.

At the outbreak of the Korean war, this system was ready. [13]
Chapter 2. Retreat to Pusan
Eighth Army Endangered

The shrinking perimeter around Pusan was threatened with encirclement and collapse in late July as the first elements of the Sixth North Korean Division swept into Mokpo, the South Korean naval base at the southwestern tip of the Korean peninsula. Travelling mostly at night, enemy troops had rapidly infiltrated south. So skillfully was this flanking movement conducted that Republic of Korea police reported the movement merely as a movement of guerrilla forces. On 24 July, U.S. naval air reconnaissance reported large movements of unidentified troops to southwest Korea.

The Eighth Army now realized that regular North Korean army units were involved and that it was in danger of encirclement and isolation. Between the enemy and Pusan, a scant 150 miles, there were few United Nations ground forces to stop the encirclement.

It was this situation which compelled General Walker to query Tokyo about close air support from the Seventh Fleet.

"The first word of the encirclement reached me at my desk . . .,” reported Rear Admiral A. K. Morehouse, Chief of Staff to Admiral Joy. “The call came from Brigadier General Jarred V. Crabbé of the Air Force. He told me that the ground situation was desperate, and that the Navy’s help was needed at once . . . . It was obvious we had to help, even though I had a lot of personal misgivings. In the first place, I knew there were too few trained ground control parties available at the front. Air-ground communications were bound to be crowded. Numerous details essential to a job like that just had to be forgotten—things like arrangements for marking our front lines, and using the same maps with identical co-ordinates. But our forces were in such a desperately bad way that naval air had to come to their rescue the best way they could.”[14]

Admiral Struble answered the Eighth Army’s emergency message for help in fifty-one minutes flat. The Seventh Fleet commander replied that his naval aircraft, as soon as refueling and replenishment of ammunition was completed, would be available. However, Struble cautioned that the successful use of the carrier planes for close air support missions was predicated on the establishment of “satisfactory communications and control.” As a minimum requirement for any successful air-ground support, Struble suggested that either Commander Amphibious Group One’s Tactical Control Squadron be despatched to Korea immediately with their equipment, [14A] or that a small seven-man party from the Fleet experienced in ground control operations be sent ashore.

Admiral Joy, in answering the EUSAK (Eighth U.S. Army in Korea) emergency despatch, sounded the same note:

“In the coordination of naval air with the Fifth Air Force, no great difficulty is anticipated. However, coordination, which has been delegated to CG, Far-east Air Force, depends absolutely on successful joint communications . . . .”[15]

Joy also despatched Struble that the dangerous and desperate situation on the ground in Korea demanded that the fast carriers participate at the earliest possible time:

“‘. . . The calculated risk of damage to friendly forces must be accepted,’ he told Struble. ‘The ground situation is so critical that commencement of operations on 25th is highly desirable . . . .’”

At midnight 24 July, the Seventh Fleet weighed anchor and headed for the east coast of Korea to participate in the first close air support strikes of the Korean War.

Planes from the Valley Forge were launched at 0800 the next morning, with orders to report to the U.S. Fifth Air Force’s advanced headquarters, Joint Operation Center (JOC), Taegu.[15A] The British carrier Triumph
supplied the majority of the combat air patrol in order that every available Valley Forge plane could be sent over the battle zone. In twenty minutes the naval planes were over the frontlines.

The pilots, having been briefed that the Eighth Army was in desperate straits and in sore need of every bullet and bomb which could be delivered to their defense, circled the JOC, trying to report their presence.

However, the too-few communication channels were jammed, and the too-few “Mosquito” plane controllers were overloaded. Proper maps were lacking, and circuit discipline was non-existent. In some instances, while Skyraiders and Corsairs circled the frontlines trying to establish communications with the liaison aircraft, F-80 jets from Japanese bases, some carrying two rockets, others only machine gun ammunition, were called in for strikes. After varying periods of trying to contact the “Mosquito” controllers, the naval pilots flew westward searching the roads and trails for military targets of opportunity. Some aircraft found targets; others did not; a few pilots jettisoned their loads in the sea before returning to the carrier.

Struble’s early afternoon despatch reported this first close air effort:

“The results of the morning sweeps and strikes were very minor due to a dearth of targets. No rolling stock seen, only a few donkey carts plus men in rice paddies. On the whole, the area is one of peaceful agriculture. Seven trucks strafed did not burn. Four trucks strafed and burned. Will continue afternoon strikes, but under above conditions, the prospects appear poor. Consider it mandatory that proper communications be arranged. . . .”

The Valley Forge planes flew close support on the 26th of July, again with limited success. Few of their heavy loads could be delivered, and none of it in the Naval-Marine technique of close air support. However, several flights found enemy targets. Pittman, leading ten VF-53 F4Us, got five trucks; Hodson, leading six VA-55 ADs, got two more; Barker, leading seven VF-53 F4Us, got two more; Ramsey, leading four VA-55 ADs, got another, damaged a railroad bridge, and fired a village concealing troops.

Because of deteriorating weather conditions, the Fleet moved during the evening of the 26th to the west coast of Korea, refueling en route.

Admiral Joy summarized the initial efforts in a despatch to Admiral Sherman:

“Even though MacArthur and Walker express enthusiasm over the effect of carrier air assigned to close and general support missions, the results were disappointing. . . . Investigation of Army and Air Force tactical air in Korea indicates need for reorganization and training before minimum Navy standards can be attained. Air Force appears receptive to Navy’s suggestions, but training will take time. The critical situation continues at front and overrides any consideration of whether the missions given our naval forces are optimum. In view of the situation, we must do everything within our capabilities. . . .”

In Tokyo, meanwhile, an effort was made to alleviate the air-ground communication problem. Admiral Joy had attached to his command part of an ANGLICO Company, OinC LT E. B. Williams, a unit specifically trained in the control of both naval gunfire and naval aircraft on shore targets. If Army-Air Force personnel could be provided and radio equipment assembled, this ANGLICO might quickly train frontline teams for controlling the attacks of the Air Force and naval aircraft. Joy sent the following proposal to the headquarters of MacArthur and Stratemeyer:

“. . . Suggest the most profitable use of the ANGLICO detachment is to conduct training in the Tokyo area, preferably at Johnson Air Force Base. Admiral Doyle will assume responsibility for the training. In three days time, the ANGLICO can train six tactical air control parties, each party consisting of one officer and five enlisted, including one technician. Please advise me if this training is desired. I am ready to begin now . . . .”

The Fleet, meanwhile, was also considering remedies. Successful close air support hinged on air-ground communications. Without a good link between ground and air, the full power of the naval aircraft could not be exploited.

First, Admiral Hoskins called a three-way huddle: his own staff, the Valley Forge, and the Britishers
from HMS Triumph. What could be done? Well, the Royal Navy officers replied, they had a radio jeep, and one army major and one captain trained in the close support control of airplanes; could they be used?

They certainly could. Valley Forge offered to supply the technicians and other personnel to form a complete tactical air control party. Even one more experienced ground control party in Korea would be a big help.

Admirable as was the intent of this suggestion, it never came to pass. On the 29th of July the Valley Forge returned to the battleline, the British carrier was detached from the American task force to join the British task group and never returned.

The second thing Hoskins thought of to increase the Navy’s contribution to holding the Pusan perimeter was to send a personal representative to the Joint Operation Center, Korea. He discussed the problem with Vice Admiral Struble on the TBS radio. The task force commander authorized Hoskins to send a representative to JOC, Korea. On 27 July, therefore, LCDR C. H. Gates of CAG-5 was catapulted off Valley Forge.

Gates’ visit to the JOC proved valuable. He arranged for the establishment of a direct communication channel between the JOC and the Fleet. He briefed the JOC personnel on the capabilities and limitations of a carrier and its airplanes. He explained the disparity in maps.

The naval aviators were using World Aeronautical Charts (WAC), whereas the Air Force pilots were using coded and gridded charts.[16A] To give directions to naval pilots meant that the Air Force controller flying in his Mosquito airplane would have to locate the target on his gridded chart, convert the target’s co-ordinates to latitude and longitude, and pass these to the naval pilot. This laborious conversion, while adding to the already-strained communication channels, had to be accepted. Gates also arranged an armament loading code, and was able to induce the JOC to divide the burden of control among the controllers and to reduce the orbit time of the naval airplanes.[17]

Gates also brought back to the Fleet the first accurate description of the desperate ground situation.

The next effort to improve the Fleet’s close air support contributions took place on 3 August while ships replenished at Sasebo. At a conference in Tokyo between FEAF and COMNAVFE officers (VADM Struble, the Fleet Commander, was not present, then being in Formosa with General MacArthur), a memorandum of agreement was prepared which made close support the first priority task for the Seventh Fleet carriers “under direct control of the Fifth Air Force.”[17A] (However, close air support was provided only upon request of FAFIK (Fifth Air Force in Korea) and after approval by COMNAVFE; at other times, the carriers were free to operate in other areas of Korea.) Second priority targets were interdiction targets south of the 38th parallel; and third priority targets were the B-29 targets. This memorandum allowed little leeway for the avoidance of bad weather. This informal memorandum, which Struble had not concurred in, was later abrogated in part by Admiral Joy on 24 August.

Philippine Sea (CAPT W. K. Goodney) arrived on the first of August.[17B] At long last, the “Happy Valley” had a teammate. On the 5th, the two carriers headed for Korean waters to perform close support over the front lines. Once again an attempt was made by the Navy to reduce the control and communications bottleneck. Liaison pilots from both Valley Forge and Philippine Sea were despatched ashore to Taegu to perform the dual role of liaison and to control the attacks of naval planes. The plan was for one pilot to return to the Fleet daily so that he could present the existing ground and intelligence picture. The other planes would supplement the too-few Mosquito aircraft. Five such liaison planes were sent in on the 5th and 6th, six planes on the 7th, and one plane on the 8th.

As a result of these visits, the frontlines were divided into four sectors, each one having an airborne Air Force controller, plus a naval aircraft controller. The naval planes were supposed to control only naval strikes—but it became quickly apparent that the naval planes would have to control anything and everything that came into their area.

This temporary expedient helped to reduce the confusion and resulted in diminishment of the
communication snafus. Controlled by the Mosquitos, LCDR Hodson, CO, VA-55, led 5 ADs from Valley Forge to attack and kill many enemy troops near Korysong; the next day, Hodson did a repeat, bombing, rocketing, and napalming more troops and destroying a supply dump. LTJG Billy Glen Jackson, leading four Valley Forge Skyraiders, destroyed two trucks, one jeep, and one tank in an attack near Kumchon.

Notwithstanding these successes, close air support was still not what it might have been. Many of the naval aircraft assigned for close support could not be directed and were diverted to armed reconnaissance missions along the roads approaching the battlefront. Lightly-loaded flights of F-80 Shooting Star jets from their Japanese bases arrived over the battle zone, and because of their short endurance, had to be used immediately. As they were sent in by the Air Force Mosquitos to make attacks, the naval aircraft were often ordered to “stand by” or to “stand clear.” To the naval pilots circling with their heavy loads, it was disappointing to be told to wait while a succession of lightly-loaded jets, some with only five minutes to spend over the target, were called in for strikes.

Moreover, in the minds of the naval pilots, the circuit discipline of some of the Air Force aviators was poor. There were many long-winded discussions between them and the Mosquito pilots about the targets, their location, the terrain, the mission, the weather, and the ordnance—and the results. In a few isolated occasions, as naval aircraft orbited, F-51 aircraft from other areas were ordered to strike the same sectors that naval aircraft had been circling.

The ground situation worsened during the 7th and 8th of August. General MacArthur, fearful lest the Eighth Army be overwhelmed, directed that during the period 8-17 August all of the air effort, including that from the carriers of Task Force 77, be devoted to close air support and interdiction. Valley Forge and Philippine Sea were directed to stagger their withdrawals for resupply in order to maintain continuous pressure on the frontlines.

“Immediately after my trip to Formosa with General MacArthur,” said Vice Admiral Struble, “I commenced Seventh Fleet operations on as intensive a schedule as possible, in order to apply a steady and unremitting pressure upon the North Korean ground forces. I ordered the support force of the Seventh Fleet to transfer its base of operations from Okinawa to Sasebo in order to increase the amount of time that the carriers could spend on the line.”

Reports from leaders of the carrier strikes indicated considerable results:

“10 Aug: LT S. Dalzell, Jr., leading two F4Us and two ADs from Philippine Sea: ‘Incendiary and GP bombs were used against barracks—results good, although attacks were not controlled.’

“16 Aug: LT M.D. Gallagher, leading 5 ADs from Valley Forge: ‘Destroyed 8 trucks, one jeep. Damaged 3 trucks, one village. Mosquito controller appeared inexperienced. We assisted in spotting targets and frontlines.’

“16 Aug: LCDR L. W. Chick, leading 8 ADs and 8 F4Us from Philippine Sea: ‘Enemy troops were hit in 9 villages by bombs and strafing, and in 3 orchards by rockets and strafing. 2 trucks strafed.’

“16 Aug: LT C. E. Smith, leading 4 F4Us from Valley Forge: ‘Burned supply and gasoline dump and 4 villages near Taegu.’

“19 Aug: LCDR E. T. Deacon, leading 10 F4Us and 8 ADs from Philippine Sea: ‘The Mosquito controller was contacted on the assigned channel, and although all channels were very crowded, it was possible to maintain good contact . . . troop concentrations and supply dumps east of Hypochan were bombed with depth bombs and frags. Large fires resulted in five separate areas. The burned area was between Hypochan and the frontlines along the Naktong river. When these concentration areas were set on fire, personnel ran out into the fields where they were strafed. Two trucks were blown up and three others possibly destroyed. Approximately 30 troops were killed and a like number were probably wounded by the frags and 20-mm. shells. Two command cars were caught driving into a warehouse to hide. The warehouse was set on fire and the vehicles destroyed.”

“As the Fleet retired to Sasebo following this considerable series of operations,” said VADM Struble, “a
temporary lull in the ground fighting had been reached. It was at this time that I was informed that I was to command the Inchon invasion. I immediately assembled a few staff officers and departed for Tokyo in order to commence the top command planning for Inchon.”

Commenting on the close air support, Rear Admiral E. C. Ewen, who had taken command of Task Force 77, evaluated the carriers’ efforts:

“A continuation of the present method of providing close air support,” he recorded, “is both wasteful and ineffective. It is my opinion that less than 30 percent of this Fleet’s potential close air support air power has been used in ‘Taegu-type’ close air support operations.”[19]

Admiral Hoskins commented that better results would have been obtained if the Fleet had only been asked to provide four to eight planes on station continually over the battleline instead of a “maximum all-out effort.”

The simple fact was that there were too few trained control parties on the ground, too few “Mosquito” planes in the air, and too little equipment to handle the numbers of aircraft over the battleline.

While it was irritating to some and regretful to all that the full striking power and the precision skill of the naval planes in the close air support mission could not be delivered in behalf of the Pusan perimeter, the contributions of the carriers were nonetheless substantial.

A close air support flight flown by Valley Forge aircraft on 10 August will illustrate the frequent daily accomplishments made during this period. By comparing this strike with a Marine strike on page 64, the reader will note the differences of the two close air support systems in actual practice.

Four F4Us from Valley Forge (VF-53), led by Lieutenant Clarence E. Smith, reported to the JOC at Taegu and were ordered to contact the U.S. Air Force liaison airplane “Mosquito Wildwest 7,” airborne over Chinju.

Smith did so and reported his loading: four aircraft, each with one 500-lb VT-fuzed bomb, eight 5-inch rockets, and full machine gun ammunition.

“Mosquito Wildwest 7” directed the naval fliers to destroy a small bridge west of the village. The pilots circled the bridge, noted the wind, and climbed for altitude. The dive-bombing was precise: two direct hits, two near misses from four bombs. The bridge was demolished.

“Mosquito Wildwest 7” then directed that the planes follow the road northward. About a mile from the city of Chinju, he said, troops and vehicles were reported. The pilots were ordered to find and destroy them if they could.

At flat-hat level, the four Corsair pilots combed the road. A mile or so away, hidden in the trees, a wooden house was discovered, with vehicles concealed nearby, and an oil dump. These were destroyed with rocket and machine gun fire.

Such damage by a single flight of four planes, multiplied hundreds of times, had heavy attrition effect upon the fighting. But to the naval pilots it was armed reconnaissance or “deep support,” not “close air support.”

The hard, bloody, and bitter ground fighting to hold the Pusan perimeter had already produced two emergency requests for all-out close air support assistance from the carriers. These requests from Fifth Air Force headquarters in Pusan had been transmitted directly to the Seventh Fleet, bypassing the COMNAVFE headquarters in Tokyo.

On 19 August, to allay any possible misunderstanding regarding the employment of Task Force 77’s services in support of the Fifth Air Force mission to furnish close air support, Admiral Joy sent a despatch to General MacArthur, with copies to Generals Walker, Stratemeyer, and Partridge (CG 5th Air Force Korea):

“All requests regarding employment or modification of schedules involving naval forces should be addressed to either CINCFE or COMNAVFE X CINCFE indicates the general type, time, and area where naval air effort is desired X His decision may be influenced from recommendations or requests from other activities X
COMNAVFE implements CINCFE’s desires, or if not expressed, determines the what, when, and where instructions. . . .”[20]

In late August also, Joy sent the following message to General MacArthur in an effort to have the primary mission of the carriers changed to strikes on lucrative enemy targets in North Korea:

“. . . North Korea contains a multiplicity of very lucrative and profitable targets which are well suited to carrier strikes, whereas, in the south, targets are few and well hidden. After 25 August I strongly recommend that Task Force 77 be employed north of the 38th parallel. . . .”[21]

On the 25th, however, in a direct “flash” message to the Seventh Fleet, the Fifth Air Force again requested further Navy close air support strikes. The Communists were preparing to launch an all-out attack across the Naktong River, and “close air support” was the most urgent role the carriers could perform.[21A]

At 1101 on 31 August, still another emergency call came from JOC Pusan: “. . . all available effort for close support.” The North Korean Army’s full-scale and long-awaited attack upon the Naktong defense line had commenced, and the situation was described as “critical.”

Upon receiving this despatch, Ewen recalled his airborne planes (then attacking targets in the Seoul-Inchon area), and turned the task force southeast at high speed. Planes on deck were hastily respotted and armed for a close air support strike.

The on-rushing Fleet flashed a message to JOC at Pusan:

“The Fleet’s close air support strikes will start at 1430. First strike will be 12 Skyraiders each with three 1000-pound bombs. Also, 16 Corsairs, each with one 1000-pound bomb plus four rockets and full cannon ammo. Second similar flight follows at 1530. More coming.”[22]

The first close air support launch from Valley Forge and Philippine Sea left the decks at 1315 on 1 September.

The following excerpts are taken from action reports of the Valley Forge and the Philippine Sea for that afternoon:

“Valley Forge: . . . At 1315, fourteen planes flew across Korea on close support missions. Armed to the teeth with 1000-pound bombs, contact-fuzed, they were told to orbit by the controller as he had no targets for such bombs. During the 45 minutes in which they orbited, the controller called in a flight of F-51s to strafe and rocket an enemy troop concentration. . . . The Corsairs were finally directed to bomb five villages near Kaepyodong which they destroyed. They also damaged a supply dump by strafing. . . .

“. . . The six ADs were directed to hit three villages . . . which they destroyed. . . . These villages were reported to be military concentrations. Nearby, three trucks were also burned. . . .

“. . . At 1430, eleven more planes went into the battle area for close support. The six F4Us completely destroyed one third of Haman after TAC (the Mosquito controller) had directed them to do it. They were told that the town was loaded with troops. On the road running west from town they burned eight trucks and damaged twelve more. . . .

“. . . The five ADs were directed to bomb a ridge just west of Haman where their fourteen 1000-pound bombs leveled the entire ridge. . . . At Chugam-Ni, they destroyed three buildings supposed to contain vehicles with 100-pound bombs. . . .

“. . . Eight jets were launched at 1615 for close support. Due to the number of planes over the area, they could not raise any controller. Four planes circled the two TAC (Mosquito) aircraft but still could not raise one of them due to cluttered circuits. These same four planes exploded one locomotive and damaged another. Vehicles with white stars on the top were seen. . . .

“. . . At 1745, a final launch of eight jets went in on close support. The controller was too busy to control the flight so they split into two four-plane divisions. The first division damaged about ten small boats which were on the east bank of the Naktong River. . . The other division, an artillery emplacement. . . .”[23]
The Philippine Sea’s action report for that same afternoon commences:

“This was to be a hectic day. . . .

“. . . The event at 1312 sent out a four-plane CAP plus a standard offensive strike group (8 F4Us and 6 ADs) whose mission was close support. The launch was made 200 miles from our frontlines. The group proceeded in to the bombline but was unable to get an air controller to work them. They did receive orders to make one attack on a tank concentration located well to the east of the bombline. Fortunately the flight leader from VF-113 (LT Donald G. Patterson) made a low pass first to identify the target which turned out to be U.S. equipment. The group had to find their own targets. Troop concentrations were attacked . . . a bridge was bombed and one span knocked out . . . The last attack was on twelve rafts south of the bridge which were strafed . . . three were sunk. . . .

“. . . The next event at 1430 sent out a standard offensive launch plus two additional F4Us, one of which aborted the flight. This flight had no more success than the earlier close support group. They, too, were unable to get a controller. They, too, attacked troops concentrations and warehouses. . . .

“The result of this attack was the destruction of one warehouse and one small fuel dump and considerable damage to two villages in which troops were concentrated. The effectiveness of this flight was curtailed due to lack of controlled support. . . .

“. . . The next event was a jet sweep. . . . They were unable to get contact with a controller. They did not fire a shot.

“. . . The next event was another jet sweep; again, the jets were unable to get a controller. The flight also did not fire a shot. . . .

“. . . The last event of the day was a launch of one AD4N (with CAG-11 as a passenger) and one F4U5N which proceeded into Pusan for the purpose of establishing better working liaison in the matter of close support. . . .”[24]

These action reports are from The total 263 sorties which Task Force 77 delivered to help stop the enemy’s full-scale attack.

While the Fast Carriers of Task Force 77 were flying close air support as practiced by the Air Force, the escort carriers Sicily and Badoeng Strait (TF 96.8, RADM R. W. Ruble, Commander Carrier Division 15) with Marine Squadrons VMF-323 and 214 aboard, were demonstrating the Navy and Marine doctrine of close air support in behalf of the First Provisional Marine Brigade, the 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions, the First Cavalry Division, the ROK First and Second ROK Corps, and the ROK Marines.

“During the early days of the war,” said Lieutenant General Shepherd, “I spoke to General MacArthur and General Stratemeyer about the Marine Wing. I explained to them that Marine Air was an integral part of the Marine team, that they were trained to function as a unit, and that they should be permitted to function as they had trained. General MacArthur agreed.”

No other naval staff saw such varied duty in such a short time as Carrier Division 15. The war was only a week old when Admiral Ruble’s escort carrier division (based at San Diego with the peacetime role of carrying out antisubmarine warfare Hunter-Killer operations) was given air-priority-one orders to report to COMNAVFE for temporary additional duty. The presence of Ruble’s staff would provide Admiral Joy with an advisory group familiar with aircraft operations, particularly with close air support and antisubmarine warfare, as well as provide additional and sorely-needed communication personnel.

Ruble and his staff arrived in Tokyo by air and reported to Joy on 10 July. On 12 July Ruble was given the title “Commander Naval Air Japan,” with the duty of providing logistic support to all naval aircraft in the theater, plus getting the groundwork laid for the arrival of the two Marine fighter squadrons then enroute aboard his jeep carriers.

Badoeng Strait (Captain Arnold W. McKechnie), with VMF-214 and VMF-323 embarked, arrived at
Kobe, Japan, on 31 July. The small carrier was chock-a-block with personnel, equipment, and planes—70 F4Us, 8 OY observation planes, and 6 HO3S helicopters. *Sicily* (Captain J. S. Thach), in the meantime, had arrived on 27 July after disembarking AntiSubmarine Squadron 21 at Agaña airfield, Guam. On the 31st, *Sicily* embarked the remainder of Ruble’s staff, less the admiral himself, and joined the *Badoeng Strait* at Kobe, where ground elements and equipment of VMF-214 were hurriedly loaded aboard. Thach was designated as CTE 96.23, comprising the *Sicily*, *Kyes* (DD-787), and *Doyle* (DMS-34); he was given hurry-up orders to provide close air support to the beleaguered Pusan perimeter. Thach had *Sicily* underway for the battlefront next day, recovering aircraft of VMF-214 (Lieutenant Colonel Walter E. Lischeid, USMC) on the afternoon of the 3rd of August, and launching an eight-plane strike at 1638 the same afternoon.

Upon reporting to JOC, the Marine fliers were ordered to shoot at anything west of the Naktong River, and to pay particular attention to the recently captured city of Chinju.

*Badoeng Strait*, meanwhile, completed replenishment, took aboard Admiral Ruble (who had now been relieved as Commander Naval Air Japan), and Marine Squadron VMF-323. *Endicott* (DMS-35) and *Taussig* (DD-746) were designated as escorts. By breeches buoy, Ruble’s staff transferred from *Sicily* to *Badoeng Strait*.

The little task group was again together and operating, a scant month after leaving San Diego.

Task Group 96.8
Carrier Division 15 (RADM R. W. Ruble)
*Badoeng Strait* (CAPT Arnold W. McKechnie)
VMF-323 (MAJ Arnold Lund, USMC)
*Sicily* (CAPT John S. Thach)
VMF-214 (LTCOL Walter E. Lischeid, USMC)
*Endicott* (CDR John C. Jolly)
*Doyle* (CDR Charles H. Momsen, Jr.)
*Kyes* (CDR Fran M. Christiansen)
*Taussig* (CDR Wm. C. Meyer)

Although the Marine airmen aboard *Sicily* and *Badoeng Strait* flew several interdiction hops prior to 8 August, including some preparatory strikes in the Inchon area, and furnished a few days’ close air support as practiced by the Air Force, the task group’s primary duty during this period was the furnishing of close air support to the First Provisional Marine Brigade.[24A]

On 7 August, the just-arrived First Provisional Marine Brigade was committed to action in the Pusan perimeter, first in the area southeast of Chinju as part of Task Force Kean.[24B] VMF-214 and 323 were ordered to furnish close air support for the Task Force. The personnel in the Marine ground tactical air control parties were the same people with whom the Marine fliers had been rehearsing close air support at Camp Pendleton a few weeks earlier.

For the next six days, the Marine brigade attacked to the westward, covered by the Corsairs of VMF-323 and 212, demonstrating the intricate team-work of the Navy-Marine system of close air support. Approximately six aircraft were kept over the Brigade during daylight hours. The Corsairs’ average load consisted of either a 500-pound bomb or a napalm tank, eight rockets, and a full load of machine gun ammunition.

“10 Aug *Badoeng Strait*: Strike George attacked a large roadblock three miles north of Kaesong at 1500. Steep dive bombing rocket and strafing runs were made on enemy troops on the hillsides, destroying 75% of the enemy position. After these attacks, Marines of the First Marine Brigade were able to stand up and walk through the roadblock, continuing their advance on Kaesong.

“11 Aug *Badoeng Strait*: Third Battalion standing by to attack Kaesong. Preparatory Marine artillery fire landed in the town. Suddenly, as the Marine artillerymen watched through their binoculars, a column of enemy vehicles, numbering almost a hundred, were observed, preparing to make a dash for safety. Circling overhead was
a VMF-323 flight of four F4U4B aircraft (led by their commanding officer, Major Lund). The ground controllers immediately directed Lund’s attention to the column of motorcycles, jeeps, and troop-filled trucks.

“The Corsairs made an immediate low-level strafing run in an effort to bring the column to a halt. The Marine airmen spewed rockets and bullets into the column. Vehicles crashed into one another or piled up in the ditch while enemy troops scrambled for cover. Soviet-made jeeps and motorcycles were stopped or abandoned by the rockets and 20-mm. fire. Return fire from enemy’s guns on the low-flying aircraft seriously damaged two Corsairs; LT Doyle Cole ditched in a nearby bay to be rescued by the helicopter carrying the Brigade Commander, BGEN Edward A. Craig; Captain Vivian Moses crashlanded in a rice paddy and was killed. Four additional Corsairs of VMF-323 relieved Lund’s flight to continue the destruction of the column.”

The second task given the Marine Brigade was to help eliminate an enemy-held bridge in the Pusan perimeter near Yongsan.

The Communist main line of resistance lay to the west of Yongsan along a rugged ridge, Obong-ni (also nicknamed “No-Name” Ridge). The ridge consisted of six knolls; the Marine Brigade was ordered to take them. Six Corsairs were kept on station during daylight hours.

The Marines attacked during the morning and afternoon but were repulsed. In the late evening, after bloody fighting, the Marines succeeded in capturing two hills of the ridge. Throughout the night, despite enemy attacks using automatic fire and hand grenades, the Marines grimly held their positions.

By the early morning of 18 August, the enemy had infiltrated additional strength onto the ridge to the south of the Marines and were making preparations to recapture the two knolls they had lost.

But the 3rd Platoon, Able Company, Fifth Marines, led by LT George C. Fox, attacked first at 0700. As Fox’s platoon, reduced to 20 effective men by the previous day’s fighting, moved forward, a nest of four Red machine guns opened up on them and pinned them to the ground. Captain John R. Stevens, Company A commander, spotted the nest and asked for an air strike.

Strike planes were already circling overhead, having flown in from Badoeng Strait. The tactical air coordinator was LTCOL Norman W. Anderson, and the four Corsairs were led by Major Arnold A. Lund from VMF-323. The Corsairs were briefed on the situation by LT James W. Smith, the forward tactical air controller. The enemy gun nest was only 50 yards in front of the attacking Marines. After receiving the description of the target, LTCOL Anderson decided to use a single plane and to use a 500-pound bomb. Lund designated his section leader, Captain John P. Kelley, to make the attack.

First, however, Anderson himself made certain of the target’s location, and then fired a smoke rocket at it to mark it for Kelley. Kelley observed the rocket, spotted the nest, and climbed for dive-bombing altitude. Carefully noting the wind, Kelley made his attack. His marksmanship was precise: the 500-lb bomb fell squarely into the four machine guns. The entire area was completely obliterated, and the shock to the nearby Marines was intense.

The attack had taken less than five minutes. With the sound of the bomb blast still reverberating from the rocky hills, the Marines rushed forward and with gathering momentum swept the enemy from the main line of resistance.

“From that moment,” General Craig reported in his special action report, “the issue west of Yongsan was no longer in doubt. A routed enemy fled westward, racing desperately from the continuing combined ground and air assault of the Marines, who, before the day was over, accounted for the destruction of more than 4,000 enemy troops.”

The rout was continued on 18 August, as the Leathernecks dissolved the Naktong bulge and hurled hundreds of the fleeing Reds into the river.

“18 Aug Sicily: The first flight attacked the ridge ahead of the advancing Marines near a bend in the Naktong river at Sinnam-ni. Two tanks and a fieldpiece were attacked; one tank was dismantled by a 500-pound
bomb, another destroyed with rockets. The fieldpiece was obliterated with rockets. At this time, Marine ground forces, aided by our close-air support, drove the retreating enemy into the Naktong river. While several thousands of these were attempting to swim across, this flight commenced to attack, strafing with 20 mm. explosives and incendiaries. The enemy was killed in such numbers that the river was definitely discolored by blood.”

There can be little doubt of the terrible efficiency displayed by the Marine aviators in support of the Pusan perimeter. Pound for pound of TNT, and hour for hour of effort, their destructive efficiency left little to be desired. The box score for TG 96.8 for the period ending 14 September 1950 was as follows:

Sicily: 688 sorties
Badoeng Strait: 671 sorties

Flying 24 planes from each jeep carrier, averaging a splendid aircraft availability of 92 percent, the Marine pilots achieved the following damage on behalf of the troops of the Pusan perimeter:

- Tanks: 13 destroyed, 7 damaged
- Boxcars: 35 destroyed, 121 damaged
- Vehicles: 197 destroyed, 11 damaged
- Buildings: 73 destroyed, 13 damaged
- Guns: 72 destroyed, 10 damaged
- Bridges: 23 destroyed, 15 damaged
- Fuel dumps: 10 destroyed
- Supply dumps: 1 destroyed
- Ammo dumps: 5 destroyed, 1 damaged

Despite the difficulties and shortages, the contributions of the naval and Marine aircraft to holding the Pusan perimeter cannot be minimized.

From 5 August until 3 September 1950, Task Force 77 launched 2,481 strikes against the enemy under the control of the JOC and in the close air support style practiced by the Air Force. Of these, 583 were actually controlled by the Mosquito liaison planes; the remaining 1,888 missions were flown in the immediate battle zone against Communist troops, tanks, and supplies in “armed reconnaissance” missions.

These 2,481 strikes by naval aircraft and the 1,359 sorties of the Marines resulted in great damage to enemy personnel and equipment at and near the frontlines, and in decelerating the enemy’s advance toward Pusan. The enemy was forced almost totally to abandon daylight attacks and daylight work of all kinds.

The Air Group Commander of Air Group FIVE recorded the effective support rendered by the naval aircraft:

“. . . The heavy ordnance loads carried by the Corsairs and Skyraiders were always welcomed heartily,” wrote Commander Harvey P. Lanham. “As one air controller put it to his counterpart in the frontlines, ‘I’m coming over with a bunch of Navy planes, and brother, they’re really loaded.’ On another occasion, the Navy liaison pilots at Taegu heard glowing praise of the Navy pilot who had wiped out a complete company of enemy troops by tossing a napalm bomb into the mouth of the tunnel in which they had sought refuge. Navy liaison officers in Taegu in August, heard the results of Prisoner-of-War (POW) interrogation at the JOC. To the question ‘Which U.S. weapon do you fear the most?’, the answer was ‘the blue airplanes.’”[25]
Chapter 2. Retreat to Pusan

Marine Line Backers

As mentioned in the opening lines of this chapter, the retention of a Pusan beachhead was in large measure due to several naval events—the timely Pohang landing, the air support and interdiction efforts of the naval aircraft of Task Force 77 and Marine aircraft of Task Group 96.8 (just described), the naval gunfire support supplied by the ships of Task Force 96 on the eastern terminus of the battlefront (see Chapter IX “The Seaborne Artillery,” page 281), and finally, the back-stopping efforts of the First Provisional Marine Brigade.

Early in July, before the loss of the entire Korean peninsula became a distinct probability, it was General MacArthur’s intention to disembark the First Provisional Marine Brigade at Kobe, Japan, and have it prepare to make an amphibious assault in the enemy’s rear as soon as the position of the Eighth Army could be stabilized. However, the rapidly deteriorating situation in the Pusan bridgehead made it imperative that the Brigade be committed in that area at once.

Accordingly, on 2 August, the Brigade sailed directly into Pusan and commenced unloading. Five days later, on 7 August, the Brigade was ordered to attack to the westward and seize Chinju in order to relieve pressure on the Eighth Army lines along the Naktong River. In this first operation lasting six days, the Marine Brigade made a 20-mile advance, the first successful counter-attack by American troops since the Korean War began. During this period the Marines routed an enemy force estimated as a motorized regiment, captured or destroyed the complete armament and vehicles of at least one battalion, and destroyed 1,900 enemy troops. Even more important than this military contribution to the holding of the Pusan bridgehead, perhaps, was the spiritual uplift in morale which the Leathernecks gave to all the forces in Korea.

Twice more, in August and early September, the U.S. Marines played a vital role in the defense of the perimeter.

After the enemy’s flanking movement had been squelched in the south by the Marines as part of Task Force Kean, the North Koreans increased their pressure in the central area of the perimeter in the vicinity of Yongsan. Elements of the North Korean Fourth Division forded the Naktong River on the 5th of August. By 6 August one battalion of the enemy’s 4th Division was across the river. A major effort to force the river at this point was obviously coming. Any major penetration in this area would seriously endanger the security of the bulk of the Eighth Army and its supply line to Pusan. Despite heavy and effective opposition by U.S. and ROK forces, the North Koreans succeeded in ferrying two regiments across the Naktong and held a bridgehead area measuring six by eight miles.

The First Provisional Marine Brigade and two regiments of the 24th Division were given the task of eliminating this dangerous bulge and driving the enemy back across the river.

After a fast march northward the Brigade led the coordinated attack on 17 August. Objectives were captured in 48 hours. The crack North Korean 4th Division (which had captured Seoul early in the war) was destroyed or driven back across the river, and large amounts of enemy material captured. Enemy casualties were estimated to be 2,500. (A typical close air support strike of this action has been described on page 64.)

On 3 September, the Brigade performed its third mission in holding the perimeter. As part of a coordinated attack, the First Provisional Marine Brigade again made a deep penetration of the enemy’s defensive position along the central front. A great amount of enemy ordnance, engineer, signal, and other equipment was captured. Vast numbers of enemy dead were observed in this area, and after the engagement it was estimated that enemy casualties were at least 4,500. [26]
The initial preparations for the amphibious assault at Inchon were now being made. Doyle’s operation order called for the First Provisional Marine Brigade to lead the way. Accordingly, a despatch was sent to General Walker advising him that “future operations require withdrawal of Marine Brigade from Korea in September, date to be determined. Brigade will be combat-loaded for amphibious landing.”

In view of the still delicate situation at the front lines, General Walker was reluctant to release the Marines unless suitable reserve forces were given to him.

“At our meeting with General Almond relative to the release of the Marines,” said Vice Admiral Struble, “the issue boiled down to the need for an Eighth Army reserve. I suggested that a regiment of the Seventh Infantry be embarked and moved to Pusan as a reserve to be landed in an emergency as a substitute for the Marines. This solution was accepted.”

“We had considerable difficulty in breaking the Brigade loose,” said Major General Oliver P. Smith. “Along with Admirals Struble, Joy, and Doyle, I finally called on General Almond on the afternoon of 5 September, to ask him to spring the Brigade. Joy said that unless they were made available, he would be impelled to despatch Washington. Struble told Almond that if the Fifth Marines weren’t made available, Inchon would be impossible. Whereupon, Almond went in to see General MacArthur, and when he came back, the Brigade was released.”[27]

The same evening, in a heavy rainstorm, the Marines left the front lines and marched back to Pusan.

The final naval contribution to the salvation of the Pusan perimeter occurred on 16 August 1950. This was the unpublicized rescue of the 3rd ROK Division by sea after it had been surrounded and cut off by enemy forces near Yonghae.

For five days, ably supported by Rear Admiral Hartman’s Task Group 96.51, this division had blocked the enemy’s advance down the coastal road while a new defense line north of Pusan was being readied.

The Third ROK Division had held fast while inland units were withdrawn. As a result, this division was isolated and in danger of annihilation. General Walker requested the Navy to evacuate the Third ROKs.

On the night of August 16th, the cruiser Helena, with escorting destroyers and four landing ships, took station off-shore.

Covered by naval gunfire from Helena and the destroyers, Captain J. R. Clark, Commander Destroyer Squadron Eleven aboard Wilsie, ordered the four LSTs into the pre-arranged beach, guided by the lights of jeep headlights ashore. The LSTs beached, and the ROK division began an orderly embarkation. Before daylight broke, the LSTs had loaded six officers and seventeen men of the Korean Military Advisory Group, 327 officers and 5,480 troops of the ROK Third Division, 1,260 civilian evacuees, and 100 vehicles without loss of personnel or equipment.

The next day, the Third ROK Division was re-landed at Kuryongpo-ri, and was back in action.

To these troops, “control of the sea” assumed a fresh, new meaning.
Two general results are perceivable from a study of the early period of the Korean war from 25 July 1950 to the invasion of Inchon on 15 September 1950.

The paramount result was to demonstrate the fact that without the American Navy, the bridgehead in Korea could never have been held. The gunfire support supplied at the eastern anchor of the battlefront, the timely landing of the First Cavalry at Pohang, the rescue of the Third ROKs, the air strikes of Task Force 77 and Task Group 96.8, and the three counteattacks by the First Provisional Marine Brigade, were of decisive importance in holding Pusan. In addition, the logistic link connecting Korea to Japan and the United States was a bridge of ships bringing personnel and munitions of war.

“It is not an exaggeration to say that without the Navy the Pusan perimeter could never have been held,” said Vice Admiral Joy. “The unspectacular role of carrying personnel and supplies to Korea was perhaps the Navy’s greatest contribution. Next in importance was the Navy’s support of the 8th Army by bombardment, interdiction and close air support missions, as well as the timely landing of the 1st Cavalry Division at Pohang. The vital role played by our carriers in this connection cannot be overemphasized. As General MacArthur said to me at the time: “Had you not employed the carriers as you did in sustained support of the 8th Army, Congress would think twice about further appropriations for the construction of aircraft carriers.”

The commanding general personally acknowledged the vital role played by the Navy. Asked by the authors if he considered the naval assistance vital to holding the Pusan perimeter, General MacArthur replied: “Naval forces in a peninsula campaign, such as Korea, are always a vital factor, for they alone can effectively interdict enemy coastal movement and amphibious operations. Furthermore, in Korea I knew that if our meager forces were impelled to fall back to Pusan proper, the Navy could hold open our lines of supply, and under its guns we could hold a beachhead indefinitely.”

Regarding the services rendered by the four carriers in holding the perimeter, General MacArthur wrote: “The Navy carriers were a vital factor in holding the Pusan perimeter, especially until our land bases were developed effectively to handle the air phase of the campaign. Even then they provided a powerful adjunct to the land-based aircraft supporting our ground operations.”

The second result of the battle to save Pusan was to spotlight a Navy-Air Force disparity in the doctrine and technique of close air support.

The dissection of this disparity is extremely difficult, technical and involved, but nonetheless a meaningful and necessary study for the student of naval warfare.

The Battle of Pusan revealed three fundamental differences between the Air Force system and the Navy-Marine system of close air support:

1. A difference in philosophy over use of air power.
2. A difference in techniques.
3. A difference in semantics.

The root of the disparity is one of concept. First of all, the Air Force believes the proper place to apply air power is first and foremost upon the sources of the enemy’s war-making potential, and second, in the immediate battle area. Isolation of the battlefield, in their view, takes precedence over air strikes in the battlefield. And control of aircraft, they believe, must never degenerate to individual ground commanders whose limiting
perspective cannot result in the most effective theater-wide use of the airplanes' potential.

As for the Navy, the validity of the strategic bombing concept has never been fully accepted, in the sense that it is the sole and only arbiter of modern warfare. Neither is there any firm belief that “strategic” targets can be neatly separated from “tactical” targets. In the accomplishment of any given military objective, it is the Navy’s view that sufficient force of the proper type should be applied to the enemy to attain any given objective. Close air support is regarded as a vital and indispensable tool for defeating an enemy’s ground forces.

The second major difference is one of technique. The Navy-Marine system of close air support requires that pilots be trained to recognize terrain features and to appreciate the capabilities and limitations of ground arms in order that strikes can be performed very close to friendly forces. Marine pilots are especially well trained in this respect, naval pilots less so. Air Force pilots do not receive the same degree of training.

In the matter of control, the crux of the difference of the two systems, the Marines have thirteen Tactical Air Control Parties in a division: one for each battalion (total of nine), one with each regiment (total of three), and one for the division itself. Any or all of these control parties are capable of requesting and directing the delivery of “close” air support.

In contrast, the Air Force system only provides one Tactical Air Control Party per regiment, or a total of four for a division, as compared with thirteen in the Marine division. The greater number of control parties for a Marine division is to provide for the anticipated critical situation during the amphibious operation, a contingency that the Army division in the field need not anticipate.

But the difference in numbers of TACPs is only a reflection of the real difference in the concept of control. The Marines admit that wartime manpower restrictions would make it impractical for an Army division to have the same number of TACPs as is required for their division in an amphibious assault. However, even if the Marines had fewer TACPs, their method of control would be no different; for it is the Marine Corps’ view that the frontline commander should be able to make his request direct to the supplying agencies, with no interference or delay from intervening agencies. One of the basic presumptions is that unless close air support is immediately available (within 10 to 15 minutes), its value to the frontline commander is questionable or considerably reduced. The Marine system places the controller in the frontlines with the troops, while the Air Force-Army doctrine places the air controller of the Tactical Air Control Party aloft in a liaison-type aircraft. By so doing, the close personal contact with the ground commander is lost, and the centralization of authority in Air Force commands is emphasized.

The final difference is semantical: the definition of “close air support.” Each Service believes itself to be providing close air support; yet, each Service defines close air support differently. This misunderstanding is compounded by the vague definition of “close air support”: “Air action against hostile ground or naval targets which are so close to friendly forces as to require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.”[28]

What is meant by “close”? To the Navy-Marines, “close” is considered to be that area immediately in front of friendly troops—50 to 200 yards. The Air Force on the other hand, considers “close” to mean within several thousand yards of the front line . . . the distance to which field artillery pieces would effectively reach.[29]

Thus, what the Army-Air Force defines as “close” air support is given another description by the Navy and Marines: “deep support.” Generally speaking, the Air Force did not and does not perform what the Navy calls “close” air support.[30]

All these differences were later succinctly summarized by Lt. General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, as a result of his visit to Korea in 1951:

“We believe in providing for a small number of on-station planes; the Air Force does not. We believe in continuous direct communication between the frontline battalion and the controlling air agency; the Air Force does not. We believe that close air support of the frontline troops should take precedence over routine interdiction
missions; the Air Force does not.”

In appraising and studying close air support in Korea, the naval student must recognize the special, unusual and favorable circumstances which prevailed. First of all, there was no effort made by the North Koreans to contest UN control of the air. Had they done so, the propeller-driven close air support aircraft of both Navy and Air Force certainly would have had greater difficulty in giving close air support. Not having to fight for control of the air over the battlefield freed a great many more UN planes for close air support missions which otherwise would have been impossible.

Secondly, the uncontested control of the seas meant that carrier task forces could move in closely to shore, almost becoming immobile. Never again, perhaps, will these two special circumstances be duplicated.

The Marines, whose close air support doctrine requires a minimum of one aircraft squadron for each Marine battalion, had available, at times, almost double that amount of close air support in Korea. During the battle for the Pusan perimeter, for example, with only one battalion in assault, the Marines often had two squadrons of close support aircraft (averaging 40 effective airplanes) supporting them.[30A] This abundance of close air support, while seldom in excess,[30B] must not leave the impression that such abundance is necessary or will always be available. When other supporting weapons such as artillery, tanks and mortars are available and effective, the more expensive airpower weapon must take a lower priority. In Korea, however, there were many times when more economical means were either unavailable or unable to handle the support task. In these cases, the abundance of effective close air support was able to meet the need.

In other wars in other places, against air and sea opposition, and under poorer weather conditions, it must be recognized that the rather luxurious condition of close air support which existed in Korea—no air opposition and extremely close carriers—will probably never happen again.

**Results**

The Battle of Pusan spotlighted but did not resolve the close air support problem. Two major campaigns which followed—Inchon and Hungnam—amply demonstrated the merits of the Navy-Marine system. After Hungnam, however, the Navy did not again raise the close air support question. Not so the Marines, whose First Marine Air Wing was thereafter detached from the Marine Division.

Neither the Air Force nor the Navy-Marine Corps changed their systems. Both the Navy and the Air Force considered their own system adequate and effective, and that of the other not wholly suitable to its respective needs.

“The Army made an investigation of the merits of the two systems in the combat zone and concluded:

. . . it would be illogical if not dangerous in the long run to substitute the Marine system for the Ground Forces-Air Forces system.”[31]

The Navy also made a study and concluded:

“The Marines and Navy should continue to adhere to their system until a better system can be developed. Under no circumstances should the present system employed by the Air Force be adopted by the Navy and the Marines.”[32]

There was one other result. The controversy brought about the reestablishment of the Tactical Air Command in the U.S. Air Force and its restoration to a position of importance if not equality. The tactical airplane saw a rebirth. On 1 December 1950, the U.S. Air Force established the Tactical Air Command under the command of Lieutenant General John K. Cannon, with the basic mission of training and developing tactical aviation “in cooperation with Army Field Forces.”

Thus, the dispute over close air support leveled the heavy unbalance of pre-Korean days when the preponderance of our nation’s air power was being devoted to the strategic bombing role.
Chapter 3. The Magnificent Gamble: The Amphibious Assault at Inchon

Introduction

As far as the U.S. Navy is concerned, the one single operation of the Korean war which in history must receive transcendent importance is the Inchon assault.

For eighty-two days, the UN ground forces had been constantly on the defensive and often at the brink of disaster. Ridge by ridge, and mile by mile, the U.S. and ROK armies had retreated from the 38th parallel to a tiny perimeter around the port of Pusan, bloodily punishing the Communists with every backward step. The issue in the perimeter hung in balance for almost a month.

On 15 September 1950, with the shattering suddenness of a bursting shell, the course of the Korean war was reversed by the Inchon landing. In ten swift days the North Korean People’s Army, which had been hammering at the threshold of victory, was broken and beaten. The landing at Inchon and the capture of the capital city of Seoul had won the war.

History records no more striking example of the effectiveness of an amphibious operation.
Chapter 3. The Magnificent Gamble: The Amphibious Assault at Inchon

Conception

The credit for the conception of making an amphibious assault at Inchon can only be given to one man: General Douglas MacArthur. It was he who conceived it, who fought for it over the intense but unpublicized opposition of many and the reluctance of most military leaders in the Far East and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[1] The heaviest opposition came from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Omar Bradley, and from Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins.[2] Lesser objection was raised by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Forrest P. Sherman. Collins and Sherman had flown to Tokyo in mid-August to confer with MacArthur about the forthcoming operation.

Of Generals Bradley’s and Collins’ objections, General MacArthur wrote the authors: “. . . I believe that Generals Bradley and, probably, Collins were fundamentally opposed to amphibious operations as an acceptable technique to modern war. General Bradley some time before publicly had so expressed his professional judgment. General Collins based his objection more upon the depth of the turning movement which, of course, was essential if the operation was to be effective.”[3]

According to Vice Admiral Joy, Admiral Sherman initially objected to the site of Inchon because of its hydrographic hazards. “At no time did I hear any naval officer tell the General that Inchon was impossible,” said Vice Admiral Joy, “but we were all anxious to point out the obvious dangers.”

“Not impossible” was the general attitude of the Navy in the Far East. Rear Admiral James H. Doyle’s concluding remarks at the 23 August briefing for the benefit of General MacArthur: “General, I have not been asked nor have I volunteered my opinion about this landing. If I were asked, however, the best I can say is that Inchon is not impossible.”[4]

Vice Admiral Joy has described General MacArthur’s 45-minute talk at this final briefing, wherein General MacArthur gave a glowing testimonial of his confidence that the Navy would make Inchon a success. The Navy had never let him down, he said. He recognized the undertaking as a gamble, quoting its odds at 5,000-to-1, but said he was accustomed to taking such odds.

Vice Admiral Joy said that after listening to the General’s eloquent and passionate soliloquy, “My own personal misgivings about Inchon were erased. I believe that the General had persuaded me, and all others in the room—with the possible exception of Admiral Sherman—that Inchon could be successful. Admiral Sherman was almost persuaded. Nevertheless, he retained some slight misgivings. In fact, the next day he spent one and one-half hours alone with General MacArthur, and upon coming out of this conference, was won over to the General’s position. He said to me, ‘I wish I had that man’s confidence.’ ”[5]

Of Admiral Sherman’s objections, General MacArthur wrote the authors: “During his discussions on the matter I sensed that Admiral Sherman’s objections to the Inchon movement were largely animated by a sense of duty which necessitated the presentation in their most naked form of all professional difficulties and objections which could be foreseen.”

After the return of Sherman and Collins to Washington, the Inchon operation was approved by the then-Secretary of Defense, Louis A. Johnson.

“. . . General Collins—maybe the censor will want to strike this out—did not favor Inchon and went over to argue General MacArthur out of it,” Secretary Johnson testified. “General MacArthur stood pat. I backed MacArthur.”[6]

General MacArthur credits Admiral Sherman for final approval of the decision.
“I am sure he must have been largely instrumental in influencing the ultimate solution to accept my own point of view and approve the project,” he wrote.
MacArthur’s selection of Inchon as the point of assault was a blend of his strategic, psychological, political, and military reasoning. As the Reds drove the UN forces southward, he made frequent reference to their over-extended supply lines, most of which passed through Seoul. If Inchon, only fifteen miles away, could be seized by sea assault, the enemy’s supply lines would be quickly severed. “The history of war,” he said, “proves that nine times out of ten, an army has been destroyed because its supply lines have been severed.” A successful landing at Inchon would shorten the war, save unnumbered casualties, and possibly obviate a winter campaign.

Psychologically, the General felt that a successful landing at Inchon would not only reverse the course of the war but would rescue the Western world’s falling prestige throughout the Orient. In addition to checking the aggression of the North Koreans, it would capture the imagination of the Far East and halt the expanding course of Communism.

Strategically, MacArthur insisted that an amphibious landing should be made deep into enemy-held territory. “The amphibious landing is the most powerful tool we have,” he said, “To employ it properly, we must strike hard and deeply into enemy territory.”[7] Inchon, he added, would be the anvil on which the UN forces would drive northward out of the Pusan perimeter to crush the North Korean enemy. The other recommended points, near Pyongyang, Posung-Myon, and Kunsan, were too far and too close to the battlefront, he said. The beaches opposite Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, were well above the 38th parallel and therefore too distant, while those near Kunsan were too close to the Pusan perimeter. A landing at Kunsan, he thought, would not succeed in trapping the North Korean People’s Army. The Reds would merely retreat a few miles to negate and contain the landing.

General MacArthur’s Inchon strategy is revealed in his own words: “The deep envelopment, based upon surprise, which severs the enemy’s supply lines,” he wrote, “is and always has been the most decisive maneuver of war. A short envelopment, which fails to envelop and leaves the enemy’s supply system intact, merely divides your own forces and can lead to heavy loss and even jeopardy.”

Politically, MacArthur felt that a successful landing at Inchon and the capture of Seoul would reap gains equal to the military one. On the first meeting of Major General Oliver P. Smith, USMC, and General MacArthur, the latter stated: “The landing of the Marines at Inchon will be decisive. It will win the war, and the status of the Marine Corps will never again be in doubt.”[8]

Also motivating MacArthur’s selection of Inchon was his confidence that it would not be strongly defended. This was merely the extension of his South Pacific World War II experience and military philosophy to “hit ‘em where they ain’t.”[9] The North Koreans, he said, would consider a landing at Inchon impossible and insane, and would be taken by surprise.

Again, MacArthur was right, for enemy opposition to the landing was only nominal. On the first two days of the Inchon landing (15-16 September) the First Marine Division had the following battle casualties: 22 KIA, 2 DOW, 2 MIA, 196 WIA;[9A] total 222.

(Subsequent to the landing, however, several events proved that the race to invade at Inchon had been a photo-finish, for a mine-laying effort to seal Inchon had commenced a few days before the actual landing took place.)
The Objectives and Hazards of Inchon

Perhaps the principal and most sobering hazard which every naval and Marine planner who examined the charts of the Inchon area found was the miserable geography. The tides of Inchon (33 feet at their maximum; 23 feet at average spring tide) were among the greatest in the world, and certainly the worst in the Orient. Moreover, these extreme tides reached their peaks in approximately six hours, producing a five-knot current.

The tidal approach to Inchon channel was generally eastward. Over the centuries, the tides had deposited vast mudbanks near Inchon which at low water extended some 6,000 yards to seaward.

The approach channel to Inchon, poetically called “Flying Fish Channel,” was narrow, tortuous, and difficult even for a daylight passage. With the absence of navigation lights and the possibility of enemy gunfire and mines, the navigation of an invasion fleet through such a channel was made extremely dangerous. So narrow was the channel that, if a ship foundered in the final approach to Inchon, the vessels ahead of it would be trapped, particularly at low tide. By chance, the destroyer Collett had been in Inchon harbor just before the war started; Commander Robert H. Close was one of many who knew from recent and firsthand experience the difficult navigation of Flying Fish Channel.

The final effect of the tides was that they controlled the invasion date. To make a large scale amphibious assault at Inchon demanded at least 29 feet of water to insure that the LSTs would have sufficient water beneath their keels to reach the selected landing beaches. On only four days a month were such high tides available. The date for any landing in the fall of 1950, therefore, had to be September 15, October 11, or November 3, give or take a day or two. Obviously the enemy could punch tide tables with as much accuracy and ease as we ourselves could. Moreover, the tides not only dictated the day but even the hour—the time of high water. Thus, there was little leeway in the selection of an assault date. The tides predetermined both day and hour to the detriment of those elements so essential to the success of an amphibious assault—surprise and flexibility.

The next hazard was the strategic location of the city, with its protecting seawalls, and the related island of Wolmi-do. Never before had U.S. Marines made an amphibious assault into the heart of a large city, or across a so-called “beach” protected by stone seawalls. The oriental city would give excellent cover to enemy troops and defense forces, and there would be little room for the Marines to maneuver, once they were ashore. Moreover, there was only limited space for beaching the vital LSTs which had to accompany the troops, bringing in the necessary supplies, food, and ammunition. Inchon, while South Korea’s best west coast harbor, was only mediocre. It had, for example, only ten per cent of Pusan’s capacity. Its inner harbor had a single dredged channel, twelve to thirteen feet deep. Its pier space was restricted; its unloading areas were several miles apart, and its cargo-handling facilities were inadequate.

The island of Wolmi-do was yet another geographic handicap. This oyster-shaped, pyramidal island lay in the channel off Inchon and only 800 yards distant, and was connected to it by a narrow causeway. The island’s topography and location gave it excellent command over the sea approaches in every direction. Wolmi was suspected to be heavily armed, although a great deal of intelligence of its exact defenses and their locations was not known.

The potentially impregnable location of Wolmi demanded that it be neutralized before any attempt to capture Inchon was made; otherwise, it would stand in a flanking position to thwart the Marine assault upon the Inchon beaches. This necessity for neutralization meant that some of the element of surprise had to be sacrificed.
For when the two-day bombardment effort necessary to neutralize Wolmi was made, the enemy might logically conclude that UN forces planned to land at Inchon.

The necessity for reducing Wolmi-do and other Inchon strong points commencing two days before the assault further highlighted a serious and oft expressed objection to Inchon: surprise, that most valuable ingredient of an amphibious assault, might thereby be lost.

In addition, however, there were other factors related to the element of surprise. The principal one was that the U.S. Navy would be building up and loading out from an insecure base. In every landing of the Pacific war, the U.S. forces had operated from a secure base where the knowledge of a forthcoming landing could be rigidly controlled. In the case of Inchon, however, the operating and assembly area was Japan; and Japan was known to be alive with spies and Communist sympathizers. It was unlikely that the assembly of a huge fleet, the gathering of supplies, and the loading of two divisions of troops, could be concealed from the enemy. The only hope of success was to keep the point of landing a secret from the enemy.

In Tokyo, the imminent invasion was referred to as “Operation Common Knowledge.” Official statements hinted of something afoot. Syngman Rhee said, “We are about ready to go.” General Walton H. Walker, when asked when UN forces would take the offensive, replied, “In a very short time.”

As has been stated, Army leaders objected to the Inchon operation because, as General MacArthur stated, they believed the depth of the turning movement was too great; also because it would denude the Eighth Army of all its reserves. In the unhappy event that the Inchon landing miscarried, no reserve troops could be sent to Korea for at least four months. General Walker, it must be recalled, had vigorously opposed releasing the Marine Brigade for this very reason.

The senior naval and Marine officers who objected to an amphibious assault at Inchon did so solely because of the amphibious obstacles of Inchon itself.

No naval or Marine officer who had studied the military problem had any quarrel with the need for an amphibious assault. Nor did any naval or Marine officer question the strategic logic, the psychological wisdom, or the political promise of an amphibious landing at Inchon. Most of the naval and Marine experts who examined the problem of a west coast amphibious assault held the view that all of General MacArthur’s objectives could be achieved by landing at other places which offered fewer natural hazards than Inchon. MacArthur listened, but firmly rejected the alternative locations. It had to be Inchon.

“We drew up a list of every conceivable and natural handicap—and Inchon had ‘em all,” said LCDR Arlie G. Capps, the gunfire support officer of Task Force 90.

“Make up a list of amphibious ‘don’ts,’ ” said CDR Monroe Kelly, Doyle’s communication officer, “and you have an exact description of the Inchon operation. A lot of us planners felt that if the Inchon operation worked, we’d have to rewrite the textbook.”

In summary, therefore, General MacArthur’s choice of Inchon, in spite of the physical hazards, the organized resistance, and the well-founded doubts which had been expressed, was one of military genius and calculated daring. The choice was his alone, and to him full and unfettered credit must be given.

The naval officer who would command the Joint Task Force Seven—Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble—had this to say, “General MacArthur deserves full and complete credit for three things: his conception of the operation; his determination to carry through with the operation; and his full, personal acceptance of the many hazards in the operation.”

Major General Oliver P. Smith, USMC, commented as follows regarding the concept of Inchon: “There is no doubt but that the concept was MacArthur’s, but the concept of a water-borne envelopment is inherent in amphibious operations. The Navy made many water-borne envelopments during World War II. What the general public is left unaware of is that the concept would have been valueless if the execution had been faulty.”
The Sea War in Korea
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson

Chapter 3. The Magnificent Gamble: The Amphibious Assault at Inchon
Planning

After the final briefing of General Collins and Admiral Sherman in Tokyo on 23 August, the decision to land at Inchon was firm, except for the formal approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which arrived a few days after the two JCS members had returned to Washington. The three officers who would be responsible for formulating the plans for the operation, and executing them, were Commander Seventh Fleet, Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble; Commander Amphibious Group One, Rear Admiral James H. Doyle; and Major General Oliver P. Smith, USMC, Commanding General First Marine Division. Struble would determine the broad plans; Doyle would handle the amphibious planning; Smith the landing force plans. For the Inchon assault, Struble would have an additional title: Commander Joint Task Force Seven.

The presence of Struble, Doyle and Smith in the Far East for the forthcoming Inchon operation was fortuitous. Struble had participated in or had supervised twenty-two amphibious operations, including Normandy, Leyte, Ormoc Bay, Mindoro, and Corregidor, during World War II. Moreover, he had worked closely with MacArthur in the latter’s South Pacific campaign, and Struble’s experience and reputation were well known to the General. Doyle had had experience in amphibious warfare during World War II on the staff of Commander Amphibious Forces South Pacific, seeing action at Guadalcanal and Tulagi during the Solomon Islands campaign and later as commanding officer of the cruiser Pasadena. He had been Commander Amphibious Group One since January 1950. Smith, one of the Marines’ top amphibious experts, had commanded a regiment at Cape Gloucester, and had participated in the Peleliu and Okinawa operations.

No more experienced senior officers in the field of amphibious warfare could have found in the American Navy.

It was also fortunate that Doyle’s staff had commenced their study of a landing at Inchon in early July. “On 4 July,” said Doyle, “I received orders to bring a number of my staff to Tokyo by air for temporary additional duty in connection with the planning of amphibious operations in loading the First Cavalry Division for an amphibious landing somewhere in Korea. Inchon on the west coast was tentatively selected. At this time, only an administrative landing at Inchon was planned for the purpose of bolstering the retreating and sorely pressed ROKs. This was then changed to Pohang. The studies we did of Inchon in July, however, were the basis of amphibious planning which followed two months later.”[10]

Struble was at sea with the Seventh Fleet during the several conferences which discussed the point of landing, including the final briefing of 23 August. “Upon returning to Sasebo on August 25th,” said Vice Admiral Struble, “I received word that I was to command the Inchon invasion. I immediately assembled a few staff officers and departed for Tokyo to commence the top planning for Inchon.

“On my arrival in Tokyo, I was apprised of the decision to land at Inchon on 15 September—less than three weeks away. After a personal study of the problem, I could appreciate why General MacArthur had chosen Inchon: it was the prize gem if we could take it. After a careful study, and after the plans had been completed, I was convinced we could take it. I also formed the impression that our chances for a fair amount of surprise at Inchon were good. It was my job to organize the operation so that it would be a success.

“The next few days saw a number of conferences between my small staff, Admiral Doyle and his planners, and General Smith and his planners. On 30 August, I had a conference with Admirals Andrewes, Ruble, and Higgins, and Captain Austin, who flew up from Sasebo; Admiral Doyle and Admiral Henderson also attended.
“On 7 September, I flew to Sasebo for another conference with Andrewes, Ewen, Higgins, and Austin. After that one, I flew to Kobe for another one with Almond and Smith.

“These conferences served to rapidly coordinate the final planning of the various forces and greatly facilitated the coordination of later operations. Many of my decisions had to be transmitted orally to Admiral Doyle and General Smith and others in order to expedite the writing of their detailed amphibious and landing force plans.”

The plan of operations was soon promulgated and contained the following concept:

“(1). An initial landing will be made on Wolmi-do to secure the island prior to the major landing. This step is essential because of the commanding position of the island in relation to the Inchon shoreline. On D-day at L-hour, one battalion of Marines will land in assault on Wolmi-do to seize the island prior to additional landings. L-hour will be on the early morning tide about 0630.

“(2). After the Wolmi-do landings, the principal landings will be made on RED, YELLOW, and BLUE beaches at Inchon by the First Marine Division (less one RCT) (Reinforced) landing in amphibious assault. H-hour for these landings will be on the afternoon high tide about 1700. This division will then seize a beachhead in the Inchon area.

“(3). The beachhead will be expanded rapidly to seize Kimpo airfield and the Han River line war of Seoul. The advance will be continued to seize and secure the city of Seoul, the terrain commanding Seoul, and an area to the south. The Seventh Infantry Division reinforced plus Tenth Corps troops will land administratively from second and third echelon convoys in the city of Inchon at a time to be designated after D-day and then carry on combat operations as directed by the Commanding General Tenth Corps.

“(4). Bombardment and fire support in connection with all these operations will be provided by cruisers and destroyers. Air cover, strikes, and close support will be provided by fast carrier and escort carrier aircraft within the objective area.

“/s/ A. D. Struble, Vice Admiral, Commander Joint Task Force SEVEN and Commander Seventh Fleet”

There was the basic plan: neutralize Wolmi, invade Inchon, seize the major airfield at Kimpo, and capture Seoul.

As the concept of the operation was finalized in ‘round-the-clock conferences, the details of the amphibious force and landing force plans were determined and written down.

The dovetailing of the fleet, amphibious and landing force plans was accelerated by the close proximity of the naval and Marine staffs.

Major General Smith’s command group and advance planning staff (23 officers and 12 enlisted men) had arrived in Tokyo from Camp Pendleton, California on 22 August and had established an advance command post aboard USS Mt. McKinley. The remainder of the Marines moved into General MacArthur’s headquarters in the Dai Ichi building in downtown Tokyo. It was an ideal situation in view of the extreme urgency. “It was possible to employ the quickest and most informal method of doing business,” reads Doyle’s operational report.

“Telephone conversations and oral directives were used in place of despatches, letters, and formal directives.”

In a matter of days the detailed plans were ready.

Thus, the planning of this vast and complex operation was completed in only 23 days—a record which seems likely to stand in military history. This speed is a tribute to the ability and skill of the planners and to the soundness and solidity of the amphibious doctrine.

The principal forces for the Inchon assault were:

- Attack Force (RADM J. H. Doyle)
- Landing Force (10th Corps) (MAJGEN E. A. Almond)
- Patrol & Reconnaissance Force (RADM G. H. Henderson)
- Blockade & Covering Force (RADM W. G. Andrewes, Royal Navy)
Fast Carrier Force (RADM E. C. Ewen)
Logistic Support Force (CAPT B. L. Austin)
Advance Group (added after original plan was put out) (RADM J. M. Higgins)
Flagship Group (CAPT E. L. Woodyard)

The principal duties of these forces were as follows:

(a) The Advance Group, including the Flagship of 7th Fleet, would conduct a reconnaissance in force of the Inchon Area on 13 September. The primary purpose would be to locate and silence gun positions on both Wolmi-do and the adjacent Inchon area which might threaten the success of the landing. Six destroyers would be sent up the channel to anchor in a fan-shaped ring around Wolmi-do Island to draw its fire and to silence its gun positions. At the same time, two American and two British cruisers would conduct a long range bombardment of the Inchon area with air spot, to reduce strong points and positions. Coordinated with the cruiser-destroyer fire would be heavy air attacks from the carriers. This neutralization operation by the advance group would be repeated on 14 September.

(b) The Attack Force under RADM Doyle would make the assault landing and control the close air support and the naval gunfire support for the assault troops. The attack force would continue to provide support of the landing force after they had accomplished their landing.

(c) The Landing Force (10th Corps) would land on the designated beaches in the Inchon area and carry out the ground plan. Smith’s Marine division would carry the assault and seize the beachhead. The Seventh Division, inexperienced in amphibious warfare, would follow Smith’s Marines ashore administratively.

(d) The Patrol and Reconnaissance Force under RADM Henderson would provide long range reconnaissance and other aircraft patrols covering the whole area of operation.

(e) The Blockade and Covering Force under RADM Andrewes, Royal Navy, would conduct special reconnaissance missions and provide for covering of units of Attack Force en route to the objective area. Andrewes was also assigned specific interdiction missions and was to maintain a naval blockade of the west coast of Korea.

(f) The Fast Carrier Force would conduct air operations to maintain air supremacy in the objective area and for the isolation of the objective area. The carriers would also provide air cover and support for the actual attack landing operations.

(g) The Logistic Support Force would provide refueling and reammunitioning facilities in the objective area.
Preparation by the U.S. Marines for the Inchon landing unknowingly began the day the war started in Korea. For the first few days, the Marines had no specific orders—only precedent. But 177 years of precedent was good enough, and was to prove consistent in this case. The first order directing the First Marine Division to prepare to embark a reinforced regimental combat team came on 2 July. Five days later, the First Provisional Marine Brigade was activated, and between 12 and 14 July this brigade sailed.

While this Marine Brigade was fitting out, it became obvious that it was only a matter of time before every available marine would be en route to Korea. General MacArthur, in the first thirty days of the war, sent a total of six despatches to the Joint Chiefs of Staff requesting the Marines. But large scale participation by the Marines was not possible with the reduced peacetime size of the active forces. Accordingly, Marine Reserves were recalled on 19 July and replacements were ordered to the First Marine Division from the Second Marine Division.

From posts and stations all over the world, Marines charged into Camp Pendleton. From the desert supply depot at Barstow, California, came the jeeps, the DUKWs, and the amphibian tractors to complement the rapid build-up.

“The magnitude of the task accomplished by the Marine Corps in the first ten weeks of the conflict may be judged by the fact that on 30 June, the First Marine Division (Reinforced) at Camp Pendleton had an active strength of 641 officers and 7,148 enlisted,” reads General Shepherd’s report on the activities of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. “From this initial Strength, the First Provisional Brigade (266 officers and 4,503 men) was taken. Yet, by 15 September, the First Marine Division had been expanded to 26,000—an expansion, augmentation, and movement without parallel in American military history.”

An amphibious assault is often compared to a chain—a series of interlocking operations, each one dependent on the others. One link breaks and the whole chain fails.

The Inchon operation placed exceedingly difficult stresses on the amphibious assault chain. The shortage of time, the lack of rehearsal, the shortage of trained personnel complicated the always-difficult problem.

“So many times during an amphibious attack, the little guys in the little boats need more knowledge of the big picture,” said Admiral Doyle. “This was especially true at Inchon. I considered it vital that every key man be given the most recent data available. As there was no time prior to Inchon for a rehearsal, I held a briefing on board the flagship for all commanding officers, loading officers, control officers, and all those actually concerned with making the assault. I told them that since there was no time for rehearsal, I wished all CO’s to personally instruct boat crews and coxswains what they were to do, why they were to do it, and how their individual tasks fitted into the overall picture. I wanted the cox’ns to have all this background information so that they could react in the event of unforeseen developments. We have such high-type enlisted men in the Navy that I knew with proper instructions, they would prove resourceful in the event of trouble.”

One of the urgent needs prior to the Inchon landing was intelligence. Despite the fact that South Korea had been occupied by American forces for more than two years, and that Inchon had been one of the main harbors in use, there was an incredible lack of information regarding the harbor.

Pictures were poor. Maps were wholly inadequate. The close air support charts used at Inchon were hastily made into books by the U.S. Army’s 64th Engineer’s Base Topographic Battalion. The charts were mostly monochrome, and in some cases reproductions of World War II Japanese maps. “Considering the extremely short
time allowed,” reported CDR J. T. Moynahan, after a special inspection for the Hydrographic Office, “it is a miracle that the books were produced at all.” There was little late information on the condition of the mudflats, the height of the seawalls, the tractional qualities and the gradient of the mudflats.

One of the most helpful sources of information on Inchon was Captain Thomas F. Brittain’s World War II report of the landing of American occupation forces in Korea in 1945.

From unusual sources and by unorthodox methods, frantic efforts were initiated to obtain the needed intelligence.

These methods and efforts took three forms. First of all, an Army officer, Warrant W. R. Miller, was loaned by the Second Transportation Medium, Yokohama, to ComPhibGruONE. Miller had spent more than a year handling LSUs and LCMs in Inchon, and he had had recent and firsthand experience with Inchon’s tidal conditions and unloading problems. “His knowledge and advice was accurate and invaluable,” said CDR H. W. McElwain, the intelligence officer of Task Force 90.

To determine the seawall heights which the attacking Marines would be forced to scale, a special team of one officer and two civilians who were in the area from the U.S. Air Force’s Wright Field in Dayton, Ohio, were made available to PhibGruONE; Colonel Richard W. Philbrick, USAF, and Mr. Amrom H. Katz and Mr. Donald J. Graves. From aerial photographs taken by RF-80 jet aircraft flying at 200 feet, these gentlemen determined the heights of the seawalls at various tidal stages within a few inches of their actual height, corroborating the information available from other sources.

The third source of information would come from a small behind-the-lines intelligence party led by Lieutenant Eugene F. Clark, USN. Clark, an ex-chief yeoman, had fought through the Pacific war, including duty on Okinawa with the Army’s Military Government Group. After the war he served aboard an AKA, had commanded an LST running the China coast, and had also commanded the USS Errol, an attack transport which received the Battle Efficiency Pennant under his command.

At the outbreak of the Korean War Clark was assigned to MacArthur’s headquarters GHQ staff. His previous experience ideally fitted him for the most unusual of missions for a naval officer. Clark’s party, consisting of himself and two specially picked South Koreans, was to land on one of the small harbor islands near Inchon, and to send back to Tokyo the missing details of the needed intelligence.

On 31 August, Clark and his two interpreters sailed from Sasebo aboard the British destroyer HMS Charity, and transferred the next morning to the South Korean frigate PC-703. By nightfall that evening, Clark’s party was ensconced on Yong-hong-do island, a scant 13.8 miles from Inchon itself. The island, six miles long and three miles wide, was typical of the hundreds of small islands dotting the west coast. The Yong-hong-do islanders were friendly and helpful. Clark commandeered the only motorized sampan on the island; he also organized the teen-aged boys of the three-hundred-odd inhabitants into coast-watching parties. Two machine guns were set up facing the nearby island of Taebu-do, which was occupied by enemy troops.

For two weeks Clark clung to his perilous roost, fighting sampan battles with North Korean vessels from the adjacent islands, and capturing infiltrators who crossed from Taebu-do at low tide to dislodge him from his stronghold. Nightly, Clark sent into Inchon missions composed of young loyal South Korean boys who were instructed to measure the mudflats and the heights of the seawall, to count the defending troops, and to chart the positions of the hostile guns, observation posts, and trench implacements. Clark personally rowed into Inchon harbor one moonless night and wallowed about on the mudflats to prove that not even an amphibious Marine, much less a tank, could negotiate the spongy gumbo.

In his nocturnal prowling in the waters south of Inchon itself, Clark succeeded in capturing some 30 small vessels, most of them carrying civilians in transit between Inchon and the harbor islands. Occasionally, however, Clark captured a sampan with policemen or soldiers who were able to contribute to the over-all intelligence picture.
His most valuable contribution to the Inchon landing, Clark thought, was his discovery that one of the main navigation lights of the difficult Flying Fish Channel, located on Palmi-do, could be lit. The Reds had not entirely destroyed it, merely damaging the rotation mechanism and extinguishing the wick; otherwise it was intact. Clark reported these facts to Tokyo by radio and was instructed to light this important navigational light at midnight on 14 of September. This aid made the invasion fleet’s passage up Flying Fish Channel a great deal faster and easier on the morning of 15 September 1950.[11]

It was an exceedingly dangerous mission exceedingly well accomplished. For his bravery and accomplishment Lieutenant Clark was awarded the Navy Cross.
Chapter 3. The Magnificent Gamble: The Amphibious Assault at Inchon
Wolmi—The Cork in the Bottle

As stated previously, a successful landing at Inchon demanded that the island of Wolmi-do be captured first. In the planning stages there was much discussion on how best to do this. Could the island be sufficiently neutralized by a bombardment on the morning of the invasion? If so, the critical element of surprise might be preserved until the very moment of landing. The experts who examined the island’s position and studied its defenses thought not. The lessons of other Pacific island pre-invasion bombardments were too plentiful and too recent. To assume that Wolmi might be neutralized in a single morning would be dangerously optimistic.

“A series of balanced operations were planned for the neutralization of Wolmi-do commencing 10 September,” said Vice Admiral Struble. “First, Admiral Ruble’s Marine airmen of Task Group 96.8 would burn the island with napalm. The Advance Force attacks on 13 and 14 September would follow. Finally, there would be another bombardment on the morning of the assault.

“In all the planning, it was my intention to so balance the air operation on the west coast that the finger of suspicion would not be heavily pointed at Inchon. To accomplish this, I had the carriers not only strike Wolmi and the Inchon area, but also the Kunsan area to the south[11A] and the Pyongyang area to the north. I also ordered an amphibious feint in the Kunsan area on 7 September.

“I felt that if we could keep the point of our landing concealed until the first bombardment of 13 September the enemy would not reach the conclusion that Inchon was to be invaded until it was too late.”

In planning the destroyer bombardments of Wolmi, the question of whether or not to bombard at night was raised.

“One thing we all agreed on,” reported Rear Admiral John M. Higgins, commanding the Gunfire Support Group, “was the desirability of making the attack on Wolmi in broad daylight despite the fact that this forced us to give up the surprise element and made us better targets. But if we went up there at night and hit heavy opposition, there’d be a lot of confusion in that narrow channel.”[12] Making the attacks in daylight would also diminish any danger of collision, and in case one or more ships became immobile from enemy fire, the towing task would be less difficult.

It was planned that the destroyers would operate close enough to Wolmi to tempt the hidden guns to open fire.

“The ‘sitting duck’ concept was carefully discussed and agreed upon in advance,” said Vice Admiral Struble, “as a means of drawing enemy fire and thereby revealing the locations of their gun positions.”

Finally, the decision was made to anchor near Wolmi in order to counteract the five-knot current; further, the destroyers’ time of anchoring would be adjusted so that they would ride the flooding tide, and thereby face the incoming tide. By keeping their anchors underfoot to steady ships’ head and position, the destroyers would be headed out of the channel and ready for a fast exit in case the return fire from the island was too heavy. Riding the flood tide would also place the destroyers broadside to the island, thus allowing all guns to bear.

The destroyers, meanwhile, were making preparations for the bombardment. In his action report, the skipper of the Gurke, CDR Frederick M. Radel, described his crew’s efforts to repel boarders—a rare precaution in the age of atom bombs, supersonic airplanes, and guided missiles:

“About the only preparations we made,” said Radel, “were to prepare ship for towing, to rig fenders for going alongside a damaged or stranded vessel, and to brief and arm repair parties to repel possible boarders.” The destroyers, if disabled, would be so close to the enemy island that boarding across the mudflats became a distinct
De Haven took a bizarre step to invite the enemy’s attention. Since the destroyers would be as close as 800 yards to Wolmi, where individuals on deck would clearly be visible, might not De Haven attract Wolmi’s fire by setting dummies on the open deck? CDR Oscar B. Lundgren thought it worth the effort and approved his crew’s plan of placing several straw and rag-filled dummies on the forecastle.

Extra 40 mm. ammunition was stacked on deck, for the ship’s magazines were already full.
Chapter 3. The Magnificent Gamble: The Amphibious Assault at Inchon

The Neutralization of Wolmi-do

The neutralization of Wolmi-do was commenced on 10 September by Rear Admiral Richard W. Ruble’s Carrier Division 15 aircraft. The Marine aircraft of VMF-212 and 323 dropped 95 tanks of napalm in a systematic pattern all over Wolmi. Photo reconnaissance the next day showed 39 out of 44 buildings in the warehouse area destroyed, the entire dwelling area burned out, and buildings on the north peninsula 80 per cent destroyed. Periodically, over the next two days, a pattern of air strikes to soften the island’s defenses was delivered.

The pre-invasion bombardments of Wolmi-do commenced at 0700 on 13 September.

Gunfire Support Group Six—cruisers Toledo, Rochester, HMS Kenya, HMS Jamaica, and destroyers Mansfield, De Haven, Lyman K. Swenson, Gollett, Gurke, and Henderson—started up Flying Fish Channel. The weather was clear, the sea calm.

A few miles south of Inchon, as the channel narrowed, the cruisers dropped out of the column and anchored in their bombardment stations.

The destroyers continued northward.

Shortly before 1145, Mansfield, the leading destroyer, reported what appeared to be a string of mines. De Haven’s skipper, CDR Lundgren, confirmed the sighting. The order for open fire was given and both cruisers and destroyers opened fire on the enemy mines. The first mine was hit by Gurke at 1146.

“The mine menace was in the general vicinity of Palmi-do,” said Vice Admiral Struble, “and had apparently been placed in this location because of a bombardment fired at Inchon about a month earlier by two British cruisers and two destroyers.[13]

“Fortunately, due to our decision to come in at low tide, the mines were uncovered, discovered, and generally destroyed by gunfire.”

Destroyer Squadron Nine’s commander, Captain Halle C. Allan, detached Henderson to remain behind temporarily to destroy as many of the mines as possible, and then when the rising incoming tide hid them from view, to rejoin at high speed. Except for a few mines, most of this minefield was destroyed by the cruiser-destroyer fire.

The destroyers boldly sailed past the doomed island, then under heavy air attack from Task Force 77 carrier aircraft. Gurke anchored first at 1242, only 800 yards from Wolmi. Behind her, the other destroyers halted in their assigned positions.

Hundreds of eyes aboard the American destroyers scanned Wolmi-do’s surface trying to detect the telltale humps of concealed gun positions. For several minutes nothing happened, and the destroyers rode to their anchors in the terrible silence.

Captain Allan two-blocked his signal: “Execute assigned mission.”

De Haven opened fire first, shortly before 1300, followed by Collett. Not until 1303 was there any fire returned from Wolmi, and it was concentrated on the three destroyers nearest the island: Gurke, Swenson, and Collett. The first enemy shots were over, then short; at 1306, Collett took her first hit. She was struck again at 1310, again at 1320, and again at 1329. The last shell was a 75 mm. armor-piercing shell which broke into two pieces, one piece going into the engineroom and fracturing a low-pressure steam line, the larger half plowing into the plot room, where it broke the firing selector switch and wounded five men. Collett shifted to individual control and shifted her anchorage on which at least one enemy gun had found the range.

Gurke was hit next in two places, neither seriously. The Swenson took a near miss which instantly killed
LTJG David H. Swenson and wounded ENS John N. Noonan.

“As the first hits were reported to me,” said Vice Admiral Struble, “I directed Captain Woodyard to heave short and have the **Rochester** stand by to enter the narrow channel to Inchon in order to support the destroyers if it developed that they would be unable to handle the problem themselves.” But the bombardment proceeded without further casualty, the **Mansfield** being narrowly missed during the retirement.

The destroyers steamed out of the anchorage at 1400, having blasted the island for more than an hour, supported by shellfire from the cruisers in the lower bay. As the destroyers steamed clear, the planes from Task Force 77 resumed the air attacks.

“After the bombardment,” said Vice Admiral Struble, “the entire advance force departed from the area off Inchon and proceeded down Flying Fish Channel to produce the illusion, if possible, that we were retiring.

“After we were well clear, I ordered the task force to stop for a conference aboard the **Rochester**. Admiral Higgins and his staff officers and Captain Allan of the destroyers were present.

“After a discussion of the first bombardment, I decided to re-orient the carrier attack from south to west, and to accept the attendant risk of bombs dropping on the causeway between Wolmi and Inchon. At the request of the Marines, I had previously ordered this causeway spared so that the Marines who captured Wolmi on the morning of the 15th could use it to cross to Inchon and join the main assault.

“I also took action to improve the next day’s air spotting for the cruiser fire, which had not been satisfactory.”

The reduction of Wolmi was resumed in similar fashion the following day. Prior to standing up Flying Fish Channel, the advance force hove to, half-masted flags, and conducted burial-at-sea ceremonies aboard the **Toledo** for the late LTJG David H. Swenson.

Only five destroyers (**Collett** having been detached) entered the channel. As **Henderson, Mansfield, De Haven, Swenson**, and **Gurke** steamed northward, a small portion of the previous day’s minefield was seen and again taken under fire.

The remaining five destroyers resumed their positions around Wolmi and commenced fire. Wolmi’s batteries were slow to answer, and indeed, for the first forty minutes, not a shot from the island splashed around the destroyers. For seventy-five minutes the bombardment group earthed the tiny island. As the ships retired, this time unharmed, not a shot was heard in retaliation from the wounded island.

In retrospect, the bombardment of Wolmi in such a manner and under such circumstances was extremely audacious. That it was so successful is a tribute to the aggressive spirit of the U.S. Navy, which has always accepted great risks where there is great promise. History must record this bombardment as a heroic and daring action.[14]

Silenced and shrouded in smoke, Wolmi was now ready for capture. The Marines made last-minute preparations to remove the Wolmi cork from the Inchon bottle.

The advance attack force, Captain N. W. Sears, consisting of three APDs and one LSD[15] steamed up Flying Fish Channel in the darkness on the early morning of the 15th, guided by the flames of still-burning Wolmi-do and the light from Palmi-do island, atop of which sat LT Eugene Clark, shivering inside his blanket, watching the invasion fleet steam past in the darkness. Ahead of these ships were the destroyers **Mansfield, De Haven, Swenson**; and, following them, the LSMR division of three rocket ships (401, 403, and 404), plus the **Southerland, Gurke, Henderson, Toledo, Rochester, Kenya, Jamaica, Collett, and Mataco**.

At 0545, the bombarding ship opened fire on Wolmi, and again the F4U Corsairs from Carrier Division 15, ten of them, sprayed the landing beaches. At 0633, LTCOL R. D. Taplett’s Third Battalion (Fifth Regiment) landed from seventeen LCVPs and three LSUs on the shattered isle.

There were two waves of LCVPs of eight boats, each carrying troops, and one wave of three LSUs carrying a total of nine tanks. The first wave of LCVPs was re-employed as Wave Four. The resistance was
generally light, for many of the 500-odd enemy troops defending the island had been reduced to dazed inaction by
the three days of air and surface bombardment. Some of the defending troops—elements of an artillery regiment
and an independent marine regiment—had slipped back across the causeway to Inchon during the night. The U.S.
Marines stormed up the hilly slopes, and in forty-two minutes the American flag was flying from Wolmi-do.
However, for several hours more, the Marines rooted the defenders out of their holes. The enemy suffered 120
dead and 190 captured, to the 20 wounded of the U.S. Marines. The rest of the day was spent by these Marines
getting emplacements ready for two battalions of light artillery which would be landed on Wolmi with the main
attack, to support the Inchon invasion. The tanks were also made ready to cross the causeway to join the attack
upon Inchon.
Chapter 3. The Magnificent Gamble: The Amphibious Assault at Inchon

The actual invasion of Inchon commenced at 1730 on the evening of 15 September. There were three unusual features of the assault. First of all, the U.S. Marine Corps had never before made an assault into the heart of a large city, against the prospect of heavy opposition from warehouses, buildings, and other cover. Nor had they ever landed on seawalls.

After observing the Reds’ response to the Wolmi bombardment, General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, said: “There clearly remained little further justification for anticipating an unopposed or lightly opposed landing. . . . The size of the task force, clearly visible to the Communists,” continues Shepherd’s report, “left no doubt that the Wolmi-do landing must be only a preliminary, and evidence of hurried enemy preparations to move into the Inchon area were detected by our aircraft and appropriate attacks launched. Nevertheless, the initial shock and surprise which forms a valuable part of most amphibious attacks was largely anticipated, and the enemy was alert for the evening landings.”

The second undesirable feature was the fact that the landing had to take place just prior to darkness, which meant that the Marines did not have a daylight period in which to get set for the night.

A third undesirable feature of the landing across the Inchon seawalls was the necessity of having LSTs right behind the assaulting Marines: because of the tides and the late hour of the landing, sufficient supplies—3,000 tons—had to be beached simultaneously with the invading Marines in order to guarantee logistic support during the night and until the next high tide would permit replenishment.

“One of the toughest decisions I had to make during the planning for Inchon,” said Admiral Doyle, “was the decision to leave the LSTs on the beach during that first night of the landing. It is easy to imagine what would have happened to me if something had gone wrong; I especially worried about the possibility of having a United States Navy ship captured.

“However, the Marines asked that the LSTs be left on the beach for their support; they said they’d protect them. I had complete reliance and confidence that they could do it. Once the decision was made, I worried no more about it.”

Doyle and his planners were well aware of the risks—and were frank to admit that these LSTs, as never before, would be “large slow targets” and fortunate if half survived. The Pacific Fleet evaluation group summarized this dilemma in their report:

“The possible sacrifice and loss of eight LSTs had to be accepted in order to insure logistic support to troops ashore at Inchon during the night. . . . Dried out on the mudflats by the receding tide, these eight LSTs were helplessly vulnerable to enemy fire, and with their explosive inflammable cargo were subject to loss.”

Perhaps it was the high expectancy of loss which necessitated the choice of the eight LSTs for this hazardous but necessary phase of the assault. At any rate, the eight LSTs which made the assault landings were amongst those that had been turned over to the Army and SCAJAP after World War II. For five years they had been used, misused, unused, and abused for cargo work around the Japanese harbors. When recommissioned into the U.S. Navy, it was found that much of their original equipment had been altered, stripped, or damaged. Their overhaul and upkeep during the five years had almost been nil. As a result, Commander Tractor Squadron Three (CAPT R. C. Peden) estimated that each of these LSTs would ordinarily have required at least four months of refitting and overhaul in a U.S. shipyard to bring them up to a minimum condition for operations. Another of the SCAJAP LSTs, in fact, was in such uncertain material condition that it was towed to Inchon.
Almost as bad was the lack of experienced people to man these vital LSTs. To take an LST into Inchon harbor, against its fast-flowing current, gunfire, mudflats, and in darkness, ordinarily would have demanded handpicked skippers with special training. Instead, LT R. M. Beckley, skipper of LST-898, who had made two previous landings in an LST, and LT Trumond E. Houston, skipper of LST-799, who had made none, were typical of the commanding officers.

“On 13 July 1950,” wrote Houston, “I received immediate detachment orders from my duty station at the U.S. Naval Training Center, Recruit Training Command, San Diego, California, to report to Commandant, Twelfth Naval District, for air priority class one to Japan to take command of an undesignated LST.

“Upon arrival in Japan, I found I was one of ten prospective commanding officers of LSTs which had been operating with Japanese civilian crews since 1946 and were at that time being assembled at the U.S. Naval Repair Facility, Yokosuka, Japan, for repair, fitting out, and recommissioning in the U.S. Navy. My ship, the LST-799, arrived about the same time in Yokosuka as I did. What a revelation! It was stripped, dirty, stinking, and generally in a horrible operating condition (all LSTs were the same).

“My crew and officers arrived piecemeal. Some came by surface, some by air, some were from local commands. The crew, numbering sixty men and five officers, could be broken down roughly in three parts. One third was regular Navy, one third was recruits from training centers, and one third was recalled reservists, most of whom had been at home only ten or twelve days before.

“We were a motley, ragtag crew. Three days before commissioning, we descended on the 799, directed the Japanese crew to retreat within a half hour, and took over.

“We were commissioned on 28 August, about 0930. At 1000, we had orders to get under way for a berth shift. I had never handled an LST before.

“During the ensuing few days, all hands did everything possible to make our ship ready for sea. Material needs were the most critical. Even a day prior to getting under way, we had no sextants, bearing circles, special signal flags, and many other very necessary items of equipment. We had no wardroom equipment: linen, silver, dishes, and blankets. We used Japanese equipment wherever it was available.

“On the third day after commissioning, we were on our way to Kobe, Japan, where Marine elements were deployed for loading for the assault at Inchon, Korea. We arrived in Kobe, rode out a typhoon there where the eye of the storm passed directly overhead; eventually we were re-routed to Pusan, Korea, for loading of Marine units and equipment.

“We picked up the convoy from Japan off southern Korea and continued together for Inchon. On the evening of 15 September 1950, LST-799 was the last of eight LSTs to land on Red Beach, landing on the extreme left flank.

“This was my own and my crew’s first beaching. We had had no training or practice time. I shudder as I remember how green and inexperienced the entire ship was. Only the basic knowledge of mechanics so many of our young Americans acquire, their inquisitive and exploring minds, their ‘can-do’ attitude can explain how we ever arrived at the beach at all.”

Upon such vessels and such men did the success of the landing at Inchon depend.

“My orders were to get as many of the eight ships into the Red area and unloaded as was humanly possible, no matter what the cost,” said LCDR James C. Wilson who commanded the LSTs. The final afternoon bombardment of the Inchon beaches lasted for forty-five minutes, with rocket ships, destroyers, cruisers and airplanes all joining in the large and tremendously powerful bombardment.

Vice Admiral Struble’s orders to the bombardment forces clearly specified that there should be no promiscuous firing at the city itself or at civilian installations. To achieve this, the entire objective area had been divided into 60 sub-areas. Known military targets had been previously assigned, and those which offered the greatest potential hazard to our landing troops were circled in red. It had been agreed that any ship could fire into
a red-circle area with or without a “spot.” In the uncircled areas, however, firing was permitted only if definite targets were found and an air spot was available. This differentiation between types of areas was adopted to reduce destruction of nonmilitary targets to a minimum, to save the city of Inchon for occupation forces, and to avoid injury to civilian personnel. “The Seoul-Inchon area is inhabited by our South Korean Allies,” said Struble in an order to his forces, “and our forces plan to utilize facilities in this area. Unnecessary destruction will impede our progress. Bombing and gunfire will be confined to targets whose destruction will contribute to the conduct of operations—accurate gunfire and pinpoint bombing against specific targets, rather than area destruction, is contemplated.”

Belting Inchon’s harbor area was a large, grey, heavy stone seawall. Four lengths of this harbor wall had been selected as the landing “beaches,” though certainly the word “beach” was a misnomer in every case. “Red” beach was to the north, 1,000 feet long, with a 15-foot seawall. It lay beneath a protecting hill atop of which was a Korean cemetery. It was to prove a troublesome spot. The other main beach, “Blue,” lay to the south of the city, relatively clear of the urban area, and in such a position that the Marines could sever the city’s communications from the rear. Green beach and Yellow beach (not used until D+1) were on Wolmi and the tidal basin of the inner harbor, respectively. The latter two were logistic beaches only, Red and Blue being the assault beaches.

The assaults on Red and Blue beaches were simultaneous, roughly an hour before sunset and high tide. Twenty-three waves of LVTs made the Red beach assault with the eight LSTs. In each LVT was a pair of scaling ladders—some metal, some wooden—with hooked ends designed to catch the seawalls. As the first wave of boats touched the seawall, the tops of these seawalls were still four feet above the boats’ bows. In some cases the ladder hooks were too small to fit the wall, and the Marines leap-frogged over one another. The first wave tumbled ashore with relatively little opposition, but the enemy fire picked up as Waves Two and Three approached.

The LSTs, led by 859, started in one by one at five-minute intervals at 1830, one hour after the first Marine wave. These vessels seemed to draw the fire of the defending Reds, enabling the Marines ashore to move forward. Despite the smoke, dust, haze, and the approach of sunset, the eight LSTs succeeded in making the beach, although not in the order originally planned.

Just as LST-973 (LT R. I. Trapp) beached, it was hit by a mortar shell that could have meant disaster. The shell struck among gasoline drums parked topside; raw gasoline gushed down the deck, into the ventilator and crew compartments. Quick work on the part of the damage control party prevented a fire which, spreading to the abundant ammunition nearby, might have caused a major accident. LST-914, fourth in line, was struck by enemy gunfire and set afire, but the blaze was soon under control. LSTs 857 and 859 were also hit.

The seawall proved troublesome. Some LSTs bounced off it, others found the wall too high to lower their ramps.

“It was almost dark as we headed for the beach,” said Lieutenant Houston. “Due to heavy sky, light rain, and smoke from burning buildings ashore, visibility was extremely poor. Sporadic mortar and small arms gunfire was being received from ashore. While this was our first beaching, it was going to be a good one. We hit the seawall at about six knots. The ship shuddered and bounced for several minutes before hanging onto the quay. It was well that we had hit hard, for we shattered the quay wall, enabling us to commence immediate unloading of heavy equipment.

“Bulldozers went out first and immediately commenced covering the slit trenches along the waterfront from which enemy small arms were being received. Additionally, they helped break up the quay in order that other LSTs could get their bows in a position to commence unloading.

“Two Marines seriously wounded by mortar fire at the bow door entrance were brought aboard. Both died on board and were transferred to an adjacent hospital LST.

“Unloading continued throughout the night as ships remained dried out on the mudflats.”
The Marines continued to press forward, and in about one hour and a half had secured the hill near Red beach.

On Blue beach, 15 waves of LVT(A)s and LVTs and 6 waves of LCVPs took the Marines ashore. Again, the seawall was a problem. Dynamite was used to blast openings, and one charge almost blew up Vice Admiral Struble and General Almond.

In the afternoon Vice Admiral Struble went past the Mount McKinley and picked up General Almond of the Tenth Corps to observe the afternoon landing. Struble had recognized that the approach in connection with Blue beach was very difficult, and that the conduct of the ship-to-shore movement here might well have difficulty; he also thought it desirable for General Almond, who had little or no previous amphibious experience, to actually observe the conduct of a difficult ship-to-shore problem.

Struble and Almond approached the seawall in the barge, with about the second or third wave, to the left of the landing area. As the two officers approached the seawall, a sergeant of the Marines hollered out in an irate fashion, “Boat there! Get the hell out of here!” Recognizing the urgency of his voice, Struble ordered the coxswain to get out in a hurry. After the barge turned, a large explosive charge blew up and destroyed the nearby seawall. The sergeant was making a breach in the seawall in order that the boats in following waves could go into the breach and the men could get across the top of the wall quicker and better.

The pre-bombardment smoke, combined with the dust and haze, lowered the visibility to less than 100 yards. A 24-inch searchlight was trained on the desired beach to assist the boatmen taking the Marines ashore, and this was a great help. Nevertheless, part of Wave Sixteen became lost and was deposited to the north of Blue beach on the salt beds. (Later, these troops were reembarked and relanded on Blue beach.) Fortunately, resistance was light in this area, and the Marines pressed inland in the fast-falling darkness.

On 16 September, the ground forces advanced against light resistance on an arc radiating five miles from Red beach. The Korean Marines mopped up resistance in the town of Inchon. Air interdiction in the vicinity north and south of the objective area was successful in preventing effective enemy reinforcement. The waterfront unloading, which was very slow at first, improved on D+1 Day, and henceforth unloading proceeded on schedule. Many enemy tanks, vehicles, and mortars were strafed and rocketed on the Seoul-Inchon road. General unloading commenced at 1030 as transport types were moved to berths close off the harbor entrance. Development of unloading facilities commenced in the inner harbor. A causeway on the west side of Wolmi-do was completed, but because of the tidal current, only one LST could be berthed alongside. Commander Amphibious Group Three (RADM L. A. Thackrey, USN) arrived in Eldorado and was placed in charge of unloading operations ashore. Consolation arrived and commenced embarking casualties. At 1800, Commanding General, First Marine Division, assumed command of the landing force elements ashore. The Gunfire Support Group continued deep and close support fire missions with good results.

At 0550, 17 September, two enemy aircraft, believed to be YAK-3s, made bombing runs on Rochester. The first drop of four bombs missed astern, except for one which ricocheted off the airplane crane without exploding. The second drop missed close aboard on the port bow and shrapnel did minor damage to electrical equipment. There were no casualties. The first plane to make a bombing run also strafed the Jamaica and was shot down by that ship. Jamaica suffered three casualties.

The First Marine Division continued to advance against light resistance, although the enemy resistance stiffened on the flanks. During the morning, two hundred enemy troops and five tanks attacked the Fifth Marine Regiment six miles southeast of Inchon. Results: all tanks destroyed and enemy troops annihilated. Kimpo airfield was secured by 2005.

Much traffic was observed moving into Seoul from the east and north. From 500 to 1,000 enemy troops were observed 12 miles south of Munsan, moving toward Seoul. These troops were wearing white clothing over dark; they turned and walked in the opposite direction when U.S. aircraft approached.
U.S. 7th Infantry Division commenced administrative landing at 1400.
The Inchon assault must be recorded as an audacious gamble. That it succeeded so notably and brilliantly enhanced the military reputation of the one man who said it could be done—Douglas MacArthur. It also reflects great credit on the three principal naval and Marine officers—Struble, Doyle and Smith—who planned and carried it off.

Admiral W. F. Halsey’s telegram to the General said as much: “It was,” said Halsey, “the most masterly and audacious strategic stroke in all history.”

Rear Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, the Deputy Chief of Staff to Commander Naval Forces Far East, footnoted the operation: “This operation really shows the greatness of that man.”

General MacArthur saluted the Navy and Marines on the morning of the 15th, in a message to Vice Admiral Struble: “The Navy and the Marines have never shone more brightly than this morning. MacArthur.”
The Sea War in Korea
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson

Chapter 3. The Magnificent Gamble: The Amphibious Assault at Inchon
Significance of the Inchon Landing

That Inchon was a magnificent gamble grandly taken by General MacArthur, and that it also was brilliantly conducted by the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, there can be no doubt.

In researching the multitudinous reports of the Inchon campaign, frequently found are such words as “fortunately,” “phenomenal,” “in spite of,” “unique,” “unorthodox,” and “improvised.” It was “fortunate,” says an Amphibious Group One report, “that the staff of ComPhibGruONE had commenced its research on an Inchon landing in July.” “It was fortunate,” says the First Marine Division report, “that a Marine Mobile training team was in the Far East when the war began.” “It is phenomenal,” says the Pacific Fleet Interim Evaluation Report, “that the LSTs were able to perform their assigned missions only fifteen days after commissioning.” “It was fortunate that the typhoons Kezia and Jane didn’t interfere,” said Admiral Albert K. Morehouse, Chief of Staff to Commander Naval Forces, Far East.

It should not be inferred, however, that the planning or the execution of the Inchon landing was haphazard or that its success was due solely to good fortune. Quite the contrary is true. The planning and execution of the Inchon landing in record time, and with a minimum of casualties, despite the considerable hazards, is a tribute to the skill, training, readiness, and courage of the men of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps who made it possible.

The results of the Inchon operation were notable in many fields: the effect it had on the war; the effect it had upon the Chinese; the effect it had upon the Navy and the Marine Corps; and the effect it had upon our national military policies and programs.

The immediate military effect upon the Korean War was instantaneous and decisive. The Commanding General himself had a brief but erroneous moment of doubt that the intended purpose of the landing had not been realized. On the 17th of September, with the Marines plunging toward Seoul, there was still no evidence that the landing had resulted in any relaxation upon the Pusan perimeter. General Walton H. Walker’s U.S. Eighth Army was still in its positions.

On the Mount McKinley, General MacArthur sent for Rear Admiral Doyle, and expressed his fear that the landing had not achieved the results he had hoped for; and thereupon, he directed Doyle to commence planning another amphibious landing, this time at the point the Navy had originally chosen, near Kunsan. When Doyle asked what troops he should plan on using for the new assault, MacArthur suggested the First Cavalry Division.

In a few hours, however, a despatch from General Walker reported that resistance in his front had weakened, and by that evening it was apparent to all that the great gamble had paid off.

The Inchon landing can be credited with ending the North Korean aggression, for in a matter of days the entire half of the peninsula below the 38th parallel had been recaptured by the UN forces, and the North Korean Army was a beaten and broken army.

Admiral Doyle credits one fortuitous circumstance with having a direct bearing on the success of the 8th Army breakout from the Pusan perimeter as a result of the Inchon operation: the death of their number one general, General Kang Kun. “The death of their number one general,” said Doyle, “greatly influenced the deterioration of the North Korean Army in the Pusan perimeter. He was a very good general and even General MacArthur conceded his ability. His successor did not have the ability to hold the North Korean Army together.”

To the naval student, the results of the Inchon landing are many and varied. The immediate lesson is that
Inchon demonstrated afresh the incalculable value of amphibious operations. Completely contravened was such a statement as the one made only nine months earlier, in October 1949, by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar S. Bradley: “I predict,” said the General, “that large scale amphibious operations will never occur again.”

An excellent condensation of the results of Inchon are found in Admiral Doyle’s action report:

“The target date which was designated, 15 September 1950, did not give adequate time by normal standards for joint planning between the Commander, Attack Force and the Commander, Landing Force. There was no time available for the joint training of the landing forces involved, or for holding rehearsals for the Marines, ships, planes and landing craft which participated in the operation. Many naval and Marine units arrived in Japan with barely sufficient time to combat load in accordance with loading plans.

“The successful accomplishment of the assault on Inchon demanded that an incredible number of individual and coordinated tasks be performed precisely as planned in the face of almost insuperable difficulties. The fact that the assault was successful is a matter of history.

“Under the circumstances I have briefly mentioned above, it is my conviction that the successful assault on Inchon could have been accomplished only by United States Marines. This conviction, I am certain, is shared by everyone who planned, executed or witnessed the assault. My statement is not to be construed as a comparison of the fighting qualities of various units of our armed forces. It simply means that because of their many years of specialized training in amphibious warfare, in conjunction with the Navy, only the United States Marines had the requisite know-how to formulate these plans within the limited time available and to execute these plans flawlessly without additional training or rehearsal. To put it another way, I know that if any other unit of our armed forces had been designated as the landing force for the assault on Inchon, that unit would have required many, many months of the specialized training, including joint training with the Navy, which is a regular part of the Marines’ everyday life.

“All these facts emphasize the soundness of our national policy in entrusting to the Navy and Marine Corps the specialization in, and the development of, amphibious warfare. Conceivably, in the future, we may be required to execute many amphibious landings on many fronts.”

Vice Admiral Struble subsequently made the following observations:

“General MacArthur’s choice of Inchon for the landing demonstrates his great military sagacity. Inchon-Seoul was a strategic target of the greatest value, and his decision as Commander-in-Chief to face the many amphibious difficulties was indeed courageous.

“The critical ground situation in the Pusan perimeter, and the necessity for a landing with the higher high tides on September 15th, or waiting until October 13th, made action by the earlier date of vital importance. Hence the time available to prepare and issue the instructions to seven major forces and arrange for the coordination between them was very limited. That the many varied operations went off like clockwork, despite a typhoon, indicates the high intelligence of the commanders concerned.

“Their names should be mentioned: Rear Admiral Higgins and the Sitting Duck Destroyers under Captain Allan for their mighty bombardment of Wolmi and Inchon. Rear Admiral Ewen and Rear Admiral Ruble for their powerful, accurate air attacks, which stunned the North Korean defenders of Inchon and harassed the supporting forces trying to reinforce the city. Rear Admiral Doyle and Major General Smith, USMC, who successfully landed the First Marine Division in the courageous assault that captured Wolmi-do and Inchon. Major General Almond, U.S. Army, whose Tenth Corps captured Seoul in short order. Rear Admiral Andrewes, Royal Navy, Rear Admiral Henderson, and Captain Austin, whose forces strongly supported the assault.

“Their aggressive action and splendid teamwork carried out the operation with a precision and effectiveness which were wonderful to behold and which are now a matter of record.

“The landing demonstrates the great power of an assault from the sea. Such an operation requires the
maximum of coordination to attain that great power. Naval training after World War II, despite great budget difficulties, had prepared naval amphibious forces and Fleet Marine Forces that could produce the precise coordination required for an amphibious assault. The Navy and the Marines were ready for the call.

“The continued development of amphibious warfare by the Navy and Marines will make this powerful tool in modern clothing available to the next American commander who needs another Inchon on short notice to defeat the forces of aggression.”

The landing at Inchon also had significance and bearing upon the continuing dispute over effective close air support. As related in an earlier chapter, the Navy felt its efforts to assist the hard-pressed UN troops holding the Pusan perimeter had been “woefully ineffective,” with a wastage of 70 per cent of the close air support sorties. The largest part of this difficulty was traceable to the lack of proper communication facilities, air-to-air and air-to-ground; to the lack of maps common to all; and to the lack of cross-education, common doctrine, and training in the close support of troops.

The logic and proof of the Navy’s arguments regarding close air support of troops was beautifully demonstrated during the Inchon assault and the capture of Seoul. So effective and so smoothly did the close air support go that it, in the words of Admiral Ewen’s report, “left little to be desired.”

The Tenth Corps commander, General Almond, sent warm praise to Admiral Struble on 27 September:

“Air support by your command for the 10th Corps attack on Seoul 25 September was outstandingly effective, comprehensive, and timely. Please pass to Admiral Ewen and his men my congratulations and appreciation for this splendid effort which markedly furthered the capture of Seoul.”

Congratulatory messages and letters also were received from other commands: Brigadier General H. W. Kiefer and Major General D. G. Barr of the Seventh Infantry Division, as well as General MacArthur himself.

The Inchon landing taught no new lessons about amphibious techniques. None were used, and none were needed. What was demonstrated was that for traditional warfare the doctrine and command relationships and tactics of World War II were still effective and still decisive.

General MacArthur was lavish in his praise of the naval and Marine officers who had planned and executed Inchon. In a letter to the authors, the General stated: “Admirals Struble and Doyle and General Smith delivered a performance in planning and execution which not only sustained our country’s great naval tradition, but which in ultimate effect is probably unexcelled in the history of warfare.”

One of the most important, delayed-action lessons of Inchon was the realization that the shipping and troop concentrations of the traditional amphibious landing had to be modified to obviate the danger of the atomic bomb. The Inchon assault spurred future thinking and planning for the use of assault helicopters instead of landing craft, and for the need of new amphibious-type vessels which would have greater speed, not only for avoiding submarines en route but for greater, faster, and more automatic unloading capabilities at the beachhead. Inchon demonstrated that our APA and AKA types were obsolescent; that the threat of the atomic bomb would no longer permit the slow discharge of cargo in a confined harbor. As General MacArthur had indicated to General Smith, the result of the Inchon landing was to make certain the permanence of the Marine Corps in the United States military establishment. The incomparable achievement of the Marines at Inchon demonstrated in clearest terms the need of an adequate and ever-ready Corps.

Another result of Inchon was the demonstration of our appallingly poor tactical intelligence. Why maps were inadequate, photography nonexistent, and intelligence sources undeveloped is beyond comprehension. The Navy would do well to learn that no matter what the announced national policy objectives, intelligence collection by the Navy regarding areas of potential amphibious, or other, operations should be worldwide.

Any analysis of Inchon, like any judgment of the naval aspects of the Korean War, must recognize the unique and peculiar circumstances which obtained. First of all, there was no submarine opposition—indeed, with the exception of a few mines, no naval opposition of any kind. Secondly, there was no air opposition. Thirdly, the
actual opposition of the landing was light.

These three factors, had any or all been introduced, would have made the assault more difficult and costly; but, in the opinion of VADM Struble, would not have altered the successful outcome. Any future amphibious campaign, however, must reckon with these three missing components. Even when measured in terms of traditional warfare, and omitting the atomic bomb, the success at Inchon, therefore, cannot blindly be accepted as a standard for any future amphibious venture. Inchon must be a guide, not a criterion.

The effects of the Inchon landing on our national military planning were immense. First of all, the U.S. Marine Corps, which in the eyes of many had been largely relegated to garrison tasks, was revitalized. MacArthur’s prediction to Smith, “the future of the Marine Corps will never again be in doubt,” was accurate. Secondly, the adaptation of doctrine and technique of amphibious warfare to the atomic age, which had largely stagnated between the wars, was resumed. The assault at Inchon had been a textbook repetition of the Pacific war. The experience and cogitation of first five years of the atomic era, 1945-1950, convinced the naval and Marine experts who witnessed the Inchon assault that never again could the concentration of troops, ships, and munitions be permitted in amphibious warfare. New methods, new doctrines, new techniques, and new equipment had to be developed. Inchon provided the spark which revitalized the art of amphibious warfare, and gave birth to the technique of “vertical envelopment.”

Finally, far from being passé, as many post World War II amateur and professional strategists had predicted, naval forces, including Fleet Marine Forces, were a solid and practicable means for implementing the national strategy of the United States.
The Sea War in Korea
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson

Chapter 4. The Battle of the Mines (Part I—Wonsan)
The Mopup of the North Korean Army

By September’s end, the shattered North Korean Army was in full retreat. Entire Communist divisions had completely disintegrated and were spread over the Korean countryside in disorganized units. Enemy lines of communication and supply had been completely severed, and escape routes, except for the mountainous areas, were in United Nations hands. Many enemy troops were trapped in the peninsula’s southwest corner. In their haste to escape, the enemy had abandoned both arms and equipment; tanks, mortars, artillery, and small arms littered the roads, rice paddies, and ditches of South Korea.

Without hope of replenishment or reinforcement, unable to travel or communicate with impunity, and completely blockaded at sea, the remaining Communist soldiers who had not been captured or who had not surrendered were forced to hide, to organize guerrilla bands, or to sneak over the mountainous areas toward their homeland.

Within a matter of days following the Inchon landing, the North Korean military effort that had reached the very doorstep of Pusan was now struggling frantically to reassemble and redeploy for defense of the territory north of the 38th parallel.

The United Nations ground forces, meanwhile, advanced rapidly on all fronts. On the east coast, the Republic of Korea First Corps, four divisions strong, lined up near the 38th parallel, awaiting orders to drive toward the ports of Wonsan and Hungnam. The South Korean Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Capital Divisions were poised and eager to capitalize on the enemy’s desultory status.

West of the First Corps, the forces of the U.S. Tenth Corps fanned out of the Seoul area in hot pursuit of enemy stragglers. The First Marine Division, supported by the Marine Corsair pilots of Task Group 96.8, pushed northward to take Uijongbu, a vital road hub twelve miles north of Seoul, which had briefly served as temporary headquarters for the retreating North Korean Army. Simultaneously, the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team commenced a mopup of the Inchon peninsula.

Eastward from Seoul, the U.S. Seventh Division pushed 25 miles to capture the important rail junction of Osan and to close other retreat avenues for the Reds.

In South Korea, the Eighth Army reoccupied territory held captive since the war’s beginning. The U.S. 25th Division entered Kunsan, a west coast port; the U.S. 24th Division and the South Korean First Division mopped up South Central Korea, clearing out enemy pockets around Taegon, Yong-dong, and Kumchon. Before these Eighth Army divisions could actually renew the offensive, however, they would have to transit the lines of the Tenth Corps.

As the complexion of the war on the peninsula shifted from the defense to the offense, from positional warfare to pursuit, UN naval forces kept the enemy under constant blockade, surveillance, and bombardment whenever possible. However, only a few of the ships were fortunate enough to have shooting assignments. Canada’s destroyer Athabaskan and Australia’s destroyer Bataan took potshots at enemy hideouts in the Kunsan area. Missouri anchored in Inchon channel south of Wolmi-do and fired missions against enemy troop concentrations on the road leading north from Suwon. The cruisers Toledo and Rochester, from a position in the Inchon channel north of Wolmi-do, heavily shelled troop concentrations and strong points in the Seoul-Kimpo area.

Early in the morning of 27 September, a particularly heavy bombardment was commenced by the cruiser Manchester and destroyers Ozbourn, Hollister, McKean and Frank Knox. Five thousand enemy troops had been
reported bivouacked on Fankochi Point. At eleven minutes past seven, the five-ship armada opened fire and shelled the area continuously for forty-nine minutes with five- and six-inch fire. Following this bombardment, thirty-three rocket- and bomb-loaded Corsairs and Skyraiders roared in from Boxer’s Air Group Two (CDR Donald M. White, USN) to attack the Communist defenders.

For four days, the pilots of Task Force 77 contributed to the reduction of enemy forces and military targets on Fankochi Point.

The only incident of the entire bombardment happened to Ensign Claude E. Dorris of Fighting Squadron 23, who was hit by antiaircraft fire during a bombing run. Dorris crash-landed ten miles south of the North Korean capital city of Pyongyang. It was a 60-mile flight for a Kimpo-based Marine helicopter (from VMO 6). In an adventurous flight by helicopter (flown by Captain Victor A. Armstrong, USMC), a successful pickup of Dorris was made in about two hours, but the ’copter ran out of gasoline in the vicinity of the Han River. Fortunately, the emergency landing occurred in friendly-held territory.

In the post-Seoul mopup, Task Force 77 lost six aircraft and suffered damage to twenty. One man had been killed in action. The Seventh Fleet carriers struck eight railway bridges, destroying five. Twenty-four highway bridges were attacked and eight destroyed. Also reported destroyed in the free-swinging offensive were three aircraft, two hundred and three trucks and vehicles, twenty warehouses, nine locomotives, ten gun emplacements, fifty-two railroad cars, four tanks, and one hundred and forty-three oxcarts.

After operating in the Yellow Sea from 21 September through 3 October, Task Force 77 departed for Sasebo, Japan. Rear Admiral Edward C. Ewen stated that the carriers had supported the UN forces with both close- and deep-support air strikes and by serving as target air coordinators and by spotting for naval gunfire. Ewen reported that targets below the 38th parallel had been reduced so effectively and rapidly after the recapture of Seoul that carrier aircraft were out of targets. The American Navy was now ready and eager to carry the war back into the territory of the North Koreans who had initiated it.
Chapter 4. The Battle of the Mines (Part I—Wonsan)

The UN Debates the Decision to Cross Parallel 38

As the North Korean People’s Army scurried back across the 38th parallel, Communist diplomats in the UN now sought to win with words what they had failed to win by arms.

Obviously, the North Korean forces were hopelessly defeated. The only chance of salvaging the situation for the hard-pressed North Koreans was to forestall the victorious UN armies from pursuing the North Korean People’s Army across the border until the forces of Red China were ready to intervene.

Most UN members felt that the 38th parallel, always unrealistic, had ceased to exist the moment the North Koreans violated it on 25 June. UN naval and air elements had fought north of the 38th from the war’s beginning. President Truman personally felt that the UN forces had every legal basis for engaging the North Korean People’s Army north of the 38th parallel. President Syngman Rhee of the Korean Republic had strongly held this opinion from the very beginning. Nothing less than full sovereignty and capitulation was acceptable to him.

Communist delegates in the General Assembly of the United Nations at Lake Success, New York, led by President Andrei Vishinsky, took violent exception. If UN troops crossed the 38th, thundered Vishinsky, the United Nations Forces would become aggressors.

Surprisingly, the Soviet delegate’s argument found one sympathetic ear in the person of India’s Jawaharlal Nehru, a man whose political philosophy for peace was scarcely in consonance with that of Vishinsky and his Communist supporters.

Although the debate at Lake Success was to last less than a week, every day the military movement north of the 38th parallel could be delayed by the Communist verbal barrage would be critically important to the rescue of North Korea.

Much of the Soviet harangue fell on deaf ears. The majority of the non-Soviet delegates felt that General MacArthur’s original authority was sufficient to bring peace and security to all of Korea. No orders to march across the parallel were needed.

Sensing that his verbal battle was being lost, Vishinsky tried still another stall; he recommended that both North and South Koreans be invited to the UN headquarters to tell their story to the General Assembly.

To those experienced in the devious doubletalk of the Reds, this proposal was pathetically flimsy. Vishinsky was stalling, grasping for time—time for the North Koreans to rest, regroup, replenish; and, more than anything else, time for Chinese Communist troops to reach the front so that the fighting could be resumed.

The U.S. delegate to the UN, Ambassador Warren R. Austin, recommended that if the Soviets were sincerely interested in halting the conflict, they accept his eight-point proposal:

1. Establishment of a free, independent, and united country.
2. Creation of a United Nations Commission empowered to devise and recommend the unification process.
4. Consultation with the thus-established government of Korea in all matters pertaining to the united republic’s future.
5. The United Nations to assist in Korea’s reconstruction and development.
6. Retention of United Nations forces in Korea only as long as necessary to achieve these objectives.
7. Elimination of special privileges for any nation and the development of friendly relations with all.
“8. Admission of Korea to the United Nations and assumption by her of the obligations, duties, and privileges of membership.”

Vishinsky promptly countered with a seven-point proposal:

“1. That the belligerents cease hostilities. (The UN had voted a cease fire on June 25, but Communist Korea had refused.)

2. That United Nations troops be withdrawn to permit the Korean people the sovereign right to settle ‘freely’ their internal affairs. (The UN had already voted against return to the pre-June 25 status.)

3. That all-Korean elections be held to establish a unified, independent government. (The Soviet had refused to permit such elections in 1948.)

4. That the North Korea Assembly and the National Assembly of South Korea elect a commission of delegates from each to organize and conduct free elections. (This required recognition first of the North Korean puppet government.)

5. That Red China and Russia be members of UN committee observing the election. (Russia had consistently refused to participate in any previous UN commission on Korea. The price now was recognition of Communist China.)

6. That a unified and independent Korea be given economic aid through the UN. (All agreed.)

7. That after the establishment of the all-Korean government, the Security Council consider admitting Korea to the UN. (The records to date: Russia vetoed admitting South Korea to the UN and the United Nations had voted against admitting North Korea.)”

In essence, Vishinsky wanted the UN to surrender and to apologize for starting the war.

On 4 October, the UN General Assembly’s Political Committee passed the following resolution:

“. . . That all appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea;

That all constituent acts be taken, including the holding of elections under the auspices of the United Nations, for the establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic government in the sovereign state of Korea;

That all sections and representative bodies of the population of Korea, south and north, be invited to cooperate with the organs of the UN in the restoration of peace, in the holding of elections, and in the establishment of a unified government;

That United Nations forces should not remain in any part of Korea otherwise than so far as necessary for achieving the objectives specified;

That all necessary measures be taken to accomplish the economic rehabilitation of Korea; and,

That a commission drawn from Australia, Chile, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the Philippines, Turkey, and one other nation be established to achieve the listed objectives.”

Noble ideas all—but unfortunately none of them would resolve the problems existing on the battlefield.
The Sea War in Korea
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson

Chapter 4. The Battle of the Mines (Part I—Wonsan)
The Decision to Land at Wonsan

In the Far East, meanwhile, General MacArthur was making his own tentative plans to cross the parallel. Two members of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, USN, and General J. Lawton Collins, USA, while in Tokyo in late August to discuss the Inchon landing, had agreed that the ultimate military objective was the destruction of the North Korean military forces. They also agreed that ground operations would be extended beyond the 38th parallel as necessary to achieve that goal. This Tokyo agreement took the form of a recommendation that was placed before the U.S. Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall on 7 September. A week later, while en route to the Inchon beaches, MacArthur received a JCS despatch stating that while President Truman had approved certain conclusions relating to the Korean conflict, these early “conclusions” were not yet to be construed as final. Although President Truman approved the plan to push north of the 38th, MacArthur was told to make plans, but to take no implementing actions without explicit permission.

That General MacArthur anticipated authority to cross the 38th parallel was evident on 26 September. On this day the General directed his Joint Special Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG) to develop a plan for operations north of the parallel. MacArthur stated his belief then that the Eighth Army should make the main effort either on the west or the east coast. Once this matter was resolved, he felt there should be an amphibious envelopment on the opposite coast—either at Chinnampo or Wonsan, or elsewhere.

The next day, 27 September, General MacArthur received from his G-3 (operations officer), Brigadier General Edwin K. Wright, Operations Plan 9-50. This plan made two assumptions: first, that the bulk of the organized North Korean People’s Army had already been destroyed; and secondly, that neither the USSR nor Red China would enter the conflict. This plan provided that General Walker’s Eighth Army should attack across the 38th parallel directing its main effort along the Kaesong-Sariwon-Pyongyang axis, this drive to be undertaken in mid-October; and that General Almond’s Tenth Corps should concomitantly land amphibiously at Wonsan, on the east coast. Almond’s Corps, after landing, would continue westward through the Pyongyang-Wonsan corridor and link up with General Walker’s Army in North Korea, thereby trapping the remainder of the North Korean People’s Army. The plan further envisioned that these two commands, after uniting, should advance north to the Chongju-Kunuri-Wongwon- Hamhung-Hungnam line, a line measuring fifty to one hundred miles south of the Yalu River marking the border between Korea and Red China. Only ROK troops would be allowed to proceed north of this line.

Although the plan to make an amphibious landing at Wonsan was first proposed to COMNAVFE in Tokyo shortly after the Inchon landing, it was not until 29 September that General MacArthur himself outlined the plan to subordinate commanders. This was done on the second floor of Seoul’s capitol building, following the ceremonies in which he gave Seoul back to the government of the Republic of Korea. General MacArthur described to those present, including Vice Admiral Joy, Lieutenant Generals Walker and Stratemeyer, and Major General Almond (plus representatives from the Eighth Air Force and Tenth Corps), how he planned to end the war with another amphibious envelopment.

Click here to view map

On 20 October, he said, the Tenth Corps would land at Wonsan. The Marines would be outloaded at Inchon, and, because of Inchon’s limited port facilities, the Seventh Division would be embarked at Pusan. While the Tenth Corps made a seaborne run-around-end, the Eighth Army would push directly toward the North Korean
capital of Pyongyang.

After landing at Wonsan, he continued, the Tenth Corps was to move northward between the sea of Japan and the Taebek Mountain Range, turning westward through passes in the mountains to link up with the Eighth Army.

The reasons motivating a seaborne landing at Wonsan were later explained by General MacArthur. “The Eighth Army’s lines of supply were already taxed to their maximum capacity to sustain the day-to-day minimum requirements of its troops in the line,” he said. “Furthermore, the dispatch of Tenth Corps by sea was intended as a flanking movement against enemy remnants still trying to escape from the south to the north, and as an envelopment to bring pressure upon Pyongyang should the attack upon that enemy capital result in a long drawn-out siege.” [4]

General Almond started to implement the Wonsan plan immediately following the MacArthur conference in the Seoul capitol building on the 29th. Almond called his Tenth Corps commanders together that same afternoon for a second conference at Ascom City, near Inchon.

There, Almond stated that he hoped it would be possible to land at Wonsan by 15 October, advancing by five days the D-day deadline set by MacArthur.[4A] Almond believed that the Eighth Army should be able to pass through and relieve Tenth Corps by 3 October, on which date the shipping would start arriving in Inchon for loading.

To the naval planners 15 October seemed extremely optimistic. As late as 29 September, the First Marine Division was still fighting north of Seoul; on 2 October, in fact, the Marines had 16 killed and 81 wounded in heavy fighting at the front. Moreover, should the first vessels not arrive at Inchon until 3 October, and if five days were required to load, as had been estimated by JSPOG, plus four more days to steam from Inchon to Wonsan, then only two of the original six days would be left for unloading the landing force in the objective area.

In early October the Marines did not know how many ships or what type would be made available for transporting the division. Moreover, they had no maps of the Wonsan area, and there was little intelligence. As events unfolded, Almond’s desire that Tenth Corps should be relieved by 3 October was accurate as far as the Seventh Division was concerned.

As a matter of fact, elements of the Eighth Army began relieving the Seventh Infantry Division on 2 October, and General Almond ordered this division to begin moving toward Pusan by motor and rail.[5]

Despite his lack of planning information, Major General Oliver P. Smith, the Marine Commander, established a tentative task organization composed of three regimental combat teams (RCT) and issued his operation order. In it he earmarked the First and Seventh Marines to launch the Wonsan amphibious attack. Each regiment would employ two battalions in assault. All Marine units would combat-load out of Inchon. General Smith did not welcome the probability of splitting his division, once ashore, in mopping-up operations.

Next day, 4 October, General Almond issued Tenth Corps Operation Order No. 4. This ordered the Seventh Infantry Division to outload at Pusan for the landing at Wonsan and the First Marine Division to report to the Attack Force Commander of the Seventh Fleet as a landing force for the Wonsan amphibious assault. The Marines were to seize the Tenth Corps’ base of operations at Wonsan, to secure the Wonsan airfield, and to furnish logistic support until relieved by the shore party.

On 5 October the Fifth Marines were relieved. On the 6th and 7th, the First and Seventh Marines were relieved. On 7 October, the First Marine Division command post at Inchon was transferred aboard Admiral Doyle’s flagship, the USS Mount McKinley. Marine outloading at Inchon began 8 October.

For the first several days, an amphibious landing at Wonsan was not questioned by the Navy. Both Admiral Joy and Admiral Struble recognized the military need for an assault, as well as the logistic urgency for capturing an additional logistic port.

The naval planning for an amphibious assault at Wonsan was a near duplication of the preparation for
Inchon. Admiral Struble issued his preliminary plan on 5 October and his final plan on 9 October. The tasks given by Admiral Struble to his forces were several: (1) To maintain an effective naval blockade of the east coast; (2) to furnish naval gunfire and air support to any east coast Army units in addition to those to be landed at Wonsan; (3) to conduct pre-D-Day bombardments; (4) to load and transport the Tenth Corps to Wonsan; (5) to seize Wonsan by amphibious assault; (6) to occupy and defend a beachhead; and following the successful accomplishment of all this, (7) to provide naval gunfire, air, and initial logistic support to the Tenth Corps.

The major elements of Admiral Struble’s task organization included:

- CTF 90 Attack Force (RADM James H. Doyle)
- CTF 92 Tenth Corps (MAJGEN Edward M. Almond)
- CTF 95 Advance Force (RADM Allan E. Smith)
- CTG 96.2 Patrol and Reconnaissance Group (RADM George R. Henderson)
- CTG 96.8 Escort Carriers (RADM Richard W. Ruble)
- CTF 77 Fast Carriers (RADM Edward C. Ewen)
- CTF 79 Logistics Support (CAPT Bernard L. Austin)
As the planning and preparation to invade Wonsan went forward, a message was received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorizing General MacArthur to proceed north of the 38th parallel:

“Your military objective is the destruction of the North Korean armed forces. In attaining this objective you are authorized to conduct military operations, including amphibious and airborne landings or ground operations, north of the 38th parallel in Korea, provided that at the time of such operations there has been no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, no announcement of intended entry, nor a threat to counter our operations militarily in North Korea. . . .”[6]

From this despatch it was apparent that although the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff did not want to expand the war, they did not discount the possibility that the Soviet Union and Red China might intervene.

The JCS despatch further instructed MacArthur:

“. . . under no circumstances will your forces cross the Manchurian or USSR borders of Korea and, as a matter of policy, no non-Korean ground forces will be used in the northeast provinces bordering the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian border. Furthermore, support of your operations north or south of the 38th parallel will not include air or naval action against Manchuria or against USSR territory. . . .”

Two days later, 29 September, General MacArthur was further instructed in a despatch from Secretary of Defense Marshall “. . . to feel unhampered tactically and strategically”[7] in proceeding north of the 38th parallel. Thus General MacArthur now had sufficient latitude to carry out his Wonsan plan which he had submitted to the JCS for final approval on 28 September. Additionally, he told the JCS:

“There is no indication at present of entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces.”[8]

JCS approved the MacArthur plan three days later.

On 9 October, the JCS amplified its instructions to the Commander in Chief as follows:

“Hereafter, in the event of open or covert employment anywhere in Korea of major Chinese Communist units, without prior announcement, you should continue the action as long as, in your judgment, action by forces now under your control offers a reasonable chance of success. In any case you will obtain authorization from Washington prior to taking any military actions against objectives in Chinese territory.”[9]
During the preparations for the Wonsan landing, General MacArthur twice called on the enemy to surrender.

His first appeal, issued on 1 October, was addressed to the North Korean commander in chief, Kim Il Sung, who was also the Premier of North Korea. The appeal was broadcast by radio and showered from aircraft in leaflet form:

“The early and total defeat and complete destruction of your armed forces and war-making potentials is now inevitable.

“In order that the decision of the United Nations may be carried out with a minimum of further loss of life and destruction of property, I, as the United Nations Commander in Chief, call upon you and the forces under your command, in whatever part of Korea situated, forthwith to lay down your arms and cease hostilities under such military supervision as I may direct and I call upon you at once to liberate all United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees under your control and to make adequate provision for their protection, care, maintenance, and immediate transportation to such places as I indicate.

“North Korean forces, including prisoners of war in the hands of the United Nations command, will continue to be given the care dictated by civilized custom and practice and permitted to return to their homes as soon as practicable. I shall anticipate your early decision upon this opportunity to avoid the further useless shedding of blood and destruction of property.”[10]

Kim Il Sung made no direct response to the surrender request. Instead, a reply in the form of a warning came indirectly from another source two days later. Red China’s foreign minister, Chou En-lai, informed K. M. Pannikar, the Indian ambassador at Peiping, that China would intervene in the event United Nations forces crossed the 38th parallel. Chou En-lai stated further that China would not intervene if only ROK troops entered North Korea.[11]

On the same day, in an 11,000-word speech, Chou En-lai also warned that Red China would not “supinely tolerate seeing our neighbors being savagely invaded by ‘imperialists.’ ”

General MacArthur issued his second surrender ultimatum on 9 October, less in the expectation of a response than as a forewarning to the North Koreans that further military action was contemplated. The second surrender message was again addressed to the Premier and government of North Korea:

“In order that the decisions of the United Nations may be carried out with a minimum of further loss of life and destruction of property, I, as the United Nations Commander in Chief, for the last time call upon you and the forces under your command in whatever part of Korea situated to lay down your arms and cease hostilities.”

MacArthur added:

“And I call upon all North Koreans to co-operate fully with the United Nations in establishing a unified independent and democratic government of Korea, assured that they will be treated justly and that the United Nations will act to relieve and rehabilitate all parts of a unified Korea. . . .

“Unless immediate response is made by you in the name of the North Korean government, I shall at once proceed to take such military action as may be necessary to endorse the decrees of the United Nations.”

The second surrender request also met with silence.
As North Korean defenses on the east coast collapsed and the ROK Army’s northward advance accelerated, the question arose in early October if it would not now be wise to take Wonsan’s harbor by an overland drive, rather than by an amphibious landing. Most military and naval commanders in the Far East were in solid agreement that in order to destroy all the North Korean forces in North Korea, the remarkable victory at Inchon had to be followed quickly with a prompt and vigorous pursuit. As the ROK’s rapid advance up the east coast proceeded, the question of whether to travel by land or by sea was debated on the Service command levels and in the press.

Most Army men favored a sea assault on Wonsan, although there were Army dissenters even among MacArthur’s staff. Generals Doyle O. Hickey and Edwin K. Wright felt that Tenth Corps could best be incorporated into Eighth Army at the close of the Inchon-Seoul phase of the operation. Brigadier General George L. Ebberly, MacArthur’s G-4 (Logistics Officer), thought Tenth Corps could be more easily supplied if it was made a part of the Eighth Army.

As the situation ashore was changing, the original reasons which motivated a sea-borne landing at Wonsan were still compelling. First, by landing the Tenth Corps at Wonsan, the heavy supply load on the port of Inchon would be relieved, as an additional harbor would thus be opened for the direct supply of the Tenth Corps. Secondly, the Tenth Corps would be strategically located to operate as an enveloping force against the enervated North Korean People’s Army as it opposed the U.S. Eighth Army’s drive toward Pyongyang.

The Army’s arguments for a sealift to Wonsan were well stated by the Tenth Corps commander, Major General Edward M. Almond. On 17 October 1950, aboard Mount McKinley, he told the author that “from a tactical point of view, it’s cheaper to go to Wonsan by sea.” Going overland, he said, was simply out of the question. “Half of our heavy equipment—bulldozers, big guns, and heavy trucks—would have been left in ditches by the side of the road.” Almond said that the terrain in North Korea made an overland movement inadvisable. Moreover, there was poor lateral communication between east and west above the 38th parallel.

Paradoxically, while recognizing the urgency for having the Tenth Corps on the eastern half of the peninsula, most Navy men looked with disfavor on a sea movement to Wonsan.

“None of us at COMNAVFE could see the necessity for such an operation,” said Admiral Joy, “since the 10th Corps could have marched overland to Wonsan in a much shorter time and with much less effort than it would take to get the Corps around to Wonsan by sea.”

Naval preference for an overland movement stemmed from several reasons. First, if the entire Tenth Corps outloaded at Inchon, the use of the comparatively small port with its swift tides would seriously interfere with the offloading of incoming supplies for the Eighth Army. If more than half of Inchon’s facilities were used for outloading Tenth Corps, Eighth Army was certain to be in short supply and its forward advance hobbled. Second, shipping and amphibious craft were in limited supply. To assemble all the sealift for a major invasion would seriously restrict the support that could be given to UN forces operating in other areas. Third, commencing 10 October, reports were received from the minesweepers that they were encountering more mine interference than expected. A landing delay at Wonsan might happen.

The Marines, after hearing about the rapidly advancing ROKs, did not anticipate with avidity the prospects of invading a beach likely to be in friendly hands in a matter of days or even hours. As reports came into the headquarters in October, they progressively indicated that the First ROK Corps, spearheaded by the naval
gunfire support of Admiral Smith’s ships, would soon hold Wonsan before any amphibious seizure could be affected. The “Rambling ROKs” were averaging about 14 miles per day from their jumpoff on 1 October.

The naval preference for an overland movement to Wonsan was succinctly stated by Rear Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, Deputy Chief of Staff to Commander Naval Forces Far East: “As events had developed, we objected to an amphibious assault as being unnecessary,” said Burke.\[12\] “It would take a lot of troops out of action for a long time when the enemy was already on the run. We felt that the same objective—to seize the port of Wonsan—could be achieved by marching the Tenth Corps up the road leading from Seoul to Wonsan.”

One other Army officer who agreed with the Navy was Major General David G. Barr, Commander of the Seventh Division. Barr told Admiral Doyle that it was his preference “to take the high road” from Seoul to Wonsan.

Despite the debate and discussion the original MacArthur decision to land from the sea in Wonsan, was never reopened with the General himself. “I was never apprised of any Navy objection to the seaborne landing at Wonsan,” he later told the authors.\[13\]

COMNAVFE made his objections known to MacArthur’s chief of staff, General Hickey, shortly after the operation was proposed. The advantages of going overland were all brought out. The Chief of Staff was sympathetic but said that the General had made up his mind about the landing and there was no use trying to talk him out of it.

“In retrospect,” said Admiral Joy, “it must be said that the landing was to pay dividends for the Navy. Had it not been undertaken we might never have become fully alerted to the menace of mine warfare nor profited from the lessons we learned about mine sweeping.”
While the decision to make an amphibious landing at Wonsan was never changed, General MacArthur did consider a plan to invade at Hungnam rather than at Wonsan. On 8 October, he confided to Admiral Joy that if the First ROK Corps took Wonsan prior to D-day, he was considering landing the Seventh Division administratively at Iwon. In this case the Seventh Division could drive west-southwest to join the Eighth Army on the west coast. At the same time, said the General, the First Marine Division could make an assault landing at Hungnam, instead of Wonsan, to cut the enemy’s lines of communications through Hamhung. Vice Admiral Struble told Joy that a landing on Iwon could probably be made on short notice “because of the limited mine problem and the satisfactory landing beaches in that area.” He added “Iwon was an open beach. We could have taken chances at Iwon and made an assault there.”

Landing the Marines at Hungnam, however, was a more complicated problem, and Joy pointed out to General MacArthur that because of mines, early and easy entry might be impossible; that there were insufficient landing craft to land simultaneously at two places; that the timetable for the operation was already critically tight; there was no time to shift ships, rewrite plans, and all the rest. But the most important deterrent, he reminded MacArthur, was there were far too few minesweepers to clear even one area, let alone two.

On 9 October, Admiral Joy informed Admiral Struble by dispatch that he was trying to prevent a change in plans, but that because the General was personally sponsoring the Hungnam assault, his efforts might prove unsuccessful. Joy said it appeared probable that unless the ROK Army soon captured Hungnam, MacArthur might order the Marines and the Seventh Division to land at Hungnam, or the Marines to land at Hungnam and the Seventh at Wonsan.

Admiral Struble was in full agreement with Joy that no Hungnam change should be tried. “If anything,” he told the authors after the war, “Hungnam represented a potentially longer minesweeping problem than Wonsan. Because of the very considerable lack of minesweeping forces and experienced personnel available, only one mined area could be cleared at a time.”

With the support of Struble and Doyle, and in view of all factors, Joy persuaded MacArthur to continue the original Wonsan plan.
Chapter 4. The Battle of the Mines (Part I—Wonsan)
Historical Background of the Communist Mining Campaign

Before commencing the narrative of the problems encountered by the U.S. Navy’s minesweepers at Wonsan, it will help the reader’s understanding if the Russian interest in mine warfare is documented and a brief description is given of the hydrography of Korea, which in many ways was an ideal location for the use of mines.

Historically, Russia has long been noted for her interest and success in mining—more so perhaps than with any other naval weapon in modern times. Russia used the mine effectively in the Crimean War, in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 and ’78, and in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 and 1905. In the latter conflict, for example, the Russian Navy sank two Japanese battleships off Port Arthur, in southern Manchuria, with moored contact-type mines of a type very similar to those that were to be used at Wonsan nearly a half century later.\[13A\]

Initially the Soviet mining effort in North Korea was probably undertaken to keep UN ships out of North Korean harbors and to limit UN naval offensive capabilities. As it turned out, Korea provided the Soviet Navy an ideal opportunity to test the United States Navy’s ability to cope with mines in the western Pacific as of 1950. At the same time Soviet Russia could help her North Korean satellite delay the advance of the UN ground forces.

Actually, the Korean peninsula was almost ideally suited for an experiment in defensive mine warfare. After the UN’s entry into the war, the Communists could foresee that U.S. naval forces would take every advantage of their amphibious warfare specialty to move northward. The landings at Pohang and Inchon were eloquent testimony of this special skill. Moreover, the Communists recognized the vulnerability of Korea’s eastern coast to amphibious assault, and also to bombardment from the sea. The waters off the east coast were deep and the coastal plains narrow. The coastline was reasonably straight, and the 100-fathom curve lay fairly closely to shore. Off the good harbors of Wonsan and Hungnam, there was a large shelf of shallow water which made mine planting exceptionally effective.

On the opposite shore, Korea’s western coastline was a honeycomb of shallows, with the Korean rivers emptying into the Yellow Sea. Nowhere in the Yellow Sea was the water more than sixty fathoms deep; mean tidal range was twenty-one feet. While not ideal, the west coast was certainly mineable.

Thus, the Soviets could once again make full use of mines—to forestall further amphibious assaults by planting minefields off every suitable beach area, and to make coastal bombardments hazardous by the use of offshore moored minefields.
To properly understand the complexity and severity of the mine problem faced in Korea by U.S. naval forces, a brief description of the modern mine is necessary.

Mines have been employed in naval warfare for more than 350 years. Until about 1880, sea mines were known as “torpedoes.” Admiral Farragut’s famous order at Mobile Bay, “Damn the torpedoes, Four bells!” was made in regard to the crude sea mines built and used by Confederate forces during the Civil War.

Until the advent of World War I, the sea mine was a simple but effective weapon. A large charge of gunpowder or TNT, encased in a suitable container, was chained to the floor of the ocean by an anchor so that the mine itself bobbed beneath the surface some 10 to 20 feet. Several triggering “horns” protruded from the mine container. If a passing ship made contact with one of these horns, the mine’s firing circuit was closed and the mine exploded—usually with fatal consequences to the contacting ship.

In sweeping such a minefield, these mines are cut by streaming sweep cables from the stern of the small sweeper with “depressors” and “otters” to hold the cable—at proper depth as well as to force the cutting cable to plane outboard of the sweep vessel. Floats or “pigs” keep the cable from running too deep.

Commencing with World War I, however, this simple type of contact mine was joined by the first of several other types of mines. During World War I, mines were developed that could be controlled by an electrical circuit from the beach. The British also developed and used the first magnetic mine.

In World War II, still more treacherous mines were developed—ones that would lie on the ocean floor and wait to be exploded by the noise of a ship’s propellers, by the reduction of water pressure caused by a passing ship’s hull, or by the shifting of the lines of force of the earth’s magnetic field as a ship’s steel hull passed by—or by a combination of these influences.

The first of the modern mines is the magnetic mine, first used by the British but perfected by the Germans in World War II. Unlike the contact mine, the magnetic mine does not have to be chained to an anchor, but can be sown freely on the ocean floor.

When the Nazis first began use of the magnetic type mine in 1939, they made two mistakes. Instead of waiting until enough of them were ready so that all British ports could be mined simultaneously, the Nazis employed them in driblets. The second Nazi mistake was inadvertent. A Luftwaffe pilot dropped one of the new magnetic mines on a mudbank in the Thames estuary instead of in the ocean, and the Royal Navy promptly disassembled it and discovered its secret.

“The Nazis were able to employ these mines in limited quantities and only in a relatively few ports,” said Captain N. B. Atkins, officer in charge of the U.S. Navy’s mine warfare section in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations when the Korean war started. “Had larger quantities of German magnetics been available to permit a more widespread and continuing use, the employment of this weapon might have forced the capitulation of England. This was a serious German blunder and leads to one of the major considerations in the introduction of new types of mines in modern war. New mines should never be introduced until sufficient stocks are on hand to insure full exploitation of the new mines’ effectiveness. If this is not done, the expense and effort devoted to the mine’s development may be wasted.”

Another reason for the failure of the German magnetic mine effort was Great Britain’s success in the field of countermeasures. “Great Britain had countermeasures to the magnetic mine largely worked out and ‘on
the shelf” in advance of its use by the Germans,” said Atkins. “They had developed a system of degaussing ships (neutralizing the ship’s magnetic field) and had built crude magnetic sweeps. Neither of these countermeasures had been placed in service by the Royal Navy because of the cost and copper involved.”[14]

To sweep the magnetic mine, minesweepers must duplicate the influence to which the mine itself responds. The magnetic sweep gear consists of two large cables—a short “leg” and a long “leg”; these cables are lowered into the sea from the minesweeper’s stern. Floats known as “pigs” keep the cables buoyant. The long leg is allowed to drift astern of the sweeping vessel for some 1,200 feet. At the end of each leg is a copper electrode. When the electrical cables are in position, a powerful generator aboard the sweeping vessel is turned on. This transmits a powerfully pulsed current which passes through either a closed loop of cable or through the cables and a water path between their electrodes kept safely astern of the sweeper. Thus, a strong magnetic field is created, capable of detonating any mines within the cables’ influence.

As will be seen, magnetic mines were present in the Wonsan minefield.

The second type of modern mine is the acoustic mine, which can be detonated by the machinery or propeller noise of a passing ship. Like the magnetic mine, it can also be planted on the floor of the sea. The acoustic mine utilizes a simple hydrophone or “artificial ear” that is set to “hear” a ship’s engines or propellers. When it does, its diaphragm vibrates and closes the fatal switch. Acoustic mines are destroyed by duplicating the noise of a ship’s propeller. The equipment for doing so is called a “hammer” or a “bumblebee” that rumbles as it is dragged through the water.

The third type of modern mine is the pressure mine. In the evil lexicon of mine warfare, pressure mines are even more unsweepable and diabolical than either acoustic or magnetic mines. In a pressure mine, the negative pressure of a passing ship sucks a diaphragm upward, closing the firing switch. Consequently, to sweep pressure mines, the minesweeper must endeavor to duplicate the change in water pressure produced by a passing ship. This requires that either an underwater hull like that of a ship, in both size and shape (called a “guinea pig” ship), be pulled through the minefield, or some other means be found to induce the same kind of pressure change in the water. The pressure mine is generally used in combination with a magnetic or an acoustic mechanism.

Fourthly, the toughest type of modern mine is the combination mine—one that combines one or more of the above types in the same carcass: a magnetic-acoustic, or a pressure-magnetic mine. This combination type mine will explode only when the sweepers employ two or more of the disturbing forces.

To make the problem even more complicated, “ship counters” can be built into the firing circuit of nearly any type mine. These counters can be pre-set so they will explode only after five, ten, or more ships have passed safely by. Thus, a minesweeper can sweep a channel a predetermined number of times, declare the channel “clear,” and still have the mine explode beneath the next passing ship.

Finally, there is the deadly, but rarely used, electrically-controlled mine that is wired to and activated by a switch on the beach.

These are the modern types of mines which naval science had devised at the time of the Wonsan landing. They are passive weapons which complement other naval weapons in controlling the seas. They can deny access to harbors, approaches, and ocean areas (where the water depth will permit), to friend and foe alike.

The United States Navy would have found command of harbors and minable waters in the Korean theater much easier to maintain if adequate mine sweeping forces and experienced people had been ready before the war commenced.
The Sea War in Korea
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson

Chapter 4. The Battle of the Mines (Part I—Wonsan)
U.S. Navy Mine Warfare Retrenchment, 1945-1950

The job of the minesweeper is specialized, dangerous, and difficult. There is little glamor and less publicity accompanying the task.

The attitude in the U.S. Navy toward mine warfare—general until October 1950, and occasional since—has not been unlike the bitter sentiment against mines expressed in 1806 by the British Admiral, Earl of St. Vincent, to Prime Minister Lord Grenville. The British Ministry had given encouragement to Robert Fulton to build a mine from a gunpowder keg.

“Why should we who depend utterly on command of the sea,” asked the British Admiral, “seek to develop a weapon which we do not need, and which, if perfected, would deprive us of that command?”

During World War II, the U.S. Navy’s Pacific minesweeping fleet had varied between 525 and 550 ships. When the Korean War began, the U.S. minesweeping force in Far Eastern waters consisted of only four 180-foot, steel-hull, fleet minesweepers (three of them in a caretaker status), and six wooden auxiliary minesweepers.

Ninety-nine per cent of the U.S. Navy’s mine personnel during the Pacific war were Reserves. Between 1945 and 1950, this reservoir of trained officers and men had dwindled to the vanishing point due to budgetary cuts and a lack of naval interest and emphasis on mine warfare. There was little effort made toward improving minesweeping gear or toward developing new minesweeping techniques. The excellent minesweeping forces of World War II had literally dissolved.

To trace the cause of the U.S. Navy’s minesweeping inadequacies in Korea, which the five-day delay off Wonsan brought into sharp focus, it is helpful to review a series of the historical events between the end of World War II and the opening of Korean hostilities.

In March of 1946, the headquarters of Mine Force, Pacific Fleet was transferred from the command ship in Japanese waters to Treasure Island, San Francisco. The allocation of minesweepers was largely placed in the hands of the Chief of Naval Operations. All minelayers (as distinguished from minesweepers), except for four which were transferred to the Atlantic Fleet Mine Force, were put in mothballs. All mine locator ships, except for three transferred to the Atlantic Fleet Mine Force, were scrapped. All minesweep tenders were inactivated and later sold or scrapped.

The heaviest blow to the Navy’s mine warfare readiness came in January 1947, at which time the Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, dissolved the mine warfare command in the Pacific and further reduced the Atlantic and Pacific mine warfare forces, in order to meet further 1948 budgetary limitations imposed on the Fleet forces.

Minesweeper strength in the Pacific Fleet was further reduced in subsequent months, and what was left was divided up between two type commanders: Commander Service Force, Pacific Fleet, and Commander Cruisers-Destroyers Force, Pacific Fleet. Only three officers from the original Mine Force, Pacific Fleet staff with its wealth of operating experience were left to perpetuate the continuity of mine warfare in the Pacific Fleet. Commander Donald N. Clay was given over-all responsibility as CINCPACFLT’s Operations and Readiness officer. Clay had two key assistants. One was the Readiness Training officer (CDR George C. Ellerton, USN), who reported to Commander Service Force with logistical responsibility to maintain minesweeping gear. The other was the Readiness Plans officer (CDR Richard D. Hugg), who reported to CINCPACFLT staff to maintain a continuity of policy and plans. “This was the best possible solution at the time,” said CDR Clay.

The Navy Department directed that the mineman rating be abolished in 1948, but rescinded the order
These severe reductions were inevitably accompanied by a de-emphasis of training and a diminishment of the importance given to mine warfare. It became increasingly difficult to keep qualified personnel to promote mine research or to maintain any kind of a training program. Because of the concurrent severe destroyer and high-speed tug shortage, the destroyer-type minesweepers were employed more and more as antisubmarine warfare and towing ships. Those of AMS[14A] type (except for the six stationed in Japan) were distributed at Pearl Harbor, Guam, and San Diego for protection of strategic ports. Meanwhile, Commander Service Force was conducting an orderly rollback of minesweeping equipment to Pearl Harbor and to the continental United States.

As far as the general service attitude in the Navy was concerned, mine warfare was regarded as a task which virtually any line officer could perform when the time came. Numerous papers and strategic studies by the too few younger experts were written on the subject, but at command levels, mine warfare was not generally appreciated to be the kind of warfare that required a lot of training, experience, or research. Consequently, the mine as a modern naval weapon became more and more neglected as a serious threat to control of the seas.

Paravanes were no longer installed on naval vessels as protection against the moored contact-type mine. Degaussing test facilities were limited in the Pacific. Although the discovery had been made near the end of World War II that destroyers’ sonars could be modified to detect moored mines, the possibility had not been implemented. Ships actually designated for minesweeping were limited in their training by the lack of realistic drill mines. Minesweeping training had been sacrificed to make time for more antisubmarine work and target-towing services.

On 25 June 1950, there were two divisions of destroyer minesweepers (DMSs), two divisions of fleet minesweepers (AMs), twenty-one minesweepers (AMSs), and two new minesweeping boats (MSBs) in active service in the U.S. Navy. However, there was no mine type commander in the Pacific. Minesweeping types and responsibilities had been split between Commander Service Force Pacific, who had the AMs and AMSs, and Commander Cruisers-Destroyers Force, Pacific, who had the DMSs. CINCPACFLT had twelve minesweeper type ships under his command: four DMSs in West Coast yards for overhaul and refresher training, and three AMSs for port protection; three AMSs at Pearl Harbor for port protection; and two AMSs for port protection at Guam.[14B]
When the Korean War began, COMNAVFE had six AMSs and one AM in active commission, three AMs in a caretaker status, and twelve Japanese minesweepers under contract, making a total of twenty-two ships available in Far Eastern waters. These vessels were charged with the task of check-sweeping Japanese harbors and channels in which bottom-influence mines had been planted by the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Army Air Corps during World War II.

Directing Far Eastern minesweeper operations at the outbreak of hostilities was Commander Mine Squadron Three (LCDR D’Arcy V. Shouldice), whose flagship, the *Pledge* (LT Richard O. Young), served also as tender and logistics supply ship.

In addition to his flagship, Shouldice’s force included the following ships:

- *Partridge* (AM-31) (LTJG Robert Fuller) (CoMinDiv-31)
- *Kite* (AM-22) (LTJG Nick Grkovic)
- *Osprey* (AM-28) (LTJG Philip Levin)
- *Redhead* (AM-32) (LTJG T. R. Howard)
- *Chatterer* (AM-40) (LTJG James Patrick McMahon)
- *Mocking Bird* (AM-27) (LTJG Stanley P. Gary)

“These ships had been engaged in check-sweeping operations since the termination of World War II,” said Shouldice. “This meant that by 1950, they had five years of active minesweeping behind them—and five years of age.

“We were operating on a shoestring,” Shouldice continued. “Our type commander was COMSERVPAC, and our operational commander was COMNAVFE.

“The NAVFE staff was itself a very small organization at the time. They too were operating on a shoestring. We worked directly under NAVFE’s operations officer, Commander E. S. Burns, who gave us our broad directives and left the minesweeping details up to us.

“Our most recent directive before the Korean War was to check-sweep the Inland Sea of Japan from Kobe to Kure for influence mines. We had hoped to finish this by early December 1950, before winter weather set in.

“The organization to support us was the most elementary and primitive of any I have ever known. ‘Pitiful’ is the word. It was a hand-to-mouth proposition. This is not intended as criticism of anybody. It’s just the way it was.

“Our biggest prewar bugaboo was water in the fuel oil. It was not uncommon to see a minesweeper belch a puff of white smoke and stop dead in the water. This meant that water had been injected into the engines and probably had damaged them.

“Consequently, our usual request when we went alongside a tug or a SCAJAP LST to refuel was ‘Give it to us from the top of the tank.’ This helped to limit the amount of water and residue piped into the sweepers’ tanks.”

Shouldice said that his sweepers’ communication gear was obsolescent and needed standardization so that all the minesweepers could talk to each other on the same radio circuit.

“Instant communications are a ‘must’ in the minesweeping game,” said Shouldice. “If you can’t warn the ship astern, or if you can’t change your tactics immediately as required by unforeseen developments, it may be
fatal.”

Despite material and logistic deficiencies, the minesweepers in Japanese waters were in a good state of training; however, their training had not included the sweeping of live-contact or drill mines.

“Each ship had a minimum requirement of forty hours’ sweeping a week,” said Shouldice. “I left it up to my skippers when they got their forty hours in. If they preferred to sweep by moonlight, it was okay by me.

“The ships were able to get under way in a minimum period of time. They steamed smartly in and out of harbors in perfect formation, at a 10-knot clip. Off Hokkaido, they swept through blizzards, snowstorms, and rough water. They continuously encountered such items as fish nets and uncharted rocks to foul their sweep gear. Yet, none of the sweepers ever failed their commitments by reason of material failure or breakdown.”

As the war on the Korean peninsula intensified in July-August 1950, the mine warfare problem which was to arise in late September and October could not be foreseen. First priority for the reactivation of ships, therefore, had been given to amphibious types, carriers, and escort ships. Rear Admiral F. C. Denebrink, Commander Service Force, Pacific (COMSERVPAC), ordered the three AMs in caretaker status at Yokosuka reactivated. On 14 August, Pirate and Incredible were placed on the active list. The third ship, Mainstay, remained inactive for a time because of material shortage. COMSERVPAC also sent the AMSs Merganser and Magpie, then at Guam, and the AMSs Pelican, Gull and Swallow, then at Pearl Harbor, to the Korean theatre.

Just before the minesweeping problem became first priority, Captain Richard T. Spofford was ordered to duty as Commander Mine Squadron Three. Spofford had had much experience in the mineplanting side of mine warfare.

“I assumed command on 3 August,” said Spofford, “and immediately told LCDR Shouldice, who took Commander Mine Division 31, to take our sweepers over to Pusan and keep that port open. Shortly thereafter, I reported to Admiral Joy that my squadron was not adequate to conduct assault sweeping operations against a major combatant power. I emphasized to Admiral Joy that there was negligible intelligence on enemy mines and mine-laying vessels; that I had insufficient ships to carry out an assault sweep against a well-planned minefield, particularly a mixed-type of minefield.

“Also, there were shortages of all types of materials, including training materials, as well as shortages of personnel.”[15]

In late August, Joy relayed Spofford’s comments to Admiral Sherman, who was in the Far East at the time, and asked him about the possibility of increasing minesweeping types. The Chief of Naval Operations said that because of the higher priority of other type vessels, minesweepers could not be activated for the time being.

Sherman’s views were concurred in by Admiral Radford.
On 2 October, Vice Admiral Struble, riding at anchor at Inchon aboard his flagship Rochester, ordered Joint Task Force Seven reformed for the Wonsan amphibious assault. Simultaneously, he ordered all Seventh Fleet minesweepers under way for the Wonsan area as soon as possible. An experienced mine warfare officer, Vice Admiral Struble had very little to warn him of the impending enemy mining effort other than isolated bits of evidence which, when added to intuition, provided less than an optimistic picture. Admiral Struble viewed the possibility of mines in Wonsan as a calculated risk. He thought that the sea approaches to Wonsan were mined; that the minefields might consist of moored mines of Russian type, probably of magnetic and controlled mines; that acoustic and pressure mines might be found in the area; and that, in addition to the mines, opposition could be expected from emplaced artillery in the Wonsan approaches.

Vice Admiral Struble was reasonably certain that if there was to be any future naval threat from the Communists, it must come from their use of sea mines. The North Koreans still retained the capability to plant mines and to launch “drifters” from the many junks and sampans. This fact had been early recognized by Joy as well as Struble long before Inchon. First of all, much of the Korean coastal area was shallow—ideal for minefields. Secondly, the muddy waters offered near-perfect concealment. Thirdly, ocean currents in both the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea were of such a nature that floating mines launched at any North Korean port would traverse the entire length of the peninsula within 15 days. Thus, the drifter mine itself presented a constant danger to surface vessels.

Vice Admiral Struble had recently received several reports of mines sighted and mines destroyed. Altogether, more than 300 mines had been sighted around the Korean coastline. Enemy sea mines had been reported by the U.S. destroyer McKean (CDR Harry L. Reiter, Jr.) at the entrance to the North Korean harbor of Chinnampo on 4 September, 11 days before the Inchon landing. On 7 September, HMS Jamaica sighted and sank a floating mine 25 miles north of the Chongsanot area, in the sea area off Chinnampo. Another was almost immediately seen and exploded by HMS Charity. There was some doubt at first whether the mines were moored or drifting, but the Britishers concluded that the mines were drifters, having been set loose in the hope of catching some of the blockade ships. At Inchon, on the morning of 13 September, destroyers DeHaven and Mansfield of DesDiv 91 had spotted a minefield in Flying Fish Channel.[16]

Altogether, from the period of 4 September to 30 September, UN ships and aircraft sighted mines on 54 separate occasions, most of them in the shallow Yellow Sea, between Chinnampo and Inchon.

To make matters even worse for the Seventh Fleet Commander, more than 25 floater contact-type mines had been sighted on the surface in the high seas around Korea. It was assumed that these drifter mines were contact-type mines which had become detached from their moorings and were floating on the surface. Whether the fact that these mines lacked self-scuttling devices[16A] was intentional or whether the devices were merely omitted for reasons of simplicity and economy was not known.

Obviously such a mine situation would be a considerable threat to ships engaged in fire-support missions. Support ships would either be confined to operating in swept channels or they would have to remain outside the 100-fathom curve.

Brush (CDR Fletcher L. Sheffield, Jr.) was the first U.S. Navy ship to be mined. On 26 September 1950, while steaming 1,000 yards astern of the destroyer Maddox (CDR Preston B. Haines) as the two ships prowled along Korea’s northeast coast in search of enemy shore batteries, Brush struck a mine.
The destroyer was instantly rendered helpless. Thirteen men were killed and thirty-four others were seriously wounded. One of Brush’s firerooms, the messing compartments, and the Chiefs’ living quarters were open to the sea. Her bow rode a full fathom low; her plotting room was completely demolished and flooded. A flash fire which was described by one of the officers, Ensign Charles Cole, as being bright red, had swept through three deck levels. The forward steering gears were destroyed, forcing the skipper to conn his ship by telephone relay to the helmsman in the steering engineroom aft. To make the situation even more critical, the nearest safe port was in Sasebo, Japan, about 470 miles distant. During World War II, the destroyer Meredith had been similarly damaged during the invasion of Normandy and had sunk before she could negotiate the short but choppy English Channel.

The salvation of Brush was a ticklish undertaking for Commander Sheffield, but it was a success. Escorted by the cruiser Worcester (Captain Harry H. Henderson), the destroyer DeHaven (CDR Oscar B. Lundgren) and soon augmented by the salvage tug Bolster, the Brush limped into a Sasebo drydock on 30 September. On that same day the destroyer Mansfield (CDR Edwin H. Headland) struck a contact mine while searching inside the North Korean harbor of Chosen, 60 miles north of the 38th parallel, for a downed Air Force B-26 pilot.

Mansfield was hit in the bow. Her damage, less severe than that to Brush, would still require stateside repairs. The explosion occurred just beneath the hull number on the bow, 728. Numbers “2” and “8” had been blasted away, leaving number “7,” which could hardly be considered as lucky. However, of 28 casualties aboard the Mansfield, none were killed; and besides that, the crew was now due to get stateside pre-Christmas leave.

A third U.S. warship, the 136-foot, wooden-hulled minesweeper Magpie had no luck at all when a mine escaped her sweeps on 1 October. While she and a sister ship, Merganser (LTJG Alvin L. Short), both recently arrived from Guam, were sweeping a channel two miles off Chusun, 30 miles north of Pohang, her starboard bow nudged the horn of a floating mine. Of her 33-man crew, only 12 survived, every one of them injured. They were picked up by Merganser and taken to Pusan for treatment. Among the 21 lost with the Magpie was the captain, Lieutenant (jg) Warren Roy Person.

And on the same day, approaching Mokpo on Korea’s southwestern tip, a fourth ship, the South Korean YMS-504, was severely damaged when her starboard propeller whirled into a moored mine, causing sympathetic explosions from two other nearby mines. Although only five men were hurt in the explosions, 504’s engines were wrecked and her hull was sprung and taking water.[17] Her skipper, whose name unfortunately was not attached to his blithe reply to offers of assistance, signaled that YMS-504 would “soon be ready again to kill more Reds.” Another ROK ship, YMS-509, had struck a mine on 28 September that knocked off her bow but left her engines operating. Chinhae Naval Base reported that one small commercial vessel had blown up in the area after striking a mine.

On 27 September, a normal contact mine[17A] was sunk a few miles directly east of Wonsan. The mine was unblemished, shiny with new paint, and from all appearances had been in the water a very short time.

Mine sightings, although plentiful, had not yet revealed any concentration on the east coast near Wonsan or Hungnam. However, as Admiral Struble pointed out, “this could not be construed as indicating a lack of concentration of moored minefields in either the Hungnam or Wonsan area.” Except for one prisoner-of-war report which stated that mines had been laid around the Chongjin lighthouse in North Korea, and ten unassembled influence mines[17B] found in oxcarts on Wolmi-do shortly afterward, the Navy’s mine intelligence was based on what friendly forces had seen for themselves in the water.

“When they said ‘go’ on the Wonsan operation, mines were our biggest headache,” said CDR Harry W. McElwain, Intelligence Officer for Task Force 90.

Hoping for the best, the little ships of Mine Squadron Three began departing Sasebo for Wonsan on 6 October 1950. Lt. C. E. McMullen’s ill-fated Pirate (AM-275) was first to leave. Rear Admiral Smith gave orders
for *Pirate* to rendezvous with CTG 95.2 (RADM Hartman) in Worcester; McMullen\[18\] was underway three hours later. McMullen said he left Sasebo without an OpOrder and, as far as he knew, the remaining sweepers were still in Sasebo making preparations to get underway as quickly as possible.

When Captain Richard T. Spofford and his small flotilla arrived off Wonsan in the chilling gray-green dawn of 10 October to commence sweeping operations, he knew little about Wonsan’s harbor except its geography and bathymetry. Only three fragments of mine intelligence were available. First, the location of the normal navigation channel published by the Soviets was known. Second, a report had been received from the cruiser *Worcester* concerning the location of an offshore minefield near Wonsan, which had been spotted by the ship’s helicopter on 9 October. And third, the earlier discovery of minefields in both Inchon and Chinnampo was indicative that Wonsan too was mined. How extensive, and what type of “cabbage patch” the Communists had planted in the harbor of Wonsan itself, was largely conjecture.

Nor did Spofford have information concerning the military status of the numerous islands in the harbor. Were they occupied by North Korean troops? Did the islands have artillery to oppose minesweeping efforts? Had the city yet been captured by friendly troops? As for the minefields themselves, Spofford lacked even fragmentary information of how many mines had been planted in the harbor, what types they were, or where they might be located.

Had someone gratuitously handed Captain Spofford the information that the Wonsan minefield covered 400 square miles, that it numbered more than 3,000 mines, and that it was a “mixed bag” of magnetic as well as contact mines, his task of sweeping the expansive Wonsan minefield would still have been an exceedingly hazardous one.

The biggest handicap was a shortage of minesweepers. During World War II, the amphibious assaults against Okinawa had been preceded by more than 100 sweepers; at the invasion of Normandy by 300. At Wonsan, Spofford’s Mine Squadron Three commenced its work on 10 October with only *six* minesweepers.

“My first inclination,” said Captain Spofford, “was to start work in the regular navigation channel which the Soviet naval forces had been using, on the assumption that it would have been subjected to a faster and more careless mining effort because of the hasty retreat of the Soviet satellite forces.”

After careful consideration, with the 20 October landing date in mind, Spofford decided to risk a direct-approach sweep, sending his ships, led by the two “big steel jobs,”[18A] *Pledge* and *Incredible*, on an exploratory run straight from the 100-fathom curve to the landing beaches by the shortest and most direct route. “If it worked,” said Spofford, “there was a chance we could meet the D-Day deadline.”

Shortly after sunrise on the morning of 10 October, the minesweeping task got underway. The officer in tactical command, LCDR Bruce Hyatt, was riding the *Pledge*, since his flagship *Pirate* had not yet rejoined front conducting exploratory minesweeping chores in behalf of the gunfire support ships south of Wonsan.

The *Pledge* began the sweep directly from the westward tongue of the 100-fathom curve in a direct line for the landing beaches where the troops were scheduled to go ashore in only 10 days. Astern of *Pledge* steamed the *Incredible*, *Osprey* and *Mocking Bird*, each ship streaming its sweep gear. Two additional minesweepers followed the formation—the *Chatterer*, dropping orange-colored conical “Dan buoys”[18B] and *Partridge*, “riding shotgun,” to destroy by gunfire any mines brought to the surface by the other minesweepers.

To assist and expedite the sweeping, a helicopter from the USS Worcester hovered to shoreward of the minesweepers, attempting to spot mines beneath the surface of the water. This would be the first instance in naval warfare of an organized and combined effort between surface ships and a helicopter to locate a minefield. Patrol aircraft and lighter-than-air ships were used in some instances and with varying degrees of success during World War II.

The helicopter had only recently entered the mine-hunting business, and this quite by happenstance. In September, the USS *Helena*’s helicopter, flown by LT Harry W. Swinburne, while searching in the vicinity of
Kokoko for survivors from the sunken *Magpie*, had discovered two moored mines. Swinburne took photographs of the mines and submitted them to the Board investigating the sinking. Soon after, helicopters were used on regular dawn-to-dusk mine search patrols around their own ships of Cruiser Divisions Three and Five.

On 3 October, *Worcester*’s “copter” pilot, Chief Aviation Pilot B. D. Pennington, sighted several moored mines in the Wonsan area. From that day onward the helicopter had a welcome place on the mine warfare team.

“It didn’t take long to discover the value of the helicopter as a mine-hunting platform,” said LCDR J. R. Beardall, Jr., *Worcester*’s gunnery officer. “If the sea was not rough, if the direction of the sun rays was right, and if the water was clear, you could see the mines very easily.”

By late afternoon of the first day’s sweeping on 10 October, a 3,000 yard wide channel had been swept from the 100-fathom curve to the 30-fathom curve, a distance of about 12 miles. Twenty-one contact mines had been cut and destroyed without casualty.

“We were pleased and optimistic as the first day’s effort was about to end,” said Captain Spofford. “If the combination of Mine Squadron Three’s skillful seamanship and good luck held, I felt that we might not even need the entire time that had been allotted to clear the channel.”

But good luck did not hold.

In the late afternoon of the 10th, the *Worcester* helicopter suddenly dipped, lifted slightly, dipped again and again. The voice of Chief Aviation Pilot B. D. Pennington rang out the bad news: “One mine line directly ahead of *Pledge* . . . Another line just beyond that . . . Another . . . .”

Altogether, Pennington could see five distinct lines of mines inside the 30-fathom curve, directly in the assault path to the beach. Within a few moments all the minesweeps had verified the presence of dozens of mines from sonar echoes.

As dusk fell, when the sweepers filed out of the channel and anchored in swept waters near the 30-fathom curves, every officer and man was weary and somewhat taken aback by the discovery.

In a summary despatch to Admirals Struble and Smith, Captain Spofford was most gratified in our sweepers’ ability to come through the first day unscathed, “assisted by adroit handling and highly effective use of sonar— and God’s blessings.”
Chapter 4. The Battle of the Mines (Part I—Wonsan)
Efforts to Clear a Channel

“After receiving the information about the extensive minefield,” said Captain Spofford, “I decided to shift our sweeping effort to the Russian navigation channel. It could not be much worse and the numbers of mines might be fewer than we had found on the 10th.”

By this time Spofford had the advice and assistance of two mine experts from Mine Forces, Atlantic, CDR S. M. Archer and LCDR Don DeForest, and Mr. Howard Naeseth from the Mine Countermeasures Station, Panama City, Florida. They had been hastily flown to the Korean theater from the east coast of the United States.

During the morning of 11 October, Spofford augmented the examination of the minefield by the use of “frogmen”[19A] from the destroyer transport Diachenko. The “Ute’s” were ordered to skim along the surface of the harbor looking for mines—or their absence—from their shallow-draft LCPRs. Spofford also requested and received help from Commander Fleet Air Wing One in the form of patrol planes to augment the air search. Patrol Squadron 47 (CDR J. H. Arnold) was directed to assign a PBM for daytime search. Rear Admiral A. E. Smith, CTF 95, sent a message to his naval beach group ashore (CTE 95.22):

“If there is a small naval craft in Wonsan harbor, it may have a chart of the swept channel and the minefield. Encourage KMAG[19B] and others ashore to make thorough search in order to get in their logistics and ice cream.”

During the previous afternoon of 10 October, the minesweeping force had been augmented by the arrival of the Pirate, Redhead, and Chatterer. These three were despatched to the Russian navigation channel. Here, sweeping went so smoothly that at a midnight conference, 11-12 October, attended by his staff and all commanding officers, Captain Spofford determined to make an all-out effort the next day in the Soviet navigation channel with the hope of beating the landing date deadline now only eight days away.

The frogmen, under the command of LCDR William R. McKinney, were ordered to reconnoiter the two outlying islands of Ung-do and Yo-do in search of any mine cables which would indicate the presence of electrically controlled mines. McKinney later reported “no control mine cables present.”

Spofford also decided to try a rarely used technique to clear the minefield: a countermining aerial strike by Task Force 77. Could carrier aircraft carrying regular bombs drop them into the minefield?[19C]

The Task Force 77 operators studied the problem. If the mine experts felt that such an effort might help, certainly the Seventh Fleet planes could drop the bombs. Upon hearing of the plan, Admiral Struble approved the attempt, but with little hope of its success.

During the early morning of 12 October, minefield-strike aircraft from Philippine Sea and the Leyte arrived over Wonsan harbor. AD “Skyraider” aircraft were scheduled to perform the major portion of the effort. Each AD carried three 1,000-pound general purpose bombs. F4U Corsair fighters each carried one 1,000-pound general-purpose bomb. The bombs were all fuzed hydrostatically to detonate at 25 feet.

The carriers’ pilots planned to drop two 5-mile lanes of bombs 200 yards apart, with a 200-yard distance between bombs in the lanes. To solve the problem of making a bombline on the open sea, one AD under radar control flew directly above another AD loaded with smoke floats. Upon signal from the control aircraft, the smoke floats were dropped at half-mile intervals.

The strike group itself was composed of two columns of aircraft. The right-hand column consisted of fourteen AD aircraft and eight F4U aircraft; the left-hand column consisted of seventeen AD aircraft.
After both columns of aircraft had cleared the target area, eight additional Corsairs with similar loading were called in by the air coordinator to fill obvious “holidays” in the bombline.

Execution of the aerial countermining strike revealed numerous problem areas. For one thing, not one of the smoke floats functioned. Channel buoys and visual reference on two islands in close proximity had to be used instead. It was extremely difficult for the pilots to maintain an accurate distance between aircraft. They used their gun sights to check distances on the planes ahead. But the fact that a slipstream was present and that aircraft were strung out in a column five miles long was to cause unavoidable gaps in the bomb pattern. This problem was further aggravated by the fact that drops were made on voice signal.

The time interval between the air coordinator’s transmissions and the individual pilot’s reception and execution produced further irregularities in the pattern.

Results of the countermining effort are unknown. Next day, as Pirate swept through a line that had been bombed, she swept only one mine in her port gear and five in her starboard gear, which indicates the bombing may have made a gap in the line. Since two ships, Pirate and Pledge, were sunk the same afternoon in the nearby vicinity, it appears doubtful that the countermining effort was a success.

It was an admirable innovation and effort, but it is not definitely known that mines were destroyed. Later, FEAF’s General Stratemeyer offered to lend his B-29’s in a countermining effort. In view of the carrier aircraft experience, and because of his own World War II aerial countermining experience, Admiral Struble rejected any further bombing of the minefield as impracticable. Captain Spofford had calculated that, to be successful, each bomb had to explode within thirty feet of a mine itself. Such accuracy could scarcely be expected.

If there was any better way to sweep mines than the minesweeper, it had not been found. The conventional bombing of a minefield was not the answer. Nor did Spofford or Shouldice think in retrospect that an underwater atomic charge would have done the job. Both felt it would only have contaminated the entire area without solving the problem.
Because of the novel air strike of Task Force 77 aircraft, the minesweepers did not get underway at their usual hour—sunrise—on 12 October.

Following the air attack, the minesweepers proceeded on a westerly course toward the harbor at a speed of six knots. Ahead of them were three islands: Yo-do on the left; Ung-do on the right; and Sin-do, where the former Japanese fortress had been located, almost dead ahead. Protecting the sweepers and ready to give them gunfire support were Diachenko, Doyle and Endicott.

As in previous occasions, the “big steel jobs” were in the van on the fateful October 12th. LCDR Bruce Hyatt led the formation in his flagship Pirate, with Pledge and Incredible following astern. Laying Dan buoys astern of the Pirate was the Redhead, with Kite on shotgun duty astern of the Incredible; her 3-inch muzzle bared, Endicott steamed close astern of the sweep formation.

After passing through the Russian navigation channel, the sweepers altered course to port in order to pass between the two islands of Yo-do and Ung-do.

At 1112, the minesweeping fleet entered unswept waters.

Three minutes later, Pirate’s ready boxes were undogged and her 3-inch gun manned as a precaution against possible enemy shore battery fire.

Then, as quickly as it is written here, things began to happen. Two mines, their cables severed by Pirate’s sweeping gear, popped to the surface. Four more followed. The mines were 50 yards apart, and lay on a north-south line between Yo-do and Ung-do islands. Three minutes later, Pledge, maneuvering astern through the mines already cut by Pirate, swept three more with her port gear. Incredible, still in formation, got herself into the thick of things by cutting still another four.

“Just about this time,” said LCDR Hyatt, “I received information from the helicopter pilot that a large ‘cabbage patch’ lay dead ahead, and that at least three more lines of mines were in the vicinity of my sweepers. The pilot told me that the lines were bounded by the islands of Ung-do, Yo-do, Mo-do, and Sin-do. The exact position of the mine lines was not indicated, nor the angles at which they lay.

“I made a quick decision to abandon the original plan to turn south, and to continue in the reported Russian-swept channel instead.”

Both Hyatt and Pirate’s commanding officer, LT C. E. McMullen, considered a turn at this critical point more dangerous than continuation on course. Any turn now would in all likelihood expose the Pirate to a mine while in the turn.[19D]

Pirate’s first definite sonar report came a moment later—when the range was only 100 yards. Within seconds the Pirate’s starboard bow lookout reported a shallow mine close aboard the starboard bow. McMullen threaded his way gingerly through the treacherous field.

A few seconds later, Pirate’s stern rose from the water, exposing her propellers, then fell back into a boiling sea of muddy spray. The explosion of a mine directly underneath had broken Pirate’s main deck into two parts. The ship lurched to starboard, then back to port, quickly taking a list. Within four minutes the Pirate had capsized.

Pledge, commanded by LT Richard O. Young, immediately cut her sweep gear, hove to, and put her motor whaleboat in the water. To add to the confusion, as Pledge’s whaleboat was being launched, previously undetected shore batteries on the island of Sin-do opened fire on the sinking Pirate and those of her crew already
in the water. *Pledge* responded with her single 3-inch gun, whereupon the enemy fire shifted to *Pledge*. While this was happening, 13 loose mines lay floating on the surface, and nearby, countless others lay undetected beneath the surface.

“My first thought,” said LT Young, “was to rescue the *Pirate*'s survivors and continue to sweep.”

He was soon to decide otherwise, however, in view of the concentration of shore battery fire, plus the fact that he could not pass through *Pirate*'s minesweeping gear without enmeshing his own vessel. Young ordered all battle stations manned as quickly as possible to counter not only the concentration of fire that was coming from Sin-do but additionally small caliber fire from Rei-to island as well. Young made a quick radio call for air support, and ordered his minesweeping gear cut.

For a moment the *Pledge* lay to and continued to fire until all her ready 3-inch ammunition had been expended.

By now, Sin-do’s shore battery had bracketted *Pledge*; and although *Pledge*’s gunners had knocked out at least one enemy gun,[19E] Young knew his position was fast becoming untenable. Enemy shells had now begun to find their target on *Pledge*, which was being slowly set to seaward toward the *Pirate*.

With the hope he might make a turn back into waters that had already been swept, Young ordered “Left full rudder; starboard engine, ahead two-thirds.” The ship had turned approximately thirty degrees when she struck a mine. The time was 1220.

*Pledge* had been mined amidships on the starboard side near the forward engineroom. Damage throughout the ship was extensive. Decks and bulkheads were ruptured from the keel to the open bridge. The starboard side of the hull was split beneath the waterline, and water was rushing into the rupture.

When Young, who had been temporarily knocked out by the blast, regained his senses and saw the status of ship and crew (all persons in his view were seriously injured), he gave the order to abandon ship.

The mine-hunting patrol plane overhead, a PBM Mariner flown by LCDR Randall Boyd, executive officer of VP-47, had discontinued its search the moment the *Pirate* commenced to receive surface fire.

“I noticed gun flashes from the beach,” said LCDR Boyd, “and splashes around the *Pirate*. I radioed the *Endicott* and told them I would spot their fire onto the enemy guns. For the next several minutes I acted as communication observer and spotter, and also kept the *Endicott* informed of the location of survivors. The *Endicott* directed her boats into the area to pick the survivors as we coached her fire on the northern coast of Cho-do island.

“As I made circle after circle over the enemy territory, I noticed several slit trenches running parallel to the beach, and also several small blockhouses. My gunners were able to keep these trenches unoccupied while the *Endicott* was doing a nice job of demolishing the blockhouses and tunnels. We also flew over Sin-do, and were able to distinguish reinforced concrete gun emplacements on it. Although our strafing would accomplish little, I ordered all guns that could bear to strafe them.

“Meanwhile, I had relayed the word back to the carriers of the mining of the two sweeps and of the enemy gunfire, and had requested an aircraft strike. I suggested the planes carry 500-pound bombs, rockets, and napalm.

“We continued strafing each enemy-held island and spotting survivors for the *Endicott* boats as well as spotting her surface fire until the F4Us and ADs from the *Leyte* arrived overhead.

“Our way home the tail gunner of my plane came forward and asked if I had heard him report over the intercom that we were being shot at by AA fire while we were circling Sin-do. I told him yes, but since all the tracers were being sucked aft, I hadn’t worried about the small stuff. Whereupon he told me that he wasn’t talking about the small stuff but about those big black bursts of AA directly astern of our plane and at the same altitude. Apparently, each time we circled Cho-do island, we received about twenty rounds of big stuff which I hadn’t noticed at all. I suppose the ‘Commie’ gunners thought I was nuts, coming by again and again. At any rate, we
didn’t get a scratch.”

With Pirate down, and Pledge sinking, Incredible’s radio suddenly blared forth: “Dusty, Dusty, my engines are dead.” At the worst possible moment Incredible had experienced complete engine failure. This meant that all the “big steel jobs” were out of action. The only ships left to do the sweeping were LCDR D’Arcy Shouldice’s “chicks.”

Ordering his ships to the rescue, and using enemy gun flashes as point of aim, Shouldice’s small wooden minesweepers were joined by the Endicott’s gunners in taking the enemy batteries under fire with their single 40-mm. and their two 20-mm. guns.

All Pledge’s officers, with the exception of her engineering officer, LTJG E. A. Miller, Jr., had been seriously wounded by the mine blast, but all were rescued. Miraculously, Miller had only been slightly wounded as he was tossed over the side by a geyser of oil and water.

Altogether, there were 92 casualties from the two sunken vessels; of these 12 were missing in action and one died from wounds after his rescue. Hyatt, McMullen, and Young were among those rescued.

Two attempts to open a path through the minefield had failed—a direct sweeping run to the beaches where the landing was to be made had encountered heavy and well-laid minelines. Had this plan not failed, it would have been the best solution. Nor could the attempt to open the Soviet navigation channel be considered a successful experiment. And the deadline for landing the Marines was now only seven days away.

“I was aboard the Missouri with the heavy bombardment forces off Songjin, North Korea, when news came about the sinking of the Pirate and the Pledge,” said Admiral Struble. “I jumped in a destroyer, picked up Admiral Smith, and headed south at best speed where I could take direct charge.”

Even worse news was soon to be discovered—the presence of magnetic mines as well as the contact type.
The message that rocked the Pentagon came from Rear Admiral Allan E. “Hoke” Smith, who, as Advance Force Commander, was the officer directly over Spofford, responsible for conducting the minesweeping operations. His message, addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations opened with words the U.S. Navy never hoped to read: “The U.S. Navy has lost command of the sea in Korean waters. . . .”

The Navy that was prepared to defeat a Communist air or submarine attack, to sink an enemy’s fleet of ships, to do precision bombing, rocketing and gunnery, to support troops ashore, and to blockade a hostile shore, had encountered a massive field of more than 3,000 mines laid off Wonsan under the direction of Soviet naval experts.

As a result, the strongest Navy in the world was to steam about in the Sea of Japan while a few minesweepers struggled to clear a channel into Wonsan.

Two men to agree with Smith’s estimate of the situation were Admiral Joy, and the Navy’s Chief of Naval Operations, the late Admiral Forrest P. Sherman. “Let’s admit it,” he said in conversation with his columnist friend, George Fielding Eliot. “They caught us with our pants down. Those damn mines cost us eight days’ delay in getting the troops ashore and more than two hundred casualties. That’s bad enough. But I can all-too-easy think of circumstances when eight days’ delay offshore could mean losing a war.

“Hoke’s right; when you can’t go where you want to, when you want to, you haven’t got command of the sea. And command of the sea is a rock-bottom foundation of all our war plans. We’ve been plenty submarine-conscious and air-conscious. Now we’re going to start getting mine-conscious—beginning last week.”

With the three AMs out, two permanently and one temporarily for engine repairs, safe sweeping practice assumed paramount importance.

After reviewing with his predicament, Captain Spofford made the decision to marshal as many small boats and frogmen as he could, and they, with helicopters and PBMs spotting from above, would undertake the tedious search. Under personal supervision of LCDR DeForest, the small boat crews took to the mine field like children at an Easter-egg hunt.

A few sympathetic North Korean fishermen joined the hunt.

After two days searching, the channel had been sufficiently explored and marked that sweepers could enter it with relative safety.

Additionally, Captain Spofford ordered the destroyer transport Diachenko to cautiously probe her way down the channel, using the long fingers of her antisubmarine sonar in search of any additional underwater charges.

Finally it appeared that the Wonsan channel was all but swept; the sweepers Mocking Bird, Chatterer, Redhead, and Kite were making their last few penmanship ovals near the beaches, when Redhead’s skipper, LTJG T. R. Howard, reported that “the whole ocean started to erupt amidst the sweepers.”

The first 250-foot geyser about 400 yards astern of Redhead had not subsided when a second blast occurred six seconds later, very similar to the first and not more than 100 yards away from the first. So far no damage had been done, except to the jangled and exhausted nerves of the sweep force themselves. But the third explosion, under the keel of ROK YMS-516, blasted that small ship into bits and pieces.

In all probability, these new-found mines were the same influence type that had been found unassembled on ox-carts at Wolmi-do one month earlier.
At this point “Dusty” Shouldice admitted that he was frightened, “plain scared, and disappointed, too. It was the disappointment of a lifetime to be within an hour of a completed mission, and then find influence mines. Everything went into a tailspin—all our plans—we didn’t know what type mine we had triggered—we didn’t know where—we didn’t know how many. We were back where we started.”

Commander Task Force 95, Rear Admiral Smith, summed it up in a despatch to Admiral Joy, thusly:

“. . . Army is calling for support by sea through Chinnampo, Kunsan, Haeju on the west coast, . . . Hungyong, Wonsan, and several other spots on the east coast. All these harbors are mined and many more smaller ones. There is adequate proof of the quantity of mines. Two thousand to four thousand in the Wonsan approaches, fifty to one hundred magnetic in Wonsan alone. Task Group 95.6, after fighting and cutting its way through for 25 miles, and within an arm’s length of Blue-Yellow beaches, had three ground mine explosions.”

This meant that now the AMSs must methodically form a line parallel to the landing beaches about three miles out and edge toward the landing beach by making pass after pass over virtually the same track. It was to be a very slow and nervewracking business.

Not until the following morning, 19 October, were Shouldice and his frightened “chicks” to learn what type of mines they had triggered the night before. Then, during one of the most dramatic conferences, Captain Spofford announced that the cloud of influence mines hanging over Wonsan had been dissipated.

“We know that there are magnetic miles,” said Spofford. “We know at least one magnetic line has been planted, and we know their position quite well, thanks to the work of DeForest.”

DeForest, after completing his supervisory task of buoying those contact mines that could be seen from the surface, had set out to the beach in search of some of the mine intelligence that was sorely needed when the operation started.

After much searching, sniper fire, and hairbreadth escapes, DeForest was led to an old strawstack under which he found a new Soviet-built search coil—the “eyes and ears” of a magnetic mine. Additionally, DeForest had found North Korean personnel who had helped to assemble and lay the mines, so that when he returned to Captain Spofford, he had much of the vital information that would be needed in order to finish the sweeping job.

Although Captain Spofford now held the combination to the Wonsan mine field, it still would require seven more days of arduous sweeping before he would have it open.

On the evening of 25 October, Shouldice reported to Captain Spofford that Wonsan had a swept channel “clear of mines.” A total of 15 days had been required to complete what was supposed to have been a five-day sweep. Of approximately 3,000 mines which had originally been planted in Wonsan, only 225 had been swept and destroyed. Probably that many or more had broken their moorings and had become floaters. But the majority of the mines, probably 2,000 or more, were still anchored in place in the mine-fields. “These 2,000 were no longer dangerous to our operations,” said Struble, “as we knew where they were, and cleared channels to the Wonsan beach had been swept.”
The Sea War in Korea
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson

Chapter 4. The Battle of the Mines (Part I—Wonsan)
North Korean Mining Tactics

From an examination of the available records, it is concluded that the Communist mining campaign in Korea commenced no earlier than 10 July. There is no evidence of any mine shipments or minelaying prior to that date. It is Admiral Struble’s view that the decision to commence mining was not made prior to North Korean’s initiating the war. His belief is further supported by the fact that North Korean forces were initially supplied with other types of weapons and war materials, not mines. Moreover, it is concluded that had the Communists anticipated U.S. naval opposition, undoubtedly the mining campaign would have commenced immediately on outbreak of war in order to deny as much water as possible to our naval forces.

Post-Wonsan assault intelligence reports indicated that the mining of Wonsan and Chinnampo began around August 1. This program was intensified after the fall of Inchon.

It is further concluded, based on an examination of recovered shipping labels and an examination of captured mines, that all the mines used in the Korean campaign originated from Soviet stockpiles. Most of them arrived in Korea during the period 10-20 July 1950 by rail, although there is evidence to indicate that a few were shipped by sea. Interrogation of railroad personnel at Wonsan after its capture verified the fact that about 4,000 mines passed through their hands, mainly for use in Wonsan itself but also for use at points further south. At Chinnampo, it was learned from the interrogation of prisoners that mines were shipped to Haeju by truck, and that other mines were shipped to Inchon and Kunsan by rail.

It was to be later discovered that the Soviet Union had not only provided the North Koreans with mines, but with torpedoes and depth charges as well. On 16 October, fourteen Soviet-built 21-inch torpedoes were found in a tunnel near the Wonsan airstrip. With warheads attached, the torpedoes were about 24 feet long, and similar to the type used by the Germans in World War II. Twenty-nine depth charges weighing 300 pounds each, and 40 depth charges weighing 50 pounds each were found. In addition 167 contact-type mines were found.[22] More than 600 sea mines were later discovered ashore in the Wonsan area.[23]

North Korean prisoners stated that in some instances Russian naval officers operated as far south as Inchon; that Soviet naval instructors gave mine technical training and supervised assembly of the mines in both Wonsan and Chinnampo between 16 July and 17 August; that they made the adjustments on the magnetic mines that were laid in the Wonsan minefield; and that Soviet military personnel actually participated in the laying of magnetic mines. Later, at Pyongyang, one officer and three men—all North Koreans—were given training in magnetic mines.[24]

Because of the excellent mine patterns laid and their close integration with the North Korean coastal defenses, it is also concluded that Soviet personnel supervised the preparation of the Wonsan minefield.

As far as the contact mines were concerned, the evidence indicates that North Koreans did most of this work. The minelaying procedure and equipment was very simple, even primitive, in sharp contrast to U.S. Navy equipment and doctrine. Wooden barges, of a type normally used in river and coastal traffic, were equipped with iron or wooden tracks and fitted to carry ten to fifteen mines. The mines were man-loaded on the barges and towed by tugboats into pre-determined areas where, on signal, the mines were rolled off the stern of the barges at intervals of one to one-and-one-half minutes.

In this manner, about 3,000 mines were laid off the city of Wonsan in a period of three weeks.
Chapter 4. The Battle of the Mines (Part I—Wonsan)

Marine Air Comes to Wonsan

The initial planning for Wonsan had assumed a similar operation to the Inchon assault: the landing was to be followed by capture and rapid exploitation of a nearby airfield. During the assault phase, two Marine fighter squadrons would participate—VMF-214 and VMF-323, aboard CVEs Sicily and Badoeng Strait—to furnish close air support. As soon as the Wonsan airfield was seized, Marine Air Group 12 would land and operate therefrom. MAG-12’s headquarters, service squadrons, and heavy equipment were to be surface-lifted from Japan. Two other fighter squadrons, VMF-312 and VMF(N)-513, were to come in by air. The other night fighter squadron of the group, VMF(N)-542, was to remain at Kimpo.

But the rapid advance of the “Rambling” ROKs negated all these plans. Major General Field Harris, Commanding General, First Marine Air Wing, and Tactical Air Controller for the Tenth Corps, flew to Wonsan on the 13th, two days after the ROKs had captured the city. After inspecting the airfield, he determined that flight operations could be initiated immediately. He ordered VMF-312 to leave Kimpo the next day. To facilitate flight operations, the Far East Air Force Combat Cargo Command started to bring in aviation gasoline in 55-gallon drums. Bombs and rockets were loaded on Corsairs of VMF(N)-513 at Kimpo and air transported to Wonsan.

According to original plans, VMF-312 was to be supported by airlift for only three days, pending the opening of the Wonsan port, when the surface echelon was due to arrive. But because the harbor was not cleared of mines until 25 October, flight operations had to be supported entirely by airlift for twelve days. The arrival of VMF(N)-513 on 17 October added to the logistical burdens.

For twelve days, two Marine air squadrons were entirely dependent on airlift for all their supply. Fuel in 55-gallon drums was rolled along the ground a distance of one mile from the supply dump to the flight line, and then pumped by hand from the containers into the aircraft. Operating with one jeep and eight bomb-trailers, the ordnance sections unloaded the transports, assembled the bombs and rockets, and reloaded them on planes. With muscle substituting for machines, flight operations were maintained.

In this manner Marine airmen gave direct support to the First ROK Corps advancing northward to Hamhung. As an example of their effectiveness, a flight from VMF-312 attacked 500 enemy troops near Yangdok on 19 October and killed approximately 100 of them. This same squadron caught a body of 800 men on the road near Kansong on the 24th and caused about 200 casualties.
Chapter 4. The Battle of the Mines (Part I—Wonsan)

Wonsan Taken—By the ROKs

Except for a few hot and hectic hours in the city’s southern suburbs, the capture of Wonsan by the First ROK Corps on 10 October was a routine operation. As ROKs met stubborn resistance that morning, Admiral Ewen’s Task Force 77 aircraft fortuitously appeared overhead to begin routine pre-invasion aerial bombing. The ROKs radioed an urgent call for help, and planes from Leyte’s Air Group 3 went to work, striking gun positions, slit trenches, and tanks as directed by ground controllers.

By mid-afternoon, the South Korean troops had swept into Wonsan and out again, continuing their trek northward. Only security troops remained behind to establish local order.

With Wonsan in friendly hands, General Almond’s problem was no longer one of assaulting a hostile beach and fighting in the streets. The remaining problem was simply to land his Tenth Corps as quickly as possible and to join the offensive.

The jam-packed amphibious shipping carrying the First Marine Division had Indian-filed out of Inchon’s Flying Fish Channel between 15 and 17 October. In Admiral Doyle’s troop-crowded flagship, USS Mount McKinley, were the staffs of both Generals Almond and Smith.

Upon arrival at Wonsan, 19 October, General Almond and Admiral Doyle immediately proceeded to Admiral Struble’s flagship, the battleship Missouri, anchored in Wonsan’s outer harbor.

“The purpose of the conference,” said Admiral Struble recently, “was to acquaint General Almond and other commanders with the actual situation existing at Wonsan, and to give them my best estimate of when the troops would probably be landed. The decision had been reached by that time that the tactical situation ashore did not require early landing of the forces.”

Vice Admiral Struble stated that Captain Richard T. Spofford’s minesweeping Task Group 95.6 had started sweeping 10 October. They originally had expected to finish the sweeping within five days, but due to the presence of influence mines, the sweeping would not be finished for a landing on 20 October. Struble estimated that at least three more days would be needed to clear a path through the influence minefield.

General Almond was disturbed by the prospect of delay. He was anxious to get ashore in order to direct operations of the fast-moving First ROK Corps, which had been placed under his command. He therefore decided to proceed ashore by Missouri’s helicopter, taking part of his staff with him. The remainder of his staff (plus a liaison group from Amphibious Group One) were ordered to come ashore in small boats the same afternoon.

As a result of the 19 October Commander’s conference aboard Missouri, and in view of the minefield, Admiral Struble directed Admiral Doyle to issue retirement orders to the tractor and transport groups.[24A] They were to retire along their routes of advance beginning at 1700 on the 19th. The convoys were to reverse course again in time to arrive off the channel entrance by Wonsan by the 21st of October.

Thus began what the Marines called “Operation Yo-Yo”—steam northward twelve hours, steam southward twelve hours.

Actually this process of march and countermarch was to last until 25 October, when the troop ships were finally ordered to enter the swept channel of Wonsan. Leathernecks and GI’s were so sardined into the amphibious shipping during their five-day parade up and down the Korean coast that some of them contracted severe cases of gastroenteritis and dysentery. Aboard one merchant ship, the Marine Phoenix, 750 men were stricken.

With Wonsan in friendly hands, Admiral Doyle issued instructions on 18 October for a non-assault
landing. He directed that the LVTs and LCVPs be despatched to the beach when loaded. Time schedules were to
be disregarded. All ships were directed to familiarize themselves with the procedure for transiting a minefield,
and to remain outside the 10-fathom curve until it was safe for them to enter the swept channel. As they entered,
the tractor group, loaded with cargo and vehicles, was to proceed in two columns, with an interval of 750 yards
between ships and at a distance of 600 yards between columns. The personnel-carrying transports were instructed
to enter in a single column, with 1,000 yards between ships, and at speed of not over ten knots.

Jeering placards of welcome greeted the Marines as they stepped ashore at Wonsan—one from the First
Marine Air Wing, and another from the enthusiastic ROKs. All such greetings struck the Marines as being
somewhat excessive. But Major General Oliver P. Smith summed up the Wonsan landing very philosophically:
“History just got ahead of us for once.”

Once ashore, the Marines—22,000 strong—started moving north in strength, and they fanned out with
rather formidable patrols to the south. Marine trucks and tanks started rolling northward toward the twin cities of
Hamhung and Hungnam. From this area the Marines would strike northwestward toward the northern border. This
trek would take the Marines through some of Korea’s highest mountains, where the Communists were reported to
be preparing a “national redoubt” for a winter guerrilla campaign.
Chapter 4. The Battle of the Mines (Part I—Wonsan)
Seventh Division Lands at Iwon

On 29 October, the Seventh Division was landed at Iwon administratively after the fast minesweepers Doyle and Endicott had found no traces of mines in that harbor. Nor was there any trace of the enemy since the ROK Capital Division had moved through the city four days before.

When the first troop-laden LCVPs from the Seventh Division reached Iwon’s shore at 1120 on 29 October, they were greeted by the outstretched hands of their commanding officer, General Barr, and by Admiral Thackrey.

General Barr said at the time that his division would go to the Manchurian border, destroying any enemy it found in its path. Manchuria was only 75 miles away.

By nightfall of the first day, more than 27,000 Seventh Division troops had dug in for the night in the frostbitten hills and rice fields around Iwon. Supplies came ashore during the night as jeep and truck lights illuminated the beach area. Sherman tanks rolled ashore as nonchalantly as if on Fourth of July parade. Carrier planes droned overhead in constant patrol, and the destroyer Borie (CDR Merle F. Bowman) cruised offshore ready to open fire at moment’s notice.

By the night of 31 October 1950, most of the Tenth Corps was once again on Korean soil. Some units had been at sea for nearly three weeks.
Chapter 5. The Battle of the Mines (Part II—Chinnampo)

The Need for Chinnampo

While the Marines were being landed administratively at Wonsan, the ROKs, against practically no opposition, were speeding toward the Yalu. Hamhung and its port city of Hungnam were captured on the 18th of October. By 24 November, the ROK Capital Division, supported by the interdiction fire and gunfire support of Task Group 95.2, was approaching Songjin, nearly 100 miles north of Wonsan.

In the western half of Korea, meanwhile, against stiffer resistance, the U.S. Eighth Army had occupied the North Korean capital of Pyongyang on 19 October, and General Walker was busily consolidating his positions for a push toward the North Korean boundary marked by the Yalu and Tumen rivers. On 20 October, 110 FEAF cargo aircraft airdropped the 187th Airborne Regiment—2,800 paratroops—thirty miles north of the enemy capital, near the road junctions of Sukchon and Sunchon, to add to the rout of the broken North Korean People’s Army.

The progress in the west made mandatory and urgent the opening of Pyongyang’s port city of Chinnampo for Eighth Army’s logistic support. But Chinnampo, like Wonsan, was known to be heavily mined. General Walton H. Walker made an urgent call for minesweeping help at Chinnampo. Winter was coming soon, he said, and his entire Eighth Army, both its men and its motors, required winterization. The Army was already in short supply of fuel.

Approach of winter, shortage of fuel, and the poor condition of the much-bombed road and rail communications leading northward from South Korea—these factors made the job of opening the port of Chinnampo one of top military priority.

The urgency of Chinnampo sweeping operations was fully understood and appreciated by the Navy. General Walker’s plaintive messages that his motor vehicles were being held up and that his troops were reduced to two rations per day underlined the Eighth Army’s crucial need of supplies. On 21 October, therefore, Admiral Joy radioed General Walker the following message:

“Navy recognizes serious supply difficulties and extensive logistics support for your hard-fighting Eighth Army. Difficulties overland and desirability of supply from sea are known. I am doing everything possible to alleviate this situation. Haeju harbor being swept at maximum rate possible. Sweeping slow due to few minesweepers, high tides, and well-laid minefields. Wonsan is also critical, and all U.S. sweeps have been committed there since October 7. U.S. sweeps cannot be diverted from that port until it is safe for ships’ entry. Sweepers are en route from States but will require instructions and training. Cannot estimate time for clearance of Chinnampo. If it is as well mined as Wonsan, it will require more than three weeks from the time we start.”

The minefield problem at Chinnampo differed from the one at Wonsan largely because of the wholly different hydrographic conditions. The direct seaward approach to the port of Chinnampo, unlike the deep-water channels at Wonsan, was blocked by islands and delta-like areas formed over the years by heavy deposits of silt carried down the swift-currented Taedong River into the Daido-Ko estuary.

In further contrast to Wonsan’s clear, almost tideless, and currentless harbor, Chinnampo’s muddy tide rose a minimum of twelve feet and the current moved as fast as five knots. Two navigation channels approached the harbor.

The southernmost channel was extremely shallow—only 15 feet at high tide. The northern channel was almost twice as deep. Both were mineable. To further complicate the problem, according to Rear Admiral Allan E. Smith,[1] the latest charts held by UN forces were dated 1922-24. Many changes could take place in 26 years.
The sweeping would have to start 69 miles from Chinnampo and proceed through a delta which was still about 33 miles from the dock.

“With three days to go before the channel was put through to the beaches of Wonsan, came a call from the Army and a command from Joy,” said Admiral Smith. “I was to sweep into Chinnampo, the port of Pyongyang. The Army said they could no longer supply their advance by land and had to supply by sea.

“Sweep Chinnampo? Sweep with what?” Smith continued. “No organization, no personnel, no plans, and no ships at the moment. Three small wooden minesweepers were scheduled to arrive in Sasebo within a few days. All the available minesweepers in Korea and most of the minesweeping gear in the Western Pacific were already committed to the east coast sweeping operations at Wonsan and Iwon.

“I scratched my head all right! I sent a despatch to COMNAVFE asking if an intelligence team could head for Chinnampo and obtain any information on mining there. Then I remembered that two mine observers had recently called on me—one from CINCPACFLT and one from Mine Forces, Atlantic Fleet. I sent the CINCPACFLT officer, Commander Donald N. Clay, to Chinnampo in search of advance mine intelligence and placed the Atlantic observer, Commander Stephen Morris Archer, in charge of Chinnampo sweep operations.”

In brief summary, Smith’s orders to Archer were to sweep Chinnampo “soonest-safest.” Archer was to concentrate first on opening the southern shallow-water channel to permit the early entry of LSTs and other shallow-draft types. After this channel had been opened, the northern deep water channel was to be cleared to permit the passage of large cargo and troop transport-type ships.
Assembling the Sweep Force

Commander Archer was observing Wonsan sweep operations aboard the U.S. destroyer transport Diachenko (APD 123) when he received Smith’s radio messages to clear the Chinnampo channels.

“What forces are available to me?” Archer asked by return despatch.

“None at the moment,” said Smith, whose flagship, the destroyer tender Dixie (AD 14), was riding at anchor in the Sasebo channel. “Suggest you come to Sasebo where you are free to commandeer any suitable ships you can find.”

Recruiting the Chinnampo sweep forces was that informal. Archer’s first recruit was his colleague, the mine warfare expert from Atlantic Fleet Mine Headquarters, LCDR Donald C. DeForest, who likewise had been flown out to the far east with Archer to observe, and if possible, to assist combat sweeping operations.

Archer and DeForest went quickly to Sasebo where they began a recruiting drive from Smith’s flagship. With binoculars from Dixie’s navigating bridge, the two officers watched the channel traffic for any type of ship with minesweeping potential.

Two 40-foot motor launches that had been left by the recently-departed Boxer were the first self-propelled units to pass in front of the two channel cops. It was DeForest’s suggestion that these launches be taken with the hope that they could pull light sweep gear in shallow water. Later, the USS Carmick (DMS 33) (LCDR R. K. Margetts) and USS Thompson (DMS 38) (LCDR W. H. Barckmann) steamed past and were “designated” volunteers. Neither of these ships had previously participated in Korean minesweeping duty. Next came three small AMSs[1A] (MinDiv-51) just arrived from Honolulu: USS Pelican (AMS 32) (LTJG H. V. Cronk) (ComMinDiv-51), USS Swallow (AMS 36) (LTJG J. Roberts), and USS Gull (AMS 16) (LTJG C. E. Nimitz). Next to join the force was an LST which would serve as a logistics base as well as a helicopter platform. Finally, the destroyer Forrest Royal would serve as flagship.[1B]

While the ship and officer larceny was in progress, Archer was also assembling his staff. DeForest would be operations officer and troubleshooter; CDR William H. Shea, borrowed from the staff of Commander Service Division 31, would be his planning officer. From the Royal Navy’s Theseus came LCDR W. E. H. Rodwell, RN; from Australia’s destroyer Warramunga came LCDR G. H. Gladstone, HMAN; and from CINCPACFLT’S staff came CDR Donald N. Clay, the intelligence officer.
Intelligence was the key to success at Chinnampo—good intelligence, prompt intelligence. Long before the sweeping operations began, Admiral Smith had sent Commander Clay to Pyongyang to seek advance mine intelligence. Smith had also requested the Eighth Army to seize and retain all Chinnampo boat captains, river pilots, and captured minelaying personnel as well as mine plans, ships’ logs, and hydrographic notes.

By the time actual channel sweeping commenced on 2 November, CDR Clay’s intelligence mission had paid rich dividends. Clay had located North Koreans who had personally sailed on the North Korean minelaying ships. He now knew that North Koreans had planted both moored and ground magnetic-type mines at Chinnampo. Although swift currents and extreme tides might have caused some movement, Clay knew approximately where each line had been planted; and the general areas that had to be swept were laid out and charted.

It is certain that this intelligence, more than any other single factor, reduced the duration of the Chinnampo sweeping operation and undoubtedly was responsible for the total lack of casualties from mines, either to personnel or to ships employed in the operation.

This fact underlines and re-emphasizes the great value of naval intelligence and the reason why naval intelligence must always work closely with the other intelligence agencies. A fragment of intelligence which might seem insignificant to one Service or agency often proves vital to another.

Chinnampo sweeping operations, although jury-rigged until the last moment, included practically every weapon in the naval arsenal: surface sweeps, aircraft, and helicopters.

A component of naval air began the mine clearance task on 28 October when PBMs from FAirWing Six, tendered by the USS Gardiners Bay (AVP-39) anchored at Inchon, began daily mine search patrols in the Chinnampo area. PBM “Mariners” from Patrol Squadrons 42 and 47 and “Sunderland” flying boats from RAF Squadrons 88 and 209 were continuously engaged in anti-mine operations from 29 September through 15 November. During this period, the aircraft sighted 340 mines in the Yellow Sea area; 44 were exploded and 9 were sunk by machine gun fire.

In late November, patrol planes were utilized to drop depth bombs on magnetic mines off Chinnampo. On the 28th, thirty-two 325-pound depth bombs were dropped. Only one mine was exploded. Operations the next day were slightly more successful. P2V “Neptunes” dropped sixteen bombs and destroyed three mines. The patrol planes had one distinct advantage over the small minesweepers: they could operate without regard to rough seas.

Helicopters, flying from the Royal Navy aircraft carrier Theseus, were a vital adjunct to the Chinnampo operation. Theseus provided an early base for HutRonTwoDet.[1C] The Theseus’ “egg-beater” flew a daily search of the minefield; the remainder of the British carrier aircraft provided a daily combat air patrol to protect the minesweeping force from either enemy air interference or shore batteries. The damage or possible loss of minesweepers to enemy gunfire was thus forestalled.

To insure maximum safety and to prevent the loss of any of the all too few minesweepers, the utmost use of all intelligence, knowledge, and experience had to be made. Archer and his staff sat down to second-guess where the enemy minefields might be. Next, they worked out a plan to circumvent and/or sweep those fields blocking entrance to the port. The aim, in view of the shortage of ships, was to go around minefields wherever possible. “Sweeping through was to be a last resort and for final clearance,” wrote Archer. “No losses were acceptable.”[2]

As it worked out, subsequent intelligence confirmed on the spot by helicopter observations, proved the
mining guesstimate substantially correct. It was necessary to sweep through only one minefield in clearing the initial channel to the docks.

Sweeping at Chinnampo began at an arbitrary point in the Yellow Sea, thirty-nine miles west of the line where mines were actually suspected. In actual fact, any starting point in the Yellow Sea outside the probable minefields was as good as another as all of it was shallow and mineable.

Two DMSs, the Carmick and Thompson, started the sweep of the so-called “end run” channel the morning of 29 October. This type could only be used in such a limited manner. “The DMS is neither fish nor fowl. It is neither a good destroyer nor a good minesweeper—too large, too costly, and too hard to maneuver as a minesweeper, too little fire power as a destroyer.”[3]

Before beginning surface sweep operations in the channel itself, Archer called all his skippers together, brought them up to date on intelligence and plans, and issued final instructions.

The plan for the first afternoon, 2 November, he said, would put all ships into action except the two DMSs. The three AMSs—Pelican, Swallow, and Gull—were to start the initial sweep two hours after their arrival in Chinnampo. Ahead of the AMSs would go the helicopter and the frogmen. The ROK vessels and the Bolster would follow astern, performing shotgun and darning duties.

One of the young AMS skippers, LTJG C. E. Nimitz, nephew of Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, described the Chinnampo sweep thus:

“It was good duty, but uneasy duty, especially those first few days when our intelligence hadn’t been authenticated. The uncertainty was bad enough, but that swift current compounded the problem. Sometimes, in turning, we found ourselves 1,000 yards out of position.

“We discovered something else on the morning of November 4: that a Chinnampo cyclone came up faster than a ‘Texas Twister.’ When the wind whipped up, it really whipped. Reveille had sounded only a few minutes before and most of us were sitting down to breakfast when suddenly we heard our ship banging against the steel hull of Bolster tied up alongside.

“Before I could make it to the bridge, two of our lines had parted and slight damage had been done to our rail. The seas were running high. Seventy-knot gusts sent gray murky water splashing against our pilothouse. We had learned our first lesson at Chinnampo—never to nest alongside another ship even in a dead calm, for ten minutes later the entire Yellow Sea might be standing on end.”[4]

The storm lasted almost twenty-four hours-abating as quickly as it came. With all its wrath and fury, the storm had its blessings. Four enemy contact mines had broken their moorings and surfaced, and were later destroyed by air and surface gunfire. At the storm’s height, the Catamount (LSD-17) (CDR Kenneth Loveland) steamed into Chinnampo. As the last unit to join Archer’s force, Catamount’s arrival was a historic event in naval warfare. She was the first LSD to participate in minesweeping operations.

Compared to the pint-sized and bobbing AMSs, the 4,960-ton Catamount with 458-foot keel and her 72-foot beam rode the heavy seas gracefully. She was an odd-looking mine ship with her blunt, stubby bow and high freeboard. She had a massive bridge and a squared stern that opened to the sea as her bowels flooded to take aboard and disgorge baby minesweepers. Altogether Catamount had brought with her 12 LCVPs, plus all the spare minesweeping gear available in Yokosuka and Sasebo.

In performing duties as an LCVP mothership, an LSD’s boat operations are somewhat similar to an aircraft carrier’s flight operations. Launching and recovery of the small boats, as with aircraft, must be carefully timed and supervised. As the aircraft carrier must be brought into the wind preparatory to takeoffs and landings, so must the LSD head into the sea prior to flooding the well deck for boat operations. The LSD’s boat control officer is required to perform duties comparable to those of the carrier’s landing signal officer.

The arrival of the Catamount with her LCVP sweepers strengthened Archer’s minesweeping force. The tiny boats were capable of both moored and magnetic sweeping; they could sweep very shallow areas beyond the
reach of larger minesweepers; and, in deeper waters, they could open shallow paths for the larger minesweepers to follow.

According to Archer, the intelligence mission of CDR Clay to discover the location of the Chinnampo minefields made the sweeping task much easier and less dangerous. Moreover, the staff’s “guesstimates” of the location of the enemy minefields were confirmed by Clay’s reports.

“By November 6,” said Archer, “most of our guesses had been confirmed. With Commander Clay embarked in a North Korean tug, he and his North Korean pilots threaded their way from the Chinnampo dock to the open sea, checking the location of each mine line.”

Once the tug had been safely navigated to the open sea, it was decided to make a return trip for the purpose of precisely plotting the minefield. The ROK YMS-503 became the first UN ship to enter Chinnampo. Aboard her was Forrest Royal’s navigator, Ensign Robert R. Munroe, who had volunteered to do the piloting. The safe passage of this ship was again confirmation of the valuable intelligence that had been obtained.

Altogether, 212 enemy mines had been planted in the harbor. The main entrance channel was thoroughly blocked by five moored lines and one magnetic line.

“In addition,” said Archer, “the approach to Chinnampo from the north was blocked by three lines of moored mines. But the southern channel, the one where we thought for certain that the enemy would have mines, was apparently open. Actually, we think the enemy had intended to mine it, but planes from the British aircraft carrier Theseus, by sinking what they believed to be a mine-carrying barge, had interrupted the enemy’s plan. Later on we found a sunken enemy barge where the British said it should be in the southern approaches. Fifteen mines were still aboard it.

“Once all the mine intelligence had been compiled,” stated Archer, “we were able to plot a channel which permitted our initial sweep to avoid all but one minefield. That was why it was possible for us to sweep seventy miles in ten days without a casualty of any kind.”

Otherwise, sweeping operations at Chinnampo were quite similar to those at Wonsan. A night conference always preceded the issuance of the next day’s sweep plan. “Minesweeping would run a punctual guy nuts,” said Archer. “You can’t figure out what you will do tomorrow until you find out what you have done today.” Archer, Shea, and DeForest listened to each skipper’s progress report—Archer thinking in terms of over-all accomplishment, Shea of tomorrow’s plan, and DeForest in his role as chairman of the ways and means committee.

A typical sweep day at Chinnampo read as follows:

“Pelican and Swallow under way by 0500. Proceed to Item line, stream gear, and make moored sweep along swept channel to Chinnampo. On arrival reverse course and return to Item line. UDT team and helicopter reconnoiter Item and Jig lines. Locate and buoy. Investigate mines on north beach of Soku-to. Render safe any located. Two LCVPs recheck swept areas. Four LCVPs follow with magnetic sweep. Under way approximately 0600.”

In these few words was a full, hard day’s work for all hands. No more detailed instructions were necessary, so well did every man know his own specialty.

“Because of Chinnampo’s swift tidal currents,” said Archer, “all the mines had to be cleared out in order to render the area fully safe. There was always the possibility that the swift current would cause the mines to ‘walk’ out into the swept channel.

“But the sweepers were given maximum protection at all times. By using the helicopter and small boats at low tide, we double-checked our intelligence and we double-checked the possibility of tide and current moving the mines into a swept area. As an additional precaution, after we located a minefield, underwater demolition teams in LCPRs used empty 5-inch powder cans to buoy the mines at low tide. Moreover, the AMSs always
swept at high tide; and, weather permitting, they were preceded by the helicopter.”

With the danger factor considerably reduced, sweeping became a dull and monotonous procedure.

“To give you some idea of the monotony,” said Lieutenant Nimitz, “we always passed about a half dozen bodies floating with the tide—always the same bodies, for before they could get out to sea, the tide reversed itself, bringing them in again. We named one of the bodies ‘Herman’ because he was so easily identified. His hands had been tied behind his back. Herman was the main topic of conversation. Where would Herman be the next morning?”

In addition to an occasional storm, the coming of cold weather to Chinnampo brought added burden to all the minesweepers, but particularly to Catamount and her small boats. On icy mornings, steam was used to unfreeze the big ship’s ballast valves in order to flood the well-deck and lower the stern gate. Steam also had to be applied to the LCVP boat engines after a freezing night. Despite the ice, there were some compensations which accrued to Catamount's crew—compensations that could not be matched by any other ship in the Navy. After she had deballasted, it was a rare occasion if the crew did not find some choice fish flopping around in the docking well. Fresh fish cooked to taste was a welcome reward to the sweep crews in payment for their long hours of cold, rough-water sweeping in an open boat.

Before the Chinnampo sweeping effort was finished, thirteen Japanese contract sweepers, including one mother ship and one “guinea pig” ship with padded decks and remote controls, had joined the sweep force. The Japanese sweepers, while not permitted to operate in unswept waters, did relieve United States sweeps from the monotonous duty of check-sweeping.

As early as 7 November, after ten days’ sweeping, shallow-draft vessels began to enter the port of Chinnampo. The first ship to enter was LSU-1402. Word that one ship had safely entered Chinnampo caused others to arrive, all bringing much-needed supplies to the Eighth Army.

Archer’s message to Admiral Smith as the first line from the LST hit the dock was in the clear: “Mission accomplished.”

Only shallow-draft vessels were initially permitted to enter the swept channel, and then only when they were conned by a member of the Chinnampo’s Pilot’s Association. This was a newly formed group of all available UN navigators and quartermasters, under the supervision of LCDR G. H. Gladstone, RAN.

“After the minesweeping chores are finished,” said Archer, “the most worrisome duty is harbor control and pilotage. In spite of the fact that others may be given port and pilotage authority, everyone feels, and I guess naturally, that the minesweep commander really knows the harbor best. Consequently, the conscientious commander feels personally responsible for all the ships going in or out. He will feel the necessity for supplying pilots and, in general, for being guardian angel of the port. This, when combined with language difficulties and the Oriental philosophy, was the most nerve-wracking of all my Korean experiences.”

The first LST was piloted into Chinnampo on 10 November by CDR Clay. “It seemed appropriate,” said Archer, “that this event should occur on the eve of the ROK Navy’s fifth anniversary. I therefore despatched all ROK ships present that it was a pleasure to present the open port of Chinnampo to the Navy of the Republic of Korea on its birthday.”

Archer ordered all U.S. Navy men-of-war to dress ship in honor of the occasion.

The deep water channel was declared open on 20 November, and Captain Charles H. Perdue’s hospital ship Repose was the first deep draft vessel to enter. In fact, she was three times larger than any ship which had previously entered the channel. Warramunga’s LCDR Gladstone piloted the big white mercy ship with less than a foot of water under her keel. Archer, who was more worried about the ship grounding than being mined, sent a note of congratulations to Gladstone on the successful passage, and regretted that Gladstone would have to stay aboard the Repose overnight. The wise-cracking Australian radioed back that he could stand fifty nurses for one night!
In summary, Archer stated that Chinnampo would have been a much tougher job both for the sweeping operation and later for the redeployment if there had been enemy resistance. “We would have required constant air cover, and we could have expected losses.

“As it was, our greatest danger was the navigation hazards. We constantly took advantage of all available breaks to protect ourselves from mines. But we had to worry constantly about tides and uncharted shoals.

“It was fortunate, also, that the Commander Seventh Fleet, Admiral Struble, had once been Commander Mine Force, Pacific. He understood the mine problem. There was no breathing down the neck of the minesweep commander.”

Ship performance, with exception of Boxer’s two 40-foot motor launches, whose engines were inadequate, was excellent. The LCVPs, used for the first time in Korea, worked fine and were credited with sweeping five moored mines. The LST provided an ideal base for the helicopter. “Two helicopters can base on an LST easily,” said Archer. “She makes an ideal tender and supply ship for small sweepers. She carries a large quantity of diesel oil; she can carry provisions and spare sweep gear. Her tank deck is ideal for laying out replacement sweep gear.”

The LSD provided the only means for attending small boat sweeps. She was excellent in heavy weather, as well as being a good supply ship and a black oil tanker. At Chinnampo, for instance, the Catamount carried sufficient oil to fuel the DMSs, the APD, and the destroyer. When the fleet tankers came, the LSD and the LST made it possible to effect a quick turn-around. Had there been enemy opposition, this would have been a great advantage.

Additionally, the LSD had served as a schoolship for ROK naval personnel, both officers and men, who were the first to train for minesweeping operations and to actually see the work done. This contingent was a part of the ROK sailors from six Korean YMSs being converted for minesweeping at Sasebo. During the evening, after a full day in the boats or on AMSs, these ROK naval men studied USN minesweeping manuals and discussed their project with great enthusiasm. On their return to Sasebo, they would man their own ships and be trained in minesweeping work at sea.

By November’s end, 200 miles of channel had been swept at Chinnampo, and 80 mines[4A] had been destroyed.

Still the Chinnampo sweep force was not finished. United Nations ground forces had continued to advance northward. They might need fire support or an amphibious lift along the flanks. Accordingly, on Thanksgiving Day, 1950, Archer’s force started sweeping north toward the Chongchon River.

“We felt there would be no mines,” said Archer, “but we wanted to make sure that fire support ships and LSTs could get in if needed. The AMSs made the sweep to Yongmi Dong on Thanksgiving Day. The DMSs and the destroyer were used as navigational guides, and the APD was used to carry the sweeping boats.

“We swept to within three miles of the beaches that were in Communist hands and far beyond the frontlines of UN ground forces. From our sweeps, we could see B-29s bombing Chonju, which was the far point of our advance to the northwest.

“After we had completed this sweep, we withdrew to our shelter area in Chinnampo and awaited further developments. When the Chinese attack came, we didn’t know whether there would be a Dunkirk at Yongmi Dong or whether the UN ground forces would be able to successfully withdraw south of the Chongchon River and perhaps reach Chinnampo. As soon as the APAs and AKAs started arriving at Chinnampo, our final chore developed.

“The entry of UN transports and covering destroyers had to be made at night. I stationed an AMS, a ROK frigate and my flagship at the critical turning point in the channel to serve as radar markings.

“During the night, one transport went aground and one destroyer caught a buoy in one of her screws. But the transport was refloated at next high tide and the destroyer cleared her screw next day.
“The Chinnampo evacuation was a complete success; the entire port logistic command as well as many civilians were safely evacuated. The deep channel surely paid for itself in this operation. Again there were no casualties. This is perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the Chinnampo operation. The job was completed without the loss of a single life or a single ship.

“Many things contributed to this record, but the outstanding source of satisfaction to me,” Archer concluded, “was the complete and thoroughly enthusiastic teamwork of all hands—Americans, British, ROKs (and Japanese)—in our Task Element. Vice Admiral Andrewes and his Theseus, Rear Admiral Allan E. Smith and his staff, the logistic and moral support we received from Sasebo—everyone worked together with a will and enthusiasm to get this difficult task completed in spite of weather, few ships, language problems and a random assortment of ships, personnel and equipment.”[5]

After five years of obscurity, the October-November minesweeping operations in Korea dramatized once again the fact that minesweeping demands a tremendous expenditure of logistic support. It requires painstaking coordination and much training; it requires a variety of equipment: tenders, motherships, flagships, buoy ships, [5A] small-boat facilities, helicopter bases, mine disposal units and underwater demolition teams. In Korea, fire support ships were also needed.

By the end of November 1950, minesweeping had become a problem of major significance to the United States Navy.

Rear Admiral Allan E. Smith summed it up this way:[6] “The Russians apparently have everything we have and everything the Germans had in mining techniques. . . . The United States must put minesweeping on the same priority level as antisubmarine and carrier warfare.”
By October’s end, a total United Nations victory over the North Korean aggressors seemed assured and imminent. General MacArthur stated that United States troops might be home by Christmas. The North Korean Army was crushed; their divisions were in complete rout. Thousands of enemy troops had surrendered and hundreds more were deserting their arms.

On Korea’s west coast, elements of the Eighth Army were nearing the Yalu River. On the east coast, likewise, elements of the Tenth Corps were sweeping to the Manchurian border.

Unlike the Eighth Army, which attacked frontally all along the western perimeter, General Almond’s Tenth Corps, consisting of five divisions (First Marine Division, Seventh Infantry Division, Third Infantry Division, and the two ROK divisions—Third and Capitol), attacked northward in four columns with the exception of the U.S. Third Division, whose last elements were offlanding in Wonsan on 20 November. The First Marine Division was sent northwest, the U.S. Seventh Division went north. Third and Capitol Divisions of the ROK First Corps were advancing far up the eastern shoreline. General Almond’s plan was to dominate all the main arteries of transport and communication in northeast Korea as quickly as possible.

The optimistic horizon in late October was clouded by only one storm, but one which in less than a month was to grow to hurricane proportions. Would the Red Chinese intervene? The Peking radio had said they would. On 16 October, in fact, intelligence revealed that Chinese Army units had crossed the Yalu River. Were they only, as the Peking radio had said, “volunteer forces”?

On the western front, toward the end of October, the Eighth Army was advancing toward the Manchurian border against spotty resistance, reaching Chongju on 30 October. Elements of the 24th Division fought their way into Kusong.

In the eastern half of Korea, the Seventh Regiment of the ROK Sixth Division, after reaching Chosan on the Yalu River on 26 October, found itself surrounded by enemy forces and its line of communication severed. Relief elements of the ROK Second Corps also suffered strong attacks by Chinese troops in the vicinity of Ongjon and Usan.

To make the future more ominous, units of the First Cavalry Division were surprised and suffered severe casualties during the night of 1-2 November when a strong contingent of Chinese horsemen attacked their positions.

From captured prisoners, four Red Chinese armies could be identified.

The sudden appearance of Chinese units in Korea momentarily halted the advance in the west, while the Tenth Corps in the east proceeded more cautiously.

On 5 November, General MacArthur informed the UN of the presence of organized Chinese units in Korea. It was still not clear whether the Chinese troops had joined the North Korean People’s Army to prevent its annihilation and to prolong its resistance, or whether a large-scale intervention by Red Chinese was forthcoming.

It was at this point that the carriers of Task Force 77 were asked to destroy the Korean side of the Yalu River bridges across which Chinese troops, supplies, and equipment were seen and known to be streaming.[1]

As Task Force 77 commenced its work on the Yalu bridges and as General MacArthur’s announcement was recorded at UN headquarters at Lake Success, the entire battlefront in North Korea became ominously quiet. Little action was seen in the Eighth Army sector.

On the east coast U.S. Marines pushed northwestward up a winding dirt road toward the Chosin reservoir
area. From there, it was planned that they would attack northwestward to link up with elements of the Eighth Army.
In their advance to the Chosin reservoir area, the Marines had thus far met little opposition. The worst pocket of resistance had been encountered on 2 November when the 124th Chinese Communist Division challenged Colonel Homer L. Litzenberg’s Seventh Marine Regiment south of Chinhung-ni. Fighting between this Marine regiment and the Chinese Division continued for five days.

On the night of 7 November, the Seventh’s 3rd Battalion commander, Major Maurice E. Roach, sent word to Colonel Litzenberg that he was meeting very heavy opposition and requested artillery fire.

“That night,” said Colonel Litzenberg, “we fired artillery into forty-five concentration areas, points we thought the enemy most likely to hold. That night, also, the Chinese General threw a fresh new regiment against the Marines; but by 0400 he was forced to withdraw his division in such a crippled state that it would not fight again for five months.”[2]

Aside from the Seventh Marine Regiment’s initial encounter with the Chinese, the primary source of Marine concern came from reports of pilots ranging north and west of the column that numerous small groups of Chinese soldiers were spread throughout the North Korean countryside. Many of these groups were in the open; others, when observed, took refuge in houses and huts. In addition to actual troop sightings, pilots saw thousands of footprints in the snow. Were enemy forces encircling the First Marine Division?

On 15 November, the Seventh Marines arrived at Hagaru-ri, the village at the southern tip of their first objective, the Chosin Reservoir. The Fifth Marines followed closely behind. Pilots and North Korean civilians continued to report Chinese enemy troop activity to the north and west of the Marines.

To strengthen their position, the Marines decided to move the tactical air direction center (TADC) to Hagaru-ri, where it would be in a centralized position for the close support control of Marine and naval aircraft. At the same time, construction of an air strip at Hagaru-ri was begun, big enough to accommodate C-47 type aircraft. The Marines’ foresight in both these decisions was to prove extremely beneficial in the fighting that lay ahead.

On 21 November, Colonel Herbert B. Powell’s 17th Regimental Combat Team of the Seventh Army Division reached the Manchurian border at Hyesanjin, a deserted village known as the “ghost city of broken bridges.”

So far as the occupation of enemy territory was concerned, this was the highwater mark of the Korean war.

On orders from U.S. Tenth Corps, Major General Oliver P. Smith, Commanding General First Marine Division, resumed the Marines’ advance on 22 November towards Yudam-ni, a village and road center on the west-central shore of the Chosin reservoir. From there, the Leathernecks would push north and then west toward the Communist stronghold of Kanggye for the link-up with the Eighth Army and the final advance to the Yalu.
Late in the morning of 24 November, the Eighth Army in the east began an offensive. The enemy defenses were a series of roadblocks and obstacles to hold up the advance of wheeled vehicles and tanks. During the first few hours, enemy opposition was light. Enemy positions were not strongly defended, and gains from two to twelve miles were made.

By sunset, 25 November, however, the Red Chinese had commenced a strong counterattack which penetrated the positions of the ROK First Division in the Taechon area, forcing some of its units to withdraw several miles and exposing the 24th Division’s right flank.

Night infiltrations by the enemy followed the strong daytime counterattacks. The most powerful blow fell on the right flank of Eighth Army in the mountainous area northeast of Tokchon. The Communists struck the ROK 7th and 8th Divisions in regimental strength, infiltrating between UN positions during the night. Organized withdrawal became impossible.

The first tip-off of the impending Chinese attack against the Marines came on 25 November from a Chinese private who was captured by the 7th Marines’ 1st Battalion. The private said that as soon as the two Marine regiments arrived at Yudam-ni, two Chinese corps (six divisions) would begin the attack. Three divisions would attack and surround the two Yudam-ni regiments, one from the north, one from the west, and one cutting the road to the south behind the Marines. A fourth Communist Division would attack Hagaru-ri and would sever the road between that village and Koto-ri; a fifth division would attack Koto-ri, surround it, and break the road between Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni.[3]

That a Chinese peasant private would know the maneuver plans of two Chinese Army corps hardly seems plausible. Yet, his incredible story was to be verified during the next few days of actual battle.

As the Red Chinese attacked in the north central Korean mountains, splitting the Eighth Corps and Tenth Army, thousands upon thousands of Red Chinese soldiers poured through the open lines.

On 27 November the Fifth and Seventh Marines were in Yudam-ni. The First Marines had been left behind to protect the main supply route, which was some 60 miles long. Single battalions guarded the villages of Hagaru-ri at the southern tip of the reservoir, Chinhung-ni, at the base of the 3,400-foot plateau, and Koto-ri midway between the two.

On the night of 27 November, the Chinese armies struck, hurling at least 60,000 and possibly as many as 100,000 troops against the First Marine Division in the vicinity of the Chosin Reservoir. Although not ideally positioned by any means, the Marines’ defensive posture was better than other units of the Tenth Corps, who were stretched out from Wonsan all the way to the Manchurian border, a distance of some 100 miles.

At 2200 the night of 27 November, wave after wave of Chinese attacked the Marines’ Yudam-ni defense perimeter.

For some reason, unknown to the Marines, the Chinese elected to hit the 2nd Battalion of Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L. Murray’s Fifth Marines first.

“This particular battalion, under command of Lieutenant Colonel Harold S. Roise, had gained about 3,000 yards during the day,” said Colonel Murray, “and was in a good position to defend itself. The Fifth Regiment’s other two battalions were in assembly areas and outposted for local defense. Under the circumstances the Second Battalion was better able to receive the shock of the first massed attack.”[4]

Massed attack is correct phraseology. At first the Chinese attacked by squads. As these small groups
were chopped down, the attacks were stepped up. Enemy platoons, and, in some instances, companies, charged
the Marine lines. Soon the entire front blazed with shellfire. Coordinated with the frontal assault, the Chinese also
attempted to encircle the Marines at Yudam-ni by cutting the main supply route southward to Hagaru-ri.

Although the Chinese succeeded in establishing a roadblock south of Yudam-ni, their effort proved to be
a costly one. They encountered Seventh Regiment’s Fox Company, which Colonel Litzenberg had outposted
behind the advance atop a mountain pass to guard the supply route from Hagaru-ri.

Since the heroic attack by the U.S. Marines “in the opposite direction” has been fully covered by official
Marine historians in U.S. Marine Operations in Korea,[5] no attempt will be made herein to chronicle the First
Marine Division’s fighting withdrawal from Yudam-ni to Hagaru-ri, to Koto-ri, to Chinhung-ni, and to Hungnam,
where U.S. Navy transports and combatant vessels awaited their arrival. Only the highlights of the close air
support rendered by naval and Marine aircraft will be recorded.

Courageous and tough fighting men that they are, it is certain that the First Marine Division could not
have extricated itself as a unit from the clutches of six Chinese divisions without the close air support which was
to come from Navy and Marine pilots. Nor would the job have been as easy nor as many of the injured saved
without the air logistics and rescue support that was to come from the U.S. Air Force.

When morning came on 28 November, Marine pilots from the escort carrier Badoeng Strait and from
Yonpo airfield at Hungnam, arrived over Yudam-ni expecting to support their comrades on their scheduled push
toward Kanggye, had no inkling of the savage and sanguinary battles which had been fought during the night.

By radio, now, they were briefed on what had happened. Three of Seventh Regiment’s companies had been heavily hit. Easy Company had been completely
overrun; a platoon commander, First Lieutenant Robert Bye, was now in charge of the company. Dog Company
had been driven from the crest of the terrain it was holding three times; and three times it had returned. Dog
Company’s commander, Captain Milton Hull, and fourteen men were all that remained of the original company,
200 strong. Captain Hull had fourteen wounds. Fox company had been completely cut off. Reports funneled
through to regiment that Fox’s commander, Captain William E. Barber, had been seriously wounded and was
directing his defense from a stretcher.

The Fifth Regiment, still in comparatively good shape, had been damaged as much by the severe cold
and frostbite as by enemy gunfire and hand grenades.

Marine tactical air controllers on the ground instructed all pilots that the contemplated push northward on
28 November had been cancelled; instead, would the airmen survey the Yudam-ni area for Chinese troop
concentrations and take appropriate action?

If Marines were shocked and stunned by the night action of 27 November, no less so were the Chinese.
They were unable to concentrate for a second assault until two days later, 30 November, when aerial observers
from the First Marine Air Wing reported that at noon an estimated 2,000 enemy troops were cautiously grouping
north of the Marines’ perimeter.

Marine aircraft immediately began to blanket the area with rockets, bombs, and napalm. By the time the
enemy jumped off at 1500, his estimated 2,000 strong had been slashed to an estimated five hundred.

What had promised to be a fullscale attack was now a piecemeal venture. Nevertheless, to the
accompaniment of the usual cacophony of bugles, whistles, and shouts, the Reds swept down the slope of the
ridge facing the Marines. Pilots in their cockpits overhead could not hear the noise made by the enemy troops as
they approached the Marine perimeter, but they needed little coaching from the forward air controller on the
ground.

Peeling off at 5,000 feet, four napalm-loaded Corsairs howled down to make “on-the-deck” runs. All four
napalm tanks struck the first attacking wave, scoring direct hits which tore large holes in the enemy forward wall.
As the last plane dropped its ordnance, the first was back, tailed by others, to attack the faltering enemy with
strafing runs. The enemy’s assault lost momentum and the Reds soon had enough. They broke into disorganized flight to escape the rain of 20-mm. shells. Marine aircraft had broken the back of this enemy assault. Of the 500 enemy who initiated the attack, Marine Corsairs were credited with killing approximately three hundred.

Elsewhere on the Marine defense perimeter, planes from Task Force 77 appeared and rendered similar support. Skyraider and Corsair pilots from the USS Philippine Sea were told by the Marine Tactical Air Controller that their attacks for that day had been “very good. The enemy has been stopped.”

Full participation by Task Force 77 in support of the embattled Marines was urgently requested 29 November in a “flash” message from Commanding General First Marine Air Wing to COMNAVFE. Major General Field Harris strongly recommended “a sustained effort by Task Force 77 in the Tenth Corps zone of action.”

On this same day, carrier pilots from the USS Leyte (CV-32) reported their inability to contact tactical air controllers in the Eighth Army area because of the heavy traffic. However, they reported excellent results from the flights that had been flown in support of Tenth Corps.

Philippine Sea’s pilots had similar experiences. Of ten flights flown in support of Eighth Army, only three were able to contact tactical air controllers and these pilots had been instructed to jettison their napalm alongside the road. The same troubles which had been so evident during the battle for Pusan had reappeared.

On the other hand, all three flights in support of the Tenth Corps had been directed upon lucrative targets, mostly enemy troop concentrations.

Following the results of the 29th, Commander Task Force 77, Rear Admiral E. C. Ewen, in a despatch to Admiral Struble, estimated that 60 per cent of Task Force 77’s aircraft had not been profitably employed in the Eighth Army area due to the saturation of the area by friendly aircraft and due to communications difficulty with the tactical air controllers. He reported 100 per cent effectiveness in the Tenth Corps area.

Admiral Struble therefore notified Fifth Air Force Headquarters that because of the stack-up of UN aircraft and unsatisfactory communications in the Eighth Army area reported by Task Force 77 pilots, he was directing Admiral Ewen to adjust the percentage of air effort directed between east and west as control capabilities appeared to warrant.

In reply, General Timberlake said that:

“. . . due to the fluid ground situation, it is impossible to determine the exact status of tactical air control parties in the Eighth Army area. Many of them may have been lost or made inoperative due to enemy action. Every effort is being made to determine status of TACPs and to make replacements.”[6]

Meanwhile, Fifth Air Force issued instructions giving naval flights priority of employment as soon as they reached the target area. Fifth Air Force further stated that due to critical condition in EUSAK area, the “effort of CTF-77 should be divided during the next few days.”

Admiral Struble answered that in view of the cut-off position of the First Marine Division and their urgent need for air assistance, all fast carrier flights for the following day, 3 December, would report initially to the Tenth Corps. Thereafter, some flights would be directed to proceed on to the Eighth Army area if they were not urgently required by Tenth Corps.

On 3 December, Major General Harris again sent a despatch to Admiral Joy urgently recommending that the “main fast carrier effort be made in support of First Marine Division. Navy aircraft particularly desired by First Marine Division, because of familiarity with their report system. Desire Marine shore-based air and ship squadrons operating continuously this area.”

Admiral Joy was kept informed of developments and concurred with Struble and Harris as did Lieutenant General Timberlake, who on 4 December in reply to General Harris’ request sent the following despatch:

“Concur main effort fast carriers in support First Marine Division during critical period of withdrawal.”

Once again, as during the Inchon assault, Marine and naval airmen would perform close air support for
the First Marine Division, using Navy-Marine doctrine.
At 0705, on 2 December, convoys of the trapped Fifth and Seventh Marines, loaded with their wounded and their equipment, prepared to move out from Yudam-ni. Before them and their immediate destination of Hagaru-ri lay fifteen miles of tortuous, icy roads, through mountains literally swarming with Chinese Red troops. Flights of close support aircraft from Philippine Sea, Leyte, Badoeng Strait, and Marine flights from Yonpo headed toward the cut-off Marines to spearhead the breakout.

As soon as the planes of Task Force 77 appeared over Yudam-ni, the Marines commenced their long march to the sea—distance, sixty miles.

Marine rifle units flushed enemy snipers from the nearby hills and seized the high ground on the flanks of the long column. Supporting weapons and vehicles formed the center of a moving perimeter. Overhead, 20 to 50 aircraft circled the long column, ready on a second’s notice to deliver rockets, napalm, 20-mm. shells, or 500-pound bombs. Indeed, during daylight operations, the Chinese divisions who were embarked on an offensive mission were forced to take the defensive.

For instance, when the Marines encountered their first heavily-defended roadblock in the late afternoon of 2 December, 22 Navy and Marine aircraft, following an artillery barrage, pounded the enemy position with bombs and napalm tanks.

Close on the heels of the air strike, the Leathernecks jumped off in assault. The Chinese who survived the aerial attack were quickly despatched and set running by bayonet-wielding Marines in hand-to-hand fighting.

Throughout the day of 2 December, as many as 40 to 60 tactical aircraft constantly circled the Fifth and Seventh Marines.

Planes from Leyte and Philippine Sea spent most of their time blasting small buildings around Hagaru-ri that housed enemy troops.

“Occasionally we caught the white-uniformed Chinese troops in the open,” said the commanding officer of Leyte’s VF-33, Commander Horace H. Epes. “I vividly recall catching a couple of Red soldiers hotfooting it down the road carrying a long pole with a big kettle of what looked like soup—that no one ever drank.”

At the same time, heavily-laden Air Force C-119s dropped cargoes of ammunition, medical supplies, water, food, gasoline, and C-rations in multicolored parachutes; observation aircraft cork-screwed through the falling chutes; helicopters fluttered down to pick up the seriously wounded.

When darkness came, however, and the planes went back to their bases, the Marines were left to their own resources. As a result of the 2 December fighting, however, the enemy had been so badly mangled that he was unable to seriously threaten the Marine column during the night.

On 3 December, the pattern of the previous day was repeated. The Marines continued their advance, employing the deadly combination of air and ground attack. By 1900 on 3 December, the head of the Marine column had reached Hagaru-ri. The rear elements of the column did not arrive in the village until mid-afternoon of the next day.

On 4 December, the commanding general of the First Marine Aircraft Wing sent the following despatch to Commander Task Force 77:

“I was up on the hill today (at Hagaru-ri) and saw the Fifth and Seventh Marines return. They thanked God for air. I don’t think they could have made it as units without air support. The next job is to get them off this
hill. I want to be able to cover their flanks and rear one hundred per cent, and to blast any major resistance to their front. Can use all the help you can give me until they get down. Tell your pilots they are doing a magnificent job.”

On 6 December, the First Marine Division departed Hagaru with 45 miles to go. Its objective—the next way station, Koto-ri.

There were some innovations in the close air support procedure for this movement. The Marine column moved out three battalions abreast. Forward air controllers were placed with each flanking battalion, and tactical air coordinators flew ahead of the columns’ flanks. The air coordinators’ mission was to seek out enemy forces beyond the visual range of forward air controllers.

A further step to improve the control of close air support was the use of an airborne tactical air direction center. For this purpose a four-engined R5D transport provided by VMR-152 was hastily equipped with additional communications equipment.

By 6 December, the “Flying TADC” was ready for flight operations. From its orbiting station directly above the Marine column, this novel control agency was able to communicate to all flight leaders and ground units simultaneously. In mountainous terrain, where some types of radios were limited in range, this new airborne link made a significant contribution to the air support effort.

The column had advanced only 2,000 yards when it was suddenly stopped by a concentration of enemy fire coming from a ravine 100 yards east of the road.

Friendly troops were pinned down within 75 yards of the enemy gun positions. One of the Marine forward air controllers, who was riding in a jeep immediately behind the lead tank of the column, contacted an airborne tactical air coordinator, briefed him on the enemy concentration, and directed him in on a dummy run. When the tactical air coordinator had definitely located the target, the forward air controller ordered a live run with 20-mm. fire and napalm.

Meanwhile, other Navy and Marine aircraft monitored the radio net to familiarize themselves with the target. At this time, Leyte had eight planes and VMF-214 had eighteen Corsairs on station. These planes were divided into three flights of eight aircraft orbiting at eight thousand, nine thousand, and ten thousand feet respectively.

A flight of eight planes from VMF-214 attacked first with rockets and proximity-fuzed 500-pound bombs. The second flight from VMF-214 was then called in and asked to use a new technique. In an effort to conserve ammunition and to keep armed aircraft on station as long as possible, every other plane was asked to make a dummy run. The second VMF-214 flight did so, but this plan worked no better than the first; pilots were thereupon asked to resume firing on every run.

An hour went by, and still the column was pinned down. Koto-ri was eight miles away and the precious daylight hours were dwindling. After a hurried conference with one of his forward air controllers, Colonel Litzenberg directed his three battalion front to move forward as the aircraft made firing runs perpendicular to the line of advance. The enemy guns were only 100 yards from the Marines.

Pilots of the next flight were the planes from the Leyte. They were informed of Colonel Litzenberg’s decision and ordered to attack.

“My F4Us were fully loaded,” said CDR Epes, “and at 5,000 feet there wasn’t much margin of power. It was cold as hell in the airplane, but it was colder on the ground—25 degrees below zero, with one foot of snow. The long Marine column was preparing to attack when we arrived.

“A ground controller called me by voice radio.

“’I’m in the lead jeep; I have a fluorescent panel marker on my hood. Fly over me and rock your wings. I see you,’ he said. ‘Now come over me on a heading of 180 degrees. Now push over; now commence firing.’

“Our empty cases fell among the Marines, our bullets and light bombs landed on the Chinese 50 yards ahead of them.
“Then the ground controller said, ‘Come back with napalm.’ That really worried us. Sometimes napalm spreads for a block. We were afraid we would burn up our own troops, but we complied. After the first Corsair’s napalm dropped, the ground controller snapped, ‘Move it closer.’

“We dropped napalm bombs on the sides of the hills, with Marines all along the road directly beneath. If the temperature hadn’t been 25 degrees below, I don’t believe the Marines could have stood the heat. Maybe it felt good.

“That sort of bombing spelled out close air support for the Marines. They pinpointed the target, told us exactly where to drop.”

While planes from Leyte’s VF-33 made firing runs, ground troops commenced firing. Eighty-one millimeter mortar shell trajectories arced higher than the low-flying attack planes. As an attacking plane would pass, Marine mortarmen aimed at the plane’s tails, and by this improvised rule-of-thumb they effectively lobbed in their shells before the next airplane made its run.

Under this cloud burst of shellfire, enemy gunners at last took cover and the column’s point again moved southward. New flights of close support aircraft from the carriers reported and took up the attack; aircraft control was passed rearward along the column from one forward air controller to another. By this continuous aerial bombardment, the Marines were able to neutralize and pass the enemy batteries south of Hagaru-ri.

Throughout the Marines’ withdrawal to Hungnam, Chinese troops were never able to effectively counter the Navy-Marine system of close air support. The communists’ best defensive weapons were their rifles and light machine guns.

Two carrier pilots were lost due to enemy action—Leyte’s Ensign Jesse L. Brown, while flying a close support mission near Hagaru-ri on 4 December; and LCDR Ralph Maxwell Bagwell, commanding officer of Attack Squadron 35, on 12 December. Squadron pilots saw Bagwell crawl free of his inverted aircraft and take refuge beneath a nearby railroad bridge. But before a friendly helicopter could reach Bagwell, Leyte pilots witnessed his capture by a group of 20 enemy soldiers.[6A]

Ensign Brown, the first Negro pilot to fly for the Navy, had been forced to make an emergency landing in a mountainous area northwest of Chosin Reservoir. Pilots circling overhead observed that Brown was alive but apparently unable to free himself from the wreckage. They observed also that his plane was beginning to burn slowly. The temperature was below freezing, darkness was approaching, the terrain was unfamiliar, and Brown was down five miles behind enemy lines. With complete disregard for such hazards and without hesitation, LTJG Thomas J. Hudner decided to go to Brown’s assistance. After making a successful wheels-up crash landing, Hudner found that Brown’s leg was caught in the buckled fuselage and it was impossible to extricate the injured man from his cockpit. Hudner packed snow around Brown’s fuselage in an attempt to extinguish the fire. Returning to his own plane, whose radio was still operative, Hudner requested cutting tools, along with a rescue helicopter. The helicopter, flown by LT Charles Ware, arrived shortly, but even with the cutting equipment provided, Brown could not be rescued from the wreckage before he died. Hudner was returned to safety by the helicopter.

For his selfless efforts in behalf of his friend and fellow pilot, President Truman later presented LTJG Hudner with the nation’s highest military honor, the Congressional Medal of Honor.

It took twenty-two hours for the Marine column to cover the nine-and-one-half-mile road from Hagaru-ri to Koto-ri. The trip had cost the Marines 600 wounded, all of whom were deposited in Koto-ri’s hospital tents for air evacuation.

The temporary airstrips at Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri proved invaluable for the air evacuation of wounded and frostbite cases. Marine engineers had bulldozed the airstrip at Hagaru-ri during late November in anticipation of a sharp increase in supply requirements for Tenth Corps elements in this sector. When the Red Chinese attacked, the airfield was usable by C-47 type aircraft. The shorter Koto-ri strip was improved solely for the air evacuation
of wounded.

Casualties had also been air evacuated from Yudam-ni by helicopter and light aircraft to Hagaru-ri. A low, solid overcast usually hid the peaks rising above the Chosin plateau. At all of these improvised fields, aircraft operated under the most hazardous of flying conditions. From the short air strips hacked from the frozen and rocky terrain by Marine bulldozers, 21 Air Force C-47s from FEAF combat cargo command operated. The Kotori strip was so short, in fact, that one of the forward air controllers, who was also a qualified carrier landing signal officer, guided the planes in much the same manner as if they were landing aboard an aircraft carrier. From these strips Air Force C-47s and Marine R4Ds airlifted a total of 4,675 Marine and Army wounded to safety. Light observation planes, helicopters, and three TBM aircraft contributed, flying out 163 casualties during the first ten days of December.
Chapter 6. The Hungnam Redeployment

Breakout Completed

On the morning of 8 December the withdrawing Marine column departed Koto-ri, moving down the slippery, ice-covered mountain road toward Chinhung-ni. Chinese troops were still resisting every foot of the way. Thirty-six miles to go.

One third of the distance had been covered when the column encountered a blown bridge. Only a new bridge could prevent the abandonment of all the Marines’ heavy equipment, much of which had been protected at great human sacrifice. Because of the steep cliffs rising on either side of the road, no vehicles, tanks, or artillery could bypass the gorge.

Eight Air Force C-119s were immediately despatched to Koto-ri, where each “flying boxcar” dropped a two-ton span. While under intense fire, Marine engineers built two treadway bridges which enabled the Leathernecks to cross the abyss on 9 December and thus avoid what might have been one of the most serious setbacks to the withdrawal.

At dusk on 9 December, lead elements of the Seventh Regiment attacking south joined elements of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, attacking north from Chinhung-ni. The men of the two Marine Regiments joined hands on a nameless ridge.

The breakout had been achieved. And in that achievement one thing stood out clearly: air-ground cooperation had reached a degree of perfection that would stand as a classic in the history of close air support. During the Marines’ withdrawal, more than 200 aircraft were frequently employed daily to attack enemy troops and installations blocking the southward march to the sea.

The amount of close air support furnished the Marines reached a pinnacle on 4 December when 239 individual close support sorties were controlled by the air support section of Marine Air Tactical Control Squadron Two. Of these flights, 128 were flown from the fast carriers, 34 by the escort carriers, and 77 were flown by the Yonpo-based Marines.

The effectiveness of the air contribution given the First Marine Division is best summarized by the report of General Oliver P. Smith, Commanding General First Marine Division:

“...During this phase, reliance upon support by Marine and naval tactical aircraft was stressed more than ever before. This fact was largely the result of the over-all nature of the operation which, in the final analysis, was characterized by its being beyond the range of naval gunfire support. As a result, during daylight hours, air was the predominant supporting arm throughout the period. ... As a result of utilizing the same aircraft day after day, and committing them to support of front-line units during their time on station, the majority of pilots in the First Marine Aircraft Wing had the qualifications desired of an airborne tactical air coordinator. These pilots knew the tactical situation through daily contact with it; they knew the position of each unit and could accurately judge those localities where targets were most likely to appear and what type of target it would be. This unity between ground and air elements became nearly ideal during the advance from Yudam-ni to the south, and it is no exaggeration to state that the successful conclusion of this operation would have been nearly impossible without the amount and quality of close air support that was provided. It was an ideal combat example of the ultimate perfection of the air-ground team needed to defeat an aggressive determined enemy.”[7]

Tenth Corps’ Seventh Division Commander, Brigadier General Homer W. Kiefer, tried to parallel as nearly as possible the Marine’s system of controlling close air support. Kiefer stated that this system permitted him to place tactical air control parties within each infantry battalion. Such placement proved to be the ideal and
gave the battalion commander a means of controlling and coordinating the close air support he received. General Kiefer considered it worthy of note that “in 57 days of combat, 1,024 sorties were flown by Marine Corsair aircraft in close support of the division, without a single casualty among our own troops due to friendly air action.

“This record I attribute to the fact that adequate control was available with frontline units,” wrote General Kiefer. “In many instances, Marine planes were bombing and strafing within two hundred yards of our frontlines. . . . The Marine system of control, in my estimation, approaches the ideal, and I firmly believe that a similar system should be adopted as standard for Army divisions.”[8]

Credit for the Marines’ successful withdrawal from the Chosin trap might be attributed to many interlocking factors—the Marines’ discipline, fighting spirit, and firepower, the close air support rendered by Navy and Marine aircraft, the air logistics and rescue support by the United States Air Force.

Once again, the mobility, flexibility, and firepower of the mobile air base had been demonstrated. The carriers of Task Forces 77 and 95 had been able to move quickly to the danger area, and to supply the abundant and accurate close air support which, as General Smith stated, was vital in extricating the First Marine Division from North Korea.
In early November, a vague premonition that all was not well in North Korea had begun to disturb several of the senior naval officers in the Far East theater. The isolated reports of the presence of Red Chinese forces, the absence of serious enemy resistance, the gap between Eighth Army and Tenth Corps, the threats of impending action by the Peking radio, presaged trouble to some.

Following the Wonsan landing, Admiral Joy invited Admiral Doyle to return to Tokyo, but, said Doyle, “I did not go because I was uneasy. A short time later Joy came out to visit me, bringing with him the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Francis P. Matthews, and Senator Claude Pepper.”

The visitors lunched aboard Doyle’s flagship Mount McKinley, and afterwards they were taken into the chart room to look at a map of Korea.

“We pin-pointed our own forces ashore,” said Doyle, “and explained as much as we knew about the location of enemy forces. At this time, I pointed out that we were uneasy about the division between the Eighth Army and the Tenth Corps. We didn’t know what lay between them. There had been no link-up.”

The first precautions were taken on 28 November. Admiral Joy alerted Admiral Doyle to be prepared for redeployment of UN forces out of North Korea. Doyle was instructed to prepare either for an administrative operation or for emergency measures, and told that he would exercise over-all control of any redeployment. He was also informed that he would direct any amphibious efforts on either the west or the east coast. Doyle in turn asked Rear Admiral Lyman A. Thackrey, CTG 90.1, to direct any west coast redeployment.

The following day, Admiral Joy again despatched Doyle advising him that the military situation in North Korea was deteriorating rapidly. Joy considered it desirable that all ships of Task Force 90 be placed on six hours’ notice. This alert was applicable to all ships, both in Korean and Japanese waters, for at this time much of Task Force 90’s amphibious shipping was in Japan for upkeep and replenishment.

Admiral Joy also requested the recall of the Boxer (CVA-21) and other ships because of, as Admiral Joy put it, “the critical and rapidly deteriorating situation of the Eighth Army and the desperate situation of the Tenth Corps. I felt the ground forces needed all the help the Navy could give them in the way of air and gunfire support.”

Although some objected to returning the Boxer immediately to Korea, CNO Sherman, when acquainted with Joy’s request, directed their return.

“The uncertainty of the future and the possibility of Soviet intervention were factors in Sherman’s decision,” said Joy.

The military situation continued to worsen. On 30 November, accordingly, all Task Force 90 ships were ordered underway for Korea.

From early despatches, it appeared that Eighth Army was in the most critical condition. Because of the limited port facilities on the west coast, Doyle considered that the Army would have to be under extreme hardship before it would call for a sealift from the small harbors that were available on North Korea’s west coast.

“At the most, they might redeploy a few remnants by sea,” said Doyle, “but not the entire Eighth Army with all its supplies and equipment. I therefore sent mostly small, shallow draft ships to the west coast and made preparations to conduct large-scale redeployment operations in the Hungnam area.” The anchorage area of the Hungnam harbor needed to be expanded and the minesweepers had to clear gunfire support channels. “When this was accomplished,” said Doyle, “Hungnam was an ideal port for redeployment.”
In a conference on 8 December aboard the Mount McKinley, Joy told Struble and Doyle that in view of Eighth Army’s fast movement south, no major sealift effort was now needed on the west coast. Instead, the major effort would be made on the east coast at Hungnam.

The selection of Hungnam as the port of embarkation and evacuation was logical for several reasons. It was only four miles away from General Almond’s Tenth Corps headquarters at Hamhung; it was approximately the same distance from Yonpo airfield which could serve as the air control center until operations were transferred to the Fleet after the airfield was abandoned. Hungnam was tactically feasible as an assembly and loading point for the Tenth Corps units which had fanned northward out of Wonsan and Iwon. And lastly, Hungnam was ideal because of its port facilities. Although small, the port was excellent and well protected. The tidal range was less than a foot and berthing space was available alongside the docks for seven ships. By double-banking ships, four additional ships could be simultaneously loaded. Other beach areas of the port were suitable for LST operations.
On 9 December, General MacArthur issued orders specifying General Almond’s mission for withdrawal: Almond was to be lifted from North Korea as he had come—by sea. After his arrival in South Korea he was to assemble his units in the Pusan-Usan-Masan area in South Korea and report to the Commanding General Eighth Army. The First ROK Corps was excepted from this order and it was to be released upon arrival at Samchok to report to the ROK Army.

COMNAVFE now assigned complete responsibility for the east coast redeployment operation to Commander Task Force 90, Admiral Doyle. He was given control of all air and naval gunfire support. He was made responsible for the protection of shipping en route to the debarkation ports and for coordinating all withdrawal movements with the Commanding General Tenth Corps, General Almond.

In contrast to the command arrangement for Inchon and Wonsan, Hungnam had no joint task force commander assigned.

Commander Seventh Fleet would provide Commander Task Force 90 with aircraft support and gunfire support ships on a “when and if they could be spared from carrier task forces” basis. The responsibility for coordinating naval air operations with the Air Force remained with Commander Seventh Fleet.

The decision for this arrangement was Admiral Joy’s and it was based on the overall threat confronting Naval Forces Far East.

“It must be remembered,” said Admiral Joy, “that the Chinese intervention put a new aspect on the Korean war as well as the global situation. The future was cloudy to say the least. Some sources of information even felt that it marked the beginning of World War III with Soviet participation. A Chinese attempt to capture Formosa was another possibility. I therefore felt that the 7th Fleet should be free to leave the confined waters of the Sea of Japan at a moment’s notice to proceed to any more seriously threatened area in the Far East.

“It was also felt that the Hungnam evacuation could be handled satisfactorily if necessary without the support of the 7th Fleet since heavy enemy opposition was not a probability.”
The Sea War in Korea
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson

Chapter 6. The Hungnam Redeployment
The Navy’s Three-Ring Circus (Inchon—Wonsan—Hungnam)

As Admiral Doyle completed plans to redeploy Tenth Corps from Wonsan and Hungnam on Korea’s east coast, Rear Admiral Lyman A. Thackrey, Commander Amphibious Group Three, began to redeploy elements of the Eighth Army at Chinnampo and Inchon. Redeployment of 1,800 Army and Navy port personnel and 5,900 ROK troops was completed at Chinnampo on 5 December.

The Chinnampo evacuation was carried out by five British Commonwealth destroyers (three Canadian and two Australian) and one U.S. destroyer when, in darkness and through the swept channel of a minefield, they navigated 30 miles of the shallow water of the Daido Ko estuary to cover the withdrawal of civilians, non-essential military personnel, and wounded from the Pyongyang area.

The evacuation force was led by HMCS Cayuga (CAPT J. V. Brock, D.S.C., RCN) with HMCS Athabaskan, HMCS Sioux, HMAS Warramunga (CAPT O. H. Becher, D.S.C., RAN), HMAS Bataan[9A] (CDR W. B. M. Marks, RAN) and the USS Forrest Royal (CDR O. O. Liebschner). The five ships plowed through heavy seas and snowstorms to the mouth of the Taedong River, with orders to provide necessary gunfire support and anti-aircraft fire during the loading of casualties and port personnel.

During the operation, Sea Furies and Fireflies from the British light fleet carrier HMS Theseus, flag of Vice Admiral W. G. Andrewes (who had just been promoted), flew air patrols over the flotilla.

It had been Captain Brock’s intention to transit the estuary in daylight rather than face a night passage of the area with its treacherous shoals and minefields. However, on receiving a despatch that the withdrawal program at Chinnampo was ahead of schedule, Brock decided to risk a night voyage up river.

Slowly, the six ships began the passage of the twisting swept channel through the minefield which in many places was only 500 yards wide. Visibility was almost nil, and it was three o’clock in the morning before lookouts of the four ships that completed the journey (Cayuga, Bataan, Forrest Royal, Sioux) could make out dock buildings dimly in the darkness. Captain Brock took up position, and his ships were at action stations waiting for dawn and possible enemy air attack.

“Everything was quiet,” said CDR Marks, “with members of ships loading under the full brilliancy of the arc lights.”

That day the transports were loaded with wounded Republic of Korea civilian refugees, and military personnel. Altogether about 7,700 personnel were evacuated from Chinnampo without interference by the enemy.

When the last transport had left the port, Captain Brock decided to remain at anchor for another night in the dock area, and next morning, after ordering the remaining civilian population out of the military area, his ships shelled oil storage tanks, dock and harbor installations, and supply dumps. The commercial and civilian parts of the town were left untouched.

On 7 December, the outloading of all Army stores at Inchon began. By 31 December, 32,428 personnel, 1,103 vehicles, and 54,741 tons of cargo had been outloaded.[10]

Inchon’s port was not to be closed until 5 January. As at Hungnam, important port facilities were then destroyed to prevent their use by the enemy. By this time a grand total of 68,913 personnel, 1,404 vehicles, and 62,144 tons of cargo were redeployed from Inchon to Taechon and Pusan.[11]

At Wonsan, outloading of UN personnel and material at the port area began on 3 December 1950.

Covering fire was furnished by the cruiser St. Paul (CAPT Chester C. Smith) and the destroyers Charles S. Sperry (DD 697) (CDR Robert M. Brownlie) and Zellars (DD 777) (CDR Fred D. Michael). Shellfire from
these three ships effectively isolated the city from enemy attack during the day, and at night they fired star shells to illuminate suspicious areas. Their effectiveness is testified to by the fact that no enemy attack developed either during the day or the night.

The methodical and unhurried loading at Wonsan is well described in the action report of Commander Transport Division Eleven (CAPT Albert E. Jarrell):

“We commenced loading Korean civilians aboard the SS Lane Victory at anchor at 0500 on December 7. We had previously made arrangements with the local police to screen the civilians to be evacuated. Specifically, only those persons whom the North Koreans might classify as “enemy”—with all the finality which that word implies—were to be taken out. Originally, we’d expected about 1,000 civilians, but it became quickly apparent that this number would be greatly exceeded.

“That excess produced another neuralgic pain—if we refused asylum to any of those selected, our refusal would be two strikes against them after we left. I therefore gave orders to continue loading to capacity. By midnight, 7,009 people—many of them women and children—were embarked. There were many more than that still left. I estimated that the entire population of Wonsan (75,000) plus an equal number from outlying towns, wanted desperately to leave. About 20,000 were still clambering about the barbed wire and tank barriers long after we were chockablock with passengers.”[12]

In addition to the 7,009 Korean civilians, the outloading at Wonsan included 3,834 military personnel, 1,146 vehicles and 10,013 bulk tons of cargo.

The Wonsan operation, in addition to clearing UN forces out of the Wonsan area, had another beneficial effect. It had produced a miniature dress rehearsal for the Hungnam show soon to follow. At Wonsan, naval gunfire had held the North Korean forces at such a respectable distance from the UN perimeter that UN troops were never seriously threatened. The entire operation was completed without either the loss of a single life or the necessity to sacrifice any of UN’s valuable equipment.

In the Hungnam operation Rear Admiral Doyle exercised control through various control stations: an operations unit aboard his flagship, Mount McKinley; a control vessel, a beachmaster, a port director, an embarkation control liaison officer, and an MSTS control board.

The flagship’s operations officer coordinated all shipments, assigned anchorages, issued docking instructions, prepared and issued sailing orders for all Navy and SCAJAP vessels, and supervised the operations of all the other control stations. The beachmaster controlled LST operations, the port director berthed the ship, and the embarkation control liaison officer linked the staffs of Doyle and Almond. MSTS office handled MSTS shipping. It was a well-coordinated team of experts who knew their amphibious doctrine backward as well as forward.

These control stations went into action the moment an arriving ship entered the outer harbor. The several control stations were interconnected by radio and could speak to one another. The operations officer told the port director what berth the incoming ship was to occupy. The ship was then ordered to proceed from its anchorage and await the harbor pilot near the breakwater. The harbor pilot, with the assistance of tugs, then docked the ship. Whereupon, Task Force 90 and Tenth Corps officers went to work to load the ship and assign it a “chop” time for departure from the dock.

Ships arriving in Hungnam were directed to be ready for immediate movement on sudden notice, and to maintain a 24-hour visual watch for sailing signals. Each commanding officer or master was supplied the latest hydrographic information.[13]

The control officer in charge of redeployment operations ashore, representing General Almond, was Marine Colonel E. H. Forney, whose headquarters was a shed near the dock area. Forney was responsible for continuous operation of the Hungnam port; for the withdrawal to staging areas of Tenth Corps elements; for the loading of troops on assigned shipping; and for the evacuation of refugees and the removal of all material.
Practically all cargo, with the exception of ammunition, was loaded alongside the dock on the LST beaches. Personnel were loaded into the APAs and AKAs at anchorages as close to the beach as possible. To assist the loading operation, the USS *Foss* (DE 59) was placed alongside the dock to supply electrical power. The *Shimano Maru* served as mothership for 1,200 Japanese stevedores, who helped with the outloading of supplies and equipment.

As a unit ashore became alerted for embarkation, Forney’s loading section issued instructions; the movement section directed traffic to the assigned area for staging out; and the rations section supplied the needs of the troops awaiting their turn in the tent city which had sprung up near the dock area.

General Almond’s operation order called for the First Marine Division and the ROK regiments to embark first. They would be followed by the Seventh and Third Infantry Divisions in that order. Thus, Third Infantry would have final responsibility for the Hungnam defense perimeter.

Marines started to load aboard waiting transports as soon as they arrived in the Hungnam area on 10 December. It was their fourth embarkation within five months. Marine embarkation officers could load now by sight without the aid of stowage diagrams.

Marine drivers were embarked with their vehicles; troops were billeted in the cargo spaces of commercial ships. Between 4,500 and 5,500 Leathernecks were embarked on each of the three APs. Seven commercial cargo vessels, thirteen LSTs, three LSDs, an APA, and an AKA were also assigned as lift for the First Marine Division.

The task of loading the Marines was completed by the evening of 14 December, and on the morning of the 15th the last ships with elements of the First Marine Division sailed for Pusan.

The ROK regiments departed Hungnam on 17 December, the U.S. Seventh Division on 21 December, and the U.S. Third Division on 24 December.
Chapter 6. The Hungnam Redeployment
Wall of Fire Around Hungnam

On 11 December, the Navy made final plans to lay down an aerial canopy and a curtain of steel around the Hungnam perimeter—a canopy of naval aircraft from seven carriers, plus a steel curtain of shellfire from thirteen ships.

Rear Admiral E. C. Ewen’s Task Force 77 had grown from two to four fast carrier by early December: Philippine Sea and Leyte (both of which had been supporting the troops ashore from the Sea of Japan since early November); and now Valley Forge (hastily recalled from the United States with Air Group Two embarked) and Princeton (with Air Group 19, CDR Richard C. Merrick, aboard). CVG-19 first saw action on 5 December.

In accordance with Commander Seventh Fleet’s operation plan of 12 December, the fast carriers were given the task during daylight hours of flying close air support and air cover for forces inside the embarkation areas. Outside the embarkation area, Task Force 77 aircraft were ordered to interdict enemy supply lines, support friendly ground operations, and provide air cover for the escort carriers and the shipping to and from the embarkation area. In company with aircraft from Fifth Air Force, they were also to provide heckling missions at night.

Rear Admiral Richard W. Ruble’s escort carrier group (TG 96.8), originally composed of Sicily and Badoeng Strait, was now augmented by the light carrier Bataan. This force added additional air cover for the ground forces and the armada of ships in the Hungnam port area.

In charge of providing gunfire support was Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, USN. Before the evacuation task was finished on 24 December, Hillenkoetter’s force included the battleship Missouri, the heavy cruisers St. Paul and Rochester; the destroyers Forrest Royal, Norris, Borie, English, Lind, Hank and Massey; and the rocket ships, LSMRs 401, 403, and 404. The ships of this Hungnam gunfire support group were stationed where they could deliver emergency support to the Tenth Corps, and at the same time provide protection in the event of enemy air attack.

No naval gunfire was requested until 15 December. On that date Hillenkoetter’s gunfire support group commenced “deep” support fire at ranges up to ten miles delivering both 8-inch interdiction and harassing gunfire as well as 5-inch illumination at night. For this gunfire the ships were deployed to preselected stations at sea and in the swept channel. The recently swept fishing areas allowed the bombarding ships to maneuver in an area ten miles to the north and ten miles to the south of Hungnam.

As the operation progressed and the perimeter contracted, fire support ships were moved closer ashore to obtain better firing positions. LSMRs blasted the reverse slopes near Hungnam. On two occasions the three rocket ships were used to fire barrages on the right flank, onto the high ground overlooking Hungnam where enemy troops were reportedly concentrating.

Missouri began main battery fire on 23 December at road targets between Ori-ri and Hungnam. “Though we didn’t really need her firepower,” said Doyle, “General Almond kept suggesting that we call in the Missouri. So I called for her and gave her a target selection. She quickly got a hit on an enemy troop shelter, and the air spotter reported that the Chinese Communists were running out of it in all directions.”

In addition to her main battery fire, Missouri’s 5-inch batteries contributed harassing and illumination fire in covering the withdrawal of the last ground elements.

As Tenth Corps artillery was loaded aboard ships and withdrawn between 22 and 24 December, naval gunfire took over observed firing and close support. The shore fire control parties reported the naval gunfire as
“very effective” and credited it with “destroying large numbers of enemy troops.” In at least one instance, naval gunfire was reported to have broken up an enemy attack of larger than company size.

“Gunfire support was an around-the-clock daylight activity,” said Captain Bruce C. Wiggin of CTF 90’s staff, “and a precautionary measure at night. Illumination was vital and necessary beyond the defensive perimeter, especially during the darkness.

“Ships received their target instructions from specific requests ashore and from the flagship. We were never sure of the amount of opposition that might develop, although we never expected an all-out Chinese attack on the perimeter. After all, the enemy was not stupid. Nevertheless, we made preparations for the Dunkirk-sort of thing.

“In retrospect, it seems probable that the Chinese knew they could not interfere with the redeployment. Their losses would certainly have been greater than those they could have hoped to inflict. Fire power from the sea would have dwarfed what they had already absorbed during their attack on the Marines at Chosin.”[14]

Doyle was quite disturbed about the North Korean civilians pouring into Hungnam. “If the Chinese had ever made a severe attack—and they might have,” said Doyle, “there could have been mass slaughter of many of the civilians in the area. Military men very often have to make tough military decisions of this nature, and I am very happy that I did not have to make that one.”

For the final D-day of withdrawal, 24 December, a concentrated naval gunfire barrage was maintained in a strip approximately 2,500 yards wide and 3,000 yards from the beaches and harbor. The only enemy troop movement to be observed on the final day was seen by Admiral Doyle and General Almond from the flagship Mount McKinley at the final withdrawal. “As we pulled out with all friendly troops embarked,” said Doyle, “Almond and I, through our binoculars, saw Chinese Communist troops coming over the ridge behind Hungnam, only three or four miles away. I asked my gunfire support officer CDR Arlie Capps to direct some gunfire in the direction of the approaching troops.”

Destructive bombardment of the port area itself was also begun. Ships’ gunnery officers concentrated on the destruction of railroad cars and locomotives. Demolition crews ashore blasted everything of military value.

At no time did the enemy attempt to interfere with the Hungnam evacuation either from the air or from the sea.

“It is a mistake, however, to say there was no opposition at Hungnam on the ground,” said Admiral Doyle. “Although the First Marine Division had rendered seven Chinese Communist Divisions ineffective, attacks were made on our perimeter every night during the period of withdrawal. Our ships were constantly called on for gunfire, rockets and star shells.”

The gunfire support ships’ only casualty occurred at 0645 on 24 December aboard USS St. Paul (CA-73) when a projectile from one of her 5-inch twin mounts hit one of her identical mounts, making it inoperative. Shell fragments ripped off one foot of a gun barrel, punctured numerous small holes in St. Paul’s superstructure, severed one of the radars, and slightly injured four members of the crew.

The gunfire support ships of Task Force 90 fired a grand total of 162 rounds of 16-inch; 2,932 rounds of 8-inch; 18,637 rounds of 5-inch; 71 rounds of 3-inch; 185 rounds of 40-mm. and 1,462 rockets.

By way of comparison, approximately 800 more rounds of 8-inch, and 12,800 more rounds of 5-inch were expended in defensive fire support at Hungnam than had been expended in support of the Inchon amphibious assault.

“It should be borne in mind,” said Doyle, “that Inchon only lasted a couple of days while our fire support effort at Hungnam lasted from the 15th to the 24th of December. All of it was ‘call-fire’ as requested by the troops. Our logistic forces deserve great credit for doing a magnificent job keeping us supplied with ammunition.”

On 15 December, Admiral Doyle assumed control of all air support operations within a 35 mile radius of
Hungnam. This included both the close and deep support efforts of the carriers of Task Force 77 and Task Group 96.8, the night hecklers from both FAFIK and Task Force 77, and all reconnaissance and transient aircraft flying over the area. In conjunction with the naval gunfire, the mission of the aircraft was to prevent interference with the evacuation.

The contribution rendered by air is typified by such reports as that of CDR W. F. Madden on 10 December: his flight of seven Corsairs had “strafed, rocketed, and napalmed enemy troops . . .”; by CDR Epes whose four Corsairs strafed and bombed one hundred horses and unnumbered enemy troops; by LCDR H. H. Osborne’s three Skyraiders and four Corsairs, who reported destruction of stacks of fuel drums and a supply dump.

*Philippine Sea*’s CDR E. T. Deacon reported that on the early morning of 15 December his flight of six Corsairs attacked troop concentrations. LT Krause’s six Corsairs had attacked troops concentrated in a small valley near Hungnam. *Princeton*’s pilots reported the destruction of oxcarts, trucks, gasoline drums, warehouses, and railroad tunnels.

From 15 to 24 December, a total of 1,700 sorties were flown inside the Hungnam perimeter. Many additional missions were flown outside the area.

The last pilot to fly over Hungnam was *Princeton*’s LT R. B. Mack, who described the night as “… cloudless, cold, and unfriendly. Haze was everywhere,” said Mack. “The artificial haze of war—one part hate, one part frustration, stirred to an even pall by high explosives.

“I was flying the last launch of the day as one of two F4U-5Ns, Detachment Fox of VC-3 from *Princeton*.

“After a dusk lauch, I received orders to proceed to Hungnam as target combat air patrol for the withdrawal of our forces from that port. After a very lonely trip, I arrived about 1900 and reported to *Mount McKinley*. The fighter director stationed me over Hungnam at 15,000 feet altitude. I had a grandstand seat for the most dismal and distressing sight I had ever witnessed.

“Below, the last of the troops and supplies had been loaded on board the LSTs and other evacuation craft and were pulling away from the dock areas. There were fires everywhere throughout the area, and, as I watched, flames broke out around the docks, growing and spreading until the whole waterfront seemed ablaze. Whatever had been left behind was being made useless for the Reds.

“As the LSTs cleared the beaches, several of our destroyers moved in and did their bit to ruin the real estate for future Communist use. I circled Hungnam until 2045. The ships below formed up single file, nose-and-tail like circus elephants, and headed seaward and then south to Pusan.

“As I took departure for *Princeton*, I called for the *Mount McKinley* and we exchanged greetings. ‘Merry Christmas,’ we said, for it was Christmas Eve 1950. . . .”
Hungnam was a brilliantly executed maneuver. The time was short, and putting all the parts together and making them work was extremely complicated. However, the Hungnam evacuation was not opposed either by air or by submarines or by armor and artillery equipped ground forces. Had such opposition occurred, Hungnam would not have been so successful, and there would have been losses.

Undoubtedly, under the existing conditions, the Hungnam area could have been held indefinitely, had there been a strategic need to do so. While no one in Korea believed a line across Korea ending near Hungnam was either feasible or practicable, many felt a new line across the narrow neck of Korea (ending in the vicinity of Wonsan on the east coast) could and should have been held. General Van Fleet thought so, as did Admiral Doyle.

“U.N. forces could have held Hungnam for a long period of time,” said Doyle, “but I felt then and I still feel that with the Navy’s surface and air power available we should have held the Wonsan area indefinitely.”

The significance of the Hungnam operation was that it was an amphibious operation in the reverse. No corresponding operation in military history exists. It was different from Dunkirk and it was different from Gallipoli, for both of those operations were carried out under enemy pressure.

The value of UN firepower from the aircraft carriers and surface ships contributed to the high morale of troops ashore. As far as killing the enemy is concerned, it was of questionable value.

The value of rail transport was dramatically demonstrated at Hungnam. The rail line between Wonsan and Hungnam was kept open with the help of Korean laborers; and on the four or five hundred freight cars assembled by the Tenth Corps control organization, some 8,900 tons of Class “V” ammunition were among the supplies moved to Hungnam by rail to be loaded aboard ships.

Air transport also played a vital role. One hundred twelve Air Force planes and ten Marine planes airlifted 3,600 men, 196 vehicles, 1,300 tons of cargo and hundreds of Korean refugees from the Yonpo airfield. In spite of bad weather, the Flying Boxcars sometimes took off at three-minute intervals. The field was used as long as it could be defended within the receding perimeter.

The importance of sea transport was never more self-evident as the statistics will verify. When the operation was finally concluded, 105,000 U.S. and ROK military personnel and 91,000 civilian refugees—nearly 200,000 in all—had been embarked. Refugees were loaded in incredible numbers: 12,000 in one APA and 8,400 in one LST were the records.

It was Admiral Doyle’s opinion that if UN forces had had the shipping, every person in the Hungnam area of North Korea could have been evacuated. “We could have completely evacuated the entire area,” said Doyle, “for they all wanted to leave. As we left, in fact, refugees with bundles under their arms were still pouring in for a sealift south. The Army did a magnificent job ashore with the refugees. Since Hungnam was wrecked and there was little shelter and it was terribly cold, I ordered all ships with baking capacity to bake extra bread and cook rice. Every ship with a bake shop baked to capacity. We distributed rice to all the ships to help keep the people alive.”

The statistics of supplies and equipment removed from Hungnam were equally impressive. 17,500 vehicles, 350,000 measurement tons of cargo had loaded out on 6 APAs, 6 AKAs, 12 TAPs, 76 time-charter ships, 81 LSTs and 11 LSDs.

Although there was no opposition, the command relationships worked well. In his action report Admiral Struble made the following comment:
“During the Hungnam operation, Commander Seventh Fleet was in a supporting role to Commander Task Force 90 who retained responsibility for redeployment operations. Based on my experience in the Inchon, Wonsan, and Hungnam operations, I consider that the formation of a joint task force under the fleet commander is a better solution to the command problem involved. Such a solution provides a unified command afloat for the thorough coordination of the various task forces engaged in related operations.”[17]

Admiral Doyle disagreed. “The command relationship was a deviation from previous ones,” he said, “but circumstances warranted it. The Hungnam redeployment was conducted in a very small area. It involved only one amphibious group. If, for example, there had been two amphibious groups—one at Wonsan and one at Hungnam—there would have been definite need for a joint commander to coordinate the two.”

Under the circumstances, however, the command arrangement at Hungnam worked smoothly. Had serious difficulties arisen or had the withdrawal been heavily opposed, one must conclude that there might have been greater need of a joint task force commander.

The major lesson of the Hungnam redeployment was that all the basic principles of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps amphibious doctrine were sound, and that they worked in reverse as well as they worked forward.

Admiral Joy summarized Hungnam thus: “The Hungnam evacuation showed that a well-trained and well-led amphibious force can carry out an amphibious operation in reverse as effectively as the conventional type. It again emphasized the importance of having adequate amphibious forces in being and in a state of full combat readiness.”
The defeat and collapse of the North Korean Army did not end the battle of the mines in the fall of 1950. Rather than ending the mine struggle, the entry of the Chinese and the southward shift of the frontlines marked the beginning of a new phase of the UN countermine effort.

From the war’s beginning, in contrast to action in the air and on the ground, no self-imposed restrictions had been placed on UN naval operations other than to observe the blockade limits.

However, as 1951 commenced, the Chinese Communist enemy was again in complete possession of the entire North Korean coastline. His opportunities for improving defenses against UN naval bombardment forces were considerably increased. Now he could re-mine his harbors and his coastal areas. He could emplace his coastal guns.

As a consequence, minesweeping problems for 1951, in addition to being magnified, were considerably different from those encountered during 1950.

First of all, time was less critical in 1951 than it had been in 1950. Throughout the fall of 1950, sweep missions were usually urgent—a few hours to clear Inchon; a few days to open Wonsan, Chinnampo, Iwon, and Hungnam. Either troops or supplies, and sometimes both, were urgently needed ashore. By 1951, in contrast, amphibious operations had been curtailed, and fewer deadlines faced the sweepers.

Second, whereas in the fall of 1950 sweep crews were relatively inexperienced, by 1951 they had become old hands at the trade.

Third, in 1950 the sweepers lacked repair facilities; they lacked spare parts; and they were few in number. By early 1951, many of these difficulties had been overcome.

Finally, the policy in 1950 had been to sweep where the mines weren’t. In the spring of 1951, the sweepers were ordered to sweep where the mines were.

“This change in policy was necessary to gain more maneuvering room for the fire support ships when under attack by shore batteries,” said Rear Admiral George C. Dyer, then CTF 95. “Also, the closer the ships could get to the beach, the better their gunnery.”

To illustrate the results of Dyer’s new policy, 186 mines were swept at Hungnam in early 1951. In preparation for the siege of Wonsan, initiated 16 February, 325 mines were swept.

From 1 May 1951 to 31 December 1951, the minesweeping task group swept a total of 683 enemy mines. Included in this number were nine Soviet ground magnetic types, five of which were detonated by Merganser (AMS-26) (LTJG Einer May, USN).

As has been stated, by the spring of 1951 the mine problem had lost much of its urgency and deadliness. There was now sufficient time to care for mine ships and to provide some recreation for their crews. Repair ships Luzon (ARG-2) and Kermit Roosevelt (ARG-16) were alternately available to provide routine upkeep at Sasebo.
Despite ominous whispers of re-mining and of long range coastal guns being brought into North Korea from Manchuria, Captain Richard C. Williams, who had relieved Captain Spofford in March 1951, had cause for optimism. He had inherited a going concern to carry out his new minesweeping mission which he visualized as follows:

“First, the primary purpose of minesweeping in 1951 was to permit United Nations gunfire support to get close inshore along the North Korean coast and interdict communications; to destroy troop concentrations, gun emplacements, and supply dumps.

“The second purpose of our minesweeping was to provide tactical deception; to force the enemy to redeploy troops and equipment to counter the threat of invasion. By so doing, we would relieve enemy pressure against UN ground forces.

“Third, the minesweepers would increase the effectiveness of UN naval blockade and bombardment forces operating in the Wonsan-Hungnam-Songjin areas by providing more direct mine-free routes between these ports. This would permit more flexible fire support in the event of emergency.

“Fourth, the minesweepers would reduce, by sweeping and disposing of moored mines, the threat of floating mines to UN ships.

“Finally, the minesweepers would open new ‘targets of opportunity,’ particularly around the rail hub of Hamhung through which a large percentage of supplies flowed to the enemy.”
Chapter 7. The Battle of the Mines (Part III—1951-1953)
Minesweeping 1951 Style as Seen from LST-799

One officer who was a continuous participant in Korean minesweeping operations during 1951 was LST-799’s commanding officer, LT T. E. Houston. His observations for that period contribute to a better understanding of actual operations.

“We had ComMinRon-3 aboard in early 1951,” said Houston, “having taken him and staff aboard in Sasebo.

“At this time, the minesweeping family was a heterogeneous but closely knit group. It consisted of my LST carrying one or more mine-hunting helicopters, a steel hulled sweeper, several ‘chicks’ or AMSs, occasionally South Korean AMSs, and often a tug that anchored out at the 100-fathom line for geographical reference purposes.

“My LST generally proceeded with our sweepers during the day, staying a few hundred yards in the ‘safe’ area from the sweep line. From this position, we ran a sweep plot, controlled sweep movements, assisted in picking up lost minesweeping gear—pigs, dan buoys, etc.—and helped to destroy swept mines by gunfire.

“All ships recovered sweep gear and moored each night prior to darkness, usually alongside the LST.

“At first, we swept only during daylight. Later on, as we cleared the whole bay of Hungnam and both coasts, we were forced to sweep at night and to stay farther and farther offshore because of enemy gunfire.

“Moored mines were cut almost every day. The sailors of 799 engaged in their destruction whenever possible. Approximately one out of every seven mines destroyed by gunfire ‘blew.’ Others filled with water and sank after the mine cases were holed. This destruction livened the daily humdrum existence of a support ship, and boosted morale of the men.

“The enemy’s minelaying patterns were peculiar; Some mines seemed to have been laid like the spokes of a wagon wheel, all mine lines radiating out from the hub. Other lines were at random locations. None of the patterns resembled U.S. minelaying doctrine.

“There was little pattern to the movements of our group. The amphibious force made a few dummy landings, and our sweeps always preceded them. The helicopter went first, then the small boat sweeps, followed by the AMSs and AMs. We also swept areas off the bombline and in Wonsan harbor before large ships were brought in for gunfire support and bombardment. And we moved to any area where minelaying activities were reported.

“In some places, such as the Wonsan approaches (‘Tin Pan Alley’ and ‘Muffler’) off Songjin, and over on the west coast, north of Inchon (in the area called ‘Cigarette’) we made daily check sweeps. Click here to view map

“To assist the sweeping, my LST carried on the tank deck four small LCVP-type sweep boats (MSBs). This arrangement, while novel in concept, did not prove practical. The LST’s bow yawed too much, making it difficult to re-embark the LCVPs. The system was too complex and dangerous to use except in the mildest of weather. After a trial, we went back to housing all the MSBs aboard Comstock (LSD-19).

“The ‘copters’ aboard LST-799 were initially mine spotters. Rescue work was a secondary mission, and done only on request. This ‘copter mine spotting was fairly simple. The ‘egg-beaters’ hovered ahead of the lead sweep ship and radioed the word on any mines that were spotted in the sweep path.

“On a few occasions, ‘copters destroyed floating mines by rifle fire from the plane, but this practice was stopped after one helicopter made a bull’s eye on a floating mine, which, by sympathetic explosion, caused the
detonation of four other mines. Needless to say, the 'copter was almost lost.”

Sweep commanders confirmed the helicopter’s usefulness.

“In good weather, the helicopter proved an invaluable aid to the minesweeper,” said LT C. W. Coe, whose Redstart (AM-378) swept eighty large mines, captured five enemy sampans, and destroyed two self-propelled guns and one light tank during the Korean War. “The helicopter pilot was, in effect, the long range eyes of the Redstart.”

Helicopters were also effectively used to reconnoiter areas in advance of actual minesweeping. They assisted the sweep commanders to predetermine the presence and the type of mines, the direction of the mine lines, the existence of shore batteries, and the availability of prominent land marks for navigational purposes.

“Because of the ’copters,” said Coe, “it was possible for sweep operations to be more intelligently and safely planned in advance.”[2]

In some cases helicopters actually led trapped sweepers out of a minefield, according to LCDR I. M. Laird, Dextrous’ commanding officer.[3]

“From the air, they could see them when we couldn’t,” said Laird. “A ’copter hovered over Dextrous’ bow when she was caught in a minefield, and the ship was conned by radio throughout the minefield and into clear water.

“The helicopters had many friends in the minesweps.”

Clearing the Coast for Bombardment Ships

Orders to start sweeping north of Wonsan were received on 30 March 1951.

“All the minesweeping forces at Wonsan sortied for Songjin at that time,” said Captain Richard C. Williams, ComMinRonThree.

Williams’ force included his flagship, Comstock (LSD-19) (CAPT E. T. Goyette), with LTJG Waiter P. Sheppard’s minesweeping boats embarked. It also included ComMinDiv-32 (LCDR T. L. Cleaver) in Incredible (LT E. F. Flinn), Osprey (LTJG P. Levin), Merganser (LTJG D. J. O’Neill), Chatterer (LTJG J. P. McMahon), Pelican (LT Richard Cross), Mocking Bird (LTJG Stanley Gary) and the salvage vessel Grasp (ARS-24) (LT S. J. Brown).

This sweeping force, under the over-all tactical command of Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter in St. Paul (CA-73) (CAPT Chester C. Smith), had orders to clear a stretch of presumably safe water extending from Songjin about 20 miles to southward so that ships could get closer to the coast to bombard and blast targets of opportunity.

“On the first day of sweeping,” said Captain Williams, “about fifteen moored mines were ‘cut’ near Songjin’s harbor entrance. The sweeping operations brought the Communist defenders out of their surrounding hill positions, apparently to defend their coastline against amphibious attack. Many of them were observed and blasted as they converged on Songjin.

“Later the LSD, Fort Marion, was moved near the point of shore about 15 miles south of Songjin, and her embarked Royal Marines went ashore to dynamite a strategic rail line and tunnel. The British commandoes met negligible resistance and accomplished their mission.[3A]

“The night the sweepers returned to Wonsan, Comstock’s radar operator reported an unidentified and mysterious ‘pip’ moving near the island of Yo-do. The ‘pip’ was confirmed by the destroyer patrol. Although subsequent starshell and searchlight illumination failed to reveal the target, I ordered Osprey, Chatterer, Pelican and Merganser to sweep the suspicious area at first light. They did so, and by 0630 the following morning, 15 mines had been swept and destroyed.

“Had these mines remained unswept, St. Paul would have passed dangerously close to them when she stood in at about 1100 that same morning.”
In a further effort to confuse the Communist coast defenders and sweep mines at the same time, the minesweepers were ordered to conduct a tactical feint at Kojo during mid-April 1951. Starting at the 100-fathom curve, the shallow-draft minesweep boats cut a channel to within 5-inch gun range of the beach which was later expanded by the larger sweepers.

Although the minesweepers swept and sank only about a dozen mines,” Captain Williams said, “they encountered the most menacing shore fire with which the sweepers had then been confronted.”

Check-Sweeping Korea’s West Coast

While east coast clearance and channel-widening operations to join the Kojo and Wonsan sweep areas were in progress, another operation was suddenly made necessary in early May 1951. The British forces operating on Korea’s west coast requested that a check sweep be conducted in the Chinnampo area along Chinnampo’s “Cigarette” route that had been originally cleared by Commander S. M. Archer’s force in November 1950.

“Check-sweeping increased in importance,” said Captain Williams, “because a swept area stayed safe only so long as it was watched. Because of the distances involved, it was impossible to watch everywhere at once, and therefore we had to conduct monthly check-sweeping off both coasts.”

Usually, a check-sweep involved as much effort as a clearance sweep. The check-sweep of “Cigarette” in May of 1951, for instance, involved the use of the minesweepers Curlew, Gull, Swallow and Mocking Bird, and the fire support ships HMS Concord, HMCS Sioux, and HMS Amethyst. It also required the use of an LST, six MSBs, one LSD (the Comstock, whose crew replaced center-line gas buoys in the channel) and two YMSs from the Republic of Korean Navy: YMS-501 and YMS-515. The sweepers checked both for magnetic and moored mines, but found nothing along the entire 20-mile trek.

The May 1951 re-sweep of “Cigarette” reemphasized the growing usefulness of the helicopter. The helicopter was valuable not only for reconnoitering the area ahead of the sweepers, but also to drop hand grenades along each section of the channel in the hope of neutralizing any acoustic mines present.

(The necessity of constant check-sweeping underlines the fact that actual mines need not exist in order to provoke a great minesweeping effort. The mere threat of the mine is sufficient.)

The check-sweeping effort in Korea was reduced by a tactic described by the operations officer of MinRon 3.

“The sweepers developed a faster method of check-sweeping the coastal areas,” said CDR Emory B. Myers. “Two, three, or even more ships ran abreast through an area. If no mines were cut, we assumed that the area had not been re-mined.

“This method proved much faster than sweeping the entire area. But it was not foolproof. If current or tide walked a mine into a swept area, the entire area still had to be swept as a precaution against the possibility of re-mining.”

Sweepers Add New “Salt-Water” Real Estate

“Upon completion of the Chinnampo check-sweeping operation,” said Captain Williams, “work on the east coast commenced in earnest. The coastal area from Suwan-dan to Wonsan yielded almost 200 mines during the quarter ending 30 June.”

During this period, the sweep forces were re-enforced by two AMs—Redstart (LT Carl W. Coe) and Dextrous (LCDR I. M. Laird)—and two AMSs—Condor (LT G. D. Morin) and Waxbill (LT F.J. Crozier).

Meanwhile shore battery fire was becoming considerably more of a problem. Everywhere the sweeps went, enemy artillery followed. More and more artillery pieces appeared on hills, in valleys, and in caves
overlooking the areas where the sweepers were working. Although the accuracy of these guns left much to be desired, the density of their fire made occasional hits inevitable.

“Throughout the summer of 1951,” continued Williams, “the sweepers gradually cleared the coastline as far north as Hungnam.

“At the same time, the MSBs widened the sea room in Wonsan harbor, permitting our ships to come closer and closer to the enemy guns on Hodo Pando and Kalma Gak. They accounted for 138 mines there during the summer months—more than any other three divisions had swept in any comparable period of time. Their crews, led by such fearless men as LT Walter P. Sheppard, LT Allen L. Peek, LT Louis J. Compomenosi, and LT George R. Smith, were ably coned by Desnoyers, Beaver, Schultz, Polackowitz, Lunemen, and others.”

By 10 September 1951, the MSBs had completed their job at Wonsan. All that remained was a check-sweep by the AMSs. Accordingly five AMSs were readied: Mocking Bird (LT Sidney Smith), Kite (LT Lee Hadaway), Redhead (LT Kevah Kirshenbaum), Gull (LT Douglas Tuel), and Heron (LT E. S. Roth). LT Dale Schemerhorn in Mocking Bird was OTC.

The AMS sweep was commenced at first light and resulted in checking a path over 1,000 yards in width from the western tip of Sin-do, three miles farther west. This sweep was greeted by a thunderous bombardment from Communist shore batteries to the north, west, and south. The only damage during this foray came when Redhead struck the submerged mast of a lugger which had been sunk earlier northwest of Sin-do. Redhead’s starboard propeller was damaged. Fortunately she was able to recover gear and to limp out of the harbor.

The four undamaged sweepers turned for another pass. The Reds held their fire, allowing the small ships to come closer and closer. Not until the four reached the western end of their run, three miles from the nearest lee, did the Communists open fire. Sea water from the splashes drenched the sweepers. Turning eastward, the skippers “chased” the splashes to avoid hits, and escaped damage until near the sheltering lee of Sin-do Island.

Suddenly the voice radio of Heron called, “Starboard side hit.”

Still the thunderous bombardment continued. Mocking Bird at last had the western end of Sin-do abeam, and the other ships followed her to comparative safety.

The ordeal had ended. Four mines had been swept. Heron had been hit on the starboard side of her bulwark by a 75-mm. point-detonating, fuzed projectile. It had showered the overhead, bulkhead, and deck with shrapnel. A few feet higher, and the 40-mm. gun crew on the forecastle might have suffered heavily. As it was, damage was insignificant.

(Later, it was learned that the Communists had thought the intensive sweeping into Wonsan was a prelude to another amphibious attack, and, as a result, had reinforced their gun batteries, evacuated civilians from areas near likely landing beaches, and redeployed some troops to meet the attack.)

Sweeping continued northward in the fall of 1951 to the relatively heavily mined harbor of Hungnam. More and more mines were swept and destroyed. And more and more enemy artillery appeared on the shore to interfere with the sweeping. Despite the heavy shore fire, as many mines were swept from 1 July to 30 September 1951 as had been swept in the whole Korean War up to that time.

“Luck, experience, and planning all played an important role,” said Captain Williams.
Sweeping Close to the Bear’s Tail

One of the most difficult clearance sweeps of 1951 was conducted from 3 November to 10 November 1951, at Chongjin, on North Korea’s eastern coast, 75 miles south of Vladivostok.

“Our primary mission at Chongjin,” said Captain Williams, “was to remove the mine danger inside the 50-fathom curve in order to permit bombardment ships to operate in that area at closer ranges.

“Intelligence reports concerning Chongjin painted a grim picture of the area. Beach-controlled mines were reported to be in the area, and radar contacts of high-speed patrol boats had been reported. Furthermore, the operating area was within range of enemy air—and against aircraft, the sweepers lacked adequate armament, fire control, and speed. In addition, to complicate this problem, winter with its high winds, its severe cold, its ice, and its rough seas was fast approaching.”

The Chongjin sweeping operation commenced on 3 November. Twenty three contact mines were swept, eighteen of them sunk by rifle fire. One detonated as it was swept, and the remaining four were probably destroyed by 40-mm. fire, as the helicopter could find no trace of them.

“On 6 November,” continued Captain Williams, “Heron’s sonar operator discovered a new mine line in an area that had been cleared only three days before. Eight mines were swept from previously swept waters. This was a surprise. It meant that re-mining was being done right under our very noses.

“After sweeping three days inside the 50-fathom curve and then discovering that the enemy had very recently re-mined areas previously swept, we decided to concentrate farther to seaward between the 50- and the 100-fathom curve.

“At Chongjin, the LSD Comstock (CDR William Winter) and the helicopter again proved indispensable; but the helicopter’s effectiveness was greatly reduced by mist and sleet. It failed to spot the newly laid minefield on 6 November. The MSBs also had trouble due to rough weather. In the higher latitudes their sweeping operations should be conducted only when periods of good weather can be expected. The two DMSs—Doyle (DMS-34) and Endicott (DMS-35)—proved valuable as supporting ships at Chongjin, both because they could help to guard against re-mining and because they could make a rapid check-sweep of the area.”

Despite all the hazards and difficulties encountered at Chongjin, that area was cleared of mines from the 50-fathom curve to seaward—at least temporarily.

The most significant aspect of the Chongjin sweep, however, was the clear indication that North Korean minelayers were endeavoring to keep pace with the UN minesweepers.
Chapter 7. The Battle of the Mines (Part III—1951-1953)

Mine Intelligence (1951-1953)

Concrete evidence of enemy mine replanting in the Hungnam-Songjin area came on 19 November 1951 when *Ptarmigan* (LCDR Harold Durham) swept two new contact-type mines near Hungnam. Later, on 3 December 1951, *Pelican* sank a shiny new mine in the same area. Because of the newness of these mines, it was self-evident to Captain Williams that they were recent re-plants.

Such sporadic finds gave UN commanders their most dependable clues regarding enemy mining activities. Never during the course of the war was it possible to make or keep an up-to-date chart of the enemy’s mining and re-mining operations. Ships were too few, intelligence too sketchy; coastlines were too extensive, the nights too black; the enemy’s mining campaign was too local. Nor did the mine experts of the U.S. Navy have more than “guesstimates” of the Communist mine stockpile.

However, it was believed that the enemy had sufficient mines “to mine extensively all the ports and harbors of Korea,” and that he had “built depots at Chinnampo, Chongjin, Songjin, and Hungnam.”[5] It was also generally believed that his mining campaign had a two-fold purpose: first, to deter UN forces from making another amphibious landing; and second, to hamstring the operations of UN naval bombardment forces.

Intelligence reports from North Korean guerrillas, escapees, defectors, and captured fishermen were usually skimpy and had to be verified. All of the reports, however, indicated that enemy mining was being done at night, utilizing such craft as sailing junks, fishing sampans, power junks, and MTBs. One ex-Soviet minelayer was reportedly in use, but this was never verified.

Captured sampans, which had been used as minelayers, revealed that special racks constructed of heavy timbers were placed athwartship so that mines could be housed and manually rolled over the side with ease. Despite the primitive design and small payload of the sampans (even a small sampan, however, could carry two to four mines), it was possible for the enemy to pose a mining threat against a composite of the most powerful and up-to-date navies in the world.

Typical intelligence reports received by UN commanders in the spring of 1951 are reproduced from CINCFE’s intelligence summaries:

- “3 January: Extensive mining operations reported in Taedong channel and along shore vicinity of Chinnampo.”[6]
- “1 March: Enemy reported unloading Soviet sea mines from freight cars vicinity Kalma railroad station.
- “7 March: Kalma Railroad station reported effectively hit by fire from U.S. cruiser *Manchester*. One boxcar loaded with sea mines exploded.
- “31 March: UN naval units fired on possible mining boats in vicinity of Wonsan. COMNAVFE reports strong evidence exists that the enemy is making a determined effort to re-mine areas that have been previously swept.
- “10 April: One black MTB, 13 meters long, observed in the vicinity of Chinnampo. Boat believed to be laying mines during darkness. Enemy ships reported to be laying mines vicinity 38-45N, 125-29E.”

Prisoners captured by the *Douglas H. Fox* (DD-779) told a typically confusing and contradictory story of enemy minelaying activities.[7]

Information from prisoners captured on 2 May 1952 was the occasion of a report: “Mines were being
laid in April 1951 from Sinch’ang-ni to the southwest for a distance of about 2,000 yards. Prisoners rather indefinite about the number of mines, using the word ‘many’.

Four days later, on 6 May 1952, prisoners captured by Fox stated, “There are no mines in the Sinch’ang-ni area.”[8]

On 7 May, captured prisoners told Fox’s skipper, Commander James A. Dare, that mines were planted in Hamhung harbor. Three days later, 9 May, captured prisoners stated, “No minelaying noticed in Hungnam harbor.”

Few such reports were confirmed or confirmable, but they typify the fragmentary intelligence that filtered in from South Korean guerrillas, civilian refugees, prisoners-of-war, fishermen, and defectors throughout 1951-1953.

Occasionally an intelligence report proved accurate. A North Korean Navy defector from Kojo stated: “Most mines now being laid are said to be of the anti-landing craft type. It is said that these mines are being laid in a section of the east coast where invasion is possible.”

This fragment of intelligence was verified on 2 March 1952 when a new type of enemy anti-boat mine was discovered at Wonsan. Moored to explode from 18 inches to 8 feet beneath the surface, and containing 44 pounds of TNT, this comparatively small contact-type mine (only 21 inches in diameter) created the necessity for additional helicopter searching and underwater reconnaissance in suspected areas.

Positive evidence of an east coast mining effort was discovered on 18 June 1952 when Curlew (AMS-8) (LT R. O. Snure) recovered a mine with self-planting mechanism in Wonsan harbor. With this device the enemy apparently was using the river current to float mines into the harbor buoyed by oil drums, logs, and kegs. The mine release was a pelican-hook type mechanism that was released by a soluble washer. This discovery caused Commander Task Force 95 to declare the area near the river mouth unsafe for navigation.[8A]

The North Korean prisoners volunteered a sad story about their own navy. They said it had dwindled to nothing more than a token force, with virtually no duties to perform. In fact, large numbers of naval personnel had been transferred to the Army. None of the prisoners knew of the existence of any North Korean naval craft.
In late September, 1952, HMCS *Nootka* (CDR Richard M. Steele, RCN), a Canadian *Tribal* class destroyer, was to have the signal honor of capturing a North Korean minelayer, the only enemy ship captured at sea during the war. On the night of 22 September, *Nootka* was southeast of Cho-do island near the Chinnampo approaches, making a patrol known as “Blackburn.”

At 0223, *Nootka’s* radar detected an unidentified vessel on a northerly course close inshore near Chin’-gang’-po. When off the headland to the north of this, the vessel turned and set course for the southeast tip of Cho-do. Although suspicious and worth watching closely, the radar blip was thought probably that of a friendly reconnaissance ship returning to anchorage from a nocturnal patrol.

When the unidentified vessel reached the swept channel, it changed its heading toward a customary anchorage for the “Blackburn” patrol destroyers. But its action now appeared strongly to be that of searching, and Captain Steele ordered his ship to close the suspicious craft. *Nootka* turned to give chase, and the blip on the radar screen immediately showed a new course toward the mainland. A direct chase would take *Nootka* over the area recently traversed and possibly mined by this craft, and as this seemed most unwise to Steele, *Nootka* was put on course to pass to southward and round up to intercept her.

*Nootka’s* 29 knots did not permit interception, however, before the enemy craft had reached the protection of waters too shallow for the destroyer.

“A fruitless attempt was made to drive the vessel to seaward by firing with *Nootka’s* main armament at the cliffs over their heads,” said Steele. “This vessel was now fully considered to be enemy, but it was felt that its crew were much more valuable as captives than as corpses floating in the sea.

“An attempt was next made to try and capture them by armed boats, but the enemy travelled too fast and made their escape.

“By this vessel’s actions and the tracks of its courses, we concluded that it was engaged in mining operations, and that the area it had worked probably contained mines.

“In reply to my signal requesting that this area be check-swept, a U.S. minesweeper (USS *Defense*) (AM-317) arrived and did a magnetic check-sweep of the area, commencing at dusk on the 27th. At midnight she messaged ‘negative results’ and departed for Wonsan.”

Forty-six minutes later *Nootka* established contact a second time well up in the Nam-chon River. Captain Steele moved her south quietly and slowly around the end of the suspect area and closed the coast to seek any deeper darkness that the loom of the land might offer and thus prevent, as long as possible, the enemy vessel’s seeing her.

When the enemy craft was well out into route “Cigarette” in the position Steele felt was the farthest she would venture, *Nootka* closed at over 30 knots and succeeded in cutting off a good-sized vessel which was frantically attempting to reach the land.

“We closed right in with a rush to try to psychologically dominate the situation in order to prevent the enemy’s fighting,” said Steele. “We spoke to them in Korean, informing them that any move on their part would result in their being blown to bits.

“As we drew near, we couldn’t decide what we had found. It looked like a junk, but it was different. Its silhouette was low, it was whistling along at a pretty good clip, and it was making very little if any noise.

*Nootka* was then stopped about a half cable from the enemy, and in the darkness large black objects
could just be made out dropping from her stern and floating towards us. These were assumed to be floating mines, so we backed up and put several Bofors shells into her waterline, and we then sent away our boats with assault parties. They reported the vessel deserted, and turned toward the floating objects which were then realized to be small craft containing the absconding crew.

“When close in on the first of these, Nootka’s number one boat, using a tactic which had previously proved very successful, shone a high-powered narrow-beamed light immediately in the enemy’s eyes. It disclosed a North Korean naval officer lying on a raft made of large black rubber truck tubes, with his machine gun trained on Nootka. Both parties opened fire together; however, with the advantage of light, number one boat had no casualties, and the Korean retreated downward.”

The Nootka’s boats were recalled, and the remaining enemy rafts watched on radar. Nootka went alongside the enemy minelayer, and rather than risk sending men below in the darkness, secured several wires to a section of the vessel’s deck. Then, using her 44,000-horsepower, Nootka ripped this section adrift to ascertain if further mines or men remained. The ship was empty. Nootka secured lines to her and towed her off to the westward clear of the mined area so that she might be examined at daylight.

Nootka maintained watch on the remaining crew members, and at daylight, steam in and picked them up.

When Nootka closed to pick up the prisoners, they broke up their rafts and sank the tubes, and some of them tried to drown themselves. Each had been armed with a machinegun, a pistol, and a dozen grenades, which they discarded at Nootka’s approach. Among the prisoners were two lieutenants and three chief petty officers of the North Korean Navy.

“But an interesting sidelight,” said Steele, “was that the first grapple we threw into the minelayer didn’t hold and skidded back over the side of her bulwark. When hauled back on board Nootka, it was found to be hooked into a bag full of very shaky-looking hand grenades; these were very gently dropped over the side.”

Later, a considerable amount of information was obtained from one of the prisoners concerning not only this mine field but also another field located considerably to the southward.

“In this instance and others where prisoners were taken by Nootka,” said Captain Steele, “it was interesting to note the psychological reaction brought about in these men by good and kind treatment, when they expected torture. A bath, hot coffee, hot food, and other refreshment resulted, in each case, in at least one of the men becoming very talkative.

“It was noted, however, that in almost every case their first hours of evidence proved much more reliable than the stilted, revised version given by them later and which always reverted to the theme, ‘I am not really a Communist. The circumstances and my environment forced me to accept the part.’”

The enemy prisoners volunteered the information that they had renewed their mining efforts on a small scale on the night of 13 September 1952, after they reactivated the mine and torpedo section at the Chinnampo Naval Base.

The torpedo section consisted of four officers and twenty enlisted men. The North Korean naval officers had received about one month’s training in mine warfare at Rashin. The training syllabus consisted largely of lectures by Korean naval officers based on Korean translations of a Soviet mine manual.

The mining crew used at Chinnampo consisted of a senior lieutenant, as political officer-in-charge, plus a navigator, a junior grade lieutenant mining officer, and a half-dozen enlisted men selected for their ability to row a boat. This crew had set out from Chinnampo to the coastal port of Mongumpo, not far away, to repair a badly damaged 25-foot junk (the one Nootka captured) to use as a minelayer.

Nootka’s prisoners stated that they had tried to build a minelaying craft that could not be heard nor seen, even by radar. Therefore, they had decided to substitute cracking good oarsmen for the junk’s engine, and to reduce the junk’s freeboard to within eighteen inches of the waterline, in the hope this would reduce both visual
and radar detection. Wooden longitudinal supports were installed as minelaying rails.

Actual mining operations had begun six nights later, on the night of 19 September, when two magnetic mines were laid. On the nights of the 20th, 26th, and 27th, six additional magnetic mines were planted, without benefit of navigational instruments. The navigator had taken “seaman’s eye” bearings on shore promontories by moonlight, and had assumed the speed of his craft to be about one knot.

This episode was fair proof that the Communists recognized that the west coast’s tidal range and swift currents were better suited for magnetic mines than for contact types.

A few days later USS Chatterer arrived in the Chinnampo area and commenced sweeping the northern mine area on 2 October.

The first mine was exploded with a great geyser of water at eight minutes past noon on that day.

The field was swept not without difficulty, for the enemy wheeled in artillery batteries and took the sweepers under heavy fire on a number of occasions.

“To watch the little sweepers lumbering out of the welter of fire at six or seven knots, retaining their invaluable sweep gear instead of slipping it,” said Captain Steele, “was inspiring to us Canadians, and built a deep respect for the tenacity and ability of the U.S. Navy’s fighting men that will long remain.

“Some of the American leaders in these sweeps were Reserves called back from comfortable, safe jobs where they had been attempting to build homes and catch up on some of the time lost in World War II—men past the age where fighting is exciting adventure.

“The vigorous actions of these men must be counted among the finest examples of leadership and patriotism, and I hope that their civilian associates have a full appreciation of how much such men contributed.”
The Sea War in Korea
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson

Chapter 7. The Battle of the Mines (Part III—1951-1953)
UN Ships Suffer Mine Damage

Despite the enemy’s constant mining and re-mining, mines caused comparatively little damage to UN naval forces from the spring of 1951 until the armistice in 1953.

On 2 February 1951 while sweeping near Yong-yang southeast of Wonsan, Partridge (AMS-31) (LTJG B. M. Clark) struck a floating mine and sank in less than ten minutes. Two officers and six enlisted men were killed, one officer and five enlisted men were seriously injured. Partridge was the fourth and last United States sweeper to be lost in the Korean War.

Sarsi (ATF-111) was sunk by a mine while on patrol off Hungnam the night of 30 August 1952. Two men were lost.

Two destroyers struck mines near Hungnam: the Walke (DD-723) (CDR M. F. Thompson) on 12 June 1951 and the Small (DD-838) (CDR F. C. Snow) on 7 October 1951. Both ships suffered extensive damage. Walke suffered 26 deaths; Small had 9 killed.

Another destroyer, the USS Barton (DD-722), struck a mine on 16 September 1952 approximately 90 miles east of Wonsan, while serving in the screen of Task Force 77. Barton’s skipper, Commander H. B. Seim, believed that this mine had broken loose from the Wonsan minefield when Typhoon “Karen” had blown past that area on 18 August. Vice Admiral Clark, Commander Seventh Fleet, reported 40 mines around his ships in the next several weeks. Other mines had also appeared on the surface in Wonsan harbor, and some had even washed up on the beaches.

“There were some peculiar aspects to the Barton mining,” said CDR Seim. “Barton was the northernmost ship of the task force, which was southbound. It was necessary for both the carriers and the destroyers directly ahead of us to steam close aboard that mine before we hit it. When the explosion came, I had just finished reading a report on a ship’s vulnerability to floating mines. The report concluded that a ship making ten or more knots was safe, since the bow waves would push a floating mine aside. However, the bow wave failed to protect Barton, for the task force was steaming at fifteen knots!”

“The mine hit at 2115,” continued Seim. “It fractured the shell plating from keel to the main deck. The forward fireroom was completely gutted and flooded. A hole 40 feet long was opened to the sea. All five men in the forward fireroom were lost. Engineroom personnel working next to the destroyed fireroom were seriously burned.”

Two ROK ships were mined during this period: JMS-306[9A] on 6 May off Chinnampo, and PC-704 off Yo-do island, Wonsan harbor, on the night of 26 December 1951. Twenty bodies were later recovered in the vicinity of Yo-do. ROK naval records positively state that “PC-704 hit a mine and sank while conducting operations on east coast inside Wonsan harbor area.”[10]

In company with JMS-302, YMS-502, and PF-61, ROK JMS-306 was sent to Chinnampo to investigate enemy minelaying activities. On the morning of 6 May 1951, as soon as the thick morning fog cleared away, JMS-306 began her reconnaissance patrol. Twenty minutes later, at 0920, she struck a mine. The blast flooded her engineroom, killed 6 of her 36-man crew, and wounded 18.

For 72 minutes, the 12 uninjured crew members fought to control the ship’s flooding. Meantime, two friendly sailing vessels were called alongside for salvage of everything portable, including, said a ROK report, “a considerable amount of office paper.” The ship sank at 1032. Surviving crew members were transferred to PF-61 for return to Pusan.
This Page Intentionally Left Blank
Beginning in the fall of 1951 and continuing throughout the remainder of the Korean War, more UN minesweepers were damaged by shore batteries than by mines.

“Many times,” said CDR Emory E. Myers, “enemy batteries would fire at a sweep until it looked like they could not miss getting a hit with the next shell—and then for no apparent reason they would stop. This ‘stop’ and ‘go’ firing might last all day. When Red gunners got too hot, our sweepers simply cleared the area and waited for them to cool off. As a result of being frequently under fire, hardly a sweeper in Korea avoided getting hit, or having a near miss and flying shrapnel.”[12]

One of the most frequently hit minesweepers was Osprey (AMS-28) (LT D. T. Wieland, Jr.). She caught two shells on 29 October 1951, one puncturing the top of her stack, the second striking the hull above the waterline. Only one man was seriously wounded.

Again on 23 April 1952, Osprey was hit by a Songjin shore battery while she and Swallow (AMS-36) (LTJG D. A. Rostan, USNR) spotted trains for their big steel sister, Murrelet (AM-372). “Night train busting, as well as being destructive, grew to be quite a sport for the little sweepers,” said CDR Myers. “At night they would move in close to the beach and relay information to the larger ships as enemy trains came out of tunnels and ran along the beach. Minecraft helped knock off a number of trains in this manner.”

Osprey was hit on a third occasion on 13 October 1952 as she participated in Kojo amphibious demonstrations,[12A] taking numerous fragment hits and a near miss which wounded the executive officer and three enlisted men.

The only other minesweeper to be hit as often as Osprey was the destroyer minesweeper Thompson (DMS-38). She too was hit on three separate occasions.[12B]

Other sweepers damaged were Heron (AMS-18) (LTJG E. S. Roth), which took one hit about six feet above her waterline on 8 September 1951, and Competent (AM-316) (LCDR E. A. Grant), which received near misses from an estimated 100 rounds of 122-mm. shells from a 4-gun battery on 27 August 1952. Only superficial damage was done to the latter ship and no crew members were hit.

Kite (AMS-22) (LT R. G. Zimmerman) was the target for 47 rounds of 76-mm. fire while sweeping at Wonsan on 19 November 1952. Shell fragments wounded one officer and four enlisted personnel—none seriously.

During March of 1953, three UN minesweepers were slightly damaged by enemy shore batteries near Songjin: USS Gull and USS Swift and ROK YMS-510.

Despite the excitement of being frequently under fire, the minesweepers logged the duels with Communist shore batteries with brevity and nonchalance. LT A. C. Sharp made the following entries in Firecrest’s (AMS-10) log:

“1445: Ship under fire from shore battery. All engines ahead full.
“1504: Received hit on starboard side . . . shell entered messhall . . . tore up part of the deck . . . passed through lower part of refrigerator . . . glanced off ship’s ventilation system . . . passed through port bulkhead into the sea.
“1505: Shell did not explode and no casualties resulted.”

Firecrest’s damage was subsequently repaired by the Gunston Hall (LSD-5) (CAPT G. T. Baker). The meddlesome enemy shore batteries were later blasted by battleship New Jersey (CAPT David M. Tyree) and the
destroyer *Epperson* (DDE-719) (CDR C. H. Mead).

LCDR I. M. Laird, the *Dextrous’* commanding officer, made the following entries in his log:

“1243: Manned the 3-inch gun.
“1309: Ship taken under fire from shore batteries. All hands to General Quarters. Captain took the conn.
“1310: Commenced evasive zig-zag courses at flank speed, 16 knots. Took direct hit on starboard bow.
“1312: Took direct hit on top of mast.
“1314: Numerous air bursts and near misses. Commenced dropping smoke pots (to camouflage position).
“1318: Cut loose minesweeping gear. Casualties one dead and two wounded.

“Two holes in ship—one about 12 inches in diameter and another about 6 inches in diameter. Much damage to electrical gear, radio antennas, radar, signal halyards, and the port truck light missing.”

LCDR Laird’s defensive maneuver was basic doctrine for minesweepers. When possible, they opened fire on enemy shore batteries, calling for fire support when this was available. They cranked on flank speed; they cut their sweep gear, zig-zagged, and used smoke to complicate the enemy’s target solution.

“One more maneuver might be added,” said Laird. “When a flash from a shore battery showed us that one was on the way, we changed course immediately—and then spent 20 or 30 seconds, depending on the range, hoping we hadn’t zigged when we should have zagged.”

Smoke was particularly effective when produced in sufficient quantity to conceal completely the minesweeper’s evasive maneuvering.

*Merganser*’s skipper, LT E. A. May, developed a smokemaking experiment that was promptly adopted by all the sweep skippers. May inducted diesel oil directly into the main engine muffler, which caused heavy white smoke to pour out of the stack. “The beauty of making smoke in this manner,” said LT May, “was that it involved only one motion to open one valve in the engineroom, and smoke poured out when it was needed.”

While this procedure was never approved by the Bureau of Ships, Captain Williams recommended that it be allowed as an emergency measure. Sweepers continued to use the “May method” when in desperate circumstances, concluding that the oil would do less damage to their engines than might be done by the shore batteries. Actually, no ship ever had a fire or damage to its engines, even though the method was used many times.

BuShips prescribed a smoke-making procedure for minesweepers involving the use of small smoke pots that could be quickly lit off and either carried on the stern or dumped over the side. The sweepers, however, found the pots too slow in producing smoke. By the time the smoke became effective, the ship was either out of danger or had been hit.

The accuracy of enemy shore batteries highlighted the importance of counterbattery gunfire support. Few destroyer skippers had experienced minesweeper support duty prior to their Korean assignment, and no prescribed method for gunfire support of sweepers existed at the outbreak of the Korean war.

*Zeal*’s commanding officer (LT F. H. Sonntag) stated the problem succinctly in his action report.[13]

“There is no basic doctrine in regard to gunfire support by destroyer types when supporting minesweepers in areas where there are known shore batteries. The decision at present seems to rest with the commanding officer of the ship providing support. This officer has seen support ships follow the inshore minesweep float . . . and thus be closer to the beach than the minesweeper. Other vessels remain . . . to seaward of the sweeper. It is recommended that a study be made of the best support positions when various combinations of vessels are involved. Fire support ships should also be apprised of the fact that in an emergency they can pass between the minesweeper and its float without fouling.”[13A]

Each fire support skipper positioned his ship in accordance with his best judgment. Some ships gave excellent fire support by following in the wake of the minesweep and then positioning themselves between the enemy shore batteries and the friendly minesweep. Other fire support ships kept well out to sea beyond the
minesweepers, and in some instances the minesweepers were caught between the fire support ships and the shore batteries. Understandably, the minesweepers preferred to have the fire support ships as close as possible to the target.

One destroyer skipper whose ship supported the minesweepers for 33 days inside Wonsan harbor was Barton’s CDR H. B. Seim. Seim believed it was a sounder policy for the destroyers to steam abreast but outboard of the minesweepers rather than try to trail them. “This was particularly true inside Wonsan,” said Seim, “where maneuvering room was restricted both for the minesweeper and for the destroyer. All we could do was ‘figure-eight’. We wound up our batteries on one loop and unwound them on the next.”

A similar fire support plan was used by the skipper of USS Douglas H. Fox (DD-779) (Commander James A. Dare), whose results were enthusiastically endorsed both by the minesweeper Murrelet and by Commander Mine Forces Pacific.

Following Fox’s smothering fire[14] in support of Swallow (AMS-36) and Murrelet (AM-372) northeast of Lighthouse point at Hungnam, Murrelet sent the following message:

“‘From USS Murrelet: Action USS D. H. Fox: 13/0542Z: All gunfire support ships could take lessons from you X It has been a real pleasure to work with you BT.’

“Fox answered: ‘From USS D. H. Fox: Action USS Murrelet: 13/0555Z: Thank you X Your three-inch gunner is the sharpest I have seen X Will swap you even for one gun department BT’.”

Fox’s skipper, Commander Dare, explained that “this burst of mutual admiration followed several days of sweeping the area from Cha-ho to Hung-nam in which we had a few altercations with shore guns. Our sweep support plan went like this: First, the senior sweep would deliver his overlay of the swept area so we would both be using the same ground rules. I would then put the Fox in a position about 400 yards ahead and 10° relative to seaward of the leading sweep. Fox probed ahead with 5-inch and inshore with three barrels of single shot 40-mm. (or one 5-inch when ranges were over 3,000 yards). The sweeps would each take inshore targets with 3-inch and 20-mm. This worked well inasmuch as the Fox always drew any fire received, and the sweeps could turn across our wake to get sea room.

“When we operated this way, steaming along the coast, I always felt like one of the bad guys in a western movie riding into town with pistols banging in all directions. By looking ahead with the 20-power binoculars you could actually see North Koreans running for the hills and tunnels.”

Dare’s support plan had the hearty endorsement of Commander Mine Forces Pacific, Rear Admiral J. A. Snackenberg. In a dispatch to Douglas H. Fox on 14 May 1952, ComMinPac stated, “I have been informed by my ships that you have consistently supported them with extremely close and effective gunfire. I would like to extend to the officers and men of the Douglas H. Fox the appreciation of both myself and Mine Forces Pacific.”

Despite the harassing effect and threat of enemy shore guns, all the sweepers continued to do their work cheerfully and aggressively, nor did they lose their sense of humor.

For example, when Mine Squadron Three’s flagship, the USS Cabildo (LSD-16), was hit inside Wonsan harbor while recovering her small sweep boats, Captain Herald F. Stout issued a purple heart to the ship. In the citation, Captain Stout stated:

“While recovering minesweep boats with her back flap down, the enemy directed approximately ten rounds at her middle body in a most unsporting and ungentlemanly manner, scoring one direct hit which penetrated her number two deck level causing unauthorized ventilation of decks, stacks, living spaces and personal effects. Coolly disregarding this affront to the dignity and personal privacy, by an unseen but not unfelt foe, Cabildo went through in good order and with excellent speed.”

Captain Stout postscripted the citation by stating that “the facts set forth in the enclosed citation are personally known to me and only too well.” The enemy shell had landed above the well deck within a few feet of
Commander Mine Squadron Three.
The importance of night minesweeping was greatly increased in Korea on 15 October 1952 during the amphibious feint at Kojo, an east coast city 25 miles southeast of Wonsan and 35 miles north of the battlefront.

The minesweepers arrived off Kojo on D-minus-three Day, but due to high winds and heavy seas they were unable to commence operations until morning twilight of 13 October.

Five shallow-sweep boats made the initial run. As they closed to within 1,500 yards of the beach, heavy shore battery fire was received. So intense and accurate was the enemy’s artillery and machinegun fire that only the three leading sweeps were able to complete the first pass. The two boats bringing up the rear cut their sweep gear and scampered for the open sea.

Later in the day, the three AMSs, with the direct gunfire support of two U.S. destroyers, tried to sweep the area once again.

Although the destroyer gunfire support was reported as “excellent”, it was not sufficient to silence the enemy guns. Both minesweeper Osprey and destroyer Perkins were lightly damaged. Perkins, in fact, suffered one killed and 17 wounded from two near misses which sprayed the destroyer with shrapnel.

At sunrise the next day, 14 October, the three AMSs once more tried to clear a channel. Once again heavy gunfire drove them away, this time before they could reach the sweeping area. So concentrated and accurate was the enemy gunfire that on 15 October daytime sweeping was declared a failure. If any further sweeping was done at Kojo it would have to be accomplished under the cover of darkness.

Only one more night—14-15 October—remained, but the sweep was finished that night. Fortunately, no mines were found.

The daytime failure at Kojo, and the ever increasing enemy gunfire along the northeast coast, pointed up the need for night minesweeping. Henceforth much, if not all, minesweeping in Korean waters would have to be done at night. Night sweeping had been done during World War II, but the technique had not been practiced since. There was urgent need, therefore, to become familiar again with the doctrine of night sweeping—particularly for formation sweeping prior to amphibious assaults.

The skipper of the minesweeper Shoveler (AM-382) (LT C. J. Casserly) recommended: (1) that night minesweeping doctrines be restudied and more fully developed; (2) that a positive means of determining mine contact with sweep wire be investigated; and (3) that methods of illumination or marking location of mines swept at night be investigated.

He further suggested that such things as underwater pyrotechnics, night-visible dye and grapnels might help in locating mines, once they had been swept.

But night minesweeping, although in less danger from enemy guns, was more difficult than day operations for numerous reasons:

First, navigation at night was more difficult, as was accurate charting of areas swept. Tide and current might cause either sweeping holidays or duplication of sweeping.

Second, mine destruction and mine buoying were more difficult at night.

Third, minesweeping at night increased the hazard to all ships following astern the lead sweepers.

Fourth, dozens of fishing sampans frequented the Korean coasts at night. There was always the danger that one of them might be involved in more than fishing.

“As the Korean war drew to a close, the AMs were doing all of their inshore sweeping at night,”[15] said
LCDR E. E. Hollyfield, Jr., commanding officer of the USS Symbol (AM-123). “On the east coast the AMs were responsible for check sweeping the coast from the bombline to just north of Yang-do, a distance of approximately 227 miles. We streamed our gear out of shore battery range at dusk and then just at good dark we closed the beach and commenced sweeping. We swept parallel to the coast in one direction as far as we could get before daybreak the following morning, usually a distance of about sixty to seventy miles. Sometimes during the night our tracks would come within five hundred yards of the beach. Just prior to daybreak we would proceed to seaward to recover our gear out of shore battery range. With any sea at all, we never knew what, if anything, we had swept during the night. Therefore, after daybreak, we would run a fast surveillance patrol back through the area we had swept. Floaters were found from time to time in the swept areas indicating either that we had cut mines or that some had broken their moorings during the night.

“The worst night minesweeping problem north of the 38th parallel was the sampans always ahead of us,” continued Hollyfield. “We knew the North Koreans were starving and needed to fish; yet, we never knew whether the blacked-out sampans ahead were loaded with fishing gear or with mines.”

On such check-sweeps, Hollyfield strongly recommended against sweepers making reverse passes at night for fear of running into mines that might have been cut.

“Not only did the AMSs sweep closer inshore,” said Hollyfield, “but often they reversed course at night and that is a tricky business even for experts.”

Another AM skipper, LCDR A. G. Russillo, commanding officer of USS Toucan (AM-387), said, “The difficulty with night sweeping was that we never really knew how well we were doing. After we cut them, we had a destruction problem. In rough water our radar couldn’t find them. A swept mine on the surface that can’t be seen is as dangerous as a mine that still holds its moorings. We didn’t know if we were endangering and complicating the problems of the sweeper following us. It was really a tough proposition on the west coast, with all its navigational hazards. The ‘J’ factor increased terrifically at night. Yet, as far as we know, night sweeping was effective.”

“But Korean night sweeping with all its headaches was never as bad as night sweeping at Anzio,” said CDR Myers, who had skippered minesweeper YMS-13 during that World War II operation. “At Anzio,” said Myers, “we were opposed both by accurate shore batteries and constant aerial attack. Had we confronted the Anzio type of opposition in Korea, both our sweeping problems and our support problems would have been multiplied.”
In addition to their Korean minesweeping chores, which by the end of hostilities had accounted for a grand total of 1,088 mines swept, mine craft made other significant contributions to the over-all military effort.

By May of 1952 the minesweepers had been given duties other than sweeping port approaches, harbors, channels and island defense areas, gunfire support areas, coastal patrol and gun interdiction areas. They had been directed to perform such varied tasks as providing “flycatchers”[15A] to safeguard swept areas, making continuous studies of enemy mining methods, gathering and disseminating mine intelligence, training Republic of Korea naval minesweeping forces, and training Republic of Korea naval liaison officers how to render sea-air rescue assistance.

As their sweeping ended, mine craft performed pilot rescue missions comparable to those performed by U.S. submarines during the late phases of World War II. *Symbol* rescued a friendly pilot near Hungham on 19 June 1953, and *Dextrous* picked one up in the same area on 23 May 1953. *Ruddy* rescued three airmen from a ditched B-26 near the west coast island of Cho-do on 1 July.

Capturing enemy sampans and prisoners also provided minesweepers a welcome break in the sweeping routine. On 7 May 1952, the *Ptarmigan* (AM-376) reported the capture of five sampans and twenty-five prisoners between Hungnam and Mayang-do.

On 10 May 1952, *Murrelet* (AM-372) reported the capture of a total of six sampans and twenty-six North Korean prisoners. The “prisoner” ages ranged from 41 to 57. All were fishermen from the village of Kwandong-ni and reported they had very little food and that influenza, for which there was no medicine, existed among the children. The prisoners also stated that civilians were not permitted to travel between towns, and that no trains had been heard on the coastal line for some months.

The destroyer minesweeper *Endicott* (DMS-35) achieved distinction by scoring heavy damage against several trains during the train interdiction operation. This performance elevated *Endicott* into the distinguished membership of the “Trainbuster’s Club.”[15B]
In June 1952 the decision was made by Admiral Gingrich to limit anti-mine operations to check-sweeping areas already cleared, and to discontinue clearance sweeping of new areas. Hereafter, minesweeping operations became stable and routine.

Minesweepers continued to move up and down both Korean coasts, checking anchorages, bombardment areas, and channels for renewed mining efforts.

On the east coast, the anti-mine ships regularly swept the bombardment area from Suwon-dan, near the southern tip of Korea, to Musu-dan, near the Manchurian border. East coast minesweepers kept an estimated 270 square miles of harbor and anchorage areas mine-free, and swept all mineable waters to seaward of a coastal sweep line about 300 miles in length.

On the west coast, the Chinnampo channel was one-and-a-half miles wide and an estimated 70 miles long. The Haeju estuary channel was 73 miles long. Inchon’s Flying Fish Channel was 61 miles in length, Mokpo nearly 73 miles. Counting channels, anchorages, and ports, west coast sweepers had to continuously check-sweep more than 337 square miles of water.

The decision to discontinue clearance sweeps and henceforth to limit the antimine effort to check-sweeping, diminished the mine menace during the remainder of the war.
After the armistice on 27 July 1953, minesweeping on the east coast was discontinued. On the west coast, however, minesweeping continued on a routine basis in the areas around Inchon, Haeju, and Gazan until 10 September 1953.

In place of sweeping, the minesweepers served as patrol ships on both coasts in order to survey enemy coastal traffic, to maintain surveillance over the large POW camps on Cheju-do, and to protect friendly shipping and fishing from piracy south of the demarcation line.

Commander Task Force 95 (Rear Admiral C. E. Olsen) took stringent precautions against any possible enemy allegations that UN ships were violating the truce terms. He directed that:

“(1) All ROK naval vessels remain south of the demarcation line; and after 15 August 1953, all UN ships remain south of the demarcation line;

“(2) No suspicious looking craft be visited or searched;

“(3) All UN ships take evasive action rather than return the fire of enemy guns.”

At the time of the armistice, it was not known whether the Communists planned to clear the minefields they had planted or not. On 9 October 1953, however, a Joint Armistice Team reported that North Koreans had started to sweep north of the demarcation line. Even so, the danger of Soviet-built mines in Korean waters was destined to remain for some time. In August of 1953, Vice Admiral Robert P. Briscoe, COMNAVFE, issued a mine warning in the form of a Hydropac[15C] that waters north of the demarcation line had not been swept since 27 July. Ships entering this area would do so at their own risk. Briscoe also stated that moored mines had a pronounced tendency to walk seaward, and that heavy weather caused mines to part their moorings and become “floaters.” Furthermore, he pointed out that there was always the possibility that the enemy would decide to re-mine some of the swept areas north of the demarcation line.

From 27 July 1953 until 1 January 1954, only one mine was encountered—an old floater estimated to have been in the water for about two years.

The sudden absence of floating mines following the armistice seemed to indicate that some of the floating mines encountered during hostilities actually were “drifters”—drifting by design rather than by accident.
The Sea War in Korea
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson

Chapter 7. The Battle of the Mines (Part III—1951-1953)

Significance

The mine war in Korea is rich with significance and lessons.
One of the most important results of the three-year anti-mine war was to highlight the importance of intelligence.

The relation and importance of good intelligence to effective mine countermeasures is, as demonstrated in Korea, of immeasurable value. Mines that can be located and destroyed prior to planting do not require sweeping. Similarly, the destruction of minelaying facilities limits the number of mines that can be planted. Accurate intelligence as to location and composition of minefields makes the mine countermeasures problem relatively simple. It may permit avoidance of the minefield if conditions are not favorable for minesweeping.

Prompt intelligence and accurate intelligence are prerequisites of successful mine warfare operations.

The Korean war taught much with regard to U.S. Navy minesweeping ships and minesweeping equipment. All types of minesweepers were employed in Korea. The DMS proved useful in waters along the northeast coast, but remained of dubious value as a versatile minesweeper. The most capable all-around sweeper, despite her limited cruising radius, inadequate communication, and critical stability, was the 136-foot wooden AMS. She could sweep both in deep and shallow areas, and she offered a small target to the enemy; she was durable and economical to operate. The 220-foot AM proved invaluable for off-shore sweeping. She was fast. She provided a stable gunnery platform and carried good navigational equipment; she had ample space accommodations to function as a lead ship and flagship. Since only two such vessels, the Restart and Dextrous, were in the Far East in the spring of 1951, their schedules were arranged so that one of them could be in the combat area at all times.[16]

The use of an LST as a logistics support ship, helicopter platform and mining headquarters greatly enhanced the mobility of the minesweeping task group. However, the LST did not make as good a mothership as the LSD. Launching and recovery of boats via the LST’s ramp were extremely slow and, except under the most favorable weather conditions, hazardous both to crews and boats. In its place, the LSD proved to be ideal both as a mothership for small boat sweeps and as a means of supplying and supporting the larger sweepers.

Innovations to countermine warfare developed during Korean operations were the minehunting helicopters and patrol squadrons (PBM)s and the aerial bombing of the minefield.

In regard to equipment, the same underwater object-locator gear and the same type of sonar used in World War II to detect moored mines were used again during the Korean war. The equipment for sweeping moored mines and detonating magnetic and acoustic mines had not been improved.

Regarding the U.S. Navy mine operations in the Korean war, there was no significant change in technique from World War II methods. The mine countermeasures we used in Korean waters in 1953 were of 1943 vintage.

The virtually unsweepable pressure, pressure-magnetic, and pressure-acoustic mines remained the same serious threat as in World War II. Therefore, it is concluded that UN forces were fortunate in that, except for the use of the magnetic mine, the enemy employed only World War I and World War II type mines, and these were mainly simple contact types. Had they used even combination magnetic-acoustic mines, the task of minesweeping would have been increased one hundred fold.

It must be concluded, therefore, that in the perpetual race between the development of mines and mine countermeasures, the mine has maintained the commanding lead that it gained during World War II.
The Korean War also gave new insight into the capability of the Communists in the mine warfare field of naval operations. The Soviet-sponsored minelaying in Korea alerted the U.S. Navy to the need of research, development, and production of adequate countermeasures. In recognition of this fact, the mine type command was reestablished at Pearl Harbor under Rear Admiral John M. Higgins on 3 January 1951.

Shortly after taking command, Admiral Higgins made a statement with regard to the Korean mine operations that should be read frequently by the officers and men of the U.S. Navy.

“It is obvious from the mine warfare we have been engaged in during the Korean action,” said Higgins, “that these deadly weapons can and will be effectively employed by any enemy we may face in the future.

“It is a basic fact that any small maritime nation, with only elementary transportation facilities, little technical experience, and a minimum of improvised equipment, can deny the use of its ports and the shallow waters along its coast to a large, modern naval force at little cost to itself, simply by the extensive laying of even elementary types of mines.”[17]

By 22 August 1953, the United States Navy had ordered 125 new minesweepers of various sizes, shapes, and descriptions. Many were wooden-hulled to minimize their magnetic field. It may seem curious that the nation then in the process of building the world’s first nuclear-powered submarine was at the same time building wooden fighting ships of laminated white oak—but such is the nature of modern naval warfare.

There was one residual result of the mine war in Korea. It was to make mine warfare a more dependable career specialty in the United States Navy. For, as Rear Admiral Charles B. Momsen stated: “Of one point we can be sure; if war comes, the enemy will use mines on us on a big scale. No nation in history has ever used enough mines of the right kind.”

A most significant conclusion about mine warfare in the Korean war is the fact that the Communist enemy, by the use of obsolescent moored mines and magnetic mines laid by primitive means, was able to cause considerable damage to UN ships and interference to UN operations. The enemy’s mining effort was entirely defensive in character, limited and local. Even so, the danger of mines kept UN vessels outside the 100-fathom curve “except in swept areas.” Had a full-scale enemy offensive and defensive mining effort, using the latest type mines and the most modern methods of planting mines, been made, the task of prosecuting the war in Korea would have been vastly more costly and difficult.

The transcendent mine warfare lesson to be learned in Korea was the continuing need for battle readiness. The U.S. Navy lacked readiness on 25 June 1950. As the war progressed, readiness improved.

Prior to May 1951, about 200 mines were swept at a cost of 5 sweepers sunk. From May to December 1951, 700 were swept with no loss of sweepers. This proves that with more equipment and increasing experience, the U.S. Navy developed better techniques, effectiveness, and safety. At the same time the enemy got a good look at U.S. countermeasures. His successful use of mines in Korea portends use elsewhere.

The U.S. Navy must prepare itself for future mine threats.
Chapter 8. The Struggle to Strangle

Introduction

In early November 1950, as the Chinese entered the war in force, the aircraft carriers of Task Force 77 were given a unique and unfamiliar role: to participate in a campaign to isolate a battlefield. Specifically, the Navy was given two initial tasks: (1) to destroy the six major Yalu River bridges of the seventeen which linked Manchuria and North Korea; and (2) to perform armed reconnaissance[1] in the eastern half of northeast Korea (specifically, east of 127° E).

This was the beginning of twenty months of effort by the aircraft carriers of Task Force 77 to strangle the supply lines of the enemy. Throughout this campaign, the striking power of carriers supplemented that of the surface ships and escort carriers of the blockade force, the aircraft of the U.S. Fifth Air Force in Korea, the First Marine Air Wing, and the other segments of the UN air forces in Korea. In effect, the task of air power—both land and sea-based—during these twenty months was to sever the Korean peninsula at the Yalu and Tumen rivers, to undercut the peninsula, and to float the entire land mass out into mid-ocean where interdiction,[1A] in concert with a naval blockade, could strangle the supply lines of the Communists and thereby force their retreat and defeat.

The problem for the carriers of Task Force 77 was simply this: How could they, operating an average of 150 naval aircraft in the northeast area of Korea three days out of four, hinder (and if possible prevent) the movement of enemy supplies through an area the size of the state of Minnesota, opposed by an energetic and ingenious enemy operating some 6,000 to 8,000 trucks and hundreds of trains, dispersing and camouflaging his supplies, working only at night and opposing our air attacks with the ever-increasing antiaircraft fire?

The account of this herculean effort, the successes attained by the Navy, and the ingenuity and energy which our aviators displayed, plus an analysis of why air power failed to isolate the battlefield, are profitable studies for every student of naval warfare and military operations.
Chapter 8. The Struggle to Strangle
The Naval Air Attacks Upon the Yalu River Bridges (8-30 November 1950)

During the month of October 1950, disturbing and increasingly frequent reports were received at UN headquarters in Tokyo regarding the entry of Chinese Communist forces into Korea. More than 400,000 Red Chinese troops were reported to be on the Manchurian side of the Yalu River; some Chinese Army units were known to have crossed the international boundary as early as 16 October, although how many and for what purpose was not known. Some thought the Communists were only sending enough “volunteer” troops into North Korea to permit the retreat and rescue of the badly-shattered remnants of the North Korean Army, or perhaps to protect the Yalu hydroelectric plants. Others believed that full-scale Chinese Communist intervention was imminent. The Chinese radio in Peking had said as much, warning that their forces would enter Korea if UN forces crossed the 38th parallel.

The northward advance of UN forces across the 38th parallel began on 7-8 October. Enemy resistance at first was light and sporadic. By 24 October, however, determined resistance was encountered all along the front, especially by ROK units in the east. The Seventh Regiment of the ROK Sixth Division, after reaching the Yalu River at Chosan, suddenly found itself surrounded and cut off on 26 October. Relief elements of the ROK II Corps met strong attacks near Onjong and Usan by forces including Chinese troops. If further evidence of the intervention of Chinese forces was needed, the First Cavalry Division was surprised and suffered severe casualties on the night of 1-2 November when a strong contingent of Chinese horsemen[1B] attacked its position. From captured prisoners, four Red Chinese armies were identified.

In the air, meanwhile, reconnaissance revealed that Communist reinforcements and supplies were steadily streaming across the Yalu River bridges into North Korea. On five occasions, antiaircraft guns on the Manchurian side of the river fired at UN aircraft. Russian-built MIG-15 aircraft appeared over the Yalu for the first time on 1 November and fired at UN aircraft.

In the face of this evidence of Chinese Communist intervention and intent, an earlier JCS directive which had forbidden air attacks within five miles of the international boundary was rescinded. Attacks on the temporary North Korean capital, Sinuiju, and on the Korean terminals of the Yalu River bridges were now authorized.[1C]

Vice Admiral Struble received the following despatch from Vice Admiral Joy in the early hours of 8 November:

“General MacArthur considers it urgent that the first overwater span on the Korean side of all international bridges along the Yalu and Tumen Rivers be destroyed because of the heavy use by the enemy to supply their forces in Korea. The Manchurian territory and air space under no circumstances must not, repeat not, be violated. You have been assigned the mission of attacking the two bridges near Chongsongjin. The Air Force is fully committed in the area of Sinuiju.”

Had there been time for reflection, the assignment given the carrier task force on 8 November 1950 to destroy the Yalu River bridges would have given satisfaction to those naval aviators who had long contended that the United States had vital need of the inherent precision of the fast carrier task force. Here was a request from an Air Force command asking for assistance in destroying strategic-type targets which required the delivery of large bombs with low-level, pinpoint accuracy. General MacArthur’s orders to VADM Joy had been limited. He was not to attack the bridges, but only the first overwater span of the bridges on the Korean side. Many of the Yalu bridges, therefore, could not be attacked by B-29s; to do so would force the high-flying planes to violate the Manchurian sanctuary. Moreover, high-level bombing required a “run-in” of sufficient distance to obtain a
bombsight solution. In obtaining it, the B-29s would have to fly across some of the loops and bends in the winding Yalu, part of each bend and loop being Chinese territory. For the same reason, fighter protection could not be given to the B-29s even by day; and night-bombing attacks against such precise targets were out of the question. It was too much to expect that some of their bombs might not accidentally fall on the wrong side of the river.

The imposed restrictions did not increase the effectiveness of the naval aircraft attacks, either. Each pilot was personally read Admiral Joy’s despatch which ordered that “zeal in prosecuting these attacks shall not result in border or air space violations.” The naval pilots were ordered not to fly over Manchuria; furthermore, they were ordered not to fire upon or bomb the antiaircraft guns on the Chinese side of the river. And most certainly they could not pursue an attacking MIG back over Chinese territory (“hot pursuit”).

The effect of these restrictions was to require that the naval aircraft make their dive-bombing runs perpendicular to the bridges rather than parallel to them as good tactics would require. The prospect of a hit was thereby greatly reduced. Psychologically, too, the condition of being under fire and unable to fire back was not conducive to the best marksmanship. To many of the airmen, attacks on the Yalu bridges were closely akin to running a gauntlet.

Admiral Joy summarized the problem in a despatch to all the aviators:

“The hazards involved in employing aircraft in precision attacks on small targets protected by intense, well-directed antiaircraft fire which cannot be attacked, as well as by enemy planes flying in the haven of neutral territory, except when the enemy chooses to attack, are tremendous. These factors were gravely considered by General MacArthur before he requested the Navy to take out the bridges. We all recognize that enemy reinforcements and supplies are coming over those bridges now, and will continue to pour into North Korea until the bridges are down. Carrier aircraft alone can make these precision air attacks. Our Government has decided that we cannot violate the air space over Manchuria or attack on Manchurian territory regardless of the provocation. If such attacks were made, the world might be thrown into the holocaust of a third world war. Our naval pilots have been given a most difficult task. May God be with them as they accomplish it.”

Despite all the restrictions and hazards, the attacks of the naval aircraft were to prove effective—as will be seen.

The winding Yalu River (not to be confused with China’s Yellow River), forms three-fifths of the boundary between Korea and Manchuria. It has its origin in the Chang Pai Mountains in Manchuria. From its source the Yalu runs 30 miles southward to the vicinity of Hyesanjin, thence southwestward for 450 miles through heavily forested hills to the Yellow Sea.

At its mouth, the river is more than 3,000 feet wide, and at average low tide its channel is 12 feet deep. In spring, summer, and early fall, the river is navigable by ships of under 1,000 tons as far as the Sinuiju-Antung area; but in wintertime, from late November to early April, the entire river freezes solid, except its salt water mouth.

Along both banks of the Yalu River in prewar days were lumber, paper, and iron mills, in addition to the large hydroelectric plant near Antung and other industries.

But the key military targets of the Yalu were the 17 bridges crossing the river, 6 of them major ones. The most important two were the twin 3,098 foot long railroad and highway bridges connecting Antung and Sinuiju. The highway bridge, a structure built by the American Bridge Company in 1910, consisted of 12 spans set on stone piers. The double-tracked rail bridge, only 1,000 feet to the north, was built by the Tokyo Yokogawa Bridge Company and the Osaka Train Manufacturing Company. Other important bridges were located at Manpojin, Hyesanjin, Chongsongjin, and Kanggu.

Click here to view map

For carrier aircraft operating from Korea’s east coast to strike the main bridges at Sinuiju on the west
coast would require an overland, long-range flight (225 miles) above treacherous mountains, with the additional handicap of the oncoming bad weather of winter.

These were the Navy’s targets.

Three carriers were available to make the Yalu bridge attacks: Valley Forge, Philippine Sea, and Leyte; the latter lately arrived from the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean on 3 October 1950, after an 18,500 mile journey at an average speed of 22 knots to demonstrate afresh the mobility of the carrier base and the rapid concentration of naval power.

The strike group of each carrier for these bridge attacks would be a basic element of 8 AD Skyraiders, each of them carrying two 1,000-pound bombs (although occasionally one 2,000-pound bomb), plus full belts of 20-mm. Ammunition. The F4U Corsair fighter-bombers would carry various loads: eight 5-inch rockets or eight 100-pound bombs (for flak-suppression of the enemy guns on the Korean side of the river); or a 500-pound bomb and six 5-inch rockets (a few carried the large 11-inch Tiny Tim rocket). As few as 8 or as many as 16 Corsairs would be scheduled for each ship’s strike group.

As for the F9F2 Panther jets, there would be at least 8 of them, and frequently as many as 16 per strike group, to give high cover protection above the bombers and fighter-bombers.

Thus, each strike group from the carrier consisted of at least 24 aircraft, although many consisted of 40 aircraft.

Because of their faster speed, the jets would take off separately and later. The jets would depart the carriers in three flights—the first flight 50 minutes after the “props,”[1] the second and third at subsequent 15-minute intervals. Well before the bridges were reached, the first relay of jets would overtake and accompany the props in; the second flight would give protection while over the target; the third would escort the strike group out.

Between the 9th and 21st of November, naval aircraft made a total of 593 sorties on the Yalu River bridges, dropping 232 tons of 500-pound, 1,000-pound, and 2,000-pound bombs.

For the purposes of description, the comments of the commanding officer, VF-53, Valley Forge (LCDR W. R. Pittman) are recorded for one of the first strikes on the Sinuiju bridges, on 12 November 1950:

“The Valley Forge attack group was composed of 16 F4U-4Bs, 12 ADs, and 8 F9Fs. I was strike leader, and had been ordered to follow the attack of Philippine Sea’s strike group. The Leyte’s group would follow us.

“As we neared Sinuiju, our F9Fs, led by LCDR H. J. Boydstun (VF-52) reported by radio that he would be overhead in five minutes. LT M. R. Gallaher, of VA-55, led the Skyraiders.

“Our target was the southern Sinuiju bridge, Korean side. The weather was poor, visibility low, and overcast conditions prevailed along our entire route from the east coast to the target. Fortunately, over Sinuiju itself it began to clear.

“Since the Valley Forge group arrived prior to the two other carrier groups, I was ordered by the target coordinator to continue in first. Our jets took a position ahead and well above us. At this stage of the war, we propeller pilots were increasingly thankful (and not a little envious) of the jets. They were our only protection against the MIGs.

“The coordination proceeded smoothly. We reached our pushover point, which had been selected so as not to cross the border. During the entry into the dive, I saw four MIGs take off from the nearby field of Antung, which was clearly visible.

“The plan was for the first eight Corsairs to strike the Korean AA positions, followed by eight additional F4Us dropping 500-pound VT-fuzed bombs. Then the Skyraiders were to drop their loads of bombs on the bridge. We had always been very successful in knocking out the AA mission by this method (by this time every pilot in my squadron had fifty missions over Korea).

“Our entire group went through this plan, and good hits were observed.”[2]

The three carriers sent off attacks on the Yalu bridges on 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, and 21 November,
with a few additional flights until the end of November. The pilots began to notice that the antiaircraft fire from the Manchurian side of the river was increasing, while that on the Korean side was diminishing.

“With no elation,” said LCDR H. M. Sisk, executive officer of VF-33, “our photo intelligence revealed that the enemy guns were being moved from the south side of the Yalu River, where we could hit them, to the north side, where we couldn’t. The Reds were alert to recognize and take advantage of our self-imposed restriction. We even noticed that while the guns on the Korean side of the river were well camouflaged, the ones on the Chinese side were not.

“The Leyte’s attack aircraft achieved several hits,” said Sisk, “but I believe we might have done even better if we had used more of the larger bombs. As it was, it was frustrating to penetrate the flak, get a direct hit—and then discover your bomb had knocked out only a few supporting bridge members.”

It was during the Yalu bridge attacks that naval pilots first succeeded in downing MIGs.[3A] On the initial attack on 9 November, a pilot from the Philippine Sea, LCDR W. T. Amen, commanding officer of VF-112, was credited with the destruction of the first MIG. The second kill was credited to a pilot from Valley Forge, LCDR William E. Lamb, commanding officer, VF-52; and the third to Ensign F. C. Weber, VF-31 of the Leyte. Not a single naval jet was lost or damaged.

The initial engagement with the MIGs produced one of the best stories of the war. Commander A. D. Pollock, Commanding Officer of VF-51, a Valley Forge Panther squadron, was surrounded by his pilots upon his return to the ready room.

“Were you nervous about those MIGs, Dave?” his pilots queried.
“No, I was just keeping an eye on them,” replied Pollock.
“Then why did you report 20,000 MIGs coming in at five feet?” his pilots asked him.

The Panther pilots reported that the MIGs had a better rate of climb, greater speed, a shorter turning radius, and better maneuverability than our own planes—but the superior training, teamwork, and marksmanship of the naval airmen more than eradicated these enemy advantages.

While the attacks of the carriers upon the Yalu bridges were considered successful, especially so in the face of the imposed restrictions (the highway bridge at Sinuiju and the two bridges at Hyesanjin were dropped and four others were damaged), and undoubtedly slowed the enemy’s advance, the subsequent heavy attacks by the Chinese armies upon the UN forces, commencing on 24 November 1950, made it obvious that the Chinese, with ample forces, equipment, and supplies had been able to enter North Korea.[3B]

On 29 November, therefore, the primary mission of the carriers was changed to close air support. The preliminaries for the Hungnam evacuation were on, and the First Marine Division, deep in North Korea, was in need of the aid of the firepower of every airplane that could be brought to its support.

And by now the Yalu River was beginning to freeze. Even if the carriers had been able to continue the bridge attacks, the Chinese would soon be able to cross the river at any point on the heavy ice.
On Christmas Day 1950, as the UN forces departed Hungnam, Vice Admiral Struble dispatched Major General E. E. Partridge, Commanding General, Far Eastern Air Force, to propose that the services of the fast carriers be utilized in close air support missions on the eastern flank of the Eighth Army.

Partridge replied on the 29th of December that General Ridgway desired the Navy to interdict the “east coastal road from the bombline as far north as practicable.”

This role of interdiction for the carriers was further spelled out on 15 January 1951 when General Partridge requested that naval aircraft undertake the cutting of rail lines and recommended “attacks on key bridges and destruction rolling stock currently reported scattered along route between Hamhung and Susong.”

Vice Admiral Struble tried to convince his superiors that close air support, of the type just performed during the Hungnam evacuation, and not interdiction, was the Navy’s most profitable employment. On 23 January 1951 he despatched Generals Ridgway and Partridge as follows:

“Without detracting from the value of armed reconnaissance and interdiction in some measure to prevent the transportation of troops, equipment and supplies to the enemy front lines, previous experience here in Korea has demonstrated that under the conditions existing, the results to be obtained from such operations are only partial. In my opinion, strong close air support . . . will do more to hurt the enemy potential than any other type of operation in which we can participate at this time.”[4]

But these appeals did not succeed. Intelligence reports had been received which indicated that the enemy planned to make heavy use of the eastern rail net. It was known that at least one division of North Korean troops would be moving down that route.

Accordingly, on 29 January 1951, the carriers of Task Force 77 commenced the interdiction of the east coast bridges. The bitter Korean winter weather, with its low temperatures, snow, sleet, and ice, became a major problem for both ships and aircraft.

Admiral Joy’s description of the task ahead in a despatch to Admiral Struble epitomized the resolution and purpose with which the naval forces of the Far East turned to in their efforts to obliterate the rail lines of northeast Korea:

“Rail route northeast coast between Wonsan and Chongjin is of continuing value to enemy as a major route over which supplies, equipment, and troops are being transported to immediate battle areas. The enemy’s known capability for quickly effecting temporary repairs to the damaged portions of this route can be seriously impaired by deliberate, methodical, total destruction of all piers, spans, approaches and embarkments of each vital bridge in each critical area. The enemy cannot accomplish makeshift repairs when nothing remains upon which to make them. Naval air and naval gunfire are good weapons to accomplish this job. . . .”[5]

Before beginning the story of Task Force 77’s lengthy and concentrated efforts to eradicate the rail system of northeast Korea, an explanation and description of the Communists’ supply networks and their logistic problems is required in order that the reader may appreciate the immensity of the unique task which had been assigned to the carriers.

First of all, the logistics of the Korean War favored the Oriental soldier, who needed far less in the way of supply than did our own. The Chinese and North Korean soldier was inured to simple diet, to a bare minimum of necessities, and was independent of such Western delicacies as hot food, showers, movies, PX supplies, and twice-weekly mail from home. The production centers supplying him with food and munitions were but a few
hundreds of miles distant overland.

In contrast, the UN’s production centers were thousands of miles distant overseas.

Thus, the enemy’s supply problem was much more manageable than our own. The average Chinese soldier required only 10 pounds of supplies per day, in contrast to our own soldier’s requirement of some 60 pounds per day. A Chinese division of 10,000 men needed only 50 tons of supplies per day to keep it in action. [5A] With never more than 90 divisions in Korea, and approximately 58 divisions in the frontlines, only some 3,000 tons of supplies had to get through from Manchuria to the battlefront every day.

How could this relatively small tonnage be moved? The Communists had four general transportation systems: rail, road, footpath, and sea. (See end-sheet maps.)

The rail system in North Korea was divided naturally by the mountainous backbone of Korea into two principal zones: the eastern and the western networks. A total of six rail lines crossed the Yalu and Tumen Rivers southward from Manchuria—three on each side of the peninsula.

On the western side of Korea, the three lines from Manchuria led single-track to Sinuiju, where double-tracking commenced, thence southward to the capital of Pyongyang and the battlefront. The peacetime capacity of the double-tracked portion below Sinuiju had been estimated to be 9,000 tons per day, while the three single-tracked lines from the border to the rail junction at Sinuiju could handle a total of 6,000 tons. Later, as a result of damaged tunnels, bridges, roadbed, and track, and with Communist logistical operations confined to nighttime or inclement weather, it was conservatively estimated that the Communists could deliver approximately 500 to 1,500 tons per day to the battle area on the western rail net.

The eastern rail network of North Korea also originated in Manchuria, where three lines crossed to join in the vicinity of Kilchu, thereafter becoming a single line southward to Kowon. Here the rail line split, one line running westward to Pyongyang; the other continuing south to Wonsan. Below Wonsan, the rail net split again, one branch following the east coast, the other line continuing southward toward Seoul and in effect bisecting the peninsula.

This eastern network (to be the scene of the Navy’s long interdiction effort) included 1,140 miles of track, 956 bridges and causeways, and 231 tunnels. This very large number of bridges and tunnels (one bridge for every 1.2 miles of track and one tunnel for every 5 miles of track) was required by the mountainous terrain of North Korea. The average tunnel length was 1,200 feet.

The peacetime capacity of the eastern rail net had been calculated to be some 5,000 tons per day. Later, as a result of the Navy’s interdiction efforts, the capacity of this eastern net was reduced to less than 500 tons per day—and in certain periods, to almost nothing.

Thus, even during the period of heaviest attack upon the North Korean rail network by the several UN air forces, the Reds by the regimentation of mass labor to repair bridges and breaks, by shuttling trains between breaks, and by use of the system only at night or in inclement weather, could still transport between 1,000 to 2,000 tons over the entire east and west rail systems every day. In other words, despite an all-out UN air effort by the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Air Force, and the U.S. Marines, and by various UN air units, the Communists could supply approximately half their needs by rail alone.

The second supply network available to the Communists was the highway system. While none of the Korean roads could have been rated good by Western standards (none being hard-surfaced, and all being either rough gravel or dirt), the network was to prove an even more difficult target system than the rail network. In fact, the very primitiveness of the roads was an advantage to the enemy and made them unprofitable targets to air assault.

North Korea’s road network, generally speaking, paralleled the rail net, but as can be seen in the endsheet diagram, the entire area was crisscrossed with roads wherever the mountains permitted. Two thousand miles of road were estimated to be in each half of North Korea. With the fighting front at the narrow waist of Korea, the
logistical capacity of this network had been estimated by road engineers to be more than 1,500 tons nightly, and probably a great deal more.

The third supply system was the animal and manpower system. With horses, mules, and even camels available, plus unlimited coolie-manpower using A-frames,\[5B\] uncounted additional tons of equipment could reach the front, using trails and paths instead of the highways and rail lines. The ubiquitous A-frame on the back of a sturdy Oriental peasant was to be the one logistic system that modern air power could not effectively counter.

The fourth system—the sea—had long since been securely closed by the blockade efforts of Task Force 95.

Thus, the UN faced an almost impossible task of isolating the battlefield by air. But, as will be seen, the assignment of the interdiction task to Task Force 77 was either the most profitable employment which could be found or else was justified on the basis of urgency.
The Sea War in Korea
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson

Chapter 8. The Struggle to Strangle
The Battle of Carlson’s Canyon (The “Bridge of Toko-Ri”)

The vigor, tenacity, and ingenuity displayed by Task Force 77 against the coastal rail lines of northeast Korea during the period from January to June 1951 can best be described in an account of the destruction of a single bridge over “Carlson’s Canyon,” near Kilchu, and the subsequent efforts of Task Force 77 to maintain cuts along this coastal railroad. The repeated attacks on this bridge, and the enemy’s repair efforts, became the repetitious story of similar and simultaneous attacks on dozens of other bridges throughout the year of 1951.

After the decision had been reached that the primary mission of the carriers was to be interdiction, Rear Admiral Ralph A. Ofstie, then Commander Task Force 77, ordered his reconnaissance aircraft in February to make a complete photographic survey of the east coast rail system in order to find the most profitable targets along it. Photographs of the entire east coast rail net were taken. The intelligence officers of Princeton and of Commander Carrier Division Five—LCDR G. M. Douglass and LCDR B. H. Fisher—made flak analyses, terrain studies, and target selections based on this photography in order to determine the targets most likely to interdict the rail traffic and to hurt the enemy the most.

On the morning of 2 March 1951, a perfect target was discovered by the commanding officer of Fighting Squadron 193, LCDR Clement M. Craig. Craig was returning from a strike on the Kilchu bridges when he spotted the bridge.

“We had just been bombing other bridges along the route, and were heading south when I saw this one,” said Craig.6 “The bridge was long and high, measuring 600 feet in length and having a maximum height above the terrain of 60 feet. Five concrete piers supported six steel spans across the canyon. Adjacent to this operable bridge were an additional five piers of a companion but incomplete bridge.”

Craig also noted tunnels at each end of the bridge—two tunnels, in fact, to eventually allow through traffic in both directions. Best of all, the target was south of Kilchu, at which point three rail lines from Manchuria joined. Thus, if this bridge could be interdicted—and kept interdicted—the flow of southward traffic over the eastern net from China could be seriously impeded.

Craig, upon landing aboard Princeton, personally reported this bridge to Admiral Ofstie. Craig’s description impressed the admiral that a vital target had been found—one which the Communists would find exceedingly difficult to either bypass or repair.

Not a moment was lost. On the afternoon of 2 March the bridge was taken under attack, but only minor damage to the bridge approaches resulted.

The following morning, however, the bridge was demolished by Princeton’s aircraft. Leading eight Skyraiders from his squadron, VA-195, LCDR Harold G. (“Swede”) Carlson’s pilots dropped one span of the bridge, damaged a second, and twisted two others out of horizontal alignment.

The bridge spanned what became known, in his honor, as “Carlson’s Canyon.”

The bridge was attacked again on 7 March 1951, and this time another span was dropped.

Promptly, the Communists commenced their repair campaign, working mostly at night. Using interlocking wooden beams, called “cribbing,” temporary piers were quickly constructed to replace the two missing spans and to support the damaged one. The askew sections were straightened.

On 14 March, the systematic reconnaissance taken by Princeton’s photo pilots, led by LT C. A. Hooper, revealed the status of the reconstruction progress. The frantic efforts of the Communists to get the bridge back in operation were apparent, and it was obvious that the bridge would be in commission again in a few days—unless
something were done about it.

On the next day, therefore, a carrier group again struck Carlson’s Canyon, this time with napalm. In this attack, not only were the new wooden cribbing structures beneath the originally damaged spans obliterated, but, in addition, a third orginal span was destroyed and a fourth seriously damaged. Of the original six spans, only two now remained standing.

During the month of March, meanwhile, the carrier aviators were blasting on both sides of the railroad north and south of Carlson’s Canyon to cut the track at as many other points along the route as possible. Similar havoc was being made in the other portions of the rail network.

March 1951 saw “tunnel-busting” added to “bridge-busting.” “Tunnel-busting” was a misnomer, for the carrier airmen had learned from previous experience that collapsing a tunnel, even with a big bomb, was highly improbable. Even Army demolition teams, during the evacuation at Hungnam, had failed to destroy a tunnel. Hence the approved tactic was for time-delay fuzed bombs to be thrown into the ubiquitous tunnels to destroy trains, personnel, and supplies stored therein, not the tunnel itself.

“We considered many different plans to get the key tunnels,” said VADM J. J. Clark, later Commander Seventh Fleet. “One suggestion was to put raiding parties ashore and capture a tunnel long enough to drill a hole down from the top of the tunnel, set charges, and blast the roof in. But the railroad experts said it wouldn’t do much good—that the damage would only cause the Communists a few hours’ work. Since most of the tunnels were dug out of solid rock, detonating charges inside them only had a shotgun effect out of each end of the tunnel.”

The more numerous the bridge breaks and tunnel damage, the more frequent would be the enemy’s shuttle efforts to use the coastal line, and the more interdicted the network would be. Of this period, LCDR Carlson recorded: “Bridges were hit and destroyed from one end of North Korea to the other. Successful bridge strikes were the rule, and missed or just-damaged bridges were the exception.”

Meanwhile, too, the Communists were concentrating upon repairs at Carlson’s Canyon. Rear Admiral Ofstie’s reconnaissance aircraft made careful and frequent checks of the repair activity, and night-heckling aircraft from the carriers did their best to harass and hamper the nocturnal labor. Ofstie suggested to Admiral Joy that the Communists’ repair work would be further delayed if Far East Air Force aircraft would sprinkle long-delayed-action bombs on this target. A B-29 did so on 27 March.

Despite delay-action bombs and nocturnal harassment, however, the serious damage caused at Carlson’s Canyon by the attacks of 15 March was almost fully repaired in two weeks by the patient and steady efforts of the Communists. Accordingly, on 2 April, Task Force 77 struck the bridge again in two lethal raids. So severe were the attacks and so concentrated the damage on these occasions that none of the original spans remained standing.

To the Communists, who must have looked in dismal disappointment at the naked and blackened bridge abutments standing in the pock-marked canyon, it was clear they were on the end of a losing battle. The bridge could never be kept open against such determined attacks. The only solution for the Communists was to build a bypass around the bridge on low ground which could be easily repaired by them and which would be profitless for the blue airplanes of the American Navy to attack. If traffic were to move again, a bypass of Carlson’s Canyon had to be built.

The results of the savage attacks of the Task Force 77 aircraft on the northeastern Korean rail systems began to be visible in early April 1951.[6A] Rear Admiral Ofstie reported that initial gaps in all major sections of the northeast coastal rail net had now been made, and that, as a result, enemy trains were operating in only a few short sections of track, supplies were moving only by laborious and frequent shuttling, and troops were moving only on foot.

The night-flying reconnaissance aircraft of FEAF corroborated the growing stricture that naval aircraft had placed on the east coast rail system. Nightly sightings of the B-26s showed that the percentage of rail traffic
in this sector fell from 65 per cent in February 1951 to only 32 per cent in April of 1951. Reports from POWs and raiding parties added further evidence of the disruption caused by the air attacks. When the amphibious raid at Sorye-dong below Songjin took place on 7 April,[6B] the British commandoes interrogated civilians in a nearby village. The North Korean civilians reported that not a single train had passed through their area in forty days. However, two events that now transpired were to negate these splendid results.

The first was an alert in the Formosa Straits (for which the Seventh Fleet still held basic responsibility). From 2 April until 15 April, the carriers of Task Force 77 were not available to operate in northeast Korea because of some possibility that the Red Chinese might assault Formosa during this period.

The second event was the two-phase spring offensive of the Chinese armies. The first phase started at 2000 on the night of 22 April. The front-lines suddenly became alive with activity and action as the ROK 6th Division was routed. The First Marine Division stemmed, then smashed the Chinese attack, which was attempting to turn the left flank. By early May, however, UN forces had counterattacked to stabilize the battlefield.

A second enemy attack was obviously being readied. Air reconnaissance and other intelligence reported intense enemy activity and preparation. Thousands of vehicles were reported moving south as fresh Communist divisions were apparently relieving those which had been decimated in the first-phase attack.

The result of the first Chinese offensive was to divert the striking power of Task Force 77 from interdiction to close support efforts in behalf of the endangered Eighth Army.

As a consequence, there was a lapse in Task Force 77’s interdiction effort upon the northeast coast rail net. For a period of almost a month, the Communists took advantage of the lull to repair a large part of the damage which their eastern rail net had suffered in February and March.

The carrier planes returned to the interdiction campaign on 1 May, and for the next thirteen days the bridges again received full attention. Thirty-one bridges and all bypasses were knocked out by the Boxer,[6C] Princeton and Philippine Sea aircraft. Eleven highway bridges and bypasses were also demolished.

During this period Rear Admiral G. R. Henderson (who had relieved Rear Admiral Ofstie on 6 May) received a request from CDR A. L. Downing, the senior naval representative on duty at the JOC at Taegu. Downing said that the Fifth Air Force had asked informally if the carrier aircraft could help them interdict the west coast rail lines from Pyongyang northward.

Rear Admiral Henderson directed his staff to make a study of the area and to determine what assistance his carrier forces could give. Only three carriers were available to Admiral Henderson, and in effect, with replenishment every third or fourth day, only two operating carriers. And two carriers, with only 150 aircraft, were not even sufficient to interdict adequately the eastern rail net, much less interdict the west coast lines.

Anxious to lend a hand, however, Rear Admiral Henderson’s staff selected four rail bridges in the western net; and on 11 May 1951, 32 Skyraiders (each carrying two 2,000-lb. bombs) and 32 Corsairs (each carrying eight 100-lb. or 250-lb. flak-suppression bombs), plus 16 Panther jets, struck the selected four bridges.

Three of the four were knocked out, and the fourth damaged.

Rear Admiral Henderson informed CDR Downing at Fifth Air Force headquarters that his own commitments in the east coast area precluded any permanent assistance to the FAFIK (Fifth Air Force in Korea) campaign on the west coast. RADM Henderson said he would be glad to help them in attacks such as the one of the 11th on an assistance basis only. The Navy simply did not have enough aircraft carriers to attempt interdiction of both east and west coast rail nets.

The expected second-phase Communist attack began on 16 May under a blanket of fog and rain which hampered United Nations defensive action. Task Force 77 assistance was again needed for close air support strikes at the battleline.

After four days of bitter fighting all along the front, pressure by the attacking Chinese slackened. Despite fog and rain which turned streams into torrents and which kept most airplanes grounded, a UN counteroffensive
was started in the west on 19 May and in the central sector on 21 May. This counterattack slowly ground northward until 2 June. In this fighting the Chinese losses were estimated to be 40,000 men. Fifty-five artillery pieces, 900 automatic weapons, and 22,400 artillery shells were captured.

But with the Navy’s carrier planes being thus diverted to support the ground forces, another breathing spell was granted to the Communists in North Korea to repair the heavily damaged rail network in the Navy’s area of responsibility.

On 2 June, the carriers were able once again to concentrate on their interdiction targets. In the following 9 days, 24 rail bridges and bypasses and 6 highway bridges and bypasses were completely destroyed.

After the Communists succeeded in building the bypass around Carlson’s Canyon in June, making further carrier attacks there unprofitable, the carrier airmen turned their interdiction attention to other key targets along the Kilchu-Hungnam rail net.

A railroad bridge north of Songjin was chosen, and repeated strikes were made on it. This bridge was low, and while repeatedly destroyed by the naval air strikes, the damage was quickly repairable by the Communists. On one occasion after it had been demolished, the bridge was again in operation in only 42 hours. And, as at Carlson’s Canyon, the Communists built an even easier-to-repair bypass adjacent to the original bridge.

Next, the aviators turned to a series of three coastal bridges south of Songjin. These bridges were high, hence difficult to repair, and could also be taken under fire by the ships of Task Force 95. (The northernmost bridge of the three was later to be known as “Package 1.”) In the target complex were six tunnels (useful to the Communists for hiding shuttle trains during the daylight hours, and for serving as storage centers for the bridge and track repair efforts).

The northernmost bridge, while small, stretched across a 25-foot embankment. Almost the length of 1,000 feet of open track between the tunnels, the embankment, and the bridge were exposed to observation from seaward, and to carrier attacks. The original bridge and the bypass then under construction had been damaged in mid-February.

While Carlson’s Canyon was still out of action, Ofstie’s railbusters commenced work at this Songjin bridge. Two attacks by jet aircraft struck on 1 April 1951. Four direct hits with 250-lb. bombs, by LCDR G. B. Riley, Commanding Officer, VF-191 and LT Arthur R. Hawkins (Princeton), demolished the repair effort on the latter date.[6D]

As at Carlson’s Canyon and elsewhere, the Communists promptly commenced repair work, despite the irritating and destructive harassing fire of the surface ships of Task Force 95. Stacks of material, rails, and equipment were concealed in the nearby tunnels. Antiaircraft guns and coastal guns were emplaced around the site.

Twice again in the next month the bridge at Songjin was destroyed. Twice again it was repaired.

The destroyers of Task Force 95 lobbed shells into the area every night and every day that the weather was unflyable or when the carriers were engaged in replenishment.

Similar destructive attacks were simultaneously being made at many other bridges and tunnels in the area; the bridge and its bypass at Pukch’ong, 45 miles south of Songjin, were taken out on 25 June and again on 28 June. The bridge at Ori-ri, on the rail line north of Hungnam, was destroyed on 21 June 1951. Several bridges at Kowon, on the western line connecting Wonsan and T’yong’yong, were demolished in the period 20-25 June. The rail line south of Wonsan was broken in two places.

The carrier airmen of Task Force 77 literally combed the east coast rail lines, wrecking every bridge a bomb or rocket could possibly reach.

Throughout this period, the Task Force 95 ships added their weight to the destruction. In addition to the nightly harassing fire of the destroyers at many of the exposed coastal bridges (see Chapter 9, “The Seaborne Artillery”), the cruisers and battleships contributed to the havoc.
Between 14 and 19 March, the *Missouri* was credited with the destruction of eight railroad bridges and seven highway bridges in northeast Korea.

*Helena’s* gunfire collapsed a span on the rail bridge below Songjin on the night of 27 July.

Thus did the traffic and rail net of northeast Korea feel the lethal lash of the U.S. Navy’s striking power.

By June 1951, however, it was apparent that in spite of the destructive and widespread attacks of the carrier aircraft in the Navy’s northeastern area, the battlefield was *not* being interdicted. If the enemy had been able to mount two large-scale offensives within a month, it was obvious that supplies, troops, and equipment were getting through from China to the frontlines in North Korea in abundance. The naval airmen knew that they had choked off a great part of the flow over the *east coast* rail net. Rail traffic along this line had been brought to a virtual halt through the systematic destruction of key bridges and track breaking.

How, then, were the Chinese getting their supplies through?

The answers were plain. First, the bulk of the enemy rail traffic had simply been shifted from the *eastern* to the *western* networks. Unfortunately, the Fifth Air Force in Korea lacked aircraft which could deliver a 2,000-pound bomb—the best weapon for attacking bridges—with pinpoint accuracy. Second, the western network was larger. Third, the Chinese were placing more and more dependence on truck transport. The vehicle count of enemy trucks had jumped from 7,300 in January 1951 to 54,000 in May 1951. Fourth, practically everything was travelling at night; and fifth, the skillful and highly-organized repair efforts of the enemy were matching the rate of destruction.
The only time that torpedoes were used during the Korean War was on 1 May 1951, at the Hwachon reservoir.

Early in April the Communists had tried without success to block the path of the then-advancing UN forces by opening the gates of the 250-foot high dam of the reservoir. Their intention then was to flood portions of the Han and Pukhan rivers and thereby make the northward progress of UN forces more difficult.

In late April, the enemy again seemed ready to use the waters of the Hwachon reservoir to his advantage. If another advance of his own was planned, he could close the sluice gates of the dam and thereby lower the water level in the Pukhan and Han rivers to fording depth. In the event of a UN attack, on the other hand, he could open the sluice gates and impede the UN advance across the Pukhan and Han rivers.

To forestall either possibility, the U.S. Eighth Army in Korea requested the carriers to destroy the sluice gates. Earlier high-level bombing attacks by B-29s on the 20-foot high, 40-foot wide, and 2½-foot thick gates had not been effective.

The EUSAK (Eighth U.S. Army in Korea) message was received aboard Task Force 77 at 1440. The dam-busting task was given by Admiral Henderson to Princeton—specifically to VA-195, LCDR Harold G. Carlson, USN. Torpedoes were obviously called for, but it would take a few hours to get them ready. In the meantime the Skyraiders could have a go at the dam by a dive-bombing attack.

Attack Squadron 195’s first attack was launched in less than three hours from the receipt of the EUSAK message. At 1600, 30 April, six ADs, each carrying two 2,000-pound bombs and accompanied by five Corsairs from VF-193 led by LCDR E. A. Parker for flak-suppression, struck the dam. Although one hole was punched in the dam, the sluice gates were unscathed.

The next day, the torpedo attack was delivered. The terrain made a torpedo attack difficult and hazardous. The reservoir was surrounded by high hills limiting the attack to a two-plane section run-in, while the remainder of the strike orbited overhead. The straightaway was very short, and the problem of controlling the airspeed for the torpedo drop was acute, requiring extremely precise flying. The run-in was made over the high hills into the water area, where the point of torpedo drop had to be accurate, in order that the “fish” would not strike bottom; moreover, the point of drop had to be precise to insure a sufficient arming run. Added to these difficulties were the enemy aircraft batteries surrounding the dam.

Eight ADs led by CDR R. C. Merrick, CVG-19 and LCDR Carlson, each carrying a torpedo set to run at surface level, and accompanied by twelve Princeton fighters from VF-192 and VF-193 carrying 100-pound and 500-pound VT-fuzed bombs for flak-suppression, struck the dam shortly after 1130 on 1 May. Merrick weaved his attack group through the antiaircraft fire to pushover point, and the Skyraiders dived in for the torpedo run.

The desired results were achieved. Six of the eight fish ran true. One flood gate in the center was knocked completely out and a ten-foot hole punched in the second flood gate. The impounded waters of the reservoir were released.
Chapter 8. The Struggle to Strangle  
Operation Strangle

During the last days of May 1951, General Ridgway’s headquarters proposed a scheme by which the battlefield might be interdicted. Why not draw a line across Korea behind the Chinese lines, assign portions of it to the various air forces, and ask them to destroy every vehicle, every bridge, and every target in their section? This was the genesis of “Operation Strangle” under which the Navy would operate from 5 June until 20 September 1951.

The “belt” interdiction idea had appeal and logic on paper, although there was now great skepticism that any interdiction effort could be made effective within the Korean peninsula. But since the system in use had achieved only limited success, why not try one which was primarily concerned with the highways? The highways, not the railroads, were now carrying the vast preponderance of supplies.

Accordingly, a one-degree strip of latitude across the narrow neck of North Korea—from 38°-15’N to 39°-15’N—just above the battleline was selected. The traffic networks within this belt were studied and divided into eight routes: the Fifth Air Force in Korea would take the three western-most routes; the carriers of Task Force 77 would take the two central routes; and the First Marine Air Wing would take the three eastern routes. (See diagram on page 242.)

In each zone, at selected defiles and passes along the important highway routes, certain areas were designated as “strangle areas” or “choke points.” In addition any bridge, embankment, tunnel, or other construction within the zone would be considered a target.

Special efforts would be made to impede enemy movement at night. Aircraft would use searchlight and flares.[6E] Night-heckling aircraft were to increase their activity. Delayed-action bombs, set to explode in periods from six to seventy-two hours, would be dropped at every important choke point to impede progress and to delay repair work. Task Force 77 aircraft made an air drop of a half-million leaflets on 20 June along the route between Chongjin and Songjin. The illustrated leaflets warned that unexploded bombs were in the ground.

Certainly, it was worth a try.

For the first several weeks, in addition to their work on the northeast rail net, the carrier airmen tackled the highway routes in the mountains of central Korea, plowing craters in roadbeds, knocking out highway bridges and passes, firing rockets into tunnels, sowing delayed action and “butterfly” bombs in every choke area, and searching for the hundreds of trucks which, like ubiquitous kitchen cockroaches, were hiding by day in order to perform at night. The turbulent mountain winds complicated bombing accuracy.

Night-heckling activity also increased, and a greater number of enemy trains and trucks were frequently caught and destroyed at daybreak. Night reconnaissance efforts of “Operation Strangle” also increased, and a close watch was kept of the results. Marine Fighter Squadron 513, operating from Pusan’s airfield, was credited with the nighttime destruction of 420 vehicles in a 30-day period.

At the end of two weeks, however, the total results were disappointing. Reconnaissance B-26s reported that the number of enemy trucks moving at night in each direction was unchanged. Some of the main roads had been blocked with delayed-action bombs, and several bridges had been knocked out; but these achievements had only caused the trucks to detour the main routes and to use other less-important and more difficult-to-hit secondary roads.

Nevertheless, “Strangle” went on, with the Air Force, Navy, and Marines working as an integrated team
in closest harmony.

The Communists’ resistance also intensified. At important points along the key roads, flak increased until the risk of making attacks often exceeded the expectation of gain. The cross-Korea highway west of Wonsan became so infested with antiaircraft guns that it was given the title “Death Valley.” Enemy road repair activity also increased, and gave evidence of efficient organization. Communist crews hunted out the butterfly bombs with detectors and destroyed them with rifle fire. On other occasions the buried delayed-action bombs were simply ignored with oriental fatalism.

By late summer it was apparent that “Operation Strangle” had failed. The reasons were simple: a bomb crater on an unpaved road could not stop a truck. The hole could be too quickly filled in or bypassed. Even a damaged highway bridge was no impediment. A simple bypass could be built, or a ford made across the usually summer-dry streams. And in comparison to the rail networks, there was greater flexibility and greater area in the highway networks to make air attack more difficult.

The carriers intensified their work on the railroads.
From time to time in the interdiction effort, the carrier airmen had an opportunity to perform other missions. One of these was the attack on Rashin in August of 1951.

The Korean peninsula stretches a long finger northeastward toward the Asian mainland, forming a neck of land which is separated from both Manchuria and Russia by the Tumen River. Along this narrow neck of North Korea and only 17 miles from the Soviet frontier lay the port city of Rashin. In fact, Rashin was less than 110 miles from the Russian city of Vladivostok. The two cities were connected by rail, road, and sea.

Rashin having been bombed once by B-29s in August 1950, the wisdom of making other attacks upon it was raised by the U.S. State Department in a letter from the Acting Secretary, Mr. James Webb, to the Secretary of Defense, Louis A. Johnson. Because of its nearness to Chinese and Russian territory, Rashin was ordered spared from attack by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 8 September 1950 at the insistence of the Department of State. The danger of an incident with Russian aircraft or a possible error in navigation which might cause UN aircraft to fly over or UN bombs to fall on the Russian side of the Tumen River were the main reasons for the decision to declare Rashin out of bounds.

As a result of this ruling, the Communists had taken advantage of Rashin’s sanctuary status and had increased its use as a rail hub and stock point for the transhipment of supplies.

During February 1951, noting the continuing logistic build-up and heavy rail traffic in Rashin, MacArthur’s headquarters again requested permission to resume bombing Rashin but this was again denied on 21 February. MacArthur, before a Joint Congressional Committee in May 1951, described the importance of Rashin in these words: “I was very anxious to bomb Rashin. . . . It is a great distributing point from Manchuria down the east coast of Korea. Its usefulness to the enemy is self-evident. Great accumulations, depot accumulations were made there. It was a great distributing center. . . . The Soviets could run stuff from Vladivostok right down there. We asked to bomb that and we were forbidden.”

By August of 1951, the immunity granted Rashin had enabled the Communists to build that port city into the most important supply point in northeast Korea. The concentration of rail traffic was particularly heavy. Passing this intelligence to Washington, CINCFE made a further request to strike the city’s warehouses, railroads, and marshalling yards. The Far East Air Force insisted that it could destroy Rashin’s legitimate targets without violating either the Manchurian border or the Soviet frontier.

This time, the request was approved. However, certain restrictions were tied to the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Superforts must bomb on a southeasterly heading, passing over Rashin from northwest to southeast. (This stipulation was designed to prevent any violation of Russian territory.)

Second, the bombing attack should take place only in clear weather, in order to minimize any possible error in navigation or bombing.

Third, the bombers should take care to avoid any damage on a known POW camp less than a mile from the Rashin railroad station.

And, of course, at no time should any plane pass north of the Tumen River.

The restriction regarding the direction of bombing, and the admonition not to fly across the Tumen River, complicated the bombing mission. From Rashin northwestward to the frontier was only 34 miles. Subtracting a few miles in order to insure no violation of the border, and a few more miles to complete the high altitude turn...
onto bombing course, plus the distance from the Rashin targets to the bomb release point, left barely sufficient air
room for the bombers to steady down and get a bombsight solution. Moreover, the specification that bombing
should take place on a southeasterly heading forced the B-29s to make their *inbound* flight over the North Korean
coastline far south of Rashin, and thereby give ample alert to the radar defenses of the area. The MIGs from either
or both Russian and Chinese territory would certainly be alerted, and it was reasonable to expect that their
opposition to an attack upon Rashin would be intense.

Obviously, then, the B-29s would need heavy fighter escort. But where would it come from? The F-86
Sabres, even flying from the most northerly fighter bases in South Korea and carrying detachable fuel tanks,
lacked the endurance to escort the B-29s at this range.

Far East Air Force planners turned for help to the Navy. Could the jets aboard the carriers of Task Force
77 escort the B-29s on the Rashin attack?

The request was passed through JOC to Commander Seventh Fleet and thence to RADM John Perry,
Commander Task Force 77.

Certainly, replied Perry by despatch. How many jets, what time, and where?

For the next three days the details of rendezvous, altitude, radio frequencies, and escort pattern were
exchanged between Navy and JOC. The Navy jets would meet the B-29s at a point 80 miles south of Rashin at
25,000 feet, take them in, over the target, and out again.

On 25 August, in CAVU [6J] weather, the mission was launched from *Essex*. Commander M. U. Beebe,
CVG-5, leading 11 F9Fs from VF-51 (LCDR E. Beauchamp) and 12 Banshee F2H2s from VF-172 (CDR M. E.
Barnett), catapulted off.

“We climbed out together,” recorded CDR Beebe,[7] “and met the 29 B-29s at the designated rendezvous
point. It was perfect coordination, for my planes didn’t even have to make a circle. We took escort stations
promptly, the Banshees taking high cover and the Panthers low cover. Base altitude was 25,000 feet on the way
in. Of course we weaved back and forth on top of the Superforts in order to keep all sectors covered and to
maintain a combat speed.

“After passing the coastline, we were all set for the MIGs. But none interfered. As planned, we made the
turn toward Rashin. The B-29s bombed in three waves, each plane dropping ten tons of bombs.

“All the while we kept rubbernecking for the MIGs, but we never saw a single one. And there was no
antiaircraft fire, either.

“The B-29s did a beautiful job of bombing, making the final run in at about 19,000 feet. It was a fine,
clear day, and their bomb pattern was clearly visible. I don’t remember seeing a single bomb off-target.[7A]

“The homeward flight was very routine. We peeled off and left them after we got close to *Essex*.
“Afterwards, CTF 77 received several despatches from the Air Force telling us what a fine escort job we
did.”

The photo aircraft which followed the strike took pictures which revealed that 97 per cent of the bombs
had fallen on the Rashin marshalling yards. A turntable, a roundhouse, a railroad bridge, and approximately 75 of
the 136 freight cars present were destroyed.

(Rashin’s munitions factories and transportation facilities were struck a third time on 10 December 1952
in an all-Navy attack by Task Force 77 aircraft from *Bon Homme Richard* and *Oriskany*. On this occasion, twelve
buildings were destroyed [including two railroad repair shops, the roundhouse and turntable] and five others
damaged. While the Skyraiders and Corsairs were dropping their bombs, the protecting jet fighters spotted several
MIGs just north of the border. The *Bon Homme Richard*’s action report reads: “The MIGs made threatening
maneuvers in an apparent but unsuccessful effort to draw the target CAP across the border. Neither side violated
the frontier.”)

For both the B-29s and the Navy fighters, the attack on Rashin had gone without a hitch. The naval
action reports, histories, and war diaries of the period mention this mission in the most routine fashion, with the single elaboration that “it is believed this is the first instance in the Korean War when Navy carrier fighters have escorted Air Force bombers.”[7B]

The significance of this mission far exceeded its bombing accomplishments. Here was yet another instance of closely integrated air effort by Air Force and Navy; second, it was an instance where naval airmen demonstrated the validity of their oft-repeated statement that many times, in many places, the mobile air power of the aircraft carrier might be essential, necessary, and helpful to the Air Force itself. In fact there might be times when naval air power would be the only way of accomplishing a task.
The interdiction effort of the carrier task force was now to enter its third phase. The first phase (breaking the Yalu bridges and the bridges of the northeast rail net) had achieved success within the northeast net. The second one (breaking the highways) had not. An effort would now be undertaken to destroy railroad tracks as well as the bridges themselves.

To give the carriers greater interdiction freedom, TF-77 was relieved of all responsibility for frontlines close air support missions on 20 September 1951.

The change of emphasis from bridge-breaking to track-busting had occurred for a very simple reason: increasing evidence of re-use by the enemy of the northeast coastal railroads. Moreover, American railroad engineers estimated that it would be harder for the Communists to repair multiple rail cuts than to repair certain key bridges.

While the carriers had been employed during the summer months in either giving close air support to the frontlines or participating in “Operation Strangle,” the Reds had taken advantage of the respite—first, to repair a great part of their fractured rail system; and second, to make ever-increasing use of “shuttle” trains between the broken bridges.

U.S. reconnaissance aircraft photographed or reported on several occasions as many as 300 railroad cars in the various marshalling yards. Naval aircraft themselves reported attacking and destroying or damaging 1,900 boxcars and 17 locomotives in a 30-day period between mid-August and mid-September.

Rear Admiral W. G. Tomlinson, ComCarDivTHREE and now CTF-77, following a coordinating conference aboard the Bon Homme Richard on 30 September 1951, with Major General Frank F. Everest (Commanding General FAFIK), made the decision to alter once again the pattern of the carriers’ attacks. Hereafter, attacks would be conducted over as wide an area as possible, striking isolated rail areas at about one mile intervals in order to force the enemy to disperse his repair crews and to reduce the effectiveness of his constantly-growing antiaircraft defenses.

A list of key highway and rail bridges was prepared which reduced the number to twenty-seven: ten rail bridges and seventeen highway bridges. In addition to striking these bridges on a systematic basis, a concentrated effort would be made to cut the tracks in as wide an area as possible.
Information on potential Communist targets in North Korea occasionally came from bizarre sources. Escapees often volunteered information; fishermen captured or defecting from North Korea added to the total information picture; and South Koreans who penetrated into enemy territory were still another source.

One of the Navy’s most spectacular air attacks—the Kapsan Strike—was based on such intelligence.

“Upon my arrival in Korea in the fall of 1951,” said VADM J. J. Clark, “carrier planes were ranging the eastern half of Korea, searching for interdiction targets. While we were concentrating on bridges, trains, and the rails, we willingly accepted any worthwhile target.

“My flag lieutenant, LCDR J. A. Scholes, happened to be a graduate of the Army Parachute School at Fort Benning, Georgia, and, while there, had met a number of trainees in undercover warfare. Some of his friends were on duty at Army headquarters at Pusan. LCDR Scholes and his Army friends arranged a system of target information which we immediately put to good use.

“Groups of guerrilla bands, mostly South Koreans, were operating in certain areas of North Korea, supplying intelligence information by portable radio to their headquarters in South Korea. This information, giving the location and the nature of worthwhile targets for Navy carrier planes, was then relayed to the flagship. The selected targets were attacked at opportune times and the results of the naval air attacks reported by on-the-scene guerrillas.

“This arrangement was most beneficial, and through it many excellent targets were destroyed. Among these were the mines at Komdok, which produced lead and silver, and which were supervised by Russian technicians. On that attack the guerrillas reported that the naval air strike destroyed many installations and killed 116 men, including one of the Russian engineers.

“Another of these raids was at Pukchong, where the undercover agents had discovered an automobile shop and ammunition factory. In a series of strikes both of these targets were demolished and 100 North Korean Army personnel were reported killed.

“At Hong-gun ni, which was an electric power supply, a surprise raid caught three North Korean Army battalions at breakfast and obtained direct hits on the building housing them. Heavy casualties were reported by ground observers.”

But the most successful raid based on information supplied by guerrillas was the 29 October raid on a concentration of Communist commissars and party officials in the city of Kapsan which resulted in the death of more than 500 Red personnel.

“On 29 October 1951,” said CDR Paul N. Gray, Commanding Officer, VF-54, “Admiral John Perry received a request from the Eighth Army to make a raid on the headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party at Kapsan, in North Korea. Guerrillas had reported there was to be a meeting of all high-level party members of the North Korean and Chinese Communist forces at Kapsan at 0900. This city was located about 60 miles northwest of Songjin, in very mountainous terrain.

“On receiving this request, Admiral Perry ordered photos made from a high altitude by our photo reconnaissance planes. The photography was done at high altitude in order that the enemy would not become aware of our intentions.

“The target itself was a compound slightly east of the city of Kapsan. In this compound was a records section which contained all Chinese and North Korean Communist party records, a security police headquarters,
and a barracks. The meeting of high-level Communists was scheduled at nine o’clock. We were ordered to strike between nine-fifteen and nine-twenty to be sure that all members had reached their seats.

“The armament carried on the flight was as follows: two 1,000-lb. bombs, of which one had a proximity fuze and the other an instantaneous fuze. Each plane carried one napalm bomb and eight 250-lb. general purpose bombs. The 20-mm. machinegun ammunition was half incendiary and half high explosive.

“The pilots were myself, LTJG Shugart, ENS Aillaud, ENS Masson. The second division was led by LT Evans, with LTJG Gollner, ENS Strickland, and ENS Kelly. (LTJG Gollner and ENS Kelly were both killed on later strikes.) We requested no fighter escort because we felt the fewer number of planes involved would give us the maximum possibility of surprise.

“On the morning of the strike the weather was clear and cold.

“We were launched about 100 miles east of Wonsan, at 0730. After rendezvous, we proceeded to the coast, staying as low as possible all the way. From a study of the maps we found valleys available all the way to Kapsan in which we could fly and thereby avoid radar detection.

“As we flew farther and farther north, the height of the mountains increased and the terrain became extremely rugged. Directly east of Kapsan was a 6,000-foot range of mountains. We approached from behind this range, made a rapid climb to 8,000 feet, crossed over the top of the mountains, and commenced our attack.

“At approximately 0913, eight proximity-fuzed 1,000-lb. bombs exploded above the compound of Kapsan. We rendezvoused in a climbing turn, made another attack and dropped the 1,000-lb. instantaneous fuzed bombs. All eight of these again landed within the compound. On our next run half the planes dropped napalm and the other half strafed. Most of the compound was set afame by the napalm bombs, and those portions that were not ignited were set afire on the next run when the remaining four napalm bombs were dropped.

“The remainder of the attack consisted of strafing the compound and pinpointing the 250s on those sections that had not been completely destroyed. The final runs were made by our camera planes at treetop level to bring back post-strike pictures.

“When we left the target, there was nothing left but a smoking mass of rubble. Pictures showed every bomb except one inside the compound, and there was only one wall left standing.

“Any antiaircraft located at Kapsan evidently was destroyed on the first attack by the proximity fuzed 1,000-lb. bombs, because no reports of accurate antiaircraft fire were received and no planes received damage. We returned to the ship without incident, although extremely low on fuel due to the long hop and the long time spent on the target.

“Within two days an Army report was received from one of the guerrillas, who had been posted on the side of the hill overlooking Kapsan and who had watched the whole attack. He reported 509 high-level Communist party members were killed in the raid, and that all records of the Communist party in North Korea had been reported destroyed.

“The remarkable thing which the post-strike pictures showed was that no part of the city had been damaged, except the compound itself.

“This raid must have really hurt the Chinese and the North Koreans, because the next week the North Korean radio put a price on the heads of all the members of the strike and called us ‘The Butchers of Kapsan’.

By mid-October 1951, the three aircraft carriers (Bon Homme Richard, Essex and Antietam) were emphasizing rail cutting. In the first three days of October, 131 track breaks were made. Between 18 to 31 October, the rail-lines were cut in a total of 490 places.

Within a month, over 1,000 individual breaks had been made in the rail tracks. The steady attrition of this naval air effort became apparent as new enemy car sightings decreased. Further evidence of the campaign’s effectiveness was seen in the enemy’s cannibalization of rails. Photographs revealed that a great part of all double-tracking, spurs, and marshalling yard rails had been removed for use at more essential places. Also, the
pattern of antiaircraft opposition changed, increasing along the routes and becoming less intense at the bridges.

In November 1951, 922 track cuts were claimed and 44 rail bridges reported destroyed, despite increasingly difficult flying weather.

Jet aircraft of Task Force 77 proved to be ideal vehicles for the track-busting task. Their speed, silent approach, and bombing steadiness made them ideal for such precision work.

Also by now strike groups had learned to make more efficient use of their bombs. Big ones were used for bridges; small ones were saved for the tracks.

Track-breaking, however, was not as simple as it first appeared. In the first place, the width of the track—only 56 inches—made a small target indeed. Only a hit directly on the tracks was effective. Second, pilots had to compensate carefully for the effect of any cross wind. Third, the pilots soon found that a “seaman’s eye” correction had to be made for the offset distance from the cockpit of the plane to the bombrack itself. Otherwise, the bomb would explode harmlessly on either side of the rail-bed.

In the first nine days of December, 937 track cuts were made. Between 29 December and 9 January 1952, Task Force 77 averaged 116 track cuts per day. And in the 24 operating days between 28 December and 1 February 1952, the fast carrier pilots claimed 2,782 cuts in the track.

In this same period, 141 bridge or bridge bypasses were also destroyed. Admiral John Perry’s action report for this period concludes: “An almost complete interruption of eastern rail line movement was accomplished by this effort.”

Although rarely mentioned in war diaries and action reports, one of the most difficult tasks of the interdiction campaign to carrier division commanders, air group, and squadron commanders was the maintenance of high pilot morale. The unchanging routine of the interdiction missions, the increasing danger of being shot down by enemy gunfire, and the often invisible results of the effort, all tended to lower the level of pilot morale.

“One of my toughest jobs,” recorded CDR M. U. Beebe, Air Group commander of Essex’s Air Group Five, “was the constant battle to keep pilots’ morale up.[8] Day after day, for weeks on end, pilots had to fly over the same area of Korea, bombing bridges or punching holes in railbeds. The antiaircraft fire over Korea grew steadily heavier, more accurate, and more intense. In comparison to what Air Group Five’s experience had been during its first Korean tour in the fall of 1950, my second-tour pilots estimated that the enemy’s antiaircraft fire had increased on the order of ten times. In fact, by the time we left the area, we estimated that the concentration of antiaircraft guns in certain target areas of Korea was double the number the Japanese had at specific targets in Japan at the end of World War II. As an indication of this, Air Group Five went through two sets of airplanes because of the heavy operating schedule and damage received from antiaircraft fire which was not repairable on board. From 22 August until 30 November 1951, Air Group Five’s aircraft were struck 318 times, resulting in 27 aircraft losses and the loss of 11 pilots.

“A pilot would go out one day, do a first-rate bombing job on a bridge or leave several craters in a railbed, and come back the next day and find that all the damage had been repaired overnight. It was hard for him to see how his efforts were having any effect on the course of the fighting.

“For the second-tour pilots, the situation had drastically changed between November 1950 and mid-1951. The lucrative rail, supply, and individual targets had generally been destroyed. The grubby stacks of supplies, the trucks, and the bridges no longer piqued the pilots’ interest. We found then what every naval aviator discovered during the last two years of the war: that any pilot could bomb a factory, but that it took an expert to knock out a truck speeding down a road or to drop a rail span supported by ties and cribbing timbers. The Reds were adroit at rapid concealment. It took a keen and skilled eye to spot the vehicles and supplies beneath the straw, vegetation, foliage, or even refuse. By the time a pilot spotted something, made a turn and armed his guns, rockets, or bombs, the target would oftentimes have been concealed.
“Any pilot could scour an undefended section of the countryside, avoiding the flak areas. But in places like ‘Death Valley’, west of Wonsan, it required a skillful and courageous pilot to weave his way through a maze of well-defended antiaircraft positions and still get a hit. This type of war was a new challenge.

“Generally speaking, the war in Korea demanded more competence, courage, and skill from the naval aviator than did World War II. The flying hours were longer, the days on the firing line more, the antiaircraft hazards greater, the weather worse. There was less tangible evidence of results for a pilot to see. The public appreciation and understanding of the pilot’s work was less. On top of this, pilots had to know more than they did in World War II: their search and rescue points, panel marker codes, recognition signals, and their primary and secondary targets.

“The combination of these factors—the routine, the danger, the lack of visible results—made it difficult to convince the pilots that results being achieved were worth the risk. This was increasingly true after four or five months on the firing line.

“As a result, Admiral Perry and his staff tried very hard to work the air group into as many different missions as possible—such hops as strikes on Rashin, a hop into MIG Alley, or ‘close air support’ at the frontlines, and special targets such as the raid on Kapsan and Pukchong.”

The anniversary of the first year of the naval interdiction program gave opportunity to assess the damage. In 12 months the combined attacks of the naval air and surface forces had accounted for the destruction or damage of 2,379 bridges, 4,519 vehicles, 7,028 boxcars, and 4,674 rail cuts.

Commenting on this impressive record, Rear Admiral Ofstie (now Deputy ComNavFE) said:

“These one-year figures clearly show that our naval assaults have cost the Communists heavily in vehicles, rail lines, bridges, and munitions. The enemy has had to double and triple his efforts to get supplies through to the frontlines. In addition, he has been forced to divert a considerable amount of his effort and materials toward large-scale counter-interdiction effort of his own. Historically, it is significant to note that this has been the first employment of sustained ground interdiction by naval forces.”[9]

Said Vice Admiral J. J. Clark: “I don’t know how we could have done any better on the east coast.”

As 1952 was ushered in, it was nonetheless obvious from pilots’ observations, photographic intelligence, and reports received from ashore, that the enemy’s highly integrated and carefully dispersed repair organization had succeeded in matching the UN’s interdiction efforts over the whole of North Korea. Individual rail cuts were quickly and simply repairable, and there were ample supplies of lumber, unused rails, and, of course, manpower.

Accordingly, carrier tactics were altered once again. Instead of scattering rail and road cuts over wide areas, a plan to concentrate them at selected points was adopted. Rather than crater a roadbed with one bomb for every mile of track, entire stretches of railbed were torn up. At these points crater overlapped crater, totally destroying the roadbed for distances of one-half to two miles.

In 24 days of air operations in the period of 28 December 1951 to 1 February 1952, some 2,782 cuts were made and 79 railroad bridges and 50 bridge bypasses were destroyed. Temporarily, at least, the new attack plan proved too much for the enemy’s repair organization; in some places damage remained untouched for eight to ten days.

Still closer integration of naval air and surface effort against the northeast coastal routes was commenced in January 1952 in order to achieve semipermanent interdiction, regardless of weather and visibility conditions. Attack points along the northeast coast—known by the code names of “Package” and “Derail”—were selected by photographic reconnaissance. These targets were chosen so that breaks could be made and maintained by either air or surface bombardment. Against the five “Package” targets, aircraft established the initial break and planted radar buoys by which surface forces could locate, identify, and hit the target regardless of visibility conditions. At the eleven “Derail” points, responsibility for breaking the lines was assigned to the surface forces. These points would be bombarded with the aid of air spot by carrier aircraft.
As time went on, the success of both “Package” and “Derail” operations was minimized by the lack of sufficient surface bombardment units for continuous surveillance of the chosen points. [9A]

The concentration of air attack on selected areas of track continued through February 1952, when 1,037 cuts were made in the first twenty days. The major effort was applied to the main north-south and east-west rail-lines in and around the junction point at Kowon, 22 miles northwest of Wonsan. So successful were the carriers’ effort that the line from Kowon to Wonsan was kept inoperable for the entire period of 1 February to 5 March. The line linking Kowon, Hamhung, and Hungnam was cut often enough to prevent through traffic. At the same time, the rail and highway bridges west of Yangdok were under periodic attack.

In March 1952, there was another welcome break in the monotony of the rail and bridge strikes which did much to boost pilot morale. An enemy attempt to re-take the UN-held island of Yang-do, off Songjin, on 20 February met retaliation in the form of carrier aircraft attacks on small boat concentrations all along the nearby coast.[9B] Carrier sweeps from Wonsan to Songjin destroyed 300 small boats and damaged another 500—sampans and junks which might be used in another invasion attempt. The tedium of interdiction was further relieved on 13 April when the first of many combined air strikes and surface bombardments hit Chongjin.[9C]

To reduce the threat of invasion of Yo-do, the UN-held island in the besieged harbor of Wonsan, carrier aircraft made regular strikes on the enemy guns on Hodo Pando peninsula and also furnished periodic spotting services to the bombarding ships.[9D]

Everywhere the railbusting campaign continued with unabated fury. During April, May, and June 1952, over 7,000 sorties were flown, achieving in the first month-and-a-half another 3,000 rail cuts and the destruction of 80 bridges and 100 bypasses.[9E]

Once again the enemy responded to the naval air attack by modifying his repair pattern and intensifying his antiaircraft fire. And once again Task Force 77 changed its tactics. The number of aircraft in each group was increased, flak-suppression fighters attacked the enemy guns prior to the appearance of the bombing planes, and repeated passes were avoided. Pull-outs were higher. The inherent ability of the carrier to make sudden, heavy attacks on widespread targets was fully utilized.

But whatever the pattern of attacks, the purpose of the naval airmen was the same—to maintain a stranglehold on the east coast rail system.

One night-heckler pilot waxed poetical in his assessment of the interdiction effort:

“It weren’t no fun in 51
Tried and True in 52
Still out to sea in 53
Don’t want no more in 54
Still alive in 55
Amidst the blitz in 56
Almost to Heaven in 57
No homecoming date in 58
Remain on the line in 59
Pack up your ditty in 1960
To hell with this poem
We want to come home.”

While interdiction missions were flown for the remainder of the war, the month of June 1952 saw the interdiction campaign de-emphasized. Hereafter, interdiction would take the form of massed attacks on rail and transportation centers, manufacturing areas, and supply centers, with the hope that the enemy would thereby be forced to make concessions at the truce table.

In this 20-month naval effort to strangle the supply lines of the enemy by air, fast carrier aircraft had
made more than 13,000 cuts in the rail lines and had destroyed 500 bridges and 300 bridge bypasses in northeastern Korea. The destruction and damage to hundreds of locomotives, railroad cars, trucks, and motor vehicles, and to the supplies and munitions being carried, added to the effectiveness of the damage inflicted on the rail route itself. This destruction had undoubtedly slowed the movement of goods and forced the enemy to organize a tremendous resistance. It had forced him to divert a large share of his manpower and to expend large quantities of repair materials.

But the struggle to strangle the enemy’s supply lines throughout Korea, by all air forces, including Navy, did not isolate the battlefield. The volume of supplies reaching the static front seemed adequate for the enemy’s needs. There was a growing conviction that aerial interdiction of the land lines of communication could not be entirely effective over an extended period of time unless there was coordinated ground action to force the enemy to increase his rate of supply expenditure.

Admiral John Perry’s action report summarized the interdiction effort in one pithy sentence:

“Operations resolved themselves into a day-to-day routine where stamina replaced glamor and persistence was pitted against oriental perseverance.”
By their effective and incessant daytime attacks upon the bridges, tunnels, and tracking of the northeastern rail net, the carrier aviators of Task Force 77 were able to restrict its use severely. While the sun was up, the Communists were unable and unwilling to move. The flow of supplies by daylight was choked off to a thin trickle, and Chinese and North Korean trains and trucks operated at almost suicidal peril.

But at night, and in bad flying weather, the enemy desperately repaired his bridges, filled in the hundreds of holes punched in his roads and railbeds, and straightened or replaced his bent tracking; and by laborious but plentiful hand labor, he shuttled from train to train and truck to truck the munitions of war across the dozens of broken bridges and tracks. Nighttime and inclement weather brought a measure of immunity to the harassed Communists.

Concurrent with their day labors, the hardworking carriers of Task Force 77 also toiled at night throughout the entire interdiction campaign, and did their limited best to staunch the flow of supplies and to delay the repair effort. With no night carrier available, the need for the day carriers to work ’round the clock proved a heavy burden on the flight deck crews; but the burden was willingly accepted in order to increase pressure on the enemy.

The task of flying interdiction missions over Korea at night was both difficult and hazardous, although most of the night pilots felt that the danger of flying over Korea at night was considerably less than by day. In many ways, flying at night was easier. There was much less flak. Targets were much more numerous and easier to find. On dark nights, moving traffic could be identified by headlights. In bright moonlight, the enemy could move trucks and trains successfully without lights. This forced the hecklers to concentrate on the stationary interdiction targets.

However, the mountainous terrain of Korea was more of a hindrance by night than by day. Making an attack upon a bridge or a train compressed between the steep Korean hills, or on a truck concealed beside a forested road, required first-rate airmanship even in broad daylight; to perform the same job at night was even more difficult and demanding.

Despite their limited numbers, and despite the difficulties of weather, darkness, and terrain, the night flyers of Task Force 77 inflicted a great amount of damage and did much to slow down the enemy’s nocturnal movement of supplies.

The typical hop for the hecklers was for each pair to be assigned to one route or road so as to cover a distance of about 150 miles. The routes were generally through the mountains or along the coastal road. On arrival in the target area, one pilot would descend to low-altitude searching of the road, looking for headlights or blacked out traffic. The other pilot remained high. When a target was spotted, the high plane initiated the attack, dropping flares as necessary. The low plane, meanwhile, climbed and made his attack.
The Sea War in Korea
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson

Chapter 8. The Struggle to Strangle
Early Night Operations

As the interdiction campaign by the carriers in northeast Korea commenced in early 1951, the night flyers aboard Princeton (VC-35 Night Team 3, LT Franklin Metzner, OinC) made contact with the enemy’s transport system with pleasing and pyrotechnic results:

“1 Feb 1951: ‘. . . LT Atlee F. Clapp and LTJG Lawrence G. Rodgers destroyed the first of seventeen locomotives destroyed by this team. . . .’

“22 Apr 1951: ‘. . . LT Franklin Metzner and ENS John D. Ness destroyed one locomotive and severely damaged five others in a marshalling yard west of Kowon. Other flights from the carriers and the Air Force later the next morning bombed and napalmed the yard—one locomotive escaped into a tunnel, but a special strike that afternoon exploded him out of the tunnel.

“The engine proceeded out of control down the track into the marshalling yard where it ran into the wreckage of the destroyed train, exploded and overturned—seven locomotives were definitely destroyed in this day’s operation. . . .’

“18 July 1951: ‘. . . LT Wickenheiser and LTJG Oliver disrupted enemy traffic by attacking a convoy of vehicles in the vicinity of Kowon—4 vehicles were set ablaze. . . .’

“22 July 1951: ‘. . . LT A. F. Borysiewicz and ENS Colvin interrupted the advance of light enemy vehicles as they were moving through a precipitous pass twenty miles south of Songjin. From the blast of the 260-pound frag bombs, it was observed that approximately two trucks were destroyed. . . .’

“16 Oct 1951: ‘. . . One train composed of one locomotive and fifteen box-cars was sighted and severely damaged by LCDR Callis of VC-3 (aboard Antietam) with the assistance of LT Stixrud. . . .’

“8 Nov 1951: ‘. . . LTJG Warfield of VC-3 destroyed two enemy trucks while LTJG Donahoe and ENS Sybeldon of VC-3 each destroyed one truck. . . .’

During this period of operations, the night hecklers developed a few practical thumb rules for their work. The darker the night and the colder the night, the better the night pilot’s chances of finding and destroying trucks. The darkness forced the enemy drivers to use lights in order to remain on the twisting highways, while the cold weather usually forced them to close their windows to keep warm. In so doing, the drivers could not hear the approaching aircraft or the warning shots fired by the road sentries stationed along the highways at short intervals.

On moonlit nights, some of the pilots found the use of binoculars helpful. But whatever the degree of darkness, once a truck convoy was located, pilots found it essential to make their initial attacks with engines throttled back in order to keep the noise level low and to avoid alerting the vehicles.

“Strange as it may seem,” said LCDR F. E. Ward, Officer in Charge of Night Attack Team Mike, “the night pilots dreaded the bright moonlight nights for it made them excellent targets for antiaircraft guns, and forced them to fly closer to the ground in order to locate targets.”[10]

As for weapons, a great many pilots preferred their 20-mm. cannons. Others preferred the napalm tanks. Whereas a bomb could be counted on to destroy only one or two trucks, a well-placed napalm tank could do away with as many as ten trucks, besides furnishing excellent illumination for subsequent attacks. Later in the war, the 2.75-inch folding fin rocket, normally an air-to-air weapon, was tried and proved successful.

The night pilots were quick to observe the enemy’s typical reaction to nighttime attacks. Trucks in a few observed convoys were equipped with bright headlights on the rear of the trucks shining backward, and only dim lights pointing forward. By this stratagem the Reds hoped to delude the hecklers into believing that this convoy
was an “empty” moving north, rather than a “full” one heading toward the battlefront.

On occasion the pilots also observed a flashing-light warning system in certain sectors along the coastal road. On approach of a plane these mountaintop lights would blink a warning for all trucks to take cover. Trains on the exposed tracks would head for the nearest tunnel.

Pilots also noted, especially on very dark nights, that strings of simulated headlights would be placed in certain very mountainous terrain. The line of lights would be so placed that if a pilot was deceived and made a low level attack on them, he would crash his airplane into a steep, nearby hillside. None of the hecklers took the bait.

Despite the various systems used by the enemy to warn of approaching airplanes, the mere presence of the heckling aircraft achieved the desired psychological result. Communist trucks and trains scampered for concealment whenever an aircraft engine was heard. The hecklers forced the trains and truck convoys to scatter and stop, thereby halting and slowing the nighttime traffic.
In early 1952 a night heckling operation against railroads having the lyrical code-name “Moonlight Sonata” was begun. The purpose of this operation was to take advantage of the winter snowfall and moonlight, at which time the Korean hills, valleys, and rail lines stood out in bold relief.

The operation commenced on 15 January 1952, and continued through mid-March, at which time the snows began to melt. On each flyable night during the winter period, five 2-plane sections were predawn launched at 0300 each morning. Each section of aircraft was assigned a 50-mile stretch of track; pilots were briefed in advance on the locations of the best targets within that area. At the least, the presence of the hecklers would halt traffic and disrupt the rail-repair activity. If the hunting was good and trains were found, the night flyers were ordered to decommission the locomotive and then to cut the track on each side of the train so that the day flight, standing by in alert status on the carrier decks, could come in at the first light to finish the destruction of the stranded trains.

“Sonata” was partly successful, resulting in five locomotives being found, two destroyed, and three damaged. However, the periods of night which combined moonlight, good weather, and snow on the ground, plus targets, were rare.

The next special night operation was code-named “Insomnia” and commenced on 13 May 1952. This operation had one feature which some of the earlier night missions had lacked. On several occasions in the past, pilots flying the first night hops had reported that trains and trucks could not be found during the early hours of their patrols; however, just as they were leaving the area, the trucks and trains began to appear. Obviously, the Communists had noted the time pattern of the night aerial patrols and were withholding train and truck movements until the naval planes were homeward bound.

Accordingly, “Insomnia” launching schedules were re-shuffled and planes left the carriers at midnight and 0200.

During the spring period, 16 locomotives were sighted, and 11 of them were trapped by cutting the rail lines ahead and behind. Of the trapped 11, nine were destroyed at first light the next morning and the other two heavily damaged. Additionally, night pilots found good shooting on such occasions as:

“18 April 1952: ‘. . . LT A. R. Kreutz and ENS P. J. Weiland (VC-35 Team Able—Boxer) had extremely good luck on a night heckler hop, destroying 8 trucks, 2 warehouses plus one ammunition dump, and damaging 12 more trucks and numerous troops with 20-mm. strafing attacks. . . .’

“23 April 1952: ‘. . . LT C. H. Hutchins and LT D. G. Creeden destroyed a railroad bridge and four trucks, damaged six others with 20-mm. fire and left one warehouse burning. LT Creeden was hit by small arms fire, returning unharmed but with a shattered canopy. . . .’

“12 May 1952: ‘. . . LT R. L. Bothwell, LT H. D. Knosp and LTJG M. D. Avery were launched from Valley Forge. They scored direct hits on two rail road bridges, destroyed a truck convoy, bombed a train, cutting the rail lines fore and aft. This all-night operation was extremely successful in disrupting the transportation schedules, as the early morning strikes destroyed the trains that were isolated at daybreak. . . .’

“9 June 1952: ‘. . . Two night hecklers were launched. LT Bothwell and LT Knosp destroyed a locomotive and three cars south of Songjin and completely burned a fully loaded train in the yards at Kilchu with a half hour bombing and napalm attack. . . .’

Chapter 8. The Struggle to Strangle
The Use of Night Carriers in Korea

During the latter part of World War II in the Pacific, the U.S. Navy had developed special air groups and carriers *Enterprise* and *Saratoga* to operate exclusively at night. From the military and operational standpoint, this development was one of the major innovations and accomplishments of that war. The results achieved by the night carriers against the Japanese in both attack and defense were generally agreed to have been effective and successful.

During the Korean War, however, no night carriers were used, although a plan to do so (Operation “No Doze”) was formulated and briefly placed in effect during the last few days of the war. *Princeton* was now designated for operation “No Doze”; she was given three destroyers for plane guard, and all night fighter and night attack aircraft of TF-77 were to be transferred to her. It was planned for the night hecklers to strike important junctions with both regular and delay-fuzed bombs, so that TF-77’s morning flights might have lucrative targets. However, “No Doze” was postponed when *Princeton* went to Yokosuka for boiler repairs; upon her return to the fleet, the final days of the war were under way, requiring the all-out close air support of all carriers.

The proposal to employ night carriers was first raised during the early phases of the interdiction campaign in Korea. There were many persuasive reasons for doing so. First of all, a regular day carrier could not operate continuously both by day and by night. Even the task of operating eight night fighter and attack aircraft from a day carrier was an extra heavy burden on the carrier’s flight deck, hangar deck, and ordnance crews. The use of a night carrier would certainly diminish the day carrier’s burdens.

Second, those naval airmen who analyzed the interdiction campaign in Korea realized that its primary weakness was the lapse of effort during the night and the respite thus given the enemy. Operating approximately eight night aircraft from the day carriers could do little more than harass, heckle, and hamper, much less halt the Chinese nocturnal traffic to a significant point. Admittedly, a single night carrier could do a great deal more, although there was substantial doubt that one night carrier could slow down the enemy’s traffic to any vital degree. Those in favor of a night carrier also believed that fliers could tighten the *surface* blockade by detecting the movement of small craft operating close inshore.

Third, the equipment for night flying, both aboard carrier and airplanes, was much better than during World War II—radar, night lighting, control procedures for the ship, all-weather equipment, electronic equipment, and automatic pilots for the planes. Korea, said the night flyers, was a golden chance to learn more and to further perfect the all-weather art.

The pilots who had flown over Korea both by day and by night were convinced that the task at night was easier, less dangerous, and more productive. Little or nothing moved by day. But at night, North Korea crawled with activity. The night pilots were certain that the same number of trained pilots by night could accomplish much more than the same pilots by day—and at less risk of damage or loss to themselves.

The other side of the problem contained compelling evidence. One night carrier would be helpful but certainly not decisive. To bottle up northeast Korea by night would require many carriers and hundreds of planes. And for each night carrier on the line in Korea, there had to be at least one other carrier and air group training on the West Coast. The time to fully train a night pilot was 50 per cent greater. There was also the Navy-wide limitation of funds, of personnel, and the problem of priorities. Would a night carrier be more damaging to the enemy than a battleship or a squadron of destroyers?
In the operational sense, too, there was no reason to suspect that the normal enthusiasm and elation which were inherent in every returning strike pilot’s report were not equally applicable to night pilots. Often there was no way of judging, measuring, or photographing the claims of the night pilots. Under the stalemated conditions in Korea, many naval airmen felt that a carrier operating by day would hurt the enemy more than a carrier by night. Moreover, a survey made early in the war showed that the night pilots were expending 67 per cent of the ordnance in twilight and daylight periods; on the other hand, the usual time of launching hecklers during these early months—near dawn and dusk—contributed to this high percentage.

The use of a night carrier was thus debated and re-debated. But the night carrier was destined not to appear during the Korean War.
The night heckling by the day carriers, contributing to the over-all damage to the enemy in Korea, went steadily on. By now the airmen had developed the night attack work into an art. The flight over a 40-mile stretch of track or road might consume an hour’s zigzagging back and forth, as each curve and embankment was observed for traffic. Locomotives were hardest to see, as they rarely used headlights or made smoke. But careful, tedious searching paid off:

“15 July 1952: ‘. . . night heckling aircraft from Princeton stopped a train near Tanchon and eighteen propeller planes were launched by the Bon Homme Richard at 0915 to finish it off. . . .’

“22 July 1952: ‘. . . the night hecklers destroyed three trucks and damaged thirteen north of Wonsan. . . .’

“23 July 1952: ‘. . . the night hecklers, surprising a convoy of trucks, damaged fifteen, leaving a path of flame and rubble. . . .’

“24 July 1952: ‘. . . the hecklers as usual had their choice of targets, sighting at least two hundred trucks within a thirty mile radius of Wonsan . . . at least three definitely destroyed and 21 damaged. . . .’

“27 July 1952: ‘. . . at 0330 dawn hecklers left to attack rails northwest of Tanchon. VC-4 detachment (LCDR E. S. Ogle) found a moving train, cut the rails in front and behind, and damaged the locomotive before expending all the ammunition and bombs. A destroyer later destroyed the train by shelling. . . .’

“28 July 1952: ‘. . . again the hecklers trapped a locomotive and three cars.

“Following the prescribed doctrine, the rails were cut and the trains attacked. Direct attacks on the boiler stopped the engine, leaving it stalled for a later Princeton flight to destroy. . . .’

“1 Aug 1952: ‘. . . the night hecklers reported the destruction of eleven and damage to fifteen trucks in the Wonsan area. . . .’

“3 Aug 1952: ‘. . . the hecklers found choice targets in trucks in the Wonsan area. Bombing and strafing vehicles pinpointed by flames, the night flyers destroyed at least nine and damaged 25 trucks. . . .’”

As the daytime interdiction effort was de-emphasized, beginning in June, the enemy made increasingly bold use of his highways. The night flyers of TF-77, in the month of November, were credited with the destruction of 206 trucks and damage to 274.
The Sea War in Korea
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson

Chapter 8. The Struggle to Strangle
Types of Night Heckling Aircraft

Throughout the Korean War there were two airplanes exclusively used for night work: the F4U5N Corsair and the AD4N Skyraider. Each carrier had four of each type assigned to its air group, these units being attached to the appropriate attack and fighter squadron.

The Corsair fighter aircraft were night defense aircraft charged with the protection of the task force at night. Since there was no enemy aerial opposition, these aircraft were released for attacks in Korea. The parent squadron of the F4U5N pilots and aircraft was VC-3, located at Naval Air Station, Moffett Field.[10A]

The Skyraider aircraft came from VC-35, located at Naval Air Station, San Diego. The pilots and planes from this squadron were assigned to and especially trained in the night attack role. For this mission the Skyraider was an ideal vehicle. The usual load for a night heckling AD Skyraider was one 500-pound bomb, six 250-pound bombs, six flares, and full ammunition for their four 20-mm. cannon.

“The combat aircrewmen of VC-35 had to be the best trained and the most courageous type of men,” said LCDR Ward. “It takes a particular brand of courage to participate in protracted night operations, sitting in the back end of a plane, unable to see either ship or target.”

“The AD4N planes were ideally suited for the night interdiction mission,” said LCDR W. C. Griese, Officer in Charge of Valley Forge’s VC-35s Baker team. “The provision of extensive electronic equipment and stations for two crewmen to operate the gear made this aircraft approach a true all-weather airplane and allowed us to effectively complete many missions which would otherwise have been impossible. The ability of this airplane to carry a sizable ordnance load with a good endurance factor also endeared it to the hearts of the night people.

“When we first arrived on the line aboard Valley Forge in January 1953, our job after locating enemy locomotives was to cut the tracks ahead of and behind the locomotives and let the day boys knock it off the next morning. . . . We conscientiously did as we were told until discovering that the locomotives that we stranded at night often weren’t there the next morning due to the Commies’ amazing ability to fill bomb craters and repair rails within an hour or two. We then decided among ourselves that the best place to cut the tracks was directly beneath the locomotive—and then we started to do some good.

“Although we evaluated many types of ordnance for our missions, we finally concluded that the best weapon we had was the 20-mm. gun. One round of 20-mm. high explosive incendiary in the gas tank or engine of a truck would completely and permanently knock it out, and a few rounds through the boiler of a locomotive could stop it very effectively. Also, with this weapon, we didn’t have to worry about minimum safe altitudes in the run, and each shell hitting at night gave a good flash which made for very easy correcting, and our accuracy became very good.

“Our most effective single mission,” continued LCDR Griese, “was on the night of 13 February 1953. It was a pretty miserable night, with ceilings at about 700 feet and a light freezing rain falling. Apparently the enemy didn’t think we’d be out in weather like this, and they were moving gasoline tankers in convoy on the coastal highway about 20 miles south of Hamhung. Of course, we didn’t know for sure what we were attacking, since all we could see when we began our run were the headlights; but after the first round of incendiary found the gasoline there was no doubt about it! We burned seven of the tankers (and damaged three others) and we had no further use for flares in that area for the rest of the night! It was quite a sight to see a large tanker truck scream down the highway, trailing burning gas for a mile or more, and finally erupting in a big column of flame.
“This particular incident pointed out the fact that, in general, the worse the weather was, the better the hunting!”

Imaginative planning and persistence by Valley Forge’s night hecklers paid off on a mission flown the night of 3 May 1953 against the Chosin reservoir hydroelectric plant.

“Chosin No. 1 power plant had been attacked several times by large groups of our aircraft during daylight hours,” stated LCDR Griese, “despite the extreme concentration of enemy antiaircraft of all types. Since this target was right on one of our night reconnaissance routes, we were flying directly over it almost every night, at low altitude, practically on a schedule, and we never got a buzz out of any protective AA. It occurred to us, of course, that we could attack this target, and we so proposed to the planners. We were initially refused, however, on the basis that it would be too dangerous. (The intelligence people had told us that there were probably a dozen or more heavies and thirty to forty 37-mm. automatic weapons around that power plant.) We persisted, however, and finally got a crack at it in the early morning hours of 3 May. We had three of our ADs loaded with one 1,000-pound GP and one 1,000-pound SAP bomb apiece. We briefed carefully and were catapulted at 0300. The lead plane made a landfall on radar and hit the enemy beach just south of Hungnam. We had no difficulty locating the target even though it was in a deep valley and completely blacked out. The lead plane immediately pulled up and dropped a flare which illuminated the target beautifully and allowed the following planes to commence immediate glide bombing attacks. As each flare approached the ground, it was replaced by another; thus a blinding light was kept continually between the attacking planes and the enemy gunners, who, after about four minutes, finally got the word and commenced shooting wildly with everything they had. Despite this fire we stayed over the target for a total of seven minutes, and each pilot made two deliberate bombing runs plus additional flare runs. No plane suffered damage from the enemy’s intensive fire. Of the six bombs carried, one GP (general purpose bomb) hung up, one hit right alongside the plant, setting off great electrical fire-balls, and one landed fifty feet beyond the target. All three SAPs (semi armor-piercing bombs) released, but since they penetrated deeply before exploding, no results could be observed.

“The lesson from this incident lies in the fact that night pilots in night airplanes successfully navigated inland, found, illuminated, and attacked a heavily defended enemy target with comparatively little risk. It was an optimum military situation.”
During the night interdiction campaign, one new type of ordnance was tried in Korea which proved highly successful: the 2.75-inch folding-fin aircraft rocket, which had the nickname “Mighty Mouse.” Developed initially as an air-to-air weapon, this small rocket found peculiar but suitable use as a night interdiction weapon late in the Korean war.

The “Mighty Mouse” rockets were carried in packages of seven; and six pods or packages were carried on each AD Skyraider, with flares and 250- or 500-pound bombs on the remaining stations. Each package of seven was fired in a ripple, with a split second between each rocket.

The initial fleet testing and evaluation of the 2.75-inch folding-fin aircraft rocket on ground targets had been accomplished at Inyokern, California, in early December 1952, by the executive officer of VC-35, CDR Frank G. Edwards. So pleased was Commander Edwards with the test results that he convinced his superiors that a war trial over Korea was in order. In April 1953, therefore, Night Attack Team Mike aboard the Philippine Sea (CAPT Paul H. Ramsey) conducted “Mighty Mouse” rocket attacks on interdiction targets:

“7 April: ‘CDR Edwards and LCDR Ward were launched as late evening hecklers. Edwards broke the ice when he made a fine run on a truck and burned it with seven rounds. . .’

“8 April: ‘LT Harmon nailed four trucks on one run with two packages, burning all four, with secondary explosions observed.’

“13 April: ‘Encountering what appeared to be lights on a road, Ward made several passes at the head of the column without firing. During each pass the lights went out until finally, on the last pass, the truck lights were left burning and Ward continued the attack, firing all six packages (42 rockets) down the length of the column of approximately twenty trucks from a quartering direction. Several secondary explosions resulted and at least four large fires were left burning down the length of the column. The local “hero” medal was transferred to Felix upon his return to the ship. . . .’

“26 April: ‘The hecklers had their best night—Sullivan got at least five trucks with two rocket packages; fires in supply buildups in two villages; Ward burned half the village of Soho-ri with a four package attack; DeSmet burned at least four trucks and damaged two with three packages, silenced an automatic weapon near Wonsan, burned three or four buildings in a village; Erickson burned two buildings and silenced an AA position. . .’

“The destructive ability, the accuracy, the ease of handling and using the rockets was proved. Captain Ramsey reported that “the rockets were extremely effective weapons against trucks or similar targets.” Rear Admiral R. E. Blick, ComCarDiv-3, recommended a rapid increase in output, so that general Fleet usage in Korea could be accomplished.

“The use of the ‘Mighty Mouse’ rockets against ground targets was very successful,” said CDR F. G. Edwards. “Using them was like going after a bug with a flyswatter instead of trying to stab him with a pencil.”
Chapter 8. The Struggle to Strangle

Significance

Despite unusually favorable conditions, and despite the costly, vigorous, and prolonged effort just described, UN air power failed to isolate the Korean battlefield. Perhaps only the use of the atomic bomb against sources of supply and against the stockpiles in Manchuria could have accomplished this isolation; but this effort was never made.

Air power was denied the attempt to isolate the peninsula from the mainland by making attacks upon the Manchurian sanctuary. Thus, the air interdiction of the Korean battlefield took the only course which remained — that of attacking the supply system in Korea—the rail lines and highways (and the traffic upon them) which carried the enemy’s strength into his frontlines.
Chapter 8. The Struggle to Strangle
Responsibility for the Interdiction Campaign and Its Coordination

In analyzing the Navy’s role in the interdiction campaign in Korea, it must be remembered that the conduct of interdiction upon land was the primary responsibility of the U.S. Air Force as laid down in the Functions Paper. The Navy’s responsibility for interdiction on land was purely collateral. Throughout the Korean war, therefore, the general supervision of the interdiction campaign was exercised by the U.S. Air Force, through the Joint Operation Center at Taegu, under the command of the Fifth Air Force in Korea.

At no time during the Korean War were the interdiction efforts of the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force upon the Korean peninsula coordinated at the theater level. For the first six months of the war, coordination was not necessary, because of the fluid state of the ground fighting. After the evacuation of Hungnam, and especially after the ground fighting became positioned, there still was no coordinated plan for the centralization of interdiction effort, the priority of targets, or the choice of best available weapons. This lack showed up in such variances as in bridge reconnaissance by Air Force and Naval aircraft in a certain east coast area. Based on their reconnaissance pictures, the Air Force reported 36 rail and highway bridges out of commission. The Navy’s report, for the same day and for the same area, reported only six bridges out.

Lack of theater coordination also showed up in varying criteria used by Air Force and Navy. In the first months of the war, the Air Force considered that a successfully attacked bridge would normally be out of action for 30 days. The Navy’s experience showed that a bridge successfully attacked might only be out of action for two days—or even a matter of hours.

Further evidence of the lack of coordination was indicated by the fact that there was no written or formal assignment of areas of effort between the Air Force and the Navy. In the absence of such an agreement, one grew to be understood and accepted: the Navy had primary (but not exclusive) responsibility for the east coast rail and highway systems of North Korea, while the Air Force had primary (but again not exclusive) control over the western rail and highway networks. This division of effort grew and came to be understood and accepted.

The division of responsibility for interdiction was first provided on 7 July 1950 after the naval air attacks on Pyongyang. General Stratemeyer told Admiral Struble in a dispatch that “if you participate in further air strikes, request you confine activities to area north of 38° and east of 127°.” The east coast assignment was further spelled out on 5 November 1950 when Task Force 77 was assigned the area north of the immediate battlefront, and east of the line of longitude of 126°-40'E, but remaining five miles south of all Manchurian territory.

These assignments, plus the subsequent long days of effort by Task Force 77 in the immediate area of the Hungnam redeployment, the shortage of U.S. Air Force bases in South Korea, and the fact that the Air Force could effectively reach the upper parts of northeast Korea only with B-29s, were the several factors which resulted in the allocation of the east coast area to the Navy.

Several months later, on 15 February 1951, the division of North Korea was further solidified when FEAF headquarters informed COMNAVF that interdiction of the northeast coastal area was difficult for them because of the distance from their bases. FEAF requested that the Navy cover the northeast coastal route until 25 February. On the latter date Admiral Joy ordered TF-77 to continue the interdiction campaign until further notice.

Certainly, one of the lessons of the prolonged interdiction campaign in Korea was that theater control and coordination of such a costly and major effort must be effected if success is to be achieved.
Notwithstanding the heavy damage inflicted by naval air, the over-all air interdiction campaign in Korea had only partial success. Even when the attacks of Task Force 77 were added to those of the Marine Air Wing and the Fifth Air Force, the combined destruction did not succeed in restricting the flow of the enemy’s supplies to the frontlines, or in achieving “interdiction of the battlefield.” The attrition caused the enemy to triple and re-triple his efforts to supply the frontlines; it laid a terrible and costly burden upon his supply organization; it caused him the most widespread damage and loss. But no vital or decisive effect could be observed at the fighting front. Throughout the campaign, the enemy seemed to have ample strength to launch an attack if he wished. His frequent heavy artillery barrages upon our frontlines were evidence that he did not suffer from a shortage of ammunition.[11A] Captured prisoners said they had plenty of food, clothing, medical supplies, and ammunition for their small arms.

“The interdiction program was a failure,” said VADM J. J. Clark, Commander Seventh Fleet. “It did not interdict. The Communists got the supplies through; and for the kind of a war they were fighting, they not only kept their battleline supplied, but they had enough surplus to spare so that by the end of the war they could even launch an offensive.”[12]
It must be grudgingly admitted that one of the key reasons why isolation of the battlefield could not be achieved in Korea was the surprising tenacity, determination, and ingenuity displayed by the Communists to keep their rail and highway networks in operation. In spite of incessant daylight attacks and night-time harassment, despite the necessity of working at night, of using old equipment, of having long, exposed, and vulnerable supply lines, the Chinese were able to maintain and even increase the flow of supplies to the battlefront.

In addition to patience and determination, however, the Communists had method and organization for the maintenance and repair of their road and rail networks.

The responsible agency for highway maintenance was the North Korean Department of Military Highway Administration. It was charged with the repair of tunnels, bridges, and roads, and for construction of necessary bypasses. This organization, numbering some 20,000 personnel, was divided into 12 regiments of three or more battalions each. Each battalion (about 500 men) was assigned to a section of North Korea. At important points within each section, platoons of road repair personnel were stationed at two-mile intervals. Their equipment was simple but effective: shovels, sandbags, wicker baskets, picks, axes, and other hand tools. At key bridges and tunnels, in times of emergency, local labor might also be drafted. On such occasions as many as 1,000 laborers, including many women and children, would be used to repair a single bridge or tunnel.

The railroad repair system was equally extensive and equally well organized. The responsible agency was the North Korean Railroad Recovery Bureau, consisting of three brigades and numbering some 26,000 personnel. These brigades were further subdivided into repair teams of 300 people per team. In addition to the simple hand tools mentioned above, each team was equipped with horse and wagon units for the hauling of heavy timbers and rails. Moreover, specialized equipment such as welding equipment, surveying equipment, jacks, levers, and cranes were assembled at key repair points. Prefabricated wooden bridges and prefabricated metal spans, as well as timber, rails, cement, and other building materials were also stockpiled, much of it kept in the thousands of caves and tunnels.

The rapidity of the Communist repair effort is indicated by the fact that of one stretch of track near Wonsan, 400 feet were destroyed on 4 April 1952; yet on 5 April the track was repaired and in operation. All along the northeast coast, cuts made in the morning would be repaired by the afternoon.

In the struggle to keep their rail traffic moving, the Reds did two other things to foil our interdiction attacks: (1) they constructed bypasses, and (2) they shuttled rail traffic between breaks.

The construction of a bridge bypass was a simple but effective counter. Most of the rivers in Korea were shallow and fordable. When bridges across such streams were destroyed, with their piers and abutments damaged, the Reds merely laid a temporary bridge across the stream bed itself rather than attempting to repair the nearby bridge. At key locations where the terrain would not permit this simple solution, the Reds would undertake the laborious construction of a lengthy bypass to circumvent the bridge entirely. The bridge at Carlson’s Canyon was such an effort.

The Communist response to the hundreds of breaks made in their trackage was the shuttling system. At night, a train would operate as far south on a particular segment of track as possible—12 miles per night was not an unusual average. Its load would then be shifted, usually by truck but often by hand, across the broken bridge or damaged rail bed, to another train. This train would proceed southward as far as possible, hiding in rail tunnels by day, and would again shift its load to another train when it reached an impassable or unrepaired break in the line.
While the rate of moving supplies was seriously hampered, a certain amount of supplies went steadily through.

The Reds also invented and exploited every possible method of concealment, deception, and camouflage. Whenever a truck convoy had to be left exposed, it was always covered with straw or foliage, driven beneath the trees, concealed in caves or beneath bridges, or, if in wintertime, covered with white canvas. Along the road between Wonsan and Pyongyang, often referred to by the airmen as “Death Valley,” were many well-concealed revetments in which a truck could be hidden quickly. As for locomotives and boxcars, the hundreds of tunnels were excellent hideouts, and there was room inside them for some 8,000 cars—enough room to accommodate every train and locomotive in North Korea. At times, locomotives were deceptively placed in the center of the train rather than in their usual position at the front or back.

Damaged trains and trucks were left in plain view and often painted bright colors to invite attack; operating trucks carried oily rags, which, in the event of an attack, the drivers quickly lit to leave the impression of destruction. Trucks were often concealed near churches, schools, and hospitals, so that an attack on them must also involve danger of striking these buildings as well. Trucks were often concealed in bombed-out buildings. On other occasions, truck hoods were left open and the truck wheels removed, to give the appearance of being “not-serviceable”; but these same vehicles were quickly made serviceable after nightfall.

The use by enemy trucks of our own flags and markings or even the International Red Cross emblem was occasionally reported by our airmen. Trucks moved in convoys, as many as twenty in a column. Spotters were stationed along the roads at every mile to fire their rifles upon approach of one of our planes. Flashing lights along the mountain tops for warning the trains and trucks of an approaching plane were also reported by our observers.

Rail breaks were simulated by strewing debris, mud, and straw across sections of track. Exposed locomotives were covered with foliage or straw, and, in the marshalling yards, supplies were never left uncovered. Wide dispersal and small stockpiles were standard Communist procedure. Around the logistic supply center of Yangdok, for example, were twelve supply storage areas and numerous vehicle parking areas, spread out over an area approximately two and one-half by five miles with the whole area heavily defended by automatic radar-laid guns.

Flak traps were plentiful in North Korea. An open parachute hung on a tree would be visibly exposed to lure an unwary pilot. Dummy trains, trucks, tanks, and even troops (made of straw and cardboard) were exposed at key points to welcome an attack. Tracks suggesting heavy traffic would be made leading to an important looking but empty building. Steel cables were stretched across the narrow valleys into which our planes would sometimes fly. Each of these flak traps was ringed with well-placed and well-concealed guns.

And there were many occasions of the Communists using our radio channels to give pilots false information. This latter trick was usually the least effective, for when the enemy radio was asked to authenticate, he would invariably go off the air.

Perhaps the most effective deception was the Reds’ practice of making both bridges and tracks usable by night and unserviceable by day. After the end of a night’s work, a crane would lift out a portable span and deposit it in a nearby tunnel until the next day. At those bridges spanning a river, a section of bridge would be floated clear, moored downstream, and camouflaged during the daylight hours. At such bridges, piles of construction material would be left visible to leave the impression of work in progress.

As for the rails, sections of track would be hand-carried into the nearest tunnel and concealed there during the daylight hours, leaving gaps in the lines which, to the pilots, gave the appearance of an unrepaiired break.

“Their repair work was simplicity itself,” said VADM J. J. Clark. “The minute darkness came, they would lay down the track. They didn’t prepare the roadbed; they just laid the cross ties in the mud, and as long as the cars would run, it was all right.”

In addition to their organized repair systems and their clever use of concealment and camouflage, the
Reds also responded to UN attacks upon interdiction targets with antiaircraft fire. The principal heavy gun was the Soviet 85-mm., a highly mobile and accurate gun mounted on four wheels, firing a 20-pound projectile to an effective altitude of 25,000 feet at the rate of 15 to 20 rounds per minute. The principal automatic weapon was the 37-mm. gun, also a four-wheel mobile unit, firing a 1.6-pound projectile at a rate of 160 rounds per minute.

The number of enemy antiaircraft guns increased steadily in direct ratio to the intensity of our attacks. In May of 1951, the number of heavy guns and automatic weapons in North Korea was estimated to be 925. By March of 1953, the Reds had increased this to 1670 heavy and automatic weapons (37-mm., 76-mm., and 85-mm.) and several thousand of smaller automatic weapons (12.7-mm.). The greatest part of these guns were known to be Soviet, including gun-laying Soviet radar. Some of the latter were mobile radar units which were constantly moved from area to area as the pattern of the UN attacks was varied. In “Death Valley,” west of Wonsan, VA-75 reported in August 1952 that during one attack, 350 to 400 bursts could be counted in the air.

The lower pilots carried their attacks (and in many cases only an on-the-deck delivery could insure the needed accuracy), the greater became the danger of flak damage. As in World War II, the majority of flak damage suffered by our airplanes was from small arms. It is interesting to note that while most of the propeller driven AD and F4U pilots (affectionately called “Able Dawgs” and “Hawgs” respectively) never realized the intensity of the small arms fire they were attracting because of engine and propeller noise, the jet pilots in their more silent cockpits were frequently able to hear the intense small arms fire from the ground. This was also confirmed by pilots shot down and later recovered.

To appreciate this growing flak problem, the experience of Air Group Five in 93 days of operations in 1951 is typical: its aircraft were hit 284 times.

From May until December 1951, the Navy lost 74 aircraft (but only 39 pilots); the Marines lost 39 aircraft (32 pilots) on interdiction missions. The number of aircraft struck by enemy fire was as follows:

- Dec. 1951–June 1952: Valley Forge, 551 aircraft struck

This table indicates the steady rise in the number of aircraft struck by antiaircraft fire from March 1951 until June 1952.

“This heavy build-up of enemy AA batteries,” said RADM John Perry, “also tied up many enemy personnel. In the seven months we were on the line, the increase was around 200 per cent—and it continued.”[13]

The last figure in the above table shows a sharp falling-off in the number of struck aircraft, due to several reasons. In August of 1952 Rear Admiral Apollo Soucek, CTF 77, ordered that future attacks upon interdiction targets south of Wonsan should not be carried below a minimum altitude of 3,000 feet.

Second, the naval aircraft changed their attack tactics. Wherever there were heavily defended targets (and by mid-1952 all of the key interdiction targets in North Korea were heavily defended), the invariable rule was to attack the guns themselves in conjunction with the interdiction target itself. Flak-suppression became standard procedure. Moreover, larger flights of planes were used, and the number of runs on the targets was reduced. Such countering tactics caused a rapid falling off in the damage being received by our aircraft.

Two conclusions follow from a study of the Communists’ reactions to the interdiction campaign. First, the tactics employed by the Reds, and the patience and persistence they displayed, were successful in Korea and may be expected to be seen again. Secondly, the primitiveness of the battle area with regard to its communication network was an advantage to the defenders.
The isolation of a fixed battlefield (using every method short of physical occupation) is a difficult task in any terrain, and under the accepted restrictions in Korea, the attempts at isolation proved to be unprofitable and unsuccessful.

It is appropriate now to determine why interdiction in Korea was unprofitable and did not succeed in “isolation of the battlefield.”

First of all, the means available to UN forces for the accomplishment of interdiction were varied and adequate. Three weapons systems were available: the airplane, the naval gun, and the raiding party.

The UN’s airplanes ran the gamut from the large B-29 to the Mosquito L-19; the naval gun from the 16-inch to the 20-mm., the bombs from 2,000-pounders to 100-pound delayed-action bombs. Air attacks could be massed and concentrated on key targets or they could be small and widespread among many targets. In addition, UN forces enjoyed the elements of surprise, initiative, and target selection.

In the inventory of UN aircraft, the precision instrument of naval aviation was to prove itself the most effective and versatile weapon of air interdiction. In particular, the AD Skyraider was to be the most successful airplane of the 37-month war. Only the Skyraider could carry and successfully deliver the 2,000-pound bomb with dive-bombing precision against the targets of interdiction: the bridge abutment or span, the tunnel mouth, and the cave entrance. The AD’s versatility and weight-lifting capacity (as much as 5,000 pounds on an average carrier mission) made it the war’s outstanding performer.

As the war progressed, jet aircraft became capable of carrying bombs, and they too proved to be very effective interdiction weapons, especially as the enemy’s antiaircraft efforts intensified. The jets’ silent approach, their speed and their steadiness as a weapons platform made them ideal interdiction weapons. Combat losses for the jets were only one-fourth those of the propeller types.

As for the naval gun, the venerable 16-inch gun demonstrated its effectiveness once again. No other size of shell could so effectively blast a coastal interdiction target as the old 16-inch. After such targets as bridge and tunnels had been demolished, the 5-inch guns of the destroyers could usually keep them inactivated; but the smaller naval guns could not profitably effect the initial destruction.

Thus, the means for accomplishing interdiction were obviously adequate. The failure in Korea cannot be laid to a lack of them.
The Sea War in Korea
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson

Chapter 8. The Struggle to Strangle
The Target Systems of the Communists

Next, it is necessary to examine the target systems of the Communists’ logistic networks.
Broadly speaking, there are three main parts to any logistic system: (1) the sources of raw materials; (2) the points of manufacture; and (3) the distribution system.

During the Korean war, two of these three, and part of the third, could not be attacked and destroyed because of the UN’s own decision.

Thus, one of the chief reasons for the failure of the interdiction campaign in Korea was the fact that the UN could not attack the most vulnerable parts of a supply system—the sources and the points of manufacture. Only the exposed portions of the supply system in Korea could be attacked.

Having been limited to the supply system in Korea, the UN forces had their choice of four types of interdiction targets. First, there were the supply routes themselves: the bridges, tunnels, tracks, roadbeds. Second, there was the rolling stock: locomotives and boxcars, trucks, wagons and carts. Third, there were the personnel who repaired and operated the supply networks; fourth, the stockpiles of materials and supplies in transit or in dumps.

Two of these four target systems were unprofitable for systematic air attack. Obviously, with unlimited manpower available to the Koreans and Chinese, attacking the personnel operating or repairing the supply routes was infeasible. As for attacking the supplies themselves, either in transit or in dumps, this would scarcely have decisive effect for two reasons. First, the origins of the supplies were untouchable. Second, the Communists’ ability to hide, camouflage, and disperse supplies in the hundreds of caves, tunnels, and huts was acknowledged.

Thus, only two target systems in Korea were left for attack: the rolling stock and the routes themselves. Attacks upon the rolling stock had the disadvantage, once again, of not being able to touch the sources. There was an almost limitless source of trucks and trains in Manchuria; those vehicles and rolling stock destroyed or damaged in Korea need only be replaced. For an interdiction effort to be effective on this target system, the attacks on rolling stock had to inflict damage at a rate exceeding the enemy’s capacity for replacement—a highly unlikely performance.

The remaining target system was the route itself. At first glance Korea’s looked ideal, choked as it was with bridges, tunnels, and the mountains crowding and twisting the roadbeds and rail lines into devious routes. On the other hand, with the limited number of airplanes available, not every one of the 956 bridges could be demolished, not every one of the 231 tunnels blocked.

Three patterns of attack could be followed: (1) key bridges could be cut, and kept cut; (2) a belt across Korea could be selected and every supply route and target within it destroyed; and (3), widespread damage could be effected upon the roads and rail lines themselves.

This analysis indicates that true isolation of the battlefield, under the UN’s self-imposed restrictions, was never achievable in Korea. Of this effort, General Mark Clark wrote: “The Air Force and the Navy carriers may have kept us from losing the war, but they were denied the opportunity of influencing the outcome decisively in our favor. They gained complete mastery of the skies, gave magnificent support to the infantry, destroyed every worthwhile target in North Korea, and took a costly toll of enemy personnel and supplies. But as in Italy, where we learned the same bitter lesson in the same kind of rugged country, our airpower could not keep a steady stream of enemy supplies and reinforcements from reaching the battle line. Air could not isolate the front.”[14]

The U.S. Navy can take great pride that it came as close as it did.
The Sea War in Korea  
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson

Chapter 8. The Struggle to Strangle  
Summary

For naval men, interference with an enemy’s logistical system has been a traditional occupation throughout history by naval blockade and by direct attacks upon enemy shipping at sea. However, the interference with an enemy’s land supply in his own territory is a relatively new factor in warfare introduced since the advent of the airplane. Not until World War II did interference with an enemy’s logistical system by air reach a significant scale of effort. The ultimate of land logistical interdiction—strategic bombing—was extensively used during World War II in an effort to destroy the opponent's logistical systems in enemy territory.

In modern war, the factor of logistics has come to be an equal partner with strategy and tactics. Strategic bombing, in the broadest sense, is as an interdiction effort—distant interdiction to be sure, as opposed to the commonly understood definition of interdiction as meaning isolation of the immediate battlefield. But wherever interdiction is applied, near the zone of the battlefield or distantly from it, it is still logistical interference.

The failure of air power, through interdiction, to stop the fighting in Korea follows a historic pattern. Except in a few isolated instances during World War II (such as the Normandy landings), there is much evidence to show that an air effort to interrupt an enemy’s supply system has never been wholly successful. In World War II, the Luftwaffe failed to starve Britain; the Anglo-American air offensive against the Nazi war-making machinery did not prevent an increase in military production even as late as July 1944. Air interdiction of the battlefront failed in Italy, on a peninsula and in terrain that was prophetic of Korea. There, in the spring of 1944, an intensive air effort had been made to sever the German supply lines and to reduce German supply levels in order to force their retreat. Despite great efforts which achieved limited successes (at times all the Po River bridges were out of commission), the air interdiction campaign in Italy was never decisive upon the conduct of ground operations.[14A] It harassed, it hurt, it impeded the enemy; but it did not have critical results upon the ground fighting.[14B]

In the Pacific, the B-29 bomb and fire-bomb attacks on Japan’s industrial cities critically damaged that nation’s war-making potential. But there is ample evidence to show that the Japanese were already fast becoming prostrate from the strangulation of the prolonged naval blockade.

Thus, the failure of air power to interdict a battlefield in Korea was not the first time.

On 6 April 1955, almost two years after the truce in Korea, the Red Chinese in a broadcast over the Peking radio, stated that the United Nations “mobilized more than 2,000 military aircraft and still failed to cut off the supply line to tiny North Korea.”[15] Regrettably, though their arithmetic was wrong, their conclusion was right.

For many months—from early 1951 through 1952—almost 100 per cent of the offensive effort of the carriers, 60 per cent of the offensive effort of the shore-based Marines’ aircraft, 70 per cent of the offensive effort of the Fifth Air Force, and 70 per cent of the blockading efforts of the ships along the east coast was devoted to interdiction. These percentages fluctuated from month to month, and in the last year of the war, as has been recorded, interdiction had less emphasis. Nevertheless, these percentages generally reflect the weight and scale of effort which was made to isolate the Korean battlefield. In the first eighteen months of the interdiction campaign, Task Force 77 flew 20,567 armed reconnaissance and interdiction flights; the Marines ashore flew 25,266 reconnaissance and interdiction flights; the FEAF (Far East Air Force) flew 126,702 reconnaissance and interdiction flights; and Task Force 95 fired 230,000 rounds of ammunition on interdiction missions.

Despite this effort, the enemy was never kept from supplying his needed requirements. At no time—
except locally and temporarily—did the enemy limit his combat effort because of supply considerations.

By every index, in fact, the Communists were able to steadily increase their flow of supplies to the frontlines. Total over-all rail sightings held steadily throughout the war. Antiaircraft fire increased. Vehicular sightings increased from month to month.

All these facts are made more significant when it is appreciated that the enemy forces at the front were supported by long supply lines which were confined to a closely blockaded peninsula, and which were under constant, largely unopposed, attacks by considerable air strength. At the same time, our own supply pipeline was never under attack.

However, because of the limitations imposed which forced airpower to confine interdiction to only a small part of the weakest element of the enemy’s logistical system, it does not follow that, having failed in Korea, interdiction must always fail. The full effects of atomic weapons upon an interdiction campaign cannot now be foretold.

In summary, six major reasons are given as to why airpower failed to interdict the Korean battlefield. If these problems are not encountered in a future conflict, or if they are solved, then isolation of a battlefield may yet be effected.

First, interdiction failed because of the ability of the Communists to absorb widespread and heavy punishment, and, through use of unlimited manpower, to keep their highways and rail lines operating. Second, interdiction failed in Korea because UN forces could not attack the sources and fountainheads of the supply lines.

Third, interdiction failed in Korea because of our inability to find and destroy at night, and in inclement weather, the small individual targets of interdiction which we were able to destroy in daylight.

Fourth, interdiction failed because of the stalemated war. Had the fighting been fluid, the Communists’ rate of usage would have increased greatly. Then they would have been forced to use the rails and roads by day. “After my first month on the line with TF-77,” said RADM John Perry, “I never believed that complete interdiction was possible with the tools we had available. I did believe—and still do—that in a fluid, as opposed to the existing static campaign, we could cut down enemy supplies to the point where he could not long sustain a major forward move.”[16] In the words of General James Van Fleet: “If we had ever put on some pressure and made him fight, we would have given him an insoluble supply problem. Instead, we fought the Communist on his own terms, even though we had the advantages of flexibility, mobility, and firepower. We fought his way, which was terrible. We both sat, and dug in, and he was the superior rat. He was small; he could dig holes faster; and if he lost a hundred people in a hole, he’d just go out and find another hundred.

“We might have interdicted the battlefield if we’d attacked, using our advantages and superior weapons. Then we would have made him use up his supplies faster than he could supply himself.”[17]

Fifth, interdiction failed because of the very primitive nature of the enemy’s exposed supply network.

Sixth, interdiction failed owing to our inability to use the one weapon—the atomic bomb—in our arsenal which might have severed Communist supply lines in Korea.
The Sea War in Korea
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson

Chapter 9. The Seaborne Artillery
Establishment of Blockade

On 4 July 1950, the following broadcast was made to all shipping in the Pacific Ocean:
“The President of the United States, in keeping with the United Nations Security Council’s request for support to the Republic of Korea in repelling the Northern Korean invaders and restoring peace in Korea, has ordered a naval blockade of the Korean coast.”

While this broadcast did not mention the limits of the blockade, they were 39°-35' N on the west coast, and 41°-51' N on the east coast. These limits were established to keep all sea forces well clear of both Russian and Chinese territory. [1]

The imposition of a blockade of Korea was not without legal difficulties. The Soviet Union and Communist China both denounced the blockade and refused to acknowledge its existence or legality although both observed it. Early in July 1950, Admiral Joy queried Admiral Sherman: Were Soviet or Chinese merchantmen to be barred from North Korean ports? Admiral Sherman’s reply was in strict accord with International Law. All warships not under United Nations command, he said, including Russian, would be permitted to enter North Korean ports, except of course, North Korean. All other type ships were barred.

As the war opened, the forces for establishing a blockade were meager:

On 29 June 1950, the first shore bombardment of the war was fired by Juneau at Okkye on the east coast. The target was enemy personnel, and four hundred and fifty-nine 5-inch shells were fired at them. Twenty-seven casualties were reported. Okkye was again a target for Juneau’s guns on 30 June.

The initial United States naval action of the war took place on Sunday, 2 July, when Juneau (in company with Jamaica and Black Swan) sighted four North Korean torpedo boats in the vicinity of Chumunjin, on Korea’s east coast. The four torpedo boats, escorting a small coastal convoy of ten trawlers, were steaming southward when the two groups sighted each other shortly after sunrise.

As the three UN ships turned toward them, the four North Korean torpedo boats made a gallant but futile attack, firing their small guns but failing to launch torpedoes because of VT-fuzed shells exploding around them. The first UN salvo blew up and sank one torpedo boat, halted and burned a second, while the remaining two raced off in opposite directions. One of these two beached itself and was destroyed by gunfire; the other, heading seaward and zigzagging violently, managed to evade the pursuing Black Swan. Small-caliber enemy shore guns fired a few rounds at the three UN ships, one shell landing near Juneau’s port quarter, but achieved no hits.

The next morning, the Juneau discovered the ten trawlers which had taken refuge in Chumunjin, and, according to later reports, sank seven of them.

These two episodes were the opening actions in a blockade and bombardment effort which was to stretch on for more than three years—an effort unique in American naval history. In many respects it was a “crazy, mixed-up” naval blockade, where trains and trucks on land were chased by ships at sea; where Communist troops almost 20 miles from the oceans felt the shock of naval gunfire.

Hereafter, there would be no active surface opposition, no submarine opposition, and practically no enemy air opposition to the blockade. UN naval forces, led by the U.S. Navy, would have complete control of the entire five-hundred-odd miles of the North Korean coastline.

Notwithstanding these facts, the imposition of a blockade of the Korean coast was neither easy nor
simple. The geography of the peninsula was a handicap. The western coast, with its 30-foot tides, was a network of embayments, estuaries, and hundreds of off-lying islands, vast mudbanks, numerous shoals, and uncharted rocks. The east coast was precipitous, largely barren, and suitable for mining in many areas. The current on both coasts, and the several Korean rivers emptying into both the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan, lent themselves to the use of “drifter” mines. These physical features made the application of a blockade difficult.

Second, the blockade was imposed thousands of miles from the American mainland.

Third, the number of ships for blockading and bombardment purposes was never plentiful.

Fourth, the legal requirement for an effective blockade required that every portion of the blockaded coast had to be under surveillance once every twenty-four hours by ship (not by air).

The enemy was destined to resist the naval blockade and bombardment cunningly and to the limit of his ability. The thirty-six months which followed saw him make great use of mines; he also opposed the blockade and bombardment with coastal and shore defense batteries so well hidden and so deeply tunnelled into the rocky hills of the Korean coast that they were often able to defy the UN’s naval strength.

That this naval blockade around Korea was a success, that it hampered, embarrassed, and hurt the enemy, there can be no doubt. The ingenuity, aggressiveness, and persistence displayed by UN naval forces in imposing a resolute blockade at a distance of 5,000 miles from the American continent is worthy of record as well as of tribute.

Minesweepers, frigates, destroyer escorts, destroyers, cruisers, and battleships of the U.S. Navy, and units from seven other navies of the UN, plus the ROK Navy, were destined to fight a bitter, unglamorous, and seemingly futile war along the coastlines of Korea. Many ships were to be hit; an unlucky few were to be sunk. By and large, the headlines of the war would not recognize these surface forces. Their work would largely go untold and unrewarded. VIPs would come and go in a steady parade through the Korean theater—to visit the frontlines, to witness operations aboard carriers and battleships, but only rarely to observe the smaller ships of the blockade and bombardment force in action.

Click here to view map

To the “small boys” especially, it was a dreary and often dangerous campaign of constant blockade and bombardment, essential to the war effort and necessary to the support of the fighting ashore.
The USS *Juneau* had the honor of conducting both the first landing and the first raiding party in Korea. “When the war began,” said CAPT W. B. Porter,[1A] *Juneau*’s executive officer, “the *Juneau* was anchored in Kagoshima Harbor. We were having an official party—the first one since the end of the war—honoring the local Japanese officials. During the afternoon, we commenced receiving messages announcing an ‘incident’ in Korea, and telling us to stand by. As unobtrusively as possible, we discontinued the party and sent the Japanese guests ashore.

“The *Juneau*’s orders,” said Captain Porter, “were to proceed immediately to investigate landings on Kojo-do island. We arrived there the next morning (28 June) shortly before dawn.

“On arrival, the question arose, ‘How does one commence an investigation of ‘landings’ when no amphibious forces (as we know them, but only sampans) were used?’ Admiral Higgins decided to send me ashore to investigate.

“I took four Marines with me in the whaleboat. We carried along a large American flag tied to a boat hook. I also had a walkie-talkie radio and one of those ‘how to’ instruction books for learning Japanese in three weeks. My orders were to investigate, but not to do any shooting except in self-defense.

“We ran into the harbor and went ashore, and after a cautious parade down the muddy village street, sighted a Korean who was marching back and forth with a carbine over his shoulder. At this time the big problem was to distinguish a *South* Korean from a *North* Korean. They all looked alike. However, the villagers soon commenced to bring us tea and hard-boiled eggs. We knew then that they were friendly.

“With hand signals and the aid of the language book, I was able to make it clear to the sentry that I wanted to contact someone of importance. About 11 a.m., we managed to get Pusan on the phone and I talked to the American Consul there. He said that the only landings that he knew of were reported to be at Munsan.

“Whereupon we went back to the whaleboat and back to the *Juneau* which all this time had been covering us with her guns.

“The *Juneau* got under way again, and steamed up to the vicinity of Munsan. This time we had to lie offshore quite a distance, and it took our whaleboat about an hour to get my party ashore.

“Once again, we weren’t certain whether or not the spot we were landing was in enemy or friendly hands. We simply walked inland until we came to a road. I posted Marines on each side of the road in the underbrush. Pretty soon, along came a truck. The Marines jumped out onto the road, halted the truck, ordered out the occupants (who seemed to be civilians), and we turned the truck around and drove back into Munsan.

“We went to the police station and contacted the chief of police. He spoke some English and was able to tell us that the only enemy landings he had heard about had taken place near the village of Samchok.

“That was the way we got our information during the first few hours of the war.”

The important point for record is that the first Americans ashore after the declaration of war was a group of U.S. Marines led by a naval officer from the USS *Juneau*. 
As described in earlier chapters, the period between the commencement of the war on 25 June 1950 and the Inchon landing on 15 September 1950 was one of retreat to a defensible perimeter around Pusan. Four elements of naval support proved vital in the salvation of Pusan:

1. The amphibious landing at Pohang
2. The air strikes of naval and marine aircraft
3. The effective and timely operations of the First Provisional Marine Brigade
4. The bombardment fire of naval ships along the east coast of South Korea.

In the first three months of the Korean war, with sea forces limited and the ground issue in Korea much in doubt, the task of blockade was relegated to secondary importance. Every enemy soldier who could be killed or wounded by naval gunfire, every train or truck that could be stopped, every pound of supplies that could be demolished, would relieve pressure on the endangered Pusan beachhead. The firepower of the Navy’s blockading forces was used for the twin tasks of supporting the ground forces with naval gunfire, and the destruction of as much of the enemy’s forces and equipment, then enroute to the front, as possible.

Destruction along the enemy’s logistic routes was accomplished by the blockade force in two ways: by gunfire and by raiding parties.

Between 29 June and 15 September, inclusive, the ships of the blockade force bombarded strictly military targets along the enemy-held east coast 89 times. Thousands of tons of projectiles destroyed and damaged bridges, warehouses, troops, railroads, tunnels, pillboxes, marshalling yards, factories, oil dumps, and guns. Never again were enemy targets so plentiful. Never again was the enemy’s retaliation so light.

For one entire month, until the arrival in the area of the ships of Task Force Yoke on 21 July, the original ships of the Far East Navy had the Korean coasts exclusively to themselves. Juneau, Mansfield, De Haven, Swenson, and Collett, like hungry dogs in an unattended butchershop, had more than they could handle.

Rear Admiral Higgins’ eastern Korean Support Group made an impressive contribution to the eastern anchor of the endangered and shrinking battline of the Pusan perimeter in mid-July 1950 near the vicinity of Yongdok. Around this village the Korean mountains halted abruptly and fell precipitously into the sea, and the cliffside roads were compressed against the seashore conveniently exposed to naval gunfire.

At this time in this area, the Third ROK Division was stubbornly retreating before the stabbing attacks of several North Korean divisions. The ROK’s only artillery support was that supplied by the ships.

“The situation ashore was still obscure,” said British Admiral Andrewes,[2] “the communications with the Army almost nonexistent. So my fleet gunnery officer with an officer from the USS Juneau and the Royal Artillery bombardment liaison officer were landed with the object of finding out what was happening. They established communication with an American battalion ashore and arranged a system of wireless communication by giving the Army one Navy wireless set and taking from the Army one Army wireless set for HMS Belfast and USS Juneau. The party returned on board their ships at about 2130 in a ROK warship of some antiquity.”

The evening of 19 July found Juneau, Higbee, De Haven, Swenson, and Mansfield, with the British cruiser Belfast, close ashore to Yongdok. The Korean Military Advisory Group, Lieutenant Colonel Rollins S. Emmerich, USA, senior officer, was attached to the Third ROK Division. Emmerich had earlier radioed instructions for naval targets and would spot the naval ship’s fire.

At 1900, the two cruisers and four destroyers opened fire upon the designated targets: troop
concentrations, road junctions and artillery emplacements. *Belfast* fired nine-gun salvoes with controlled spots; *Juneau’s* fire was deliberate, also using controlled spots. The destroyers joined in, as well as supplying night illumination fire. Two hundred and ninety-seven shells struck the entrenched enemy in Yongdok.

Admiral Higgins reported that the village was destroyed, that large fires were started, and that smoke was still visible to the ships some 12 hours later.[3] Rear Admiral Higgins congratulated Captain St. Clair-Ford’s fast-firing *Belfast* crew, saying that her guns had spoken “with authority.”

U.S. Army observers on the battleline spotting the fire of the naval ships were effusive. Major V. W. Bennett, U.S. Army, stated that “naval cooperation was of a superior quality.” LTCOL Emmerich added “. . . This coordination and use of naval gunfire caused the largest proportions of the Fifth North Korean Division casualties. . . . The naval bombardments were terrific.”[4]

Commander Robert A. Schelling of *Swenson* wrote in his war diary for 24 July 1950:

“Report from ashore spotters: ‘Fire on enemy personnel in large numbers southeast of Yongdok inflicted heavy casualties. Best day yet.’ I interrogated a North Korean prisoner who stated: ‘Your artillery is hell. Every time you fire you kill or wound many soldiers. . . .’”

Higgins reported to Joy the results of his east coast gunfire support work in these words:

“. . . By directly supporting our hard-pressed forces ashore, the enemy’s advance on Pohang was definitely slowed. In the past 24 hours our ships have broken up enemy attacks, silenced enemy batteries, destroyed their observation posts, interdicted their traffic and troop concentrations, and made Yongdok untenable for their forces with heavy personnel losses at Yongdok.”
By late July, additional ships had sailed into Korean waters in answer to the United Nations’ appeal for sea forces: three cruisers (*Helena*, *Toledo*, *HMS Kenya*), four U.S. destroyers (from DesRon-11), two British destroyers, one Australian destroyer, three Canadian destroyers, two New Zealand frigates, and one Dutch destroyer.[44A]

Upon arrival of these additional forces, Admiral Joy promulgated a new operation order placing all blockade and support ships in a single task force (96.5) under the command of Commander Cruiser Division Three, Rear Admiral C. C. Hartman.

The task of blockading Korea was divided between east and west coasts. The west coast of Korea was assigned by Admiral Joy to the British forces under Rear Admiral William G. Andrewes, RN (TE 96.53) while the east coast was assigned to U.S. forces in two elements: TG 96.51, under Rear Admiral C. C. Hartman, USN, aboard *Helena* (who, in addition to being in tactical command of a task group was also in administrative command of the task force), and 96.52 under Rear Admiral John M. Higgins, USN, who had transferred his flag to the USS *Toledo*.

“The main factors contributing to my decision to assign the U.S. Navy to the east coast and the British to the west coast were purely tactical in nature,” said Vice Admiral Joy. “For one reason, the east coast with its longer coastline and more numerous accessible targets required more ships for blockade, as well as bombardment and interdiction missions, than the British could muster. Furthermore, since our fast carriers would be operating most of the time in the Sea of Japan it was thought best from the standpoint of coordination to have U.S. ships rather than British operating in the same area as the carriers.”

*Higbee* (DD-806) (CDR Elmer Moore) was the first destroyer from Task Force Yoke to see action.

Joining cruisers *Belfast* and *Juneau* on 21 July near Yongdok, *Higbee* squeezed off forty-six 5-inch shells. *Higbee* had the satisfaction of hearing that her fire assisted the ROK troops in briefly recapturing the town.

The cruisers *Toledo* (CAPT Richard F. Stout) and *Helena* (CAPT Harold O. Larson) were the first heavy augmenting ships to arrive. With *Collett* and *Mansfield*, *Toledo* was in action near the now enemy-occupied city of Yongdok on 27 July. Her 79 shells of 8-inch high-capacity fire were directed upon troops and military targets.

*Helena* fired the first of the thousands of shells she was to expend during the course of the Korean war at the railroad marshalling yards, trains and power plant near Tanchon on 7 August 1950. Altogether, *Helena* fired one hundred and eighty-five 8-inch shells at these targets.

August 8, 1950 saw *Toledo*, *Helena* and *De Haven* get two important east coast bridges.

With exactly 100 rounds, *Toledo* and *De Haven* demolished the bridge at Samchok.

*Helena* dropped a bridge near Chongjin, but with more difficulty.

“On 8 August, I carried LT R. F. Noble, USMC, as a bombardment spotter,” recorded LT Harold W. Swinburne, Jr., *Helena*’s helicopter pilot. “It was the first time a helicopter had ever been used for this sort of work. Our orders were to pick out suitable targets for the main batteries of the USS *Helena*. We selected a railroad bridge. On the first firing run, the ship fired numerous salvos, but only minor damage was done. After coming about to a new firing course, we asked that only one gun be fired for spotting purposes. The first shell was a direct hit and the bridge dropped into the water. The experiment was a success!”[5]
The USS *Juneau* also had the distinction of putting the first raiding and demolition party onto the Korean peninsula.

“On 6 July,” said CAPT Porter, “the *Juneau* received a despatch from COMNAVFE addressed to Admiral Higgins saying that if we could disrupt the east coast rail line in the vicinity of Rashin, we could force the Reds to re-route all the rail traffic to the west coast network.

“We got the charts of the area out and chose an appropriate target that looked to be right on the beach. The target was one of the numerous rail tunnels, and it was our plan to rig demolition charges inside and thereby inactivate both the tunnel and the track.

“Before the *Juneau* left Sasebo, I had managed to secure from Fleet activities several Army-type demolition charges, plus detonators, walkie-talkie radios, and the other equipment. I had organized a small commando outfit in a ship which I commanded during World War II, so I was not a complete amateur, although I was far from being a demolition expert. Lieutenant Johnson, the *Juneau*’s junior Marine officer, had also had some experience.

“The *Juneau* proceeded to the target area, arriving during the night hours of 11-12 July. We transferred to the destroyer *Mansfield* at 1945, about fifteen miles off the coast, and the latter destroyer took us in to about two miles off the beach. Then we transferred to the *Mansfield* whaleboat.

“Each man in my party[6] was carrying quite a load. I personally had 50 pounds of explosives, a carbine, a box of detonators, a chart, a compass, and a walkie-talkie radio.

“As we approached the beach, it was about 2 a.m. The night was very black and very dark, but the sea was calm. It was difficult in the darkness to estimate distance. A moderate surf was running, and as we neared it (about 30 yards distant, we judged), I asked the coxswain of the whaleboat if he knew how to beach a whaleboat, using a stern anchor. He said no. Just as I commenced explaining to him how to do it, he tossed the anchor over the side.

“We paid out 45 fathoms of line, then attempted to take soundings with paddles, but were unable to touch bottom. We bent on more line to the anchor line, since we still had an estimated 20 yards to go to reach the beach. About this time, the anchor line got fouled in the screw, so we cut it loose and paddled into the beach.

“Just before landing, we heard—and then saw—a locomotive pulling three or four boxcars crossing a cut directly ahead of us. It went into one tunnel, out again, and into a second.

“At any rate, I ordered the landing party out of the boat, and I jumped into the water, carrying my own load. The water was just over my head, and it was a tiring struggle to get ashore. I left two marine guards on the beach, and the rest of us started inland.

“Contrary to our maps, which indicated that the area was flat, the area where we had landed was very hilly and at the beach almost precipitous. It had a 60-degree grade, and was faced with loose rock. This made the upward climb very slow, and there was danger of the party being carried to the bottom under an avalanche of rock. Moreover, there was no rail line near the beach. A collection of fishermen’s huts was on our left, about a quarter-mile distant. We trudged inland, leaving our whaleboat crew making repeated dives to clear the fouled propeller.

“For about an hour and a half we worked our way inland over the very hilly and rocky terrain. In the pitchblack darkness I navigated as best I could, using my Army compass and chart.
“Finally, we spotted the lights of a train behind us, and then realized we had gone over the top of our target and past the rail line. (Later I figured we had gone about three miles inland.)

“We worked laboriously back to the rail line, and found the tunnel. It was about 150 yards long. At the south end of the tunnel there was a large trestle over a deep ravine. I posted one of my two remaining Marines at the north end of the tunnel and the other Marine at the south end of this trestle. The Marine officer, LT Johnson, looked after our security while we worked.

“The four gunner’s mates and I started shoveling a trench crosswise beneath the rail line in the middle of the tunnel. We dug a trench about one foot deep and five feet long, planted the charges, and put in several detonators each way along the track. After the charges were rigged, I sent one gunner’s mate up to get the Marine at the north end of the tunnel and I proceeded in the darkness down the other direction to notify the other Marine. As I walked along the trestle I lost my footing in the darkness and slipped beneath the ties, dropping the walkie-talkie and my compass. My elbows caught the ties and prevented my fall, but I got skinned up in the process.

“The rest of the mission was without further incident and we walked back to the beach. During our absence the whaleboat crew had succeeded in clearing her screw. We shoved off immediately, and as we neared the Mansfield, we heard a train coming from the north. A few seconds later, we saw the flash of our demolition charges as the train tripped them.

“Two days later, the Air Force took pictures of the tunnel area and confirmed the destruction of the train. In the pictures you could still see it sticking out of the tunnel.”

On the 6th of August, following this success, a special operations group was established aboard the USS H. A. Bass (APD-124) (LCDR Alan Ray, USN) composed of elements of the Marine First Reconnaissance Company (Major Edward P. Dupras, USMC) and Underwater Demolition Team No. One (LCDR David F. Welch, USN). This group would operate under the command of Comtransdiv-111 (CDR S. C. Small, USN) to make a total of six raids (three on each coast) between the 12th and 25th of August, for the purpose of destroying enemy railroads and bridges, and to obtain needed intelligence.

The 14 August attack was typical of the destruction accomplished by these raids. Shortly before midnight, the H. A. Bass approached the east coast area at Iwon, 41 -20' N. The target, code-named “King,” was a 200-foot stretch of railroad track between two tunnels. Lying offshore in the darkness, Bass lowered her LCPR (Landing Craft, Personnel, Reconnaissance) and put aboard the raiding party. Directed by radio to a point within 500 yards of the beach, the party then disembarked into rubber boats. The Marines paddled through the surf to reconnoiter and secure the objective area; when this was done, the demolition crews were called to come in. The “Utes” rigged charges on both tunnels and on the track itself.

Returning to their boats and paddling clear of the beach, the raiding party was rewarded with the sight of seeing the objective area obliterated as the heavy charges exploded.[6A]

The result of these raids was to retard the advance of the Communists down the coastal road to Pusan.
In early August 1950, with the Communists pressing relentlessly toward Pusan, questions were asked as to whether the naval blockade was effective. Air power had taken credit for making the enemy's rail lines inoperable, especially during daylight. All over Korea, roads, bridges, locomotives, and rolling stock had been reported as destroyed. It was axiomatic that an advancing army of 140,000 Communists needed vast quantities of munitions, supplies, personnel, and food, and that all of it could not be hand-carried. How were the Communists supplying themselves?

To some who struggled with this problem, it was an easy jump from an erroneous premise to a false conclusion. If the rail lines were inoperable, obviously the supplies were being moved by sea, perhaps at night. Hadn't aircraft often reported groups of ships, as many as a hundred in a group, all along both coasts? One mission report, typical of others, reported the destruction of a 10,000-ton ship in Inchon harbor. Wasn't this proof of the sea-lifting tactics of the Reds?

“During this period,” said Vice Admiral Joy, “I was frequently asked to intensify my naval blockade of Korea. Many felt that the Reds were getting a large proportion of their supplies by water, possibly in small leapfrogging operations at night. The west coast, with its hundreds of islands, made this supposition easy to come by.

“Frequent aircraft reports were received during this period that large numbers of junks or other ships had been sighted, here one day, there another. Immediately it was assumed that these fleets were supply armadas, and I was so informed. I had conferences with my commanders—Rear Admiral Higgins, Rear Admiral Hartman of our east coast blockade forces, and Rear Admiral Andrewes, the British west coast blockade commander.

“All of us agreed that while a small amount of sea traffic might be moving, it was very slight and not significant. Admiral Andrewes offered to employ his aircraft from HMS Triumph to photograph every port and inlet on the west coast to corroborate that the supplies were not coming by sea. I accepted his offer.”

The admiral also asked the patrol squadrons to check the reports of the “supply armadas.” Invariably the reported fleets were investigated and photographed and found to be fishing fleets. The 10,000-ton freighter reported bombed and sunk in Inchon harbor could not be found the following day by Admiral Andrewes’ bombardment ships.

“Through our night and day patrols, both radar and visual,” said CDR A. F. Farwell, Commanding Officer, Patrol Squadron SIX, “I was able to assure COMNAVFE that the enemy’s supplies were not coming by sea, even in minute quantities. We then set out to get positive information on how the Reds were supplying themselves; we succeeded in getting photographs of camouflaged bypass railroad tracks around the ruined bridges, running over crude log caissons placed in the stream beds. We made photographs of tunnels which showed smoke coming out of trains which were hiding in them, waiting for nightfall.

“Thus, emphasis was shifted back to the railroads. Then when the enemy commenced running trucks at night, the flare-dropping technique was born.”
On 12 September 1950, a change was made in the composition of the blockading and bombardment forces. Rear Admiral Allan E. Smith, USN, broke his flag in USS \textit{Dixie} (AD-14) (CAPT J. M. Cabanillas, USN) at Sasebo and assumed command of the new Task Force 95.\textsuperscript{[7A]} Henceforth, TF-95 would carry on until the end of the fighting as the “United Nations Blockading and Escort Force.”

While this history concerns the U.S. Navy, no record of the blockade and bombardment effort in Korea can be made without recording the valuable contributions of the combatant vessels of nine other nations: Australia, Canada, Colombia, France, Thailand, Great Britain, Netherlands, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea.

Ships of the naval forces of these nations served with credit and effectiveness in the blockade and bombardment effort. This common effort raised many problems: logistic, communication, tactical, operational, and doctrinal. How could a New Zealand destroyer refuel from a U.S. tanker? How could communication and phraseology be standardized? How could recognition signals and signal difficulties be solved? Could olive oil for baking Turkish bread be supplied—or small foul-weather clothing for the men of the Thai frigate?

The solution of these day-by-day problems made significant progress in teaching the naval forces of the free world to work together smoothly and as a team.

So effective was the co-operation and harmony of the forces of the UN Navy that RADM George C. Dyer, the fourth officer to command CTF-95, was prompted to say that “Without any reservations, the association of all these navies together has not only been a very cordial and profitable one on an official basis, and at the highest levels, but on the unofficial and ship’s company levels. There has been no major difficulty.”

As has been stated, Task Force 95 had the official title “United Nations Blockading and Escort Force.” A major part of this force, Task Group 95.1, patrolling Korea’s west coast, was commanded throughout the war by a British Rear Admiral. On the east coast, the elements of Task Group 95.2 were frequently commanded by naval officers of the other nations of the UN Navy.

The west coast blockade group, Task Group 95.1, contained three principal elements: the carrier element, the surface blockade and patrol element, and the west coast island defense element.

One United States and one British or Australian carrier furnished the air coverage in Task Element 95.11, relieving each other on a ten-day rotation basis. Flying from the American CVE or CVL was a U.S. Marine squadron. One of the main tasks of TE 95.11 was the harassment of junk traffic in the Taedong River estuary. Task Unit 95.11 also flew interdiction and close air support missions over Eighth Army’s left flank.

The patrol and blockade by Task Group 95.1 of Korea’s west coast differed from that of the east coast in many respects, principally due to dissimilar hydrographic and geographic conditions. The west coast was a honeycomb of islands; it was an area of high tides, of mud banks, shallows, and difficult channels. Many of the Korean rivers emptied into the Yellow Sea. Nowhere was the water more than 60 fathoms in depth. And within 10 miles of the shore, the depth was less than 20 fathoms. As a consequence, large vessels could not operate as close inshore on the west coast as was often possible on the east coast. The bombardment effort, therefore, was not as great.

In further contrast to the east coast, the more numerous islands made the guerrilla problem on the west coast much more difficult. In the last 18 months of the war, there was a contest with the Communists for control of key islands above the 38th parallel. On some of these captured islands, UN forces had placed radar stations for
the control and direction of the UN air forces’ aircraft. Some west coast islands served as search and rescue stations for parachuting airmen whose aircraft had suffered damage over “MIG alley.” Other west coast islands served well as intelligence outposts. Supporting the west coast islands, therefore, was a much greater part of the over-all task than on the east coast.

The mine menace on the west coast was also different—“better” in the sense that the range of the tides often exposed mines at low water; “worse” in the sense that the enemy could plant mines with greater ease.

Finally, the blockade problem on the west coast was more difficult because of the navigation hazards posed by fast currents, mudbanks, and high tides. Numerous rocks and shoals made a close approach to the mainland hazardous and in many places impossible.

Throughout the blockade of the Korean coasts, the ships of the UN Navy acquitted themselves ably and with distinction. American ships, operating with the carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and frigates of other navies, learned many valuable lessons and techniques from their UN sailing partners that would prove of great value in subsequent years.

Admiral Sir Roderick McGregor, GCB, DSO, RN, following an inspection trip to Korea, had these words of praise for the UN Navy: “I have been much impressed by the way in which the navies of so many nations are co-operating in the Korean War. In spite of differences in language and customs, warships of different navies are operating as one against the common enemy.”

Admiral Joy was also laudatory.

“T have only the highest praise for the manner in which our allies contributed to the war effort of the UN Navy,” he wrote. “Their co-operation was all that could be desired and they performed every task assigned them, no matter how difficult, with zeal and ability that always evoked my admiration.”
One of Rear Admiral Smith’s first acts after taking command of TF-95 was to issue an order restricting fishing by North Koreans. Until September 1950, there was no formal interference with fishing activities.

Fish was the main staple of the Korean diet.

In 1939, for example, the Korean fishing industry had ranked third in the world. Along the peninsula’s 11,000-mile coastline, where warm and cold water currents joined, were 75 kinds of edible fish, including shrimps, clams, oysters, sardines, crabs, cod and abalones. Other Korean sea food was seaweed, sea slugs and whale meat. In peacetime, approximately 300,000 tons of fish were consumed annually by the Koreans.

Rear Admiral Smith took the attitude that this sea food was legitimate contraband and should be stringently denied the Communists. The restriction of fishing by the UN blockading force would seriously add to the Communists’ logistics problems ashore, and force them to import fish from Chinese and Russian sources. The restriction would also be a psychological inducement for the North Koreans to turn against their Communist masters. Moreover, as the war progressed there was conclusive evidence that many “fishing” boats were really mining boats, laying a few or even a single mine nightly in blockaded waters. This mine-laying had to be squelched.

The language of the leaflets distributed to the North Korean fishermen was simple and straightforward:

“The Communists brought this terrible war down upon you. You cannot fish from your boats until the Communists are killed or thrown out. The United Nations Forces are human and do not desire to harm innocent victims of the war, but if you try to fish again before the Communists are completely defeated, you must suffer the consequences. A legal blockade has been declared and is enforced by United Nations Forces.”

Ships patrolling north of the 38th parallel were ordered to pass out these leaflets, and thereafter to send fishing boats back into port to spread the word. Leaflets were also delivered by airplanes. If the fishermen returned and tried to fish, their boats were to be confiscated or destroyed and the fishermen returned to the beach.

Maddox (DD-731) and Herbert J. Thomas (DD-833) delivered a quantity of leaflets to 137 sampans and junks in the week starting 22 September. Delivery was made either by boarding, or calling the vessels alongside. At every interception, the vessels were thoroughly inspected for mines, even to the extent of removing their floor boards.

Because of the order forbidding U.S. naval ships to operate inside the 100-fathom curve on the east coast, unless in swept waters, the largest share of the responsibility for the prevention of fishing by the North Koreans fell upon the small ships of the Republic of Korea Navy who were able to navigate close to the shore where the fishing took place. (Later, in January-June 1952, after the east coast had been swept to the 10-fathom curve as far as Songjin, the destroyers and frigates gave the anti-fishing campaign a high priority.)

The anti-fishing campaign fell into two areas: offshore and inshore. The offshore fishing could be eliminated with comparative ease by the use of patrol ships and patrol aircraft. But squelching the inshore fishing, especially on the west coast with its heavy tides and numerous islands, would be very difficult.

“We started with very limited resources in patrol boats, patrol craft and gunboats,” said Rear Admiral George C. Dyer, who was later to command Task Force 95. “Our anti-fishing resources never increased to the desired level.

Moreover, the complete elimination and control of inshore fishing was an impossibility. Our whaleboats and smaller ships could chase the fishing sampans ashore, and then land a party to blow them up. But blowing up
a toughly built sampan wasn’t easy. A hand grenade wouldn’t do it for long, for the damage could be patched in a few days. Gasoline poured over a sampan would burn it, but unless you stayed and kept pouring gasoline on the sampan until the last piece of timber was burned, the fisherman-owner would put out the fire with sand from the beach.

“The most certain method of controlling the inshore fishing was to confiscate the enemy’s fishing boats—and that wasn’t simple.”

Notwithstanding the hazards and difficulties, the anti-fishing campaign was to prove successful, as will be seen.
After dodging several typhoons, the USS Missouri (CAPT Irving T. Duke, USN) arrived in Korean waters in the late evening of September 14th after a full-speed run from the east coast of the United States.

“When I was informed that the Missouri would join TF-95,” wrote RADM Smith, “I planned to use her, the Helena, and several destroyers as a diversionary effort on the east coast, on the same day as the initial Marine landings on the west coast at Inchon. By so doing, I hoped to hold back some enemy troops from Inchon and to create an enemy hesitation. I chose Samchok for the diversionary bombardment.

“However, it was difficult to know the exact time of Missouri’s arrival because of several typhoons which were in her path.”

The “Big Mo” celebrated her arrival by firing fifty rounds of 16-inch fire at a bridge near Samchok, using a helicopter spot. The results were excellent.[7B]

Missouri also arrived in time to join a bombardment effort to relieve the stranded ROK LST-667 at Samchok.

This minor naval amphibious operation had been initiated at Eighth Army Headquarters in Korea, unknown to naval headquarters in Tokyo. The intent of the mission was to land a 700-odd man detachment of ROK troops in the enemy’s rear, near Pohang. The detachment’s mission was to blow bridges, establish road blocks, and generally hamper the retreat of the North Korean forces as the Eighth Army broke out of the Pusan perimeter.

Since this operation was undertaken without the knowledge of either Admiral Joy or Admiral Smith, the first word that it had aborted came to Admiral C. C. Hartman (ComCruDiv-3) when ROK LST-667 frantically messaged that she had broached in landing, bashed in her side, and was under heavy enemy fire from mortars and artillery.

Missouri, Helena, Maddox (CDR Preston B. Haines, Jr.), Herbert J. Thomas (CDR Sibley L. Ward, Jr.), Endicott (CDR John C. Jolly), Doyle (CDR Charles H. Morrison, Jr.), and six auxiliary ships were diverted from their primary mission of furnishing naval gunfire at the frontlines in order to rescue the stranded ROK personnel aboard the LST. With much labor, and loss of equipment and precious time, the rescue was finally accomplished on 18 September. Seven hundred and twenty-five South Koreans were rescued, 110 of them wounded, but 81 ROK troops had been killed, captured, or drowned in the process, and a sorely needed LST lost.

Subsequent investigation revealed that the civilian ROK LST skipper had chosen the one rock-ribbed stretch of beach on the otherwise sandy coast. Moreover, he had failed, in three beaching attempts, to cross the surf line properly.

Admiral Joy sent a despatch to Rear Admiral Smith, who had jurisdiction over the ROK Navy, to direct that future ROK amphibious operations, even minor ones, be entrusted to those experienced in such matters.
Chapter 9. The Seaborne Artillery

Missouri Assists the Breakout From the Perimeter

Following the fiasco at Samchok, the Missouri continued pounding the east coast positions of the North Korean forces. The Third ROK Division was opposed by the North Korean Fifth Division, the North Korean Seventh Division, and the 101st Security Regiment, all entrenched in the city of Pohang.

The Third ROK Division took up kickoff positions on the south side of Pohang’s Hyong-san River. The north side was strongly held by the enemy. Until the ROK troops could cross this stream and gain the coastal road leading north, the UN advance up the east coast was halted.

Missouri answered the KMAG’s[7C] request for gunfire support. After the shore fire control party took refuge in a large crater, LTCOL Rollins S. Emmerich, USA, commenced spotting the Missouri’s fire onto enemy positions across the narrow river a scant 300 yards away. The range from Missouri to target was approximately nine miles. The battleship fired 280 high-capacity 16-inch shells which landed with earthquake effect on the northern river bank.

Of this assistance, LTCOL Emmerich recorded: “On the 17th of September we broke the river dike and headed north. The Missouri’s fire was really demoralizing to those Red troops. We practically waded across that river standing up. The ruins along the river south of Pohang and in the city proper will bear out the effect and accuracy of naval gunfire.”[8]
Chapter 9. The Seaborne Artillery

Results of Blockade Forces Against North Korean Forces

The contribution of naval surface forces to the salvation of the Pusan perimeter and defeat of the North Korean army between 25 June and 15 November 1950 is indicated by the following boxscore damage:

- Aircraft: 1 destroyed
- Ammunition dumps: 2 destroyed, 1 damaged
- Artillery positions: 44 destroyed, 8 damaged
- Bridges: 14 destroyed, 14 damaged
- Buildings: 16 damaged
- Fuel dumps: 2 destroyed
- Fuel tanks: 2 damaged
- Junk and sampans: 62 destroyed, 14 damaged
- Locomotives: 1 destroyed
- Mines: 323 destroyed
- Motor boats: 22 destroyed, 5 damaged
- Observation posts: 4 destroyed, 2 damaged
- PC Boats, YMS: 2 destroyed, 4 damaged
- Pill boxes: 3 destroyed
- Radio stations: 1 destroyed, 1 damaged
- Radio towers: 1 destroyed
- RR cars: 19 destroyed, 26 damaged
- RR yards: 6 damaged
- Supply dumps: 7 destroyed, 5 damaged
- Tanks: 7 destroyed
- Transformer stations: 1 destroyed
- Troop concentrations: 663 damaged
- Troops: 387 destroyed, 81 taken prisoner
- Trucks and vehicles: 28 destroyed, 15 damaged
- Tunnels: 6 damaged
- Warehouses: 12 destroyed, 23 damaged
The period following the successful assault of Inchon and the landing at Wonsan found the blockade and bombardment forces of TF 95 moving farther and farther northward. The enemy coasts were covered as closely as possible while observing the “Stay outside the 100-fathom curve” order. Having denied the Communists the freedom of advancing southward by sea, the task was now to prevent them from retreating northward by sea.

Aboard the ships off the Korean coasts, few people knew that the original war was ending and that a new war was beginning—a war with Communist China.

On the peninsula in early November, however, it was apparent that the Chinese Communists had intervened. On 24 November their armies commenced a full-scale attack which succeeded in opening a wedge between the Eighth Army on the west coast and the Tenth Corps on the east coast. Hordes of Chinese poured through the gap. Disaster seemed probable and imminent. All available ships in Japan and several ships already enroute back to the United States were hurriedly recalled and rushed to Korea to stand by to support the evacuation of UN forces. If the onslaught of the Chinese forces could not be contained, it was planned to evacuate the UN forces from Korea via the ports of Inchon, Hungnam, Wonsan, and Pusan. If this proved necessary, every available ship would be required.

On 2 December, the First Marine Division, deep in North Korea, was ordered to withdraw to the area of Hamhung. The surface forces of Task Force 95, operating under the amphibious commander, took up gunfire support stations in Hungnam harbor. (The Hungnam redeployment is fully covered in Chapter 6.)

On the west coast, the ships of the blockade force (TF 95.1) supplied much-needed gunfire and air support to the Eighth Army as it was evacuated from Chinnampo to Inchon.

By mid-January, the UN ground forces had re-established a firm line in South Korea, and the danger of being forced off the peninsula abated.

The original war against the North Korean Communist had now ended. A new war against the Chinese Reds, which would fully occupy Task Force 95 for more than 30 months, had commenced.
The Sea War in Korea
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson

Chapter 9. The Seaborne Artillery
Sitzkrieg Blockade

The redeployment of UN forces from North Korea was followed by a period of buildup of personnel, supplies, and equipment in order to resume the offensive.

On 1 January 1951, Rear Admiral William G. Andrewes, Royal Navy, was knighted and promoted to Vice Admiral. For six weeks the British vice admiral continued serving under the American rear admiral.

“This is undoubtedly the first time a vice admiral in the Royal Navy has ever served under a rear admiral in the United States Navy,” recorded Admiral Smith.[9] “Both Admiral Brind, Royal Navy, Commander-in-Chief in Hong Kong, and Vice Admiral Andrewes himself stated that they did not desire any change; that he was to remain under my command, even though senior.

“About 12 February 1951, Admiral Joy received a message from Admiral Sherman directing that Vice Admiral Andrewes be made a task force commander. This was due to the fact that Mr. Churchill was demanding a British Commander-in-Chief for the Supreme Atlantic Command. In this situation my objective was to prevent a breakdown in the organization of Task Force 95 and the esprit de corps that both Andrewes and I had worked so hard to gain. I recommended to Joy that I become the deputy and Andrewes the commander of TF 95. This was the accepted solution, and so for the next month and a half Andrewes was Commander Task Force 95. . . .”

Smith resumed command of Task Force 95 on 3 April 1951 after Andrewes departure from the theater. At this time, also, the operational command of Task Force 95 was shifted from COMNAVFE to Commander Seventh Fleet.[9A]

During this period of change of command and reorganization, Admiral Smith issued a new operation order which determined TF 95’s missions in approximate order of priority to be these:

1. Blockade Korea
2. Deliver gunfire support to UN troops on east coast
3. Bombard
4. Conduct anti-mining
5. Escort
6. Conduct anti-submarine warfare
7. Control coastal fishing
8. Obtain intelligence.

The division of Korea into two blockade forces under CTF 95 was continued:

Click here to view table

Also under the CTF 95 was the escort group (TG 95.5), the minesweep group (TG 95.6), and the ROK naval forces (TG 95.7). (In October 1952, a new group, 95.3, was organized as a patrol group in South Korea.)

Smith directed that the east coast blockade commander (CTF 95.2—Rear Admiral Roscoe E. Hillenkoetter, USN) keep at least four ships on patrol, operating in pairs from the 38th parallel to the blockade boundary above Chongjin 41°-50' N, in order to fulfill the requirements of international law regarding a blockade. The ROK Navy Force (CTG 95.7, Commander Michael J. Luosey) was to establish two check stations on South Korea’s east coast for surveillance of coastal traffic. Except in swept waters, it was again specified that ships would remain outside the 100-fathom curve to lessen the danger from mines.

As for the west coast blockade, Task Group 95.1 (RADM A. K. Scott-Moncrieff, RN), the British and American carrier element with their aircraft, would take station near the 39th parallel in order to render close
support ashore to the western end of the battleline, as well as to help maintain the blockade. The surface blockade and patrol element (TE 95.12) would maintain a one-ship anti-junk patrol off Chinnampo, and close-in shore patrols near the coast from the northern limit of the blockade to the south.

Smith’s shrewd foresightedness and “can-do” attitude are reflected in his war diary of that period. He believed that heavy naval bombardments should be made as soon as possible in the Inchon area. If nothing else, they would deceive and confuse the enemy and force him to divert some of his ground strength to defend the area. Inchon’s recapture, of course, would return a valuable port and supply base to the UN forces.

On the east coast, Smith was equally sure that bombardments should take place in the Wonsan area, and, if possible, some of its harbor islands seized. This operation would further confuse the enemy, capitalize on his fear of amphibious assaults, and cause him to wastefully deploy forces in anticipation of another landing at Wonsan. Moreover, the harbor would be a useful point for harassing the main east coast roads and rail lines. (Here, then, was the genesis of the siege of Wonsan.)

Click here to view map

Smith believed that by an unremitting naval bombardment of northeast Korea’s exposed transportation complex, day and night, fair weather and foul, “…we would get 75 per cent or 80 per cent stoppage of traffic, and certainly a great slowing of traffic.”[10]

Smith believed that naval power could not only draw the blockade at sea ever closer (a primary Navy mission) but would also contribute to the interdiction of land communications (a collateral naval mission).

As the UN forces withdrew from Hungnam to re-assemble and resupply themselves for a resumption of the offensive, the Communists were kept guessing how their exposed coastlines would be used against them by the blockading forces of the U.S. Navy.

There were five ways. The first way would be by amphibious feints and demonstrations. From the September 1950 landing at Inchon, the enemy was well aware how decisive and how dangerous an amphibious assault could be. For the remainder of the war he would remain acutely sensitive and apprehensive that another such lightning blow might come at any place and at any moment.

To take advantage of the enemy’s sensitivity to amphibious assault, the first of many-to-come amphibious demonstrations was made on 30-31 January 1951 on the east coast near Kansong. RADM Smith, in flagship Dixie (AD-14), supervised the feint, which included bombardment and prelanding minesweeping. The USS Montague (AKA-98), USS Seminole (AKA-105), and several LSTs simulated landing activities.

Ten days later, on 10 February 1951, another fake landing was planned for the Inchon area. The Missouri prepared the way with bombardment fire on 8 February, but further operations were cancelled because of the rapid advance of UN ground forces (then engaged in a limited offensive known as “Operation Thunderbolt”), which had outflanked and forced the evacuation of the Inchon area. (In retrospect, it seems certain that the prospect of a second invasion at Inchon made the enemy’s evacuation of the area more urgent and rapid).

The second way the enemy would see his exposed coastline used against him was by surprise commando and guerrilla raids such as the one below Chongjin on 7 April 1951. Under the command of Admiral Roscoe E. Hillenkoetter (Commander Cruiser Division One), and covered by the fire of cruiser Saint Paul (CA-73, CAPT Chester C. Smith, USN), and destroyers Wallace L. Lind (DD-703, CDR Edward B. Carlson, USN), and Massey (DD-778, CDR Ed R. King, Jr., USN), 250 men of the 41st Independent Royal Marines landed from the Fort Marion (LSD-22) and the Begor (APD-127) to destroy the exposed coastal rail line eight miles south of Chongjin. Minesweepers Incredible, Osprey, Chatterer, and Merganser cleared the nearby beach, with the salvage vessel USS Grasp (ARS-24) standing by. There was no enemy opposition. Demolition charges destroyed 100 feet of track, the nearby tunnels, and the railroad embankment to a depth of 15 feet.

Raids similar to these were to harass the enemy for the remainder of the war. (One result of this particular raid was to implant the idea that the ideal way to conduct such raids would be by helicopter).
The third way the exposed enemy coastline would be used against the Communists was by laying siege to his coastal ports.

By mid-February, a night and day siege had begun in Wonsan harbor. (This historic siege is covered in Chapter 12, “The Siege of Wonsan.”) Songjin also was to feel the burden of a naval siege, commencing on 8 March, initially set by Manchester (CL-83), Evans (DD-754), C. S. Sperry (DD-697) and Hr.Ms. [10A] Everts (DD). Still later, on 26 April 1951, the port of Hungnam was placed under siege.

The fourth way the enemy would find his exposed coastlines used against him was at each end of the fighting front. For the rest of the war, American naval guns would fire at enemy troops on each flank of the battleline. In many cases, this fire would be crucially important and locally decisive.

(Each evening, before dusk, UN ground forces would conduct a reconnaissance along the frontlines to observe enemy troop concentrations, armament emplacements, and supply dumps. These infantry patrol reports were assembled and transmitted to the bombline support ships with requests for a certain number of rounds per hour on each selected target).

And finally, the enemy’s exposed coastlines were to feel the unremitting sting of bombardment at every point of military value along his coasts. That these bombardments hurt, both physically and psychologically, is demonstrated by the steady rise in the enemy’s use of coastal guns to protect himself.

The battleship New Jersey (Captain David M. Tyree) returned to war action on 20 May 1951. She was the second of four battleships (Wisconsin would be third; Iowa would be the fourth) to appear in the Korean theater.

The “Big Jay’s” baptism was memorable for her crew. After a bombardment at Kangsong on 20 May, the New Jersey moved to Wonsan to participate in the siege. Here on the 22nd, she took one hit and one near miss. The striking shell hit Number One turret, causing little damage, while the near miss killed one man and wounded three who were exposed topside.

The one hundredth day of the sieges of Wonsan, Hungnam, and Songjin came and went, with the enemy fire increasing in accuracy, intensity, and persistence. Early in July frigate Everett took a hit which did little material damage but which killed one man and wounded seven. Cruiser Helena reported firing her 10,000th round of the war, Brinkley Bass reported firing 3,315 rounds in a single two-week period.

Thus, the application of naval power to the Korean battlefield was steadily increased.
The Sea War in Korea
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson

Chapter 9. The Seaborne Artillery
Change of Command and Sit-Down

During the late winter and early spring months of 1951, a series of engagements between UN and Chinese ground forces was taking place. The United Nation forces started their first limited offensive, “Operation Thunderbolt,” on 25 January 1951. Naval forces intensified inshore patrolling along the west coast and carried out additional fire missions in support of the advance. During the first few days only light resistance from Chinese Communist outposts was encountered. UN forces advanced 15 to 20 miles to positions north of Suwon, Inchon, and Yoju without serious difficulty. At the beginning of February the enemy made several counterattacks to defend Seoul. The United Nations’ advance now developed into a full-scale attack. Carrier-based aircraft subjected the enemy to constant strafing and napalm bombings and established close surveillance of all Han River crossings.

On 10 February, the enemy suddenly vanished from the front. By nightfall of that day Inchon and Kimpo airfields were again in UN hands, as well as the industrial suburb of Seoul, on the southern bank of the Han River. In the central sector, “Operation Roundup” was launched, again with the objective of inflicting major losses on the enemy. The offensive opened on 5 February, and for the first three days UN troops moved forward without encountering major resistance. A Chinese counterattack developed during the night of 11-12 February which used both mass attack and infiltration tactics. Despite some loss of terrain, the UN forces had now learned to roll with the punch. The main line of resistance was not penetrated, and heavy casualties were inflicted upon the attacking Chinese. By 19 February the enemy’s advance in the central sector had come to a standstill.

On 21 February the Eighth Army launched still another limited offensive known as “Operation Killer.” As its name implied, the objective was to destroy as many enemy forces as possible. Operation Killer proceeded during the first few days to gain up to ten miles a day as the enemy’s rear guard was swept aside by the First Marine Division, which seized the high ground overlooking Hoengsong on 24 February. The Communists fell back along the entire 60-mile front, having suffered serious casualties.

While Operation Killer was eliminating a Chinese salient in the central sector, a limited offensive had been opened early in March in the area east of Seoul. This operation was known as “Operation Ripper,” and had the objective of outflanking the enemy and forcing him to abandon the capital city of Seoul. Despite some enemy counterattacks, patrols of the ROK First Division entered Seoul during the early morning hours of 15 March and found it almost empty of enemy troops. Seoul had changed hands four times in the course of nine months.

Toward the end of March, UN forces once more approached the 38th parallel along the entire front. A proposal to the enemy by General MacArthur on 23 March to cease hostilities and negotiate a truce in the field was ignored by the Communist high command.

During the first days of April the Eighth Army gradually pushed closer to the enemy’s main supply and assembly area in the “Iron Triangle,” between Chorwon, Kumhwa, and Pyongyang. In the central sector a major battle developed for the Hwachon reservoir.[10B] The U.S. Marines entered the town on 18 April.

By mid-April it was apparent that the Communists were preparing an other major offensive. For many weeks, reconnaissance aircraft had reported very heavy southbound traffic in enemy rear areas. New enemy units were identified in ever greater numbers within supporting distance of the front. More than 70 Communist divisions were estimated to be south of the Yalu River.

“I arrived in Korea to take command of the Eighth Army only eight days before the Chinese offensive of 22 April,” General James Van Fleet told the authors. “Everybody in the Far East was talking about the
forthcoming Chinese offensive, some a little fearfully. I even had one plan submitted to me that said when the
Reds struck, UN forces should fall back ten miles I said no, we’re not giving up Seoul. I told all my division and
corps commanders to get ready to fight, that we were going to mow them down. On the western side of Korea in
the Seoul area, the country was open and fairly flat. We knew this terrain. I told my division and corps
commanders they’d never find a prettier battlefield for killing Communists.

“I missed an opportunity after the first Red offensive on 22 April. After three or four days I could tell that
their attack was fairly shallow and not well supported logistically. The Chinese Army wasn’t a mobile Army. I
should have assembled reserves and struck. I failed that time.

“But on the next Chinese push, 16 May, I had everything set. After three days I ordered a counterattack
toward the ‘Iron Triangle’, spearheaded by the First Marine Division and Second Infantry.

“I had the First MarDiv and some Korean Marines set for a shore-to-shore operation, leapfrogging up the
east coast—almost administrative landings. At that time the east coast did not have a big buildup of defensive
forces, and we could easily have made landings there. The Navy could have shot us ashore and kept us ashore as
we built up. We could have built up faster than the enemy could have managed.

“With those landings, the Chinese couldn’t have met it. They’re not flexible enough. The Chinese armies
had no conception of fast moves; they had no communication system; they had no logistical support.

“In fact, there have been only two armies in the history of the world that have been able to move any
direction at any time. That’s the American Army and the German Army.

“So in June 1951, we had the Chinese whipped. They were definitely gone. They were in awful shape.
During the last week of May we captured more than 10,000 Chinese prisoners.

“It was only a short time later that the Reds asked for a truce.

“Then we were ordered not to advance any further.”[11]

In all this intense ground fighting in the spring of 1951, the U.S. Marines’ First Division was in the
forefront, and often in the van. Despite being separated from the Marine Air Wing and denied its customary close
air support, the division won fresh laurels by its aggressiveness and tenacity.

Two events of this period, not directly connected with the naval actions of the Korean war, must be
briefly described, for both of them were to have great effect upon the remaining two years of the naval war.

The first of these was the replacement of General Douglas MacArthur. While the UN forces had
undisputed control of both the sea and the air, and while the revitalized UN forces were advancing under the
aggressive leadership of Generals Ridgway and Van Fleet, the realization came to most of the military leaders in
Korea that under existing conditions a stalemate was approaching. It was obvious that the Chinese could not now
achieve their oft-vaunted claim to drive the UN forces into the sea. It was equally clear to the UN command that if
the fighting was to be confined solely to the Korean peninsula, and no effort made to destroy the sources of
Chinese fighting and logistic power elsewhere, then the UN goal of uniting Korea by force was equally futile.

It is beyond the scope of this book to discuss the circumstances of the relief of General MacArthur. It is
sufficient for a naval study of the Korean war to say that MacArthur believed that victory in Korea could only be
achieved by extending the military conflict beyond Korea, as he wrote the authors—“against the nerve center of
the Chinese ability to sustain his operations in Korea.”

Accordingly, on 11 April 1951, General Matthew B. Ridgway succeeded Generals Douglas MacArthur
as Commander in Chief, United Nations Command.

The second event which was to affect the campaign at sea transpired on 23 June 1951 when the Soviet
delegate to the United Nations, Jacob A. Malik, proposed ceasefire discussions between the protagonists. General
Ridgway suggested that the meeting take place aboard the Danish hospital ship *Jutlandia*. Eight days later, the
Communists accepted the proposal but insisted that the discussions take place in Kaesong between the tenth and
fifteenth of July.
Actual armistice discussions commenced on 8 July. The Chief of the UN Delegation was Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, COMNAVFE. The other U.S. Navy delegate was Rear Admiral Arleigh Burke.

The combination of these two events—MacArthur’s dismissal and the commencement of the armistice talks—produced the fighting sit-down which followed. Thereafter, the war on the ground was to become positional, and neither side was to make more than local and limited efforts to change the situation. By mid-June the front had stabilized along the general line between Munsan and Kosong. The flexibility and mobility which naval forces could give to land forces hereafter was not to be used. The firepower and mobility of the UN armies was not to be exploited.

Henceforth, the American Navy would have to content itself with performance of collateral roles for the remaining two years of the war.
The Sea War in Korea
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson

Chapter 9. The Seaborne Artillery
The Truce Talks Begin

The first indication that the Communists wanted a truce came on Saturday, 23 June 1951, during a nation-wide broadcast by Mr. Jacob Malik, the Russian delegate to the United Nations, on the United Nations program series entitled, “The Price of Peace.”

Malik’s talk included the following paragraph:

“The peoples of the Soviet Union believe it possible to defend the cause of peace. The Soviet peoples further believe that the most acute problem of the present day—the problem of the armed conflict in Korea—could also be settled. This would require the readiness of both parties to enter on a path of peaceful settlement of the Korean question. The Soviet peoples believe that as the first step, discussions should be started between the belligerents for a cease fire and an armistice providing for the mutual withdrawal of forces from the 38th parallel. Can such a step be taken? I think it can, provided there is a sincere desire to put an end to the bloody fighting in Korea.”

While it is not the purpose of this book to cover the truce talks, a brief discussion of the factors which produced the 24 months of truce talks and a first-hand account of the opening of the talks will be beneficial.[12]

Following Malik’s speech, General Ridgway, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, proposed on 30 June 1951 that a conference for discussing this Soviet armistice proposal be held. Accordingly, a radio broadcast was transmitted to the Commander in Chief of the Communist Forces in Korea. As previously stated, General Ridgway proposed a meeting aboard the Danish hospital ship Jutlandia, anchored in Wonsan harbor.

There were many advantages for holding any armistice talks aboard Jutlandia. She was a hospital ship, and therefore neutral, and would have ample living accommodations as well as adequate conference, working, and communication facilities. Commodore Kai Hammerich, the Danish commanding officer, was very pleased to offer his ship for this purpose, and was anxious to provide the very best facilities.

On 1 July, however, the North Korean premier, Kim Il Sung, accepted Ridgway’s proposal but rejected the Jutlandia. Instead, Kim proposed the place of meeting in the city of Kaesong, on the 38th parallel.

The exact reasons why the Communists rejected the hospital ship Jutlandia in favor of Kaesong are not known, but it is reasonably certain that the Reds wanted a conference site on the 38th parallel to reinforce their demands in establishing that line as the truce line. Commencing the talks at Kaesong would also allow them to appear as the truce “hosts,” and to foster the illusion that the United Nations were asking for an armistice out of military necessity.

Why had the Communists, through the Soviet delegate to the UN, requested a truce? Many times previously, they had rejected overtures to end the fighting. They had done so on 6 December 1950, again on 9 December, on 22 December, on 12 January, and on 18 January 1951. Why were the Chinese now willing to consider a truce? One of the two U.S. Navy delegates to the talks and the Deputy Chief of Staff to COMNAVFE gave the following reasons:

“At the time of the Malik proposal,” said Rear Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, “United Nations forces were confident that they could repel any attack launched by the enemy. As a matter of fact, it was hoped that the enemy would attack because the enemy’s casualties would be much greater and ours much less than if we attacked. Also we did not want to advance north any more than necessary to keep contact with the enemy. By advancing north, we shortened the enemy’s supply lines and reduced the number of enemy targets, especially transportation targets, for our air and naval power to work on. The farther north we drove the enemy, the less difficulty he would have
logistically and the more his relative strength increased.

“Therefore, it was then a question of striking a balance. In June 1951, the United Nations command had reached in its northward movement a line which ran generally northeast from the vicinity of Kaesong towards the northern edge of the now-famous Iron Triangle and reached the east coast in the vicinity of Nam River, about 40 miles north of the 80th parallel. The line was relatively short, was firmly anchored by our Navy at each end, and was highly defensible throughout its length. The UN had adopted the tactic of holding such a line and letting the enemy grind itself down against it, and it had worked very well. After falling into the trap with disastrous results several times in April and May, the Reds decided they had had enough.

“From their entry into the war in October 1950, the enemy had boasted that he would drive the United Nations command into the sea. He now knew that this was not going to happen. The enemy was losing men, he was losing equipment, he was losing ground. Time was working against him. Winter was coming on. The trend of military events in Korea was not auspicious for the Communists. In short, they were losing the war.

“It was apparent that if the enemy wanted to retrieve anything from his aggressive venture in Korea, he either would have to do it at the conference table or he would have to get and use all the modern equipment, such as airplanes and tanks, that his allies could spare. This second alternative depended on the scope of outside assistance and could lead to another world war. It would be a matter of starting a big fire in order to call the fire department away from a small fire.

“However, the Communists may have had other reasons for suggesting a truce.

“The Chinese might have come to the conclusion that they had been led down the garden path. They were fighting and losing a war which was not theirs. They must have known from the beginning that the United Nations had never been any threat to them across the Yalu; perhaps the average Chinese ‘man in the street’ was commencing to realize that fact.

“Another possibility was that they were preparing for a really big push in a couple of months, and a phony armistice conference would serve the double purpose of giving them a breathing spell and lulling the UN forces into lethargy and a false sense of security. During a lull, they could accelerate a build-up of personnel, weapons, and supplies, and strike heavily with more chance of success. They had used these tactics successfully several times before in China, the most notable occasion being in 1946.

“Another possibility was that Communist China wanted to be the sole power in Asia. She could not aspire to this if she continued to pour all of her resources and all of her men into a futile war. She was losing face in Korea, as well as resources and men. Perhaps she thought that it was time to pull out of this ill-considered venture, and concentrate her activities on increasing internal strength and expanding in other more lucrative areas.

“Still another possibility was that much Russian equipment was being lost—equipment which they might prefer to use in other more critical areas. Lost equipment would pay no dividends. Perhaps the Soviet Union told the Chinese and North Koreans that they would get no more equipment after a specified date, and that they should settle their affairs before that date as best they could.

“It was also possible that the Communists realized that they could never dominate all of Korea by military methods, whereas they might achieve domination by other means. If a military armistice were achieved, perhaps they could infiltrate later into the government of the Republic of Korea. Perhaps they felt that their many agents and guerrillas already in South Korea could so dominate elections in the Republic of Korea that the country would eventually go communistic. Perhaps they believed they could sometime in the future contaminate the officials of the Republic of Korea government so that the people would grow tired of that type of government and elect Communists in a period of frustration. In short, perhaps the Communists thought that since they could not gain their ends by military aggression, it would be wiser to try political aggression.

“In any event, not the least likely possibility was the desirability of enticing the western nations to slow down the rearmament that the Soviet Union’s aggressive moves had set in motion. A conference to discuss an
armistice might cause enough indecision and internal bickering among UN forces to reduce defensive potential and alertness to a low level.

“Still another factor in asking for a truce was the increasing disaffection in the Chinese Communist armies. More and more Chinese wanted to surrender, and desertions mounted.

‘Which one of these possibilities instigated the Communists’ proposal for armistice on the first anniversary of the Korean War? It will probably never be known. It is more likely that each of them had some influence. The Communists had nothing to lose and everything to gain by suggesting an armistice conference. If the negotiations failed, her propaganda machine could attempt to place the blame on the United Nations for the failure.’

In the time interval between the proposal by General Ridgway and the answer by Kim Il Sung, plans were made for the meeting to be held aboard ship under a special task force commanded by Rear Admiral I. N. Kiland. This special task force would be composed of a cruiser, an AGC, an APA,[12A] and a division of destroyers. It was intended that this special task force could furnish adequate communication facilities, logistic support, and living quarters to the truce delegates, UN officials, reporters, etc.

After Kaesong was designated as the conference site, the opinion was voiced that because the talks would be held ashore instead of aboard ship, the logistics support for the UN truce delegation should be shifted from the Navy to the Eighth Army. There was also considerable discussion as to whether the senior delegate should not be an Army officer. General Ridgway decided that Admiral Joy, already designated, should remain as the senior delegate for two reasons: first, Joy had become acquainted with the problems involved; and secondly, General Ridgway did not desire any of his corps commanders or General Van Fleet to lead the discussions since it might tend to weaken the combat effectiveness of the Eighth Army.

Upon the UN’s acceptance of Kaesong, some of the U.S. Navy ships which were originally scheduled to be in Wonsan were ordered to Inchon to render logistic support if that became necessary. It was thought that the correspondents would require additional facilities, both in housing and communications.
The Sea War in Korea
Malcolm W. Cagle, CDR, USN and Frank A. Manson CDR, USN

Chapter 9. The Seaborne Artillery
The Truce Teams Meet

The first meeting of the main truce delegations was scheduled for 1000 on 10 July 1951. The day dawned cloudy and damp. Helicopters carrying the UN delegation flew north at a few hundred feet altitude above waving white-clad Koreans working in the rice paddies.

“We landed on a level field near the Kaesong Methodist missionary compound,” said Admiral Burke. “As we stepped out of the ‘copters, we were met by the North Korean liaison officer, a Colonel Chang. Communist photographers and newsmen gathered around. As we got into our United States Army jeeps, which were prominently marked by white flags, the Communists took movies and motion pictures. Armed Chinese troops lined the sides of the landing site. There were also half-a-dozen enemy jeeps on the field, some of them Russian jeeps. Others were captured United States jeeps, still with their United States markings. One of these had two bullet holes in its windshield, which had probably accounted for the ill-fated United States soldier who had painted ‘Wilma’ on the hood.

“All of this was a staged act to demonstrate to us their domination of the situation.

“Colonel Chang mounted his jeep and led our convoy on the ten-minute ride to the house assigned to us. Later this house was christened the ‘United Nations House’. The short jeep ride did nothing to dispel our forebodings. Along the way, the road was lined with armed guards and photographers. The United Nations house itself was surrounded by armed guards, prominently stationed with burp guns. Going up the steps to the house I found it necessary to push to one side the muzzle of a machinegun held by a young North Korean lad.

“We entered the house. It had been stripped, but the Communists had placed tables and chairs in two rooms so we could use them as conference rooms. After what we had experienced, our trust was not at a high level.

“The staff of our United Nations delegation had earlier proceeded by motor convoy that morning to Kaesong and were already in the United Nations House. LT Horace Underwood, USNR, our Korean interpreter, informed us that the Communists were using a different time than we. In other words, ten o’clock our time was nine o’clock their time, so we had to wait an hour before the meeting was to start. During the delay, we discussed our communication facilities. We also commented on the large number of Communist newsmen and photographers and the display of armed force with which we had been met.

“About 1050, we proceeded in jeeps to the conference site. As at the UN House, there were many armed guards near the conference house. All the guards were North Koreans. All of them were rather officious in stopping our cars and in directing us where to go.

“We were escorted into a small room of the old one-time splendid house. The center of the room contained a small table on which rested beer, candy, and cigarettes. The five-man enemy delegation was standing. Admiral Joy, followed by the rest of the delegation, proceeded quietly into the tension-filled room. We didn’t know the enemy delegates. One of them said, ‘I am Nam Il’. Admiral Joy nodded and replied, ‘I am Admiral Joy’.

“Before we went to Kaesong, we had been informed that the enemy would have only four delegates; now there were five—three North Koreans and two Chinese. The North Korean delegates were in Russian-type uniforms with good-looking, gray, red-piped blouses with Russian shoulder marks, and very big blue trousers. As is their custom, the Chinese delegates were in woolen khaki uniforms with no insignia of any kind.

“The enemies’ uniforms were of two grades: resplendent or very poor. Delegates and a few staff officers were resplendent, the others were very poor.
“Our own delegation and party all wore khaki. It was a meaningful paradox. All the members of the United Nations party—both officers and enlisted men—were clothed alike. This was one more indication of our side practicing the words we preach, while the Communists used the same words but practiced something entirely different. A man could learn much about class distinction by studying the enemy delegation.

“The senior delegate was General Nam Il. He was Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, North Korean Army. Nam was about 38 years old, and in his youth had graduated from a university in Manchuria. Nam was an ardent, clever Communist standing high in Soviet favor; he was Russian-trained and dominated, and spoke Korean with a foreign accent.

“Major General Lee Sang Jo, the next senior North Korean delegate, was Chief of Staff, Front Headquarters, North Korean Army. Lee was about 38 years of age, born in South Korea, but went to China as a boy and was there graduated from the Whampoa Military Academy. Lee became a Communist in 1940 and was instrumental in establishing an underground contact between the Yenam faction and the Kim Il Sung faction of the North Korean Communists for the Korean Independence League in Manchuria.

“The third Korean delegate was Major General Chang Pyong San, North Korean Army, about 35 years old, Chief of Staff of the First North Korean Corps. There were reports that Chang had been an enlisted man in the Soviet Army at one time.

“The senior Chinese delegate was Lieutenant General Tung Hua, deputy commander of the Chinese Communist forces in Korea. He was about 51 years old, an old-line Communist, having been political officer of the First Army in 1930.

“The other Chinese delegate was Major General Hsieh Fang.

“The Communists must have had a difficult time in deciding whether the fifth delegate should be North Korean or Chinese. After a few of our meetings, it was apparent that they had added Chang to the list as a mere nonentity to fill a vacancy. Chang very seldom paid much attention to the proceedings, and still less often contributed anything. Practically all consultations were between the other four delegates.

“As the meetings opened, everyone was nervous and everyone was under a strain. The two delegations looked at each other like circus animals let loose in an arena. At 1105 Admiral Joy suggested that we go to the conference room. The first meeting convened in a rather small room with the delegation facing each other across a green, felt-covered table. Interpreters sat behind their respective delegations. The Communist staff and stenographers were on one side of the room, ours on the other. When the meeting opened, there was a United Nations flag on a small standard in front of Admiral Joy.

“During the first meeting, Communist photographers came streaming into the conference room and took a great number of pictures. We protested, and it was mutually agreed that photographers and newsmen would be excluded from the conference room. This agreement was kept. However, there were large numbers of Communist photographers all around the conference site getting many photographs which would be published in Communist newspapers. In addition, there was an unknown number of Communist newsmen in the area. Our own press was rightly vexed at this one-sided affair.

“Even more important than the indignation of our own press was the obvious result of such an arrangement. All on-the-spot news would be distorted by the Communists, and our own news agencies would have no personal knowledge of the true state of affairs.

“Our delegation finally flatly stated that we would bring 20 members of the press to the conference site. At first, this was agreed to. After Nam Il thought it over, however, he said he could not grant permission for the press at this time unless he received orders from his seniors. He might not have had the authority so we requested him to obtain such permission and notify our liaison officer the next morning. We also informed him that we intended thereafter to receive courteous equitable treatment, and that we would insist upon bringing about 20 newsmen and photographers into the conference site the next morning.
“The next morning, on 12 July, our convoy with 20 newsmen was embarked, but it was not permitted to go on with the newsmen. This was the straw that broke the camel’s back.

“The controversy over newsmen and photographers proved to be the first of many. After an exchange of notes between Kim Il Sung and General Ridgway, the matter was finally resolved, and the truce talks got underway. [12C]

“During the subsequent negotiations, crisis followed crisis. In all of them, our UN delegation had two possible courses of action. One was to try to placate the Communists and to take conciliatory measures so the Communists would not break off the conferences. This course of action had been tried in other conferences without much success. The Communists had always taken such an attitude to mean appeasement, and took aggressive action to control the situation because they thought we were weak and impotent and would sacrifice a correct position to gain agreement.

“The other course was the direct, forceful approach. This method had not been overly used in the past. It was early decided by General Ridgway, with the hearty concurrence of the delegation, that this course was the only possible way to obtain equitable terms of a military armistice. Power and strength were terms the Communist understood, and they were not influenced by much else. Consequently, we always tried to choose a sound, vigorous course of action and state it forcibly. In doing this, special care was taken to insure that these statements were reasonable and could be accepted by reasonable, unbiased men.

“It was reassuring to find that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other officials at home felt the same way we did about the chosen course of action.”

On 15 July, the delegates turned to the question of a truce, starting first with the number one item: the agenda. After much haggling, an agenda was formally adopted on 26 July. The next task would be to fix a military demarcation line. Following that, concrete arrangements were to be made for the cease fire and the armistice. The next item was arrangements relating to the prisoners of war. The fifth item involved recommendations to governments of countries concerned on both sides.

Despite the fact that the Communists had reached a military stage where they were steadily losing—a stage where they could gain virtually nothing on the battlefield, and perhaps lose everything by continuing the war—the Communists came to the truce parley fully expecting United Nations delegates to accept the terms which had been laid down by Malik in his radio speech.

“Such terms,” said Admiral Burke, “would have meant the restoration of the situation which existed before the attack by North Korea—just as if there had been no aggression. This solution would have ignored the UN positions in areas north of the 38th and would have meant the resumption of a boundary which could not be defended from the south. It would have meant that the ROKs would be placed in jeopardy again just as soon as the last UN soldier sailed away. It would have paved the way for Communist political conquest of the Republic of Korea—a feat they had been unable to accomplish on the battlefield. But important as were all these factors, there was one even more important factor—it would have shown all Orientals that the Communists had won the victory, and that UN forces were anxious to leave the area they had come to defend; that we would accept terms less than honorable, less than reasonable, in order to get out of more fighting. That would have meant the loss of confidence by other small nations in the strength and stamina of the UN.

“The Communists at the conference table had some reason to believe we would accept those terms, and they insisted that we should accept them. All logic, all arguments, all reason were of no avail as they sat stiffly and said, ‘We are unshakable, your propositions are untenable, you must accept our terms.’

“The Communists, as always, were patient. They had lots of time, and they were not averse to wasting time in the belief that we would become impatient and eventually give in on important points just for the sake of agreement. Only this time, that waiting procedure did not work as successfully for the Communists as it had in the past. Finally, UN military pressure convinced them that we had no intention of settling on anything but fair and
reasonable terms, and they resumed the conferences.

“They then proposed a solution of the 38th parallel, with a line on a map which looked attractive, if a man
did not read the words that went with the picture. It was so foolish that even they were embarrassed by having to
support it. Eventually they proposed a line not far from the battleline at that time as the military demarcation line.
The military pressure was still on, the battle line was slowly but inexorably moving north against the
Communists. Their proposition wasn’t good enough. At last they proposed, and we accepted, the current battle
line as the military line of demarcation.

“All that took five months. Five months of haranguing, of argument, of ceaseless talking; but mark this
well, five months of combat in which our side was winning. That was the reason for their acceptance of the
reasonable military line of demarcation. It was military pressure, not reason, that persuaded them to be
reasonable.

“By accepting that line of demarcation, they relieved themselves of much of the military pressure that had
been exerted against them. Again they became recalcitrant as we began to discuss Item 3, the details of the cease
fire, and Item 4, prisoners of war.”

Thus went the truce talks ad infinitum. All the UN delegates grew weary but no less wary as the talking
was continued. South Korea’s General Paik Sun Yup probably had the most difficult position of all.

Said General Paik: “As a soldier fighting under the UN command I was of course obligated to accept the
idea of participating in the truce talks. Yet as a soldier of the Republic of Korea I was also representing a
government which did not approve of the parley. However, even though I was in close contact with my
government virtually every day, at no time was I advised to do other than to fully cooperate. As a passing
suggestion for any such future coordinated parleys, it might be well for the governments concerned to reach full
understanding and accord before a joint delegation attempts to present a single policy.

“Translation, I recall, was a very serious obstacle. My government did not like the word ‘Chosen,’ for
example. The North Koreans did not approve of the word ‘Hankuk’. It seemed a trivial matter, but it actually was
highly important because of the implications inherent in the final selection of the word.[12D]

“We found early that we had to be patient. That was the secret of our somewhat limited success. We
wouldn’t quarrel. Just be patient. On the outside we would show a smile and look serene. But inside we had to
remain firm and unbending. For power is all that the Communists fear and respect.

“I believe that when the truce talks began, the Communists really wanted to have a cease fire. However,
even that was difficult to determine accurately. While Nam II was senior delegate for the Communists and made
some minor decisions, for the greater part he had to turn to the Chinese delegate and get his opinion before he
would answer a question or make a statement. Of course, behind the Chinese delegate was, and still is, the
Kremlin. So it is very difficult to say with any certainty that the Communists did or did not want an armistice.
Nobody can know that for sure except the Kremlin.

“Some of the meetings did border on the humorous. I recall one such meeting during which we sat
completely silent for 45 minutes, neither side saying a single word until both sides finally got up at the same time
and left the tent. Because both delegations merely represented their governments, it was necessary to recess
whenever neither delegation had anything new to offer in order to give the respective governments time in which
to produce some new proposal with which to try to break the deadlock.

“When the Communists agreed on a demarcation line I was frankly somewhat optimistic and thought that
perhaps we might eventually arrive at complete agreement. But now I can see that in too many cases it was the
UN delegation which had to give in. The Communist delegation does not give in or arbitrate. Perhaps one of the
reasons why this is so, is because the United States was in a very difficult position by virtue of the fact that it was
taking such an active leadership in the war itself. Russia, on the other hand, was in a much easier position because
it was still supposedly a somewhat disinterested spectator and could exert influence from behind the scenes.
“I suspect that the single event which made me the most angry occurred when one of the North Korean delegates wrote on a small piece of paper the words, ‘Imperialist dog is worse than food given to beggars at a funeral home.’ However, I realized that such things only pointed up more vividly the wrongness of their cause, their desperation. They had to resort to such personal slander because they did not dare to discuss the issues at stake candidly and truthfully.

“I am convinced that if a truce is finally signed, and the UN troops are withdrawn from Korea, it will be but a short time before we have another and far more disastrous aggression. And the next time the Communists will make complete preparations so that they will not fail. I hope and pray that UN troops will remain in Korea. Not just for the sake of Korea, but for the sake of the free nations of the world. Korea today stands as a symbol of a willingness and a determination to fight aggression wherever and whenever it may appear. For the free nations of the world to back down even once might prove to be disastrous in the extreme.”

General Paik Sun Yup’s letter to the authors was dated 12 September 1952.

The truce talks were not to end until 27 July 1953, ten months later.

First Year Boxscore for Surface Ships, 25 June 1950—30 June 1951

Aircraft: 2 destroyed
Ammunition dumps: 11 destroyed, 3 damaged
Artillery positions: 128 destroyed, 52 damaged
Bridges: 31 destroyed, 125 damaged
Buildings: 311 destroyed, 300 damaged
Junks and sampans: 213 destroyed, 147 damaged (plus 9 captured)
MG and mortar positions: 33 destroyed, 15 damaged
Mines: 700 destroyed
Motor boats: 22 destroyed, 6 damaged
Pillboxes: 12 destroyed, 9 damaged
PT boats: 3 destroyed
Land mines: 83 destroyed
Railroad cars: 74 destroyed, 101 damaged
Supply dumps: 22 destroyed, 16 damaged
Tanks: 9 destroyed, 3 damaged
Troop concentrations: 2 destroyed, 150 attacked
Troop casualties: 12,476
Trucks and other vehicles: 134 destroyed, 64 damaged
Warehouses: 33 destroyed, 46 damaged
(Also 537 POWs)
The Sea War in Korea
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson

Chapter 9. The Seaborne Artillery
The Second Year

Rear Admiral George C. Dyer, USN, relieved Rear Admiral Allan E. Smith, USN, as CTF 95 on 20 June 1951. This change of command had nothing at all to do with the fact that in five days the first anniversary of the Korean War would take place. Anniversaries notwithstanding, the Navy’s work must go on for 25 more months.

Dyer ruled that this work not only must go on but that it must be intensified. The more the Navy could do from the sea to hurt and embarrass the enemy on land, the better would be our chances in the negotiations at the truce table.

The Combative Spirit

For destroyer skippers especially, the naval war along the Korean coastline was a fertile field for the exercise of initiative and the display of command, and what Rear Admiral George C. Dyer, CTF 95, referred to as “the combative spirit.” Especially after the truce talks began, a blockade assignment could either be a monotonous patrol or an action-packed opportunity, depending on the initiative and aggressiveness of the individual commanding officer.

Patrolling ships had specific tasks: the blockade was to be maintained, fishing suppressed, enemy coastal traffic interdicted, mines swept, rescue performed, and the captured islands supported. Those commanding officers who were also element commanders had additional command duties. From them, a nicety of judgment was required to weigh the current situation, balance and apportion the assigned forces, and establish time schedules for replenishment, as well as fight the war. These duties and tasks could be performed routinely, or they could be performed with imaginative aggressiveness.

“Korea was an opportunity to discover and uncover those commanding officers who had a combative spirit,” said Rear Admiral George C. Dyer, “An otherwise outstanding naval officer, who might be the best engineer, shiphandler, and administrator in the Service, might also not have that extra quality of combat aggressiveness and pugnacity which is the mark of the victorious naval officer. As a matter of fact, few military leaders have this inner fire and this love of battle which has been traditionally vital to the success of our Navy. The naval war along the Korean coast gave ship skippers the chance to reveal whether or not they had such a combative spirit.”

In Admiral Dyer’s opinion, many of his ships exhibited a combative spirit, doing more than was expected of them. A typical one of these was the destroyer Stickell (DD-888, CDR Jesse B. Gay, Jr.).

The Stickell had joined the Northern Patrol (TE 95.22) off Songjin on 16 May 1951. On 24 May, Gay assumed Task Element command.

“I decided that the most effective means of disrupting coastwise rail communications was to knock out a railroad bridge readily observable from sea,” said Gay, “and then keep it unusable. I selected for destruction a small bridge between two tunnels south of Songjin. To conserve ammunition and increase gunfire accuracy, the Canadian destroyer Nootka (CDR A. B. F. Fraser-Harris), using her whaleboats and a small minesweeping rig, swept a channel inside the 100-fathom curve to within 2,500 yards of the beach. After this, the Stickell destroyed the bridge with single gun ‘short-range battle practice’.”

Thus commenced the “Battle of the Bridge,” which would continue until 28 June.

The North Koreans began immediate repairs, using stacked railroad ties for foundations (called
“cribbing”)—repairs which were discouraged by intermittent air bursts night and day from blockade ships in the vicinity.[12E]

At two to three-day intervals, whenever repairs appeared near completion, and after dusting off gun positions in the nearby hills with 40-mm. fire, the Stickell, covered by ships of Task Element 95.22, proceeded in the swept channel and destroyed the cribbing.

After Stickell’s gunfire had demolished the Communist repairs several times, the North Koreans gave up trying to repair the trestle, and, being unable to bypass it due to the terrain, laboriously commenced filling the 30-yard ravine, still harassed by the blockading ships.

On 14 June, Stickell landed a group of South Korean soldiers from two small sampans in the area of the besieged bridge. Two prisoners were captured, one of whom was lost when a near miss from a mortar shell capsized one of the two sampans during retirement.

The surviving prisoner stated that he was the boss of a repair gang brought from a town near the Manchurian border to assist in the repair of the bridge. He also revealed that his party had travelled the entire way by train, but that numerous trains were now held up in the tunnels awaiting repairs to the Songjin bridge. The next day the prisoner pointed out various real and fake gun emplacements in the area, and also the police station in a village area south of Songjin, which was taken under fire and destroyed.

For two more weeks, the blockading ships kept the rail line inoperable. Finally, with the bridge gap almost filled with rock and dirt, the Stickell chose another bridge a short distance to the north of Songjin and commenced a second “destroy-repair-destroy” cycle.

“The presence of some fifteen South Korean marines and an English-speaking Korean naval lieutenant on board provided excellent opportunities to conduct beach raids,” said Gay, “in addition to the routine around-the-clock interdiction and bombardment fire at Chongjin. Great credit is due to the brave Korean marines, who several nights every week went cheerfully ashore onto hostile beaches. Sometimes they went ashore during a thick fog, guided by radar; on other occasions, they went in during bright moonlight, armed with rifles and Browning semi-automatic rifles and carrying hand grenades and a couple of handbags of clips. Their discovery and progress on the beach could always be followed by the clatter of small arms fire.

“On one occasion, after a reconnaissance in the Chuuron-jang area south of Chongjin, our landing party reported several large sampans on the beach which were being armored with heavy iron plating on the inside. As intelligence reports had also been received of a Communist plan to recapture the islands held by our forces in Wonsan harbor, using armored sampans, we made plans to destroy the reported sampans at our first opportunity.

“Two nights later, the Stickell steamed into Kyojo-wan an hour before sunset, ready to destroy the sampans by gunfire. While approaching the desired firing position, a radar target was picked up which was identified as a large motor schooner fleeing to the safety of the Chuuron-jang River. We opened fire at 10,000 yards and hit it at 8,500 yards just as it entered the river. The schooner burst into flames from bow to stern, ran on the beach, and burned for the remainder of the night. Prisoners we captured later revealed that this schooner was manned by North Korean naval personnel and was carrying arms, fuel, and supplies.

“We now returned our attention to the armored sampans.

“On reaching the 100-fathom curve to seaward of them, we discovered that they were protected from our direct fire by large stone masses. I made the decision to land the Korean marines, retiring until after dark and providing gun cover as necessary.

“The ship’s motor whaleboat, with Ensign J. B. Farrell, USN, as boat officer and spotter, left the ship about four miles off the beach, towing a sampan filled with the Korean marines. A thousand yards from the selected landing spot, the sampan was cast off to proceed alone, and the spotting party prepared for action.

“As the sampan approached the beach, it was taken under small arms fire from the nearby cliffs, but our call-fire quickly drove off the defenders and the boat landed safely.

“The Koreans located three large armored sampans and destroyed them with hand grenades before being
pinned down by mortar fire from a nearby village. Illumination from the *Stickell* permitted the spotter in our whaleboat to locate the enemy mortar and it was promptly silenced, permitting the Korean marines to withdraw without incident under covering fire.”

*Stickell’s* landing force performed another type of operation on the night of 14 June when Gay decided to seize one of the Communist-held Yondo Islands about ten miles northeast of Chongjin. The *Stickell’s* Korean marines were disembarked from two sampans at the closest point of the 100-fathom curve. Again, the destroyer’s whaleboat was used to tow the sampans close to the beach. The marines landed undetected on the one inhabited island of the group. Local opposition did not develop. Considerable intelligence information was gained from the natives. The natives revealed that an official North Korean delegation was due to visit the islands the following day.

“I ordered our landing party to remain ashore to greet the dignitaries,” said Gay.

“Unfortunately, the movements of the *Stickell* in the general vicinity of the Yondo Islands aroused suspicions of the North Koreans that something was amiss, for the scheduled visit failed to materialize.”[13]

On the departure of *Stickell* from the theater, on 29 June, the following message was received from Commander Seventh Fleet:

“I have followed *Stickell’s* exploits in Songjin during the past two weeks with great interest. The effects of your aggressive spirit and initiative will be remembered by the enemy. Well done. Vice Admiral Martin.”

On 29 June 1951, the new ComCruDiv-5, Rear Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, had gone ashore on the east coast near Pohang to witness ROK troop maneuvers as the guest of the Eighth Army Commander, Lieutenant General James Van Fleet. Van Fleet asked Burke to accompany him to a certain area by jeep. Burke suggested it would be easier and quicker to go by helicopter, and that, afterward, Van Fleet could return with him to the cruiser *Los Angeles* for a dish of ice cream.

As the helicopter, piloted by Chief Aviation Pilot C. W. Buss, approached the *Los Angeles* about 1535, the wheels touched the life nets, followed by an RPM loss, and the ’copter crashed on the fantail, dumping both passengers on deck unceremoniously but uninjured.

“With the helicopter out of action,” said General Van Fleet “the question arose how I was to get ashore. Burke told me we’d have to make it by boat. We did so without incident, but I didn’t know until long after the war that the boat coxswain had not previously had experience in navigating through breakers, and that Burke himself had taken personal charge of the boat and made the landing himself.”

On 12 July the *New Jersey* (Captain David M. Tyree, USN) was at the bombline with the destroyer *Leonard F. Mason* (DD-852)(CDR J. B. Ferriter). The battleship’s fire that day killed 129 enemy troops. On 18 July, she returned to Wonsan to initiate an intensified bombardment plan known as “Operation Kick-Off.” For days and weeks hereafter, ships would fire at known and suspected positions of enemy harbor defense guns in Wonsan with both delayed-burst and air-burst shells.

The no-fishing rule was enforced more rigidly than ever in northeastern Korean waters. The 6th of August saw USS *Carmick* (DMS-32) destroying four fishing sampans near Changjin and taking their 13 occupants into custody. Eight days later, the USS *William Seiverling* (DE-441) (LCDR W. C. Cole) captured nine more poachers off Tanchon. The 19th of August found USS *Thompson* (DMS-38) (LCDR W. H. Barckmann) capturing two fishermen at Tanchon.

**The Han River Demonstration**

On 26 July 1951, as the truce delegates at Kaesong began what would be a four-month wrangle over the establishment of a military demarcation line, a special naval demonstration was commenced in the Han River. The reason for this special patrol was to counteract the Communists’ immediate claim made at the truce
table that the 200 square miles south of the 38th parallel and west of the Imjin River (including the Ongjin peninsula) were in their hands.

This territory was actually patrolled by UN guerrilla forces. Furthermore, since the city of Seoul was located at the headwaters of the Han River, it was important to insure that any cease fire agreement would provide that the maritime approaches to Seoul were not under Communist control.

It was therefore deemed urgent and prudent to demonstrate visibly to the Communists that this vital area was in UN hands.

On 28 July, accordingly, the USS *Los Angeles* (CA-135, CAPT R. N. McFarlane) entered the swept channel of Haeju-man to commence a shore bombardment of enemy frontline positions, assisted by plane spot. The Communists were caught by surprise; the Reds obviously did not consider that such a large ship could get so far into this shallow and mined sea area and bring guns to bear on the front lines. *Los Angeles* fired forty-four 8-inch rounds and sixty-six 5-inch rounds into frontline positions and received a “well done” for her work.

“The Han River demonstration was a very difficult naval operation,” said Rear Admiral George C. Dyer, CTF, who was in charge of its establishment.

“The Han River is a small-sized Yangtze, and its currents run from four to ten knots. The channel shifts rapidly from one side of the river to the other. Ther are no water-borne navigational aids, and the tides run from twelve to twenty-five feet.

“The first thing we had to do was to survey the channel. This survey work in the Han River was done most capably and energetically by the navigators of the frigates of the British Navy.

“The United States Navy supplied the anchors and buoys and the tugs to handle them.

“The survey work was conducted in power boats which could only work for a period before and after slack water, since at other times their speed of six to eight knots was either just equal or less than the speed of the current.

“The sequence of events was: (1) the small boat survey, (2) the small mine sweepers, (3) the tug with the buoys, and (4) the frigates. Up-river progress was at the rate of about three miles a day until we reached Kyodong Island.

Click here to view map

“My hat is off to the British Navy and the Commonwealth Navies for the courage, tenacity, and high degree of seamanship they showed in accomplishing this job.

“When they reached the Kyodong Island area, we established an anchorage there, and commenced taking the enemy under fire.

“The survey then proceeded both westward and eastward. However, the only navigable channel found was one that went westward along the north of Kyodong Island, then turned north at Inson Point and proceeded to the eastward.

“As soon as we showed up north of Kyodong Island, the enemy started constructing batteries at Ayang Point and at the mouth of the Yesong River.

“There was a railroad line that ran from Yenan to Kesong, and a ferry across the Yesong River. There was heavy traffic on this ferry. To shell it regularly, the frigates had to get up to the mouth of the Yesong. The enemy would plant machine guns and mortars in the rice fields at night, and when the frigate came along in the morning, would shell the frigate, and there would be a close fight.”

Dyer happened to be on board HMAS *Murchison* (LCDR A. N. Dollard, RAN) for a tour of the estuary during one particularly hot action on 28 September 1951.

“About 1600,” recorded LCDR Dollard, “unsuspected batteries of 75-mm. guns, 50-mm. guns, and mortars opened fire on us from the north bank of the Han. We had just reached the Yesong River and had dropped our anchor to let the current turn us around when the first mortar hit.”
The Australian frigate picked up her anchor and maneuvered clear, with all guns blazing. The
*Murchison’s* 4-inch fire scored several hits and silenced all opposition.

This Han River demonstration lasted until 27 November 1951, at which time the negotiators agreed upon
a provisional cease fire line.

The disputed territory was recognized as in UN hands.
Chapter 9. The Seaborne Artillery
Naval Gunfire at the Bombline

At the bombline in September, 1951, several naval ships had an opportunity to display their gunnery prowess. *Los Angeles* fired all batteries at enemy troops and gun positions near Kojo on 3-4 September. One hundred and ninety-seven rounds of 8-inch and 123 rounds of 5-inch fire were expended. The shore party controlling her fire was commendatory:

“Many enemy casualties. Explosion observed with considerable smoke and spreading fire. . . . Rounds flushed enemy troops who began fleeing inland. Fire landed among them. In one incident, troops began running back over a small hill, and as they reached the top of the hill, a series of eight-inch air bursts exploded about twenty-five feet above their heads. . . . Your firing destroyed at least three enemy gun positions and caused an untold number of casualties.”

The *New Jersey* had a chance to work at the bombline intermittently from 23 September to 3 October 1951.[13A] The naval gunfire liaison party that spotted for her made the following comments:

“24 September: ‘. . . 27 rounds of 16-inch were fired with good effect on Hills 1190 and 951, with many bunkers destroyed, others revealed, and many casualties inflicted on the enemy. . . .’

“2 October: ‘. . . four missions were fired, expending 136 rounds on Hills 802 and 951. Air observers and enemy POWs reported 25 counted enemy bunkers destroyed, 45 estimated destroyed; 200 killed, 400 wounded. . . .’

“3 October: ‘. . . *New Jersey* fired 81 rounds on Hills 796 and 802 with good effect. . .’.”

The cruiser *Los Angeles* also was credited with saving the First ROK Corps on the night of 21 November. “In early November,” said VADM J. J. Clark, then Commander Task Force 77, “intelligence sources indicated a strong buildup of enemy forces, with increased artillery and automatic weapons fire in the Kojo area. During the night of 21 November I received an urgent call for assistance to the First ROK Corps, then on the line near Kojo. General Van Fleet’s headquarters reported that the enemy was breaking through the Korean lines, and had captured a hill on which an important outpost was located. The First ROKs had run out of ammunition, and the enemy was mauling them very badly. Could we send a ship down there?

“The location of the break-through was beyond the range of destroyer fire. The only heavy ship I had was the heavy cruiser *Los Angeles*.

“I proposed sending her, but my staff called attention to a standing order requiring that one heavy cruiser or battleship be kept with the fast carrier task force at all times to provide AA protection in the event of an air attack. Another reason for this requirement was in case any of those Russian cruisers came out of Vladivostok and ran down into our area during the night.

“These seemed like pretty worthless reasons just then, so I overrode the requirements and ordered the *Los Angeles* to get down there at high speed.

“She arrived off Kojo about 0230 and her 8-inch guns turned the tide of battle. Her 91 rounds of 8-inch fire drove the Communists back and gave the First ROK Corps a breathing spell until morning, when they were able to replenish their ammunition supplies.”[14]

The last month of 1951 saw destroyer *Beatty* (DD-756, CDR Means Johnston, Jr.) patrolling the east coast north of Hungnam—“firing at any target worth our ammunition.”

During a Sunday patrol southward from Cha-ho, *Beatty* spotted but could not positively identify lines of black dots across all the harbors and inlets along the coast. They appeared to be buoys and were estimated to be
supports for anti-landing nets.

Reporting this information to Commander Task Group 95, Beatty received the following order: “Put a whaleboat in the water and have a closer look-see.”

Beatty complied, selecting the large harbor of Yangwa.

Beatty’s whaleboat, manned by a crew of volunteers commanded by Ensign Hugh H. McCreery, USN, was lowered into the water shortly after dawn and proceeded on its mission deep inside the enemy-held harbor. Since the boat crew could not comply with their mission of determining the nature of the objects until there was sufficient light, they remained inside the harbor for over two hours in broad daylight.

When about 1,500 feet off the beach, the whaleboat was suddenly caught in a crossfire from three machine gun nests. Ensign McCreery later estimated more than 100 rounds near the whaleboat, with the bullets walking by as close as five feet.

Over the “walkie-talkie” radio the ship could hear the rat-tat-tat of the machine guns. “I asked Ensign McCreery if he was firing at the enemy or was he being fired upon,” said CDR Johnston. His reply was ‘Affirmative to both.’ Almost simultaneously I asked him if he wanted the Beatty’s 5-inch guns to commence firing. I ordered my gunnery officer, LT Walter W. Schwartz, USN, to use white phosphorous ammunition which had proved very effective in counterbattery fire.”[15]

The whaleboat was directly in the line of fire as the first round was fired. McCreery (also Beatty’s assistant gunnery officer) radioed spot corrections. The first correction was almost on, and the second resulted in a direct hit on the first machine gun nest. On the third spot, fire was shifted to another nest with another direct hit. Several rounds were fired at the third, which was quickly silenced, although its destruction could not be confirmed. The crew of the whaleboat was simultaneously firing on the enemy with machine guns and even pistols.

The Beatty’s whaleboat returned unscathed, with a very detailed drawing of the buoy arrangements.

The lines of black dots proved to be anti-landing nets, illustrating the Communists’ inbred fear of another amphibious assault.
At the beginning of 1952, the war ashore had assumed all the aspects of a stalemate. Ground action was sporadic, and consisted mainly of probing raids and patrols, varying in size and violence.

Despite the intense and combined efforts of air and naval forces, it was apparent that interdiction of the enemy’s supply lines in Korea was not being achieved. The Communists were succeeding in steadily building up their military strength all along the battlefront, and their flow of supplies, while hampered and harassed, was not being interrupted to a critical degree.

The enemy’s amazing and rapid capacity for repairing his roads, tunnels, and bridges plus his unlimited manpower, and his protected supply bases north of the Yalu, required greater effort and more efficient interdiction of the blockade forces if the supply networks were to be closed off to an effective degree. The Navy had to draw the blockade and bombardment noose a few notches tighter.\[15A\]

What more and what else could be done to hurt and harass the Communists?

To Admirals Joy, Martin, and Dyer, there was little new that could be done. With the number of ships available, and the political and military restrictions imposed upon the conduct of the war, only an intensification of effort and improvements in technique could increase the Navy’s contribution to the war.

In this sense, several things could be done.

First of all, the surface ships operating with the carrier and blockade forces could be more frequently used for bombardment and interdiction, especially during replenishment and bad weather. As a calculated risk, escort and heavy supporting ships around the carrier task force could be absent from the task force on a one-day-at-a-time basis for gun strikes. The escort of convoys could be reduced.

Secondly, the closer the co-operation between Task Forces 77 and 95, the greater would be the damage inflicted upon the enemy. Commander Task Force 77 was therefore given the task of coordinating the interdiction campaign by air and naval gunfire.

Third, still closer liaison could be established with the U.S. and ROK troops at the bombline, so that naval gunfire at the battlefront might be improved in its effectiveness.

Fourth, the spotting of naval gunfire must be increased; better control would mean greater accuracy and greater damage.

Fifth, additional areas close inshore could be swept clear of mines, and more patrols established to completely eliminate any enemy attempts to short-haul supplies by junk or sampan.

And lastly, a better scheme for the coordination of the air and ground interdiction campaign could be worked out. It was this objective which brought into being the “Package” and “Derail” operations, described on page 349.
After relieving the First ROK Army Corps, the First Marine Division had taken up positions on the eastern end of the battleline. On their right flank was the First ROK Army, adjacent to the sea. However, the Marine division itself was still within the long-range reach of either cruisers or battleships.

In November 1951, the Marine division requested again that naval ships be made available to support them. Both Tenth Army Corps and COME-USAK approved this request, and a schedule of naval ships to support the division was drawn up.

In the four months which followed, it became standard practice for a new ship, reporting to the Marine Division to perform gunfire support for the first time, to send representatives to a liaison conference. At this meeting the Marines would furnish the necessary maps and overlays of the front lines and bombline, would explain the terrain topography and targets, and would furnish information regarding voice calls and frequencies. In return the ship’s gunnery officer would present information on ammunition availability, times on station, expected periods of replenishment, and other problems. These exchanges always proved invaluable.

During this period on the eastern front, the Marines were facing a deeply entrenched enemy whose main fortifications had been erected on the reverse sides of the steep mountains, away from the Marines. (See drawing on page 284.) These positions had proved invulnerable to all but the heaviest ordnance, namely, the naval gunfire of cruisers and battleships.

Major General John T. Selden, USMC, emphasized the importance of naval gunfire in a despatch request for continued gunfire support addressed to Vice Admiral Harold W. Martin, Commander Seventh Fleet.

“Since September the First Marine Division has blasted the majority of enemy’s trenches and firing positions on forward slopes. The enemy now mans these with only a sentry force. The majority of his troops remain on the reverse slopes in areas protected from our tank and artillery fire. These down-slope positions are so constructed as to be invulnerable to all but the heaviest ordnance. Artillery ammunition is limited and in general cannot destroy the desired targets. Close air support is not available in quantity. High level bombing rarely hits such targets. Naval gunfire is the only ordnance available which can be effectively employed to destroy these targets, which include regimental command posts and other enemy strongpoints. Request that naval gunfire be continued to hit maximum number these targets.”[16]

Vice Admiral Martin concurred, ordering that the maximum practical support be given to the Marines by Task Force 77’s and 95’s cruisers and battleships.

The assigned task for them was not an easy one. The average range to target would be 10 miles for the cruisers, and 16 miles for the battleships. In the very mountainous terrain, with variable and often unpredictable wind conditions, there was lubberly doubt that naval gunfire could be sufficiently accurate to destroy such small targets as artillery pieces, bunkers, and shelters. The naval gunner’s were certain they could hit the targets, but not so sure that the expenditure of ammunition might not be extravagant.

For two-and-a-half months, the bombline ships fired at the enemy’s front-lines. On 7 April 1952, General Selden passed out the report cards to Admiral Martin.

(1) Wisconsin had fired 977 rounds of 16-inch caliber projectiles in 43 missions at an average range of approximately 16 miles. This fire had killed an estimated 70 and wounded 359. Three artillery pieces had been destroyed and 7 damaged, 81 bunkers and shelters had been destroyed, and 105 damaged.
(2) *St. Paul* and *Rochester* had fired 1,661 rounds of 8-inch caliber projectiles at an average range of approximately 11 miles. This fire had killed 239 enemy troops and wounded 47. It had destroyed 2 artillery pieces and damaged 3. It had destroyed 116 bunkers and shelters and had damaged 127.

(3) *Manchester* had fired 470 rounds of 6-inch caliber projectiles at an average range of 11 miles. This fire had killed 163 enemy troops and wounded 47. One artillery piece had been destroyed and 8 damaged; 28 bunkers and shelters had been destroyed and 20 damaged.

Was such naval gunfire worth the effort and expense? The answer could only be yes. In General Selden’s words, “The support rendered during this period was both effective and justified.”

With an average expenditure of between 15 to 23 rounds per mission, naval gunfire was destroying targets for which the expenditure of 50 to 60 rounds of artillery fire was not uncommon. And the deleterious effect on the enemy’s morale was immense even if not fully measurable. The Communists had supposed their reverse slope entrenchments impervious to gunfire; consequently, the destruction of their bunkers, command posts, and artillery positions by the flanking and enfilading fire of the cruisers and battleships was totally unexpected.

Reports of the excellent results of naval gunfire came not only from spotters observing the ships’ fire but from captured enemy prisoners as well. One prisoner reported that *Wisconsin*’s fire on 25 January had hit his divisional command post, and that half the personnel in it were casualties. Another prisoner confessed that he had been induced to surrender after surviving a heavy naval bombardment, during which his unit had suffered severe casualties. In fact, one shell had landed near his position and had failed to go off. As he looked at the size of the 16-inch shell, he became convinced that it was time to surrender.

Still another prisoner reported that his battalion political officer had explained that the huge craters made by the 16-inch shells were made by atomic artillery.

General Seldon summarized the naval gunfire: “In view of the unusual circumstances confronting the First Marine Division, it is felt that the fire support ships have played a valuable and unique role in applying pressure against enemy military positions and morale.”
Time after time the blockading destroyers would fire at the same coastal targets and provoke no fire in reply. On other occasions, without warning one or more enemy batteries would open a hot, intense, and accurate fire upon the tormenting ships. In several instances the enemy guns would remain purposely silent in order to entice the patrolling ships closer and closer inshore.

The USS *Thompson* (DMS-38, LCDR W. H. Barckmann) was an early example of how ships were often enticed close ashore by silence.

On 14 June 1951, while searching for lucrative targets in the vicinity of Songjin, the *Thompson* closed the beach to less than 3,000 yards. Suddenly, out of camouflage, four 3-inch mobile batteries commenced a hot and heavy fire on her. The *Thompson* increased speed and headed seaward, while returning the surprise fire. However, before moving clear, she had been struck 13 times, had suffered 6 casualties (3 killed and 3 wounded), and had received extensive damage to her director, radio equipment, and radars. *Thompson* acquitted herself with an equally intense fire on the four guns, forcing them to cease fire.[16A]

The USS *James C. Owens* (DDR-776, CDR Robert B. Erly, USN) was another destroyer to receive a sudden and heavy attack from enemy guns. On 7 May 1952, the *Owens* was interdicting enemy coastal traffic in the vicinity of Songjin and had destroyed two railroad cars and a truck when she received information of activity in the Songjin railroad marshalling yards.

Moving the *Owens* to within 3,000 yards of the target, Erly opened direct fire on the marshalling yards, demolishing a switch engine and eight railroad cars.

At this point, approximately ten enemy guns opened a savage and accurate fire upon the *Owens*. The first salvos straddled immediately. For eleven minutes the enemy’s fire was intense and rapid, resulting in six direct hits and much shrapnel from many near misses. Three separate fires broke out in the *Owens* 40-mm. ready-service magazine and two ready-service ammunition racks.

The *Owens* counterbattery fire was equally intense. Two of the enemy guns were seen to explode, and several others silenced.

As the *Owens* left the harbor, she had the satisfaction of continuing the fire several minutes after the enemy guns had quit.

Three *Owens* men had been killed and five wounded. The after officers quarters had been wrecked; cables to the after 40-mm. mounts had been severed. *Owens* made her own repairs, transferred her dead and wounded, and resumed normal operations and was again under fire at Hungnam in less than twenty-four hours.

The USS *Cunningham* (DD-752, CDR A. A. Clark, USN) was likewise to find herself in a hornet’s nest of enemy gunfire. After a week of unchallenged inshore patrolling near Tanchon on 19 September 1952, the *Cunningham* had closed to within 3,500 yards of the beach while firing at a repair crew driven into the railroad tunnel.

“At 1430,” said Clark,[17] “the enemy batteries opened fire and scored a direct hit with their first salvo. We immediately increased speed, turned to open the range, and started chasing splashes. Within about two minutes we took four more direct hits and about seven to eight air-bursts close aboard. One direct hit ruptured four depth charges, splattering burning TNT over much of the deckhouse aft, the dense smoke making fire control difficult. The leadership and professional skill of the mount captains and after Director Officer were magnificent. The guns which would bear—the after 5-inch mount, and after twin 3-inch/50—countered with 118 rounds of 5-
inch/38 and 36 rounds of 3-inch/50 in spite of dense black smoke through mount 51 and air bursts over mount 33.

“Thereafter we weren’t hit, although the shore guns kept firing at us all the way out to 16,000 yards, expending an estimated 125 rounds of 75 to 155-mm. The five hits and near misses cost us thirteen casualties (none killed), besides disabling our SG radar and demolishing a forced-draft blower in the forward fireroom.”

Clark was fairly certain that the airbursts near Cunningham were VT-fuzed, as there were no airbursts away from the ship.
Better liaison, better coordination, and better spotting—these were the improved techniques which would increase the effectiveness of naval gunfire upon the enemy.

Of the three, perhaps the most important was spotting, whether air spot (airplane or helicopter) or the actual observation and control of gunfire by spotters on the ground. However it was done, all hands agreed that the effectiveness of the naval gunnery would be in direct proportion to the amount and quality of the spotting.

The first west coast blockade commander, Rear Admiral W. G. Andrewes, RN, had appraised the value of non-spotted fire in these words: “Unobserved fire is useful for morale purposes, both from the point of view of our own forces and of upsetting the enemy,” he said.[18] “Apart from that, it is of little real value, and many thousands of shells must have fallen harmlessly on the barren hills and rocks along the east coast of Korea.”

Helicopter spotting was a new gunnery technique, first used in combat by the Helena in August of 1950. Opinion was unanimous that a ship using its own helicopter and carrying its own spotting officer possessed one of the best assists to accurate marksmanship that a ship could have.

But helicopter spot had its drawbacks and limitations. In the first place, only certain of the cruisers and battleships had helicopters. Helicopter spot was only rarely available to the destroyers, which expended approximately 90 per cent of the bombardment ammunition fired in the Korean War. Secondly, helicopters were very susceptible to enemy gunfire, even small arms. If there was any enemy opposition, the use of helicopters was extremely hazardous. In Wonsan harbor, for example, helicopters were available, but their primary tasks were minehunting and search and rescue; their use for spotting purposes in that besieged city was highly dangerous because of the heavy enemy antiaircraft fire.

Air spot by regular airplanes had its limitations, too. The first limitation was training. The majority of the spotting pilots, both U.S. Air Force and Navy, were well trained in the technique and doctrine of gunfire spot. In a few instances, however, a lack of training, sometimes humorous, was reflected in the use of non-standard phraseology. The British Admiral in command of Task Force 95.1, Rear Admiral A. K. Scott-Moncrieff, RN, reported in April 1952 that the Dutch ship Hr. Ms. Piet Hein (CDR von Freytag Drabbe) became completely bewildered by the use of incorrect procedure by an airborne spotter. “Fortunately,” wrote Admiral Moncrieff, “the shoot was prevented from being abortive by the presence of a liaison officer from my staff who was able to translate the vernacular into simple English.”

The use of jet aircraft for spotting later in the war revealed the limitations of these aircraft: limited endurance and their need to fly at fairly high altitudes in order to maintain a satisfactory rate of fuel expenditure.

As for propeller-type spotting planes, their value was occasionally diminished by the presence of enemy antiaircraft fire in certain areas such as Wonsan, which forced them to such altitudes as to make their spotting efforts questionable.

Aside from these practical limitations, the use of air and ground spot increased steadily for the remainder of the war. Never was there enough. Requests for spotting assistance always exceeded the capacity for giving it. But the maximum available was hereafter used to increase the effectiveness of naval gunfire on enemy targets.
Chapter 9. The Seaborne Artillery

Whaleboat Operations

As already described, one of the tactics used to advantage by the blockading ships of Task Force 95 was the use of ship’s whaleboats for the detection of targets along the coasts or in harbors, as well as for the direction of the ship’s gunfire and the capture of enemy sampans and junks.

One outstanding whaleboat operation was conducted by the destroyer USS Halsey Powell (DD-686, CDR Francesco Costagliola, USN) on 18 January 1952, near Hungnam. This operation, to neutralize an enemy supply buildup where a destroyer’s gunfire could not reach, came to be known as “Chicken-Stealer.”

“Shortly after I arrived in the Hungnam area to be Commander Task Element 95.24,” wrote CDR Costagliola,[19] “all ships of the blockade force received a despatch from Admiral Dyer. In essence this despatch pointed out that on many occasions recently, ships had reported destroying single junks. Admiral Dyer stated that in his opinion we should show more dash and enterprise in capturing junks, which were useful for intelligence purposes, rather than sinking them. This operation had the code name ‘Junket’.

“This despatch was received about 13 January 1952. Since I had a shipload of eager lads, we accepted Admiral Dyer’s despatch as a direct challenge. We did not think we had much chance of encountering a junk offshore in our area, but in addition to planning for such an eventuality, we thought there was a good possibility there might be some behind such islands as Mayang-do in our area. My executive officer, operations, gunnery, communications, and shore fire control party officers were particularly active in working up a plan to steal a junk. My crew nicknamed our two boats ‘Hawk’ and ‘Falcon’.

“Having received intelligence to the effect that there were many small boats in the harbor of Sam-ho, and since Sam-ho was within enemy gun range from the sea but obscured by a promontory, we requested aircraft spot from CTF 77 for 1000 on the 18th of January. No planes showed up. We decided to try our boats. The spotting boat directed ships’ fire on jetties, boats, and a warehouse.

“Upon their return, the boat crew reported the Sam-ho warehouse gutted, jetties damaged, and many of the small boats riddled with shrapnel. The whaleboats had been fired on by a shore battery but escaped damage.

“On 19 January, in the Hungnam area, close scrutiny of the shore line through binoculars revealed a man standing at the entrance to a large cave facing us on the island of Hwa-do. We also observed seven or eight workmen with digging tools enter the cave. The information we had on the island was not clear as to whether or not it was in friendly or enemy hands. Certainly, the cave looked suspicious. Despatches to our immediate superior. ComDesRon-17 (CTG 95.2, CAPT C. E. Crombe) and the local minesweeper commander, confirmed that there were no friendly forces on that island.

“On establishing the fact that the island was enemy, we opened fire on the cave and managed to get one or two rounds into the entrance.

“Following this, a large hand-propelled barge was observed to leave Hungnam harbor and proceed along the shore in the direction of Hwa-do island. This too was taken under fire. At least one casualty was observed among the barge personnel as they worked their way laboriously back into the harbor.

“In the early afternoon, considerable activity could be discerned on the mainland almost directly behind Hwa-do. It appeared that at least a hundred people were loading supplies into small boats, presumably to ferry them to Hwa-do. A few rounds dispersed that activity.

“All this activity on Hwa-do really roused our curiosity. But from our position (which we could not vary very much) we knew something was afoot. The only way to see was to use our whaleboats. On this day, however,
the seas were rough and conditions were not considered suitable for launching and loading boats.

"The decision was made therefore to remain in this location until morning, with our anchor ‘underfoot’ to help keep the ship from drifting.

"Next morning, Sunday, January 20, 1952, the seas were calm. We started putting the boats over at 0630. Although it was only about 8,000 yards from the ship to Hwa-do, the two boats had to travel about twice that far in order to get behind it and do it surreptitiously. Although risky, I decided to keep my ship in the same spot it had been for the last twenty-odd hours, because it was the only one where we could stay close to the island and also observe the section of beach where all the activity had been observed the day before.

"About 0745, the boats were in position, ready to spot our fire. The ship opened fire, one round at a time, as directed by Ensign James Winnefeld, the spotting officer in the first boat. Lieutenant Theodore Curtis, my operations officer in charge of the second boat, kept a few hundred yards away to provide support to the first boat if needed.

"The ship had only two 5-inch mounts manned, as the crew had not quite finished breakfast. Just at eight o’clock we were startled by an explosion about 50 feet off the starboard bow. Water splashed all over the bridge. Within seconds we were backing out of there emergency full. Shells seemed to be falling all around us. Our anchor was still underfoot, but fortunately it did not snag on anything and came along with us.

"At least four guns on Sohojin Point, located about 9,000 yards north-northeast of our position, were shooting at us. Needless to say, we were at General Quarters, shooting back with all our mounts, in very short order. Although we were straddled several times, the ship was not hit and the enemy shells began to fall consistently short, then ceased.

"The boats, meanwhile, were still behind Hwa-do to the west, reconnoitering and encountering no opposition. We returned to a point about 2,000 yards south of our former location, out of range of the enemy battery, and resumed shooting at Hwa-do targets. Unfortunately, a good proportion of possible targets were on a steep reverse slope where the ship could not get at them.

"However, Ensign Winnefeld reported all houses in three small villages had been covered with shrapnel, and four houses completely gutted. Boats along the beach were sprayed with shrapnel. One was destroyed and one was sunk.

"When it became apparent that not much more could be done without the expenditure of a great deal more effort, I recalled the boats. The next couple of days and nights, Hwa-do continued in our plans and operations as a target to receive harassing fire.

"Shortly after this operation, the thought was generated that a bazooka would be a very useful weapon in stepping up the wallop of the whaleboats. On the afternoon of 22 January, the Halsey Powell (DD-686) was relieved as TE 95.24, and proceeded to Sasebo for upkeep. There, through Rear Admiral George C. Dyer and the assistance of CMD R. M. Hill (OinC Naval Ordnance Facility, Yokosuka) and the local Army unit, we obtained two 3.5-inch bazookas and a 75-mm. recoilless rifle, with ammunition for both types.

"Upon our return to the Hungnam area on January 30, the weather was bitterly cold and the boats wouldn’t start. The engineers worked ’round the clock to get them going. Between rough weather and the severe cold, it wasn’t until the afternoon of 6 February that both boats were again running and the sea was calm enough to get them in the water to take a look at the situation on Hwa-do. Finally, at 1430, we got them in the water. One boat had the 75-mm. recoiless mounted on a platform in the bow. The other boat included a 3.5-inch bazooka. Once again, Ensign Winnefeld commanded the 75-mm. boat and Lieutenant Curtis the 3.5-inch.

"The ship went to General Quarters about 1530, ready for any eventuality, and commenced a slow bombardment to keep the enemy occupied.

"About 1545, the boats reported in position and began to direct our fire. As before, however, because of the reverse slope, we were not doing much damage. Permission was requested and granted for the boats to try
their luck with the bazooka and recoilless rifle. I gave them permission and the ship ceased fire. The whaleboats
took turns, one standing off for support while the other went in to shoot at close range.

“Meanwhile, aboard ship, I nervously looked at the clock. It was 1625. I decided to issue the recall order
at 1630. Just then a not very clear communication was received from one of the boats indicating some sort of
difficulty. Our first impression was that one of the men had gotten singed on his backside from being too close to
the back blast of the recoilless rifle. The next thing we got was a frantic call for fire on a certain area of the island.

“We were a little hesitant to open fire because we couldn’t see the boats and were using indirect fire.
However, we started pouring out the 5-inch until we heard from the boats again. The boats reported that one
man—Donald Flaherty, DC2—was injured and would require the attention of a medical officer. He had been shot
in the ankle and the groin. We had no doctor aboard.

“While the boats were making their slow trek back to the ship we radioed our immediate superior in
Wonsan, CTG 95.2, Captain C. E. Crombe, for medical assistance. He dispatched the Twining (CDR M. C.
Osborne) which was also at Wonsan, and which had a medical officer embarked, to meet us.

“It was nearly dark when we finally got the two boats aboard and ran south to rendezvous with Twining.
We did not have to go very far, however, for she had been steaming at high speed in our direction. Flaherty was
soon safely transferred.

“After retrieving the two boats, we got the full story from the boat crews. While shooting at the various
targets on the beach, they had spotted a couple of sampans which they thought they could capture (one had fresh
fish in it). When the sampans were secured in tow, the two whaleboats started back to the ship, but were taken
under small arms fire by the enemy. This was when Flaherty was hit. The radioman in the other boat—William
Harrison, RM2—had a bullet graze his head which severed the headband of his earphones. Arthur Talley, BM3,
was steering his boat lying on the bottom, using a rifle as a stick to guide the tiller. They still had the sampans in
tow when some bigger guns, probably 75-mm., opened up with considerable accuracy and forced them to
abandon the prizes.

“Fortunately, the ship’s fire managed to stifle the enemy’s guns before any more damage was done.

“After Flaherty[19A] was transferred, we returned to the vicinity of Hwa-do Island and Hungnam about
2200. There was a bright, red glow over Hwa-do indicating that fires the boats had set with their shooting in the
afternoon were still burning brightly.”

Capturing Sampans

On the night of 17 February 1952, minesweeper Murrelet (AM-372) was steaming independently on
blockade and anti-mining patrol between Hungnam and Cha-ho. Near Sondo Gap, radar contact in the direction
of the beach was made at a range of 10,000 yards. Murrelet changed course to close the range and to get between
the target and the beach in order to prevent escape. It was dangerous but exhilarating work.

At a range of 400 yards, Murrelet illuminated the target with her 12-inch signal searchlight, and the light
disclosed a large two-masted sampan with all sails set. Murrelet fired one 20-mm. burst through the rigging,
severing and dropping both sails of the sampan. Murrelet came alongside, threw over two grappling hooks, and
secured the junk. Just as Murrelet prepared to put her boarding party aboard, six North Koreans crawled from
below decks, raised their hands, and surrendered. The sampan was taken in tow and delivered to the ROK Navy.

“The Murrelet got the armed whaleboat idea from Admiral Dyer’s ‘dashing’ and ‘aggressive’ despatch,”
said LCDR J. W. O’Neil. “We procured walkie-talkies, built a radar reflector screen for the whaleboat, and then
called for volunteers. Almost the entire crew stepped forward. The crew selected was LTJG W. F. Gillen, USNR;
ENS Suh In Byuk, ROK Navy; Frank H. Kennon, Jr., BM1; Brown, TN; Cluke, SN; French, SN; Beaugard,
QM2; Sherer, RD3; and Chance, FN. A few daylight practice runs proved that we could operate the boat
effectively three or four miles from the ship.

“Our method of operation was quite simple. On our night patrols, if a sampan was detected in swept water, the capture would be effected by the ship. If the sampan was detected in unswept water, we would get as close as possible, stop, and put the armed boat in the water. The radar reflector in the boat made a good target and we were able to vector them to any contact very effectively. The whaleboat would approach the sampan and ENS Suh would call on them in Korean to surrender. Then the sampan and occupants would be towed back to the ship.

“This plan met with success the instant it was put in operation. The whaleboat was vectored out on contacts six times and captured six sampans and twenty-six prisoners.

“The seventh time did not work out too well. The whaleboat was vectored about 3.5 miles into Hongwon Roads to a double contact we had picked up. They were successful in making an undetected approach and called upon five North Koreans in each sampan to surrender. The occupants stood up with their hands in the air. The whaleboat took one sampan in tow and started to go alongside the other. So far everything was routine and a carbon copy of the other raids.

“Suddenly one of the Koreans threw a hand grenade into the after compartment of the whaleboat. The explosion killed Kennon, the coxswain, wounded Brown and Cluke, and blew a three-foot hole in the port quarter. Our remaining crew members immediately opened fire with rifles and sub-machine guns, and after a brief but intense fire-fight, killed the occupants of both sampans.

“LTJG Gillen was then faced with the prospect of getting the badly damaged whaleboat back to the ship. The hole was plugged with life jackets, but it was necessary to bail continuously with helmets to stay ahead of the incoming water. Meanwhile, on the Murrelet, we listened to the reports of the action via walkie-talkie and were helpless to assist. The ship could not be taken into mined waters. It took the whaleboat about twenty-five minutes to make the return trip. Murrelet then ran at top speed to Wonsan and obtained medical attention for the wounded men.”

**Shore Battery Dueling**

One of the most successful ships in dueling with the enemy’s coastal guns was the destroyer *Douglas H. Fox* (DD-779, CDR James A. Dare). This ship worked up a procedure especially adapted to the Communist defenses.

“One lesson that I taught my crew which I had learned from World War II,” said CDR Dare, “was that if you wanted to make good gunners out of mediocre gunners, simply take them under enemy fire. Also this procedure seems to have a remarkably good effect on morale.

“In the Korean blockade and bombardment work, every ship had to choose between the evil of long periods at General Quarters, the increasing strain in Condition II; or the relative lack of gunnery coverage in Condition III.

“The *Fox* solved this problem by calling away two sections of Condition III when we were in fairly dangerous territory. This always provided a fore-and-aft 5-inch mount and complete 40-mm. coverage, plus an augmented engineering watch to man the smoke generator and to keep a man in steering aft. Since we could choose the time and duration of these extra stints, it provided fairly easy strain on all concerned.

“The coastal guns of northeast Korea, for the most part, were field artillery pieces. They had no modern control equipment or automatic computers. In my opinion, when the Commmies fired at our ships, and ships opened the range and ceased counterbattery fire too soon, it gave the Reds confidence and courage. I feel that if the *Fox* had done this, the Communists would have fired on us every time we came in range, probably with more accuracy each time.

“Our system, instead, was to approach a known enemy gun position, probing it with single shot,
deliberate fire. When the enemy gun answered, we closed the range and commenced a heavy barrage to smother the battery. After we silenced the gun, we shifted to deliberate fire again to destroy it.

“In dangerous areas, I usually kept one 5-inch mount in reserve, one barrel loaded with white phosphorous and the other with VT-fuzed common. A few salvos of this mixture silenced the enemy fire completely (and usually for several days.)”

A typical result of Fox’s doctrine was the destruction of an enemy battery on Mayang-do, on 7 May 1952.

At 1155, Fox received 12 rounds of fire from the enemy three 76-mm. gun battery. Half of the rounds were white phosphorous. The opening salvo was 20 to 50 yards away, and other straddled within 100 yards. Fox closed the range and commenced a rapid, smothering fire, forcing the enemy guns into silence.

Four nights later, in the same area, Fox captured eighteen fishermen, of whom nine lived on Mayang-do. The prisoners reported that Fox’s fire had destroyed both the gun and the housing of one large 105-mm. gun. The gun chief and five gunners were killed, and another gun dismounted.

“The Mayang-do battery never fired on us again,” said Dare.
The Sea War in Korea
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson

Chapter 9. The Seaborne Artillery
Anti-Fishing Expedition

Destroyer *Douglas H. Fox* was also to have her name recorded very often in action reports during the spring of 1952. In a period of four weeks, *Fox* made the North Korean fishing industry exceedingly unprofitable.

“Our anti-fishing campaign was carefully worked out and centered about our whaleboat raiding party,” said CDR Dare. “Since all raiding would be done at night, we put corner reflectors on staffs in the bow and stern of the whaleboat which permitted us to follow it out as far as 14,000 yards on the SG radar.

“In addition to small arms and radio, the whaleboat crew carried hand grenades, demolition charges, hack saws, axes, bolt cutters (for destroying fishing nets), and an engine repair kit in case the whaleboat engine ever failed. Part of the time the whaleboat also carried a 75-mm. recoilless rifle, with about 15 rounds of HC and 15 rounds of white phosphorous. The ‘Willie-Peter’ was wonderful for establishing a reference point on the beach from which to direct ship’s gunfire.

“The selection of a crew for the whaleboat required careful attention. Not every officer or enlisted man is the right type. My boat cox’n, Shepard, was the kind who could steer by the seat of his pants once he was given a compass course. He was tough and slightly reckless.

“The officer in charge of the boat, LT William R. Doran, was a very good leader, having all the better command virtues. He was also adept with all sorts of small arms; he was the ship’s assistant gunnery officer and therefore knew what type of fire support he could get from the ship.

“The ROK naval officer, Ensign Un Soo Koo, was a bright, extrovert type. On many occasions he managed to get information from the captured prisoners in about 30 seconds, which was then transmitted to the ship by radio. One time, he convinced two prisoners, caught 30 minutes earlier, to help spot gunfire on the loading piers and warehouses behind Mayang-do. (I am not certain the prisoners weren’t spotting our fire onto their creditors’ homes.)

“The other men in the boat crew were the rough and ready ‘can-do’ type.

“Since I felt rather keenly the risks being taken by my men in the whaleboat raiding party, I always ran the bridge plot of their track and controlled them personally from a portable radio mounted on top of the pilot house. Obviously it was important never to lose track of the whaleboat when sending it 5 to 7 miles away from the ship into the midst of a harbor or into a group of 15 to 20 sampans. In order to intercept the relatively immobile sampans, we usually vectored our whaleboat inshore of the targets; the Whaleboat would then herd the fishermen to seaward.

“Capturing fishermen required some thoughtful procedures. Invariably, every craft brought alongside was thoroughly searched beforehand. The whaleboat party, therefore, had to do everything to guarantee the ship’s safety as well as their own. They did this by going alongside and boarding, searching both sampan and prisoners on the spot, by the light of battle lanterns. After this the sampan would be towed back to the ship alongside, rather than astern, so that all guns in the boat could bear. I didn’t want an accident like the tragic one which happened to *Murrelet*.

“After capturing sampans, our whaleboat always took care to identify itself on its approach to the ship by pointing a battle lantern toward us until we were quite certain there could be no mistake.”

The very successful, one-month anti-fishing campaign which *Douglas H. Fox* conducted while patrolling “Engine Block” and at the bombline is outlined in *Fox*’s war diary. Here, incidentally, the historian’s problem is reflected with clarity, for the brief and official words of action reports and war diaries do not contain the colorful
and memorable details so important for reader understanding and interest. Accordingly, each entry from Fox’s war diary is supplemented by remarks from her commanding officer obtained later by correspondence and interview:

**War Diary: 30 April 1952.** “. . . Fox raiders in motor whaleboat investigated small radar contacts inshore of rendezvous area at 0217. . . .”

**Commanding Officer:** “The radar contacts proved to be Dan buoys left by the minesweepers, but were not indicated on my charts. As soon as this was ascertained, we sent the boat in to the small rock island which lies in the mouth of Hungnam harbor. The raiding party planted an American flag on the island, plus a sign with surrender instructions printed in Korean, and a white flag on a short staff to wave at us. The raiding crew also painted the Fox’s name rather prominently on both sides of this rock.”

(Note for history readers): The next day, 1 May, would be the Reds’ May Day celebration. When the Communists began their festivities the next morning, they would do so in sight of the Stars and Stripes.

**War Diary:** 6 May 1952: “At 0200, raiders suspended operations after having captured three sampans and 15 North Korean fishermen in the vicinity of Chang-ho ri. Fox hoisted two sampans aboard, cut third adrift, and resumed southern patrol . . . at 1148 proceeded to Wonsan to transfer prisoners and sampans to TE 95.23 at Yodo. . . . USS Ptarmigan (AM-376) and USS Toucan (AM-387) conducted night anti-sampan patrol. At 2315, Fox raiders captured 23 North Korean fishermen and one 32-foot sampan in vicinity of Paegan-dan. . . .”

**Commanding Officer:** “This was the first night the raiders investigated the harbor closure net off Sin ‘Chang-ni. They reported it to be a 4-inch hemp cable supported by oil drums, and that the net dropped from it was fairly old and rotten.

“The 23 fishermen off Paegan-dan were nearly their total fishing population. We never again observed more than one or two boats there, and these were very close inshore.”

(Note for history readers): Upon being questioned, the fishermen were able to locate a 122-mm. gun at Kajin-ni, which they said was serviced by a company of North Korean soldiers who lived nearby in underground caves. They further reported that the gun was positioned so that only the barrel protruded, and that it had taken four horses to move this gun to its hilltop position. The fishermen also revealed that they had no motorized sampans in their area, that food was scarce, and that soldiers checked them in and out on the hours of 2000 and 0400.

**War Diary:** 8 May 1952: “D. H. Fox raiders cut and destroyed 6,600 feet of fish net and sank 130 main floats of Communist dual-purpose fishing and harbor closure nets off Sin ’Chang-ni.”

**Commanding Officer:** “These nets were formed into interior and exterior traps at both ends. Our Korean ensigns estimated they would provide food for 500 or 600 people. The nets were destroyed by the raiders by first cutting the bolt rope in seven or eight places, towing the sections apart to rip the nets all the way down, and then sinking the whole mess. We doubted that they could be usefully recovered thereafter.”

**War Diary:** 9 May 1952: “D. H. Fox raiders conducted close-in search of Hungnam harbor, capturing 12 North Korean fishermen and two junk-type boats with sails. At 0335 completed raiding operations and fired on numerous factories in Hungnam. . . .”

**Commanding Officer:** “This was the morning that the officer in charge of the raiding party, LT Doran, made me think back to LT Stephen Decatur. Doran was motoring about in Hungnam harbor in the midst of 30 to 40 sampans. He sized up the two biggest ones, stopped them, searched them, forced them to hoist sail, and escorted them out of the harbor. The sun was almost up as they sailed back into the swept area.”

(Note for history readers): The destroyer Fox’s initiative and aggressiveness during a one-month period resulted in the capture of 120 fishermen and 29 boats, and the destruction of 24,000 lineal feet of fish traps and nets. The captured fishermen also furnished valuable military intelligence.
On 4 April 1952, Vice Admiral Joy gave Task Force 77 an additional mission: to coordinate its air strikes with simultaneous gun strikes by the blockade forces. Such a system would increase the damage inflicted, and it would enhance training. Fire from the surface ships would help reduce the enemy antiaircraft fire upon the naval aircraft. In return, the naval aircraft could spot the surface fire of the ships.

These combined strikes were to take place until the end of the war.

The coordination of the fire power of surface ships and the lethal power of a carrier task force’s airplanes commenced with the 13 April air-gun strikes on Chongjin.

*Philippine Sea* (CVA-47, CAPT Willard K. Goodney) and *Boxer* (CVA-11, CAPT John B. Moss) would furnish the air strikes, while the USS *St. Paul* (CA-73, CAPT Roy A. Gano), *Hanson* (DDR-832, CDR W. J. Henning), *T. E. Chandler* (DD-717, CDR T. H. Wells), and British destroyer HMS *Concord* would furnish the gun strikes.

The Chongjin targets were choice ones, especially for the carrier airmen, whose appetites had long been dulled by the steady menu of interdiction targets. Chongjin’s Japan Rayon Company and Mitsubishi Iron Works would be primary targets. In addition, the city’s numerous warehouses, gun positions, supply buildings, fuel tanks, and barracks would receive attention.

Each carrier launched its entire air group twice during the day; *Boxer*’s Air Group Two (CDR A. L. Downing) at 0600 and 1200; *Philippine Sea*’s Air Group Eleven (CDR J. W. Onstott) at 0800 and 1600. Each strike numbered from 52 to 58 planes, and 200 tons of heavy ordnance were pin-pointed on the Chongjin targets.

“My planes flew 132 sorties and dropped 119 tons of ordnance,” recorded Commander Downing. “I led the early morning hop, while CDR G. A. Sherwood, the commanding officer of VA-65, led the afternoon flight. Our targets included buildings, large cranes, a loading platform, a drydock, and five fuel tanks, as well as the rayon and iron factories.

“Although it was difficult at the time to assess damage because of the smoke from the fire and explosions, we achieved excellent results, as determined by post-strike photography. We only had one F4U, one AD, and one F9F sustain minor damage because of flak, largely because we sent the Panther jets in ahead on flak-suppression runs and they effectively silenced the AA.

“Fire and explosions shook the city during the attacks,” said Downing, “and reports of troop casualties and damage came in from outside sources for days after the strike.”[20]

Rear Admiral Apollo Soucek, Commander Task Force 77, had another observation:

“As the air-gun strikes were planned and conducted,” he said, “the pilots’ enthusiasm was observed to swing upward.”

The surface ships were equally pleased with the new system. The coordination of the firing with the bombing improved the accuracy of each while reducing the danger of all.

On 25 April, the USS *Iowa*, accompanied by USS *Duncan* (DDR-874), USS *McCoy Reynolds* (DE-440), and HMAS *Warramunga* (CDR J. H. Ramsay, RAN), was joined by four strikes of 50-odd planes each from Task Force 77 to plaster the industrial targets of Chongjin. It was the second time a battleship had operated so far north. [20A]

“We arrived and fired the first shot at 0530 in the most beautiful dawn you can imagine,” recorded Captain W. R. Smedberg, III. “The sea was flat calm—mirror like—and the temperature a balmy 68°. The sun
was bright, there was not a cloud in the sky, and a soft breeze was just sufficient to move the dust and smoke away from our targets and our line of fire.

“However, the beautiful dawn didn’t remove a feeling of tension. Since Chongjin was the most important industrial and rail transportation center in North Korea, only 48 miles from the Russian border, we had reason to be worried. I couldn’t understand how the Reds could sit and watch us wreck that city, with their own planes just across the border. We could see the Russian planes take off on our radars, but they never came closer than 20 miles from us.

“During the day we had grandstand seats for the four hour-long 50-plane carrier strikes that were nicely coordinated with our firing. A total of 200 planes dropped some 230 tons of bombs and napalm. We fired 213 tons from this ship alone. The DDs probably contributed another 25 tons, with approximately 800 rounds of 5-inch.

“Three large steel and iron works, a sprawling rayon factory, three large power and transformer stations, a big roundhouse, two marshalling yards, and a boat repair shop which included eight huge Gantry cranes and one big hammer head or traveling crane were our targets. We had the most fun getting the ship into a spot where we had five of the big cranes enfiladed; we capped the ‘T’ on them, as it were, and then just started mowing them down. The task force, some 40 or 50 miles away, did a beautiful job of keeping constantly in the area two spotting planes for this ship, so we had a combination of plane and direct spot of the many targets on the waterfront, and excellent plane spot with perfect radio communication for the deeper targets.

“At noon, during the bombardment, we intercepted a short range radio broadcast from Peking, which said that American ships were shelling women and children in the densely populated city of Chongjin. At 3 p.m., we heard another broadcast saying that three of the four ships had been sunk.”

After this strike, the Iowa proceeded south on 27 May to fire at coastal bridges south of Songjin. The battleship fired 98 rounds of 16-inch fire at them and succeeded in damaging all the bridges and closing all the tunnel entrances.

“The remarkable thing about the bombardment work by the battleships in Korea,” said Smedberg,[21] “was the most careful supervision of its delivery. Whereas in World War II our BBs fired many nine-gun salvos in bombardment, in Korea we rarely fired anything except single shots. Moreover, most of the battleship fire was spotted. I would also like to emphasize that none of our planes or ships ever shot into villages or residential areas.”
As has been explained in Chapter 8, entitled “The Struggle to Strangle,” there was no effort made during the course of the Korean war to coordinate the interdiction campaign in Korea at the theater level. However, within its own area of responsibility (the northeast coast of Korea), the Navy performed its own coordination. On 24 April 1951, Vice Admiral Joy approved the proposal of Rear Admiral Ofstie and directed that the interdiction efforts of surface and air be coordinated. For this purpose Task Force 95 was placed under the operational control of Task Force 77. The senior cruiser division commander (CTG 77.1) henceforth served as CTG 77’s representative for the surface gunfire. His duties included the maintenance of an up-to-date list of worthwhile gunfire targets, recommendations for and conduct of the necessary gun strikes, and the periodic evaluation of the program.

In late 1951 Rear Admiral F. Moosbrugger, Commander Cruiser Division Five, summarized the experience of Task Force 95’s interdiction efforts by saying that the only effective fire from surface forces was deliberate fire with air- or groundspot. Non-spotted fire might have psychological or harassment effect, he said, but its actual damage to the enemy was limited. A strip of railroad track, or even a bridge, was a very small target, and unless naval gunfire was both accurate and controlled, the ammunition was largely wasted. Admiral Moosbrugger also called attention to the need for better and more complete intelligence on what the blockade and bombardments were accomplishing.

A further step to increase the effectiveness of naval gunfire and to coordinate it with the air strikes of Task Force 77 was instituted on 11 January 1952 by the introduction of two programs known as “Package” and “Derail.”

“Package” was a shoreline target suitable both for ships and airplanes. Five points along the main Songjin-Hungnam railroad were carefully chosen (see chart), and given the code name “package,” plus a number. At three of the five “packages,” the targets included bridges. Radar reflector buoys were planted off each one to assist navigation and gunfire accuracy. At night, ships could get as close to the five targets as 1,500 to 2,000 yards, in most cases.

The “package” targets were also ones which would be difficult for the enemy to repair. And all of them were along the main east coast supply route. If these “packages” could be interdicted, the flow of enemy supplies from the Manchurian sanctuary would be seriously impeded.[21A]

The initial plan called for the cutting of the “packages” by air strikes. Thereafter, air reconnaissance would reveal the enemy’s progress in repairing the damage and reopening the rail-line. When the Communist repair effort was about complete, other air strikes would destroy the target again.[21B] However, when the carriers were replenishing, or when bad weather prevented air strikes, the surface forces of Task Force 95 were to take over and keep the “packages” destroyed by gunfire. In addition, patrolling ships were to fire a specified number of rounds (at irregular intervals) every day and every night to hamper and destroy the enemy’s repair efforts.

The second program was code-named “derail.” The “derail” targets were ones to be kept destroyed solely by naval gunfire. A study of the northeast coast was made, and eleven rail targets chosen.

Like the “packages,” the “derail” targets were along the coast, accessible to naval gunfire, and on the main Chongjin to Hungnam railroad. At each “derail,” patrolling ships would fire a limited number of shells into...
them during each 24-hour period.

By thus concentrating and coordinating both naval air strikes and naval gun strikes upon the “package” and “derail” targets, it was hoped that the Reds’ logistic efforts along the route could be reduced to a trickle—perhaps even brought to a standstill.
Chapter 9. The Seaborne Artillery
Rear Admiral Gingrich Takes Over Task Force 95

The 31st of May 1952 saw the sixth American naval officer take command of Task Force 95. Aboard the USS Dixie Rear Admiral John E. Gingrich, USN, relieved Rear Admiral George C. Dyer, USN.

At the time of this change of command, the bombardment and blockade forces of Task Force 95 had been ranging the Korean coasts unchallenged except for coastal gunfire for 23 months. Added to the hundreds of air strikes conducted on the coastal communications by the carriers of Task Force 77 were the hundreds of gun strikes by the surface ships of Task Forces 95 and 77. By now, every worthwhile target within reach of naval gunfire along the enemy-held coast had been repeatedly under siege, and had been hit repeatedly, time and again.

“Reports of destruction, when added together from every source,” said Rear Admiral Gingrich,[22] “were such an array of bridges and tunnels, locomotives and trucks, that there was scarcely room in Korea for all of them.”

Opportunities for firing at fresh targets were almost non-existent, and there was little reason to waste ammunition on targets that were already untenable or destroyed. In fact, there was some suspicion that the Oriental enemy was purposely planting worthless targets in the oft-shattered areas of northeast Korea simply to invite our ships to waste ammunition on them. Moreover, there was still a great lack of information on precisely what damage our gun strikes were actually achieving.

To Admiral Gingrich, the same conditions which had long existed on the battlefront—stalemate—had now become equally applicable to the war at sea. The war in Korea—in the air, on the ground, and on the seas—was a war of attrition. It seemed to Gingrich that the expenditure of every naval shell had to have some real expectation of damage or it should not be fired. The phase of shooting just to be shooting was over; when targets were ample, it was the only policy an offensive-minded American Navy could follow. Henceforth, thought Gingrich, every bullet and every shell ought to have some Communist’s name on it.

“The cost of a 5-inch shell at the end of the Korean pipeline was approximately $200,” said Rear Admiral Gingrich. “Unless it did that much damage, we were hurting ourselves more than the enemy.”

Moreover, naval gunfire had to be tailored to the target. Five-inch and 3-inch fire was known to be far less effective upon railroad tracks than large caliber fire. The most efficient use of destroyer fire was not to destroy, but to keep the enemy from repairing the track damage. Moreover, rather than shooting in a flat area, it would be better to shoot at the tracks where there were hills and embankments. Any “over” shell which missed the track itself might cause landslides to block the track.

Furthermore, there was little logic in thin-skinned destroyers under the command of “hairy-chested” skippers dueling with enemy coastal batteries simply for the sake of dueling. What gain was there in firing one hundred rounds back at a cavemouth from which a single or half-dozen rounds had been fired? The fire of the Communists was steadily increasing along the coasts in both accuracy and intensity; fuzed projectiles were now being used; some even thought that enemy radar-controlled guns were in evidence. Would the severe damage or even loss of a destroyer be warranted just to silence a single enemy gun manned by perhaps a dozen men?

Gingrich was no less anxious than his predecessors to bring every ounce of his naval strength to bear upon the enemy, but the naval war, he felt, had entered a new phase. If the Korean war was one of attrition, then the UN surface forces must insure that the Communists were more attrited than we.[22A]
The Sea War in Korea
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson

Chapter 9. The Seaborne Artillery
The Blockade Pinches

The life of a fisherman in North Korea, even before the war, was a very difficult one. As the farmers had been forced to sell their rice to the Red government at fixed, low prices, so fishermen had to sell their fish at government prices. Quantity quotas were established. If a fisherman met his quota, it was increased. If he did not, his license to fish was revoked. Not long after the war started, the North Korean government enforced a “Fishing Union” which exercised complete control; unless he was a member of the union, a fisherman could not obtain hooks, nets, floats, and other essential equipment.

The northeast coast of Korea was dotted with fishing villages at almost every place where adequate boat shelter could be found. Traditionally, the coastal Koreans rarely bothered with agriculture, and did not maintain rice paddies. Their dependence upon fish was even more complete than that of the inland Koreans.

The inexorable pressure of the tight naval blockade along the northeast coast made the fisherman’s life ever more unbearable. This was evident from the steady stream of escapees and defectors from North Korea. So numerous were the refugees that special UN internee camps had to be established on the islands of Yang-do, near Songjin, and Yo-do, in Wonsan harbor. These two islands became collection points for the hundreds of men, women, and children who left hardships and retaliation by their Communist village overseers, who risked the hazards of the open sea in small boats, who accepted the risk of being mistaken for minelaying personnel while escaping, and who braved these dangers despite the Communists’ warning that the Americans automatically killed any North Korean they captured.

The principal reason for so many refugee North Koreans was simply starvation. Fishing had become almost impossible.

Daytime fishing was suicidal because of the carrier and patrol planes and ships patrolling every section of the coast constantly. And at night, when the sampans of a fishing village put out to sea for a catch of pollack or sardines, they could often expect either a warning star shell over their heads, followed by gunfire to drive them ashore, or perhaps an armed whaleboat manned by eager American destroyer or minesweeper sailors, to capture them.

In an effort to break the tight blockade, the Communists organized each coastal village with one or more overseers, who endeavored to prevent the North Koreans from escaping seaward or southward, and who forced the fishermen to fish despite the dangers. The Red procedure was simply to herd the fishermen into their sampans, place guards with machineguns and hand grenades in several of the boats, and at gunpoint, force the fishermen to sea. Any sampan which ventured further than a prescribed distance from the rest of the group was fired upon. On some occasions, entire villages banded together, killed or captured their overseers, and escaped southward by sea en masse.

At some points along the east coast, such as the choice fishing grounds at the island of Mayang-do, the Communists installed radar to warn of the approach of a blockade ship. A system of flashing lights from the radar station would warn the fishermen to return ashore. At other places, warning sirens were installed which howled a warning on the approach of ships. Telephone calls were made from one fishing village to another to warn that a blockade vessel was headed their way.

Click here to view map

“The enemy had an excellent alarm system,” said Rear Admiral George C. Dyer. “The east coast of Korea had thousands of Point Lomas and as soon as one of our ships would heave into sight, the word would
spread in the vicinity, and the fishermen would head for the beach. Gradually, the enemy built up radar defenses for night alerts against our marauders.

“Rough weather, or weather in which open whaleboats could not operate, limited our operations to about 50 per cent of the days and 35 per cent of the nights.

“It took great intestinal fortitude on the part of our young boat officers and men to engage in this campaign, and it soon separated the men from the boys. The anti-fishing campaign called for the seagoing and small boat talents that were in existence in the earlier days of our Navy.”

The flight of civilians from North Korea attested to the success of the anti-fishing campaign. “On 26 September 1952,” said CDR A. A. Clark, commanding officer of the USS Cunningham, “my ship carried seventy-one refugees south from Yang-do to Yo-do for interview and for further transportation to South Korea.

“Through our ROK naval officers who were aboard for training, we were able to talk to these people, many of whom were women and children—entire families, in fact. These people had been starving, as evidenced by the way they ate the food we prepared on board for them. They also told us that they understood the reason why we had curtailed fishing in North Korea.

“As for my own ship’s company, we had lost our feeling of compassion about the hardness of the anti-fishing campaign on the civilian populace when a fishing boat dropped a floating mine for us on 19 September. We sank it with rifle fire.”

The blockading ships frequently found small sampans far out at sea, some with only fishermen aboard, some with a single family; and on one occasion, a sampan with a group of young teen-aged boys. Destroyer Fox picked up an open boat with three families on 2 May; of the eighteen aboard, nine were women, including five children, aged one to nine. The escapees had planned an escape for three months and had purposely selected the night of the Red May Day celebration to make their way to freedom.

The refugee flow was heaviest during the good weather months. Even so, the hazard of escaping in a small sampan with only six to eight inches of freeboard was great. Whenever refugees were encountered, the blockading vessels took the refugees aboard, hoisted their sampans aboard or took them in tow, and on their next patrol past either Yang-do or Yo-do, sent them ashore to the internee camps for interrogation.

The sailors of the blockade fleet, upon seeing the desperate condition of the refugees, invariably gave them old clothing, food, candy, and money. Many ships adopted “mascots” and took up collections for the orphanages where some of the younger refugees were taken.

“The internee camp on Yo-do was just to the south of the tiny village of Yodo-ri,” said LCDR A. Christopher, intelligence officer of TG 95.2, whose post was on Yo-do island in Wonsan harbor. “It was located on the south side of the air strip, and had the usual barbed wire barricade. The refugees—who averaged 60 to 70 in number—lived in caves which we dug out for them; one cave was a gigantic one which held about 90 people comfortably by Korean standards. These caves were necessary to protect the refugees from the sporadic gunfire which the Communists in Wonsan fired at the air strip.

“Each morning, the KMC guards ladled out their rations and rice which the refugees cooked themselves. It was my job to interrogate them and to get any useful information they might have. We questioned everybody, including the kids. In fact, one ten-year-old boy told us the location of a mine storage. After interview, the refugees would be transported south to the main camp at Chumunjin.

“From hundreds of interviews of refugees, it was plain that the ‘no-fishing’ rule had given the Communists extra burdens. The Reds had to try to replace the fish the North Koreans couldn’t get with imported fish from Manchuria and China; and because of the battering our planes gave the roads and railroads, this wasn’t easy.

“So tight was the naval blockade, in fact, that some of the refugees told me that they had been reduced to eating bark. They couldn’t even get fishhooks. As a consequence, they made fishhooks from the bits of metal they
could find. Even so simple an item as cordage was unavailable, and therefore the fishermen had no way to repair their nets. As more and more Koreans escaped, and more and more sampans were demolished by ships’ fire, the availability of sampans became acute. One group of fishermen that I interviewed said that the blockade was so tight that they had been reduced to spearing sting-rays to keep from starving.”[23]
Chapter 9. The Seaborne Artillery

“Train-Busting”

An elite fraternity of blockade ships was organized in July 1952, called the “Train Busters.” To become a member of this exclusive organization, a ship had to receive confirmation of a train’s destruction. The first member of the club was the destroyer Orleck.

“On July 5th, 1952,” wrote CDR E. L. Yates, “my destroyer, the USS Orleck, was assigned to the northern patrol—from Yang-do Island to Chong-jin. This run was always made during daylight.

“Our routine instructions required that we provide harassing fire at Chongjin, the northern terminus of the patrol. After sending four 6-gun salvos into certain military targets in the town of Chongjin, we headed south to register on and harass some reported shore batteries located on a ridge 13 miles south of Chongjin.

“We opened fire on the batteries while on a southerly course and were turning back north for a second firing run when the batteries opened up on us. Their opening salvo was a straddle at 10,000 yards—amazing accuracy!

“Needless to say, we immediately performed that classic naval maneuver known as ‘Getting the Hell out of There’. The enemy guns continued to hold us under fire to an estimated 14,000 yards, but their accuracy diminished rapidly. Inspection of shell fragments, picked up about the decks, indicated that 105- and 155-mm. guns had been used. No damage was sustained and only one man was slightly wounded by a shell fragment. My engineering officer later reported that he was making over 24 knots on two boilers without superheat! This sort of performance in a long-hull destroyer is distinctly frowned on by BuShips.

“Our Patrol Instructions also required that we interdict the ‘packages’. The normal procedure was to proceed south from Yang-do, and, on arrival at a ‘package,’ throw a few rounds in for track damage, then proceed to the next ‘package,’ and so on to the end of the patrol route; then return to Yang-do.

“In itself, firing at the ‘packages’ was just another chore. A great many of us had doubts about the value of these bombardments, for we never saw trains in the daytime, nor any lights at night. Yet all the intelligence reports insisted that the rail system was being used at night.

“The ‘package’ bombardments gave us the idea that by careful planning and preparation, we might catch one of these ‘ghost’ trains. First of all, we made careful visual inspections of the five ‘packages’ during daylight from positions as close as safe navigation would permit. We concluded that if we were to trap a train, it could not be done by the rare coincidence of ship and train arriving at the same ‘package’ at the same time, but rather in the normal manner of catching a train anywhere—just going to the station and waiting for one. And the best time to do so was obviously at night.

“We chose ‘Package Two’ as our ‘station’; the railroad line was within a few hundred feet of the water’s edge, and several conspicuous rocks offshore provided excellent radar fixes.

“Setting our train-trap presented a few problems, however. For example, we needed to get as close to the rail-line as possible for both good observation and accurate shooting. But getting closer than 5,000 yards meant that we couldn’t use our star shells, because at less than 5,000 yards the parachutes on the illuminating candles were supposed to rip out and drop the flare like a lead balloon. We solved this one by ignoring the BuOrd warning. (It is of interest to note that only about ten per cent of the parachutes failed at 2,500 to 3,000 yards range.)

“Our gunnery problem was solved by designating one 5-inch mount as a destructive mount and the other Condition III 5-inch mount as the illuminating mount. In this manner rapid destructive fire and illumination could
be provided with a minimum of flail or warning to enemy observers.

“All methods and techniques having been solved, the Orleck on the afternoon of 14 July proceeded from Yang-do on the southern patrol, and arrived at ‘Package Two’ about sunset. Six or eight registering rounds were fired, and at dusk the Orleck continued south into the darkness to return an hour or two later. It was hoped that this feint would lull the track repair crews living in the tunnels into the belief that we wouldn’t be back that night.

“On July 15th, the Orleck crept in to about 3,000 yards from ‘Package Two’. Our topside blowers were secured and the ship was lying quietly to.

“At 0100, the OOD, LT P. H. Klepak, USN, heard the sound of a train approaching from the north. He illuminated immediately and simultaneously opened fire, aiming for the northern tunnel.

“We hit the last car—a caboose—and knocked it athwart the tracks, stopping the train. Further illumination disclosed 15 cars trapped between the tunnels; only the locomotive and tender were able to reach shelter in the southern tunnel.

“The rest of the night was devoted to the systematic and leisurely destruction of this prize: five gondola cars loaded with ten heavy field pieces, a flat car with a tank embarked, and about nine boxcars containing explosives. The exploding of these latter cars made for a completely satisfying night’s work.

“Our success that night stirred a competitive spirit between my OOD’s—and this competition was ‘waiting at the station’—again ‘Package Two’—for a train. At 2200, LT Richard P. Carson, USNR, the OOD, spotted a flickering light moving from south to north between the tunnels. He immediately gave orders to illuminate and commence destructive fire. The results were a locomotive, one tender, and one boxcar destroyed. This train was northbound, and the flickering light apparently was from the firebox.

“As a result of these successes we received two very pleasing despatches:

“‘CONGRATULATIONS TO THE DESTROYER ORLECK, TRAIN SMASHER. DESTROYING TWO ENEMY TRAINS IN 12 DAYS IS SUPERB FIGHTING. THE EIGHTH ARMY IS PROUD OF YOU AND YOUR SHIP’S COMPANY. VAN FLEET.’

“And the second one from Vice Admiral Clark:

“‘CONGRATULATIONS TO THE FIRST OF THE NEW TYPE DESTROYER TRAIN SMASHER ORLECK. WELL DONE.’

“I believe that the destruction of these two trains dispelled any lingering doubts other destroyers may have previously entertained (including ourselves) concerning the nighttime use of the east coast railroad by the Communists. Our own success in this respect was quickly followed by similar successes by other destroyers, and led to the establishment of the ‘Trainbusters Club’.][23A]
Destroyer *Hollister* (DD-788, CDK Hugh W. Howard, USN) was in several scrapes in July 1952, and generally could call herself a lucky ship.

“This was *Hollister’s* second cruise in Korea,” wrote Howard,[24] “having been in action from Inchon to Hungnam in 1950-1951. On the first cruise I had had a veteran crew. On the second I had almost a new complement, except the leading petty officers. I also had fourteen new ensigns. However, the entire crew was an eager lot.

“On Thursday, 10 July, we were proceeding along the Hodo Pando-Hungnam-Cha-ho route—we called this area ‘The Boulevard’—when we were suddenly taken under accurate enemy gunfire. We responded with counter-battery fire, going to twenty-five knots and making smoke. As we fired, we weaved in towards shore, presenting both a small deflection target and a fast-changing target in range. Then we retired through our smoke, using our after battery in indirect fire. We counted thirty-two splashes around us, some of them close enough to soak our bridge, but there were no casualties.

“That night we returned and bombarded Mayang-do and Hongwan. During the bombardment we noted an unidentified blip on the radar screen slowly closing us in the vicinity of Mayang-do. We approached cautiously with our depth charge K-guns manned to protect against small craft treachery. Out of the darkness we could make out a sampan, and we closed it. The armed guard on our deck threw grappling irons over, and in moments we had three prisoners.

“The three were only youths about 16 years old. We took them into our head, scrubbed them, put them into dungarees, and then turned them into a temporary ‘brig’ we had rigged in the boatswain’s locker forward. With the aid of our ship’s artist, who made sketches of mines, guns, caves, troops, pillboxes, etc., we extracted the information that there were five guns secreted in caves firing at the *Hollister*, and that these guns were fitted onto tracks and could be rolled out for firing, and rolled back into the caves for protection.

“Having this information, and in the spirit of ingenuity and initiative urged by Admiral Gingrich, I asked for volunteers to form a landing party. Following the drawing of straws, the selection was narrowed down to one officer and five men, one of whom was my quartermaster, Buckmaster. The officer was young Ensign J. W. Kline, USNR. Kline had developed a theory during all our interdiction fire at the east coast rail line. If we could only have a look at the rails, Kline said, and if they were rusty, we could save a lot of ammunition. His theory sounded logical to me.

“They immediately started to get their equipment ready, including a rubber boat, a radar reflector (which they made from a five-gallon milk can), a walkie-talkie radio, and a compass. Using this makeshift equipment, we would be able to vector the rubber boat into the beach.

“At 2000 we were off Hongwan. There was no moon, and as the recon party in the rubber boat departed the *Hollister* and headed into the beach only 1,500 yards away, I told them I would return at 2400 to pick them up in the same spot. We shoved off to do some bombardment farther north, while they headed into the harbor of Hongwan.

“On the dot of 2400, I had the *Hollister* back at the assigned rendezvous, but there was not a pip on our scopes and there was complete quiet ashore. I have never gone through three more agonizing hours as that long wait offshore, lying-to and fearful of dawn, yet not willing to leave my men.

“At about 0230, after what seemed hours, a small pip finally appeared on the radar scope which indicated
that a target was closing us from the shore. As the target came closer we challenged it, and to our great relief they answered. I went to the quarterdeck as the party came alongside. With a sickened heart I suddenly realized there were only four men in the rubber boat. Kline and my quartermaster were missing.

“Meanwhile, my radar operators reported another pip slowly closing the ship from the north. We immediately locked on this target ready to open fire. As it came closer, we could make out a sampan, from which an apparition rose, calling out not to shoot. It was Ensign Kline and the quartermaster. In the darkness they had become separated from the others, but Kline came back with his answer. ‘The rails are rusty,’ he proclaimed.

“In addition the raiding party established the location of lines of prepared trenches and pillboxes, spotted a new sampan anchorage, and discovered the existence of an antiboat boom.

“This raid made a crew out of my ship overnight.”

Reporting this raid to Commander Task Force 95, Admiral Gingrich informed Hollister that such a raid wasn’t a normal part of a blockading destroyer’s duties.

On the 13th of July, Hollister again was taken under fire near Sinch’ant by three guns which made 108 splashes near the destroyer. Hollister’s answering fire scored a direct hit on one gun and silenced the other two. As before, the Hollister went unscathed.

Two days later, again at Mayang-do, Hollister was taken under fire for the fourth time in less than a week. Again the enemy’s fire was very close, but again the Hollister suffered no hits.

Despite the repeated bracketing by enemy gunfire, the Hollister did not qualify for combat pay, as a ship had to be taken under fire six times in a period of a month in order to make the grade.

“We joked about our failure to qualify for combat pay,” said Howard, “as it appeared that the Communists had read the AlNav and deliberately ceased fire after the fifth day just to thwart us!”
The Sea War in Korea
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson

Chapter 9. The Seaborne Artillery
Package One Blocked For Twelve Days

Shortly after midnight on 12 October, 1952, the USS Walker (DDE-517, CDR M. C. Walley, USN) patrolling at Package Two, received the following message by voice radio from HMS Charity at Package One:

“Have succeeded in stopping train, but need assistance as I am almost out of star shells.”

Steaming northward at high speed, the Walker joined the British destroyer, which was also experiencing difficulties with her fire control system.

“Since there was only a single track rail line from the Manchurian border to Hungnam,” said Walley, “it was apparent that if we could keep this line blocked, nothing could move by rail in either direction. We therefore set about damaging the caboose and engine ends of the train sufficiently to prevent its removal, and attempted, with only minor success, to cut the track ahead and astern of the train. We also maintained harassing fire to prevent repair crews from working.

“After a couple days of this, the Iowa (CAPT J. W. Cooper, USN) showed up and we asked that she cut the roadbed for us. This she accomplished quickly and effectively with her 16-inch high-capacity shells. She also hit the locomotive, and dished out a huge hunk of that from the boiler. Returning strikes from Task Force 77, which had unexpended ordinance, were also sent over for our control to assist in maintaining the block.

“During daylight hours the Walker lay offshore at a range of 7,000 to 8,000 yards and from time to time lobbed in a shell or two to harass the enemy repair crew as much as possible. In their white clothing they were plainly visible to us.

“One day during this period, my junior officer of the watch, Ensign Dennis O’Connor, got an idea how we might harass the Reds and hold up the work without even firing a shot. O’Connor had noticed that whenever we fired a round, the repair crews would scamper for shelter even before the shell hit. Obviously the Reds had a lookout posted, who, as soon as he saw the flash of our gun, sounded a warning to the repair crew so that in the approximate ten seconds it took for the projectile to reach the tracks and explode, the repair crews had taken cover. So, O’Connor asked my permission to light off our 24-inch searchlight, and I said, ‘O.K.’

“We all lined the bridge with binoculars to see what would happen. Sure enough, as O’Connor trained the searchlight in their direction and snapped the shutter open and shut, the repair crews dropped their shovels and ran like hell. Of course, we had a big laugh, and after that it became standard practice for us to use the searchlight every now and then just to save firing a shell. Package One was thus blocked for twelve full days.

“At night the Walker moved in to the 100-fathom curve, about 2,500 yards off shore, while another ship would lie-to farther out and furnish illumination fire. This hampered but did not completely stop the Communists’ effort to clear the tracks.

“After about a week, apparently realizing that they were not going to roll the cars away, the Communists began doing what we had carefully avoided all this time—one by one the railroad cars were dynamited clear out of the roadbed, and in a few more nights the track was cleared and patched and the ‘Red Ball’ express was rolling again.”
The steady increase in the number of coastal defense guns which the enemy employed in North Korea gave evidence of the effect of the blockade and bombardment effort. If the attacks were not wreaking damage and slowing the movement of supplies, why should the Communists bother? The expense of building gun emplacements, the cost of ammunition, the drain of personnel, all added to the enemy’s burdens.

More and more often the rocky coasts of North Korea were to see coastal guns installed at points where the roads and rail lines were exposed, or where amphibious attacks might come in. These guns were cleverly placed and almost impervious to gun attack.

Caves were dug in the face of the cliffs either from the front or from the reverse side of the hill. Usually the caves were in groups of three, although single caves were fairly common. The openings were small, only large enough to give the gun a reasonably wide arc of fire, and in no case larger than eight feet square. The entrances of these caves were usually covered with yellow-green cloths, tree limbs, or woven mats—or, in the time of snowfall, by white drop cloths. As a result the entrances were difficult to see, and even more difficult to hit. In fact, the expenditure of ammunition on them rarely succeeded in more than superficial damage.

Most of the guns in these caves were simple field artillery pieces, 75-mm. or 105-mm. On other occasions, tank guns and self-propelled guns were used by the Communists. In a few instances, the wheels would be removed from artillery pieces and the pieces secured on railroad flatcars. The flatcars would then be wheeled into a nearby tunnel until ready for use.
The third year of war, which began 25 June 1952, found the blockade and bombardment operations more standard and routine than ever, but nonetheless arduous and dangerous. Enemy shore-battery fire increased in accuracy as well as amount. The Communists’ ability to score hits on our ships at slow speeds and at close range showed steady improvement.

On the ground in Korea, both the Communists and UN forces were digging ever deeper into caves, bunkers, and trenches, laying minefields and stringing barbed wire. Little movement of the frontlines had been seen in over a year, and fighting was largely confined to small-sized but bloody clashes.

At Panmunjom, under a drab circus tent, the UN and Red truce teams remained deadlocked on the thorny problem of prisoner exchange. There was little prospect for a truce; and in fact, the truce talks were recessed in October 1952 for nearly seven months.

Ships of the U.S. Navy were completing their second and third tours of duty in Korean waters, many of them having accumulated eighteen or more months in the theater. An unlucky few ships would spend their fourth Christmas in Korean waters. Personnel aboard ships who had served one previous tour numbered more than seventy-five per cent; and one quarter of the officers and men of the American Navy in Korea had seen three full tours in the battle zone. A measure of relief had been introduced as Atlantic Fleet ships appeared for combat service more frequently.

Action reports and war diaries of this period reveal the routine nature of the naval war. Many entries in war diaries simply read, “No Comment,” and a few action reports state, “Nothing to report.” The feelings of many were summarized by the skipper of De Haven (CDR T. C. Siegmund): “We had learned to live with an unsatisfactory situation and still do a good job, no matter how dull it was.”

Even the enemy occasionally took a callous and indifferent attitude toward the war. Night-heckling pilots occasionally reported that despite their attacks on truck convoys, the drivers would not extinguish their lights. Ships firing at Wonsan reported the same thing.

The tedium and monotony, however, did not diminish the stringency of the blockade.

The increasing coastal fire from the Communists—which doubled from July 1952 to January 1953—had two immediate results: first, ships increased their patrolling speeds, changed their courses more frequently, and opened their patrolling range to the beach; secondly, ships tried to make sure that every shell fired was a winner. The enemy seemed to have very few radar-controlled coastal guns,[25A] which meant that in nighttime, blockading ships could move closer ashore for their intercepting and gunnery efforts, with far less danger from enemy counterbatteries.

The oft-tried tactic of manning a whaleboat with a reconnaissance party, and dispatching it close aboard the designated beach for target observation, still paid dividends from time to time. The whaleboat crews would lie to, waiting, watching, and listening for trains, maintaining communications to the parent ship by walkie-talkie radio.

In many instances they were successful. The effort on 14-15 August 1952 by destroyers Jarvis (DD-799) and Porter (DD-800) was typical. In this case, in addition to whaleboat parties, the two destroyers were assisted by at ROK torpedo boat. Lying approximately 3,000 yards offshore south of the Songjin area, Porter succeeded in damaging two trains while Jarvis was getting one.

The sailors of the U.S. Navy, in their ships off Korea, had little to complain about in comparison with
their countrymen in the trenches and dugouts of Korea. At sea, at least there were no fleas, no flies, no bunker life. Still, while there was less danger of injury or death than during the Pacific war, and little to be feared from enemy aircraft or submarine torpedoes, the sailormen had an irritating, uncomfortable, and unpleasant existence.

When in range of enemy guns, ships stayed “buttoned up” and personnel were forbidden to expose themselves topside. During the hot summers of Korea, temperatures below decks were stifling, and rest was impossible for the many who found the irregular gunfire too regular for sleeping. The constant jarring of the gunfire caused the glass wool insulation of many ships’ overheads to shake loose; no one could sleep in the top bunks from the irritating effect of the glass fibers.

Winters in Korean waters brought the chill and biting Siberian winds, heavy seas, and sub-zero temperatures. Ships’ superstructures were frozen beneath tons of ice, locking the forward mounts in azimuth and freezing depth charges in their racks. The icy wind had such a razor’s bite that refueling and replenishment often took place on a down-wind course.

But to most of the sailormen, worse than either the blistering summer heat or the biting winter cold was the tedious routine of the war.

The destroyers assigned to Task Force 95 could predict the statistics of a tour in Korean waters with precision: a typical tour would require 110 underway replenishments; the average ship would burn more than 3,000,000 gallons of fuel oil while in the theater. And it would see the expenditure of an average of 2,360 5-inch rounds and 1,341 3-inch rounds.

The endless siege of Wonsan, Hungnam, and Songjin went on and on. Ships patrolled “Taillight,” “Engineblock,” and “Windshield” day after day after day. Minesweepers in Wonsan made another circuit of “Muffler,” and the minesweeps at Songjin went round the harbor once again. The air-gun “Cobra” strikes increased.

In this manner, 1953 arrived.
In January of 1953, a bitterly cold month at sea, six American ships[25B] were taken under fire by Communist batteries, but none was hit. On 27 January one destroyer reported tracking a “skunk” by radar for nearly an hour and a half with plotted speeds as high as twenty-five knots. Did the Communists at last plan to oppose the strangling blockade with torpedo boats?

February 12, 1953 saw the seventh change in Commander Task Force 95 as Rear Admiral Clarence E. Olsen relieved Rear Admiral John E. Gingrich.[25C]

A change was also made in the Task Force 95 organization. Hereafter, the cruiser division commander serving with Task Force 77 as CTG 77.1 would also have additional duty as CTG 95.2, relieving the destroyer squadron commander who had performed this duty.

At the armistice conference table, meanwhile, the peace talks were still suspended. Liaison officers met occasionally, but neither side was willing to alter its position.

At sea, the blockading ships increased their activity as winter relaxed its grip.

On 6 March, the destroyer Laws (DD-558), near Hungnam, joined hands with Task Force 77’s airplanes to damage several railroad cars despite heavy enemy counterbattery fire. Five days later, Trathen’s (DD-530) guns damaged several rail cars of a train near Package Four. The Red engineer detached his locomotive from the train and fled into the closest tunnel.

As March passed, and the muddy and slippery roads of Korea dried out, patrolling ships reported increasing numbers of truck convoys along the coastal road. Approximately 500 vehicles were seen on the night of 15-16 March. They were taken under fire, but no estimate of damage could be made.

Along with the enemy’s increased coastal defense fire and truck activity, the mine activity increased too. USS Epperson (DDE-719) was able to sink five in one day.

The advancing spring saw two ships—one American, one Canadian—clobber trains. HMCS Crusader shelled and stopped three trains at Package Three on 15 April. USS Endicott (DMS-35) got three out of four on 11 May, also at Package Three.

April saw a sharp upturn in the enemy’s counterbattery fire, especially in the vicinity of Wonsan. Four American ships were hit during this month: Los Angeles, Manchester, Maddox, and Kyes.

For the remainder of the war, destroyer James E. Kyes (DD-787, CDR R. A. Thacher) was to receive more than her share of enemy attention. She first reported being shot at near Songjin on 16 March. Ten days later, in the same area, Kyes was again taken under fire, this time escaping damage from some fifty rounds of fire. Two days later, accompanying sweeper Waxbill near Hungnam, Kyes observed ten splashes in their vicinity.

By now the Communists should have learned that American destroyers can be pushed too far. On 1 April, Kyes loaded her boat with a reconnaissance party and dispatched them to the area of Cha-ho to watch and listen for trains. Sure enough, one was spotted, but it was in such a position that Kyes’ guns could not bear. Rather than let the train escape, Kyes contacted a night-heckling Fifth Air Force B-26 and vectored him to the area. Kyes’ initiative was rewarded by hearing the Air Force pilot report “several box-cars destroyed.”

April 4 saw Kyes under fire again, this time near the island of Mayang-do. Kyes got even on the 18th, near Cha-ho, and fired at an enemy train. The enemy’s counterbattery fire was rapid and more accurate than usual, and Kyes was forced to open range. She would return.

On 17 May, in company with USS Brush (DD-745), Kyes supported a ROK raiding party above the
battline near Kojo. The ROK troops reported the destruction of two automatic weapons and fourteen sampans.

But Kyes did her best night’s work on the 19th of May while in company with Eversole (DD-789). At Cha-ho, where enemy guns had fired upon her so often and Kyes herself had fired at trains several times, Kyes and Eversole at last succeeded in hitting and stopping a nocturnal train. Illuminating the area with 128 star shells, the two destroyers pumped 418 rounds of 5-inch shells into the doomed train.

This time there could be no doubt of a train’s complete destruction.

In late April, at long last, there was a break in the armistice talks, and on the 20th, the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners commenced in “Operation Little Switch.”

This break in the negotiations reflected a new atmosphere regarding a truce. To all concerned, it was now apparent that under the imposed political and military limitations, the present two-year stalemate in Korea could not be broken, except at prohibitive cost and the full-fledged extension of the war to the mainland, and perhaps even the use of atomic weapons. Otherwise the war in Korea might continue indefinitely. One GI summarized the conflict in these succinct but bitter words: “The war we can’t win, we can’t lose, we can’t quit.”

It was obvious that the Chinese could never win, and it was equally obvious that unless and until the UN changed the framework of its fighting, neither could the UN.

For psychological reasons, however, the Chinese wanted to give the impression that they were winning the war during the last few days. The Chinese high command ordered an intensification of the fighting everywhere to create this illusion.

Accordingly, pressure at the frontlines increased, and the Chinese made several herculean efforts to penetrate the UN main line of resistance. At one or two points in the First Marine Division sector, the Communists succeeded in gaining some terrain of little value but at fantastic cost to themselves—16,300 killed or wounded and 81 prisoners taken. Since the objectives themselves were certainly not worth this blood, it was concluded that by these pyrrhic victories the Chinese would claim that the UN was signing an armistice in order to keep them from “winning” the war.

Along the coasts, the enemy’s coastal gunfire increased in intensity and accuracy, keeping pace with the activity at the front. Patrolling ships were equally aggressive in matching this enemy fire. The USS Chandler (DD-717), assisted by USS Wiltsie (DD-716), did her part by destroying one train near Tanchon on 3 June.

At Hungnam, on 12 June, while Manchester (CL-83) and the USS Carpenter (DDE-825) were bombarding harbor targets, sixteen rounds of enemy fire were observed.

On the 25th of June (the third anniversary of the war), near Tanchon, the USS Gurke (DD-783) was taken under fire by heavy enemy guns. Two direct hits and several minor ones were received. Fortunately, no one was killed and only three minor personnel casualties were received.

On the morning of 8 July, ten miles south of Songjin, the USS Irwin (DD-794, CDR G. M. Slonim) took a shrapnel explosion in her mainmast from an estimated 80 rounds, which seriously wounded Captain Jack Maginnis (Commander Destroyer Squadron 24) and four other personnel. All electrical and electronic cables on the mast were cut.[25D]

During this final period, the battleship New Jersey supported by heavy cruisers Saint Paul and Bremerton and light cruiser Manchester, plus twelve destroyers, stood guard at the east coast bombline. It was the first appearance of a battleship for naval gunfire support at the bombline since Iowa in October 1952.

The sixteen ships rotated in three groups (CTU 95.28, 77.1.8, and 77.1.9) at the bombline to give constant support to the eastern anchor of the line. Thirteen thousand rounds of 5-inch, 2,800 rounds of 8-inch, 700 rounds of 6-inch, and 1,774 rounds of 16-inch were poured into enemy positions during the last two months of the war.[25E]

A large part of the credit for preventing the enemy’s frantic efforts to advance along the east coast during the final days of the war was due the naval sharpshooters. When the demarcation line was finally set, there was a
definite northward curve on the east coast where the battleline was ahead of the rest of the front.

Vice Admiral Briscoe congratulated the bombarding fleet on 19 June: “Your straight shooting of the past 12 days will not soon be forgotten by the enemy. You knocked him off Anchor Hill, ripped up his frontlines and supply routes, and added another chapter to the lesson that the way of the aggressor is hard.”

Thus the longest blockade and bombardment effort ever imposed by the U.S. Navy came to an end.
Chapter 9. The Seaborne Artillery

Significance

The revised “Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff” assign, as one of the primary functions of the Navy, this duty:

“A.1(a) To seek out and destroy enemy naval forces and to suppress enemy sea commerce.”

A collateral function of the Navy reads as follows:

“B.1. To interdict enemy land and air power and communications through operations at sea.”

Any study of the blockading efforts of the United States Navy in Korea must conclude that the naval blockade imposed during the Korean War was both effective and successful. Three of the enemy’s five main supply lines were blocked: (1) his deep-water shipping along the east coast; (2) his shallow-water coastal shipping on the west coast; (3) his deep-water shipping routes to the Asiatic seaport cities in China, Manchuria, and North Korea. The enemy was denied the use of the sea for military movements, for the transportation of supplies, and for fishing. In normal times, thousands of junks and numerous steamers moved hundreds of thousands of tons of supplies by sea. The imposed naval blockade of the UN was almost 100 per cent effective. Only an exceedingly small trickle of sea traffic—and that coastal and nocturnal—succeeded in escaping the tight barricade thrown around the peninsula.

This blockade was imposed, however, under very special circumstances, and any conclusions based on the blockading operations in Korea must take into account the almost total absence of enemy air opposition and active enemy naval opposition. Had either or both of these elements been introduced, a totally different blockading operation would have resulted. The siege of the ports of Wonsan, Songjin, and Hungnam might not have been continuous. To have imposed a blockade against vigorous enemy air and submarine opposition would have required many times the numbers of vessels that Task Force 95 was operating. However, even against enemy air and naval opposition, a naval blockade could have been established and made effective, although it doubtlessly would not have been as airtight as was the case, and it would have been infinitely more costly to both Chinese and American forces. Certainly, the pattern and tempo of operations, the weapons used, and the area of operation would have been much different. This blockade had further significance because of the fact that it was the first blockade applied by the U.S. Navy since the Civil War. The British had established a blockade in World War I, and the U.S. Navy had assisted. But this effort was relatively minor and passive. The blockade of the Korean peninsula, therefore, gave the U.S. Navy training and experience for the application of a blockade in other areas.

The effectiveness of the naval blockade, and the enemy’s failure to oppose it actively, opened both the Korean coasts for the application of a bombardment and interdiction effort which had known no similar parallel in American naval history. Naval gunfire, designed primarily to attack targets at sea and to support amphibious landings, was given three novel roles: (1) the support of fixed positions at the battlefront (as contrasted with the fluid targets of an amphibious assault); (2) the task of securing both flanks of the UN battleline; (3) the interdiction of rail and road lines along the northeast coast.

The first of these tasks was performed in a highly creditable manner. At every stage of the war, the accuracy and volume of naval gunfire (even at maximum ranges) given to support friendly frontline positions elicited the highest praise from both U.S. Army and the U.S. Marines, and, for the most part, compared most favorably with artillery fire. The devastating effect of the naval seaborne artillery was indicated by the fact that near the coast, the UN frontlines were invariably ahead of the main line of advance.

Generally speaking, the greater the caliber of the naval gun, the greater its effectiveness upon enemy
targets at the frontline. If further proof was needed, the 16-inch guns of Iowa, Missouri, Wisconsin, and New Jersey demonstrated that pound for pound they were the most efficient rifles in the Korean War. While no effective liaison or standard doctrine existed between the Army and the Navy for the use or control of naval gunfire in the first part of the war, these were quickly established, and proved to be effective for the duration. In the words of Rear Admiral Allan E. Smith, the first commander of the “United Nations Blockading and Escort Force,” “There were no ready communications between ships and troops in the initial phases because of the prewar attitude that amphibious landings were antiquated and naval gunfire obsolete.”[26]

Had the UN forces on the ground been engaged in an offensive war of movement rather than a sit-down war of stalemate, the pattern of naval blockade effort might have been different and the contributions of the blockade forces greater. It was the opinion of Rear Admiral A. K. Scott-Moncrieff, RN, the British west coast blockade commander, that a more aggressive blockade policy, heavily pointed and sustained over 7- to 10-day periods, might have caused the enemy more inconvenience than a steady tempo of operations along both coasts. Admiral Scott-Moncrieff also opined that the UN’s failure to make additional amphibious landings had enabled the enemy to build up his defenses all along the coasts, possibly liberating a number of troops.[27] A more offensive blockade policy could not have been taken independently of the ground action, however, but would have been related to offensive action on the ground and in the air as well.

Whether or not naval gunfire could have been as effective or as much used in the face of enemy air and surface opposition must remain a moot question. More active enemy opposition would undoubtedly have expedited the development and use of sea-to-shore missiles fired from distant ranges. The excellent gunfire support supplied by the battleships under the existing artificial conditions in Korea was not sufficient to warrant retention of large rifled guns in the U.S. Navy.

The second task given naval gunfire—security of the flanks—was one of the most important contributions made by the naval blockade forces. “Never in history,” said Rear Admiral Allan Smith, “has an Army had its flanks so firmly secured as in the Korean War by our Navy. In March 1951, Admiral Struble and I visited General Ridgway in Taegu. His subordinate generals had kept telling him that the enemy could outflank our western front troop line because of the shallow waters and sometimes dry land. He was assured that our Navy would not let this happen; and Ridgway replied that he would give the matter no more concern.

“This mobile artillery and naval air power on both flanks enabled our Army commander to concentrate his strength where such would put the greatest pressure on the enemy. Imagine an Army commander being relieved of concern about his flanks!”[28]

Regarding the third novel task, the collateral one of interdiction, the Navy did not succeed in denying either the east coast rail or road systems to the enemy despite the most intense, prolonged, and ingenious efforts to do so. As described in the chapter, “The Struggle to Strangle,” neither could the air attacks on the UN’s air forces. At no time during the course of the war did either the UN’s surface or air interdiction efforts succeed in stopping the flow of enemy supplies from Manchuria to the front to a decisive degree. The gun strikes of the ships of Task Forces 77 and 95 hampered, hurt, and harassed, it is true; but they had neither direct nor decisive effect upon the course of the ground fighting in Korea.

The significance of this failure is to point up the need for balanced forces in the U.S. military establishment. Assuming that the war had to be confined to the peninsula, there was only one way to have stopped the steady and constant movement of enemy trains and trucks within North Korea: the physical occupation of the ground, and physical force applied by armed men attacking and holding the routes themselves. Because of the terrain, paucity of suitable targets, and character of the enemy, it is doubted that even the local use of atomic weapons could have isolated the battlefront of Korea.
Chapter 10. The PatRons

Introduction

The first-syllable-accented word “patron” is defined in the dictionary as an “upholder” or “supporter.” While this word has no direct connection to the naval aviation term “PatRon,” (an amalgamation of the two words “Patrol” and “Squadron”), it haply has an indirect relationship in meaning.

Operations by the Navy’s patrol squadrons in the Korean War, like those of the submarines and the Service Force, were usually neither glamorous nor newsworthy. Rather, the PatRons were the upholders and supporters of the Korean War. The routine tasks and accomplishments they performed in the Far East were more important and essential in a negative or defensive sense than in a positive or offensive sense. To naval strategists during war, negative information is as vital as positive information. There are no enemy ships in the area, there are no typhoons or other weather reported which will interfere with the blockade, carrier operations, or an amphibious operation. There is no evidence of fishing or mining activities. The enemy is not concentrating his shipping forces for an invasion of Formosa.

Such essential information was supplied by the patrol squadrons throughout the Korean War despite weather, night, or the constant danger of enemy fighter opposition.

One of the major duties performed by the patrol squadrons during the Korean War was the careful and constant surveillance they kept over Formosa. In the physical sense, the Seventh Fleet, charged with that island’s protection, could not be in two places at once. In the strategic sense, however, it could be, thanks to the PatRons. The ceaseless flights of the patrol squadrons droning back and forth through the Formosan Straits made it impossible for the Chinese to attack Formosa so quickly or unexpectedly that the Seventh Fleet could not speed from Korean waters to its defense.

In Korea proper, the flights of the patrol squadrons added to the effective naval blockade. One of the primary missions was the surveillance and photography of merchant shipping. North Korean fishing efforts were constantly under observation by the patrol squadrons. The mere presence of the VP squadrons in the area was a deterrent to the enemy against any use of submarines. Additionally, the weather reconnaissance flights on behalf of the carrier forces, the search for and destruction of mines, and flare-dropping flights were missions whereby the PatRons contributed to the Navy’s over-all effort in Korea.

This chapter records the vital part played in the Korean War by the Navy’s patrol squadrons, land and sea.
For ease of understanding and explanation, patrol squadron operations during the Korean War are divided into two areas according to the geography of the operating zone in the Far East—Korea and Formosa.

In the Korean area, one Fleet Air Wing staff was assigned to control the three to five squadrons, plus tenders, based in the Japanese-Korean area (usually three land-based squadrons and two seaplane squadrons).

To protect Formosa, another Fleet Air Wing, consisting of one land-based squadron, one seaplane squadron, and one tender, was assigned to control patrol squadron operations in that area.

Fleet Air Wing Six was the patrol squadron command in the Japanese-Korean area, while Fleet Air Wing One was the staff controlling patrol operations in the Formosan Straits.
The Sea War in Korea
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson

Chapter 10. The PatRons
Korea: Organization of the PatRons

When the war began, there were 8 patrol-type airplanes in the immediate area of Korea: five PBM Mariner seaplanes from Patrol Squadrons 46 (LCDR M. F. Weisner) and 47 (CDR J. H. Arnold) operating from the Naval Air Facility, Yokosuka, supported by a detachment of Fleet Aircraft Service Squadron 119, and 3 additional VP-46 aircraft at Sangleys Point, Philippine Islands. There was no Fleet Air Wing staff, no tender, and no land-based aircraft in the immediate area of Korea. VP-46 was in the process of relieving VP-47. During its 6-months’ tour in the Far East, VP-47 had also maintained detachments of aircraft at Hong Kong and, occasionally, at Buckner Bay, Okinawa.

On 25 June 1950, Patrol Squadron 47, having completed its normal half-year’s tour, was just being relieved. Three of its homeward-bound planes were already at Pearl Harbor, a fourth was at Guam, and a fifth was in the air between Guam and Hawaii. These aircraft were hurriedly recalled and ordered to report to Yokosuka. By 7 July, Arnold’s squadron had reassembled and was in action.

One of this squadron’s first tasks, commencing 15 July, was the antisubmarine coverage of the convoy travelling from Japan to Pohang to make the amphibious landing of the First Cavalry Division at that point. Another of its early missions was to assist the U.S. Air Force in the rescue of aviators in Korean waters.

Upon the transfer of the Seventh Fleet to General MacArthur’s operational control, a detachment of Fleet Air Wing One (based in Guam) was established in Japan. Captain John C. Alderman, Fleet Air Wing One’s chief of staff (who happened to be on leave in Japan), was given command of this detachment. This temporary command was known as Fleet Air Wing One Detachment, Japan. Assigned to assist Alderman in the subsequent hectic days of July were CDR D. C. Higgins, CDR D. J. Omeara, LCDR J. L. Burge, LT W. E. Davis, and LT J. B. Black. Alderman’s tasks were not only to operate the patrol aircraft assigned to him, but also to take care of all other naval aviation matters of supply and logistics in the Korean area.

By 12 July, thanks to the arrival of Rear Admiral R. W. Ruble, USN, Commander Carrier Division Fifteen, and his staff, it was possible to reorganize and expand the naval air organization. A new command, Naval Air Japan, was established. As best it could, this interim staff dealt with the ever-rapidly increasing demands being made upon naval air for support and coverage.

On the 4th of August 1950, Fleet Air Wing Six was commissioned. This wing would operate and control the patrol squadrons in Korea in lieu of Fleet Air Wing One Detachment, Japan. Fleet Air Wing Six was given control of all American and British patrol squadrons operating in the Japanese-Korean area.

By 9 August 1950, Rear Admiral George R. Henderson, Captain W. E. Gentner, and Captain Joseph Murphy had arrived to form the nucleus of the Fleet Air Japan staff, a naval aviation area command which would function for the remainder of the war.

While these organizational changes were being made, other U.S. Navy patrol squadrons were arriving in the area. VP-6 (CDR A. F. Farwell) flying P2V3 Neptunes,[1] had arrived in Japan on 7 July and commenced operations initially from Johnson Air Force Base, near Tokyo, and three weeks later from Tachikawa Air Force Base.

The next squadron to arrive was VP-42 (CDR G. F. Smale). This squadron’s PBM5 Mariner aircraft landed at Iwakuni, Japan, near Hiroshima, on 21 August 1950.

In addition to these U.S. Navy patrol squadrons, two Royal Air Force squadrons operated under the command of Fleet Air Wing One Detachment, Japan, and later under Fleet Air Wing Six. RAF Squadron 88
(Squadron Leader M. Helme) flew from Hong Kong with four Sunderland aircraft, and had begun its patrols on 1 August. A second Royal Air Force squadron, 209 Squadron, commanded by Squadron Leader P. LeCheminant, commenced flight operations (flying four Sunderlands) on 10 September 1950 from Iwakuni.

During the early period of the Korean War, the missions given Fleet Air Wing Six were several: antisubmarine patrol along both coasts of Korea, search and reconnaissance, convoy escort, and weather reconnaissance to assist the operating combat ships. In addition, other missions such as search and rescue, antitank, photographic missions and various logistic flights were assigned.

In the first months of the war, the patrol squadrons were able to corroborate the fact that the naval blockade of Korea was effective. Numerous, often vague reports were being received in Tokyo that the North Korean Army was being supplied by sea in its advance on Pusan. These reports, often sightings by high-flying bomber aircraft, were proven false by the patrol squadrons whose visual, photographic, and radar surveillance of the coasts showed the “supply” fleets actually to be “fishing” sampan fleets.

Daily patrols were flown along the western shores of Korea in the Yellow Sea and in the Bay of Korea, on the east coast of Korea in the Japanese Sea, as well as in the Tushima Straits. Whenever the carriers of Task Force 77 were replenishing, an ASW patrol was maintained over them at all times. In addition, a nightly weather reconnaissance mission was flown for the benefit of the carrier task force. The weather information was also beneficial to the shore-based Marines and Air Force aircraft in Korea.
Chapter 10. The PatRons

Spotting

In addition to the routine antisubmarine patrols, weather and coastal reconnaissance, there were several unique and unusual missions performed by patrol squadrons during the early period of the Korean War. The first of these was the spotting of naval gunfire.

On 2 August 1950, a VP-6 aircraft conducted a spotting mission for the bombardment of Mokpo by HMS Cossack and HMS Cockade. So successful was this mission that a second mission was conducted by VP-6 on 6 August, using two P2Vs, when spotting services were furnished to British cruisers Kenya (CAPT T. W. Brock) and Belfast (CAPT Sir Aubrey St. Clair-Ford, Bt, DSO), the two British destroyers Cossack and Charity, and the Dutch destroyer Evertsen (LCDR D. J. VanDoorninck). The targets were military installations in Inchon. The USS Sicily provided four Marine Corsairs from VMF-323 as escort for the two spotting Neptunes. Heavy antiaircraft fire was expected, but none was seen. The P2Vs were piloted by LT George D. Anderson and LT John W. Stribling; the spotting pilots were Britishers—Royal Artillery Captain Thompson from the fleet combined operations bombardment unit, who spotted for Ceylon, and Royal Navy Lieutenant Handley (a Seafire pilot from HMS Triumph), who spotted for Kenya. The bombardment group fired many salvos into the Inchon railroad station, the Jinson Electrical Works, and the oil storage tanks on the northeast side of the city. The spotters described the results as excellent.

On 7 August, a third spotting mission was conducted by aircraft from Patrol Squadron Six for a bombardment of Tanchon by the USS Helena and four destroyers.

Later in the Korean War, a patrol aircraft was called upon for some emergency naval gunfire spotting. On 12 October 1950, while searching for mines in Wonsan harbor, a VP-47 PBM flown by LCDR Randall Boyd was present when the sweepers Pirate and Pledge were sunk.[1A] Also present was the destroyer minesweeper Endicott. The Wonsan batteries opened fire on the sweepers Pirate and Pledge, and in attempting to dodge the gunfire, Pirate struck a mine and sank. Before Pledge could move out of range, she suffered the same fate.

Lieutenant Commander Boyd flew over the stricken vessels to give support and to draw the fire from the Wonsan batteries. Air support from the carriers was requested. Meanwhile, the PBM continued to circle the area, spotting the gunfire of DMS Endicott. The enemy’s surface batteries were effectively silenced.
For the first month after VP-6’s arrival, this squadron made many attacks on North Korean targets. The P2V3 Neptunes were capable of carrying a heavy load of either bombs or rockets, in addition to their six bow machine guns. Since VP-6’s coastal patrols along the northeast shore of Korea paralleled the rail network, targets along this part of North Korea were frequently seen.

On 29 July 1950, two P2V3s, piloted by LCDR R. L. Ettinger and LT William J. Pressler, were on a coastal reconnaissance patrol near Chongjin. The two Neptunes sighted a railroad train, an appropriate target for their 16 HVAR rockets. The train was quickly destroyed with rockets and 20-mm. fire from the bow guns.

On 13 August, in a flight led by VP-6’s executive officer, LCDR E. B. Rogers, two Neptunes attacked several camouflaged power boats and barges at Chinnampo which were engaged in minelaying (although this fact was not then recognized). Three of these boats and two barges were sunk in the attack. Rogers’ plane took six holes. On the same day, camouflaged Communist ships and patrol craft in the Wonsan area (believed later to have been laying mines) were attacked by other VP-6 aircraft. Two surface craft were damaged in this attack.

A similar attack on 16 August, on the west coast of Korea, on similar surface craft resulted in the loss of the first P2V. The plane, piloted by ENS William F. Goodman, had completed an attack on a small patrol-type enemy vessel in the Chinnampo area when the crew observed fire in the starboard engine. Ensign Goodman made a successful ditching a short distance from the enemy shoreline and the plane’s entire crew was later rescued without casualty by the British cruiser Kenya.

As a result of the loss of this Neptune, orders were issued that henceforth patrol aircraft squadrons should not be assigned to attack missions. Specifically, the order read: “Aircraft of this force will normally not attack surface or land targets unless specifically directed to do so.”
One of the most unusual tasks performed by the patrol squadrons during the Korean War was the spotting and destruction of mines. This task commenced in late September 1950 and became increasingly important. After the amphibious assault at Inchon, two PBM aircraft from VP-42 were flown to Inchon harbor and tendered there by the USS *Gardiners Bay*. Their task was to fly low over the approaches to Inchon and Chinnampo, and to spot the anchored mines for the surface sweepers.

The two VP-42 aircraft arrived at Inchon on 2 October and commenced mine search operations the next day. Many minefields were located and reported, as well as numerous drifting and floating mines. A number of these were sunk or destroyed by gunfire by the PBMs.

This initial operation was successful because low tide left the mines exposed or “watching.”

In anticipation of the amphibious landing at Wonsan, VP-42 changed its operating locale to Wonsan in early October, joining with the aircraft of VP-47 in the search for mines. In this task, the Mariners teamed with helicopters and surface ships to clear a path through the minefields for the amphibious forces. During this period, VP-42 was credited with the destruction of eight mines.

Mine hunting in a large, slow seaplane was not without its hazards. The Wonsan shore batteries were frequently active. One VP-42 aircraft received two bullet holes from rifle fire north of Wonsan on 28 October. And the destruction of a mine by aircraft machine gun fire required skill and accuracy. The circling pilot had to bring his aircraft close enough to the mine to permit accurate gunfire—but not too close, in order to avoid the subsequent five- to six-hundred-foot geysers of water sent up by the mine’s explosion.

An aerial mine search was as tedious and difficult as a search for a periscope feather. Even when a minefield’s general location was known, the search demanded excellent and trained eyesight, good surface and water conditions, and, most of all, patience. The surface of the sea could neither be rough nor muddy; the elevation of the sun had to be right. Mine lookouts found that a slightly overcast sky furnished the best type of suffused light for spotting submerged mines.

In regard to mine hunting, the commanding officer of VP-42, Commander G. F. Smale, recorded:

“. . . The quality of patience on the part of the plane commander and crew is as important in the search for mines as it is for submarines . . . Lookouts succeed only after many hours of negative results. . . . “[1B]

The patrol aircraft of FleetAirWing Six succeeded in destroying 54 mines during the months of September and October—31 of these in the Chinnampo area.[1C]
Another of the important collateral tasks performed by the patrol squadrons in the Korean area during the early part of the war was the many logistic and liaison flights flown. Since there were no adequate landplane fields at either of the Fleet bases at Yokosuka and Sasebo, the seaplane patrol squadrons performed a very vital function by linking the naval command in Tokyo and the two major Fleet operating bases.

An outstanding example of this role was the occasion after the Inchon landing when an aircraft of VP-42 carried a cargo of 75 cases of whole blood, weighing 7,000 pounds, from the Naval Air Facility at Yokosuka to the fighting forces at Inchon on 7 October 1950.
Early in 1951, still another unique mission, code-named “Firefly,” was given to the patrol squadrons: flare-dropping missions. This coordinated action of flare and attack aircraft was a distinctly new application of air power in support of ground operations.

As has been recorded in Chapter 8, “The Struggle to Strangle,” a principal reason for the failure of air power to isolate the battlefield was the limited ability of airplanes to locate and destroy enemy trains and trucks at night. Uncontested air-sea control made it very difficult for the Chinese and North Koreans to move their supplies and munitions by day. By night, and during bad weather, however, the enemy moved his supplies and replenished his needs with little hindrance.

In an effort to hamper and harass the enemy’s nocturnal movements, Admiral A. W. Radford, while on an inspection trip to Korea, suggested the use of P4Y2 aircraft as flare planes. Major General Field Harris, Commanding General of the First Marine Air Wing (then operating a night-flying squadron of F4U4N Corsairs and a night-flying squadron of F7F3N Tigercats) formally requested the assignment of appropriate naval aircraft to assist his heckler aircraft by carrying a large number of flares and accompanying them over the roads and rail lines north of the battlefield. Marine All Weather Fighter Squadron 513 had already developed flare tactics using transport-type (R4D) aircraft. However, these planes lacked both self-sealing tanks and armor protection, and the antiaircraft hazard was great.

No specially trained pilots or suitably equipped planes were available for carrying and dropping highly-dangerous magnesium flares. The only possible aircraft that could be modified for the task was a World War II aircraft, the P4Y2 Privateer. (The Air Force used C-47s and C-46s for the flare task.) Two such squadrons were available: VP-772 (CDR D. D. Nittinger) and VP-28 (CDR C. S. Minter, Jr.). It was decided to modify one P4Y2 to carry and drop flares, and to evaluate its performance in Korea.

Accordingly, one P4Y2 aircraft and crew from VP-772 (first reserve patrol squadron in action in Korea) was assigned to the Marine Wing. This aircraft was modified for flare missions by squadron personnel who removed the bomb-bay gasoline tanks and certain electronic equipment so that the aircraft could carry 150 to 250 flares, depending on their size and weight. The squadron also rigged flak curtains around them. On 12 June, this aircraft reported to Pusan, Korea.

The initial evaluation flights proved “excellent,” according to Major General Field Harris. The controlling observer, riding in the nose of the P4Y, had good visibility and could make the flare drops more accurately than from a transport. Commencing on 29 June, flare missions were alternated between VP-772 and VP-28, with four aircraft assigned.

“When the P4Ys were first used for the flare dropping operation,” said CDR Minter, “the Marine Air Wing was based at K-1, a field near Pusan. Our operations were normally conducted along the road complex leading south from Wonsan, although the area was frequently changed because of weather or other factors. The flare planes and the Marine intruders did not depart in company from K-1 since the VP plane cruised at a slower speed than the fighters (though not much slower when the bomb and rocket load was as big as the Marines liked to carry). Rendezvous was accomplished in the target area either by the night fighter picking up the flare plane on radar and homing in, or by the flare plane dropping a flare and having the fighter home on it. A flare mission normally lasted for approximately six hours, one plane having the sunset to midnight session, and a replacement having the midnight to sunrise stint.
“Each plane was scheduled to work with a total of four fighters, which came on the scene individually, spaced approximately one-half hour apart. If a fighter had to abort for some reason, the flare plane frequently was able to work with other planes for illumination purposes for bombing runs or anything else that might be required. The arrangement was obviously quite flexible and was quite interesting for the VP boys, who were accustomed to long, monotonous hours of overwater flying. This seemed almost like legalized flat hatting.”[2]

The flare-dropping task called for the patrol aircraft to depart after sunset with a two-ton load of flares and to fly over Korea accompanied by several Marine night-intruder aircraft. (Sometimes as many as seven attack aircraft would utilize the P4Y2’s flares for a single flight, although the average was three to four.) Such missions required the most careful and complex teamwork on the part of these planes. First of all, the flare-carrying P4Ys (called “Lamp Lighters”) had to make a rendezvous with the night-attack aircraft. When this had been done, a search for enemy truck lights was commenced by the intruder and the flare plane. Upon finding a suitable target, a string of four to seven flares would be dropped to illuminate the target area. The attacking pilot might also ask for the flares to be dropped on a certain heading, and for repeated runs.[2A]

Once the area had been illuminated, the attack pilot searched the ground and attempted to locate targets while the VP plane kept the area illuminated. The Marine intruder pilot had to make his search quickly before the enemy trucks had time to conceal themselves beneath trees or other cover.

These flare-dropping flights proved to be very popular and effective, and were continued by VP-28 and later by VP-871.[2B]

The historical part of Commander McAfee’s report reads: “The operation was conducted on a large scale . . . the outstanding fact was that it was one of simplicity and ingenuity. The turning of night into day was realized.”
Chapter 10. The PatRons
Weather Reconnaissance

One of the most important duties performed by patrol squadrons during the Korean War was the task of weather reconnaissance flights flown each night on behalf of Task Force 77 operating in the Sea of Japan. Weather flights were flown in the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea to estimate and evaluate the next day’s weather for carrier operations.

During the winter months, this service was especially helpful when the bitter Siberian weather with its sudden fogs and lowered visibility conditions might hamper the carrier task force’s operations. In July 1951, a similar weather service was inaugurated by the planes of Fleet Air Wing Six for the west coast escort carriers of Task Force 95.2.
Chapter 10. The PatRons
Incidents With MIGs

The latter part of the Korean War saw two incidents between patrol aircraft and enemy MIGs. The first occurred on 11 May 1952 when a VP-42 PBM reconnaissance patrol over the Yellow Sea near the Korean coast was attacked by two enemy fighters. One 20-mm. hit in the wing did only minor damage, and the plane returned safely to Iwakuni.

The second attack occurred on 31 July 1952 when a Mariner assigned to VP-731 (CDR W. T. O’Dowd) was attacked by two Chinese MIG aircraft. At the time of this attack the plane was on a reconnaissance mission over the Yellow Sea off the west coast of Korea. Without warning, the two attacking MIGs made a firing run from astern, killing Aviation Machinist’s Mate H. G. Goodroad, the tail gunner. The PBM, piloted by LT E. E. Bartlett, Jr., dived to 250 feet and turned toward Japan. The two MIGs made several more firing runs. During the second run, a 37-mm. shell exploded in the PBM’s turret hatch, killing Airman Claude Playforth and wounding the starboard waist gunner, Aviation Ordnanceman Third Class R. H. Smith. On the third run, Airman Apprentice H. T. Atkins was injured from exploding 23-mm. projectiles. The Mariner, while seriously damaged, was able to land at the island of Paengnyong-do, off western Korea, for temporary repairs.
At the outbreak of the Korean War, there was one Fleet Air Wing in the Pacific, with headquarters at NAS Agaña in Guam. The Fleet Air Wing commander, CAPT Etheridge Grant, was also Commander Fleet Air Guam. On 25 June 1950, CAPT Grant’s command consisted of one land-based patrol squadron (VP-28, CDR C. F. Skuzinski—nine P4Y2s) based at Agaña, Guam; and a seaplane squadron (VP-46, LCDR M. F. Weisner—nine PBMs) based at Sangley Point, Philippines. One tender, the AVP Suisun (CAPT H. G. Sanchez), was in Tanapag Harbor, Saipan.

Upon the outbreak of the war, Fleet Air Wing One was given the task of preventing any attack upon Formosa. In view of this assignment, Captain Grant was relieved of his duties as ComFairGuam in order to give his full attention to the protection of Formosa.

A daily reconnaissance of the northern sector of the Formosan Straits was begun on 16 July by VP-28, operating from Naha, Okinawa. Patrol Squadron 46 commenced daily reconnaissance patrol of the southern sectors of the Formosan Straits and the China Coast on 17 July, tendered by the USS Suisun.

For the remainder of the war, Fleet Air Wing One operated in the Formosa area the land-based patrol squadron at Naha, Okinawa, while the seaplane squadron based in the Pescadores during the summer months shifted its operations to the Philippines during the typhoon season. These two squadrons maintained a continuous 24-hour patrol of the Formosan Straits and the China coast, supported by ready-duty destroyers from the Seventh Fleet maintained in constant readiness in Formosan waters. A round-the-clock coverage of the China coast was maintained with two flights of landplanes of seven to eight hours’ duration during the daylight hours and one seaplane patrol during the period of darkness. The area covered was in international waters from south of Swatow to north of Shanghai. The destroyers were occasionally supplemented by cruisers from the Seventh Fleet or the blockade forces operating in Korea.
On 26 July 1950, only a few days after the Formosa reconnaissance patrols had been established, a VP-28 aircraft (CDR C. F. Skuzinski) was attacked in the northern part of the Formosan Straits by F-51 type enemy planes with North Korean markings. The attack did no damage, but it was the first of several such attacks which were to occur.

On 7 December 1950, there was an alert in the Straits. In the early morning darkness, a patrolling VP-46 aircraft, piloted by LTJG R. C. McGuffin, showed an unusual number of targets on its radar scope. McGuffin turned directly toward the blips and passed overhead at 1,000 feet. None of his crew was able to see lights below, but the radar picture showed hundreds of targets in a systematic formation headed eastward toward Formosa. Perhaps this was the first wave of a Chinese assault on Formosa. Perhaps it was only another fishing fleet.

McGuffin turned his Mariner aircraft around and reduced his altitude to 100 feet to make a low-altitude approach across the unknown formation. As McGuffin closed the target, he illuminated it by searchlight. Hundreds of junks in close formation were revealed. They showed no lights and were all headed eastward. The best estimate McGuffin’s crew could make was 500 junks.

If this were an invasion attempt, this group would not be alone, certainly. Expanding his search, McGuffin turned northwestward. Approximately 70 miles from the first group, an additional group of approximately 250 junks was contacted. Like the first group, this formation of junks was also on an easterly course.

Could this be an invasion attempt? McGuffin radioed his base and alerted the patrolling destroyers. He then returned to cover and trail the first group.

By this time the ships had reversed course and were sailing westward toward China.

It was never known whether this sighting was a feint, a possible full-fledged attack on Formosa, or merely an incidental meeting of two large formations of fishing vessels.

If either a feint or a full-fledged attack, the Chinese Communists discovered that there was little hope of catching the U.S. Navy off guard.
During mid-1952, several contacts between the aircraft patrolling the Formosan Straits and Communist Chinese MIGs occurred. There were other incidents of surface vessels firing at the patrol airplanes. On 9 September, one of VP-28’s planes was fired upon by a Chinese Communist LCI-type vessel. A week later, a similar attack occurred. The next day, a third attack was made; but in all three cases, no damage was received.

On and 20th of September, and first enemy action near Formosa by MIG aircraft occurred. On that day, in the sea near Shanghai, a VP-28 P4Y piloted by LT Harvey R. Britt was attacked by two MIGs. Although five firing passes were made, there was no damage to the P4Y.

On the 22nd of November 1952, a second incident with a MIG occurred. In the sea off Shanghai, a VP-28 P4Y was attacked by one MIG. The Chinese MIG made eight firing runs during a fifteen-minute period, while the P4Y was at an altitude of 200 feet over the ocean on an easterly course. The weather was good, although there were cumulus clouds at 2,500 feet. The MIG was first identified by the tail gunner, who spotted it coming in astern at a range of five miles. The MIG came under the tail of the P4Y, opened his dive brakes, and flew formation alongside the port wing for approximately ten seconds. Obviously, the Chinese pilot was trying to identify this large blue airplane. As for and MIG, the P4Y pilot and his crew were positive of its identity. A large and a small red star were visible on the side of the fuselage, with Chinese characters alongside.

Satisfied that this was an enemy plane, the MIG peeled off to port, commenced a climb to about 1,000 feet and then began his attack. As he did so, the pilot of the big P4Y turned his plane into the MIG and brought his five turrets into action. For the remaining seven runs, the MIG alternated from side to side, starting his runs about three miles away and pressing them home. His gunnery was atrocious, spoiled by the skillful airmanship of the P4Y pilot and his crew. There was no damage to either plane.
Chapter 10. The PatRons
Significance

Of the three elements of naval aviation in Korea—carrier, marine aviation, and patrol—the patrol squadrons had the most routine operations. This does not mean that their operations were without contribution or significance to the war effort. Patrol squadrons increased the effectiveness of the blockade by their reconnaissance flights, the search for and the destruction of mines, and the surveillance of enemy fishing activity. Patrol squadrons furnished up-to-date weather information for the carrier forces which was always helpful and frequently vital. The patrol squadrons performed the unique and unusual mission of providing flare illumination for the Marine night-intruder pilots. They obtained reconnaissance of the coastal areas of Korea, and kept surveillance over merchant shipping in the immediate area of Korea. The seaplane squadrons provided certain logistic and transport functions which could not be supplied by landplane types. The mere presence of highly trained, antisubmarine squadrons in the Korean area discouraged the use of submarines by the enemy. Lastly the patrol squadrons minimized the danger of any invasion of Formosa by the Communists.

In Korea, the land-based patrol airplane proved more efficient than the seaplane. The landplane squadron had greater endurance, greater self-protection and greater operational versatility. For the first time in the history of naval aviation, it saw greater use than did the seaplane. For every nine seaplane sorties, the patrol landplane flew twelve. During World War II, the ratio was reversed.

However, the landplane squadrons required more shore support and provoked sovereignty and basing problems. While seaplane squadrons were more mobile and could operate more flexibly, their operations were not as economical. Seaplane operations in Korea and Formosa highlighted the need for the development of new types of tenders.

To both the seaplane and the landplane, the war in Korea ushered in the electronics era.
The value of amphibious operations was well understood by the United Nations’ high command in Korea: MacArthur, Ridgway, Van Fleet, and Clark. This fact is illustrated by the initial remark made by Lieutenant General Van Fleet to Rear Admiral George C. Dyer, soon after the latter had reported for duty in Korea as Commander Task Force 95.

Van Fleet and Dyer had first become acquainted during the Greek Civil War in 1947 when Van Fleet was in charge of the U.S. Military Mission to that country. At the time Dyer was Commander Cruiser Division Ten.

“At our meeting in Greece in 1947,” said Dyer, “I stressed the fact that Greece was a peninsula. Its geography made the application of naval power particularly appropriate. Her coastlines were vulnerable both to amphibious assault and naval bombardment.”

Admiral Dyer further pointed out to General Van Fleet that Greece had a small but first-rate Navy, and it was his belief that these naval units could be very helpful against the Communists. Van Fleet never forgot the discussion.

Four years passed before Van Fleet and Dyer met again in Seoul, Korea, in June 1951. There, as Dyer was being ushered into Van Fleet’s office, the three-star general rose from his chair, threw his arms skyward, and exclaimed, “Korea is a peninsula!”

Generals Ridgway and Clark also knew the value of amphibious attack and took advantage of every opportunity to keep the UN amphibious threat alive to the enemy. They ordered amphibious training exercises conducted both in Japan and Korea. Marines of the First Division performed landing exercises in Hwachon Reservoir in plain view of Communist observation posts.
The Sea War in Korea
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson

Chapter 11. The Amphibious Threat (1951-1953)
Communist Vulnerability to Amphibious Attack

The complete control of the air by UN air forces over the battleline forced the Communists to burrow ever deeper into the ground. As a result, their frontline defenses became increasingly immobile and vulnerable to amphibious attack. By the fall of 1951, in fact, fighting on the Korean peninsula had degenerated into trench warfare reminiscent of the Civil War siege of Richmond, or Flanders in World War I. Conventional weapons—artillery, close air support—were at best only partially effective.

By the summer of 1952, the Communists had taken advantage of the stalemate to build as strong a defense line as military history had ever seen. General Maxwell D. Taylor, who had helped to crack Germany’s Siegfried line during World War II, considered the Chinese defenses along the 150-mile Korean front even more formidable than the Siegfried Line.

Essentially, the Communist defense was a honeycomb of underground tunnels stretching from one coast of Korea to the other. A single tunnel might extend for miles. Many of the tunnels and fortifications were so deep and strongly built that they were impervious to bombs and artillery fire. Not only had the Communists reverted to trench warfare, they had been forced to glorify it—largely because of the threat of UN firepower from air, land, and sea.

As soon as the Reds retreated to a new hill, the hole-boring began. First, they dug on the protected side near the top; then they gophered their way around to the side facing the UN lines. Gradually, transections were dug linking all the tunnels together in a spiderweb of passages, bunkers, observation posts, and gun positions. To U.S. Marines who had fought at Tarawa, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa during World War II, the defensive trench system in Korea was more elaborate, although not as formidable.

At the same time the enemy was rat-holing at the front, he was also strengthening his coastal defenses. The Communists had been caught napping at Inchon and they were already too much committed on the stalemated battleline to be caught flatfooted a second time. With Pohang, Inchon, Wonsan, Iwon, and Hungnam as constant reminders, the Communists knew and feared the United States amphibious capability.

General Mark Clark aptly described the Communists’ fear of amphibious assault: “... The enemy had an overwhelming preoccupation with the defense of his coastline. He had tasted the whip of our amphibious techniques at Inchon and was afraid of it. He did everything he could, particularly on the beaches around Wonsan on the east coast, to prepare for a possible new assault from the sea by our amphibious infantry units. And he knew that every one of our American divisions had been, or could easily be, trained to wage amphibious warfare.

“Hundreds of thousands of North Koreans built and manned the beach defenses along every stretch of coastline that conceivably could be used for an amphibious invasion. Behind them were Chinese Communist forces in reserve positions from which they could move quickly to bolster the defenses at any beach under attack.

“The defense system along the beaches, like the defense system at the front, was very deep and depended in large measure on underground installations for its effectiveness. But in addition to the underground works there were lines of open trenches spreading back from the beaches so that any troops attacking from the sea would be forced to attack one line of trenches after another, once they attained their foothold on dry land. Barbed wire was strung along the water’s edge. Minefields were plentiful. Large areas of rice paddy land were flooded to make them giant tank traps which would mire our equipment in mud. Preparations were made to flood other areas during an invasion so that flood waters themselves could be used as a defensive weapon.”
The Sea War in Korea  
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson  

Chapter 11. The Amphibious Threat (1951-1953)  
UN Amphibious Planning

For the final two years of the war, United Nations commanders continuously considered the feasibility of amphibious attack against both the east and west coasts of Korea. For example, it was once proposed by Vice Admiral Clark to make an amphibious assault north of Wonsan, just above the Hodo Pando peninsula. The idea was not to permanently hold Hodo, but to seize the land long enough to locate and spike the vexatious guns of that area. Other full-scale assaults were proposed and considered at various times.

“On the west coast, the Haeju peninsula looked the most promising,” said Vice Admiral Robert P. Briscoe, who was then COMNAVFE. “Tentative plans were made for a corps landing in that area in the event the truce negotiations fell apart.

“We gathered all the advance intelligence that was needed, estimated the size of forces required, and defined the major problems that would most likely be encountered.

“It developed that the major problem of an amphibious assault at Haeju was not the assault itself, but how we would get our heavy equipment across the rice paddies to high ground, once we were ashore. The Haeju problem was further complicated by the lack of reserve troops in the area. To make a landing in Corps strength, we would have needed two Army divisions and one Marine division from the United States.”

On the east coast, the most promising site for an amphibious operation was the Kojo peninsula just south of Wonsan; from there, UN forces could move down the valley to the southwest and cut off communications between the North Korean and Chinese armies.

“Neither of these amphibious assaults was ever conducted,” said Briscoe, “because we simply did not have the troops available in the Far East. We had sufficient shipping, we had the necessary gunfire and air support for a landing, but we simply did not have the troops. After the stalemate developed, we never had more than two reserve divisions in the Far East area at any given time. One of these was kept in Japan, and the other was held in reserve in Korea.”

Had General Van Fleet been permitted to do so, he would have broken the stalemate with an amphibious landing.
The Sea War in Korea
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson

Chapter 11. The Amphibious Threat (1951-1953)

The Kojo Feint

A plan to land at Kojo was first proposed in mid-1951 by Rear Admiral T. B. Hill while Chief of Staff to Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. Hill envisioned an amphibious end-around landing on Korea’s eastern coast, in the vicinity of Kojo. Once ashore, the troops would drive southwestward to link up with the Eighth Army and thereby cut off the North Korean Army from its source of Chinese supply.

“This plan was known as ‘Wrangler,’” said Vice Admiral Clark, “and it appeared to have excellent chance of success.

“It had the approval of the Commander in Chief Far East, General Ridgway, and also General Van Fleet, Eighth Army. But very soon after I arrived in October 1951, General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited the Eighth Army headquarters in Korea and disapproved the plan, stating: ‘We want no more of the enemy’s real estate.’

“For more than a year I heard no more about Kojo,” Clark continued, “until October 1952, when I was Commander Seventh Fleet. At that time Admiral Radford arrived, in company with Vice Admiral Briscoe, to inspect the Seventh Fleet. Radford remained overnight in the flagship, and visited Task Force 77 the next day. Briscoe had proposed feinting an amphibious demonstration in the Kojo area in an attempt to draw enemy troops from their underground frontline positions. It was never intended to land any of our troops, but it was hoped that the enemy would react to the demonstration by sending his troops to the defense of Kojo, and that the Navy and Air Force could then destroy the enemy as they moved. General Mark Clark approved the idea, and designated me as Commander Joint Amphibious Task Force Seven, placing under my command various amphibious forces, including units from the Sixteenth Corps, the First Cavalry Division, and 118th Regimental Combat Team. Major General Anthony Trudeau was in command of the troops, and Rear Admiral Francis X. McInerney commanded the amphibious group.”

The Kojo operation, known as “Operation Decoy,” had the following concept in the operation plan of Commander Joint Amphibious Task Force Seven:

“This force, supported by coordinated joint action, will seize by amphibious assault, occupy and defend a beachhead in the Kojo area with the Eighth Cavalry Regimental Combat Team in order to:

“b. Draw enemy reinforcements to defense of the objective area
“c. Fully exploit the enemy’s physical and psychological reaction.”[2]

A noteworthy feature of the Kojo plan was that it made no mention that the operation was to be only a demonstration landing.

“For deception purposes,” said Admiral Clark, “knowledge of the demonstration aspect was confined to only the highest echelons of command.”

The subordinate commands, including the carrier and the minesweeper commanders, were unaware that the operation would be a feint.

October 15th was tentatively chosen for D-day. In accordance with Clark’s orders, Joint Amphibious Task Force Seven prepared and distributed plans on 25 September both for a Corps landing and for a Regimental landing. On 4 October, General Clark authorized execution of the Regimental landing plan.

The existence of two plans caused little inconvenience at the Army Corps and Division and the naval task force levels; but on the lower levels, where movements actually had to be made, ships’ capacities determined,
boat assignment tables developed, and command relationships and liaison established, there was considerable difficulty in separating the two operations.

Commander Seventh Fleet agreed that the requirement for the development of two plans did cause some confusion, but the most complicating factor was the short planning time. Admiral Clark considered it remarkable, in view of this disadvantage, that the plan was resolved so satisfactorily.

Ship movements for the Kojo operation began on 1 October. Troop-loading operations commenced 6 October at Muroran, Otaru, and Hokkaido, where the Eighth Regimental Combat Team was located. Troop transports —Task Group 76.4 (ComTransDiv-14) in the Bayfield (APA-33)—began departing Hokkaido for the rehearsal area at Kangung, Korea, on 9 October.

Rehearsal operations were conducted on D-minus-three day, 12 October, under most adverse weather conditions. Winds in excess of 25 knots caused a two-hour delay in the H-hour rehearsal time. Four LCVPs broached during landing operations and were lost. Another was lost as it was being lowered into the water. Because of the dangerous surf conditions, the ship-to-shore movement was discontinued after the fifth wave. High winds and heavy seas prohibited the planned minesweeping for that day.

“At sunrise on the morning of the 14th,” said Admiral Clark, “my flagship, the USS Iowa, joined the other ships in a bombardment of Kojo in a realistic softening-up process preparatory to the mock landing—but the Communists still did not know it was to be a mock landing. Every effort was made to give them the impression that another invasion such as the one at Inchon was impending.”

The Iowa, the cruisers, and the destroyers continued shelling the beaches all night, until H-hour the next morning. The only ships to receive heavy counterbattery fire were the minesweepers, which were operating within visual range of enemy gunners.

“The transports held reveille at three A.M. the morning of D-day,” said Commander Paul J. Hidding, executive officer of the U.S. transport Mountrail (APA-213, CAPT William H. Farmer). “As dawn broke, the clouds were so heavy and visibility so poor that the enemy could not possibly have seen us. Therefore, he could not have been fooled into thinking we were really going to land.

“As a consequence, the announcement of H-hour was postponed until about 1130, at which time we were told that H-hour would be at 1400.

“Our transport, which was 23,000 yards offshore, immediately started lowering boats and loading troops. The troops were re-embarked aboard ship, however, before the boats departed for the beach. At this time the weather was fairly calm. But in the 45 minutes it took them to reach the turnaway line, 5,000 yards from the beach, the wind whipped up to 35 or 40 knots. The enemy also lobbed a few shells at the incoming boat waves without causing damage. By the time the boats got back to the ship, the wind had intensified to 55 knots. Ours was the only transport to send all its boats ashore. With the winds at gale force, we had quite a time picking up 26 boats, particularly the LCMs. One of the transports—Okanogan (APA-220)—had four boats completely destroyed during recovery. Thanks to excellent seamanship, all of the other boats were recovered without serious casualty by 1630. The transport group then departed for Pohang-dong to disembark the Eighth Regimental Combat Team.”

“Naval air and gun bombardment continued throughout D-day in spite of high winds and heavy seas,” wrote Captain P. W. Watson, commanding officer of Bon Homme Richard. “Both props and jets smashed at the beaches and their approaches in anticipation of a landing. In addition to pummeling strong points, the flyers destroyed 12 buildings, blew up an ammunition dump, and caused a large secondary explosion in a fortified area. Meanwhile, the landing craft headed for the beach, but on reaching a point 5,000 yards out, they reversed course and returned to the ships. Shortly thereafter, the operation was officially termed an exercise. One Skyraider received a direct hit in the wing from medium flak but was able to ditch safely. The pilot, LTJG Walter Alt, was picked up in good condition by the helicopter of the USS Iowa.”
“Having no indication whatsoever that the projected ‘landing’ was not genuine, the *Bon Homme Richard* and Air Group Seven spared no effort to make the Kojo operation a success. Consequently, when the real nature of the operation was disclosed, many of those concerned felt let down.”

Air and naval bombardment continued throughout D-plus-one day, 16 October. At 1900 Joint Amphibious Force Seven was dissolved and all naval units returned to their routine assignments.
The Sea War in Korea
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson

Chapter 11. The Amphibious Threat (1951-1953)
Significance

Except for the manning and activation of formerly unoccupied gun positions at Kojo, after D-minus-three day, there was actually little evidence of enemy reaction to the Kojo feint.

A U.S. intelligence agent who landed at Kojo on the night of 13 October reported enemy beach defenses had been evacuated, and that only a small number of troops were seen in the objective area. The intensified shore-battery fire later encountered by our minesweepers and the fire support ships indicated that these guns were manned, possibly by troops already in the immediate areas.

On D-minus-three day, pilots from Task Force 77 reported sighting approximately 1,000 enemy troops passing through the objective area. The cause of this troop movement was never determined.

In his action report,[7] Commander Task Force 77 reported that only ten enemy troops were killed by air attack in the period from 12 to 18 October. If the Kojo demonstration had brought any large number of enemy troops into the open, it was only at night.

Intelligence reports disclosed, however, that in the three months following the Kojo feint, the enemy relocated both North Korean and Chinese Communist reserve divisions from interior positions to coastal areas around Wonsan and Kojo. Although there is no indication that such a plan was afoot before the demonstration, it cannot be concluded that this change resulted from the demonstration. “The actual effect of the Kojo amphibious demonstration is difficult to determine,” said Vice Admiral Briscoe, “except that the immobility of the Communist forces was strongly indicated.”

As far as damage inflicted on the enemy during the aerial and surface bombardment, Commander Seventh Fleet drew the following conclusions:[8]

“**Aircraft Operations.** It is impossible to draw a direct comparison of damage between the two periods, due to the diversified nature of the targets; however, it will be noted that the destruction achieved by aircraft in the 1–5 October period was, in general, slightly greater than that achieved in the 12–16 October period, with slightly less tonnage of bombs and considerably fewer sorties. This is attributed to the fact that the former period was devoted primarily to prebriefed and coordinated heavy strikes, while by contrast the amphibious operation required a much greater percentage of non-attack missions. . . . It is concluded that less damage was done by aircraft, with a greater expenditure of effort, during the Kojo demonstration than during a normal operating period.

“**Ship Bombardment.** It appears that considerably more damage was done by naval gunfire during the period of the Kojo demonstration than during the earlier period. This opinion is reinforced by the fact that a greater percentage of unobserved and unevaluated fire occurred during the operation than during normal periods of deliberate gunfire. Considering these factors, it is estimated that approximately three times as much damage was done by naval gunfire during the Kojo demonstration as during a normal 5-day period; however, the expenditure of ammunition was about five times the normal.

“Another factor to be considered in arriving at a cost analysis of this operation is the interruptions of upkeep schedules of ships which were mobilized for the operation. This is particularly applicable in the case of destroyers, which are in short supply, as always. The operation required 128 destroyer days which would otherwise have gone into much-needed upkeep.

“The foregoing is not intended to belittle the value of the demonstration as a training maneuver. Such training is invaluable, and cannot be measured in the light of cost. However, it is considered that the concept of
drawing the enemy into the open in order to inflict severe losses on him was not realized and, in retrospect, had very little possibility of succeeding under the existing conditions of stalemate and limited United Nations resources.”

Perhaps the most serious deficiency encountered in the Kojo demonstration was the lack of a means for early and positive identification of aircraft. Numerous instances occurred when unidentified aircraft appeared over Wonsan and in the objective area during the actual operation. Although no enemy air attacks were made on either ships or aircraft, lack of early warning and positive identification was a source of much worry.

In his action report, Admiral Clark stated, “Air defense was the greatest weakness of advance force operation, due to the difficulty of locating and identifying bogies. The ships’ radars experienced considerable interference due to proximity to land so that blind alley of approach existed. . . . A contributing factor also was the presence of numerous Air Force aircraft and their reluctance to respond to calls for identification.”[9]

Subordinate commanders, particularly the carriers and minesweepers, commented adversely on not knowing the true nature of the Kojo operation. Until the night before D-Day, only the highest echelons knew that the landing was to be a fake. Some of the lower echelon commands considered the risks taken and the casualties sustained were not justified.

“On the other hand, if Kojo was to fool anybody, we had to make it look real,” said Admiral Briscoe. “Then, too, there was the possibility the landing would actually be made, and it was not decided until after the troops were loaded that it would be a feint.”

In summary, the Kojo operation was designed to bring the enemy out into the open, to expose him to attack, and to throw him off balance in the belief that a major amphibious assault was in progress. It did not achieve all that was hoped for. However, the operation did prove that the United Nations forces would have been able to land at Kojo against very little opposition and with few casualties. Communist prisoners of war stated later that the Communists had planned to wait until our troops had landed at Kojo before making any countermoves.

Regarding the probable result of any major amphibious assault in enemy territory, the principal Navy and Army commanders were emphatic.

“An amphibious assault behind enemy lines would have broken the back of the Chinese Communist forces at any time,” said Vice Admiral Briscoe, “due to the concentration of Communist forces near the battleline. An attack against their rear would have cut their line of supply and brought them out into the open where our superior firepower would have been decisive.

“But an amphibious assault would have required more troops—and we did not have the troops.”

General Van Fleet believed an amphibious assault might have been decisive, but that the war could have been won without one.

“The Navy could have shot us ashore,” said Van Fleet, “and kept us ashore as we built up. We could have built up faster than the Chinese could have met our attack.

“In fact, the Chinese could not have met us at all. He was not flexible enough. He had no method of movement or control. He had no concept of fast moves, he had no communication systems, he had no mobility, he had no logistics support system to maintain his momentum, as we have.

“This was the Chinese Communist Army’s greatest weakness. He could not sustain an offensive—nor could he long hold out against a sustained offensive. The enemy didn’t have the means of logistic support, he didn’t have the ‘know how,’ he didn’t have the schooling. It takes a long time to learn about supporting a moving army.

“If UN forces had opened up an offensive all along the front and continued to push” said General Van Fleet, “we would have put such a strain on his logistic supply line, forcing him to work in the daytime as well as night, that he would have been given an insoluble logistic problem. In short, if United Nations forces had utilized their inherent advantages of mobility, flexibility, and firepower, we could not have been stopped. We could have
won the war at any time. Instead of doing that, we fought the war on the enemy’s terms and according to his rules. The war was never stalemated. It was a sit-down on our part.

“Winning the war was not our job. Our job was to sit on the battleline and let air drop in and punish him in the hope it would subdue him enough to sign on the dotted line. It was a sit-down by order of the United Nations. It was a self-imposed loss, because we could and should have won it.”
The American naval siege in Wonsan harbor, which grew to be the longest in modern American naval history, was begun on 16 February 1951.[1A]

On the day the operation began, there was no plan to lay an indefinite or constant siege to Wonsan. The “siege of Wonsan” was progressive, originally conceived by Rear Admiral Allan E. Smith, during the period of the Hungnam evacuation as part of a plan for capturing certain islands on both coasts, including at least one in Wonsan harbor.

At the time Smith proposed his plan, UN forces were in retreat from the initial onslaught of the Chinese Communist armies. During the confusing days of December 1950, UN forces faced not only the prospect of being forced off the Korean peninsula, but also the possibility that World War III was beginning.

Smith’s immediate evaluation was that his blockade and bombardment forces had to get back on the offensive; that if they had something tangible to accomplish, they could contribute to the stabilization of the land fighting.

“My evaluation,” Admiral Smith recorded,[1B] “showed that it would be good naval warfare to hold certain strategically-placed islands. The first one I chose was Cho-do, in the entrance of Chinnampo. The next one was Paengnyong-do, just south of Changsangot Peninsula. The third one was Tokchok-to, at the entrance to Inchon. The fourth one was off Kunsan (not needed as the frontline held to north of it). And the fifth was the island group in Wonsan harbor.

Smith’s plan was to put on these islands 150 or 200 South Korean Marines. This he did, equipping them only with rifles, though later they were issued a few burp guns and hand grenades. Thus when the Eighth Army came north again, these positions would have been retained, and we would not have to recapture all those hundreds of islands on the west coast.

Smith proposed this plan to COMNAVFE and it was approved.

It is thus clear that the “siege of Wonsan” was originally only a plan to seize one or more of the dozen-odd islands in the harbor until the UN forces again fought their way northward to capture North Korea, including Wonsan itself. The prospect that the war would stalemate in a few months across the narrow waist of Korea south of that port was not then a matter for consideration.
To appreciate the extraordinary nature and the importance of the 861-day naval siege of Wonsan, a description of that city and the geography and hydrography of its harbor are needed for the reader’s understanding and interest.

The city of Wonsan, strategically located on Korea’s east coast in the relatively tideless Sea of Japan, was the principal seaport of North Korea. The harbor was large—three hundred square miles—and naturally protected from storms. In a part of the world often plagued with typhoons, the Japanese had named the port the “Harbor of Refuge” because it was rarely in a storm’s track.

Unlike other ports to the north, Wonsan was ice-free in winter. Its anchorage had a mud bottom over good holding ground in six to eight fathoms of water.

These were the features which, in 1880, caused the Japanese (who had just been granted use of the harbor) to begin its maritime development. In that year Wonsan was only a small, sleepy, and isolated village.

In 1950, the city of Wonsan had grown to be a thriving and modern seaport by Oriental standards. It was a strategic rail center, a naval base, a road transportation hub, and an industrial complex. The city’s estimated population was 100,000.

Wonsan was the terminus of the cross-peninsular rail and road line to the North Korean capital of Pyongyang. It was also a pivotal location for the north-south rail line, and for highways in both directions.

The principal industry centered around its huge petroleum refinery—a plant covering 4,000,000 square feet, with an annual capacity of almost 2,000,000 barrels. Before the Korean War commenced, it was believed that the Wonsan refinery was supplied by ships from the Russian wells on Sakhalin, the long and rugged island adjoining Siberia.[1C]

In addition to the refining industry in Wonsan, several other industries were located in or near the city. The Korean Railroad Company maintained a modern plant in Wonsan for the construction, repair, and maintenance of locomotives and rolling stock. A lead smelting company, a steel pipe company, a coke plant, a flour mill, a shipyard, a fishing cannery, and a “sake” brewery were also numbered among the Wonsan industries. Wonsan was also the center of great fishing activity.

Wonsan’s seaport had excellent facilities. A 900-foot concrete wharf in the inner harbor was equipped with warehouses and railroad sidings. A large 40-ton travelling crane was reported in use on this wharf. At either end of the wharf were several quays and piers for small vessels. The oil refinery had its own pier several hundred feet in length.

These features and industries, therefore, as well as the importance of the harbor, were the factors underlying the establishment of the naval siege.

The physical features of Wonsan made it a location of great beauty. The islands dotting the harbor, the mountains which rose up within and behind the city and to the north on the peninsula called Hodo Pando, and the picturesque curve of the bay, had made Wonsan a summer resort center.

This was the city which would see the longest siege in modern naval warfare.
Chapter 12. The Siege of Wonsan
Difficulties and Advantages of Siege

To besiege Wonsan’s inner harbor actively and at close range involved risks and dangers. First, the harbor was landlocked, and enemy gunfire from all sides could be expected. Second, much of the old minefield was still present, and it was safe to assume that the Communists had refreshed the swept areas since December 1950, and would try to re-mine the harbor at every opportunity. This could be, and was, done surreptitiously at night from the small, ubiquitous fishing sampans. Third, the siege of Wonsan would be hazardous because of the restricted navigation. In addition to mines, the numerous islands and shoals in the harbor would complicate navigation and gunnery.

On the other hand, there were many advantages in besieging Wonsan, in holding its harbor and capturing its islands. First, the enemy would be forced to divert large numbers of troops to protect himself against a second invasion—troops which might otherwise be in or supporting the battlefront. Second, by holding and clearing the Wonsan minefields, UN forces would be able to invade whenever it suited their purposes. Any movement of UN ground forces north of Wonsan would demand the opening of an additional port for logistic support of the armies. Third, as has been stated, the city of Wonsan was an important Communist transportation center, lying astride the main rail and road arteries between northeast Korea and the frontlines. It was also the terminus of the only east-west railroad in North Korea. Naval gunfire could bring these important transportation routes under fire. Fourth, by holding the harbor, the best port in North Korea would be securely closed; fishing activity therein could be controlled by establishing a checkpoint on one of the nearby harbor islands. Fifth, the harbor could be an effective base from which to obtain enemy intelligence and conduct guerrilla operations. Sixth (although this reason was not initially apparent), Wonsan harbor could be an important search and rescue point for our aviators and aircraft.

And last, to be able to lay siege to the main port in North Korea, to hold its islands, and to bring gunfire to bear on its military targets, would have demoralizing effect upon the Communists, and be of great psychological value to the United Nations.

These were the reasons why it was essential to lay siege to Wonsan.
Chapter 12. The Siege of Wonsan
Initial Operations

After a path through the minefield had again been swept by MinRon Three commencing 12 February, the initial siege operations in Wonsan were begun by the destroyers USS Wallace L. Lind (DD-703, CDR E. B. Carlson) and USS Ozbourn (DD-846, CDR C. O. Akers) on 16 February 1951.[1D] Rear Admiral Smith, the blockade commander, was on hand, embarked in the cruiser Manchester.

The two destroyers bombarded the harbor’s military installations, but the swept area was so small and navigation so difficult that the two destroyers fired the bombardment at anchor.

Two days later, again at anchor, and at the conclusion of a snowstorm, Ozbourn received from Sin-do Island, the first Wonsan counterbattery fire, which wounded two men. Dragging her bottomed anchor, Ozbourn got underway toward the outer harbor. Her Mark 56 director was damaged, her after deckhouse holed, her starboard searchlight demolished. She was the first U.S. siege ship to be struck in Wonsan.

It was obvious that if a siege was to be effective, Wonsan’s harbor islands had to be captured or neutralized.
Chapter 12. The Siege of Wonsan

The Harbor Islands (1951)

Of the numerous islands in the Bay of Wonsan, UN forces eventually occupied and used seven: Yo-do, Mo-do, Sa-do, Sin-do, Tae-do, Ung-do, and Hwangto-do.

The first island captured was Sin-do. Enemy troops as well as enemy guns had been reported on Sin-do. To prepare the island for capture, therefore, two destroyers and two frigates, under the command of Commander Destroyer Division 112 (CAPT B. F. Roeder), commenced a two-hour bombardment at 0700 on the morning of 24 February, with spotting furnished by Manchester’s helicopter. Three hundred fifty-eight 5-inch and two hundred and fifty-nine 3-inch shells blasted the island at 0900. Following this bombardment, a detachment of 210 Korean marines went ashore. The landing was unopposed and the island was reported secure at 1018. Sin-do, lying only 4,000 yards from Kalma Gak, would provide a fine observation post for spotting naval gunfire and for observing the train and truck traffic in Wonsan city.

The next island occupied was Yo-do, the largest island. There was no opposition or interference, and the occupation by 210 Korean marines was without incident.

Yo-do was approximately 2,500 yards long and 1,500 yards wide, with an elevation of 377 feet. One cove and beach, suitable for landing, were located on the western side of the island. Nearby was the tiny fishing village of Yodo-ri, with a population of some 70 men, women, and children. The town consisted of several huts and one school. The size, location, and topography of Yo-do made it an ideal base for implementing the siege.

In mid-March, the Communists made an attempt to make a sampan landing on Tae-do, but were driven off by gunfire from the destroyers.

Three days after this attempt, 24 March 1951, the U.S. destroyer English (DD-696) (CDR R. J. Toner) landed a shore fire control party on Tae-do. Except for a leper colony of one hundred fifty people, Tae-do was not occupied. The island was also the site of a former Japanese fort, and lay even closer to Wonsan. On the following day, the cruiser Saint Paul and four destroyers, including the English, fired on targets in Wonsan with good results, their gunfire being corrected by the spotters on Tae-do.

Operating from Yo-do, the Korean marines gradually expanded control over several other islands in the bay: Mo-do, So-do and Hwangto-do. The latter island was the best spotting and observation post of all.

The first naval officer assigned to the Wonsan harbor islands was LT James S. Lampe, Jr., an intelligence officer from the staff of Commander Task Force 95. Lampe, the son of Presbyterian missionary parents, spoke fluent Korean, having been born in Korea and having lived there for eighteen years.

“I landed on the island of Yo-do on 13 June 1951, with orders to report to CTG 95.2,” said Lampe. “At this time, we held and were using five of the harbor islands: Yo-do, Hwangto-do, Sa-do, Mo-do, and Sin-do. By far, the most important were Yo-do, our base island, and Hwangto-do, our naval gunfire spotting island.

“I lived on Yo-do. It was the best island for a base and was far enough out in the harbor to be reasonably safe from enemy guns, and in a good position where our ships could support us in case of a counterinvasion.

“Before I arrived, the Korean marines, in March or April 1951, had installed a large 4-foot searchlight on the top of the hill on the north side of Yo-do, just above the village. Power for the light was furnished by a gas engine, and it was manned by a crew of Korean marines. In case of invasion, this light was to be used to illuminate the beach in front of the village; otherwise we used the searchlight at night to give our planes a checkpoint. (Incidentally, this searchlight drew a great deal of fire from the Wonsan batteries—almost every day
after a night’s use. However, no direct hits were ever received up till the time I left (August 1952), although there were near misses several times.[1E]

“For several months, I lived in a tent near the small village of Yodo-ri. On 14 July 1951, the island of Yo-do became the headquarters for units of the 41st Royal Independent Commandos, commanded by LTCOL D. P. Drysdale, MBE, Royal Marines. The next day, the U.S. Marine who was to command the Wonsan islands, LTCOL Richard G. Warga, established his new command on Yo-do (CTE 95.23).

“There were several tents in our 95.23 camp—four for living quarters, one for a messhall, and one for an outhouse. They were placed on a little slope near the village and in the trees. During my fourteen months on Yo-do, I tried unsuccessfully to get a toilet seat from one of the destroyers for our outhouse; we did our best to sand and whittle the seat to make it more comfortable, but it never was.

“Our group of tents made a nice target. Many times when the Hodo Pando batteries fired at the ships near Yo-do, a few rounds would strike near our tents. Although there were many close hits and fragments, luckily, no casualties were suffered from this fire.”
The Sea War in Korea
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson

Chapter 12. The Siege of Wonsan
Shore Fire Control Parties on Hwangto-do

Perhaps the most useful of the Wonsan harbor islands for the siege ships was the island of Hwangto-do, one of three islands used for the spotting of ships’ gunfire. The barren and rocky island, without a single tree, had an elevation of 160 feet, and was only 3,000 yards from the shore, and therefore closest to enemy guns and mortars. Hwangto-do was also closest to the city of Wonsan, to the much-battered Wonsan airfield, and to the important road running southward to the front through the Anbyon Valley. This road was the enemy’s main supply route in the eastern sector. From the observation post atop Hwangto-do, spotters could look directly upon Wonsan, the Anbyon Valley road, and several important bridges along this railroad and highway.

Until June 1951, Hwangto-do could only be approached in sampans because of the mine danger. Sampans were not endangered because the mines were anchored six to ten feet beneath the sea surface and below their keels. Because of the island’s proximity to enemy gunfire, all movement to and from this island was at night. A Korean Marine Corps LCVP was used to carry food and other supplies to the other “friendly” islands but had not been used to supply Hwangto-do.

“In July,” said LT Lampe, “we were told by a prisoner that the minefields protecting the eastern beach of Kalma Gak were in two rows, and that a boat could go safely from the middle of Tae-do to the western tip of Hwangto-do without crossing a mine line. Since the garrison platoon on Hwangto-do had been asking for food, ammunition and additional men, the situation warranted trying to take the LCVP to the island. That particular day, a strong westerly wind made it impractical to try to send the usual sampans. It would have been necessary to scull all the way from Yo-do, a trip that would have taken all night.

“Therefore I loaded the LCVP with all the things Hwangto-do needed, and I headed for the island following the route recommended by the POW. The trip was without mishap and turned out to be the first of many. Thereafter, I took all the supplies into Hwangto-do by LCVP, always at night.

“In early July 1951, Captain W. L. Anderson, USN, was CTG 95.2, embarked in USS Blue (DD-744). While discussing the effectiveness of the ships’ gunfire with the captains of the Blue (CDR R. S. Burdick) and the USS Frank E. Evans (DD-754, CDR G. L. Christie), it was brought out that the fire might be more effective with a Shore Fire Control Party stationed close in to the targets. I assured them that the island of Hwangto-do could be used for this purpose and would be an ideal location.

“We made out a list of the things the party should take with them. Included was all the food they would use, the kind of clothing and bedding, the kinds and numbers of weapons, and the amount of ammunition and the radio gear most suitable. A volunteer party was picked, and a night chosen to go in. Volunteers were requested because the party could expect to be under close, accurate enemy artillery and mortar fire, and, of course, there was the ever-present threat of an enemy landing. Raiding sampans coming out from the south couldn’t be detected by radar from the siege ships, and the ships would be unable to take them under fire when they were close to the island. Even so, everyone wanted to volunteer.

“On the night of 5-6 July 1951, I took them in to Hwangto-do in one of the destroyer’s whaleboats and got them ‘squared away’. The whaleboat carried a radar reflecting screen, and the ships kept a close watch on our progress. We landed on the only beach on the island. This beach was on the west side of the island and was very exposed to enemy fire. The rest of the island coast was rough rock and couldn’t be approached because of underwater rocks. Nearby was a cluster of ten fishing huts.

“The shore fire control party holed up in one of the fishing huts. The Korean Marine Corps garrison
platoon was most happy to have them on the island.

“The results achieved by the *Evans* and the *Blue*, using this shore fire control party, were extremely
good. As I recall, they fired at a torpedo station and supply buildings in Wonsan. The team stayed on the island
for three or four days and I brought them out. From time to time, other ships’ teams took their place. The ships’
interdiction and bombardment fire was materially improved.”

This employment became more frequent with many other siege ships landing their own SFCPs on
Hwangto-do. A small party of U.S. Marines was posted to Hwangto-do on 19 July 1951, and remained there for
the rest of the siege, the personnel being rotated every four months.[1F]
Chapter 12. The Siege of Wonsan

Siege Procedure

As has been stated, one of the main purposes of laying siege to Wonsan, in addition to being able to bombard the enemy’s main road and rail lines leading to the front, was to clear the enemy minefields still remaining in Wonsan, and to prevent the enemy from planting others. This was no easy task. Minesweeping had to be continuous. In a single day the Communists could re-mine the swept areas, using a few of the always-plentiful sampans. Even a small sampan could carry as many as four mines.

“During my period in Korea as CTF 95,” said Rear Admiral George C. Dyer, “most new mines were laid during periods of rainfall, snowfall, or winds strong enough to raise the waves in Wonsan to the ‘high chop level’. During such periods, with the radars in our ships it was impracticable to detect sampans laying mines. None were laid during actual typhoons because the winds and sea currents caused the enemy to know that the mines would probably be wasted, and they had none to waste.”

To clear the minefields, four or five minesweepers were assigned to the Wonsan task group, two of them operating every day sweeping the harbor and its approaches. Since these small vessels lacked the means of fully defending themselves from Wonsan’s shore batteries, it was the duty of two (sometimes three) assigned destroyer types patrolling Wonsan to suppress enemy fire upon them.

By the end of April the sweepers had sunk or exploded 29 mines in the harbor of Wonsan. March 30th was the big day when Thompson, Pelican, Chatterer and Merganser had swept and destroyed 15 mines.

At this early stage of the siege, a typical day’s routine can be described as follows:

The minesweepers, supported by destroyers, would make a daily sweep in an assigned area. If the sweeps were fired upon, the destroyers would retaliate. During a day’s patrol, the destroyers would also have certain bombardment missions. And whenever lucrative targets were spotted in Wonsan (either by ship spotters, naval gunfire parties on the islands, or aircraft) they would be taken under fire by the destroyers.

At night, alone or in conjunction with night-heckling and reconnaissance aircraft from the carriers or the Fifth Air Force in Korea, the destroyers would fire at assigned or observed targets, in most cases with the spotting assistance of the shore fire control parties stationed on the “friendly” islands.

From time to time, the siege would be augmented by the rocket attacks of the LSMR division,[1G] by the air strikes from Task Force 77, and by heavy gun strikes. During mid-March 1951, the first of many cruiser and battleship bombardments to strike Wonsan during the siege was conducted. Manchester (CL-83, CAPT Lewis S. Parks) accompanied by Lind (DD-703, CDR Edward B. Carlson) made a surprise raid on enemy troop barracks in Wonsan on 17 March. Intelligence reports later stated that more than 6,000 casualties had been inflicted. On 19 March, the first battleship to participate in the siege, the USS Missouri, blasted enemy gun positions with her 16-inch fire.
Chapter 12. The Siege of Wonsan
Wonsan Bombardments by Night

In early April 1951, an interesting experiment was initiated between the bombarding ships of Task Force 95 and the aircraft of the Twelfth Reconnaissance Squadron, Fifth Air Force. Already, as the result of both air and gun strikes on their supply lines, the Communists had suspended efforts to move supplies by day. All resupply through the Wonsan transportation complex was done at night. Reconnaissance aircraft of the Air Force had the mission of photographing the road and rail lines of North Korea every flyable night so that a check could be kept on the number and amount of supplies getting through to the enemy frontlines. Other night-flying aircraft of the First Marine Air Wing (F7F Tigercats and F4U Corsairs) and Fifth Air Force (largely B-26s) were out upon every occasion to damage and destroy as much of this night supply work as possible. In this effort, the attacking Navy, Marine, and U.S. Air Force aircraft were ably assisted by flare-dropping P4Y2 Privateers from Fleet Air Wing Six. [1H]

At Wonsan, the night-heckler and night-attack aircraft found the siege ships willing teammates. Star shells fired by the destroyers enabled the attack aircraft to locate targets more easily and make attacks upon them. The aircraft, in return, spotted the bombardment fire of the destroyers and increased its effectiveness.

The work of DesRon One ships Floyd B. Parks (DD-884), Agerholm (DD-826), and John R. Craig (DD-885) on the night of 5 May 1951 was typical of this work.

“This was the Parks’ first of two 30-day periods in Wonsan,” recorded CDR H. G. Claudius, USN. [2]
“Two of my officers, LT Harold A. Bres, USN, and LTJG Urban G. Whitaker, Jr., USNR, worked out an excellent procedure for working with our own Task Force 77 planes during the day and with Air Force planes at night. Many Air Force planes checked in with us at night looking for targets. We gave targets to these planes, and in addition to vectoring them in, we assisted them to locate the target area with star shells. On their arrival in the area we would illuminate the target for them to make their runs and drop their ordnance. We continued illumination to assist them in evaluating their attack.

“After unloading their bombs, the planes usually had thirty to forty minutes they could remain in the area, and they were generally glad to use this time to spot for us. During this night bombardment work, the planes kept clear of our fire but remained in a position where they could spot our fall of shot, using illumination provided by star shells fired from another mount. The spotting ability of these pilots varied but was generally considered good, and in the case of some Air Force pilots who had had some Navy spotting indoctrination was excellent. Nearly all the pilots we worked with were most enthusiastic, with the result that the Reds in Wonsan got little rest or freedom of movement day or night.”

With the Agerholm illuminating, the B-26 spotting plane directed the fire of Parks and Craig on a Wonsan bridge. The two destroyers fired ten rounds and made two direct hits. After demolishing a new supply building, the attention of the spotting plane was called to a truck convoy moving through Wonsan. While the destroyers furnished illumination, the B-26 attacked and destroyed several of the trucks.

Later the same night by the light of the destroyer’s star shells, a second B-26 damaged a chemical factory and demolished four storage tanks.
On the 95th day of the Wonsan siege, 22 May 1951, an enemy shore battery succeeded in bringing death aboard one of the blockading ships.

“When we arrived for our first two-week tour in Wonsan,” wrote CDR A. F. Beyer, Commanding Officer, USS _Brinkley Bass_,[3] “everything appeared to be quiet. Enemy shore batteries were relatively inactive, and our ships would anchor during daylight as well as at night, providing a sitting-duck situation for the enemy but a simplified fire control problem for us. Shortly after arrival we were fired upon and lost our anchor in the hurry to maneuver clear. We quickly learned to provide a moving target during good visibility, but we continued to anchor at night. We also learned other important survival techniques, such as keeping men clear topside, wearing as much protective clothing as possible (we would have welcomed some of those flak suits used later on during the war), wearing Kapok life jackets, etc.

“On 20 May 1951 we were left alone in Wonsan. The other ships were on other assignments or were receiving logistic support. At one time during the day we were at our battle stations and close enough to the enemy beaches at Umi-do so that we could spray the area with 40-mm. fire. . . . Not many hours later we were on the receiving end of their shells. Rapid maneuvering and heavy counterbattery fire kept us from receiving any direct hits; however, we were finally sprayed with shrapnel as a result of a 120-mm. near miss to starboard. This resulted in ten personnel casualties (we were at General Quarters and manning our 40-mm. guns) and superficial structural damage. Three of the casualties were serious, and one man, Fireman Apprentice John D. Bryan, died later. After that day we decided not to man our machine guns but to keep the personnel involved below decks. Later the same afternoon, the _Manchester_ and several destroyers returned. We transferred our wounded to the _Manchester_ and continued firing on assigned targets.

“Every day thereafter we could expect some enemy action, especially late in the afternoon, because the setting sun favored the shore batteries due west of the swept areas. Knowing this, the situation was never dull and all hands kept themselves ready to come to General Quarters on a moment’s notice. It was almost a relief when we returned fire in an effort to destroy the enemy’s gun emplacements. At least we lost some of the tense feeling.

“Moreover, there was enough humor aboard to keep us on an even keel. For example, we continued to show movies in the messhall and in the wardroom. One picture was a World War II battle action story. At the exact moment when General Quarters was sounded in the movie, our own G.Q. announced the fact that we were again under fire. For a brief second there was some confusion, but not for long.”

Two days before the _Bass_ suffered her casualty, the battleship _New Jersey_, while bombarding Wonsan targets, took a hit atop Number One turret. This shell did little damage, but a subsequent near miss killed one man and wounded three.

On 24 May, cruiser _Manchester_ and destroyer _Brinkley Bass_ detected targets south of Hodo Pando islands and opened fire. A Communist sampan formation was broken up and four sampans captured, each of them reinforced for carrying four mines.
Chapter 12. The Siege of Wonsan

Results of First 100 Days of Siege

At the completion of the first 100 days of the Wonsan siege, 27 May 1951, Admiral Smith reported that it had cost the enemy the following:
107 trucks destroyed, 238 damaged
8,195 troop casualties
149 buildings destroyed, 466 damaged
34 bridges destroyed, 83 damaged
63 railroad cars destroyed
3 tunnels damaged
11 locomotives damaged
54 small boats destroyed, 238 damaged

Despite flurries of enemy gunfire and a few hits, the cost of wreaking this damage upon the Chinese and North Korean enemy had been small.

As on the railroads in North Korea, the Communists in Wonsan had been forced to organize a repair effort for the city’s road and rail lines as a result of the destructive attacks of UN ships and aircraft.

On several occasions during this period, the enemy’s fire had suddenly picked up as the Communists made determined efforts to drive the siege ships out of the harbor. Following a heavy Task Force 77 strike of 270 sorties on 6 July, the Reds retaliated with an especially heavy bombardment on 17 July 1951; more than 500 splashes were counted in the water around *O’Brien* (DD-725, CDR C. W. Nimitz, Jr.), *Blue* (DD-744, CDR R. S. Burdick), and *Cunningham* (DD-752, CDR L. P. Spear). In return, the three destroyers pumped out 2,336 rounds of 5-inch fire, in a four-and-a-half hour exchange. The Communist bombardment was continuous and well coordinated from three areas—Umi-do, Kalma Gak, and Hodo Pando—but inflicted no more serious damage than spraying two LSTs near Yo-do with fragments.

“This exchange was known as ‘The Battle of the Buzz Saw’, said RADM Dyer. “After this date I made it compulsory that at all times in daylight, and for all bombardments, either night or day, ships should be underway.”
Chapter 12. The Siege of Wonsan

The Enemy Defenses of Wonsan

As the siege of Wonsan was laid, there were few enemy batteries around the bay of Wonsan. As the siege lengthened, however, the number of guns defending the harbor rose steadily.

Likewise, the enemy shore defense system in Wonsan, which in the beginning was limited, was steadily strengthened. As UN minesweeps swept “Broadway” and “Lower Broadway” ever closer to the shore, the enemy’s entrenchments were expanded to include the beaches nearest the swept areas. Shore entrenchments were also positioned at other places where the Communists thought the UN forces might land—the beaches near Wonsan city and on the south coast of the bay and, later, in the western portions of the bay.

The Communists’ shore batteries were placed so as to cover both the ship operating areas and to sweep the potential landing sites: heavy machine guns and mortars were positioned near the probable landing beaches, and 76-mm. batteries in the nearby hills. The harbor’s heavy guns (122-mm. and 155-mm.) were located farther back from the shoreline and positioned to take the ship operating area under fire.

In the early months of the siege, the enemy’s batteries were located as follows:

All harbor guns were of the field artillery type, as distinguished from naval or regular fixed shore defense guns. With few exceptions, these guns were hidden in caves or tunnels, cleverly camouflaged, and were rolled out for firing and rolled back inside for protection, for the Communists soon learned that an exposed gun was certain to be destroyed.

In the early months of the war a great many empty gun emplacements, caves, and tunnels were in evidence. Two reasons are likely. First, in case one position became too hot, a gun could be moved to a new position. Second, empty gun positions often attracted fire from planes and ships. By the end of the second year of the siege, however, there were few empty gun positions, as more guns were brought into the area.

“Most of the low, near-to-the-water gun positions in the Wonsan area had a single entrance,” said LT James S. Lampe, the intelligence officer assigned to Yo-do. “This entrance was for the gun itself, and it was always as small as possible. Only a few of the gun caves—usually the big ones—had a personnel entrance. These came in from the back side of the hills, permitting the crews to man their guns without being exposed to our fire.

“Most of the heavy gun positions had large rooms for ammunition storage as well as crew’s quarters. The Communists did not seem concerned about having their ammunition and gun crews in the same hole.

“In addition to the field artillery pieces, there were two other types of guns used against our siege ships: tanks and rail-mounted guns.

“Tanks were positioned at several points around the bay, but were most prominent at certain positions on ‘Sugar Loaf’, a small hill on Kalma Gak, plus other tanks on Kalma Gak proper. Two of these tank positions were set-up so that the tank could fire through ‘gunports’ located at the very base of the hill. The tank itself was never exposed, but was moved forward until the gun barrel protruded from the port. Another tank often came around the north end of ‘Sugar Loaf’ to fire, but beat a hasty retreat whenever it was taken under fire.

“In the latter part of 1951, four rail-mounted guns appeared in the bay. “Three of these were north of the city, not far from the beach. These, too, were retractable into caves.

“As far as I could determine from the refugees who fled to the islands from Wonsan, all of the harbor defense guns were North Korean manned. It is doubtful that the Chinese manned any of the guns. North Korean Army units manned most of the harbor guns except the Hodo Pando batteries, which were manned by a North Korean Navy unit.
In regard to their control procedures, they zeroed-in certain positions where they were most apt to catch a ship with little maneuvering room. In many of the firing positions, the Communists hacked a circular groove in the hard-packed ground, into which the wheels of the gun carriage fitted snugly. Around this circular track various points were marked to zero-in selected points with rapidity. The Red gun crews learned to work as teams, and even developed a definite plan of coordination between the widely-spaced batteries. Spotting stations equipped with plotting boards were established and splash information was passed by telephone to a fire control station. The fire control station would calculate corrections and phone them to the batteries. The Reds had no automatic machines or computers, but nonetheless they became fast and accurate. They also reported ships sunk from time to time. One destroyer was reported sunk three times, and when it appeared the fourth time in the bay, they claimed we had changed the numbers on a new ship.

“The presence of our siege ships and minesweepers inside the harbor was definitely a severe irritant and worry for the Communists. During the first year of the siege of Wonsan, there were four occasions when the Reds believed a landing was imminent. These scares usually followed a maximum air strike by Task Force 77 or a heavy bombardment by a battleship, or a combination of the two. They were kept continually on their toes and never dared to leave the harbor lightly defended.”

The presence of our siege ships and minesweepers inside the harbor was definitely a severe irritant and worry for the Communists. During the first year of the siege of Wonsan, there were four occasions when the Reds believed a landing was imminent. These scares usually followed a maximum air strike by Task Force 77 or a heavy bombardment by a battleship, or a combination of the two. They were kept continually on their toes and never dared to leave the harbor lightly defended.”

The increase of enemy gunfire resulted in six ships being hit in July: *Everett* (PF-8); *LSMR-409; LSMR-525; O’Brien* (DD-725); *LSMR-412; and Helena* (CA-75). In August, the siege ships were untouched. In September, two were hit: *William Seiverling* (DE-441); and *Heron* (AMS-18).

“The limited area available to the ships in Wonsan made it extremely difficult for our ships to maintain their positions when subjected to fire from the shore batteries,” wrote RADM George D. Dyer, the blockade commander. “In order to provide them with more advantageous positions, the sweeping of additional areas between the islands and the providing of so-called escape routes from the inner harbor were undertaken in mid-June 1951. This extremely hazardous operation was pressed in the ‘Lower Broadway’ area with vigor. Upon completion of the initial sweeping in late August 1951, sweeping was started on 2 September in the new ‘Muffler’ area. This latter area permitted a much closer approach to the city.”

If the enemy hoped to lift the siege with increased gunfire, however, and provide himself an opportunity for re-mining the swept areas and recapturing the harbor islands, he failed.
The Sea War in Korea
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson

Chapter 12. The Siege of Wonsan
Doubts Raised Regarding Continuance of Siege

While none of the ships of the UN Navy had yet been lost or even seriously hit, there began to be some doubt as to whether the siege was worthwhile. In the first 180 days of the siege, approximately 50,000 naval shells had been pumped into the city’s targets. The doubts were expressed largely because there was no accurate way of determining precisely what the bombardment was doing to the enemy’s over-all capability and to his morale.

Outwardly, a little speculation was in order. It was evident, after six months of the siege, that neither the bombs from aircraft nor the gunfire from ships, even in combination, had succeeded in halting the steady flow of material through Wonsan at night. The daytime flow had been effectively dammed, however, and a great deal of damage had been done in six months:

- Guns: 262 destroyed, 230 damaged
- Trucks—Vehicles: 178 destroyed, 348 damaged
- Junks—Sampans: 89 destroyed, 299 damaged
- Bridges: 36 destroyed, 100 damaged
- Tunnels: 15 damaged
- Railroad cars: 66 destroyed, 80 damaged

But at night, as the observers on the friendly islands could plainly see, the enemy trains and trucks rolled steadily southward despite the gunfire and harassment. In view of this heavy nocturnal traffic, was the known and estimated damage sufficient to justify the risks being taken? The risk to the destroyers and minesweepers in the harbor was already great and was still growing. It was easy to imagine the tragedy which might occur if a lucky hit in a steering mechanism should veer a speeding ship into the minefield or aground on one of the numerous islands.

Risk to the siege ships was accepted. Damage to the enemy, however, was only one criterion of the value of the siege. The very fact that enemy resistance was on the increase was evidence that the siege was hurting. Also, it was known that large numbers of enemy troops were bivouacked near Wonsan to defend the area from an amphibious assault. One intelligence report said that 79,200 troops were stationed in the vicinity of Wonsan to counter an invasion. Several American aviators—Air Force, Navy, and Marine—had already been rescued from the harbor where they might have been captured or lost. And by what yardstick could the psychological value of this thorn-in-the-side siege be measured?

“The question of the desirability of continuing the Wonsan siege was raised at least twice during my tenure as CTF 95,” said Admiral Dyer. “The best brains in the Army and Navy—Forrest Sherman, MacArthur, Ridgway—were all convinced of the necessity of the siege.”

The siege was therefore continued and accelerated.

A heavy gunstrike by surface forces (New Jersey and Toledo) pounded Wonsan targets on 2 July 1951. On 18 September 1951, the first coordinated air-gun strike by Task Force 95 was conducted in Wonsan commanded by Rear Admiral George C. Dyer aboard USS Toledo (CAPT Hunter Wood). Other ships included HMS Glory, USS Parks, USS John R. Craig, USS Orleck, and USS Samuel N. Moore. The same ships repeated the bombardment next day, joined by the three rocket ships, LSMR-409, 412, and 525.

The air-gun bombardment was repeated on 10 October. For this strike, a British task force, under the command of Rear Admiral A. K. Scott-Moncrieff, participated, led by the Australian light aircraft carrier Sydney [3A] (CAPT D. H. Harries, RAN) and supported by cruiser HMS Belfast and destroyers HMS Concord, USS
Colahan, HMCS Cayuga, HMS Comus, and USS Shields. A large enemy troop center had been located in Wonsan, and heavy damage was done to this concentration.

A third heavy bombardment, led by Wisconsin, struck military targets in the besieged city on 20 December.
Chapter 12. The Siege of Wonsan

The Helicopter Ship (LST-799) in Wonsan

The value of holding the harbor of Wonsan for rescue purposes is revealed by the fact that LST-799 (the first ship of the U.S. Navy to serve as a helicopter carrier in wartime) rescued twenty-four aviators between March 1951 and November 1952, most of them while operating in or near the Bay of Wonsan.

“After the Hungnam evacuation,” said LT T. E. Houston, skipper of the LST-799, “we returned to Yokosuka for a conversion which was designed to make us into a helicopter base for minespotting helicopters and a tender and supply ship for minesweeping boats and ships. We had space and facilities topside to handle three helicopters, although we frequently had but two aboard, and more often only one.

“The planned use for our helicopters was originally that of minespotting, not rescue; but as time went on, our ‘copters got more and more into the role of rescue.”

After conversion, LST-799 arrived in Wonsan on 20 March 1951 to serve as a harbor headquarters for ComMinRon Three (Captain Richard C. Williams, USN) and a floating helicopter and minesweeping boat base.

“On our arrival in Wonsan,” said Houston, “we anchored on the leeward side of Yo-do. At this state of the siege, we weren’t concerned about shorebattery fire; and our helicopter pilots in March and April of 1951 had quite a lark. They used to fly around the city of Wonsan quite freely and unharmed. The North Koreans and Chinese would wave at them and seemed not to care.

“By mid-summer, however, the honeymoon was over, and the Reds were no longer hospitable to sightseeing helicopters. I was told that this unfriendliness on their part was attributable to the practice of some helicopter pilots’ dropping hand grenades in the general vicinity of the North Koreans while they were enjoying their toilet.”

LST-799 effected its first rescue in Wonsan on 5 April. The rescued pilot was Ensign M. S. Tuthill.

“It was a beautiful spring afternoon,” recalled Houston, “and we had just finished an emergency rescue drill. The alarm sounded, and the boatswain passed the word, ‘Away the rescue party, away!’ Our rescues were usually performed by helicopter, but we also kept an LCVP ready.

“Dashing out on deck, I joined the rest of my crew topside watching a parachuting figure whose plane was just crashing into the ocean.

“The LCVP was away first, and the helicopter soon after. But the ’copter reached the downed pilot first, and as it often happened, the helicopter crewman had to jump into the water and assist the downed pilot into the hoisting sling. While the helicopter returned the pilot, the LCVP picked up the crewman. Except for a chill, both were in good shape. This was Ensign Tuthill’s second dunking and helicopter rescue; he understandably had a high regard for the whirley-birds.

“The majority of our rescues were performed while underway,” continued Houston, “and most of them were over land. If a rescue call came in while the ’copter was flying a mine spot mission, the ’copter would return, refuel, assemble all the information, and take off again. I would head the LST to the nearest safe spot to landward to close the distance as much as possible.

“The rescue missions themselves were carried out independently by the helicopter unit. They did the job as they saw fit.”

One of the most tragic helicopter rescue attempts took place on 3 July 1951 from Wonsan harbor. LST-799 temporarily left the harbor, and the MinRon-3 helicopter unit was based aboard the relief helicopter ship, the LST Q-009.
The helicopter pilot was LTJG John Kelvin Koelsch, who had recently completed a full tour of combat rescue duty flying from the USS Princeton. Upon the return of Princeton to the United States in late May 1951, Koelsch volunteered for an additional combat tour, and was assigned to ComMinRon-3 in early June.

Koelsch had given an outstanding account of himself aboard Princeton, rescuing at least two of his shipmates. He had also developed a type of floating sling that came to be adopted by others, and he had personally engineered and developed several safety devices for the operation of helicopters in cold weather.

“Koelsch was based on LST-799 for just a few weeks,” said LT Houston, “and he impressed me as being a very quiet, reserved person who was always ready for any rescue mission, no matter how dangerous, and he let this be known. If anything happened, he wanted to be a part of it. While on board, he rescued Ensign M. D. Nelson, near Yo-do, on 22 June.”

On the late afternoon of 3 July, about an hour before darkness, a “Mayday” call was received aboard LST Q-009 saying that a Marine pilot had been shot down twelve miles west of Kosong, a small town thirty-five miles south of Wonsan. Despite the late hour, and the worsening weather, LTJG Koelsch and his crewman, George M. Neal, AM3, volunteered to make the pickup.

Covered by a flight of four Corsairs, Koelsch proceeded to the rescue area, but because of a nearly solid overcast of low clouds, was forced to leave his protective escort. Koelsch was last seen descending through a break in the low overcast about 1810.

Koelsch first located a parachute, then proceeded to search the surrounding area in the gathering darkness. This area, the Anbyon Valley, was the enemy’s main supply road leading to the battlefront from Wonsan. Accordingly, this road was infested with AA guns and automatic weapons.

A few moments later, the circling pilots heard Koelsch’s radio message that he had found the downed pilot and was heading for the pickup.

This was the last word of Koelsch, Neal, and the Marine pilot (CAPT James V. Wilkins, USMC) until the end of the war. In December 1954, as a result of an award recommendation by Captain Wilkins, the subsequent events of the rescue and the captivity of Koelsch were laboriously pieced together.

Despite intense ground fire which had struck his helicopter in one place, Koelsch had pressed on to make the pickup. Of this fire, Captain Wilkins later said: “He found me, after two passes into the most intense small-arms fire I’ve ever witnessed.”

As Captain Wilkins secured himself in the hoisting sling, a burst of AA fire struck the helicopter, and it crashed against the mountainside. Of the three, the only one who suffered injuries was Captain Wilkins, who was seriously burned on the legs.

For nine days the three men avoided capture. Captain Wilkins was unable to walk, and Koelsch and Neal made a crude pallet and were attempting to carry him to the coast.

On 12 July, having reached the beach, the three were captured while Koelsch was attempting to obtain food and water from a village. Koelsch’s subsequent conduct and example in prison camp elicited the highest praise from his fellow prisoners.

A few months later, LTJG Koelsch died of starvation and dysentery. For his gallantry and heroism during the rescue attempt and his subsequent captivity, he was posthumously awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor on 3 August 1955.
By mid-summer 1951, the siege ships assigned to Task Group 95.2 in Wonsan harbor for thirty-day periods had learned to whet air-surface teamwork and coordination to a razor sharpness. Task Force 77 periodically assigned aircraft to the bombarding vessels for spotting duty in order to increase the effectiveness of the naval gunfire. The ships themselves sent shore fire control parties to Hwangto-do, Mo-do or Tae-do islands to assist the naval gunfire liaison parties spot the ship’s gunfire.

The alacrity and effectiveness of the teamwork developed between naval ships, shore fire control parties, and planes is illustrated by an event recorded by CDR H. G. Claudius, commanding officer of the USS Floyd B. Parks, during September 1951:

“We had a shore fire control party from the ship on Hwangto-do, who spotted for us during the day and sometimes at night. One afternoon we had two Task Force 77 planes spotting our bombardment on Kalma Gak. At the same time, two of our AMS-type minesweeps in formation were sweeping just off the south beach of the harbor. We received a hurry-up call from our shore fire control party on Hwangto-do that they could see the Reds were working two guns out from caves to open up on the minesweeps, who were probably only about 4,000 yards from the gun positions. We immediately vectored the two TF 77 planes, who still had rockets, to the enemy guns. All in a couple of minutes, and before the enemy guns could get off a shot at the minesweepers or return to the cover of their caves, the planes had been vectored in to where they could see the guns and plaster them with a full load of rockets. Through the alertness and instant action of the shore fire control party, the ship’s CIC and gunnery team, and the TF 77 pilots, our minesweepers were probably saved from casualties and damage and two enemy guns were damaged or destroyed.”[5]
Chapter 12. The Siege of Wonsan
The Second Year

The first anniversary of the Wonsan siege—16 February 1952—found the destroyers Rowan (DD-782), Twining (DD-547), and Gregory (DD-802) pounding the Wonsan targets with the usual harassing and interdiction fire.

The mineswept areas of the harbor had been gradually increased to the west and southwest, enabling the ships to get closer and closer to targets ashore. The swept areas were marked with yellow buoys to delineate the edge of the minefields. Near these buoys, and in the close-ashore portions of the swept areas, the siege ships soon learned to be especially alert and mobile, for the Communist gunners had carefully “zeroed-in” the marker buoys, and used them for spot correction of their gunfire.

While sweeping mines in “Ulcer Gulch” on 5 March 1952, USS Pelican (AMS-32) and USS Curlew (AM-8) were taken under fire by the Kalma Gak batteries. Both ships lit off their smoke generators and escaped being hit. The use of smoke to cover the retirement of the sweepers always proved helpful and became standard practice.

The enemy guns continued active in March. Manchester (CL-83), Kyes (DD-787), McGinty (DE-365) and Douglas H. Fox (DD-779) were on the receiving end of a heavy and accurate outburst on 13 March, but aided by a Task Force 77 strike, succeeded in silencing the enemy guns. On 20 March Wilsie (DD-716) and Brinkley Bass (DD-887) came under fire. Osprey (AMS-28) was the next day’s target; while on the 22nd of March, Brinkley Bass (DD-887) and Stickell (DD-888) were under fire.

On 24 March, the enemy guns achieved a direct hit on Brinkley Bass amidships, just aft of the torpedo tubes, which seriously wounded one man and caused injuries to four others.

On 28 March, the frigate Burlington (PF-51) was straddled.

April 1952 was to see even greater efforts made by the enemy to cripple or sink a ship. On 18 occasions the patrolling minesweepers, destroyers, and ships of the Wonsan element were fired upon. Only three were hit, however—destroyer Leonard F. Mason on the 2nd of May (no casualties) and Cabildo (LSD-16) on the 25th of May (two personnel casualties).

During April and May, the fire of the bombarding ships took a steady toll of guns, junks, trucks, tanks, bridges, and buildings in Wonsan harbor. On the last day of April Maddox (DD-731) and Laffey (DD-724) damaged ten boxcars of a nocturnal train.

This period saw Maddox (CDR H. A. Hanna) and Laffey (CDR H. J. Conger) on the receiving end of one of Wonsan’s longest and heaviest bombardments. The two destroyers were supporting two sweepers, one working in “Tin Pan Alley” with Laffey, the other in “Muffler” with Maddox. Shortly afterwards, the Hodo Pando guns opened the duel. Maddox and Laffey increased speed to 25 knots, opened fire, commenced the “war dance”[5A] and turned to make a fast changing target in deflection.

“We were intermittently under fire from Hodo Pando, Kalma Gak and the Umi-do area,” said CDR Conger. “I personally saw about 200 splashes around us, although some thought they counted as many as 300. One hit close enough to throw a handful of shrapnel on our bridge, one chunk knocking out one of the bridge windshields.”

For six hours, the two destroyers made figure eights between Ung-do and “Ulcer Gulch.”

“I feel certain our counterbattery fire did a lot of damage to the Hodo Pando batteries,” said Conger. “This duel took place on the second day of our thirty-day tour in the harbor, and those particular guns never fired...
on us again.”
The Sea War in Korea
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson

Chapter 12. The Siege of Wonsan
The “Mayor” of Wonsan

The siege of Wonsan during this period can be illustrated by the typical experiences of one of those who held the title “Mayor of Wonsan.”[5B] A non-political office, this honorific title was conferred, beginning in May 1952, upon those who held the command of Task Unit 95.2.1. The evidence of the title was a large, gilded wooden key.

The creator of the title “Mayor of Wonsan” is unknown to the authors despite considerable research.[5C] However, the symbolic “Key to the City of Wonsan” was originated in May 1952 by CDR R. J. Ovrom, then Commander Escort Squadron Nine.

Commander Ovrom had the gilded key made at Ship Repair Facilities, Yokosuka, Japan, by a Japanese craftsman; on one side was the inscription, “Welcome to Wonsan”; on the other, “The Bay of Eternal Prosperity.” This key was passed from one CTU 95.2.1 to another until the end of the war, when the key was sent to the U.S. Naval Academy museum for safekeeping.

Captain R. D. Fusselman, as Commander Escort Destroyer Division Thirteen, aboard the USS Jenkins, held the title during the period of 16 September to 6 October 1952.

“Being the ‘Mayor of Wonsan’,” said Captain Fusselman,[6] “gave me the task of running the activities within the harbor itself; to supervise the minesweepers working in the western end of ‘Muffler’ and in the southern end of ‘Tin Pan Alley’; to furnish covering destroyers and destroyer escorts; to work closely with our naval personnel, Marines, and the Koreans on the friendly islands; to coordinate and work with the ships of the outer harbor blockade; and of course, to keep CTF-95 (Admiral Gingrich) informed.

“By the time I assumed the job, the Communists had added shore defense guns all around Wonsan harbor, so that it was necessary for the patrolling ships to maintain a good speed, about fifteen knots, and never to stay on one course too long. By this time, also, the enemy gunfire had gotten so accurate that we no longer anchored at night.

“The enemy guns, for the most part, were practically invisible. Most of them were dug into caves in the hillsides and could be retracted for protection. Others were on the reverse slopes and couldn’t be seen. Still others were mobile, and the Communists changed their locations every so often. The only way you could spot them was by the flashes and smoke of their fire. Sometimes, you couldn’t see the flashes because of the sun, and many of their guns didn’t put out a lot of smoke.

“It was a common chuckle among our ships that the Communists had a gunnery school right in Wonsan city, and that one of our primary jobs was to serve as suitable targets for the training of artillermen.

“At any rate the enemy’s gunnery improved constantly and kept us on our toes. Personally, I think my ships were lucky not to be hit. The only reason they weren’t was because of our evasive tactics. Whenever the enemy guns opened up on us, our ships cranked on speed, started the ‘war dance’, and made themselves a rapidly moving target.

“The minesweepers had the toughest job, having to work close to the beach and in constant danger of gunfire. The sailors on the destroyers realized this and often contributed their ice cream ration to those fellows.

“Over-all, I believe that the siege of Wonsan was very worthwhile. We did a lot of damage on the MSR [6A] and to military installations in Wonsan. Also, with the harbor kept free of mines, our Navy posed a constant threat of invasion.

“But more important, perhaps, was the excellent training our ships and people received. Wonsan taught
us not to forget basic gunnery doctrines and techniques; it taught us the value of knowing how to use optical control and of having a good director setup, and not to depend entirely on our electronic equipment.

“The 30-day duty in Wonsan gave all hands a boost in morale, pep, enthusiasm, and efficiency. There was a noticeable buildup in unit pride, and a visible determination not to have a machinery breakdown that would force a ship off the firing line.

“Most of all, the duty at Wonsan gave all hands a feeling of mutual interest and interdependence. To those who served there, Wonsan pointed up the need for balanced forces within our Navy—forces which intimately know each other’s capabilities and limitations.”

[Click here to view table]
The Sea War in Korea
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson

Chapter 12. The Siege of Wonsan
The “Bald Eagle” of the Essex

The naval aviator of the Korean War most rescued from the harbor of Wonsan was Commander Paul N. Gray, commanding officer of VF-54, a Skyraider squadron aboard the Essex. To him especially, and to the dozens of other pilots who ditched and parachuted to safety there, the occupation of Wonsan harbor was justified as a collecting point for disabled airmen and aircraft.

“My first misfortune” wrote Gray, “occurred on 7 September 1951, while dive bombing a bridge at a place called Majon-ni. I was hit in the engine and I had a tense flight of about 50 miles as the oil ran out. I watched the pressure drop to zero about five miles short of Wonsan but was able to glide to the harbor, where a South Korean patrol boat picked me up.

“The second misfortune, and probably the closest of all, happened while strafing a train in the railyard at Wonsan. I sustained a direct hit by heavy enemy antiaircraft fire. A later count showed 57 separate holes in my plane. I landed at an emergency strip in South Korea, and after plugging the most essential hydraulic lines, took off again and flew the plane back to the Essex, where it was used as a source of spare parts. The date was 28 October 1951.

“From this time until January 1952, I avoided further emergency landings mainly because the AA fire missed the vital parts of my plane. However, on 22 January, my luck changed and I was hit again by a 37-mm shell directly in the engine. At the time I was leading a bombing hop on the rail line north of Wonsan, about 25 miles from the harbor. The plane immediately caught fire and the engine quit. Apparently three or more cylinders had been blown off by the explosion. Largely because of my loud prayers, the engine caught again and ran intermittently until I got to the water just off the beach at Wonsan. The USS Gregory fished me out of the very cold water more frozen than I ever care to be again.

“Later, on 30 January 1952, while bombing a rail line south of Kowan, I was again presented with another 37-mm. hit in the engine. This one blew off a blade of the propeller, and before I could cut the mixture, the engine almost vibrated itself off the airplane. By alternately opening and closing the mixture control, I again nursed the plane just off the beach at Wonsan, and was picked up by the USS Twining.

“Upon returning to the Essex, RADM John Perry told me that the Navy could take no more chances on my getting ‘smoked’, and restricted me thereafter to flying antisubmarine patrol missions in the vicinity of the task force.”

During these episodes, the pilots of VF-54 posted a sign in the squadron ready room in honor of their bald-headed skipper: “Use caution when ditching damaged airplanes in Wonsan harbor. Don’t hit CDR Gray.”
As the air interdiction campaign to cut the Communists’ rail and road supply lines in 1951 and 1952 intensified, there was a rise in the damage and loss of naval aircraft[7A]. Many damaged planes had ditched alongside the siege ships in Wonsan harbor in similar fashion to Commander Gray, although not as frequently. This fact highlighted the need of an emergency airstrip on one of Wonsan’s captured islands.

To illustrate this fact, the helicopter ship, LST-799, had rescued 24 aviators—U.S. Navy, South African, U.S. Marine, and British—the majority of them in the vicinity of Wonsan. The following are summaries of most of these rescues:

“30 September 51 at Hungnam, rescued CAPT J. W. Tuttle, USMC, pilot delivered to LSD5. (Helicopter flown by LT J. M. Farwell and J. E. Kincaid, AD1.)
“3 October 51, rescued 2nd LT A. M. Muller attached Second Squadron Bon Homme Richard, delivered to LSD 5. Intense small arms fire in the pickup area. As helicopter ascended, several riflemen popped up from underbrush and opened fire. (Helicopter flown by Chief Aviation Pilot C. W. Buss and R. O. Sherrill, AD3.)
“3 October 51, rescued 2nd LT A. M. Muller attached Second Squadron South African Air Force, 55 miles west of Wonsan. Heavy small arms fire encountered. Pilot delivered to LSD 5. (Helicopter flown by LT J. M. Farwell and crewman W. H. Williams, AD2.)
“6 October 51, rescued ENS W. C. Bailey, USN, 507924, attached VA-923, Bon Homme Richard, effected from Wonsan. Downed pilot fifteen miles northeast Hungnam. (Helicopter flown by Chief Aviation Pilot C. W. Buss and S. W. Manning, AT3.)
“22 October 51 at Wonsan, rescued CAPT Edward N. Lefarvie, 30579, USMC, from behind enemy lines 40 miles southwest of Wonsan. Antiaircraft and small arms fire encountered throughout the mission. (Helicopter flown by LTJG G. Hamilton and crewman D. J. Cowser, AD3.)
“29 January 52 at Wonsan, rescued LT S. B. Murphy, 428338, USN.[7B]
“3 February 52 at Wonsan, rescued LT Robert J. Geffel of VF-653.
“20 March 52 at Wonsan, rescued ENS E. B. Bernard, 506693, USN, attached to VF-653 USS Philippine Sea. (Helicopter flown by LT C. R. Severns and crewman T. C. Roche, AD2.)
“30 March 52 at Wonsan, rescued ENS H. E. Sterrett, 538313, USNR. (Helicopter piloted by LT C. R. Severns and crewman T. C. Roche, AD2.)
“12 May 52 at Wonsan, rescued LT J. Newendyke, 471388, USNR. (Helicopter piloted by ADC(AP) W. L. Dunn and crewman C. H. Cooley, ADC.)
“29 May 52 rescued ENS Glen M. Wicker, USN, 507908, attached to USS Philippine Sea. (Helicopter piloted by ADC(AP) W. L. Dunn and crewman E. Stewart, AD2.)
“9 June 52 at Wonsan, rescued ENS F. Lofton, USN, 507764, attached to USS Princeton. (Helicopter piloted by LT B. F. McMullen and crewman T. C. Roche, AD1.)
“10 June 52 at Wonsan, rescued ENS R. N. Hensen, from USS Princeton. (Helicopter flown by LT C. R. Severns and crewman T. C. Roche, AD1.)
“10 June 52 rescued LCDR Cook Cleland, 99640, USNR, attached VF-653 from USS Valley Forge.
“13 June 52 rescued LCDR Leonard Robinson, commanding officer VF-64, USS Boxer.
“13 June 52 rescued LTJG W. F. Moore, USN, 508222, attached VF-193, USS Princeton.
“16 June 52 rescued LTJG W. A. Buttlar, 494638, USN. (Helicopter flown by LT B. E. McMullen, crewman R. A. McDaniel, AD3.)
“18 June 52 rescued LTJG A. Zimmerly 507754, USN, VF-63, USS Boxer. (Rescued by LT B. E. McMullen and crewman Decker.)

“The 799’s total pilot recovery score,” said LT Paul D. Drummond (who had relieved LT Houston as its skipper in November 1951), “was twenty-four, two of which were by boat and twenty-two by helicopter. Our big rescue day was 13 June 1952.

“At about 1300 we received a ‘Mayday’. Lieutenant Birton E. McMullen, the helicopter pilot, took off with his crewman, R. A. MacDaniels, AD3, in the direction of Hodo Pando. Information received via radio indicated that there was a pilot down about ten miles inland and that a CAP was orbiting him.

“McMullen proceeded to the scene and located the downed pilot. Because of ground fire and rough terrain, the pickup had to be made by hoist on the run.

“The CAP did a good job of strafing during the pickup, with some of the pilots making dry runs because they were out of ammunition. The downed pilot, who turned out to be LTJG C. K. Alford, was in good shape, with only slight burns on one hand and one on the side of his face.

“Alford’s plane had caught fire, and he had bailed out. During his descent, he was fired upon, and returned the fire with his own pistol. Upon reaching the ground, he discarded his parachute. Three armed soldiers approached his hiding place. When they were within fifteen feet, Alford opened fire, dropped two, and the third soldier fled.

“During the course of the return trip,” continued Drummond, “one of the escort airplanes spotted a dye marker. This pilot was LTJG W. F. Moore, who had been hit by AA fire and had ditched just east of Hodo Pando. LT McMullen located Moore and picked him up. This made four people in a ‘copter designed to carry only three.

“For this reason we on the ship were concerned lest the helicopter’s heavy load make landing aboard hazardous.

“However, McMullen reported that since he was almost out of gas, his load wasn’t excessive.

“When the copter got close enough for us to see, it looked like four people were riding in the front seat of a Model T Ford. I doubt if a helicopter ever brought back a more satisfying load.”

Two famous aviators—one Navy and one Marine—were rescued by LST-799 from Wonsan. On the 10th of June 1952, LCDR Cook Cleland was rescued. Cleland was skipper of reserve squadron VF-643 from Valley Forge. He was the aviator who had won the Thompson Trophy race at the National Air Races in Cleveland, Ohio, in 1948.

The famous Marine aviator whose life was saved by a helicopter from LST-799 was Colonel Robert E. Galer, USMC, a Congressional Medal of Honor winner of World War II.

“The ‘May Day’ came in about 1700,” said LT Drummond. “The report stated there was a pilot down about sixty miles in a straight line southwest of Wonsan, and about all of this distance inland. This 120-mile round trip was just about maximum for a rescue helicopter. It was also very late in the afternoon, and there was doubt that enough daylight remained to effect a rescue. Flight after sunset was extremely difficult because the horizon was often not visible. Moreover, the flight had to be made over a circuitous route to skirt known gun positions. And to make the rescue even more ticklish, the rescue would be made at a height near the helicopter’s ceiling.

“It was decided to give it a try, however. The helicopter pilot was LT E. J. McCutcheon, who had been
aboard only a few days, and who, except for one or two mine reconnaissance missions, had had little time to
acquaint himself with the area. McCutcheon took off and headed for the coast where the CAP of two Corsairs
were waiting to lead him in.

“‘Mac’ was fortunate in that the weather was clear, and after sunset he had a beautiful full moon, which
permitted him to see the horizon.

“The helicopter arrived at the pickup position while there was still light enough for him to find LTCOL
Galer, and he commenced making the pickup. This had to be done ‘on the run’ to retain enough ‘lift’ to keep from
crashing the helicopter on the hillside. As it turned out, the ‘copter did slide off and dragged LTCOL Galer
through the underbrush before ‘Mac’ lifted him clear of the ground. Control was recovered before anything more
serious occurred, and the ‘copter cleared the area for the trip home.

“As soon as we heard he was on the way home, we made a beeline for the point where he was expected
to cross the coastline. By this time it was dark, and McCutcheon’s fighter escort was low on fuel. There was a
‘Dumbo’ (amphibian) in the air to relieve his escort in the vicinity of the coastline and to assist in guiding the
‘copter back to the ship. We lighted ship, lining the edges of the main deck with battle lanterns laid on their backs,
turned both signal search lights vertically, and fired flares every few seconds.

“The ‘Dumbo’ contacted ‘Mac’ and got him headed in our direction. Just about the time McCutcheon
was starting to throw gear overboard to lighten his load, he spotted us. He arrived on deck about 2030 with
approximately ten gallons of gas and a great sense of relief. Other than bruises and one or two possible cracked
ribs, COL Galer was in good condition.”

There was little doubt that the siege of Wonsan proved worthwhile for the rescue of UN aviators.

To the Naval and Marine officers who were living on Yo-do during this period, the value of having an
emergency airstrip was easy to recognize.

The naval officer assigned to Yo-do, LT James S. Lampe, Jr., also a naval aviator, has recorded how the
idea of an airstrip on Yo-do originated.

“The credit for proposing an airstrip on Yo-do belongs to LTCOL Richard G. Warga, USMC, the
Commander East Coast Defense Element (CTE 95.23),” said Lampe. “He and I were billeted together in our tent
camp on Yo-do when the idea was broached. We had seen several planes ditch in the general area of Wonsan
during the summer of 1951 and we had talked to most of the pilots. Winter was approaching, and ditching planes
in that frigid water would make survival even more difficult.

“One morning in August, LTCOL Warga was hunkered over our Coleman burner on the floor of our tent,
frying the eggs I had scrounged from a destroyer the previous day. Warga asked me, as an aviator, if it wouldn’t
be possible to crash land a plane on one of the Yo-do beaches, rather than ditch it in the harbor. I told him no, it
wouldn’t, because no beach of the island was long enough and the curvature of the beaches wasn’t right. We then
got to wondering if a plane could crash land in the ‘valley’ portion of Yo-do.

“As far as I know that was how the idea to build an airstrip on Yo-do germinated. After breakfast, COL
Warga and I walked from one end of the ‘valley’ to the other several times, estimating its usable length, how
much leveling would have to be done, and how much equipment would have to be moved ashore. We estimated
that two bulldozers could make a ‘crash’ strip in a couple of weeks, and, with additional time, a short landing
strip. The possibility looked good to us.

“COL Warga sent a dispatch to CTF 95 recommending the project—not without misgivings, however.
We both knew how close the airstrip would be to enemy artillery fire.”

Of the several friendly islands of Wonsan, Yo-do was the only one suitable for an airstrip. Even so, the
strip would be short and would accommodate only propeller-type planes—no jets. By running the emergency
field completely across the island in the “valley” from northeast to southwest, a runway length of some 2,400 feet
could be obtained.
But many obstacles to building an airstrip on Yo-do were evident. Could it be kept operational in such close proximity to the Wonsan shore batteries? The Kalma Gak batteries were 13,500 yards distant. The batteries on Hodo Pando were 10,000 yards distant. And the batteries behind Umi-do were closest of all—only 8,000 yards. Building a strip under the muzzles of these guns might be difficult. And after it was built, could it be operated? Perhaps the enemy guns could keep the strip so pocked with holes that it would be useless for landing aircraft.

There was also some opposition to building a field on an island above the stagnant battlefront which, if a truce were ever signed, would have to be evacuated. Why build an airfield and later have to donate it to the enemy?

Finally, there was the consideration that the island of Yo-do might be recaptured. In Wonsan itself, the memory of the 28-29 November 1951 raid on Hwangto-do was still fresh. On the west coast of Korea, the Communists succeeded in recapturing one of the ROK-held islands in the Yalu Gulf (the island of Taehwa-do). On the east coast near Songjin an enemy raid had been carried out on the Yang-do islands, a tiny three-island group about five acres in area, on 19 February 1952. Thirty sampans had attacked the little island of Kil-chu at 0130. Destroyer *Shelton* (DD-790, CDR Stephen W. Carpenter), the New Zealand frigate *Taupo* (LCDR K. A. Cradock-Hartoff, MBE, RN), and the USS *Endicott* (DMS-35, LCDR L. W. Barnard) helped break up the attack. Two waves of enemy troops succeeded in getting ashore, but a stout defense by the defending 83rd ROK Marine Corps Company (led by former all-American halfback First Lieutenant Joseph Bartos, USMC) killed or captured the attackers. Of the 86 enemy raiders who had landed, 80 were killed and 6 were wounded. A simultaneous raid on the nearby island of Myongchon by 15 sampans was broken up, the ships sinking 10 sampans and inflicting heavy casualties in the remaining five. A near miss punctured *Taupo*’s engine room and *Shelton* suffered 15 casualties from three shore battery hits.

Building an airstrip on Yo-do might invite its capture.

The Seventh Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Robert P. Briscoe, took all these factors into consideration, but when considered in the light of how many Seventh Fleet aircraft might have been saved and might be saved in the future, the dangers and obstacles were readily accepted. In fact, the salvage of a single plane would be worth the effort. The mental comfort such a field would give to Task Force 77 pilots was yet another factor in favor of the airstrip.

“We made an effort to talk to each pilot who ditched in Wonsan,” said Lampe, “and without exception every one said that such a strip would be a great help and a great comfort when they were striking in the Wonsan area.”

The Seabees of ACB-1 (Naval Beach Group One, Officer in Charge, CDR Wm. C. Bowers, CEC) were confident that if the Marines could hold it and the Navy operate it, they could build it.

With typical enthusiasm and zest, the Seabees (3 officers and 75 men) sailed from Japan aboard *LST-692* on 3 June 1952, debarking on Yo-do and commencing work on the airstrip on 9 June.

“The LST arrived at Yo-do with a long pontoon strapped to each side,” said LT Lampe. “Each of these pontoons ran almost her entire length. Because of this, and because our only beach had a very shallow gradient, I anticipated some trouble in getting her close enough to the beach to offload equipment.

“However, the Seabees had it all worked out. Before beaching, the pontoons were dropped in the water, strapped together, and then pushed onto the beach with the bow of the LST. The Seabees were offloading their heavy equipment in jig time.”

Engineers had estimated that 45 days would be required to construct a 120 × 2,400 foot strip. Despite annoying gunfire on two days (13 and 21 June), the Seabees finished the job in one-third the estimated time, reporting the runway operational on 25 June. By removing rock from one end of the field, the Seabees managed to widen the strip to 200 feet, and improved one end of the runway by adding ramps to the water’s edge in order to
facilitate the removal of dud aircraft by barge.

The strip was first used on 15 July 1952 when seven Corsairs of VF-193 (*Princeton*), ran low on fuel after an afternoon’s fruitless search for their downed comrade, LTJG Harold A. Riedl, who had been shot down 30 miles northwest of Hungnam. Three of the searching Corsairs refueled on Yo-do and returned to *Princeton*. The other four spent the night, and returned safely to their carrier the next day.\[8A\]

Although the Communists tried many times to neutralize the field with gunfire, they never succeeded.

In honor of the officer who had ordered it built, Vice Admiral R. P. Briscoe, now COMNAVFE, the airstrip was named Briscoe Field.

Briscoe Field was to prove of immense value the final year of the war, as it became the rescue point for many pilots and aircraft.
To the destroyer-minesweeper teams besieging Wonsan’s harbor day after day, the duty was routine but never monotonous. Even in the swept areas of “Muffler” and “Tin-Pan Alley,” there was constant danger not only from enemy gunfire on three sides, but from drifting mines and surreptitiously planted moored mines as well.

“The Chinese needed only a few hours and they could have re-mined Wonsan,” said Rear Admiral Gingrich, CTF 95. “Our intelligence revealed how the Communists would tie mines to logs and float them down the Namdae Chon River into the harbor to try and drive us out.

“First they used plain logs and timed their passage from the launching points out into the swept areas of ‘Muffler’ and ‘Tin-Pan Alley’, watching them with binoculars. After they had established the time pattern, they would lash contact mines to other logs, using a pelican hook with a soluble washer. This soluble washer was timed to dissolve and deposit the mine in the swept area.”[9]

The accuracy of the enemy guns steadily improved, and they were able to achieve hits with fewer and fewer rounds. USS Lewis (DE-535, LCDR G. B. Hawkins) was struck twice on 21 October 1952. The first shell struck the forward fireroom and disabled the number one boiler, but fortunately it was a dud. The second shell struck Lewis’ fantail, doing minor damage. Lewis’ casualties were seven dead and one wounded.

“Nowhere was the primitiveness of the Korean War more evident than in Wonsan harbor,” said Commander Sheldon H. Kinney, commanding officer of the USS Taylor (DDE-468). “We only had to worry about mines and shore guns; not aerial, naval, or submarine opposition. Even so, these two were enough to keep us on our toes.

“There were several thumb rules which were pretty generally accepted by the destroyers that worked in Wonsan. One was that if you got close to the corners of the swept areas, especially those close inshore, your chances of being fired upon were increased, because these positions had been zeroed-in. Second, if two or more ships were operating in the same area close together, the probability of receiving enemy fire was greater. The Communists fired often because the swept areas were fairly small and in maneuvering the ships to stay clear of their gunfire, the danger of collision or running into the minefields was greater. Third, the Communists usually fired late in the afternoon when the sun was in position to make us excellent targets and to make it very difficult to locate the offending battery. Somebody even coined a phrase for this, ‘the Wonsan cocktail hour.’

“During the entire period my destroyer was in Wonsan harbor, we followed the usual procedure of being in a modified Condition III. At no time did we ever sound General Quarters. We kept one mount of our 3-inch and two 5-inch mounts manned with control and plotting crews on station. A senior gunnery department officer on watch was free to conduct indirect call fire from CIC or direct fire from the MK 37 director. This arrangement permitted prompt fire when required. Below decks, we set Condition Able continuously.

“Our most interesting and busy day in Wonsan,” continued CDR Kinney, “occurred on 18 September. On this particular day, Taylor was ‘riding shotgun’[9A] on the USS Heron (AMS-18) (LTJG Dixon Lademan), which was conducting a routine minesweeping operation in ‘Tin-Pan Alley.’

“About 1130 that morning, both ships commenced to receive very accurate and heavy enemy fire estimated to be 155-mm. in size. The first salvo bracketed both ships. We checked the surrounding land areas but were unable to see where this fire was coming from. The Heron immediately cut loose her heavy magnetic minesweeping gear and commenced a retirement in a northeasterly direction towards Yo-do island.

“I rang up 22 knots and commenced making a smoke screen with both fog generator and fireroom
smoke, laying it in between the Heron and the firing batteries. This smoke proved very effective in screening Heron, and Taylor then doubled back to enjoy the immunity from observation. The enemy fire ceased.

“A spotter on one of the friendly-held islands reported to us that the probable location of the guns was in the hills to the south of the city, and that their range was too far from us to permit reaching them with our 5-inch fire. Not being able to return the enemy fire irked us.

“Several days later, however, we got even. On the 26th of September the visibility was particularly excellent. At this time the island spotters were able to make a very good count of visible gun positions in the surrounding hills. They counted about thirty guns. We fired at several things during the day—sampans in the harbor; boxcars and flatcars in the marshalling yards, using air spot from Air Force Mustang aircraft; and enemy gun batteries.

“Early in the afternoon, the crew of the main battery director detected smoke from an enemy battery on a hill behind the city. The range was 16,600 yards. We plotted the guns in and determined that these were the same guns that had fired on us but a few days before. We closed in to the very edge of the southwest corner of ‘Muffler’ in order to come within range. Then we opened fire. ‘Fire for effect’ was followed by a direct hit which sent a billowing cloud of white smoke towering into the sky. The gun was silenced, and it was later verified by the island spotters that a large supply of ammunition had been detonated.”[10]
Chapter 12. The Siege of Wonsan

The Harbor Islands

By the fall of 1952, seven islands in Wonsan harbor were in UN hands—Yo-do, Mo-do, Sa-do, Tae-do, Sin-do, Ung-do and Hwangto-do. The rest of the numerous small islands had been rendered untenable by the raids of the Korean Marine Corps. After the leper colony from Tae-do had been evacuated by UN forces to an island off South Korea, that island was used as a gunfire spotting post. Ung-do had been garrisoned to prevent its capture and use by the Communists.

The largest island, Yo-do, continued to serve as harbor headquarters for CTE 95.23, commanded by a colonel or lieutenant colonel, U.S. Marines, with 12 U.S. Marines. Also, the island was headquarters of the Seventh KMC battalion, approximately 700 marines, who had the mission, under CTE 95.23, of protecting all the “friendly” Wonsan harbor islands. Atop Yo-do, 377 feet high, was an observation post which commanded a good general view of the entire harbor.

Three of the friendly islands were utilized as spotting posts for ANGLICO[10A] shore fire control parties: Mo-do, Tae-do and Hwangto-do.

The island of Mo-do was closest to the Hodo Pando batteries, approximately 6,000 yards distant. Although many of the 40-odd Hodo Pando guns were on reverse slopes, the flash of their fire could be seen from Mo-do, and bearings taken. Simultaneous bearings on the Hodo Pando guns were also taken from Yo-do, to accurately position the location of these batteries.

With an elevation of 236 feet, Mo-do also commanded a good view of the enemy batteries which had the nickname “Ink Spots” (see chart). These guns were heavy batteries (155-mm.) and could reach all the harbor islands, including Yo-do. The “Ink Spots” were also in a position to defilade the entire swept channel of “Muffler,” and were a constant irritation to the sweepers working in that area.

Mo-do was the usual post of one naval officer and three men of the ANGLICO, whose duties, in addition to spotting naval gunfire, were to maintain a plot of worthwhile targets, of the Hodo Pando batteries and the “Ink Spots,” and to maintain a nightly count of truck traffic moving south. Whenever the siege ships were firing into Mo-do’s area, the naval gunfire spotting team would correct the ships’ fire.

The island of Tae-do was closest to the Kalma Gak batteries, and was the duty post of one naval officer and three men of the ANGLICO.

Still the most important and hazardous island was Hwangto-do. Assigned to this island was a U.S. Marine Officer and three spotters, plus a contingent of Korean Marines to protect the island from nocturnal sampan raids. As at Mo-do and Tae-do, the duty was four months in duration.

Life on Hwangto-do was a cave existence of C-rations, noise, and darkness. The occupants could come outside only at night. A light or a fire at night drew heavy mortar fire. Daylight meant constant danger from mortar and machine gun as well as artillery fire. The shore fire control parties dug bunkers on the north side of the island, where they lived, and a lookout bunker at the top of the island for observation purposes. The island was without water, except for one small well. Additional water, food, ammunition, and supplies had to be brought in at night across a small landing beach which faced Wonsan.

On clear nights, the enemy truck traffic moving south from Wonsan was visible from the Hwangto-do observation post. The number of trucks whose headlights could be counted averaged 300. On occasions, the south-ward-moving truck count rose as high as 700. For every truck in convoy whose headlights could be seen, three or four without headlights could not be seen. Whenever the truck count out of Wonsan was above normal,
increased activity along the battlefront could be expected a few days later.

The senior naval officer ashore on the harbor islands was the intelligence officer of Commander Task Group 95.2, a destroyer or destroyer escort squadron commander, who was afloat.

“I arrived on Yo-do on 16 July 1952 as the relief of LT James S. Lampe, Jr.,” said LCDR A. Christopher, “remaining on Yo-do until March 1953. Lampe met me at the just-finished airstrip in a jeep, and we started up to the camp. We hadn’t gone fifty feet when a 155-mm. shell exploded about 250 yards away. Before we got to the camp near the top of the hill, three or four more lit around the road. That was quite a greeting!

“The campsite was protected by a forty-yard-wide land minefield which surrounded the site. Only the road and one guarded path passed through the minefield. The land mines were a mixture of trip-wire mines and regular mines. We also had a few machine gun posts around the site.

“All of the Americans on Yo-do lived in this tent camp. Later, we dug ourselves more comfortable bunkers. The camp had been well placed on a reverse slope so that the enemy’s artillery fire couldn’t reach us too well. Once in a while, however, we took some tree bursts on the ridge behind us that shook us up. Below our camp was a bluff, which fell some 100 feet almost vertically to the sea.

“Near our tents were slit trenches where we retired whenever the Reds were shooting at us; also available was a communal privy.

“My companions numbered three other intelligence officers: LT Joseph B. McNeill, Jr., USN; an Air Force officer, 1st LT John Intorcia; and my South Korean assistant and interpreter, LT Chiang Jung Taek.

“Our worst night, I suppose, was during Typhoon Karen, which passed just south of Wonsan on 18 August 1952. It blew like hell, and during the night our tents took off. Every few minutes a tree would fall down, or a limb would be torn off and fall into the land mines, causing them to explode. From one explosion, a few fragments of shrapnel went through my tent.

“The rest of the night we were wet, cold, and miserable. But the thing which really set our nerves a-jangle was to have an enemy mine break its moorings, hit the rocky beach below us, and explode. [10B]

“Mostly we ate canned food, although the destroyers and heavy ships were always generous about giving us fresh food whenever we went aboard. Later on, we established a better messing system. All water had to be chlorinated.

“I had several duties on Yo-do. Among other things, I served as intelligence officer for CTG 95.2 and kept a situation plot for the island defense element commander. I also did all the interrogations of the North Korean refugees and prisoners of war.

“Each morning I assembled all the information from the shore fire control parties who were assigned to Mo-do, Tae-do and Hwangto-do—truck counts, target information, active gun positions and the like.

“Whenever I received word that one of our cruisers or battleships was coming in for a bombardment of Wonsan, I would make a trip to the other islands where we had shore fire control parties, getting the best and latest target information.

“When the ‘heavy’ came in, I would meet her in the outer channel, go aboard, and give her the target information. Once aboard, my first job was to get the ‘heavy’s secondary battery all lined up on the Hodo Pando guns, so that they could be taken under fire as the ship entered the inner harbor. I assisted optical control in spotting the exact caves in which the guns were located.

“After orienting the secondary battery, I commenced briefing the main battery plot on their targets.

“I think the Wonsan bombardments which were set up in this fashion did a lot of damage. Our shore fire control parties on Mo-do, Tae-do, and Hwangto-do were sharp and experienced. When they gave a 50-yard spot correction, it was fifty yards.

“One excellent bombardment took place on 23 September 1952, when the Iowa had General Mark Clark, Admiral Briscoe, and Vice Admiral J. J. Clark aboard. We had late target information on some of the Hodo Pando...
guns, and when the ‘Big Mo’ opened up on them she got a magnificent secondary explosion from an ammunition storage for that battery. The smoke went several thousand feet in the air. These particular guns were permanently silenced.

“In my opinion, the siege of Wonsan was very worthwhile for a number of reasons. It was valuable as an intelligence outpost. It was valuable as a rescue point for aviators and airplanes. And it was a thorn in the side to the Communists, who could never be sure we wouldn’t make a landing some place in the area.”[11]
The start of the final year of the siege saw destroyers *De Haven* and *Samuel N. Moore* on guard in Wonsan. For the remaining five months there was little change of pattern, although there was a constant increase in Communist effort to drive the American Navy out of the harbor. The Communist gunners seemed determined to sink at least one American ship to compensate for the 861-day long siege.[11A] The enemy’s ammunition, which from time to time had been rationed, was used liberally as a truce approached. April, May, and June witnessed the heaviest volume of enemy fire as the Communists fired approximately sixteen hundred, thirteen hundred, and eleven hundred rounds respectively—more than half of them at the siege vessels.

The “friendly” islands, too, received a steady increase in the enemy fire, particularly the island of Yo-do.

“I lived on Yo-do for the last four and one-half months of the war,” said LCDR William L. Thede,[12] assigned to COMNAVFE Special Support Group, TG 96.8. “I lived in a bunker near the airstrip, and from time to time helped to control the fire of the siege ships.

“Commencing in February 1953, we noted increased fire from the Won-san batteries, both on the islands and at the siege ships. One of these batteries was on Hodo Pando, and we believed it to be a battery of Russian Naval 107-mm. guns. We dug up several duds from one of the Yo-do rice paddies from this battery. The shells were new, definitely of that odd size, and Russian. However, I have no reason to think the guns were manned by other than North Koreans.

“But the worst and most frequent fire on Yo-do was 90-mm. fire which came from the Umi-do area (we called this area ‘Little Eva’) and from the hills behind Wonsan city (an area we called the ‘Shooting Gallery’). We also took a lot of fire from Kalma Gak and other areas of the bay.

“On many days, as the end of the war approached, we received as many as two or three hundred bursts in the Yo-do area in a single day.

“The purpose of this fire, in my opinion, was to neutralize Briscoe airfield, although they never did it. Occasionally, the guns seemed to be shooting for the FS-type[12A] ship which occasionally anchored off Yodo-ri, bringing our supplies. The Wonsan guns rarely fired at night, although I do remember one occasion when the ‘Little Eva’ battery kept firing until 2130, ‘walking’ shells up and down the strip. That day we had several planes—four or five—land on the strip, and apparently they were trying to hit them. After they completed firing at the strip, we would destroy the duds, and the Seabee Detachment would repair all strip damage during the hours of darkness. The strip was never inoperable as a result of enemy fire.

“But all their fire on Yo-do, the Communists never made a direct hit on any planes while I was there, although several were hit with shrapnel while on the strip. The Air Force C-47s from Seoul which landed on the Yo-do strip bringing our supplies never stayed long. They would taxi up to the seaward end of the strip, unload as quickly as possible, keeping their engines running, and then take off immediately.

“As for our carrier planes, we rarely had more than two or three on the field at any one time. We had three revetments on the seaward end of the strip, and these positions gave pretty good protection to any planes parked there.

“The worst damage that Yo-do took from the Wonsan guns happened in May 1953. At this particular time we were in the process of moving into a new area, and were building an ammunition bunker; temporarily, we had stored a batch of 30- and 50-caliber machine gun ammunition, some land mines, C-3 explosive, and hand grenades in a pit at the far end of the airstrip. Just before lunch a lucky round made a direct hit on this storage, and
for 45 minutes, we had quite a noisy, smoky mess on our hands. No one was hurt, however.

“As for the ships, the fire on them increased steadily, and the ability of the Reds to get hits with fewer and fewer rounds improved. Also, the Reds made much greater use of air burst shells in the last months of the siege. In my opinion, the Reds were using a ‘barrage’ or area type of fire, where they would ‘zero-in’ a particular area, or spot, and then fire a barrage at that general spot with a certain number of rounds whenever a ship was close to it. Maneuvering ships, instead of receiving a steady volume of fire, went through areas of gunfire. We drew two lines on our charts toward the ‘Little Eva’ batteries. Outside these lines ships would not be taken under fire; but if they crossed them, they would almost invariably be taken under fire by the ‘Little Eva’ batteries.

“In my opinion, the siege of Wonsan was well worthwhile. At one time, in 1951, as many as 60,000 troops were reported in the Wonsan area to guard against an amphibious landing. By holding the harbor we forced the Chinese to defend it with guns and troops which otherwise could have been used at the front, or elsewhere.”

Five times in each of the months of April, May, and June, the Wonsan batteries succeeded in hitting an American ship. The cruiser *Los Angeles* was lightly damaged twice in a week—the last time on 2 April.

Most of the other hits were on the patrolling destroyers, causing only superficial damage to the ships, but not always so in personnel casualties. *Maddox* had three casualties from a direct hit on the main deck on 16 April. *Kyes* had nine casualties from a fantail hit on 19 April.

“The opening salvo was so far off we weren’t even sure they were firing at us,” said Commander R. A. Thacher, *Kyes*’ commanding officer, “but they quickly spotted on. They must have estimated our speed correctly at 25 knots, which was the speed most destroyers went to for counter-battery fire. Since we couldn’t go faster with two boilers, we slowed to 15 knots, and most of the following salvoes were over’s. I believe firmly that if we hadn’t slowed, we would have been hit several times around the bridge area.”[13]

Accompanied by cruiser *Bremerton*, and destroyers *Twining* and *Colahan*, the battleship *New Jersey* fired 115 rounds into Wonsan on 5 May. Her first salvo destroyed a main observation post. Sixteen-inch shells also struck and exploded a concrete ammunition bunker. The “Big Jay” also fired at an enemy battery at Hodo Pando, collapsing the cave mouths and obliterating the firing tracks. For almost three weeks this battery was silent. Again on 11-12 July, the “Big Jay” plastered the Hodo Pando guns. These 164 rounds silenced the battery for the rest of the war.

USS *Brush* had nine casualties on 15 May; USS *Wilsie* took a single hit on 11 June as the result of 45 rounds of 105-mm. fire; on 14 June the heavy cruiser *Bremerton* counted four rounds in the seas around her. On 15 June, USS *Lofberg* (DD-759), USS *John A. Bole* (DD-755) and USS *Current* (ARS-22) were on the receiving end of more than 100 rounds of large caliber fire, but none of the three was hit. On 17 June, *Henderson* (DD-785) received superficial damage from 80 rounds from the Wonsan batteries.

On the 18th of June, a bad day for the siege ships, cruiser *Saint Paul* was under fire. USS *Irwin* (DD-794) took a main deck hit which caused five casualties. The hardest hit was *Rowan* (DD-782). Forty-five rounds of shellfire bracketed her, five striking. One shell, thought to be a 155-mm., punched a two-foot hole on her starboard side at frame 209, a scant eight inches above the waterline. Another shell demolished the Mark 34 radar. Several other holes were visible in her side. Nine people were wounded, two of them seriously.

*Gurke* had three casualties on 25 June. The daylight patrol movements of the ships were somewhat restricted during June and July, but there was no intention of abandoning the siege, even for an instant.

Minesweeper *Symbol* (AM-123) and destroyer *Wilsie* (DD-716) drew fire on 7 July. The same day *Lofberg* (DD-759), John W. *Thomason* (DD-760) and *Hammer* (DD-718) received 300 rounds, *Thomason* being slightly damaged by straddling air bursts. On 11 July, cruiser *Saint Paul* was hit by one 105-mm. shell at her 3-inch/50 gun mount, but no personnel were injured, as these guns were not manned. On the 23rd, she was again under attack, some of the shells falling as close as ten yards; but this time, there was no damage.

The Red gunners in Wonsan were to succeed in neither of their missions: they could neither sink a ship
nor could they drive the American Navy out of the harbor.
Chapter 12. The Siege of Wonsan

The Siege Ends

On the last day of the war, 27 July 1953, amidst preparation to abandon the harbor in accordance with the truce, the siege ended as it had begun, with minesweepers sweeping and the destroyers patrolling, taking the Wonsan targets and guns under fire. Destroyers Wiltsie and Porter, and cruiser Bremerton fired salvoes at Wonsan targets until a minute before the 2200 deadline. The smaller harbor islands were abandoned on the day of the truce. Yo-do, with its more extensive installations, took longer to evacuate; equipment had to be removed, storage dumps emptied, fortifications destroyed.

The last two ships to leave the harbor—the cruiser Bremerton and destroyer Cunningham—did so on the late afternoon of 1 August, after a day of pleasant swimming in the harbor which had felt the fury and stricture of a full-scale siege.

The siege of Wonsan had demonstrated the courage and tenacity of the American Navy. The important rail and highway center, with its many industries, once a city of 100,000 and now half that size, was a mass of cluttered ruins. So important had this city been as a transportation hub that the Communists had been forced to great effort to repair and rebuild the almost daily damage. Hardly an undamaged building was visible. Many industries had gone underground.

In a land-locked harbor which had been heavily mined and which the enemy had sought constantly to re-mine, where shallow, shoal-filled waters abounded, and despite the most intense enemy opposition, a siege of 861 days had been imposed with skill, determination, and success by a tireless and efficient team of American sailormen.
Chapter 13. On the Line

Introduction

Only rarely during the height of the interdiction campaign (on such occasions as the Hwachon Reservoir attack in May 1951 and the raid on Rashin in August) was the mission of Task Force 77 varied. Commencing with the air-gun strike on Chongjin on 13 April 1952, however, and definitely after June, the missions given the carrier airmen of Task Force 77 turned more and more toward strikes on industrial, military, and frontline targets, and less and less to interdiction and armed reconnaissance flights. As was described earlier, there was plentiful evidence that the interdiction campaign was a failure. For the next six months of the final year of the war, the carriers’ efforts would strike primarily industrial targets in North Korea. For the last six months of the war, Task Force 77 would give the bulk of its support to frontline troops.

This shift of emphasis and employment was heartening and pleasing to all hands, planners and pilots alike. To the carrier division commanders and their staffs, such attacks were more in keeping with the inherent ability of a carrier task force to employ surprise and concentration. To the pilots, such attacks were happy respite from the dangerous and dreary interdiction and armed reconnaissance missions. As to accomplishments, the sudden onslaught of combined carrier strikes upon an oil refinery, a manufacturing installation, or a supply concentration point meant greater destruction and damage, with less risk of damage or loss to our own forces. Such employment also kept the enemy off balance. The initial strikes in June 1952, on the enemy’s hydroelectric plants, for example, brought on little antiaircraft fire; the same attack a few weeks later provoked AA fire of greater intensity and accuracy. The intervening time had allowed the enemy, anticipating repeated attacks, to rush guns to that location for its protection. A few months after the Suiho attack, for example, photo analysis revealed that the number of heavy and automatic guns surrounding the dam had increased from 71 to 167. Meanwhile, the carriers had shifted their offensive power to other targets.

By thus avoiding a rigid and unchanging routine, the naval aviators were able to inflict heavier damage at lesser cost. Too often in the Korean War, the conflict became rigidly set in fixed patterns: the enemy could be fairly certain that our night flyers would appear over the coast a few minutes after sunset or three hours before daylight; he could be certain, if he saw a colored-smoke rocket or our troops laying down their colored frontline panels, that a close air support strike was enroute; from previous attacks he could often anticipate what the direction of dive-bombing approach would be, and thus better emplace his AA defense weapons in preparation.

The final year of the Korean War saw a definite trend toward more flexible employment of the carriers. While the interdiction effort continued until the end of the war (the plan was to strike the rail lines and bridges at least once every three weeks), it received less emphasis. Bridge and track-busting strikes were employed only to keep the enemy’s AA dispersed and his repair organization tied down.

In the final twelve months of the war, the carriers attacked a variety of targets, from hydroelectric plants to zinc mills, more than forty times, and developed a new type deep support air mission (termed the “Cherokee” strike).
The ceaseless and unspectacular attacks upon interdiction targets during months on end had a welcome climax on 23 June 1952, when, as an explosive finale to the first two years of war, the Navy, Marines, and Fifth Air Force in Korea began a two-day series of attacks upon the thirteen major electric power plants in North Korea.

For twenty-four months, these hydroelectric power plants had been ordered spared from destruction.[1] In the early months of the Korean War, this had been done partly in hope that the war would be won, North Korea occupied, and a costly and needless destruction avoided. After the Inchon landing, the hydroelectric power system had not been molested lest it give the Chinese Communists an excuse for entering the war. Later, after the Chinese Communists’ entrance, there was some thought that attacking the power plants might prejudice the course of the armistice negotiations.

By June 1952, however, after nearly a year of wrangling at the truce table, it was clear that there was little immediate hope either of negotiating a cease-fire or of capturing all of Korea by force. Continuing to spare any legitimate military target in North Korea for fear of prejudicing the armistice talks no longer was justified.

The truce talks, in fact, were destined to drag on for another year. Key military leaders in the Far East had consistently held that the North Korean hydroelectric power plants were legitimate military targets, that their continued operation directly contributed to the enemy’s war effort. These power plants furnished the Communist radar network with electrical power; they operated the MIG-15 air complex near Antung. It was known that many small, isolated and underground factories making war material in North Korea used this electric power. Moreover, a large portion of the system’s electrical capacity was transmitted to Manchuria for such arsenals as the Anshan steel industry, the Antung aluminum plant, and the Fushun coal mines.

“The spark to attack the North Korean hydroelectric power plants was struck by the Navy,” said LCDR Nello D. S. Andrews, USNR, intelligence officer, Staff, Commander Task Force 95.[1A] “In April 1952 I had briefed Admiral Dyer on the report of an interrogation of a North Korean Brigadier General of Artillery by the name of Lee II, who had escaped to the Wonsan harbor island of Tae-do on 21 February 1952. He told us that the Communists were aware that UN forces had a policy not to hit their power installations. According to him, this policy was a source of great comfort to the Reds, for the electrical power provided heat for their buildings and power for their underground factories.

“Upon hearing this, Admiral Dyer immediately requested by despatch to CINCFE that the ban be lifted. A few days later CINCFE advised us that the matter was under study.

“Approximately a month later, during the turnover period when Admiral Gingrich was relieving Admiral Dyer, it seemed appropriate to bring up the matter again. That morning, I had just received a Task Force 77 press release concerning the preceding day’s operations, which included mention of damage to an electrical transformer in the Wonsan area. I explained to Admiral Gingrich the long-standing prohibition against bombing or bombarding the hydroelectric system, part of which was exposed along the east coast in our area of responsibility. Admiral Dyer asked me to leave the briefing and get copies of our exchange of despatches recommending that we lift this restriction.

“Immediately after the briefing, Admiral Gingrich and Admiral Dyer helicoptered from our cruiser to the Missouri to have lunch with Vice Admiral J. J. Clark, who had recently relieved Vice Admiral Briscoe as Commander Seventh Fleet.
“Admiral Clark gave the proposal his enthusiastic approval, I was told, and personally took the matter up with Admiral Briscoe (COMNAVFE) and General Mark Clark (CINCFE), who in turn referred the matter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”

General Mark Clark has described before a Congressional subcommittee how the authority to strike the North Korean power complexes was obtained:

“...When I went to the Far East, I looked around to see what can I do on my own responsibility within my sphere of authority, what can I do in Korea over here to make the Communists realize that we are still fighting... These hydroelectric plants which were turning out the power for Manchuria, for their industry, it seemed to me, should be destroyed. I was denied the right to hit the Suiho, the big one, so I sent a message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff just telling them that I was going to attack the following places, and I told them how I was going to attack them, with what kind of planes, with what kind of bombs, and gave them a certain number of hours notice that if they wanted to stop me, they would have time.

“I did not ask for permission. Much to my surprise, that came back approved and saying ‘We delegate to you the authority to bomb the Suiho dam...’”[2]

The Navy’s part in the raid was laid on personally by Vice Admiral J. J. Clark.[3]

“I was aware,” said VADM Clark, “that General Clark had informed the JCS that he was going to bomb the hydroelectric plants. It happened that I was on a visit to Tokyo and sitting in the office of Rear Admiral McMahon (Chief of Staff, COMNAVFE) when the JCS’s approval despatch came in.

“I told McMahon that bombing the big Suiho dam was a job for the Navy, and he commented that the Air Force would probably be glad to have us. I told him to offer them 36 ADs, each of them loaded with 5,000 pounds of bombs, and he wrote up a message to FAFIK to that effect.

“On my way back to the operating area aboard the Philippine Sea two days later, I decided to go directly over to Seoul and discuss the Suiho mission in person with LTGEN Glenn O. Barcus, Commanding General, FAFIK. In the interval, there had been a flurry of despatches between General Barcus and Admiral Soucek, and the Navy’s contribution had been reduced to only 20 divebombers.

“Later, I learned that the Suiho hop was almost cancelled at this stage because of the serious MIG interference potential near the Suiho dam. In fact, General Barcus had a despatch all written up ready to send to FEAF and to General Clark recommending cancellation of the strikes on Suiho.

Click here to view map

“It was at this moment that Barcus got my departure report saying I was headed for Seoul to see him. When he received it, he told his staff to hold up the Suiho cancellation despatch until I got there, for he had guessed why I was coming.

“After going over the problem with General Barcus, I told them I didn’t see any reason we couldn’t hit Suiho. I said that we could get in and out of there without too much trouble. I noted that the strike plans called for only 20 Navy divebombers; I said that 20 weren’t enough, that we ought to send as heavy a strike in there as possible and really clobber that dam. I offered him 36 divebombers, and he accepted that.”

Like the 1950 attacks upon the Yalu bridges, an attack upon the Suiho installation would be difficult. The fourth largest power plant in the world (about 400,000 KW, the same as U.S.’s Bonneville), the power plant lay on the North Korean side of the Yalu River within sight of the untouchable Manchurian territory, only 35 miles from the Antung air complex loaded with more than 250 MIGs. Because of the importance of this installation any strike in that vicinity would probably arouse intense Communist fighter opposition. The site was heavily defended—28 heavy antiaircraft guns and 43 automatic guns, some of them radar-controlled—and many of them on the Manchurian side of the river. Moreover, the Chinese had taken advantage of our “holy land” restrictions against over-flying Manchuria and had emplaced their batteries to better cover the only directions of attack. From long experience in “MIG Alley” above Suiho, it was known that the fire from these guns was intense and
The location of the hydroelectric plant at the western mouth of the Yalu River meant that an attack upon it by the Seventh Fleet’s aircraft would require a long, cross-Korea flight. Unless skillfully planned and executed, this would give the enemy’s antiaircraft and fighter defenses an ample alert period. And like the Yalu bridge attacks, the necessity of avoiding Manchurian territory predetermined the choice of attack courses. (This strike would be the first time that naval aircraft had operated in “MIG Alley” since the attacks on the Yalu bridges in the fall of 1950.)

The active planning, which had begun at the JOC at Seoul two days before the strike, included general target assignments and allocated attack forces, not only for Suiho, but for the twelve other hydroelectric dams in North Korea. Early in the planning, it had been decided not to use B-29s for the Suiho attacks. The “Superfort” bombers were not considered suitable because of the necessity for surprise, the heavily-defended nature of the target, and the need for pinpoint bombing (concentrating on the powerhouse, transformer yards, and penstocks on the North Korean side of the river, and not the dam itself). B-29s had proven too vulnerable to MIGs in daylight attacks, and there was no assurance that they could make the strike without violating the Manchurian sanctuary in their bombing runs, or without having some of the bombs released at high altitude fall on the wrong side of the river. Instead, the fighter-bombers of the Navy, Marines, and Air Force were selected to strike Suiho, although there was some doubt whether, since the B-29s had been unable to penetrate the alert MIG defenses, the Skyraiders of the Navy could do so. The carrier aircraft of the west coast carrier, under Commander Task Force 95, who would join the attacks, had to be carefully coordinated with the others.

H-hour of 0930 June 23 was chosen for the attack.

The day before the attack, Admiral Apollo Soucek’s staff and the flight leaders, supervised by the strike leader, CDR A. L. Downing, USN, worked ’round the clock preparing the details of the strike: the ordnance loadings, the fuzing, the flight schedules. Intelligence materials were assembled and distributed, and pilot briefings held. Strike leaders busily worked out the details of navigation, rendezvous, fuel consumption, order of attack, direction of attack, and direction and route of recovery.

“The strike planning was done aboard the Boxer under CDR A. L. Downing’s supervision,” said CDR Neil MacKinnon, Commanding Officer, VA-195.[4] “Although we had to anticipate that the hop into that heavily defended area of ‘MIG Alley’ would be rough, we still welcomed a change of pace from bombing the railroads.”

“Our attack plan was very tight,” said CDR Downing. “We had a plus or minus one minute to get on target and three minutes to attack and clear the target. Arrival too soon and killing time over the target would not be popular, nor would a melee with the F84s that were to follow us be a pleasant exercise.”

Early in the morning of the 23rd, H-hour was postponed on account of weather, the Fifth Air Force saying that a 48-hour delay might be needed. Shortly before lunch, however, another message flashed into the Boxer, flagship of Admiral Soucek, then Commander Task Force 77. The weather outlook over the target was improving. Attack on Suiho was re-scheduled for 1600.

“When H-hour was being kicked around that morning,” said Downing, “me and my plotting board were in a sweat trying to figure out the new launch times so we could all arrive at the proper time over the target.”

During the morning, while this rash of despatches concerning the possible cancellation of the strike was being exchanged, Bon Homme Richard and Philippine Sea joined with Boxer and Princeton. For the first time in 18 months, a full carrier task force of four carriers would be operating together. The attack from their decks was to be the biggest to date of the entire Korean War.

At 1400, with the Fleet into the wind, launching for the Suiho attack commenced. Thirty-five AD Skyraiders rendezvoused from VA-65 (CDR G. A. Sherwood, USS Boxer), VA-195 (CDR Neil MacKinnon, USS Princeton), and VA-115 (CDR C. H. Carr, USS Philippine Sea). Thirty-one of these Skyraiders carried two 2,000-pound bombs and one 1,000-pounder each; the remaining four, in addition to two 2,000-pounders, carried a
survival bomb[4A] for dropping to anyone unfortunate enough to be shot down.

Shortly after the 35 Skyraiders passed the North Korean coast, the jet fighters joined up. These 35 planes were flown from VF-24 (LCDR William A. Jernigan, Jr., USS Boxer), VF-191 (CDR John Sweeny, USS Princeton), and VF-112 (CDR James V. Rowney, USS Philippine Sea). Twenty-four of the F9Fs were each carrying two 250-pound general purpose bombs, and all carried full trays of ammunition for their guns. (The jets not carrying bombs were the target combat air patrol planes, which required extra fuel.)

The weather over Korea was improving to the naval airman’s advantage. The route and the vicinity of the target still were reported clouded, but the area near the Suiho dam was reported clear. This meant that the pilots could use cloud cover for surprise before and concealment after the raid.

The attack group skimmed among the clouds and past the highest mountain tops of North Korea, then commenced a slow let-down to remain below radar detection height. The route chosen across Korea was over isolated territory in order to minimize the possibility of ground spotters detecting and reporting the group.

Already circling the Yalu in “MIG Alley” were eighty-four F86s whose task it was to provide continuous cover for the naval group. Eight minutes before the scheduled time of attack, the Sabre pilots reported to CDR Downing that more than 200 swept-wing MIGs were visible, parked on the airfields in the Antung complex.

When would they come up?

At 1555, only five minutes from the target, the attack group from Task Force 77 commenced a high-power climb to reach dive-bombing altitude. If surprise had not been achieved, the MIGs from Antung and the guns surrounding Suiho would soon be working them over; but as the group came in sight of the huge dam, it was obvious that surprise had been achieved.

Commander Downing ordered the attack to begin. The Panthers commenced their flak-suppression dives. The ADs, meanwhile, reversed their course and commenced their runs. Downing led the Boxer dive-bombing planes in; on his tail was MacKinnon with the Princeton divebombers; and following him, Carr led the Philippine Sea’s ADs.

“Our target was not the dam itself but the Suiho powerhouse,” said CDR MacKinnon, “and it was an excellent aiming point. It was a building 80 feet by 500 feet housing the generators, transformers, and switching equipment. There was a fair crosswind blowing north to south which complicated our bombing, but which cleared the target of the smoke and dust of the exploding bombs. I saw a few puffs of AA fire as we were in our attack, but it was not enough to hinder us.”

Other targets were the transformer yard and the penstocks. Each Skyraider salvoed its bombs at 3,000 feet, simultaneously firing its machine guns to keep enemy heads down, and levelling from its run by 1,500 feet altitude.

The antiaircraft fire was now coming up, and pilots later reported it as “intense machine gun fire, plus moderate, continuous predicted fire from heavy weapons and automatic antiaircraft fire.” Bursts were accurate at all levels up to 10,000 feet. As expected, most of the fire was “out of bounds” from across the river in Manchuria.

As the last Skyraider entered its dive, the final flights of flak-suppression F9Fs dove on the defending guns on the North Korean side of the river. Of their work, LT T. G. Dreis later said: “The flak suppression was terrific. The AA looked rough when the jets first went in. After they made their runs, there was nothing to it. They really did a job.”

In less than 180 seconds, the entire Navy attack, having dumped ninety tons of bombs on Suiho’s installations, was up and away, streaking to the southeast.

“The majority of the bombs were on target,” said Vice Admiral Clark, “and post-strike photography showed no misses.”

Two or three secondary explosions were observed to follow from inside the powerhouse, and all of the pilots could see dense smoke and dust roiling from the powerhouse, thousands of feet high. Of the attack CDR
Downing said: “The bombing was excellent; the powerhouse looked like a volcano erupting.”

Despite the large number of enemy guns surrounding the dam, only five of the Navy’s planes were hit by antiaircraft fire. One Skyraider from VA-115, flown by LTJG M. K. Lake, was seriously hit and set on fire in the starboard wheel well; but with his wingman, Lake was able to reach Seoul’s Kimpo airfield, where a successful wheels-up landing was made. Considering the concentrations of guns protecting Suiho, the flak-suppression efforts of the jets had been highly effective.

“It was obvious that we had caught them flatfooted,” said CDR MacKinnon. “I attribute our success to the excellent planning and leading by CDR Downing, to our mountain-top approach, and to the sudden, last-minute climb to bombing altitude. The strike, which we had anticipated would be a rough one, turned out to be a textbook hop. The timing was perfect, we hit every checkpoint on schedule, and the bombing was excellent.”

“Although we only had one briefing with the strike leaders,” said CDR Downing, “the entire exercise went off as though we had been doing it for years. By my own timing, the last man was out of his dive and on retirement course in two minutes flat from the first flak-suppression pass—a real tribute to the superb work of the flight leaders of the following elements.”[5]

As the naval aircraft concluded their runs, the U.S. Air Force’s attacking F84 Thunderjets—124 of them—appeared in a well-coordinated second strike. Interservice teamwork was excellent. If any reprisal was to come from the MIGS across the Yalu, surely the moment had come; but by now, the high-circling Sabres could see less than 80 airplanes instead of the more than 200 observed a few minutes earlier.

Where were the MIGs? Had they assumed that industrial targets in Manchuria were to be hit and flown off to cover them? Or was an attack on the Antung air base complex itself expected and the planes hastily flown clear? Or were the Red pilots simply without orders, unready or unwilling to interfere?

Whatever their reasons, the expected stiff aerial opposition never materialized, and the remainder of the U.S. Air Force attack blasted the Suiho plant opposed only by the defending guns. Concurrent with the Suiho attack, twelve other power complexes in North Korea received similar treatment.

The next day, the Suiho plant was still smoking, and North Korea’s electric power was seriously reduced. The capital of Pyongyang was without power; factories on both sides of the Yalu were paralyzed, and lights all over Korea and Manchuria were going out.

The attack on the North Korean power plants had done several things, not the least of which was to rekindle enthusiasm among the naval airmen, sated by the monotonous routine of interdiction. The strike had shown the Navy’s flexibility to surprise and accurately hit a heavily-defended target. It had also shown the harmony of effort and precision which the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force could effect, which prompted General Barcus to say “My hat’s off to the Navy for a terrific job. We must get together again sometime.”

The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William Fechteler, congratulated the Seventh Fleet Commander and the pilots of Task Force 77:

“It is with great pride that I read the despatch and news reports of the magnificent accomplishment of your forces in the superb attacks upon the North Korean power installations. The excellent performance of duty and high combat effectiveness demonstrated by your forces and particularly the pilots involved in the actual combat are deserving of the highest praise and inspiration of your own people and a warning to the enemy of his inevitable defeat. Well Done.”

The surprise assault certainly caused extensive damage[5A] to the electric system of North Korea and Manchuria. The strikes forced the relocation of enemy AA guns all over Korea. Rear Admiral H. E. Regan, Commander Carrier Division One, only a month later was able to report the successful destruction of several bridges which, prior to the hydroelectric power raids, had been too well defended to attack.

Finally, the Communists were left in doubt as to the future targets and locations which might be attacked. [5B]
The highly satisfactory results achieved by the carrier strike on 23–24 June not only inflicted severe damage to the hydroelectric system of North Korea, but the attacks were also visible demonstration to the Communists that a new corner in the Korean War had been turned. The psychological effect was pronounced, both at the Panmunjom armistice table and in the North Korean capital. The Pyongyang radio denounced the missions as “sneak attacks,” adding that “anyone with common sense knows that a hydroelectric power station is a project of peaceful construction devoid of all military significance.”

But even more impressive strikes were now being scheduled. A plan was developed at Far Eastern Air Force headquarters in Tokyo to attack military targets in the North Korean capital city of Pyongyang. Its 40-odd military targets—warehouses, bridges, troop barracks, factories, and Army headquarters—had been spared for months for the sake of the armistice talks. But now there was even less reason to withhold attacks upon the capital city’s military targets than there had been for withholding attacks on the hydroelectric plants.

Attacking Pyongyang’s military installations, however, would be a difficult and demanding task. Many planes had been lost over Pyongyang, and pilots generally considered the city one of the worst “flak-traps” in North Korea. Photographic interpretation showed 48 heavy antiaircraft guns and more than 100 smaller automatic guns ringing the North Korean capital. The enemy’s antiaircraft opposition was certain to be both intense and accurate. Moreover, there were prisoner-of-war camps in the environs of the city, and these had to be avoided in the bombings.

Two carriers were scheduled to make a full-scale, full-day contribution: Princeton and the Bon Homme Richard, the latter recently arrived in Korean waters for her second tour, with Air Group Seven aboard.

“This was the first time in our six months’ tour that my Air Group joined with another one for a combined strike,” said CDR G. B. Brown, Commander Carrier Air Group Seven.[6]

“The strike on Pyongyang was scheduled for 11 July. Since our ship was carrying Admiral H. E. Regan, then CTF 77, and his staff, the Princeton air group commander, CDR William Denton (CVG-19), flew over to our ship a couple of days prior to the attack, bringing some of his squadron commanders, and we laid our plans for the strike.

“Our plans followed the now-standard strike procedure: the jets being launched some time after the props, joining us a few miles from the target, and preceding us down in our dives in order to knock out the enemy guns. The props, both Corsairs and Skyraiders, would follow them, and after their recovery, the jets would again cover our retirement.” the launch began at 0831 on 11 July with a single mishap. Ensign E. B. Conrad, a VF-72 pilot flying an F9F-2, lost power after the catapult shot and ditched. Conrad was unhurt, and was quickly rescued by the Princeton helicopter.

Bon Homme Richard launched 45 aircraft; Princeton, 46. The combined strike group, led by Commander Denton, CVG-19, rendezvoused over the island of Yo-do in Wonsan harbor. Brown, leading the Bon Homme Richard aircraft, and flying an AD himself, joined above and behind the Princeton strike group.

“The weather at the time of launching was pretty good,” said Brown, “although there was only a very small spread between the wet and the dry temperatures.

“Our course to the target took us directly over the enemy town of Yongdok, a supply storage site which had been on the receiving end of dozens of naval air attacks. On this occasion, even though we were flying along at approximately 18,000 feet, the Yongdok guns opened upon us, and shrapnel from one burst hit one of my
Corsairs—not seriously, however, and it was able to continue. But it was a prelude of what was to come.”

The carrier aircraft had been chosen to make the initial attacks and to strike several targets in Pyongyang on the southeast side of the city, the ones nearest the POW camps: an ammunition storage area, a vehicle camp, a headquarters and troop billeting area, a factory, a railroad locomotive repair shop, and a railroad roundhouse. Other target areas had been assigned to aircraft of the U.S. Fifth Air Force, the U.S. Marines, the Australian Air Force, and aircraft from HMS Ocean (CAPT G. L. G. Evans, RN), the British carrier operating under Commander Task Force 95. These elements of the UN air force were scheduled to relieve each other in an all-day, all-out attack on the city’s military targets.

As the carrier aircraft sped toward the target, the Sabres of the Fifth Air Force were taking off from their South Korean bases to form a barrier patrol in “MIG Alley,” and thereby prevent MIGs from interfering with the attacks on Pyongyang.

“The weather over Pyongyang was good,” said Brown. “Exactly on schedule, our flak-suppression jets from the task force joined up and took high cover; we picked up speed during the run-in. Each one of my ADs was carrying three 1,000-pound bombs; the Corsairs, one each.

“As we neared the city, which was very prominent because of its location in a big bend of the Taedong River, the AA commenced. It started at Sonchon and followed us all the way in. It was as heavy and accurate as anything I saw during World War II; moreover, much of this stuff came from radar-controlled mounts, something we hadn’t worried about during the Pacific war.

“The flak-suppression dives of the jets were effective and timely. Later, we gave them credit for destroying five guns and silencing two more. Despite their good work, however, some of my boys were hit. LT E. P. Cummings and his observer, L. L. Tooker, AT1, took a direct hit which blew off part of the AD’s tail surface. We saw their plane go straight in and crash about a mile from the target.

“Two other Richard aircraft were hit prior to the commencement of our bombing runs. One Corsair, flown by LTJG G. G. Jeffries, took a direct hit by heavy AA in the leading edge of his port wing, but the shell passed on through without exploding; even so, Jeffries pressed home his attack despite the damage.

“The Bon Homme Richard’s targets were the railroad roundhouse, the locomotive repair yard, and the ammunition storage area. LCDR F. H. Ervin, LCDR W. M. Harnish, LTJG J. A. Ryes and ENS P. G. Merchant made direct hits on the large rail repair shop. LCDR W. E. Teufer and LT W. L. Harris made direct hits on the roundhouse. As for the ammo’ storage area, all bombs fell within the assigned area, and it looked well battered.”

The bombing by the Princeton strike group was equally effective. During the dive LCDR L. F. Dutemple, flying an AD from VA-195, was hit and lost to AA fire, and his aircraft was seen to crash nearby. Two Corsairs from VF-193 were also hit, but landed at friendly bases in South Korea.

Photographs taken after the strike showed that the roundhouse was 60 per cent destroyed, including two locomotives therein, while the railroad repair shop was 50 per cent destroyed.

“This mission was one of the most accurate attacks that my air group made,” said Brown. “The antiaircraft fire we encountered from Pyongyang’s radar-controlled heavy guns, and the fire from their medium and automatic weapons was the heaviest and most accurate we encountered during our entire tour.”

The Princeton pilots agreed.

“It was the heaviest flak we saw,” recorded LCDR N. W. Boe, commanding officer of VF-193. “It was so thick we could have dropped our wheels and landed on the stuff.”

As the naval aircraft recovered from their attacks and headed homeward, the high-flying jets soon picked up radio reports from the Fleet. The weather in the Sea of Japan and along the east coast of Korea had suddenly worsened, fog had formed, and ceilings were down to 200–300 feet, with visibility reduced to less than 500 yards.

“The jets in our strike group, on hearing this, decided to land at Suwon and Kanghong,” said Brown. “The rest of us—all props—kept heading homeward. We vectored into the Fleet by YE,[7A] and let down
through a 5,000-foot overcast division by division, at two-minute intervals. Upon breaking out of the stuff at about 300 feet, and being vectored in to the carrier, we couldn’t see across the task force. However, with the aid of our ‘hooker’ control atop the *Bon Homme Richard* bridge, we all got aboard without further incident.”

The remainder of the carrier strikes against Pyongyang had to be cancelled because of the weather. The strikes on the capital city, less Task Force 77 aircraft, continued the rest of the day. A total of 1,400 tons of bombs and 23,000 gallons of napalm were delivered upon Pyongyang’s targets during an 11-hour period by 1,254 aircraft.

For two days the Pyongyang radio was off the air. When a weak signal was again emitted, the North Koreans called the day’s strikes “brutal,” adding that they had been ordered as retaliation for the failure of the armistice talks.

The Pyongyang radio also stated that 1,500 buildings had been destroyed and 900 damaged. One bomb had made a direct hit on a large air raid shelter, causing large casualties among high Communist party members.

[7B]
The Sea War in Korea  
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson

Chapter 13. On the Line  
The Sindok Mine Strike (27 July 1952) and Kilchu Magnesite Plant Strike (28 July 1952)

The success of the raids on Suiho and Pyongyang, which had cost the enemy so much and the Allied air forces relatively little, was accepted as good evidence of the wisdom of de-emphasizing the interdiction program. True, there were only a few targets in all of North Korea like the hydroelectric plants and the military concentrations in Pyongyang worthy of massed air attacks. But this more flexible pattern of air attack meant greater damage inflicted in proportion to losses sustained.

From June until the end of 1952, naval air conducted a series of attacks which took the formidable title “coordinated maximum effort air strikes.” On twelve days of July 1952, Task Force 77 aircraft struck a variety of industrial targets, ending with an attack on the Sindok lead and zinc mill and the Kilchu magnesite plant on 27 and 28 July.

The zinc mill had been processing and shipping 3,000 tons of zinc and lead to Russia via China every month. Destroying it would certainly cost the Communists more than another hundred breaks in the rail lines.

In the now well-established pattern, the jets struck the anti-aircraft guns first and last, allowing the propellered ADs and F4Us to saturate the area with 500-pound, 1,000-pound and 2,000-pound bombs.

“Bon Homme Richard 27 July; Sindok: ‘. . . Flak suppression was effective, accurate bombing and strafing runs taking its toll in Communist gun positions. The ADs dropped all their bombs in the target area, destroying or badly damaging the main plant and heavily damaging the transformers and other buildings in the vicinity. . . .’

“Princeton 28 July; Kilchu Magnesite Plant: ‘. . . A total of thirty-eight aircraft (25 F4Us and 13 ADs) in two strike groups dropped forty tons of bombs and rockets resulting in 60 per cent destruction of the magnesite plant; complete destruction of a thermo-electric plant which furnished power to the magnesite plant; major damage to a barracks area; also three to five cuts in the main railroad bridge leading south from Kilchu.’

All planes but one returned safely from the strikes. LTJG E. M. Crow of VF-193 bailed out and was rescued by Helena’s helicopter during the Kilchu strike.
Chapter 13. On the Line
The Raid on Changpyong-ni (20 August 1952)

The year 1952 saw the “air task group” concept tested in the Korean War. Two such groups, Air Task
Group One (CDR C. H. Crabill, Jr., aboard Valley Forge) and Air Task Group Two (CDR J. G. Daniels, III, aboard Essex) saw action and both groups performed excellently.

The air task group concept had arisen during the early days of the Korean War, during the time when the largest single attack group launched from the carriers rarely exceeded 12 to 16 planes. Only on the most infrequent occasions had the carrier air group commanders functioned in their designed role of tactical airborne coordinator. During the first 18 months of the war, even squadron commanders found few missions for leading their entire squadrons at one time. Squadrons had as many as four or five officers who were qualified and experienced to lead the usual four to twelve planes launched on close air support, interdiction, or armed reconnaissance missions.

With this pattern, obviously, the airborne duties of the air group commander in the Korean War bore little resemblance to similar duties in World War II.

However, there were other reasons for the air task group idea. The principal advantage was that a carrier’s complement of aircraft could be tailored to suit the mission at hand. If the mission was attack, the aircraft could be predominantly attack types. If air defense was the mission, all fighters could be carried. And for such hostilities as those in Korea, a balanced group could be placed aboard.

Whatever the carrier’s airplane complement, a senior naval aviator of the rank of commander, supported by a small staff, would be assigned as Air Task Group Commander. There would be no administrative organization; the designated squadrons would simply report to the Air Task Commander for operational control.

“There were some misgivings about the air task group concept at first,” said Commander Daniels ATG-2 commander. “The principal reservation was that such a grouping of squadrons might lack the traditional sense of pride, unity, and loyalty that comes with belonging to any organization. However, in actual practice in Korea I believe there was as much fierce pride among my pilots for belonging to Air Task Group Two as there was in any air group.

“Actually the air task group is analogous to an air group except that the air task group commander doesn’t have to contend with the petty administrative details of the chain of command. He simply has an air group without paper work. His primary job is to get the group in fighting shape.

“In my opinion, the tours of ATG-1 and ATG-2 in Korea certainly proved the merit of the air task group concept.”

Typical of the performance of Air Task Group Two was the 20 August 1952 attack on Namyang-ni, a large supply area located south of the Yalu River, on the west coast of Korea.

“This was another of the several mass attacks of this period,” said Daniels, “similar to the ones on the hydroelectric power plants and the two attacks on Pyongyang in July and August. This particular mission was at extreme range for the jets, and it demanded the most careful timing and integration, not only among the planes of the Essex but between the various other elements of the UN air forces.”

Since the target was only a few miles from the Yalu River, and almost directly beneath “MIG Alley,” it was expected that fighter opposition would be heavy.

“Our flight was made up of 43 planes from the Essex and 62 from the Princeton,” said Daniels. “The weather over Korea was good, with only a few scattered clouds over the mountains.
“I was leading the Essex Panther jets, so we took off quite a bit later than the props. We joined them on schedule northwest of Wonsan.

“As we neared the target, we could see the Yalu River. I had good voice communications with the Air Force F86s who had set up the usual barrier patrol in ‘MIG Alley’.

“We arrived at the push-over point exactly on time, and went in just ahead of the props. The Air Force had given us the intelligence on the location and number of the enemy AA guns, and I must say that their information was excellent. On an attack such as this, its success depends on accurate knowledge about the guns; if their exact locations are known, the flak-suppression aircraft can really do a job on them. Otherwise, if you are not sure of their whereabouts, all you can do is strafe the general area, and that’s not too effective.”

The flak-suppression runs of the Essex and Princeton aircraft were precise, and the Corsair and Skyraider pilots later reported the flak as light and inaccurate.

“None of the Essex planes were hit,” said Daniels, “and our entire attack was completed in less than two minutes. As we cleared the targets, a strike of Fifth Air Force F84 fighter bombers came right in behind us. It was beautiful coordination.

“As we climbed for altitude, I got a jolt. The Sabre jets patrolling above us near the Yalu River said that twelve MIGs had broken through and were heading our way.

“We climbed as rapidly as possible for altitude to protect the props. We had gotten back up to about 12,000 when my section leader, LT Hal Crumbo, tally-hoed four MIGs.

“Their pass was simply one quick ‘whoosh’ high above us, with no one exchanging a shot. I don’t think they spotted the prop planes below us.”

Flying high cover at 16,000 feet with 12 Princeton Panther jets. Commander John Sweeny (Commanding Officer, VF-191) had also spotted the MIGs.

“We had radio contact both with the Air Force radar station on Cho-do island, and with the Sabres above us,” said Sweeny, “so we had ample warning that they were coming.

“My three divisions were in step-up formation, with my team on top and staggered to the north. There was about 1,000 feet between divisions.

“I first spotted two MIGs jumping us front abeam. We immediately went to 100 per cent power, and at the right time turned into them, when they broke off and climbed away. Immediately after, three MIGs came up on our tail, so we reversed course to take them head-on. At this, they pushed over to pass beneath us. I got my sights on the lead plane, but he was so far below me that there was no reason to waste the ammunition. As we reversed to base course, two more MIGs started a run from the other beam, but again broke off when we turned into them. They simply put on full power and left us. The speed and rate of climb of those MIGs impressed all of us. They were painted green and brown, and their red stars were plainly visible. But I certainly wasn’t impressed with either their formation flying or their flight discipline.

“At no time did they come close enough for us to get a shot, yet all the while they were shooting wildly at nothing.

“All considered, it wasn’t much of an engagement, but it was the only time in my tour that we got close to MIGs. However, that small episode gave my pilots a lift, for it was quite apparent that the airmanship and teamwork of the MIG pilots were as bad as their gunnery.

“After this hop we kept hoping to get back into MIG territory and suck them down to low altitude where we could turn inside them. But it never happened.”

The homeward flight of the strike group was uneventful.

“Of the nineteen buildings in the supply area,” said Daniels, “photo reconnaissance showed ten of the buildings completely destroyed, while the other nine had up to 70 per cent damage.

“The significance of this strike was its split-second timing and coordination, the beautiful teamwork that
was achieved with the other Air Force and Marine planes attacking the same target, and the effective flak suppression which permitted almost casual bombing with excellent accuracy by the Sky raiders and Corsairs.”
On 28 August 1952, the Navy began a series of guided missile operations by Guided Missile Unit 90 aboard the USS Boxer. Pilotless radio-controlled World War II “Hellcats” (F6F5) converted to guided missiles, equipped with a television guidance system, and loaded with high explosives, were conducted to the target by control planes.

Between 28 August and 2 September, six guided missile attacks were launched against selected bridges. This marked the first use of the guided missile in combat from carriers. Several missiles found their targets, and only one was abortive due to faulty control.
The Sea War in Korea
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson

Chapter 13. On the Line
The Destruction of the Aoji Oil Refinery (1 September 1952)

One of the few targets in northeast Korea suitable for a massed carrier air strike was the oil refinery at Aoji, a synthetic oil producing center in the far northeast corner of Korea, only eight miles from Russian territory and four miles from the Manchurian border.

Here was a target that only the Navy could strike under the accepted ground rules which specified “no flying” over the Manchurian arsenal-sanctuary. This tip of northeast Korea was beyond the effective reach of land-based fighters; and it could not be touched by B-29s without their overflying one or both of the borders. But from the mobile air bases of the Navy, the target was only a skip and a jump.

“Aoji was one of the main sources of gasoline for the Communists in Korea,” said VADM J. J. Clark, Commander of the Seventh Fleet.[10] “This huge petroleum center had been long spared because of its location. I knew that naval air could knock it out.

“I went to General Mark Clark, the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command, and asked authority to strike it.

“After referring the problem to the JCS, General Clark gave me the go-ahead.”

Three carriers—Essex, Princeton, and Boxer—furnished two large coordinated strikes to smash the Aoji refinery on 1 September 1952. Essex launched 29 planes from ATG-2, Princeton launched 63 planes from CVG-19, and Boxer launched 52 planes from CVG-2.

Simultaneous naval air strikes were also directed upon an iron works near Munsan and the thermoelectric plants, transformers, warehouses, and supply buildings in Chongjin.

The strike on the Aoji refinery was routine and almost leisurely. No antiaircraft fire or MIG opposition was encountered, permitting repeated runs on the target.

The destruction of the refinery was complete, as indicated in these excerpts from the reports of the strike:

“Princeton: ‘. . . extensive damage to the refinery with smoke and flames visible to a great distance. . . .’

“Essex: ‘. . . completely successful with 100 per cent coverage and damage on all targets assigned. . . .’

“Boxer: ‘. . . No opposition was offered and Boxer planes inflicted heavy damage. . . .’

The total absence of antiaircraft fire from Aoji proved conclusively that the Communists had taken advantage of this “restricted” area’s nearness to Manchuria and Russia. By building industrial plants in this northeast corner, the Communists believed them to be inviolate.

This largest all-Navy air attack of the Korean War proved them wrong.
The second instance of the Navy’s escorting B-29s during the Korean War occurred on 8 October 1952 (the first had been the raid on Rashin in August 1951).

“One of the worst flak traps in northeast Korea was the rail center at Kowon,” said Captain Ray M. Pitts, USN, operations officer of Commander Seventh Fleet. “Every time we sent a strike in there, we ran into trouble, and dozens of pilots had been lost or suffered damage from the intense antiaircraft fire which surrounded Kowon.

“It occurred to our Seventh Fleet staff that a joint raid could be worked up by the Air Force and the Navy for hitting Kowon. On one of my trips to Tokyo, I went over to FEAF headquarters and told them about the Navy’s plan.

“Our idea was to send an escorted group of B-29s over Kowon. The Superforts would be loaded with 500-lb. VT-fuzed bombs. Their bombing targets would be the antiaircraft guns around Kowon. Immediately after their attack, while the Reds were all torn up by the effect of this bombing, the Navy would send in a low-level strike right behind the Superforts. The Navy’s targets would be the marshalling yard and the supply and storage areas of Kowon. I offered to furnish Navy fighter escort for the B-29s.”

The plan was accepted. On 8 October 1952, a combined Air Force-Navy strike walloped Kowon. Twelve F2H2 Banshees, led by Commander Denny P. Phillips, Commanding Officer, VF-11, from the USS Kearsarge, rendezvoused with ten Superforts over South Korea. The B-29s’ base altitude was 21,000 feet, with the three levels of Banshee cover at 25,000, 30,000, and 35,000 feet.

The Superfort attack was without incident, except for one brief moment during the approach to Kowon when a group of fighters was tally-hoed in the distance. Prompt recognition of the planes by LT Jack O’Donnell as F-86 Sabres, not MIGs, settled the pilots’ nerves.

The marksmanship of the ten B-29s was precise, and CDR Phillips recorded his squadron’s praise: “The Air Force was to be commended, both for perfection in carrying out the scheduled rendezvous and the excellence of their bomb drop.”

Four minutes after the B-29 attack, a large strike group from Air Groups 19 and 101, and Air Task Group 2, numbering 89 aircraft in all, bombed and rocketed Kowon. The rail, communication, troop, and supply facilities were successfully bombed and rocketed, with much reduced interference from the Kowon gun.

The Navy’s opinion of the attack system was high. Rear Admiral R. F. Hickey reported that the joint attack “opened the door to future coordination highly desirable in certain areas of enemy territory.”

The strike on Kowon, however, proved to be the last instance during the Korean War of the Navy escorting B-29s.

“The Kowon coordination was a great success,” said Captain Pitts, “but unfortunately, we were not able to do it again.

“It was my understanding that at this time our Air Force bombers were shifting to a ‘jet-stream’ type of single-plane, night-time bombing attack; they told me that putting any large groups of B-29s over Korea for a daylight attack wasn’t possible.”

The successful attack on Kowon and the teamwork between Air Force and Navy was summed up by a VF-11 historical report:

The raid was highly successful and all aircraft returned safely.
As the interdiction campaign dwindled, and the carrier strikes such as those just described blasted the few industrial targets in Korea, it was appreciated that a more fruitful employment for naval air power ought to be found. Under the self-imposed ground rules, it was obvious that the war might continue indefinitely unless some new way could be found to make the enemy return to and be more amenable at the truce table. October 1952 had seen an indefinite suspension of the truce talks, a recess which would last for 199 days (until 26 April 1953).

But a new target system or even a worthwhile old one for naval air power was hard to find. “Strategic” type targets had never been plentiful in North Korea, even in peacetime. The few that had existed had been hit repeatedly. After two years of war, new or worthwhile strategic targets did not exist. “Maximum air effort” targets, such as Chongjin, Aoji, Wonsan, Suhi, and Pyongyang, were few and had been frequently hit. The transportation networks, in the waning interdiction campaign, had been demonstrated to be unproductive target systems. Standard close air support missions (which had been resumed on 13 July 1952) were often disappointing along the stalemated and stagnant battleline. The Communists were so deeply and solidly entrenched that strafing attacks and the delivery of light bombs and rockets had little effect.

What, then, could the carriers do?

The answer was found by Vice Admiral J. J. “Jocko” Clark, the Seventh Fleet’s commander.

“In May 1952, shortly after I had taken command of the Seventh Fleet,” said VADM Clark, “I visited Korea at the invitation of General Van Fleet, and remained with him at his headquarters for several days. He arranged trips for me to visit the battlefield. On 30 May I visited Major General J. T. Selden, commanding the First Marine Division, at his headquarters south of Panmunjom. General Selden flew me up and down the frontlines in his helicopter and then took me to individual command posts in the frontlines by jeep.

“While flying behind our frontlines, I noticed many concentrations of our own forces that were not underground. These included supply concentrations, personnel housing, medical centers, truck parks, and ammunition dumps. As I flew over these areas, it occurred to me that if the enemy had the same air power and air supremacy that we enjoyed at the battleline, it would be impossible to have so much of our material freely exposed and in the open. I then reasoned that the enemy could not fight a kind of war he was fighting and still have all his forces, supplies, and equipment underground. Some of his stocks of supplies had to be above ground, out of sight and out of range of our artillery.

“On returning to the Seventh Fleet on 31 May, therefore, I asked Rear Admiral John Perry, Commander Carrier Division One, to obtain aerial photographs of the territory behind the enemy’s frontlines which was out of reach of artillery.

“Later, after the photos had been assessed, Perry reported a multitude of worthwhile targets all along the front.

“In the pictures, many underground tunnels were visible, and in some cases the enemy had even dug tunnels all the way through the mountains. Of course these fortifications and the stagnant condition of the frontlines made regular close air support strikes ineffective. But even though he might have a lot of his war supplies buried in the hills, a lot of it was exposed which would make excellent targets for the concentrated, surprise and pinpoint attacks of naval aircraft.”[13]

This was the origin of what came to be known as the “Cherokee Strikes,” named in Clark’s honor because of his Cherokee ancestry.
“The decision to call the new system ‘Cherokee’ may have sounded whimsical to some,” said Captain Ray M. Pitts, “but there was a definite reason for choosing it. We thought first of giving the system a name that would have tactical significance—like ‘carrier tactical strike.’ But we decided against that for we wanted a name that would mean something totally different from ‘close air support.’ You can’t hang an argument on a word like ‘Cherokee.’

“After Admiral Clark germinated the idea, the rest of the staff set to work to translate it into action. “I made a trip through the lines in Korea to see if the general concept was workable. First, I checked with the key officers of our First Marine Division. I also made a swing around several battalion command posts discussing the proposed ‘Cherokee’ system with them.

“Next I went to Seoul to the JOC to clear the concept with the Fifth Air Force on the working level. There was nothing in writing.

“Then I went to Tenth Corps headquarters and talked to them. “Everybody was enthusiastic and thought the ‘Cherokee’ plan would work and that it deserved a try. “My own opinion was that the best place for our naval air power to destroy enemy supplies was at the front, not somewhere back in North Korea. At the front, every bullet, every round of artillery, every pound of supplies was twice as expensive to the Reds as it was crossing the Yalu. In my opinion, we could do more harm in a stalemate war by destroying the enemy’s logistics at the battleline.

“Upon my return, Vice Admiral Clark and I went over to Rear Admiral Hickey’s flagship. His operations officer (CDR Louis Hurd) and air intelligence officer (CDR R. P. Fuller) took a look at all the maps and photos I had brought back and they agreed we had found a worthwhile new target system.

“That was how the ‘Cherokee’ system got underway.”

The first Cherokee strikes were flown on 9 October 1952. Three strikes, totalling 91 aircraft, were launched from Kearsarge, Princeton and Essex on troop and supply areas beyond the range of Tenth Corps artillery.

To the carrier aviators, the first Cherokee strike was simply “one more hop,” and there is little in either ship or squadron records to distinguish the day of 9 October. VF-821’s report mentions the day in one brief sentence: “Flak-suppression hop of eight F9Fs led by CDR D. W. Cooper.” Another Essex squadron history, VF-871 says simply, “eight planes hit troop bunkers.” CDR L. W. Chick’s squadron, VA-55, records the results of two missions that day without embellishment: “Twelve ADs destroyed eight mortars, three 37-mm. gun positions, 400 feet of trench, eight bunkers, and started two fires;” and “eight ADs destroyed two artillery positions and three bunkers while covering 90 per cent of the target area.” Kearsarge’s Skyraider squadron, VA-702, recorded that “eleven aircraft hit a supply area twenty miles north of the Punchbowl.”

“By mid-October,” continued Vice Admiral Clark, “Task Force 77 had gradually shifted a large proportion of its strike effort to the Cherokee program until about 50 per cent of its air attack potential was being devoted to this type mission. General Van Fleet enthusiastically approved the program and authorized the division commanders to move their bomblines temporarily to include worthwhile targets for the duration of the strike.”

Especially happy was the foot soldier in the line. To him, the various concepts of close support, its mechanics, and its methods of control, were meaningless. To him, also, the sight of a large number of planes, from whatever source, demolishing enemy targets with heavy bombs was an exhilarating tonic.

After the first few Cherokee strikes, however, there was confusion at the JOC and concern at Air Force headquarters. The Fifth Air Force in Korea looked on the new missions as regular close air support, while the Far East Air Force headquarters was concerned lest the new system jeopardize Air Force control of air power over the frontlines.

Lieutenant General Otto P. Weyland, FEAF, informed Vice Admiral Clark that he did not believe that the FAFIK controllers were capable of handling large numbers of strike aircraft loaded with large bombs on missions
so close to friendly lines. He added that in recent months, there had been seven cases of unidentified but friendly aircraft inadvertently dropping bombs on the friendly side of the front. None of these was definitely attributable to the Navy, he said, but such accidents did emphasize the need for proper liaison and control.

“The initial confusion,” said Vice Admiral Clark, “was one of simple misunderstanding. My only objective in originating and planning the Cherokee hops was to utilize the striking power of the Seventh Fleet for the infliction of the greatest possible damage upon the enemy with the least cost to our own forces.

“The misunderstanding was due to two things: first, the basic difference between a ‘Cherokee’ type strike and a regular close air support mission; and second, the method of controlling them.”

The Cherokee strikes were different from close air support strikes in several respects. In the case of close air support, missions were not pre-briefed, the planes carried a standard bomb loading, and only eight planes could be handled over any particular target at one time. No flak-suppression planes accompanied the close air support aircraft. Moreover, the close air support aircraft were required to remain on call for considerable periods of time. The flights checked in with the frontline control parties and were often controlled by the light Mosquito aircraft who spotted their targets and directed their attacks. Finally, close air support targets were those limited to the area between the main line of resistance and the bombline. Good visibility was required to identify targets and deliver close air support.

The Cherokee strikes, on the other hand, were heavy air power missions outside of the bombline. They were pre-briefed, pre-arranged strikes, carrying weapons specially selected for the target. The number of planes over the target was unlimited because no individual control was needed. The target was selected from intelligence or photographic interpretation, and at the pre-briefing all pertinent information available was given to the pilot. The Cherokee strike aircraft used jet aircraft loaded with antipersonnel bombs for flak-suppression. Artillery, when available, was also used to augment the flak-suppression. The Cherokee strikes proceeded to the target as an organized unit, and the timing of the attacks called for delivery immediately upon arrival, with a minimum of time on station.

The misunderstandings of Cherokee were satisfactorily resolved on 17 November at a conference between Eighth Army, Commander Seventh Fleet, and Fifth Air Force. It was agreed that close air support missions would continue as before, that the Cherokee strikes were different, and would not interfere with them. However, the Cherokee strikes henceforth would be coordinated through FAFIK, would check in and out with the TACP[14A] of the Army Corps in the area, and would use Mosquito type aircraft to mark the targets. Eighth Army also agreed to move the bombline position closer to the frontlines on specific occasions in order to permit the naval aircraft to strike. In some cases the bombline was moved as close to friendly troops as 300 yards—a rare tribute to the accuracy of the naval airmen.

The use of the Cherokee strikes at the battleline reached its peak in November and December, with the Air Force joining the Cherokee campaign.

The opinions of the pilots of Task Force 77 with regard to the Cherokee program ran to each end of the enthusiasm-apathy scale. Those who were fortunate enough to see tangible evidence of their attacks could appreciate why the “ground-pounders” in the frontlines were enthusiastic. Those who saw or heard no results of their work—and pilots often saw little because of the smoke and dust—were unimpressed. VA-702 recorded this opinion: “Much enemy flak was encountered on these missions, and pilots usually considered a Cherokee strike as ‘hot’. The strikes are very effective in knocking out enemy artillery pieces.”

On 22 November, the Essex and Kearsarge teamed up for two coordinated Cherokee missions in the Kumwha sector of the front witnessed by a distinguished group of observers: General Hoyt Vandenberg, Commanding General U.S. Air Force; Lieutenant General O. P. Weyland, Commanding General Far Eastern Air Force; Lieutenant General Glen O. Barcus, Commanding General FAFIK; and Lieutenant General James Van Fleet. This enemy sector had come to have the name “Artillery Valley” because of the intense AA fire which was
frequently poured into UN lines. Lieutenant General R. H. Jenkins, Ninth Corps Commander, moved the bombline south about 5,000 yards to permit the Task Force 77 aircraft to strike.

The first strike on “Artillery Valley” was credited with destroying three artillery pieces and five enemy bunkers, and damaging four artillery pieces and five enemy bunkers. The second strike destroyed twenty-five personnel shelters and damaged ten more. The frontline controllers reported that ninety per cent of the Navy planes’ 1,000-pound bombs were on target.

“It was impressive to see those divebombers and fighters dive so steeply,” said General Van Fleet. “The heavy bombs they carried (2,000 lbs.) were really mountain busters, and even from our distance the whole earth shook.”

After watching the strikes, General Van Fleet radioed the Fleet:

“I witnessed two magnificent strikes totalling thirty-six aircraft at approximately 1500 today. Present were Generals Vandenberg, Weyland, and Barcus. Congratulations on the accurate and breathtaking performance. Hope all pilots and planes returned safely. Van Fleet.”

“By a combination of Navy and Air Force Cherokee strikes and Army artillery efforts,” said Vice Admiral Clark, “the enemy’s gun potential in the Kumwha area was reduced to about 10 per cent of what it had been.”

The new strike program steadily grew in proportion until more than half the naval air effort—approximately 2,500 sorties per month—was being applied along the frontlines—either as close air support missions (nicknamed “Call Shot”) or as pre-briefed strikes (nicknamed “Cherokee”). The period from 2 November to 25 November was typical: 522 Cherokee missions, and 212 Call-Shot sorties.

“One several occasions,” said Captain Ray M. Pitts, “the Cherokee program was credited with disrupting several major buildups and attacks by the Communists north of the bombline in the fall of 1952.

“On one occasion, I was attending a briefing at First Marine Division headquarters. During the briefing, it was revealed that there was an enemy buildup in their area, and they had reports of a limited Communist push.

“This enemy concentration seemed an ideal target for a Cherokee, so I copied down the coordinates of the area and fired a priority despatch to Commander Seventh Fleet for information of Commander Task Force 77.

“Admiral Clark verified the mission to CTF 77 by voice radio. Next morning at first light, a Navy jet photo plane took pictures of the area.

“The developed pictures corroborated the buildup; by 1030 that same morning, a heavy Cherokee strike was on its way.

“Later, our forces captured some prisoners who told us that this raid had taken a heavy toll; that the Chinese were burying their dead the rest of the night, including their general.”

The table of total damage by the Task Force 77 aircraft for this period was as follows:

Supply Areas: 5 destroyed, 3 damaged
Bunkers: 56 destroyed, 102 damaged
Trenches: 680 yards destroyed, 435 yards damaged
Mortars: 40 destroyed, 15 damaged
Artillery: 34 destroyed, 31 damaged
Personnel Shelters: 34 destroyed, 7 damaged
Troop Casualties: 59
Caves: 1 destroyed, 5 damaged
Buildings: 6 destroyed
Rail Cuts: 6 destroyed
Railroad Cars: 1 destroyed, 4 damaged
Usually, only estimates of damage to the enemy fortifications could be given, except on the occasions when a hill or a section of the enemy line was captured. The Communist entrenchments were well constructed and deeply tunneled into the rocky Korean hills. As many as six openings led from bunkers. The bunkers were strongly built, usually fifteen feet in diameter.

On such deeply-dug entrenchments, only the heaviest bombs proved effective. Light bombs, even napalm, did little damage to the tunnels, bunkers, and dugouts. The 1,000- and 2,000-pounders carried by the Corsairs and Skyraiders, however, often collapsed the tunnels and bunkers, burying alive the Communist soldiers therein. On other occasions the terrific blast of these bombs was sufficient to kill. Dead Communist soldiers were sometimes found with their brains oozing from their ears as a result of the heavy blasts.

The Cherokee strike pilots also dropped heavy bombs fuzed for delays of up to twelve hours in order to harass and hamper the enemy for long periods during the nights.

“On one day in early December in the ‘Iron Triangle’ area,” said CDR R. P. Fuller, Air Intelligence Officer of Carrier Division Five, “TF-77 planes had twenty-seven secondary explosions from Cherokee strikes. One ammo storage blew so high that the smoke rose up to 2500 feet.”[16]

As the year 1953 commenced, the Cherokee program hit a snag.

“The danger of bombing friendly troops in the Cherokee program was always recognized,” said Vice Admiral Clark, “and every reasonable precaution was taken to prevent it. Target location and identification was very difficult because of the similarity of terrain, the profusion of ridges, ravines, canyons and streams along the battlefront. This problem was intensified by the snows and fog of wintertime.”

During January to September 1952, there had been no less than 63 instances of bombs having been dropped behind friendly lines. Of the 63, the Fifth Air Force was responsible for 39 and the Marines 18, and the Navy was thought accountable for the six unidentified flights.

“In December and January,” continued Admiral Clark, “bombs were dropped on four occasions inside friendly lines. Newspaper correspondents happened to be on the scene and published detailed accounts of the mishaps. One of them occurred on 21 December, when a CTF 77 airplane accidentally released a bomb on Republic of Korea troops. One man was killed and four injured. Again on 17 January, two bombs were dropped by early morning night-hecklers which killed three ROK Army soldiers and wounded eight others.

“In view of the publicity, General Clark activated an inter-Service board to investigate the incidents and to assign Service responsibility.

“Since the Fifth Air Force in Korea was charged with the sole responsibility for the prevention of friendly bombings,” said Admiral Clark, “a campaign was immediately instituted by them to prevent recurrence. The Fifth Air Force instituted a policy that any air group commander whose planes were involved would be relieved, and the pilots involved recommended for court-martial. As a result, Fifth Air Force’s participation and interest in the Cherokee strikes dwindled, and to some extent the Navy’s did also. This was unfortunate, because it slowed down the use of Cherokee strikes at the battleline for several weeks.”

By March 1953, however, control procedures, careful briefings, and improving weather permitted a return to heavier emphasis on Cherokee support to the frontlines. Planes with missions at or near the frontlines were controlled by radar until they were definitely north of the bombline.

Cherokee targets were selected jointly by the Commander Task Force 77 planning officer and Headquarters Eighth Army in a new attempt at closer liaison and control.

On 1-10 March, Admiral Hickey and his staff toured the frontline areas to obtain the Army reactions to the Task Force 77 attacks.

The general Army opinion of the heavy Cherokee strikes continued to be excellent. The strikes, they said, usually demolished the targets. While the results were not always visible or measurable, the program was undoubtedly hurting the enemy and reducing his attack potential. In fact, several of the Cherokee missions had
blunted and even prevented enemy attacks.

“I was on this frontline inspection trip,” said CDR R. P. Fuller, “and every single Army man and Marine we spoke to, from private to general, praised the Cherokee strikes. ‘Can you imagine’, they would tell us, ‘what our reaction would be if the Reds had their airpower striking us here in the frontlines?’

“The best evidence that the Cherokee program was hurting the enemy was his AA reaction,” continued Fuller. “The Communists never wasted ammunition, yet they often exhausted their local stores of ammo trying to counteract the Cherokees.”[17]

The Army suggested that naval flight leaders, in addition to bringing their own jet fighters for flak suppression, might want to request friendly artillery fire to keep the Communists’ heads down. The Philippine Sea’s pilots were quick to recognize that the antiaircraft suppression effect of artillery fire, when it could reach a Cherokee target, often was superior to that of the jet fighters.

Lieutenant General James Van Fleet, Eighth Army’s commander, had an excellent opinion of the effectiveness of the Cherokee program. Indeed, the General visualized it as having a potential for something more than defensive strikes in defense of a static front.

“The Cherokee strikes really clobbered the enemy,” said General Van Fleet, “and would have been better if we had just put on a ground attack with them. The Cherokee program was a system which, properly used, could have broken the sit-down; they were heavy strikes of concentrated effort delivered over a short period. If followed up by ground action, they might have caused a break-through or caused the enemy to react violently to restore his lines, consuming his reserves of manpower and ammunition until he was exhausted over a period of a week to ten days. Then the ground armies could have been released to produce a war of movement instead of a war of digging in.”

The Cherokee strike program continued for the remainder of the war.
One of the most dramatic incidents of the Korean War happened on 18 November 1952, when U.S. Navy pilots encountered Russian MIGs.

On this day, Task Force 77 (under the command of Rear Admiral R. F. Hickey) was operating in far northern Korean waters, engaged in a two-day “maximum air” strike effort on targets in North Korea, principally against industrial targets in Chongjin, Kilchu, and Hoeryong, a city on the Yalu River. On the previous day, Task Force 77 had launched five coordinated air strikes on Chongjin, and the coastal city had also been bombarded by the battleship Missouri and the heavy cruiser Helena.

On the 18th of November, as on the day before, the task force was operating southeast of Chongjin (approximately 90 miles from Vladivostok), striking Hoeryong. The task force was in the same sea area that it had used on many previous occasions.

Cruising at 13,000 feet above the task force, centered around the carriers Oriskany, Essex, and Kearsarge, was a team of four F9F5 Panther aircraft from Oriskany’s VF-781 Pacemaker squadron (LCDR S. R. Holm).

The Panther pilots were:
- LT Claire R. Elwood—Team Leader
- LTJG John D. Middleton—Wingman
- LT Elmer R. Williams—Section Leader
- LTJG David M. Rowlands—Wingman

Because of a fuel boost pump failure in LT Elwood’s plane, the four Panther aircraft had descended from normal combat air patrol altitude to the 13,000-foot level.

Shortly after noon, various groups of unidentified aircraft crossing ahead of the task force from northwest to northeast were detected by the task force on radar at distances of from 40 to 100 miles.

At 1335, however, a group of unidentified aircraft, estimated at eight, was plotted on a direct approach toward the task force.

The Oriskany’s air controller alerted the CAP and ordered a vector and climb toward the unknown aircraft.

Because of his malfunctioning engine which forced him to remain at a lower altitude, Elwood detached his second section (LT Williams and LTJG Rowlands) to make the contact. Williams and Rowlands continued the climbing vector. At approximately 1350, upon reaching 15,000 feet, Williams tally-hoed seven condensation trails high above him. The aircraft were MIGs. At the time of contact the planes were approximately north of the task force, 45 miles away. The fight which followed lasted a furious and confused eight minutes.

In a loose, abreast formation, the seven silver-colored MIGs passed high above the two Panther pilots, made a descending turn, and split into two groups—one four-plane group and one three-plane group—in an attempt to box in the two Navy planes.

“At this point,” said LT Williams, “we lost sight of the MIGs because their contrails had stopped. However, we continued our climb to 26,000, and upon levelling off I spotted four MIGs making a flatside attack on us from the ten o’clock position.

“As the four came toward us and reached firing range, I turned hard left into them, spoiling the effectiveness of their run, even though neither Rowlands nor I was able to bring our own guns to bear.
“The four MIGs recovered to our right, in a sort of strung-out formation, with the fourth MIG especially far back.

“I continued my wrapped-up turn, and came on around for a tail shot at this last MIG. I commenced firing from 15° off his tail.

“My first burst sent him into an uncontrolled spiral. Dave Rowlands followed this crippled MIG down to 8,000 feet, where he left it smoking in a deep graveyard spiral. Later, gun camera film confirmed the kill of this MIG.

“Meanwhile, the other three MIGs pulled up and away from me, and split into a pair and a single in an attempt to get on each side of me.

“The pair of MIGs then made an attack. I rolled into a sharp turn, and got a head-on burst at the second one.

“I kept turning into subsequent attacks,” continued Williams, “and on several passes, I was able to reverse my turn in time to get a shot at an overshooting MIG. In one such counter I scored some hits, for in the gun camera film which was later developed, parts could be seen flying off. Either by my gunfire or this pilot’s deliberate action, the MIG ran out his dive brakes and decelerated so rapidly that I had to pull away sharply. I only missed a collision with him by a narrow margin.”

As Rowlands rejoined the fight from below, a MIG promptly made a head-on attack on him. The dogfight became a melee. At some unknown time during the dogfight, the three other MIGs joined the battle.

“This MIG started firing at me from ‘way out,” said Rowlands, “and then broke off his attack in a steep-climbing turn. By now, there seemed to be MIGs all around me.

“I countered each attack as best as I could. On one of them, I succeeded in getting a MIG in my sights and fired a long burst. He started smoking, but a split second later my attention was diverted by another MIG making an attack on me. He and I wound up in a tight circle across from each other, and neither of us able to get on the other’s tail. Finally, the MIG simply leveled his wings and climbed very rapidly away from me.”

Until now, despite all the flying bullets, the two naval aircraft had not suffered a hit. Both Williams and Rowlands were operating their engines at 100 per cent power.

“At this point,” continued Williams, “I succeeded in getting another MIG burning. I stayed on his tail, trying to finish him off, when I spotted another MIG coming up my tail. As I rolled into a hard right turn, I felt my plane shake.”

A high explosive shell had struck Williams’ plane, severing the rudder control and knocking out the aileron boost. With the MIG still on his tail, Williams dived his crippled plane for the clouds, 10,000 feet below.

“The MIG stayed right behind me in a tight trail position,” said Williams, “and continued to fire at me even as we went into the clouds. My only evasive maneuver was a series of zooms—applying hard forward and back pressure on the stick control.”

Meanwhile, a third Navy Panther was climbing to join the fracas. At his request, LTJG Middleton was detached from his leader, LT Elwood, and climbed to join the scrap involving his two squadron friends.

Upon reaching the fight, a MIG made a head-on run at Middleton. Simultaneously, Middleton saw Williams, a MIG, and Rowlands diving for the clouds. Rowlands, out of ammunition, had fallen in alongside the MIG, flying a loose wing position on it in an effort to draw him away from Williams.

“The most unbelievable part of the incident,” said Middleton, “was the sight of Rowlands sitting so close on a MIG’s tail with the MIG firing away like mad at Williams.”

While Middleton dove toward his teammates to render aid, a second MIG attacked him, but his shots missed.

Following this attack, the MIG reversed its course and the pilot either lost Middleton in the sun or became engrossed in getting ready to make an attack on Rowlands. In either case, Middleton was now in position
for a full-deflection shot at his attacker. He commenced firing from far out, and continued firing as the MIG’s
superior speed left his Panther tailing behind. Middleton saw the enemy pilot bail out, and the MIG crashed into
the sea.

“After watching the enemy pilot land in the water,” said Middleton, “I orbited around him with my
emergency IFF on, as I was convinced he would be of more benefit to us alive than dead.”[19A]

“I am convinced that Middleton saved my life,” said Rowlands, “as the MIG he shot down was making a
run on me.”

After reaching the safety of the clouds, the three Panthers were given a radar steer to return to the task
force. All three pilots landed aboard Oriskany without further difficulty.

As the task force retired toward the south at the conclusion of the two-day effort, all ships in Task Force
77 were a buzz of activity and talk. Radar plots and logs were exchanged; Williams, Rowlands, and Middleton
were pumped for observations, opinions, and comments.

That the MIGs were Russian ones from the Vladivostok complex there seemed little doubt.

“Every time we had taken the task force up that far north before, or even just a battleship, we got some
kind of reaction in the form of airplanes rising up from the vicinity of Vladivostok,” said VADM J. J. Clark,
Commander Seventh Fleet aboard Missouri. “This was plain from many radar plots. Usually, they seemed to be
just flying some sort of barrier patrol as protection for their own area.

“On this occasion, however, there were about 60 or more images on the radar scope at various times
during the afternoon. The bunch which tangled with our planes were headed straight for the Fleet, and only 35 to
40 miles away when the initial contact was made. I can only surmise that they had orders to attack.”[20]

Said the Air Intelligence Officer of ComCarDiv-FIVE, CDR R. P. Fuller, “At the time of this melee,
there was one division of F9F2s and one division of F2H2s from the Kearsarge Air Group airborne and less than
two minutes away. Why they were not vectored into the scrap, I’ll never know.”

Both Williams and Middleton were convinced that the MIG pilots had not used the superior points of
their aircraft to advantage.

“The poor showing of the MIGs was not wholly due to inexperience,” said Williams, “although that was
a factor. They seemed to use good offensive tactics, but their gunnery was not good. Part of their failure to shoot
us down was no doubt wild shooting. But I believe another reason for their poor marksmanship was the inferior
gunsight with which the MIG was equipped.”

Rowlands was in agreement with his team leader.

“The pilots of VF-781 concluded that we were very fortunate to have come back with our whole skins,”
said Rowlands. “The MIG pilots were inexperienced and sacrificed their aircraft’s advantages without hesitation.
As for their gunnery, theirs was about like mine—wild. All of them fired too far out for accuracy.”

The Navy-MIG incident was still a conversation piece during the visit of the newly-elected U.S.
President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, to Korea in early December, three weeks later.

“On 3 December,” said Vice Admiral Clark, “I was invited by General Van Fleet to his headquarters in
Seoul to meet the President-elect, Dwight D. Eisenhower. At the suggestion of Admiral Briscoe, I took along in
my plane the three Oriskany pilots—Lieutenants Williams, Middleton, and Rowlands—who had fought the
Russian MIGs so that they would be available in case Mr. Eisenhower might wish to see them. As it happened, he
did.

“When we arrived in Seoul at the Eighth Army Headquarters I told General Van Fleet I had brought them
along, and he said he’d tell ‘Ike’ they were present. The President came out, shook hands, and invited them into
his private suite. Present were the Secretary-designate of Defense, Mr. Charles E. Wilson, Admiral Radford,
Admiral Briscoe, General Van Fleet, and myself.

“While the three officers were telling their story to the President, in walked General Weyland,
commanding the Far East Air Force, and Lieutenant General Barcus, commanding the Fifth Air Force. It was at once realized by everybody present that the Navy had stolen the show.”

The naval pilots were impressed by the knowledge of air warfare that the President displayed, and his desire to know what the pilots wanted in their combatant aircraft.

“President Eisenhower congratulated us,” said Rowlands, “and was quite interested in just where the fight started and who had started it. He also wanted a firsthand account of the fight.”

“The President’s reaction to our story was one of elation,” said Williams, “but what impressed me most was his desire to get our opinion and evaluation of our present aircraft and what we pilots wanted in performance of future aircraft.”

Later that evening, Vice Admiral Clark took LT Williams and his wingmates to Admiral Radford’s quarters for a further interview.

“Admiral Radford was critical of our pilots becoming separated during the dogfight,” said Vice Admiral Clark, “because, according to accepted combat doctrine, it is basic that fighter planes stick close together for mutual protection. I had to agree with Admiral Radford, except for the final score; that was in our favor.”

Minor though it was, this encounter had several results and repercussions. It had demonstrated the definite superiority of the MIG over the most advanced Navy fighter then operational in the Fleet: the F9F5. Only the superior training and better marksmanship of the naval pilots had evened the score. Official records credit Williams and Middleton with the destruction of one plane each, Rowlands with one damaged. This is undoubtedly conservative. Later compilations of radar plots and pilot interviews indicated a strong possibility that only one or possibly two of the original seven MIGs returned to base. Five or perhaps even six were either shot down directly, damaged so severely as to crash, or ran out of fuel on the way home.

Another result of the incident was to re-emphasize the basic purpose of the fighter: air-to-air combat. The peculiar nature of the Korean War and the usual employment of Navy fighters had unconsciously subordinated their primary function to bombing, rocketing, and flak-suppression.

Also, the scrap had partly counterbalanced two recent Task Force 77 losses to enemy MIGs. On 4 October 1952, LT Eugene F. Johnson, a VF-884 Corsair pilot aboard Kearsarge, had been shot down by a MIG near Wonsan. Johnson’s was one of seven F4Us attacking Yongpo. While in a dive, he had been attacked by four MIGs, and his plane was seen to crash.

Three days later, a second Navy pilot had been lost to MIGs. On 7 October 1952, near Hungnam, a Princeton F4U pilot, ENS John R. Shaughnessy, VF-193, had been set afire and shot down by a MIG. Shaughnessy had succeeded in parachuting clear of his burning Corsair, and been picked up by the USS Boyd (DD-544). While in the water, Shaughnessy had become entangled in his parachute shroud lines and been nearly drowned when rescued. He expired on board the Boyd.

“These MIG attacks followed no special pattern,” said VADM Clark. “Each time they appeared, the Task Force would send our jet combat air patrol out to catch them, but when our jets were on station, the MIGs failed to appear. Indications pointed to the fact that the Communists were using radar control for these MIGs. As a result of these attacks, Task Force 77 began a program of destroying these enemy radar stations which continued through the rest of the war as the opportunity afforded.”

To many of the naval airmen, the destruction of the MIGs on the 18th of November had partially evened the score.

Finally, the battle had tested the air defense capability of a carrier task force.

In the official report of Commander Carrier Division Five, Rear Admiral R. F. Hickey reported that the task force communications and radar performance had been “excellent” and the “coordination between ships’ CIC’s (Combat Information Centers) highly efficient.”
During the last several months of the Korean war, the Communist enemy adopted a tactic which long went uncountered—the use of “Bedcheck Charlies.”[20A]

The Bedcheck Charlies were antique aircraft of two types—YAK-18 Soviet-built training planes (a low-wing, single-engine aircraft with a cruising speed of 100 knots and a cruising radius of approximately 200 miles); or PO-2s (a Russian-built wood and fabric bi-plane with a top speed of 110 mph). Each of these aircraft was capable of carrying one or two small bombs.

At odd intervals on dark nights, singles or small groups of YAK-18 or PO-2 aircraft would fly from grass fields in North Korea over the battleline or to the Seoul area, flying as low as possible to reduce the possibility of radar detection. Their wood and fabric construction made radar detection difficult. Buzzing low over the city in the darkness, these raids succeeded in arousing the sleeping city. Air raid alarms would be sounded; in most cases searchlights would be lit off; and during the course of these nocturnal maraudings, the Bedcheck Charlie would drop one or two small bombs. The damage was usually trivial and often nonexistent. But the harassment and nuisance value was far from insignificant.

In May and June, the Reds became increasingly bold and succeeded in doing some damage.

On 3 May, a group of Bedcheck Charlies dropped nine bombs in the X Corps and I ROK Corps areas along the battleline, but no casualties were reported. Shortly after midnight, 26–27 May, a group of Bedcheck Charlies (estimated at six PO-2s) succeeded in dropping four small 100-pound general purpose bombs and eight 50-pound artillery shells on K-14 airfield near Inchon, puncturing the gasoline pipeline. On the night of 2 June a group of Bedcheck Charlies was reported over K-6 airfield (near Pyong-taek, 30 miles south of Inchon), obviously feeling for the neat lines of parked airplanes. This was the greatest danger of these raids—the possibility that the Bedcheck Charlies might locate and inflict severe damage to aircraft parked on the South Korean airfields, some of which had little or no suitable AA defenses for low, slow-flying, wooden training planes.

The night of 8 June saw a nine-plane raid on Seoul which, according to newspaper reports, killed two persons and injured eight. The first bomb hit only 1,000 feet away from President Syngman Rhee’s residence, while a second hit a school building 400 yards away. Another bomb struck in front of the Seoul press billets, and flying glass slightly injured a Life magazine photographer.[21] Many thought the attack on Rhee’s residence was an attempt to make the ROK President more amenable to the impending truce.

On the night of 16 June, a 15-plane Bedcheck Charlie raid succeeded in bombing a petroleum, oil, and lubrication dump near Inchon, torching 52,000 gallons of petroleum products. The raid commenced at 10:30 P.M. and continued for two hours, as searchlights and AA fire criss-crossed the skies. Smoke and flames from the burning 40-acre area were visible the next day for 40 miles. It was the Seoul area’s fifth raid in nine nights.[22]

To combat these raids, there were not available either to the Fifth Air Force in Korea or the First Marine Air Wing planes which were slow enough to destroy these trainers and which were also equipped with the necessary night-fighter electronic equipment to detect them. The jet-type night fighters employed (FAFIK was flying F-94s; the Marines, F3D Skyknights) could not slow down sufficiently to engage the Bedcheck Charlies. On a few occasions a team of flare-dropping aircraft and a T-6 “Texan” trainer had been launched while a Bedcheck Charlie raid was in progress, with the hope that they could illuminate and destroy the pestiferous planes; but the system never worked.
“When I learned about these enemy night raids,” said VADM J. J. Clark, Commander Seventh Fleet, “I asked my staff if there wasn’t something the Navy could do to lend the Air Force a helping hand.

“The operations officer for CarDivOne, CDR John P. Conn, suggested that we send Corsair F4U5N night fighters ashore to assist in combating these nuisance raids. Since our planes were Corsairs, and the Marines had an airfield at K-8 from where they operated Corsairs, the F4U5Ns could be based at that airfield, which was 35 miles south of Seoul.

“Without further ado, and not waiting for him to accept, I sent a message to Lieutenant General S. E. Anderson, commanding the Fifth Air Force, advising him that a detachment of Corsairs from the Fleet was on its way to report to him in an effort to knock out these Bedcheck Charlies. Two F4U5Ns were sent in from each carrier.

The Navy night pilots (all from VC-3) received a week’s familiarization. On the night of 29 June, LT Guy P. Bordelon, attached to Princeton, shot down two of the Bedcheck Charlies.

“Admiral Briscoe told me about this when I arrived in the office on the 30th for a routine visit,” said VADM Clark. “I immediately decided to award LT Bordelon a Silver Star Medal for his feat, and since I was scheduled to fly back to Korea that night, I decided to go to K-6 to witness the operations of our night fighters and to lend encouragement to their efforts.

“As we approached the field at about 2230 that night, we were ordered to land at K-3 because of an air raid. We turned around and flew to K-3, but that field was blanketed by heavy fog. We finally landed at 0130 next day at Taegu.

“Afterwards we learned that the reason for the alert at K-6 had been another enemy raid. LT Bordelon had shot down two more night fighters. Then and there, I decided to present him with a gold star in lieu of a second Silver Star.

“Accordingly, I flew to General Anderson’s headquarters in Seoul. Both the feats of LT Bordelon had been confirmed by the radar track kept by the Air Force, although no wreckage of the downed planes was ever found. I then flew to K-6 where luncheon was given in honor of LT Bordelon by Major General McGee, USMC, under whose immediate jurisdiction the feats had been accomplished, and who had flown over for the occasion from K-3. Bordelon told us that when he had made contact with the enemy planes, each of them began to take violent evasive action.

“In a traditional ceremony I presented Bordelon with both awards at the same time, promising him, or anyone else who shot down five planes at night, a Navy Cross.

“On the night of July 17th, Bordelon succeeded in bagging his fifth enemy plane. Since his operations were conducted under General Anderson, commanding the Fifth Air Force, after obtaining authority from the Secretary of the Navy, I asked the General to make the presentation of the Navy Cross at once. This he did at an appropriate ceremony at Fifth Air Force headquarters.

“LT Bordelon had attained for himself the distinction of being the first and only night ace in the U.S. Navy. As a result of his effort, enemy night raids on Seoul ceased, and the city was able to sleep once more.”
Chapter 13. On the Line
The Truce Talks Resumed

During the winter months of 1952-1953, the stalemated war dragged on in the same monotonous pattern, with little change in the battleline, with little ground action other than patrol activity, and with little hope for an end to the bleak and bitter war.

January at Panmunjom saw occasional meetings between liaison officers, at which the Communists made false charges about overflights and bombardments of the neutral zone. The fighting along the front consisted only of harassing probes and limited objective offensives. By Presidential order, the island of Formosa was de-neutralized.

February saw little change, with continued limited activity along the front. Late in the month, there was a pickup in close air support by Seventh Fleet aircraft. Typical of this work was a mission on 21 February 1953. Six Valley Forge VF-54 ADs, led by their skipper, CDR Henry J. Suerstedt, Jr., were diverted from a routine close air support mission and put to work on a hill in Ninth Corps area where UN troops were attempting to regain control of the crest. Communist troops were dug in on the defilade side of the crest and artillery could not reach them. Suerstedt’s ADs made runs parallel to the front of the UN troops, dropping 500- and 1,000-pound bombs on the Communist side of the ridge at distances reported by the “Mosquito” as only 75 yards from the UN troops. Following these runs, three of the ADs strafed. The ridge was reported as taken. The “Mosquito” reported 100 per cent accuracy and ordnance effectiveness: sixteen bunkers destroyed or severely damaged, and two caves destroyed, along with many enemy troops.

March saw a die-hard Communist riot in the POW compounds at Yongcho and Koje Islands, and several hard attacks by the Reds, but with no exchange of real estate, however.

April and springtime, however, brought new developments. The major event was a resumption of the deadlocked truce talks. To a UN invitation to exchange seriously sick and wounded prisoners in accordance with the Geneva Convention, the Communists surprised the world by saying “Yes.” On 6 April, therefore, talks were commenced at Panmunjom which led to agreement on 11 April. “Operation Little Switch” commenced on 20 April. Six thousand six hundred and seventy Communist personnel and 684 UN prisoners (149 of them U.S.) were exchanged.

Spurred by this speedy agreement, steps were taken to reopen the main truce talks. On 26 April, following the exchange of sick and wounded, the 199-day recess of the armistice negotiations was ended. Prospects that an end to the stalemated conflict might be imminent suddenly became brighter.

At sea, April Fool’s Day began with Task Force 77 repeating the oft-repeated tasks once again. The rail lines from Kilchu to Tanchon were hit. Close air support was given to U.S. IX Corps. Naval gunfire spot was furnished for still another bombardment of Songjin. Targets in Wonsan, including the harbor guns, were struck. One F9F5 from VF-51 (flown by LT E. J. Thabet) was hit by flak. Thabet parachuted to safety over Wonsan, being rescued by LST helicopter.

On 13 April, the beleaguered city of Chongjin was battered in another maximum air-gun strike. One hundred and nineteen sorties from Philippine Sea’s Carrier Air Group Nine and Oriskany’s Carrier Air Group Twelve hit the city’s transportation network and its mining and ordnance areas. Pilots reported the destruction of a communications center in a harmless-looking bank building.

April 21st was “Boy-San Day,” when the pilots of Princeton and Oriskany struck targets of their own
preference. Two hundred and twenty-three sorties were flown. Even so, the targets were much the same—the supply and industrial areas of northeast Korea, the Hodo Pando guns of Wonsan, a jet sweep past Pukchong, and naval gunfire support and Cherokee missions. The best result, perhaps, was the fact that no pilots were lost.
As the main armistice talks were reopened, there was only one major obstacle to a truce: what to do with the 114,500 Chinese and 34,000 North Korean prisoners who refused to return to their homeland. The Communists insisted they had to be returned—using force if necessary. The UN’s position was that no prisoner who refused repatriation should be returned to Communist control against his will. The government of the United States refused to compromise on this cardinal principle. “. . . The principle that force shall not be used to compel resisting prisoners to go home excludes every form of coercion. We cannot, consistently with that principle, create a situation where such persons are offered no alternative to repatriation other than indefinite captivity or custody.”

For weeks, the truce talks pivoted on this thorny issue. At the resumption of the plenary sessions the Communist negotiators made a proposal that all prisoners not directly repatriated be sent to an agreed neutral state where, for the succeeding six months, representatives of the states to which they belonged would “explain” to them matters related to their return. The disposition of any remaining nonrepatriates after the six months had passed would be referred to the political conference called for under the draft Armistice Agreement. Subsequent negotiations centered upon three matters: the choice of a suitable neutral state; the question whether the prisoners who did not accept repatriation should be turned over to the neutral state outside Korea, which the United Nations Command considered a difficult and unnecessary operation; and the length of time the nonrepatriates should remain in neutral custody, after which the UN Command insisted they must be released to civilian status.

On May 7 the Communist representative submitted a revised proposal providing for establishment of a neutral commission, to be called the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and to be composed of the four states already agreed upon as members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission—Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland—plus India. This proposal provided that the Commission would take custody of the prisoners in Korea. It further provided that the nonrepatriates would remain in neutral custody for four months, and that thereafter the disposition of any remaining prisoners would be referred to the political conference.

On May 13 the United Nations Command presented a counterproposal providing for the release of all Korean nonrepatriates immediately after the armistice, sending only the Chinese nonrepatriates into neutral custody where India alone would provide the necessary military forces for their control, and shortening to two months the period during which the non-repatriates would remain in neutral custody.

This proposal was immediately rejected by the Communists. Optimism plummeted once again.

To further complicate the truce negotiations, President Syngman Rhee announced on 25 May that his Republic of Korea government would not accept any armistice that would leave Korea divided; his government further threatened to withdraw all ROK divisions from the UN command and use them independently to continue the war if a truce was signed. On the same date the UN team issued a counterplan, which provided for the transfer of all nonrepatriates to neutral custody for 90 days. However, the guarantee that no prisoner would be forced home against his will remained. This was followed by a ten-day recess.

On 4 June, the much-recessed armistice talks were resumed, and another attempt was made to settle the repatriation issue. Rhee ordered his ROK truce team member to boycott further meetings. The Communists agreed to accept an “explanation” period after the armistice, during which time, under the Five Power Commission’s supervision, they could interview each Chinese and Korean prisoner who refused repatriation and try to induce him to return to Communist homeland.
With this stumbling block removed, the single issue obstructing a truce was the readjustment of the military demarcation line on which the armistice was to be based.

As before, whenever the truce prospects brightened, the enemy increased his efforts to gain ground along the MLR (Main Line of Resistance). Several outposts changed hands repeatedly, but no major change had yet occurred in the location of the frontlines.

“The pattern of enemy offensive activity intensified early in June,” said VADM J. J. Clark. “The UN command received reports of troop movements toward the front, and many concentrations of Communists armies in the forward area were noted. Attacks along the line increased, ranging from company to division size. The heaviest concentration was in the eastern sector.

“All this activity on the part of the Communists was simply a question of ‘face’, which is all-important to the Oriental mind. At the time of the armistice, the Reds wanted to appear in an offensive role. They seemed determined to seize enough ground for propaganda purposes so they could say that UN forces were signing an armistice to avoid a military defeat.”

On the eastern sector, after a bitter struggle, Anchor Hill and Hill 812 passed into enemy hands in late May and early June. This was followed by heavy action in the central sector, where the Communists attacked the Ninth U.S. and Second ROK Corps in division strength. Heavy concentrations of enemy artillery and mortar fire preceded all attacks. In the Second ROK Corps sector, Communist forces succeeded in pushing back the main line of resistance, capturing Capitol Hill, Finger Ridge, Outpost ‘Texas’, and portions of Christmas Hill.

“Nothing this heavy enemy activity,” continued VADM Clark, “I visited General Taylor’s Eighth Army headquarters. On 6 June, I ordered Task Force 77 and Task Group 95.11 to exert maximum carrier air effort in support of the United Nations troops at the battleline.”

During this final period of the war, Task Force 77 saw a new burst of activity. Four carriers operated on the line almost continuously, despite poor weather. Many operating records were smashed: total sorties flown, tonnages of armament delivered, total days at sea. Underway replenishment at night—of a magnitude never before known (27 times in 49 days)—became routine.

The following are excerpts from reports of the period:

**Boxer:** (CAPT Marshall B. Gurney; Air Task Group One, CDR L. A. Whitney)

“11 June 1953: 130 sorties. The ADs proved exceptionally effective in a close air support mission on the central front. The Mosquito controller reported 500 yards of trenches destroyed, 15 mortar positions destroyed, and 12 secondary explosions . . .

“14 June 1953. 131 sorties. Jet Cherokee strikes hit supply buildings near the eastern frontline near Anchor Hill. ADs and jets were both used in close air support on eastern and central MLR. 1625 yards of trench, 8 mortar positions, and 9 gun emplacements were destroyed by close air support missions. . .

“15 June 1953: 147 sorties. Today’s strikes were part of the maximum effort put out by Task Force 77 in support of a counteroffensive by UN forces to retake ground lost the previous week in the vicinity of ‘Anchor Hill’. In the effort, 650 yards of trench, 3 machine gun positions, 7 mortar positions, and 73 buildings were destroyed. ‘Well Done’s’ were received from CG 8th Army, ComSeventhFlt, CTF 77, CincPacFlt, and ComNavFe. . . .”

**Lake Champlain:** (CAPT George T. Mundorf, USN; CVG-4, CDR John Sweeny)

“15 June 1953: Props again rendered close air support to United Nations troops, and jet strikes were directed to billeting and supply targets in the Cherokee area. One hundred forty-seven sorties were flown, dropping 103 tons of ordnance. The Lake Champlain (which had commenced combat operations two days earlier) received the following from CTF 77: ‘You amateurs turned in a veteran performance today X We are proud of you X’.”

**Philippine Sea:** (CAPT Paul H. Ramsey; Carrier Air Group Nine, CDR T. D. Harris)
“15 June 1953: The heaviest naval air blow of the conflict was struck today. . . Today was an all-Navy show for strikes in support of the ground forces to regain ‘Anchor Hill.’ At the end of the day’s operation, ‘Anchor Hill’ was referred to by Air Group pilots as ‘Anchor Valley.’ The hill was regained by friendly ground forces and the operation was praised by General Lee of the ROKs and General Taylor of the Eighth Army. . . .”

Princeton: (CAPT O. C. Gregg; Carrier Air Group Fifteen, CDR John E. Parks)

“15 June 1953: The combat sortie record for aircraft carriers is believed to have been broken when 172 and 184 sorties were launched during 2 single-day operations (14 and 15 June).”

On 14 and 15 June, Task Force 77 had delivered 300 and 403 frontline missions respectively. Admiral Clark described the Seventh Fleet’s contribution to the Anchor Hill operation.

“After conferences with Lieutenant General H. K. Lee, who commanded the First ROK Corps, I ordered a concentrated surface gunfire and carrier ir strike to support the recapture of Anchor Hill and its surrounding terrain. My flagship, the New Jersey, and the cruiser St. Paul would join the shoot.

“Carrier planes, assisted by the New Jersey, and the St. Paul, began an intense bombardment and bombing of the area on the 14th which continued throughout the morning of the 15th.

“Acompanied by Rear Admiral Harry Sanders (Commander Cruiser Division One) and Captain Herschel A. House of my staff, I flew by helicopter to an outpost near the scene of action. There I witnessed the attempt to re-occupy the lost territory.

“Supported beautifully by Seventh Fleet’s planes, General Lee’s troops had no difficulty in recapturing two of the hills, but on the main peak of Anchor Hill the enemy held out stubbornly until after four o’clock in the afternoon.”

The battleship New Jersey laid down one of the heaviest bombardments of the war to assist in the capture of Anchor Hill. (This was the first use of a battleship at the bombline since Iowa had been so employed in October 1952.) The “Big Jay” reported 44 bunkers destroyed, 20 heavily damaged, 2 caves closed, 610 yards of trench torn up, 13 gun positions destroyed, and 13 others damaged.

“I have never seen a greater display of courage than that of the ROK troops in climbing the mountainous terrain of Anchor Hill,” said Clark. “The ROKs would climb a few steps, only to be picked off by machine gun and artillery fire which was deadly accurate. Other ROKs would take the place of their fallen comrades. There was a large bomb crater about halfway up the hill in which several men had taken shelter from the blistering barrage. As I watched with binoculars, the enemy dropped a mortar shell into the crater, and men could be seen rolling part way down the steep slope until they stopped and lay still. They were dead. Again, farther up the hill, other ROK soldiers reached rocky terrain which offered some protection for a time, but the enemy again waited until twenty or thirty troops were concentrated among the rocks, then he delivered a heavy artillery barrage in their midst.

“Despite the enemy’s intense opposition, the ROK Fifth Division troops reached the summit about four o’clock, supported by Seventh Fleet planes and ships. The entire complex was captured. The Communist enemy had suffered more than 3,000 casualties, while the First ROK Corps casualties were only 200 killed and 300 wounded. Lieutenant General Lee credited the carrier aircraft and the naval gunfire support for making it possible for his forces to seize Anchor Hill.

“Unfortunately,” said VADM Clark, “the enemy regained the main peak later that night due to faulty leadership and supply arrangements. The enemy offensive on the eastern front was crushed, however, and fighting in that area subsided.”

Congratulatory dispatches for the naval support came from many commands. General Taylor said in his despatch:

“Today has been a costly one for our enemies. The frontline troops of Army Eight were in praise of the magnificent report they received from the planes of the Seventh Fleet and the gunfire of the ships at sea. . . .”
Lieutenant General Lee radioed:

“Please accept my deepest thanks and appreciation for the magnificent effort of your naval air and surface forces in support of the Corps’ operation. I have never seen a better performance. . . .”

For 700 days, Communist intransigence had opposed the truce. Ironically, on 16 June, as a truce agreement was finalized at Panmunjom, a sudden and unexpected action on the part of President Syngman Rhee came close to ending the truce talks once and for all.

At lunch that day, Lieutenant General William K. Harrison, Jr., the senior UN negotiator, had confided to Vice Admiral Clark that the last remaining adjustment of the demarcation line was about to be made and that he expected an armistice within three or four days. At four o’clock in the afternoon, in fact, Harrison telephoned Clark to say that all remaining points of discussion had been agreed upon and that it was only necessary to translate the terms into the various languages before the armistice would be signed. In four days, Harrison told Clark, the actual signing could take place.

It was at this stage of the negotiations that President Syngman Rhee dramatically released the 27,000-odd anti-Communist prisoners in his custody. Rhee also declared martial law throughout the Republic of Korea and recalled his army officers stationed in the United States, saying that the armistice meant suicide for South Korea, and that if the United States signed the armistice, it would be an act of betrayal and appeasement.

At Panmunjom, the Communists hotly denounced the action of Rhee, accusing him of freeing the prisoners so they could be enlisted in the ROK Army, and further accused the United States of complicity in the release. The Communist negotiators demanded that the released POWs be recaptured—a manifestly impossible task.

For several anxious days there was deep concern in UN circles, particularly among the Allies who had contributed forces to the UN command, lest the unilateral action by Rhee break up the truce negotiations, re-kindle the war, and perhaps even expand its scope.

In late June, the President of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, sent Mr. Walter S. Robertson, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, to Korea to confer with Mr. Rhee.

Upon Robertson’s arrival, 26 June, a series of demonstrations took place throughout South Korea. President Rhee repeated that it was South Korea’s desire not to sign an armistice, but to fight on to the bitter end. On 25 June, speaking to 300,000 Seoul citizens on the occasion of the third anniversary of the Korean War, President Rhee asked that his country “. . . be allowed to decide our own fate.”

The Communist response to these demonstrations and announcements was one of the heaviest attacks of the war. The Chinese attack was directed at the Second ROK Corps, commanded by General Chung Il Kwon, in what many considered to be a punishment attack to belittle the ROK Army and to persuade President Rhee to agree to a truce.

The Reds struck in force on the night of 13 June. Six enemy divisions, numbering 13,000 men, assaulted the Second ROK Army Corps sector of the battleline. When their administrative allotment of artillery ammunition had been expended, the Second ROK Corps withdrew in good order to a distance of six to eight miles, fighting a delaying action. On the right flank the ROK Capitol Division, commanded by General “Tiger” Song, gave ground slowly and successively, withdrawing its artillery safely, and bloodily punishing the enemy.

For the next six days the carriers of Task Force 77 stood by the endangered sector. Vice Admiral Clark directed on 14 July that until further notice, all Task Force 77 air effort would support the battlefront.

Lake Champlain (CAPT L. B. Southerland; CVG-4, CDR J. R. Sweeney)

“15 July 1953: . . . inclement weather limited flight operations to 23 sorties. . . . concentrated on close and deep support of hard-pressed UN troops along the east central front. The Tactical Air Controller of one of the Cherokee missions reported that their drop on an ammunition dump, which resulted in five secondary explosions, was ‘the best run in weeks’.”

Lake Champlain (CAPT L. B. Southerland; CVG-4, CDR J. R. Sweeney)
Boxer (CAPT M. B. Gurney; ATG-1, CDR L. A. Whitney)

“16 July 1953: 111 sorties were flown, almost all in the bulge area of the front near Kumwha. . . . Two Cherokee strikes . . . destroyed 35 personnel shelters, 20 bunkers, 400 yards of trenches and an artillery position. Three secondary explosions resulted. Other Panther flights of the day destroyed eight trucks, cut five bridges, and damaged storage and staging areas.”

To quell the attack, Eighth Army also requested that armed reconnaissance flights along the enemy’s main supply routes be increased. To advance, any Chinese offensive must be supported logistically, and by daylight.

By chance, one Lake Champlain squadron commander had driven over the same roads and across the same bridges in June that he would be bombing in July.

“To the novice in Korea, a particularly good way to distinguish North Korea from South Korea was by the quality of roads and bridges,” said CDR W. W. Kelly, commanding officer of VF-62. “In South Korea, the roads looked like clean white ribbons from the air. The bridges were wide, white, and conspicuous-looking. In contrast, the North Korea roads and bridges were small, damaged, and unused-looking.

“On 16 July, I was leading an armed recco hop when the main controller called on the radio, diverted my flight, and ordered us to bomb all the bridges in a certain area.

“We quickly plotted the coordinates and found that the targets were in friendly territory. I could identify this particular area personally because, a few days before, I had been on a board of investigation and had driven over it in a jeep.

“I immediately thought this might be a fake enemy transmission since the sender was diverting my flight and asking us to bomb our own territory. After he authenticated, however, he told us that the Chinese forces had broken through in this area, and we were to knock the bridges out to slow them down.

“Unfortunately, we were not armed for bridge-busting. We did our best with our 250-pound bombs, and I think it kept the enemy slowed down. Just as we were leaving the target, my air group commander came along with eight Lake Champlain Skyraiders. They had 2,000-lb. bombs, and I personally saw CDR Sweeney’s bomb blow a section of bridge high in the air.”

For the remaining two weeks of the war, the four carriers pounded the enemy forces, setting new records for sorties flown on three successive days—24 July, 598; 25 July, 608; 26 July, 649. Seven thousand five hundred and seventy-one offensive sorties, half of them at the bombline, were delivered in an all-out effort to stabilize the front.

“As it turned out,” said Admiral Clark, “the Chinese Communist Army was not prepared for a general offensive. Most of the Communist soldiers had only two or three days’ rations in their pockets, and they couldn’t move fast enough.

“By the 19th of July, the full weight of the enemy onslaught had subsided and friendly counterattacks gradually reduced the extent of his frontal penetration.

“This release of prisoners by President Rhee had prolonged the war about five weeks, during which time United Nations troops, including South Koreans, sustained 46,000 casualties while the Communists had suffered an estimated 75,000 casualties.”

Vice Admiral R. P. Briscoe, Commander Naval Forces Far East, despatched his congratulations:

“Please pass to all units of your Fleet my congratulations upon the superb effort they have put out during the past few weeks. In spite of almost impossible operating weather, they have prevented the enemy from capitalizing on his advantage and have added immeasurably to the destruction of his resources. A hearty well-done to all of you.”
The last day of the war began like the ones before. Task Force 77 aircraft destroyed and damaged 23 railroad cars, 11 railroad bridges, one railroad tunnel, 69 buildings, 100 yards of trench and 9 highway bridges. Forty rail and three highway cuts were made.

**Philippine Sea:**
“The day had a fast start with 49 sorties launched before the truce . . .”

**Boxer:**
“On 27 July, 77 sorties were flown. Missions consisted of strikes, armed reconnaissance, and interdiction. At 1000, the cease-fire agreement was signed at Panmunjom which became effective twelve hours later. At 2200, all hostilities ceased, but until that time F9Fs hit airfields at Yonpo, Koeman, and Hamhung West.”

**Lake Champlain:**
“On 27 July, in conjunction with the signing of the truce, a leaflet drop was conducted on major cities along the east coast of Korea. Simultaneously, strikes were made to render all airfields in North Korea non-operational at the time of the signing of the truce. Close air support missions were carried out by the props before the truce was signed—124 sorties flown, 61 tons dropped.”

To some pilots of Task Force 77 the last day was unusual only in the sense that targets were plentiful but couldn’t be hit. To others it was a last chance to qualify for an Air Medal.

“My flight was assigned the airfield at Hyesanjin,” said CDR W. W. Kelly. “Our orders, which we had acknowledged receipt of in writing, were to hit only the airfield, and if for any reason we couldn’t do it, we were to jettison our loads at sea.

“Our flight of eight Banshees hit the coast at Kilchu, staying under a low overcast as we headed up the valley. Here, in the same places we had often looked in vain for fruitful targets, and where if we found a train or a truck we’d fight among ourselves to see who would get a shot at it, we suddenly saw large piles of material—one large pile of what looked like telephone poles; larger crates of material, lumber, etc.

“Then to complete our sense of frustration, we saw a train chugging down the valley very conspicuously. We couldn’t and we didn’t shoot it up, but went on to our target at Hyesanjin.”[25]

At sea, the blockade and bombardment work went on as before. The cruiser *Saint Paul* (CAPT C. W. Parker, USN) fired the last round of the war at sea at 2159.

On the harbor islands of Wonsan the day was no different either, although the tempo was less. At the designated time of cease fire—2200—the east coast islands’ defense forces commenced the destruction of the islands’ fortifications.

Ashore, the front was generally quiet, although a few rounds of enemy mortar and artillery fire were received in the First Marine Division’s area until 2153, when five rounds of 82-mm. mortar landed in the First Korean Marine Corps Regimental Combat Team’s area.

Some U.S. Marines reported Chinese policing their front a full thirty minutes before the agreed-upon hour of 2200. Chinese troops could be seen looking for souvenirs. Some of the enemy troops waved lighted candles, flashlights, and banners in celebration.

On “T-Bone Hill”, the Communists erected an arch of tree limbs and called out for UN troops to “come on over and we will walk through the arch as brothers.”

On “Old Baldy,” North Korean girls could be seen singing and dancing, while the Red soldiers waved
large papier-mâché Picasso peace doves as the hillside microphones blared out an invitation to “come on over and talk.”

On “Arsenal Hill” a man’s voice invited the UN soldiers to join him in the song, “My Old Kentucky Home.” Other Chinese soldiers danced and sang, banged pans together, and erected huge signs proclaiming the signing of the Armistice.

One group of Chinese soldiers approached a Marine listening post, asked for water, and tried to carry on a conversation. Still others hung up gift bags and shouted, “How are you? Come on over and let’s have a party!”

It was a strange ending to the strangest war the United States Navy had ever fought.
Chapter 14. Conclusion

At 2200, on the night of 27 July 1953, an uneasy truce settled along the battleline in Korea. The 37-month-and-2-days war had ended. It had cost the United States 142,091 casualties\(^1\) and almost twenty billion dollars.

What had been gained by this expenditure of blood, time, and treasure? Had the United Nations and the United States won or lost the Korean War?

A single, simple answer to that question cannot be given as this book goes to print, for there still are two diametrically opposed views, which cause continued and bitter argument. One view, although not wholly accepted in political and diplomatic circles, is that the Korean war represented a victory for the West since the Free World was able to demonstrate the real value of collective security; and furthermore, it was able to accomplish what it set out to do: to localize and punish aggression, to drive the invader back to his lair, and to notify him that future forays would be met with even greater force.

This viewpoint is summarized by a 12 February 1956 editorial in the Washington Post.

“President Truman, for the United Nations, fought the war for a limited objective, and this he achieved. He achieved a successful result, moreover, without damaging our dominion in world strategy. Actually, that dominion was improved, and in the process Mr. Truman kept the Russian intervention limited with his atomic deterrent.”

This point of view also holds that any expansion of the Korean War, inside or outside Korea, might have brought Russia into the conflict; and since neither the Free World nor the United States was then militarily prepared for a larger conflict, the risk of involving the Soviets was not to be taken.

The other view, generally prominent in military circles, is that the Korean War was a loss, militarily as well as psychologically. Even though the means for defeating the enemy were available, they were not used; and our failure to defeat the aggressor was an invitation to future aggression and truculence.

These views were reflected in such statements as General Mark Clark’s, “We lacked the determination to win the war”; and by Admiral J. J. Clark’s remark to the authors: “You shouldn’t be in a war if you don’t want to win it”; or in General Van Fleet’s answer to the authors’ question, “Under the accepted conditions of war, could the Korean War have been won without too great a cost?” General Van Fleet’s reply was that the Chinese Communists were beaten in June 1951 when a truce was first requested, and they could have been beaten “any time” in succeeding months. These views were certainly held by General MacArthur. When asked by the authors, “With forces available in the Far Eastern theater, what strategy should have been followed after Chinese entry?”, General MacArthur replied: “It was fundamental that the only strategy to be followed in such a situation was to apply maximum power of our naval and air arm in support of our hardpressed ground forces. This means: to have directed our attack against the nerve center of the Chinese ability to sustain his operations in Korea.”

This point of view holds that Russia would never have dared to intervene in Korea.

To the question, “Did the United States win or lose the Korean War?” therefore, no answer can now be given. For if the United Nations (or the United States) had taken military action to defeat the Red Chinese either under the MacArthur formula (blockade China, bomb across the Yalu, use Chiang’s troops)—or the Van Fleet plan (decisively defeat the Chinese on the Korean peninsula itself)—or the “Jocko” Clark format (drop just one A-bomb anywhere in North Korea)—no one can say now whether the Soviets might have intervened. As Admiral Clark said, “The only man who can say if such actions would have expanded the war or not is Stalin—and he’s dead.”
Leaving this question to future historians to answer, one thing nevertheless remains clear. Without command of the seas between the Free World and Korea, and in the waters adjacent to that beleaguered peninsula, the Korean War, as fought, most certainly would have been lost both militarily and politically with a finality that would now be plain to every American. Operations by ground and air forces were completely dependent on a steady flow of personnel and supplies, the bulk of which came across the vast Pacific ocean.

This conclusion is substantiated by these factors:

a. Six of every seven people who went to Korea went by sea.

b. Fifty-four million tons of dry cargo, 22 million tons of petroleum products went to Korea by ship.

c. Every soldier landed in Korea was accompanied by five tons of equipment, and it took 64 pounds every day to keep him there.

d. For every ton of trans-Pacific air freight, there were 270 tons of trans-Pacific sea freight. For every ton of air freight, four tons of gasoline for the airplanes had to be delivered across the Pacific by ship.

No war involving the United States exemplified the value of sea power better than the Korean War. The need of a strong, balanced, and adequate U.S. Navy for controlling the oceans for our purposes and for denying them to an enemy was made elementarily clear.

General Van Fleet’s opinion of the Navy’s work in Korea was direct and to the point: “We could not have existed in Korea without the Navy,” he told the authors. “The sea blockade was so complete that it was taken for granted. And at the same time the enemy could not supply himself by water. Naval gunfire on both east and west coasts added to his burden; and had the Eighth Army wished to go on the offensive, naval gunfire on the flanks would have made it much easier. Freedom from enemy air and naval attack left us free to operate in the open.”

Without seapower, certainly, the United States could never have gotten her soldiers and their equipment, her airmen and their aircraft, to the scene of conflicts, nor supplied them once there. Nor could the weight of this nation’s strength have been applied upon the enemy without the American Navy.

One principal result of the Korean War was to validate the naval concepts about future war which had been revealed in the B-36 Hearings before Congress in the fall of 1950: that the United States must have flexibility, mobility, and balance not only in its military planning but in its military machinery. The “modern” military school of thought that had thrived between 1945 and 1950—that a Navy’s use in any future war would only be that of convoy and patrol—was proved fallacious.

Concerning what Korea had proved about the future of the Navy and the Marine Corps, two leading Generals of the U.S. Army were emphatic. General Van Fleet, asked if a Navy was necessary in the atomic age, said abruptly, “The need of a Navy is a self-evident fact.” General MacArthur was equally certain: “Naval supremacy,” he wrote, “is essential to the conduct of any insular campaign.” Regarding the need and use of the U.S. Marine Corps in the event of future Korean type conflicts, General MacArthur said: “Any campaign of this type at once calls for the employment of amphibious maneuver for which, by virtue of its training and integration with sea-borne operations, the Marine Corps is far better adapted than any other military unit.”

Vice Admiral C. T. Joy, the naval theater commander for the first two years of the war and the chief of the UN Command Truce Delegation Team, made the following cogent summary upon his departure from the Far East:

“The Korean War may not go down in history as a major war or as a war that appreciably changed the maps of the world. But it nevertheless is a war of deep significance. It has been a war to prevent a larger war by serving notice on a ruthless enemy that he can go so far and no farther. From the standpoint of national preparedness we have been awakened to the danger that surrounds us. Let us hope that we remain awake. From the standpoint of battle effectiveness, the Korean War has re-emphasized lessons which were almost lost sight of in the years that closely followed World War II. We know now that there is no quick, easy, cheap way to win a
war. Sole reliance for our security cannot be placed in any one weapon or in any one branch of the Services. We cannot expect the enemy to oblige by planning his wars to suit our weapons. We must plan our weapons to fight war where, when, and how the enemy chooses. The choice of time, place, and circumstances rests with him.

“We need balance between the Services and balance within the Services. In the Navy, for example, we have learned that we cannot ever again neglect our minesweeping force. We cannot neglect our air arm. Inchon and Hungnam have again forcibly emphasized the vital need for our amphibious force. We cannot write off the naval gun as obsolete; the Korean War has again proved its worth. We have found a pressing need and full use for all of our naval weapons. And while the Navy’s role in the war has gone unpublicized for the most part, it is sufficient to know that but for the Navy the war in Korea would come to a sudden halt. The job of getting the troops there and keeping them supplied is just as essential as it ever was, whether it makes interesting reading or not.

“During the last ten months of my tour in the Far East I was fortunate, or unfortunate, enough to face our common enemy across the conference table. If there are still those in the Free World who believe that the enemy can be moved by logic, or that he is susceptible to moral appeal, or that he is willing to act in good faith, those remaining few should immediately disabuse themselves of that notion. It was a mistake to assume, or even hope, that the enemy was capable of acting in good faith. Future textbooks can set down the maxim that the speed with which agreement is reached with the Communists varies directly as the military pressure applied, and that the worth of any agreement is in proportion to the military strength you are able and willing to apply to enforce it.

“As for the future, it should be clear that there is nothing inevitable about the onward and upward progress of the United States or the United Nations. In fact there is nothing inevitable about our survival. History is littered with the graves of civilizations that assumed all is well. All is not well. We will survive and progress to the extent that we are aware of the enemy who threatens us, and to the extent that we stay strong enough to meet him in the arena of his choosing. Nothing can erase the tragedy that is Korea. But if Korea has taught us that in unity lies the strength that will preserve our freedom, then Korea has not been in vain. . . .”
Appendix 1. List of Major Naval Commanders During the Korean War
Appendix 2. List of Air Groups in Task Force 77
Appendix 3. Task Organizations for Pohang, Inchon, Wosan, and Hungnam
Appendix 4. Commands Receiving Presidential Unit Citations and Navy Unit Commendations for Korean War

Click here to view page 1
Click here to view page 2
The Sea War in Korea
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson

Appendix 5. Patrol Squadrons Serving in Korean War
Appendix 6. Glossary of Technical Terms and Abbreviations
Appendix 7. Enemy Aircraft Destroyed by Navy Pilots in Korean War
The Sea War in Korea
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson

Appendix 8. U. S. Navy Casualties in Korean War

Click here to view page 1
Appendix 10. Statistics on U. S. Naval Operations in Korea
The Pusan Perimeter
Lynn Montross and Nicholas A. Canzona

Foreword

AN ABILITY TO furnish skilled forces to meet emergency situations on short notice has long been a hallmark of the Marine Corps. When the call came for such a force to be dispatched to Korea on 2 July 1950, the Corps was handicapped by the strictures of a peacetime economy. Nevertheless, a composite brigade consisting of a regiment and an air group was made available within a week’s time.

With a reputation built largely on amphibious warfare, Marines of the 1st Brigade were called upon to prove their versatility in sustained ground action. On three separate occasions within the embattled Perimeter—south toward Sachon and twice along the Naktong River—these Marine units hurled the weight of their assault force at the enemy. All three attacks were successful, and at no point did Marines give ground except as ordered. The quality of their performance in the difficult days of the Pusan Perimeter fighting made them a valuable member of the United Nations team and earned new laurels for their Corps.

Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps
The Pusan Perimeter
Lynn Montross and Nicholas A. Canzona

Preface

THIS IS THE first volume of a planned series dealing with United States Marine Operations in Korea during the period 2 August 1950 to 27 July 1953. Volume I is designed to give the military student and the casual reader an accurate and detailed account of the operations in which Marines of the 1st Provisional Brigade and Marine Air Group 33 participated during the fighting in the Pusan Perimeter, from the date of their landing on 2 August until their withdrawal on 13 September 1950, in preparation for the Inchon landing.

Since this is primarily a Marine Corps story, the activities of other services during this period are not described in detail except to present a proper background to the overall account.

Many officers and men who participated in this campaign have contributed to the preparation of the book by answering inquiries, submitting to interviews, and commenting on the preliminary manuscript. Their assistance has been invaluable. Special acknowledgment is also extended to the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Pacific Section, and particularly Lieutenant Colonel Roy E. Appleman, USA, for enemy intelligence material; to the Marine Corps Board Study: An Evaluation of the Influence of Marine Corps Forces on the Course of the Korean War for its interpretations and conclusions; and to Life Magazine for courtesy shown in permitting use of Korean photographs made by Mr. David D. Duncan. Maps included herein were prepared by the Reproduction Section, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Va. United States Army, Navy and Marine Corps photographs have also been used to illustrate this monograph.

--Brig. Gen. T.A. Wornham, USMC, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chapter 1. Korea, Doorstep of Strategy

IT MEANT LITTLE to most Americans on 25 June 1950 to read in their Sunday newspapers that civil strife had broken out in Korea. They could hardly have suspected that this remote Asiatic peninsula was to become the scene of the fourth most costly military effort of American history, both in blood and money, before the end of the year. Yet the danger of an explosion had been present ever since the end of World War II, when the United States and the Soviet Union rushed into the political vacuum created in Korea by the defeat of Japan.

The Korean question came up officially for the first time at the Cairo Conference of December 1943. With Soviet Russia not yet being represented as a belligerent in the Far East, the United States, Great Britain and China agreed that “in due course Korea shall become free and independent.”[1]

Any discussion of this issue had to take into consideration Korea’s status as a Japanese possession since 1910. Government, industry, commerce, agriculture, transportation—every phase of Korean life had been administered by Japanese for the benefit of Japan. As a consequence, the 25,000,000 inhabitants of the peninsula were woefully lacking in experience to fit them for the responsibilities of independence.

Syngman Rhee, the elderly Korean patriot, had long been clamoring for recognition of his Korean government in exile. The United States hung back because of reluctance to offend Joseph Stalin, the Soviet dictator, at a time when Russia was a powerful military ally. Moscow had a strong bargaining point, moreover, in the prospect of giving military aid to the United States in the fight against Japan. Such an alliance was particularly desirable from the American viewpoint early in 1945 because of the losses resulting from Japanese kamikaze tactics. In the belief that active Soviet participation might shorten the war and save thousands of American lives, President Franklin D. Roosevelt was disposed to compromise with Stalin.

The two agreed informally at the Yalta Conference of February 1945 that Korea should be independent “. . . and that if a transition period were necessary, a trusteeship should be established,” according to James F. Byrnes, United States Secretary of State. He added in his memoirs that “a desire to help the Koreans develop the skills and experience that would enable them to maintain their independence was the inspiration for President Roosevelt’s acquiescence in the trusteeship idea.”[2]

The Soviet dictator made a plea at Yalta for historical justice. Although Czar Nicholas II had been execrated as a tyrant and warmonger in Communist doctrine, Stalin demanded that the “wrongs” resulting from the Russo-Japanese War be righted 40 years later. The price of Soviet military aid against Japan, in short, was the restoration of Russian territory in the Far East that had been lost in the defeat of 1905.
The Pusan Perimeter
Lynn Montross and Nicholas A. Canzona

Chapter 1. Korea, Doorstep of Strategy
The Historical Background

It was inevitable that the fate of Korea would be involved in any such readjustment. Korea is one of those tragic areas of the earth’s surface which are destined in all ages to be a doorstep of strategy. As the focal point of the China-Russia-Japan triangle, the peninsula offers each of these powers a threshold for aggression against either of the other two. Possession of Korea has been for centuries an aim of aspiring conquerors in the Far East, and all three rival nations have had a turn.

China was first. From ancient times down to the last quarter of the 19th century, the Chinese Empire held a loose suzerainty acknowledged by the Koreans. Japan won a brief foothold in the 16th century under the great war lord Hideyoshi, only to learn the painful lesson that control of the sea is requisite to a seaborne invasion of a peninsula. Naval victories by the Koreans cut Hideyoshi’s line of communications, and he withdrew after frightful devastations which left an enduring tradition of fear and hate. Both Japan and Korea then entered upon a period of self-imposed isolation lasting until their political hibernation was rudely interrupted by Western nations clamoring for trade.

The United States took the lead in inaugurating a new era in the Far East. Commodore Perry and his American warships opened up Japan to commerce in 1853. Several persuasive bombardments of coastal cities by American, British and French naval guns were required to end Japan’s seclusion; and in 1871 an American squadron was sent to Korea after the destruction of an American merchant ship and massacre of its crew. United States Marines and bluejackets stormed Korean river forts defended by cannon. All objectives were taken and heavy casualties inflicted, but it remained for Japan to open up the “Hermit Kingdom” to trade 4 years later with the threat of war.

Russia had not been a disinterested bystander during this era of cannon-ball diplomacy. Her participation in Far Eastern affairs dated back to the 17th century and had once extended to the North American mainland. The sale of Alaska to the United States in 1867 indicated a renunciation of this phase of expansion, but Russia had no intention of abandoning her ambitions in the Far East. Shortly after Japan compelled Korea to sign a treaty of amity, the Russians offered to train Korean officers and lend military aid to the faction-ridden kingdom.

At this point China took a hand. Suspecting that the two rival nations were dabbling in Korean affairs for purposes of their own, the Celestial Empire attempted to restore her suzerainty.

This policy was bound to lead to a collision. Western nations were not surprised when Japan and China resorted to arms, but few observers expected the supposed dwarf to beat the giant with ease. Japan’s well led army, equipped with the best modern weapons, landed at Chemulpo (Inchon) and captured the Chinese fortress at Pyongyang in northwest Korea. Sweeping across the Yalu into Manchuria, the invaders overran the strategic Liaotung Peninsula, taking Port Arthur and Dairen.

It was all over in a few months. When the Empire proper was threatened with invasion, the Chinese government sued for peace in 1895.

The Japanese terms were more than severe, they were humiliating. They included: (1) a large indemnity; (2) the cession “in perpetuity” of the Liaotung Peninsula as well as Formosa and the Pescadores group; and (3) Chinese recognition of what the Japanese were pleased to call “Korean independence.”

But the victors had overdone it. Russia, Germany, and France formed the Triple Intervention which compelled Japan to relinquish the Liaotung Peninsula. The three European powers preferred that this strategic bastion remain in the possession of China, which was ripe for despoiling at the convenience of the Western
Russia now assumed the role of a friend binding China’s wounds. The secret treaty of alliance signed by the two empires in 1896 was aimed like a pistol at Japan. In return for promises of support in the event of further Japanese aggressions, China gave Russia the right to extend the Trans-Siberian Railroad to Vladivostok across Chinese territory in Manchuria.

Click here to view map

The precept was not lost upon other European nations. England, Germany, and France also established spheres of influence in China after forcing the government to lease territory or grant special privileges. And Russia added to former gains by a 25-year lease of the Liaotung Peninsula.

China’s Boxer Rebellion of 1900 interrupted the march of events, but two treaties in 1902 indicated that Japan and Russia would soon be at each other’s throats. Japan acquired an ally in England, as a result of that nation’s alarms over Muscovite designs, so that the neutrality of European powers was practically assured. Russia and China drew closer meanwhile with a new treaty of alliance. The stage was set for a fight to the finish in the Far East.

Possession of the Philippine Islands had given the United States a new interest in Far Eastern affairs since the Spanish-American War of 1898. John Hay, Secretary of State, realized that the American “open door” policy was imperiled by the situation in Asia.[3] But he admitted in April 1903 that nothing short of the threat of armed force could have checked Russia’s encroachments.
The Pusan Perimeter
Lynn Montross and Nicholas A. Canzona

Chapter 1. Korea, Doorstep of Strategy
The Russo-Japanese War

A candid comparison would reveal a striking similarity between the aggressions of Czarist Russia in the early 1900’s and those of Soviet Russia half a century later. The expression “cold war” was not current in 1903, but the account of Russia’s threats, seizures and violated agreements has a dismally familiar aspect to the modern reader. Rudyard Kipling paid a bitter tribute at the turn of the century to these techniques of the Russian Bear in his lines:

“When he stands up like a tired man, tottering near and near;
When he stands up as pleading, in wavering, man-brute guise,
When he veils the hate and cunning of his little swinish eyes;
When he shows as seeking quarter, with paws like hands in prayer,
That is the time of peril—the time of the Truce of the Bear!”

Following the Sino-Japanese War, the truce between Russia and Japan in “independent” Korea was broken by both nations whenever a favorable opportunity arose. Both of them intrigued constantly at Seoul. For a time, indeed, the Korean government was directed from the Russian legation with the backing of Russian troops. Twice, in 1896 and 1898, Russia and Japan signed agreements reaffirming Korea’s independence and promising anew to withdraw their forces. These pacts were promptly violated by both contestants for power, but Japan prepared more realistically for the forthcoming struggle. On a February night in 1904, without the formality of a declaration of war, a Japanese squadron attacked the Russian warships anchored at Port Arthur. This surprise blow was followed shortly by the landing of Japanese troops at Chemulpo. They advanced to the frontier and defeated the Russians in the battle of the Yalu—a victory that has been compared with the battle of Valmy in the French Revolution as a landmark of history.

Certainly the West was made aware that an Oriental nation had risen to the stature of a world power for the first time in modern history. The value of Korea as a strategic springboard was demonstrated when Japanese land and sea forces isolated the fortresses on the Liaotung Peninsula. Port Arthur fell after a bloody siege of 6 months. Next, the Japanese invaders of Manchuria defeated an army of 350,000 Russians and inflicted 150,000 casualties in the four-week battle of Mukden. This was the decisive clash on land; and in the one-sided naval battle of Tsushima, Admiral Togo annihilated the Baltic fleet which the Czar had ordered on the long voyage to the Pacific.

The end came abruptly in the summer of 1905. In the Treaty of Portsmouth, signed on 5 September, Russia ceded the southern part of Sakhalin Island to the victors while recognizing their “paramount” interests in Korea. All rights in the Liaotung Peninsula went to Japan as well as important concessions in Manchuria. Not much was left to Russia in the Far East except a precarious foothold in northern Manchuria.
For 5 years Japan kept up a pretense of a protectorate in Korea. Then, in 1910, came outright annexation. Europe’s “balanced antagonisms” soon flared up in World War I, leaving Japan free to exploit Korea as a colony. Western observers might have noted such evidences of modernization as new docks, railroads, factories and highways. But they were administered by Japanese overseers as Koreans sank to the level of coolies without a voice in the government.

Although Japan joined the fight against the Central Powers in World War I, her military efforts were made against allies as well as enemies. Using Korea as a beachhead, she attempted to enlarge her empire on the Asiatic mainland at the expense of Russia, then in the throes of revolution. Three years after the Armistice, a Japanese army still occupied the Vladivostok area; but the United States took such a firm diplomatic stand that Tokyo backed down.

This retreat was only a postponement. During the next decade Japan set up a strategic shield to the east and south by fortifying the mandated islands of the Pacific, awarded to her after the war. Treaties and agreements were violated whenever convenient, and in 1931 she turned westward again to satisfy her appetite for Russian and Chinese territory.

The time was well chosen. With the Western nations in the depths of an industrial depression, Japan began a series of aggressions against the Chinese in Manchuria. The gains were consolidated in a puppet state known as Manchukuo, comprising a fertile and populous area as large as California. China was unable to offer much resistance, and Soviet Russia could not risk a major war in the Far East. Even so, some of the Soviet border clashes with the Japanese in time of “peace” were actually battles fought with tanks and planes.

In 1937 came the Japanese invasion of China proper. Germany and Italy were launching aggressions of the same stamp in Europe and Africa, and the world was to know little stability until all three totalitarian states had been crushed in World War II.

Soviet Russia had a grim struggle for survival while resisting the full tide of Nazi invasion. But at the time of the Yalta Conference, Stalin was in a position to ask a stiff price for military aid in the Pacific. The United States agreed that the Port Arthur area and southern Sakhalin should be returned to Russia to redress the “wrongs” of 1905. Concessions were also made in Manchuria and outer Mongolia.

Stalin, for his part, consented to sign a treaty of friendship with Nationalist China as an ally of the United States. Later events made it evident that he had no intention of keeping his pledges. On the contrary, Soviet policy already visioned a Communist empire in the Far East which would include China as well as Korea.

The Yalta Agreement was stridently criticized in the United States after Stalin’s duplicity became apparent. But the War Department took a realistic view as early as the spring of 1945:

“The concessions to Russia on Far Eastern matters which were made at Yalta are generally matters which are within the military power of Russia to obtain regardless of United States military action short of war. . . . The Russians can, if they choose, await the time when United States efforts will have practically completed the destruction of Japanese military power and can then seize the objectives they desire at a cost to them relatively much less than would be occasioned by their entry into the war at an early date.”[4]

This was precisely what happened. Moscow waited to declare war until 8 August 1945—6 days before the imminent collapse of Japan. Soviet forces fought only a few actions in Siberia with a Japanese army stripped of planes for home defense. As a consequence, Russian propagandists found it hard to paint a convincing picture
of “the heroic deeds of our brave Far Eastern warriors.”[5] Obviously they had met little resistance while overrunning Manchuria and northern Korea to accept the surrender of nearly 600,000 Japanese troops, including 148 generals. These prisoners were sent to Siberia for years of servitude; and the “conquerors” despoiled Manchuria of heavy machinery, turbines, dynamos and rolling stock.[6]

The value of this booty has been estimated at a billion dollars, and the forced labor of Japanese war prisoners during the next 5 years was worth at least another billion. Not satisfied with these spoils, Moscow also demanded a share in the occupation of Japan. This design was balked by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, supreme Allied commander, who made it plain that he needed no such assistance.[7]

Even after the guns fell silent, there was no peace. One enemy had been exchanged for another, since Soviet Russia took advantage of war-weary allies to follow in the footsteps of Germany and Japan. There was the same familiar pattern of encroachment both in Europe and the Far East. There were the same violations of treaties, the same unfriendly acts falling just short of hostilities. The cold war had begun.

Oppression at home and aggression abroad—this had been the policy of Russia’s czars, and it became the policy of Russia’s dictators. Despotism had been replaced by Communism, but there was little difference. Communism proved to be an old tyranny presented as a new ideology, and Joseph Stalin succeeded where Nicholas II failed. Circumstances were kinder to Stalin, and he gobbled up territory in Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Germany, Hungary, Rumania, Mongolia and Manchuria.

Never before had one man ruled so much of the earth’s surface. Yet there was something neurotic and fear-ridden about the Kremlin’s outlook which success could not cure. It has long been a historical theory that this psychosis may be traced back to Russia’s bondage in the Middle Ages under the Mongols and Tartars. At any rate, victory and enormous spoils did not give Moscow a sense of security in 1945. Buffer state was piled upon buffer state, and thousands of World War II prisoners were enslaved behind the “iron curtain” to build new Soviet military installations.
The importance of Korea in the Soviet scheme of things was indicated by the haste with which Russian troops crossed the frontier on 12 August 1945, three days after the declaration of war. They were the vanguard of an army numbering a quarter of a million men led by General Ivan Chistyakov, a hero of the battle of Stalingrad. The surrender terms called for a joint American and Soviet occupation, with the 38th parallel serving as a temporary line of demarcation. Not until 8 September, however, did Lieutenant General John R. Hodge reach southern Korea with the first American troops.

By that time the Russians had gone through their usual routine, and the machinery taken from northern Korea was estimated at 30 to 40 percent of the industrial potential. Looting by Soviet troops went unpunished, and regular supplies of food for the huge army were demanded from an impoverished people just freed of the Japanese yoke. The Russians had a tremendous advantage over United States occupation forces. Since World War I more than a million Koreans had found a refuge from Japanese bondage on Russian or Chinese soil. Thousands of men had been indoctrinated with Communist principles and given military training to aid the Chinese Reds fighting the Japanese invaders of China. Thus in 1945 the Russians could count on the efforts of Korean revolutionists to establish Communist rule in their homeland behind a façade of democracy.

The United States forces, on the contrary, did not even have enough interpreters. They impressed the Koreans at first as being alien occupation troops setting up a military government. Meanwhile, the Russians had installed an interim civil government at Pyongyang. Korean Reds filled the key positions, and Stalin’s portraits and the hammer and sickle emblem were seen at political rallies.

Koreans of all persuasions opposed the division of their country into two zones on either side of the 38th parallel. The Reds at Pyongyang contrived to lay the blame on the Americans. They made a further appeal to Koreans on both sides of the boundary by announcing a land reform in the northern zone. Ever since 1905 a Japanese landlord had been the hated symbol of oppression. Pyongyang won a great propaganda victory, therefore, by announcing the confiscation of all large estates, Korean as well as Japanese, and the division of the land among the peasantry.

The bait was so tempting that the hook did not become apparent until too late. Then the beneficiaries of the Agrarian Reform discovered that they could neither sell nor rent the land, nor could they use it as security for loans. If anyone ceased to work his holding, it reverted to the People’s Committee, which allocated it to some other family. The State retained possession, in short, and the peasant remained as much of a serf as ever. Worse yet, the taxes disguised as “production quotas” eventually amounted to 60 percent of the total crop, which was more than the Japanese had extorted.

This is a sample of the methods used to reduce North Korea to a police state, just as similar states were being organized in occupied lands of Europe by local Reds doing the bidding of Moscow. In the Soviet zone of Korea all banks, factories and industries of any consequence were nationalized by the so-called People’s Committee. Military training for offensive warfare was given to men armed with captured Japanese weapons. Pressure was put upon these recruits to “volunteer” for combat service with the Chinese Reds waging a civil war against the Nationalists.
Moscow was secretly backing the Communists led by Mao Tse-tung in their efforts to wrest China from the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek. Such activities, of course, were in violation of the treaty of friendship and alliance with Nationalist China which Stalin had signed on 14 August 1945. But agreements were never allowed to interfere with Soviet ambitions, and Moscow aimed to create in Asia a bulwark of Communist puppet states extending from the Arctic to the tropics.

Asiatic soil was peculiarly suited to the growth of such institutions. Although Communism derived originally from the theories of a German revolutionist, Karl Marx, it was adapted by Lenin and Stalin to the political climate of Asia. Human lives and liberties have always been held cheaply in the East, and absolutism has been the rule in government. Communism, as it developed in Russia after the revolution of 1917, would probably have been better understood by Genghis Khan than Marx. For it is significant that no Western nation has ever embraced this political faith voluntarily, even though it has attracted a minority of radicals and malcontents in nearly every country.

Asia was ripe for change after World War II. In spite of Japan’s defeat, that nation had made a good deal of progress with its “Asia for the Asiatics” propaganda. The Far East seethed with unrest in 1946, and Communism spread ominously through a China weakened by three decades of invasion, revolution and civil war.

While Nationalists and Communist armies contended for the ancient empire, an undeclared war went on in the background. This was the cold war between the United States and Soviet Russia as they supplied arms and munitions to the opposing forces. Russia also supplied troops and laborers. For it has been estimated that no less than 250,000 North Korean Reds were induced to serve in various capacities with the Chinese Communists in Manchuria.[12] There the soldiers completed their military training in actual combat, with veteran Chinese officers as instructors.

By 1948 there was no longer much doubt about the outcome in China. In the battles of Tsinan, Changchun and Mukden, the Nationalists lost 33 divisions, totaling more than 320,000 men, in killed, wounded and missing. Losses of equipment included 250,000 rifles and vast quantities of other arms and equipment. During the four and a half months following the fall of Tsinan in September 1948, the Nationalist losses were estimated at a million men and 400,000 rifles. Even planes of United States manufacture were captured by the Reds, who also acquired a cruiser that the British had transferred to the Nationalists.[13]

“The unfortunate but inescapable fact,” concluded the United States State Department in 1949, “is that the ominous result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the Government of the United States. Nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable limits of those capabilities could have changed that result; nothing that was left undone by this country could have contributed to it. It was the product of internal Chinese forces, forces which this country tried to influence but could not. A decision was arrived at within China, if only a decision by default.”[14]

As a result, Mao Tse-tung’s forces could claim a sweeping victory by the end of 1949. Only the island of Formosa was left to Chiang Kai-shek and his battered remnants. Meanwhile, it grew increasingly plain that Korea was destined to be the scene of the next great tug-of-war between Communism and the free nations.
Chapter 1. Korea, Doorstep of Strategy
Civil Strife in Korea

Not only had the Russians made the 38th Parallel a political boundary in Korea; they had also resisted all American attempts at unification. This meant that economic recovery was badly handicapped. For the mines, heavy industries and hydroelectric plants were located in the north, while the south had most of the agriculture. Products once exchanged with mutual benefit now had to be imported from abroad.

Trusteeship was hotly resented by all Koreans, even though few of them had gained administrative or technical experience under the Japanese. This prejudice was exploited by Soviet propagandists who denounced the “undemocratic” American policy of bringing in administrators, technicians and educators. As a consequence, the United States military government made a poor showing at first in comparison to the puppet government of Communist-trained Koreans installed at Pyongyang by Russians pulling the strings behind the scenes. Anti-American propaganda won converts to the south as well as north of the 38th Parallel, with General Hodge being accused of maintaining a harsh military rule.

At the Moscow Conference of 1945 the Soviet Union had agreed with the United States that the whole of Korea was to be given a democratic government after passing through the trusteeship phase. A Soviet-American Joint Commission was to meet and make recommendations for this purpose; but as early as 1946 it became evident that the Soviet representatives had been instructed to sabotage any attempt to create a united Korea with its own government.

After the failure of the first year’s efforts, Hodge ordered the establishment of an Interim Legislature at Seoul as the counterpart of the People’s Assembly at Pyongyang. Of the 90 seats, half were to be filled by popular vote and the remaining 45 by Korean appointees of the Military Government. The election was a triumph for the American-educated Dr. Syngman Rhee and the rightists. Hodge tried to give the other South Korean factions a voice by appointing moderates and liberals, but the Interim Legislature had no solution for the discontent in Korea as the economic situation went from bad to worse in spite of American aid.

Although the Americans on the Joint Commission did their best, they were blocked by all manner of Soviet-contrived delays and obstacles. Finally, in 1947, the United States submitted the question to the United Nations. After long discussion, the General Assembly resolved that all the people of Korea be given an opportunity in the spring of 1948 to elect a national assembly for the entire country.

A commission representing nine member nations was appointed to visit Korea and supervise the voting. But the Russians not only refused to participate in the election; they went so far as to bar the commissioners from entering North Korea.

The new National Assembly elected in May 1948 by South Korea had the task of forming a government. On 17 July the first constitution in 40 years of Korean history was approved by the deputies, who elected Syngman Rhee to a 4-year term as president.

It was an eventful summer south of the 38th Parallel. The Republic of Korea came into being on 15 August, and on that day the American military government ended. John J. Muccio was appointed by President Truman to represent the United States in Korea with the rank of ambassador. Plans were made to withdraw the 50,000 United States occupation troops during the next 8 months, leaving only 500 officers and men as military instructors for the training of a Republic of Korea security force.

In the northern zone the Communists organized demonstrations against the United Nations Commission. Strikes and disorders were fomented south of the 38th Parallel, and 200,000 North Koreans marched in protest at
There was an air of urgency about such attempts to prevent the election in South Korea. The exposure of the Agrarian Reform as a fraud had hurt the Communists, and the disinterested spirit of the United States occupation was gaining recognition throughout Korea in spite of initial blunders. Pyongyang could not afford to let South Korea take the lead in forming a government, and July 1948 dated the creation of a Communist state known as the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea. After adopting a constitution modeled after that of Communist Bulgaria, the Supreme People’s Council claimed to represent all Korea. In justification it was charged that “American imperialists carried out a ruinous separate election and organized a so-called National Assembly with the support of a traitor minority and with the savage oppression of the majority of the Korean people.”[15]

The Russians announced in December 1948 that they were withdrawing all occupation troops. It was no secret, however, that they would leave behind them an NK army that far surpassed the ROK military establishment.[16] Kim Il Sung, the Red Korean prime minister, referred to it pointedly as a “superior army” in an address at Pyongyang.

“We must strengthen and improve it,” he declared. “Officers and men must establish iron discipline and must be proficient in the military and in combat techniques.”[17]

Numbers at the end of 1948 were estimated at 60,000 regulars in addition to constabulary, railroad guards, and trainees. These troops were equipped by the Russians with captured Japanese weapons, and Russian arms were shipped into northern Korea to meet the needs of an expanding army.[18]

It was a military force of an entirely different character that American officers organized on the other side of the 38th Parallel. The new ROK army was strictly a defensive force, trained and equipped to maintain internal security and guard the border and seacoast. Neither tanks nor military planes were provided by the Americans, who leaned backward to avoid any suspicion of creating an instrument for offensive internecine warfare.

Raids by Red Korean troops across the border became a frequent occurrence throughout 1949. One of these forays, supported by artillery, was a large-scale NK thrust into the Ongjin Peninsula. Heavy fighting resulted before the invaders were driven back into their own territory.

Having failed to prevent the formation of a democratic Korean government—the only government in Korea recognized by the United Nations—the Reds at Pyongyang were making every effort to wreck it. Since 80 percent of the ROK electric power originated north of the frontier, they were able to retard economic recovery by cutting off the current at intervals. There was no other unfriendly act in the Communist bagful of tricks that Pyongyang neglected to employ while its radio stations blared forth a propaganda of hatred.

Early in 1950 the situation grew more tense daily as thousands of veterans returned to North Korea after serving in the Communist armies which overran China. When Radio Pyongyang began making appeals for peace that spring, it should have become obvious to practiced observers of Communist techniques that preparations were afoot for war. On 10 June 1950 the Pyongyang government announced a new plan for unification and peace after branding the top ROK officials as “traitors.” The motive behind this proposal was apparently the usual Communist attempt to divide an enemy on the eve of an aggression. For the long-planned blow fell at 0400 (Korean time) on Sunday morning, 25 June 1950. Russian-made tanks spearheaded the advance of the NK ground forces across the 38th Parallel, and Russian-made planes strafed Seoul and other strategic centers.

Captured NK documents offer proof that the invaders had already set the machinery of aggression in motion while making their plea for peace. This evidence included the written report of instructions given by one Lieutenant Han to a group of picked men on an intelligence mission. On 1 June 1950 they were to proceed by power boat to an island off Inchon, where confederates would help them make their way to the mainland. “Our mission,” explained Han, “is to gather intelligence information concerning South Korean forces and routes of
advance ahead of our troops. We will perform this task by contacting our comrades who are scattered throughout the length and breadth of South Korea.”[19]

The lieutenant explained that the forthcoming attack on South Korea was to be the first step toward the “liberation” of the people of Asia. And his concluding remarks leave no doubt as to the complete confidence with which the Korean Communists began the venture:

“Within 2 months from the date of attack, Pusan should have fallen and South Korea will be again united with the North. The timetable for this operation of 2 months’ duration was determined by the possibility of United States forces intervening in the conflict. If this were not so, it would take our forces only 10 days to overrun South Korea.”[20]
IT WAS AN army of veterans that broke the world’s peace in Korea. There were thousands of veterans of the Chinese civil war and Manchurian guerrilla operations. There were even a few scarred warriors who had served with the Soviet forces in such World War II operations as the defense of Stalingrad.

Practically all the commissioned and noncommissioned officers were battle-hardened, and a majority of the rank and file had seen action. The origins of this army were deeply rooted in Asiatic soil. During World War II an endless stream of Koreans escaped from Japanese bondage and found a refuge in Soviet or Chinese territory. Some of them took to banditry, others were absorbed into the Soviet or Red Chinese armed forces. These refugees dreamed of a united and independent homeland; and at Yenan, China, the Chinese Communists encouraged this movement as early as 1939 by supplying arms to a force known as the Korean Volunteer Army. During the first month alone the KVA attracted 3,000 recruits, and at the end of the war an advance column marched back to Korea under a leader named Kim Mu Chong.[1]

Although the heads of the KVA had been thoroughly impregnated with Communist doctrine at Yenan, they were coldly received by General Chistyakov and the Russian occupation forces. It was a Soviet puppet state that the Kremlin wished to see established in Korea, not a Red-tinted independent Korean government. Communist right-thinking did not save Kim Mu Chong and his KVA troops from the humiliation of being stopped at the frontier in September 1945 and disarmed.

The Russian commander piously justified his decision on grounds of upholding international law. But he offered to return the confiscated arms if the Korean Reds would retrace their steps and join the CCF fight against the Nationalists. He promised that after the struggle had been won, the KVA would be welcomed back to Korea. [2]

Accepting these terms, Kim Mu Chong marched into Manchuria to aid the Chinese Reds. His force numbered nearly 20,000 the following spring, but the KVA lost its identity when the men were mingled with Chinese and Mongolians in the CCF Northeast Democratic United Army. Most of the officers and NCO’s of the former KVA were organized into teams to recruit and train Korean volunteers both in Manchuria and Korea. As combined military instructors and political commissars, they created an integrated Communist force out of such oddly assorted material as peasants, guerrillas and bandits. Used first as security troops and later welded into a regular army structure, these thousands of Korean Reds undoubtedly had the principal part in “liberating” Manchuria from the Chinese Nationalists.

Meanwhile, the Russian occupation forces did not neglect the conversion of North Korea into a satellite state. One of the first steps was the establishment of a military academy at Pyongyang in the autumn of 1945. Founded ostensibly for the training of police, it had as its primary purpose the instruction of army officers. Graduates of the first and second classes became teachers when branches of the academy were set up at Nanam, Sinuiju and Hamhung. These offshoots, known as the Peace Preservation Officers’ Schools, turned out the cadres which were later activated as the 1st, 2d and 3d Divisions of the new North Korean army. For more than 2 years, however, the fiction was maintained that graduates were to patrol rural areas, protect railroads and guard the frontier.
The Pusan Perimeter
Lynn Montross and Nicholas A. Canzona

Chapter 2. Red Aggression in Korea
Units of North Korean Army

Not until 8 February 1948 did the “North Korean People’s Army” come into official being with the activation of the 1st, 2d and 3d Infantry Divisions. At that time there were some 30,000 troops and 170,000 trainees in North Korea, according to later United States Army intelligence estimates.[3]

The 4th Infantry Division was formed in 1948 from trainees plus a veteran regiment transferred from the 2d Division. Two new infantry divisions, the 5th and 6th, were organized the following year when Korean veterans of the 164th and 166th CCF Divisions returned as units with their arms and equipment.[4]

It is probable that the leaders of the North Korean state were committed early in 1950 to the invasion of the Republic of Korea. At any rate, the training and organization of new units was accelerated during the spring months. From February to June nine new divisions were activated—the 7th, 8th, 9th, 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th Infantry Divisions, 10th Mechanized Infantry Division and 105th Armored Division.[5]

Two factors combined to hasten the NKPA aggression. It had undoubtedly become evident to the Kremlin in 1949 that the Republic of Korea could never be brought into the Communist fold by propaganda, subversion, incitation of disorders or any other means short of a victorious civil war. Moreover, a successful war of invasion was equally desirable as a cure for political discontent at home. Not only was the Agrarian Reform resented everywhere in North Korea, but taxes had gone up as high as 60 percent of the crops to maintain the top-heavy military structure and pay for tanks, planes, howitzers and other arms supplied by the Soviet Union. Although most of the heavy industries of Korea were located north of the 38th Parallel, they included no arms plants with the exception of a small factory capable of turning out submachineguns and ammunition. North Korea was also able to produce 80 percent of its own POL products for military purposes and some of the army uniforms. Other supplies, all the way from the Tokarev semiautomatic pistol (adapted from the U.S. .45 Colt) to the T-34 tank, were imported from the U.S.S.R.[6]

Most of the weapons were old models of recent manufacture. The heaviest load came by rail from Siberia through Manchuria via Antung and crossed the Yalu into Korea at Sinuiju. As many as three freight trains a day rumbled over the bridge between those cities and continued along the west coast to Pyongyang. Supplies were also received from Vladivostok by water to Chongjin or by the east coast rail line to Wonsan.[7]

It must also be remembered that thousands of Korean veterans of the Chinese civil war returned with their arms and equipment, including American-manufactured weapons surrendered by the Nationalists. The NKPA was second only to the Soviet Army itself in the spring of 1950 as the best armed and equipped military force of its size in the Far East.

The U.S.S.R. did not limit its aid to arms. Lieutenant General Vasilev and a group of Soviet military instructors arrived at Pyongyang in 1949 to train NKPA staff and line officers for offensive warfare. About 3,000 promising NKPA candidates were sent to Soviet schools that year for courses in such specialties as artillery, air and tank tactics.

Of the original 14 NKPA divisions, the first 6 were composed largely of well trained troops. The 12th Division, like the 5th and 6th, consisted of Korean veterans of the Chinese civil war. Constabulary troops made up the 8th and 9th, while the 7th, 13th, 14th, and 15th Infantry Divisions and the 10th Mechanized Infantry Division were formed of conscripted trainees for the most part.[8]

The picture grows confused in the spring of 1950, with 8 new divisions being organized in 5 months. Many of the recently drafted men received only the most sketchy training; and some of the older units were
weakened by drawing off well trained men to stiffen the new outfits. All accounts agree, however, that the NKPA leaders anticipated an effort of only a few days, ending with the destruction of the ROK army. This was not an unreasonable assumption, since a swarm of NKPA spies had brought back accurate reports of unpreparedness. Not only was the Republic of Korea weak militarily, but a bad economic situation had been made worse by increased population due to immigration.

Altogether, Pyongyang could put nearly 100,000 fairly well-trained and armed troops in the field, with about half of that number in reserve as replacements, occupation troops or constabulary. But the problem of manpower did not worry Communists who were not squeamish about violations of international law. For the aggressors planned to make war nourish war by conscripting both soldiers and laborers in invaded regions of the Republic of Korea. It was an old Asiatic custom.
With few exceptions, the North Korean war leaders proved to be willing and able instruments of policies formulated in Moscow. Kim Il Sung, the prime minister and commander in chief, was an imposter named Kim Sung Chu who made a bid for popular support by taking the name of a dead Korean resistance hero. As a youth he had fled from Korea and joined the Communist party in Manchuria. There he distinguished himself in guerrilla operations against the Japanese. In 1938, after rising to the stature of a corps commander, he met military reverses and found a refuge in Soviet territory. Legend has it that he attended a Soviet military academy and took part in the battle of Stalingrad. However this may be, he returned to Korea in August 1945 as a 35-year-old captain in the Soviet army of occupation.[9]

South Korean descriptions of Kim Il Sung as an uneducated ruffian were doubtless prejudiced, but certainly he was a ruthless guerrilla leader who showed an uncommon aptitude for politics. His rise in the new North Korean state was spectacular, for in September 1948 he became the first prime minister. The following year he went to Moscow for conferences at the Kremlin, and nine days after the outbreak of civil war in Korea he was appointed commander in chief of the invading army while retaining his position as prime minister.

In contrast to this rough diamond, Marshal Choe Yong Gun cut a reserved and dignified figure as deputy commander in chief and minister of national defense. Born in Hongchon, Korea, at the turn of the century, he had the equivalent of a high school education. In 1925 he went to China and is believed to have attended the Whampoa Military Academy at Nanking and the Yenan Military School. At Yenan, after being converted to communism, he became a political instructor and later served in the 8th Route Army. Choe was commander of the Korean Volunteer Army in 1941 and fought against the Japanese in Manchuria. Returning to Korea in 1945, he commanded the Cadre Training Center until 1948, when he was named the first commander in chief.

Even Choe’s enemies in South Korea credited him with a high order of intellectual capacity and moral courage. Despite his Communist party membership, he opposed the invasion of the Republic of Korea. He was cool, moreover, toward Lieutenant General Vasilev and the other Soviet advisers who reached Pyongyang in 1949 to prepare the Korean armed forces for an offensive war. This attitude probably explains why he was sidetracked in March 1950, when Vasilev took charge of the combat training and re-equipment program. Although Choe was not on good terms with Kim Il Sung at this time, he was regarded as a superior strategist and administrator. And after being bypassed temporarily, he continued to be respected as a leader by the North Korean army and peasantry.

Nam Il stood out as the most cosmopolitan and polished of the North Korean war leaders. Born in 1911, he was Kim Il Sung’s schoolmate in Manchuria and the two remained lifelong friends. As a young man, Nam Il made his way across the U.S.S.R. to Smolensk and attended college and a military academy. He entered the Soviet army at the outbreak of World War II and is said to have participated along with Kim Il Sung in the Stalingrad defense.

Both of them returned to Korea with the rank of captain in the Soviet army of occupation, and both entered upon successful Communist political careers. In 1948 Nam Il was elected to the Supreme People’s Council and became vice-minister of education in charge of military instruction. The most Russianized of the North Korean leaders, he took pains to cultivate the good will of the Soviet advisers. Speaking English, Russian, and Chinese as well as Korean, he held an advantage over his North Korean rivals in such contacts. He also made a better appearance, being tall for an Oriental and always well turned out in a meticulously pressed uniform and
gleaming boots.

A major general without an active field command at the outbreak of war, he was rapidly advanced to the rank of lieutenant general and chief of staff. His stern demeanor, while seated stiffly in his black Chrysler driven by a uniformed chauffeur, soon became one of the most impressive sights of Pyongyang. But his talents remained more political than military, and he never won the respect which the army accorded to Choe Yong Gun.

Among the corps commanders, there was none more able than Lieutenant General Kim Ung. About 40 years old at the outbreak of war, he had graduated from the Kumchon Commercial School in Korea and the Whampoa Military Academy in China. As an officer of the 8th Route Army, he won a reputation for daring in 1939 by tossing hand grenades into a conference of Japanese generals at Peiping and escaping after inflicting numerous casualties. Returning to Korea in 1946, he started as a regimental commander and made a relatively slow rise because of his CCF background. But after lining up with the Soviet faction in the army, he was promoted to the command of the 1st Division in 1948 and of I Corps during the invasion.

The rapid ascent of Lieutenant General Yu Kyong Su to the command of III Corps would indicate that promotion was sometimes due to political influence. A graduate of a Red Army tank school in 1938 at the age of 33, Yu served throughout World War II as a company grade officer in a Soviet tank unit. After his return to Korea, he married Kim II Sung’s sister and shot up from the command of an NK tank regiment in 1948 to the rank of corps commander late in 1950. During the first few weeks of the invasion, he was awarded the highest NKPA decoration, the “Hero of the Korean Democratic People’s Republic,” with a concurrent award, the “Order of the National Flag, 1st Class.”

On the other hand, the career of former Lieutenant General Kim Mu Chong, ex-commander of II Corps and ex-chief of artillery, was blasted by the opposition of Kim Il Sung and Nam Il. A CCF veteran, Mu had served under Mao Tse-tung on the “Long March” as one of 30 Koreans to survive the ordeal. He commanded a Chinese artillery brigade and was rated the best CCF artilleryman. In 1945 he came back to Korea and conducted a speaking tour stressing the desirability of cooperating with Red China and omitting any reference to the Soviet Union. This lapse explains his failure in North Korean politics, but in deference to his high military reputation he was given command of II Corps in June 1950. The poor showing made by his units on the central front was ascribed by Mu to the fact that Kim Il Sung picked him for missions which could not succeed. Although he did not lack for support in the army, Mu was relieved of his command and other positions in the late summer of 1950. Expulsion from the North Korean Labor Party followed after Kim Il Sung denounced him in a speech for disobedience of orders.

Mu’s downfall was only one chapter in the bitter struggle for power waged by two opposing tactical schools in the North Korean army from 1948 to 1950. Veterans of CCF campaigns against the Japanese and Chinese Nationalists upheld a system of large-scale guerrilla warfare refined into a military science. Approach marches under cover of darkness, infiltrations, probing night attacks—these were the basic tactics employed by Mao Tse Tung’s forces for the conquest of China. Although mobility was the keynote, a rigid tactical system allowed little latitude of decision to officers below the regimental level. School solutions were provided for every military problem that could be foreseen, and many of the North Korean officers had graduated from the CCF military academy at Yenan.

Another group of officers advocated the tactics learned at Soviet military schools and in Soviet campaigns of World War II. This system, of course, made the CCF tactics seem primitive in comparison. For the Russians placed much more dependence in armor and artillery as preparation for infantry envelopments. Such tactics called for more supplies and ammunition than could have been provided by the elementary CCF logistics.

The CCF veterans seemed to have the upper hand in the North Korean army early in 1948. But a survey of NKPA officers’ careers during the next 2 years indicates that their opponents triumphed. Thus, at the onset of civil war, most of the key positions in the army were filled by men who had hitched their wagons to the red star of...
Moscow, both militarily and politically.

This does not mean that CCF tactics had been put aside entirely. On the contrary, these methods had evolved out of military poverty and were admirably adapted to an Asiatic peasant army. The North Korean forces, being compelled to import arms, were never able to afford enough planes, tanks, and artillery to make the best of the Soviet system. And it was inevitable that heavy losses of such equipment in combat would cause a reversion to CCF tactics.
The Pusan Perimeter
Lynn Montross and Nicholas A. Canzona

Chapter 2. Red Aggression in Korea
The NKPA Infantry Division

No child ever bore a more striking likeness to its parent than did the NKPA to the Soviet organization of World War II.

The army as a whole came under the overall control of General Headquarters at Pyongyang, which planned and directed the invasion of ROK territory. As the troops advanced, a Front Headquarters was set up to control corps operations. This organization of Soviet origin was the highest tactical echelon of command. Normally including three or four corps of several divisions each, it resembled an army group in military establishments of other nations. Front Headquarters had only a wartime mission and could be disbanded in time of peace.[10]

Next to the corps in the chain of command was the infantry division, the basic tactical formation, modeled after that of the Red Army in World War II. Of triangular design, numbering some 11,000 men, it was reported by POW’s to consist of a headquarters, three rifle regiments, an artillery regiment, a signal battalion, an antitank battalion, a training battalion, a reconnaissance troop, and such division rear services as medical, veterinary, transport, and supply units.[11]

Division Headquarters, with about 120 men, included the commander, a major general, and officers of the division and special staff. Closely associated with the CG, and possessing almost as much power and responsibility, was the division political deputy, usually a senior colonel, who supervised politico-military activities and reported any deviations from doctrine. This was a peculiarly Communistic institution, of course, and it was the duty of the deputy to see that officers and men of the division remained well indoctrinated.

The NKPA rifle regiment, with a T/O strength of about 2,500 men, consisted of 3 rifle battalions and supporting artillery. Each of these battalions, numbering some 650 officers and men, included 3 rifle companies, a heavy machinegun company, a mortar company, an antitank gun platoon and an antitank rifle platoon in addition to signal, medical, and supply platoons.

An NKPA rifle company, which had a T/O strength of about 150 men, was made up of a headquarters, 3 rifle platoons and a heavy machinegun section. The rifle platoon had 4 squads and a T/O strength of 45 men. Squad weapons were said to include a light machinegun, a sub-machinegun and Soviet M1891/30 rifles. Two hand grenades were carried by each rifleman.

An army patterned after the Soviet system was certain to emphasize artillery, and the NKPA artillery reserve at the outset of the invasion consisted of 3 regiments—1 attached to GHQ, and 1 to each of the 2 corps operating at that time. But shortages of equipment and logistical problems made it necessary in actual combat for the NKPA to concentrate most of its artillery potential within the rifle division.

The organic artillery support of each division included a regiment with a T/O total of approximately 1,000 men. Two 76-mm. gun battalions, a 122-mm. howitzer battalion and a headquarters company numbered some 250 men each. A battalion consisted of 3 firing batteries with 12 artillery pieces each, and personnel carried M1938 carbines.

There was also a self-propelled artillery battalion made up of 3 gun companies, a signal platoon and a rear services section with a total of 16 SU-76 pieces. A lieutenant colonel commanded this unit, which had a T/O strength of 110 officers and men.

The other major components of the NKPA infantry division were as follows:

SIGNAL BATTALION. — a wire company, radio company and headquarters company, making a total
of 260 officers and men.

ANTITANK BATTALION.—about 190 officers and men in three 45-mm. antitank companies and an antitank rifle company.

ENGINEER BATTALION.—T/O of 250 officers and men carrying M1944 rifles and equipped with picks, shovels, axes, saws and mine detectors.

TRAINING BATTALION.—About 500 officers and men charged with the responsibility of training NCO’s for the division.

RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY. — an estimated strength of 4 officers and 90 enlisted men equipped with 80 submachineguns, 20 Tokarev pistols, 4 telescopes and 5 pairs of binoculars.

REAR SERVICES.—a medical battalion, a transport company, a veterinary unit and a supply section. Of the 200 personnel in the medical battalion, about 60 were women, according to POW testimony. The transport company, with some 70 men, was composed of 50 2½-ton trucks, 6 or 7 motorcycles and 10 horse-drawn wagons.[12]

The NKPA infantry division, in short, was a faithful copy of the World War II Soviet model. But it must be remembered that the foregoing T/O and T/E statistics represented the ideal more often than the reality. Owing to the speeding up of preparations in anticipation of an easy victory, many NKPA units lacked their full quotas of men and equipment at the outset of the invasion.
POW interrogations revealed that NKPA military aviation evolved from the North Korean Aviation Society, founded in 1945 at the Sinuiju Airfield by Colonel Lee Hwal, a Korean who had served in the Japanese air force. The organization consisted at first of about 70 students and 17 pilots who were veterans of Japanese air operations. Equipment included a few aircraft of Japanese manufacture and several gliders.[]

In 1946 the Society was required to transfer its aircraft and trained personnel to the Aviation Section of the Pyongyang Military Academy. Soviet-trained Korean officers were placed in positions of responsibility under the command of Colonel Wang Yun, a former captain in the Soviet air force who replaced Lee Hwal.

The Aviation Section numbered about 100 officers, 250 enlisted men and 500 students by November 1948. Estimates of aircraft are contradictory, but one source reported 7 Japanese trainers, 6 Japanese fighters and a Japanese twin-engine transport. Shortly afterwards the first Soviet aircraft were received, and the NKPA Air Force was created from the Aviation Section and moved to the Pyongyang air base.

The final phase of development came in January 1950 with the expansion of the air regiment into a division under the command of Wang Yun, promoted to major general. Strength of the unit in April 1950 was estimated at about 1,675 officers and men, including 364 officers, 76 pilots, 875 enlisted men, and 360 cadets. The receipt of more Soviet planes at this time brought the number of aircraft up to 178, including 78 YAK-7B fighters, 30 PO-2 primary and YAK-18 advanced trainers, and 70 II-10 ground attack bombers.

Captured documents indicate that the aviation training program was speeded up along with other NKPA activities during the last few months before the invasion. In June 1950 each pilot was required to fly 40 training missions and attend 40 hours of lectures. As preparations for the invasion neared completion, a forward displacement of tactical aircraft was put into effect.[]

The North Korean armored division, a copy of its Soviet counterpart, had only about half of the overall strength. Thus the NKPA 105th Armored Division, comprising some 6,000 officers and men, included 3 medium tank regiments, the 107th, 109th, and 203d, with 40 tanks each. Organic supporting units were the 206th Mechanized Infantry Regiment and the 308th Armored Battalion equipped with self-propelled 76-mm. guns. POW reports also mentioned reconnaissance, engineer, signal, ordnance and medical battalions and a mixed unit identified as the 849th Antitank Regiment, attached to the division after the invasion started.

All reports indicate that the division was split in combat, with each tank regiment being assigned to an infantry division. Even the training of the regiments had been conducted separately, and there is no evidence of prewar maneuvers on the division level.

Each tank regiment had an estimated T/O strength of about 600 officers and men. The three medium tank battalions were supported by a regimental submachinegun company, a supply and maintenance company and a headquarters section in addition to engineer, signal, reconnaissance, and medical platoons. Forty T-34/85 medium tanks were divided into 13 for each battalion and 1 for the headquarters section, which also rated a CAZ/67 jeep.

Responsibility for the indoctrination of the regiment rested with a political section headed by a lieutenant colonel. As assistants he had 2 officers and 3 sergeants.

An NKPA tank battalion included a headquarters section and three 25-man companies. A company contained three platoons, each of which was assigned a medium tank. The standard crew consisted of the commander, usually a senior lieutenant, the driver and assistant driver, the gunner in charge of the 85-mm. rifle, and the assistant gunner operating the 7.62-mm. machinegun. The usual ammunition load was 55 85-mm. shells
and 2,000 rounds of machinegun ammunition.

Not much was known about the 206th Mechanized Infantry Regiment, but it was believed to consist of three motorized infantry battalions, a 76-mm. howitzer battalion, a 45-mm. antitank battalion, a 120-mm. mortar battalion, a signal company, and an NCO training company.[16]
Officer procurement problems were solved in large part by the fact that thousands of North Koreans had seen combat service with the CCF forces. Many of these veterans were qualified as junior officers or NCO’s without further training. Remaining vacancies for company-grade officers were filled by officer candidate schools or the commissioning of qualified NCO’s.

The West Point of the NKPA, located at Pyongyang, turned out an estimated 4,000 junior officers from the time of its activation in 1946 to the beginning of the invasion. Courses normally ranged in length from 6 to 10 months, but were abbreviated to 3 months during the autumn of 1949 in anticipation of the invasion. After hostilities began, the need for replacement officers became so urgent that one entire class at the Pyongyang academy was commissioned wholesale on 10 July 1950 and sent to the front after 20 days of instruction.[17]

Three Soviet officers, a colonel and two lieutenant colonels, reportedly acted as advisers to a faculty composed of NKPA majors. The five departments of the Academy were devoted to infantry, artillery, engineering, signaling, and quartermasters’ duties. A second military academy at Pyongyang specialized in subjects which Communists termed “cultural.” So much importance was attached to political indoctrination that graduates of this school were commissioned as senior lieutenants and given unusual authority in their units. Although a 2-year Russian language course was offered, most of the candidates took the standard 9-month term.

Branches of the Pyongyang military academy were established as officer candidate schools in Hamhung, Chinnampo, Chorwon, Mesanjin, Kaechon and Kanggye. Applicants were required to have an acceptable political background and a 6-year minimum of schooling, though the last was sometimes waived. A command and staff school at Pyongyang offered advanced tactical and administrative courses at the battalion and regimental level to selected officers. At the other extreme, NCO schools were located at Sadong, Sinuiju, Sinchon and Nanam. Tactical instruction was given at the platoon and squad level with emphasis on weapons courses. NCO training was accelerated in preparation for hostilities, and 4,000 veterans of CCF service in Manchuria completed 2-month courses at the Sadong school alone in the spring of 1950.

Technical training in aircraft, artillery, tank and engineering specialties was offered in schools for junior officers as well as enlisted men. But it appears that most of the officers above the company level received their instruction in Soviet schools.[18]

Conscription, according to POW accounts, was introduced as early as 1948. In the rural districts each myon (a political subdivision smaller than a county but comprising several villages) was given its quota of recruits to be furnished between the ages of 18 and 35. The village chiefs then assembled all the men in this age group and made their decisions on an arbitrary basis. Selectees had little or no hope of appeal, but were assured that provision would be made for their families during the 3-year term of service.[19]

The system was much the same in North Korean cities, which were divided into sections for conscription purposes. Sometimes the leaders in urban areas called for volunteers. If the response was lacking in enthusiasm, men were singled out and requested to “volunteer.” This method was invariably successful, since a man who refused could be deprived of employment.

The conscription program was speeded up along with other preparations as invasion plans neared completion. About 12,000 men were inducted from March through May 1950 and given 6 weeks of basic training at such camps as the No. 2 People’s Training Center at Sinuiju.
In some communities the men eligible for military service were requested to attend a meeting. Upon arrival, they were taken in trucks to a training center and compelled to enlist.

Harsh as such methods might seem, they were gentle as compared to the forced conscription of ROK civilians after the invasion got underway. Both men and women in captured cities were crowded into school buildings, given political indoctrination and forced to learn Communist songs. After a week of this curriculum, the men were inducted both as combat recruits and laborers. And though the women were told that their service would be limited to duty as nurses or clerks, some of them were coerced into carrying out reconnaissance or espionage missions.[20]
Chapter 2. Red Aggression in Korea
The NKPA Order of Battle

The transition from a cold war to a shooting war in Korea should not have surprised anyone familiar with the events of the past 2 years. For several hours, indeed, there was a reasonable doubt on the historic morning of 25 June 1950 whether an undeclared war had begun or merely another large-scale NKPA raid across the frontier. But this time it was the real thing. Commencing at 0400, 7 infantry divisions and an armored division swept across the 38th Parallel, with 2 infantry divisions in reserve. From right to left, the NKPA order of battle was as follows:

The 6th Infantry Division along the west coast, sealing off the Ongjin Peninsula and moving on Kaesong; the 1st Infantry Division advancing on Kaesong and Seoul; the 4th and 3rd Infantry Divisions and 105th Armored Division attacking in west-central Korea and converging on Seoul; the 2d and 15th Infantry Divisions driving toward the Hwachon-Chunchon axis in east-central Korea; and the 5th Infantry Division taking the route along the east coast. Following close behind were the two reserve infantry divisions, the 13th and 15th.[21]

There was no question as to the outcome in the minds of observers who knew the composition of the ROK army. The very name was misleading, for it might more accurately have been described as a large constabulary in process of being converted into an army. Given another year of training and added arms and equipment, the Republic of Korea would perhaps have built up an adequate defense establishment. But the enemy took good care to strike while this development was still at the blueprint stage.

In June 1949, at the conclusion of the occupation, the United States forces turned over arms and equipment to the value of about $110,000,000. These supplies included 100,000 small arms (rifles, pistols and machineguns) and 50,000,000 rounds of ammunition; more than 4,900 vehicles of all types; about 2,000 2.36" rocket launchers and 40,000 rounds of ammunition; and a large number of 105-mm. howitzers, 37-mm. and 57-mm. antitank guns, and 60-mm. and 81-mm. mortars, together with 700,000 rounds of ammunition for those weapons. Twenty training planes (L4 and L5 types) were transferred as well as 79 light naval craft suitable for patrolling the coast.[22]

It is noteworthy that this list was limited to light arms for a constabulary of about 50,000 men. Tanks, military aircraft and medium or heavy artillery were significantly lacking.

At the request of the ROK government, a Korean Military Advisory Group remained in South Korea after the conclusion of the American occupation. Composed of 500 United States Army officers and enlisted men, the KMAG took on the task of directing the training of a ROK constabulary. The group was under the control of Ambassador Muccio, since General MacArthur’s responsibility for the defense had ended along with the occupation.[23]

After the NKPA invasion, the United States was severely criticized in some quarters for failing to provide the Republic of Korea with arms and training equal to those of the enemy. American reluctance was due in some measure to indiscreet declarations by that fiery old Korean patriot, Syngman Rhee. The ROK president, 74 years old at the outbreak of civil war, did not shrink from advocating the unification of Korea by armed force. On 20 February 1949 he predicted that his troops “could defeat North Korea within 2 weeks” if the U.S.S.R. did not interfere. Eight months later, on 7 October, his confidence had increased to the point where he was “sure that we could take Pyongyang in 3 days.”[24]

Such remarks placed the United States in an uncomfortable position. If aid to the Republic of Korea were to include tanks, military aircraft and training for offensive warfare, Americans would be open to the charge
of inciting civil strife. Communist propagandists would scream that accusation in any event, of course, but there would be grounds for the suspicion of other members of the United Nations. Ambassador Muccio made sure, therefore, that United States assistance did not extend beyond the legitimate needs of ROK frontier defense and internal security.

The triangular ROK infantry division was modeled after the United States unit but numbered about 9,500 troops. Eight divisions and a regiment had been organized and partially trained by June 1950. They were the 1st, 2d, 3d, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and Capital Divisions and the 17th Regiment. Only 4 of these divisions, the 1st, 2d, 6th, and 7th, had their full complement of 3 regiments. All the others had 2 except the 5th, which had 2 and a battalion.

ROK military strength was estimated at 98,808 troops by the KMAG in June 1950. About 65,000 of them had been given unit training for combat. They were fairly proficient in the employment of small arms and mortars, but their instruction had not included defense against tanks. Command and staff work were still at a rudimentary stage, and both officers and NCO’s needed seasoning.

The ROK Army of June 1950 had made good progress, in short, when it is considered that most of its components had been activated within the past year. But it was no match for the Red Korean columns which attacked at dawn on 25 June 1950. The ROK order of battle, if such it could be called, consisted of a regiment and four infantry divisions ranged from left to right across the peninsula—the 17th Regiment and the 1st, 7th, 6th, and 8th Divisions. The remaining divisions were dispersed for purposes of internal security: the Capital at Seoul; the 2d at Chongju and Taejon; the 3d at Taegu; and the 5th at Kwangju.

The ROK frontier forces were not well disposed for defense in depth. Taken by surprise, they put up an ineffectual resistance despite brave fights here and there against odds. On other occasions the sight of an enemy tank or armored car was enough to scatter ROK riflemen, and the progress of the invading columns resembled an occupation rather than an attack.

Before sundown on the day of invasion it appeared that NKPA leaders had not erred in allowing a timetable of 10 days for overrunning the Republic of Korea. The question now was whether the conflict could be confined to that Asiatic peninsula. Communist aggressions were no novelty, to be sure, either in Asia or Europe. But in the past there had always been some show of peaceable intentions, however hypocritical, or some shadow of legality. This was the first time that a Soviet puppet nation had been permitted to go as far as open warfare. Matters had come to a showdown, and it could only be interpreted as a challenge issued by Communism to the free nations of the world.
AT THREE O’CLOCK in the morning of 25 June 1950 the telephone rang in the New York suburban home of Trygve Lie, secretary-general of the United Nations. He was informed that North Korean forces had crossed the 38th Parallel to invade the Republic of Korea.

The news had just been received by the United States Department of State directly from Seoul. Ambassador Muccio had emphasized that this was not one of the large-scale North Korean raids into ROK territory which had become an old story during the past 2 years. For his report concluded:

“It would appear from the nature of the attack and the manner in which it was launched that it constitutes an all-out offensive against the Republic of Korea.”[1]

The implications were disturbing. Every middle-aged American could recall the failure of the League of Nations to halt Japanese, Italian, and German aggressions of the 1930’s with moral suasions. Even when economic sanctions were invoked, the aggressors went their way defiantly without respect for anything short of armed force. And now history seemed to be repeating itself with dismaying fidelity as new aggressors challenged the new union of nations striving to maintain peace after World War II.

There was even an ominous parallel in the fact that another civil conflict in another peninsula had been the prelude to Armageddon in the 1930’s. For it might well have been asked if the Korea of 1950 were destined to become the Spain of a new world war.

The answer of the United Nations was prompt and decisive. At 2 o’clock in the afternoon on 25 June 1950, a meeting of the Security Council was called to order at New York. A dispatch had just been received from UNÇOK—the United Nations Commission on Korea—reporting that four Soviet YAK-type aircraft had destroyed planes and jeeps on an airfield outside of Seoul. The railway station in the industrial suburb of Yongdungpo had also been strafed.[2]

By a unanimous vote of nine member nations (with the U.S.S.R. being significantly absent and Yugoslavia not voting) the blame for the aggression was placed squarely upon the North Korean invaders. They were enjoined to cease hostilities immediately and withdraw from ROK territory.

The United Nations had no armed might to enforce its decisions. But the Security Council did not intend to rely merely upon moral suasion or economic sanctions. At a second meeting, on 27 June, the Council proclaimed the NKPA attack a breach of world peace and asked member nations to assist the Republic of Korea in repelling the invasion.

For the first time in the war-racked 20th century, a group of nations banded together for peace had not only condemned an aggression but appealed to armed force to smite the aggressor. On the same day that the Security Council passed its historic resolution, the United States announced that it was giving immediate military aid to the Republic of Korea.

President Truman, as commander in chief, ordered American naval and air forces into action. Fifty-two other members of the United Nations approved the recommendations of the Security Council. Their pledges of assistance included aircraft, naval vessels, medical supplies, field ambulances, foodstuffs and strategic materials.

Only 3 of the 56 nations responding to the Council were opposed to the majority decision. They were the Soviet Union and her two satellites, Poland and Czechoslovakia, which had been brought into the Communist orbit by compulsion after World War II.

On 29 June President Truman authorized General MacArthur to send certain supporting United States ground force units to Korea. An American naval blockade of the entire Korean coast was ordered, and Japan-
based Air Force planes were given authority to bomb specific military targets north of the 38th Parallel. These decisions were upheld by the wholehearted approval of nearly all Americans, according to contemporary newspapers.[3] Virtually the only dissenters were such left-wing extremists as the 9,000 who attended a “Hands off Korea” rally held early in July 1950 under Communist auspices in New York.[4] Barring such rule-proving exceptions, Americans had long been smoldering with indignation at Soviet cold-war tactics. They applauded the resolute stand taken by the United Nations, and they were proud of their country for its response. Unfortunately, they did not anticipate that anything more serious than a brief “police action” would be necessary to settle affairs. Never in their wildest imaginations had it occurred to them that an Asiatic peasant army might be more than a match for all the United States ground forces in the Far East.
Chapter 3. The Marine Brigade
NKPA Gains of First Week

It was by no means a contemptible army, judged even by Western military standards, which ripped through ROK defenses after crossing the 38th Parallel. The major effort was the two-pronged attack on Seoul, conducted with precision by the 1st NKPA Infantry Division, advancing through Kaesong and Munsan while the 4th and 3d united south of the frontier with elements of the 105th Armored to proceed by way of the Yonchon-Uijongbu and Pochon-Uijongbu corridors.

On the right the 6th Infantry Division made short work of overrunning the isolated Ongjin Peninsula and thrusting eastward toward Kaesong. On the left the offensive was covered by the drive of the 2d and 12th Infantry Divisions on Chunchon while the 5th made rapid gains along the east coast.

In this area the North Koreans initiated the first amphibious operations of the war with four Soviet-manufactured torpedo boats. Built entirely of aluminum, of about 16 gross tons displacement when fully loaded, these craft measured slightly over 19 meters in length and were powered by two 10-cylinder engines rated at 850 horsepower each. With a crew of 8 men, a cruising speed of 20 to 25 knots and a range of 15 hours, the boats carried 2 torpedoes and were armed with a 12.7-mm. heavy machinegun and 2 submachineguns.

During the first 5 days of the invasion, the 4 torpedo boats escorted convoys which transported NKPA troops down the east coast for unopposed landings as far south as Samchok. But on 2 July 1950 the tiny North Korean “navy” was almost literally blown out of the water when it encountered UN Task Group 96.5 off Chuminjin while escorting 10 converted trawlers. With more bravery than discretion, the small North Korean craft accepted battle with the American light cruiser Juneau and two British warships, the light cruiser Jamaica and the frigate Black Swan. Evidently the enemy hoped to score with a few torpedoes at the cost of a suicidal effort, but the U. N. guns sank 2 of the aluminum craft and drove a third to the beach, where it was soon destroyed along with 7 of the convoy vessels. The North Koreans were credited with “great gallantry” in the British dispatch after the fourth torpedo boat escaped. But it was the last naval effort of any consequence by an enemy strangled in the net of the UN blockade.

On land the NKPA columns advanced almost at will during the first 4 days. Nearly a hundred tanks and as many planes were employed by the two main columns advancing on Seoul, and on 27 June 1950 the ROK seat of government was removed to Taegon while Far East Air Force planes were evacuating United States citizens. ROK fugitives, winding southward in an endless stream of humanity, choked every road and multiplied the difficulties of the defense. To add to their misery, one of the bridges across the river Han was blown prematurely when masses of Koreans were crossing.

The fall of Seoul on the 28th ended the first stage of the offensive as the NKPA forces halted for regrouping. Chunchon had surrendered in east-central Korea, so that the invaders held a ragged line stretching from Chumunjin on the east coast through Chunchon, Kapyong and Seoul to the port of Inchon on the west coast.

The beaten and in some instances shattered ROK forces were meanwhile falling back through Suwon in the hope of establishing new positions of defense.
A strategy of delaying actions was the only course open to General MacArthur for the time being. One of his first decisions led to the establishment on 27 June of the GHQ Advanced Command Group at Suwon under the command of Brigadier General John H. Church, USA. This group had as its primary mission the reorganization of the demoralized ROK forces, which were already reporting thousands of men missing in action. Secondary missions were to keep Tokyo informed as to military developments and expedite the delivery of supplies. As early as 27 June, 119 tons of emergency supplies had been sent to Korea by air, and an additional 5,600 tons were being loaded on ships in Japan.[7]

American naval and air forces lost no time at getting into action after President Truman’s authorization. United States Naval Forces in the Far East, under the command of Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, had as their principal element the Seventh Fleet, commanded by Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble. Its tactical organization, Task Force 77, immediately clamped down a blockade on the Korean coast after wiping out enemy naval opposition. Other warships of the Seventh Fleet were meanwhile blockading Formosa to guard against the possibility of Chinese Communist intervention by means of an attack on the last Nationalist stronghold.

The United States Far East Air Forces, commanded by Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer, USAF, consisted of eight and a half combat groups responsible for the defense of Japan, Okinawa, Guam and the Philippines. Primary missions assigned to the fighter and bomber squadrons were the elimination of NKPA air opposition and the retarding of enemy ground forces by means of interdictory air strikes on bases and supply routes.
Chapter 3. The Marine Brigade

Geography of Korea

Geography being a first cousin of strategy, maps of Korea were almost literally worth their weight in diamonds both in Tokyo and at the Pentagon. For that matter, they were nearly as rare as diamonds, and it became necessary in many instances to work with outdated Japanese maps.

On the map of Asia the Korean peninsula resembles a thumb dipping down into the Yellow and Japan seas. For centuries it has been the sore thumb of Asiatic power politics, so that trouble in Korea resulted in a twinge being felt in the capitals of Europe. But small as Korea appears on the map, it is actually about 575 miles in length—a peninsula resembling Florida in shape but having about the area of Minnesota.

Variations in climate are comparable to the gradient from Maine to Georgia along the Atlantic seaboard of the United States. Extremes ranging from summer weather of 105° F. to winter temperatures of 40° below zero have been recorded. A monsoon season of floods is to be expected in July and August, followed by a period when typhoons are a possibility. Altogether, it is a climate which can contribute no little to the difficulties of a mechanized invader.

It would be almost an understatement to say that Korea is mountainous. Few areas of the earth’s surface are so consistently rugged. Bleak cliffs seem to thrust themselves dripping out of the sea on the East Korean littoral. The peaks become higher and more perpendicular as they march inland, until altitudes of 9,000 feet are reached.

The principal chain of mountains extends from the Yalu in the north along the east coast to the Pusan area. Just south of the 38th parallel a spur branches off diagonally to southwest Korea in the region of Mokpu. The remainder of the peninsula consists largely of smaller ranges and foothills.

The few broad valleys are found chiefly on the west coast, which has a good many indentations and estuaries. Here also are most of Korea’s large rivers, flowing west and south. Of little aid to navigation, these streams are broad and deep enough to hamper military operations; and in the monsoon season, floods become a menace.

As if the west coast were paying a penalty for being less mountainous, mud flats and islands hamper navigation. And here the tides are among the highest in the world, with an extreme range of about 30 feet existing at Inchon in contrast to unusually moderate tides along the east coast.

The west and south are the agricultural areas of Korea. Nothing is wasted by peasants who till every inch of the lowland flats, rice paddies, and terraced hills. Due to their back-breaking toil rather than many natural advantages, Korea was able to export as much as half of its two food staples, rice and fish, under the Japanese administration.

The population, estimated at 25,000,000 in 1945, increased both by immigration and a high birth rate during the next 5 years until as many as 29,000,000 inhabitants were claimed. Seoul was a capital of a million and a half residents, and the two leading seaports, Pusan and Inchon, had not far from a quarter of a million each. Modern office buildings, factories and street railways were found in combination with muddy streets and thatched huts on the outskirts.

A standard-gauge rail network, built largely by the Japanese, linked the principal cities and connected in the north with the Manchurian railways. The highway system was good for an Asiatic country but inadequate for the purpose of an invader on wheels and tracks. Hard-surfaced roads were few and far between, and the ordinary earth roads were churned into bogs during the monsoon season. Air transportation was limited to only a few large
airfields and emergency landing facilities.

Altogether, Korea promised to be a tough nut to crack, when it came to geography, for the officers poring over maps in Tokyo.
The United States ground forces in the Far East comprised the understrength 7th, 24th, and 25th Infantry Divisions and the 1st Cavalry (dismounted) Division of the Eighth United States Army, which had been stationed in Japan since the end of World War II. These divisions had only about 70 percent of their personnel, the regiments being limited to two battalions.

The explanation of these deficiencies goes back to the end of World War II. Popular clamor for the speedy discharge of the victorious United States forces had resulted in American military sinews becoming flabby during the next few years. Strenuous recruiting had been necessary to maintain the small army of occupation in Japan at part strength, and it was no secret that many of the men were attracted by the expectation of travel and light occupation duties. The possibility of battle had scarcely been anticipated when the invasion began, and combat readiness left a good deal to be desired. Training on the company level had been good on the whole, but both officers and men were handicapped by the lack of maneuvers for units larger than a battalion.

Shortages in equipment were equally serious. There were not enough mortars, recoilless rifles and other weapons even if there had been enough maintenance parts and trained maintenance technicians. Most of the arms, moreover, consisted of worn World War II equipment which had seen its best days. Finally, the divisional armored units had been provided with light M24 tanks, instead of the heavier machines normally employed, because of the weak bridges in Japan.

It was, in brief, an unprepared and ill-equipped little army of occupation which represented the first line of United States defense in the Far East.

On 2 July the advance elements of the 24th Infantry Division, commanded by Major General William F. Dean, were flown from Japan to Korea. Two days later, on the American national holiday, the first contact of the United States ground forces with the enemy was made near Osan, about 8 miles south of Suwon.

The American force consisted of 2 infantry companies, a battery of artillery, two 4.2" mortar platoons, a platoon of 75-mm. recoilless rifles, and six 2.36" rocket-launcher teams. Named Task Force Smith after its commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Smith, the first United States contingent collided on the morning of 5 July with a whole NKPA division supported by 30 T–34 tanks. Despite the odds against it, Task Force Smith put up a good delaying fight of 4 or 5 hours before pulling out with the loss of all equipment save small arms.

On 7 July, the UN Security Council passed a resolution calling for a unified command in Korea, and President Truman named General MacArthur as commander in chief. Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, who had been one of Patton’s best officers in World War II, was appointed commander of the Eighth United States Army in Korea (EUSAK) on 12 July, and 4 days later he assumed control of all ROK ground forces.

The ROK army, as might be supposed, was badly battered and much in need of reorganization. At the end of the first week of invasion, the ROK missing in action had reached a total of about 34,000. Whole battalions had been scattered like chaff, yet it speaks well for the spirit of the troops that most of the missing eventually returned to their units. The odds against them had made it a hopeless fight, but these Korean soldiers would give a good account of themselves when they had better training and equipment.

The United States forces were finding it hard sledding, for that matter. The remaining units of the 24th Infantry Division were in action by 7 July, having arrived by sea from Japan. They were followed by the 25th
Infantry Division, commanded by Major General William B. Kean, which completed the movement to Korea on 14 July.

These first outweighed United States forces had no choice except to trade space for time in a series of delaying actions. Although the units had to be employed piecemeal at first, they slowed up the main thrust of the enemy—the advance of three NKPA divisions, well supported by armor, down the Seoul-Taejon axis.

Seldom in history have American forces ever endured a worse ordeal by fire. Unprepared morally as well as materially, snatched from soft occupation duties in Japan, they were suddenly plunged into battle against heavier battalions. The “Land of the Morning Calm” was to them a nightmare land of sullen mountains and stinking rice paddies. There was not even the momentary lift of band music and flag waving for these occupation troops, and they were not upheld by the discipline which stiffens the spines of old regulars.

Considering what they were up against, the soldiers of the 24th and 25th have an abiding claim to a salute from their countrymen. They fought the good fight, even though they could keep militarily solvent only by withdrawals between delaying actions.

Officers as well as men were expendables in this Thermopylae of the rice paddies. Because of the large proportion of green troops, colonels and even generals literally led some of the counterattacks in the 18th-century manner. Colonel Robert R. Martin, commanding the 34th Infantry of the 24th Division, fell in the thick of the fighting while rallying his troops. General Dean stayed with his forward units, personally firing one of the new 3.5” bazookas until the enemy broke through. He was reported missing for months, but turned up later as the highest ranking United States military prisoner of the conflict in Korea.

American light tanks could not cope with the enemy’s T–34’s; and even when the first few medium tanks arrived, they were equipped only with 75-mm. guns against the heavier NKPA armament. Not until the third week of ground force operations, moreover, did the United States artillery units receive 155-mm. howitzers to supplement their 105’s.

There was nothing that the ground forces could do but withdraw toward the line of the river Kum. Here a stand was made by 24th Division units at Taejon, an important communications center. But the enemy managed to establish bridgeheads, and the fall of the town on 20 July marked the end of the first phase.

Two days later the 24th Division, now commanded by General Church, was relieved south of Taejon by Major General Hobart R. Gay’s 1st Cavalry (dismounted) Division, which had landed at Pohang-dong on the 18th. And on 26 July the separate 29th Infantry RCT disembarked at Chinju on the south coast after a voyage from Okinawa.

The reinforced Eighth Army was still too much outnumbered to vary its strategy of delaying actions with sustained counterattacks. While the new American units and the 25th Division fell slowly back toward the line of the Naktong, the regrouped ROK divisions were assigned sectors toward the north and east, where a secondary NKPA offensive threatened Pohang-dong. Meanwhile, the exhausted 24th Division went into Eighth Army reserve.

The ground forces would doubtless have been in a worse situation if it had not been for hard-hitting United States naval and air support. Major General Emmett O’Donnell’s B–29 Superforts of the FEAF Bomber Command took off from Japanese bases to fly strikes on enemy supply routes, communications hubs, marshaling yards and other strategic targets all the way back to the Yalu.

Task Force 77, ranging along the west coast, gave Pyongyang its first large-scale bombing on 3 July. Gull-winged F4U Corsairs, leading off from the Valley Forge flight deck with 5-inch rockets, were followed by AD Skyraiders and new Douglas dive bombers. Bridges and railway yards were destroyed by raiders who shot down two YAK-type planes in the air and destroyed two on the ground.

Along the east coast the Juneau and other warships of the Anglo-American blockading force patrolled the enemy’s MSR, which followed the shoreline. Salvos from the cruisers, fired at the sheer cliffs, loosed
avalanches of earth and rock to block the highway. Railways were mined and tunnels dynamited by commando parties landing from ships’ boats.

The combined U. N. efforts inflicted heavy material and personnel losses while slowing up the NKPA offensive. But it is a testimonial to Soviet and Red Korean preparations for aggression that the army of invasion kept on rolling. There was even some prospect late in July that the enemy would yet make good his boast of being able to take Pusan within 2 months in spite of United States intervention.
United States Marines

Ch 3. The Marine Brigade
Requests for United States Marines

Upholding their long tradition as America’s force-in-readiness, the Marines have usually been among the first troops to see action on a foreign shore. Thus it might have been asked what was holding them back at a time when Army troops in Korea were hard-pressed.

The answer is that the Marines actually were the first United States ground forces to get into the fight after completing the long voyage from the American mainland. There were no Marine units of any size in the Far East at the outset of the invasion. But not an hour was lost at the task of assembling an air-ground team at Camp Pendleton, California, and collecting the shipping.

The spirit of impatience animating the Marine Corps is shown by an entry on the desk calendar of General Clifton B. Cates under the date of 26 June 1950. This was the day after the news of the invasion reached Washington, and the Commandant commented:

“SecNav’s policy meeting called off. Nuts.”[11]

On the 28th General Cates had his first conference with Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations. He noted on his calendar the next day: “Recommended to CNO and SecNav that FMF be employed.” Two days later General Cates “attended SecNav’s conference.” And on 3 July his calendar recorded more history:

“Attended JCS meeting. Orders for employment of FMF approved.”[12]

The steps leading up to this decision may be traced back to the conference of 28 June, when Cates gave Sherman a summary of the strength of the Marine Corps. Along with other branches of the service, it had taken cuts in appropriations since World War II, so that total numbers were 74,279 men on active duty—97 percent of authorized strength. The Fleet Marine Force had a strength of 27,656—11,853 in FMFPac (1st Marine Division, Reinf., and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing) and 15,803 in FMFLant (2d Marine Division, Reinf., and 2d Marine Aircraft Wing).[13]

Neither of these understrength divisions, General Cates pointed out, could raise much more than an RCT of combat-ready troops with supporting air.

Admiral Sherman asked CinCPacFlt on 1 July how long it would take to move (a) a Marine BLT and (b) a Marine RCT from the Pacific Coast. Admiral Radford replied the next day that he could load the BLT in 4 days and sail in 6; and that he could load the RCT in 6 days and sail in 10.[14]

Next, a dispatch from CNO to Admiral C. Turner Joy announced that a Marine RCT could be made available if General MacArthur desired it. COMNAVFE called personally on the general, who had just returned from a depressing inspection of the invasion front. Not only did CINCFE accept immediately, but he showed unusual enthusiasm in expressing his appreciation.[15]

Sunday 2 July was the date of the message from General MacArthur requesting the immediate dispatch of a Marine RCT with supporting air to the Far East. CNO acted that same day. With the concurrence of JCS and the President, he ordered Admiral Radford to move a Marine RCT with appropriate air to the Far East for employment by General MacArthur.[16]

Later, when General Cates asked CNO how the historical decision had been accomplished, Admiral Sherman replied cryptically in baseball language, “From Cates to Sherman, to Joy, to MacArthur, to JCS!”[17]
Chapter 3. The Marine Brigade
Activation of the Brigade

Even at this early date there was talk both in Washington and Tokyo of forming an entire Marine division after mobilizing the Reserve. For the present, however, it sufficed to organize the RCT requested by General MacArthur. There could be little doubt that the assignment would be given to an air-ground team built around the two main West Coast units, the 5th Marines and Marine Aircraft Group 33. They were activated along with supporting units on 7 July as the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, senior officer at Camp Pendleton. The air component, consisting of three squadrons of MAG–33, was placed under the command of Brigadier General Thomas H. Cushman, who was named deputy commander of the Brigade.

Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., commanding general of FMFPac, and a G–3 staff officer, Colonel Victor H. Krulak, had been ordered on 4 July to proceed immediately to Tokyo and confer with General MacArthur. Before leaving, Shepherd found time to recommend formation of third platoons for rifle companies of the 5th Marines, and CNO gave his approval the following day.[18]

Unfortunately, there was not enough time to add third rifle companies to the battalions of the 5th Marines which had been training with two companies on a peacetime basis. Camp Pendleton and its neighboring Marine Air Station, El Toro, hummed with day and night activity as the Brigade prepared to sail in a week. Weapons and clothing had to be issued, immunization shots given, and insurance and pay allotments made out. Meanwhile, telegrams were sent to summon Marines from posts and stations all over the United States.

Among these Marines were the first helicopter pilots of the United States Armed Forces to be formed into a unit for overseas combat service. Large-scale production of rotary-wing aircraft had come too late to have any effect on the tactics of World War II, though a few Sikorsky machines had been used experimentally both in the European and Pacific theaters toward the end of the conflict. But it remained for the United States Marine Corps to take the lead in working out combat techniques and procedures after organizing an experimental squadron, HMX–1, at Quantico in 1947.

Seven pilots, 30 enlisted men and 4 HO3S–1 Sikorsky 2-place helicopters were detached from HMX–1 on 8 July 1950 for service with the Brigade. Upon arrival at El Toro, these elements were combined with 8 fixed-wing aircraft pilots, 33 enlisted men and 8 OY planes to form the Brigade’s air observation squadron, VMO–6.

This is an example of how units were assembled at Pendleton and El Toro. Major Vincent J. Gottschalk, appointed commanding officer of VMO–6 on 3 July, had orders to ready his squadron for shipment overseas by the 11th. Thus he had just 48 hours, after the arrival of the Quantico contingent, in which to weld the elements of his outfit together. Among his other problems, Gottschalk had to grapple with the fact that there were not enough OY’s in good condition at El Toro. He found a solution by taking eight of these light observation planes overseas with a view to cannibalizing four of them for parts when the need arose.[19]

There was not enough time in most instances for weapons familiarization training. Company A of the 1st Tank Battalion had been accustomed to the M4A3 Medium tank with either the 75-mm. gun or the 105-mm. howitzer. Activated on 7 July for service with the Brigade, the unit was equipped with M–26 “Pershing” tanks and 90-mm. guns. Captain Gearl M. English, the commanding officer, managed to snatch 1 day in which to take his men to the range with 2 of the new machines. Each gunner and loader was limited to 2 rounds, and the 90-mm. guns were never fired again until they were taken into combat in Korea.[20]

Support battalions were cut down to company size, generally speaking, for service with the Brigade.
Thus Company A of the 1st Motor Transport Battalion numbered 6 officers and 107 men; and Company A of the 1st Engineer Battalion (reinf.) totaled 8 officers and 209 men.

The largest unit of the ground forces, of course, was the 5th Marines with 113 officers and 2,068 men commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L. Murray. Next came the 1st Battalion (reinf.) of the 11th Marines, numbering 37 officers and 455 men under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Ransom H. Wood.

Altogether, according to a report of 9 July 1950, the Brigade ground forces reached a total of 266 officers and 4,503 men.\[21\]

On this same date, the Brigade’s air component amounted to 192 officers and 1,358 men. The principal units were as follows:
VMF(N)–513: 15 officers, 98 men, 12 F4U5N aircraft.
VMO–6: 15 officers, 63 men, 8 OY and 4 HO3S–1 aircraft.\[22\]

Adding the ground force and air figures gives a grand total of 6,319—458 officers and 5,861 men—on 9 July 1950. Before sailing, however, the activation of third rifle platoons and the last-minute attachment of supporting troops brought the strength of the Brigade and its air components up to 6,534.

Most of the equipment came from the great Marine supply depot at Barstow in the California desert. Here were acres of “mothballed” trucks, jeeps, DUKW’s and amphibian tractors dating back to World War II. It has been aptly remarked, in fact, that “there were more veterans of Iwo and Okinawa among the vehicles than there were among the men who would drive them.”\[23\]

Rail and highway facilities were taxed to the limit by the endless caravan of equipment moving from Barstow to Pendleton and El Toro after being hastily reconditioned and tested. Not all the arms were of World War II vintage, however, and the Marines of the Brigade were among the first American troops to be issued the new 3.5" rocket launcher.
Chapter 3. The Marine Brigade

Brigade Leadership

It appeared to be a scene of mad confusion at Pendleton as Marines arrived hourly by train, bus, and plane. But the situation was kept well in hand by General Craig, who had seen many other departures for battle during his 33 years in the Corps. Born in Connecticut and educated at the St. Johns Military Academy, Delafield, Wis., he was commissioned a Marine second lieutenant in 1917 at the age of 21. Throughout the next 3 decades he served with distinction both as a line and staff officer, and both as student and instructor at the Marine Corps Schools.

During World War II he was executive and later commanding officer of the 9th Marine Regiment, which he led in the landing at Empress Augusta Bay on Bougainville and the recapture of Guam in the Marianas. Awarded the Bronze Star and Navy Cross for gallantry in these operations, Craig became operations officer of the V Amphibious Corps in time to help plan the Iwo Jima operation. After the war he returned to Guam for 2 years in 1947 to command the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, Fleet Marine Force, before becoming ADC to Major General Graves B. Erskine, CG 1st Marine Division, in 1949.

The white hair and slender, erect figure of the dynamic Brigade commander would soon become a familiar sight to every platoon leader at the front. His assistant, General Cushman, was born in St. Louis, Mo. in 1895 and attended the University of Washington. Enlisting in the Marine Corps shortly after the outbreak of World War I, he completed flight training and was designated a naval aviator. Subsequent tours of aviation duty in Haiti, Nicaragua, and Guam were varied with assignments as instructor at Pensacola and administrative officer with BuAer in Washington. Cushman was a wing commander in World War II and was awarded a Bronze Star and Legion of Merit while serving in that capacity and later as chief of staff to the CG of Marine Aircraft Wings, Pacific. After the war he became commander of the Marine Corps Air Bases and CG of Aircraft, FMFMF Pac.

Lieutenant Colonel Murray, CO of the 5th Marines, was born in Los Angeles in 1913. He graduated from Texas A. and M. College in 1935 and was commissioned a Marine second lieutenant. After prewar service in China and Iceland, he became a troop leader in three of the hardest-fought Marine operations of World War II—Guadalcanal, Tarawa, and Saipan. Awarded the Navy Cross, two Silver Stars, and the Purple Heart medal, Murray made a name for heroism that was noteworthy even in Marine circles.

This was no light achievement, for both CMC and CG FMFC—General Cates and General Shepherd—had distinguished themselves as Marine combat leaders. Both were wounded in Marine operations of World War I, and both won later honors during Caribbean actions of the Marine Corps.

On 11 July, as Brigade preparations for sailing neared a climax, General Shepherd sent the first report of his visit to Korea. He and Colonel Krulak had held conferences with General MacArthur, Admiral Joy and Rear Admiral James H. Doyle, commanding Amphibious Planning Group 1. The commander in chief, said Shepherd, already envisioned a great amphibious operation with a complete Marine division and air components as his landing force. Not only was he “enthusiastic,” about the employment of Marines, but he believed in the necessity for employing them as an air-ground team.[24]

MacArthur was “not sanguine” about the situation in Korea. He felt that the nature of enemy resistance, combined with the rugged terrain and the possibilities of Soviet or Red Chinese intervention, threatened to protract operations. Thus he favored a Marine amphibious landing far in the enemy’s rear to cut off and destroy the North Korean columns of invasion.[25]

General Shepherd’s report made it seem likely, just before the Brigade sailed, that its units would
probably be absorbed soon into a Marine division with an amphibious mission. For the present, however, it was enough to start the movement from Pendleton and El Toro to San Diego, where the convoy awaited. MAG–33 had orders to embark in the transports Anderson and Achernar and the carrier (CVE–116) Badoeng Strait. The ground forces would make the voyage in the LSD’s Fort Marion and Gunston Hall, the AKA’s Alshain and Whiteside, and the APA’s Pickaway, Clymer and Henrico.[26]

General Cates was on hand at the docks from 12 to 14 July when the Brigade sailed. His long cigarette holders were famous, and no second lieutenant in the Corps could throw a more military salute. As he eyed the ground forces filing past, the Commandant could only have felt that Marine traditions would be upheld. A good many of the PFC’s, it is true, were too young to have seen action in World War II, though nearly all had been well grounded in fundamentals. Perhaps at the front they might become victims at first of their own over-anxiety. But they would doubtless grin sheepishly about it afterwards and become combat-hardened in a short time.

A glance at the NCO’s, the platoon leaders and company commanders of the Brigade could only have brought a gleam of pride to the Commandant’s battlewise eye. With few exceptions, they were veterans of World War II who could be relied upon to get the best out of their men. And it may be that the Commandant was reminded of the remark attributed to General William T. Sherman during the Civil War:

“We have good corporals and sergeants and some good lieutenants and captains, and those are far more important than good generals.”[27]

Nobody could give a more smooth and eloquent talk than General Cates before a Washington audience. But when it came to saying farewell to the Brigade troops, he addressed them in the language of Marines.

“You boys clean this up in a couple of months,” said the Commandant, “or I’ll be over to see you!”[28]
Chapter 4. The Advance Party

AS THE SHIPS of the Brigade vanished over the horizon, Generals Craig and Cushman rushed to complete final administrative details at their respective West Coast bases. Then, in the early morning of 16 July, the advance party, consisting of the two commanders and parts of their staffs, boarded a transport plane at the Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, and began the long journey westward.

The first stop was Pearl Harbor, T. H., island “Pentagon” of America’s vast defensive network in the Pacific. On arrival, Craig and Cushman immediately reported to General Shepherd. In company with him, the two visitors called briefly on Admiral Radford. Later, Shepherd, his staff, and the advance party met at Fleet Marine Force Headquarters for a conference on the problems incident to the Marine commitment in combat.[1]

The Brigade commander painted a vivid picture of his provisional fighting force, stressing both its potential and its handicaps. He repeatedly emphasized the necessity for the addition of a third rifle company to each infantry battalion. With equal fervor he spoke of the need for two more 105-mm. howitzers in each battery of his artillery battalion. He told how the Brigade had been forced to leave behind much of its motor transport because of limited shipping space, and he requested that replacement vehicles be provided as soon as possible.

His presentation was not falling on deaf ears; for combat-wise officers knew only too well how such shortages would restrict the maneuverability, firepower, and mobility of the Brigade. Finally, Craig repeated his earlier request that steps be taken immediately to provide for monthly replacement drafts of 800 men. If the peace-strength Marine unit were committed to combat in the near future, he said, it could ill afford to watch its already thin ranks dwindle indefinitely. [2]

Leaving behind a maze of support and reinforcement problems for FMFPac Headquarters, the Brigade advance party boarded its plane and set out for Japan. On 19 July the big aircraft discharged its passengers at the Haneda Airport, near Tokyo. General Craig immediately reported to his naval superior, Admiral Joy. Later the Brigade commander, General Cushman, and the other officers of the advance party, assembled at General Headquarters, Far East, where they would get their first glimpse of the war through the eyes of the United States Army.

They conferred first with Major General Edward A. Almond, USA, and Brigadier General Edwin K. Wright, USA. The former was Chief of Staff to General MacArthur, while the latter served as G–3 on the staff. After Almond and Wright had received a report on the organization and capabilities of the Brigade air-ground team, they ushered the two Marine generals into the office of MacArthur. [3]
The commander in chief greeted his visitors cordially and expressed his pleasure at having Marines in his command again. He commented briefly on the excellence of the 1st Marine Division and certain Marine air units which had served under him during World War II. The general smiled as he mentioned a rumor to the effect that he had been prejudiced against Marines during the Pacific War. Sweeping aside this tale as being unfounded, he said that he had always held the greatest admiration for the Corps and would welcome its units to his command any time.[4]

Following this reception, MacArthur meticulously briefed Craig and Cushman on the critical situation in Korea, where the war was already entering its fourth week. The commander in chief disclosed his tentative plans for commitment of the Marines: he would hold the Brigade in Japan as a force in readiness until an entire Marine division could be assembled. If he could have this division by September, he intended to launch an amphibious assault against the port of Inchon on the west coast. Striking deep in the Communist rear, he would sever the long lines of communications linking North Korean bases to the Communist invaders at the front. Thus isolated, the latter would quickly wither, and Walker’s Eighth Army could smash out of the Pusan Perimeter.[5]

When MacArthur concluded, he and Craig discussed the organization of the Brigade. The Marine general emphasized that his command was an air-ground team; and though few in numbers, the Brigade had a powerful potential if its air arm remained integral. MacArthur assured him that the Marine combination would remain intact, unless some emergency dictated otherwise.

Craig next mentioned that the infantry and artillery units of the Brigade were at peace strength. MacArthur was surprised to learn that each battalion had just 2 rifle companies, and each battery only 4 guns instead of 6. He was even more surprised to find that each of the 6 infantry companies had 50 men less than the number called for in Marine war tables. The Army leader had been aware of certain shortages when he sent a message to the Pentagon on 10 July, requesting the Joint Chiefs of Staff to authorize expansion of the Brigade to a full war-strength division.[6] He believed at the time, however, that the Brigade itself would be formed on a wartime basis. Now, confronted with reality, he ordered his chief of staff to prepare another dispatch to the Joint Chiefs, asking that the Brigade be expanded to full war strength and reiterating his request for an entire division.[7]

MacArthur concluded the conference by informing Craig that the Marine fighting team would remain in Japan under operational control of Joy’s headquarters. This was good news to the Brigade commander. Being attached to the Naval command meant that his Marines would be free to train and otherwise prepare for their future amphibious mission; whereas an assignment to the Eighth Army’s rear echelon might have entailed time-consuming occupational and administrative duties.[8]
Although the solution to Marine Corps problems had seemed simple enough in MacArthur’s office, it was quite another story on the other side of the world in Washington. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had rendered no decision on the general’s 10 July request for a Marine division. Nevertheless, General Cates ordered his staff to draw up detailed plans for expansion so that immediate action could be taken if authorization were forthcoming. As a result, Plans Able and Baker were prepared, the one designed to augment the Brigade to war strength, the other to explore the requirements for creating a full division. To cover these possibilities together with the Corps’ other irrevocable commitments throughout the world, Marine planners were drawn more and more toward a single basic conclusion—if President Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff granted MacArthur’s request, the Marine Corps Reserve would have to be mobilized at once.

When the Joint Chiefs received the message which MacArthur had dictated in General Craig’s presence, they requested an estimate from the Marine Corps on how long it would take to form a war-strength division. General Cates summed up his case: the Marine Corps, numbering only 74,279 officers and men,[9] was committed on a global basis. There was a brigade on its way to Korea, a peace-strength division on the Atlantic Coast,[10] and a battalion landing team permanently assigned to the Mediterranean Fleet. There were detachments of Marines assigned for domestic security, shipboard duty, and overseas security. Moreover, in order to carry out any expansion program on a sound basis, it would be necessary to maintain cadres of experienced personnel in various training centers. The Commandant’s presentation made it clear that any immediate expansion would, as proved by simple arithmetic, be dependent upon mobilization of the Reserve.

Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to President Truman that the Organized Marine Corps Reserve be called to active duty. That same morning, 19 July, Admiral Sherman notified General Cates of this decision. The Commandant lost no time at ordering his staff to alert all Reserve units. His grounds for haste were well founded; for in the afternoon a presidential proclamation announced that the “citizen-Marines” would be mobilized. The following day Cates called CNO and submitted Plans Able and Baker, the proposed procedures for building both the Brigade and 1st Marine Division to war strength.

In the meantime JCS had notified MacArthur that his request could not be granted until late fall “without unacceptable weakening {of} the Fleet Marine Force Atlantic.”[11] When the U. N. commander received this message, he countered immediately with the reply:

“... Most urgently request reconsideration of decision with reference to First Marine Division. It is an absolutely vital development to accomplish a decisive stroke and if not made available will necessitate a much more costly and longer operational effort both in blood and expense.

“It is essential the Marine Division arrive by 10 September 1950 as requested. While it would be unwise for me to attempt in this message to give in detail the planned use of this unit I cannot emphasize too strongly my belief of the complete urgency of my request. There can be no demand for its potential use elsewhere that can equal the urgency of the immediate battle mission contemplated for it.

“Signed MacArthur”[12]

On 22 July the gears of mobilization were already enmeshed. Taking this into account along with the urgency of MacArthur’s last communication, the Joint Chiefs showed the first signs of relenting in their reply to Tokyo. This time they informed the Army general that they were reconsidering his problem, but added that he must advise them of the proposed employment of the Brigade up to 10 September and the possibility of adjusting
that deadline. The same message carried the encouraging news that a directive had already been issued to bring both the Brigade and its air group to full war strength.[13]

In answer, MacArthur stated his intention to retain the Brigade in Japan, unless a more critical situation developed in Korea prior to 10 September. He described his operation planned for mid-September as an amphibious landing in the rear of the enemy’s lines. This seaborne attack, he added, would be designed to envelop and destroy the Communist invader in conjunction with an offensive from the south by the Eighth Army. The General concluded his message on notes of conditional optimism and grave warning:

“Although exact date of D-day is partially dependent upon enemy reaction during month of August, I am convinced that an early and strong effort behind his front will sever his main lines of communications and enable us to deliver a decisive and crushing blow. Any material delay in such an operation may lose this opportunity. The alternative is a frontal attack which can only result in a protracted and expensive campaign to slowly drive the enemy north of the 38th parallel.”[14]

On 25 July these exchanges came to a climax when the Pentagon directed the Marine Corps to build its 1st Division to full war strength.

At this point the change of heart among the Joint Chiefs of Staff is pertinent because of its direct effects on the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. As previously noted, the Pentagon on 22 July approved the Marine Corps’ plan Able which provided for the expansion of the Brigade to war strength. General Cates immediately set machinery in motion to bolster the ranks of that unit. With the approval of Admiral Sherman, he cut into the rosters of Marine security detachments throughout the United States and arranged for the personnel thus released to be channelled to Craig’s command. It was also possible now to implement an earlier plan relating to casualty replacements for the Brigade. As far back as 14 July, the Commandant had ordered activation of the First Replacement Draft, fixing its departure for Korea at 10 August.[15] Thus Craig could be assured of early reinforcement by more than 800 officers and men if the course of the war necessitated a premature commitment of his Brigade.
Generals Craig and Cushman were meanwhile assigned a large office in General Headquarters, Tokyo. There they cleared away much administrative detail which accumulates in the path of every military operation. On 20 July the two commanders called on General Stratemeyer. Marine Air was the focal point of discussion as they again explained the organization of their fighting team. When they informed Stratemeyer of MacArthur’s decision to keep the Brigade intact, the air officer gave them further assurance that MAG–33 would always be available to support the Marine ground force.[16]

 Originally, the Army planned to base the Marine ground elements at Sasebo, Japan, and the air group 400 miles away at Itami Field, near Kobe. Craig and Cushman realized that the resulting large gap would give rise to problems in liaison, training, and supply. Hoping to change such an undesirable arrangement, the Brigade staff carefully studied the layout of available land and facilities. Armed with the results of this research, Craig proposed to General Headquarters that all Marines be based in the Kobe-Osaka-Kyoto area. After he outlined the advantages of keeping the Brigade and its supporting aviation close together, Wright responded encouragingly to the recommendation.[17]

Click here to view map

Confident that the suggestion would be favorably considered, the advance party flew to Itami on 21 July and made a detailed reconnaissance of debarkation, billeting, and training sites. While Craig inspected the area and prepared a report, Cushman examined the air base facilities and established his headquarters according to the initial plan. The Marine officers then returned to Tokyo 2 days later to push the request for getting both air and ground forces located in the same area. To support his proposal, Craig submitted a complete “floor plan” not only for the Brigade but also for the entire 1st Marine Division. MacArthur’s staff promptly approved.[18]

On the 25th the advance party again set out for Itami, this time to prepare for the arrival of the Brigade. Their plane was a scant 20 minutes out of Tokyo when an urgent message from General Headquarters directed their return to that city at once. The big aircraft roared back to the field, and a few minutes later the Marines were driving through the Japanese capital.

At headquarters, Wright summed up the most recent reports from the front. The American forward wall was crumbling under continuous hammering. A wide envelopment had just netted the whole southwestern tip of the peninsula for the Communists, who were now pressing in on Pusan from the west as well as north. Lacking sufficient troops to defend its broad frontage, the Eighth Army was falling back. If the Red tide continued unabated, there was imminent danger of losing Pusan, the one remaining major port in American hands. Should this coastal city fall, South Korea would be lost.

Wright told Craig that all available troops had to be thrown into the line to meet this threat. Therefore, General MacArthur had diverted the seaborne Brigade from Japan to Korea, where it would join General Walker’s beleaguered forces.[19]

Obviously, the Marines were not far from a fight.
The Pusan Perimeter  
Lynn Montross and Nicholas A. Canzona  

Chapter 4. The Advance Party  
Voyage of the Brigade

At sea the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was unaware of the decisions and difficulties developing on higher levels. Nevertheless, that tactical organization was having enough trouble of its own. On 12 July, Company A, 1st Tank Battalion, and the 1st Amphibious Tractor Company departed San Diego on board the LSD’s *Fort Marion* and *Gunston Hall*. Designated Task Unit 53.7.3, the twin amphibious ships sailed 2 days before the rest of the Brigade and were scheduled to join the main convoy, Task Group 53.7, before crossing 160° east longitude.

At noon on 13 July, the well deck of the *Fort Marion* accidentally flooded, the water rising to a height of 5 feet among the Brigade’s M–26 tanks. An hour passed before the ship’s pumps could drain the compartment, and briny water damaged 14 of the new armored vehicles, 300 90-mm. projectiles (then in critical supply), and 5,000 rounds of .30-caliber ammunition.

When news of the flood damage reached Brigade headquarters, then still at San Diego, the message was rushed to Craig. He immediately sent a dispatch to Captain English, authorizing him to jettison the ruined ammunition. He added that replacement armor would be requisitioned from the Barstow depot without delay. Craig then contacted the supply base and was promised that 14 M–26’s would be commissioned and on their way to San Diego within 24 hours. The Brigade commander was preparing to request additional shipping for the vehicles when messages from the *Fort Marion* reported that 12 tanks could be restored to operating condition at sea. The remaining two would require new parts and 72 hours of repair work upon debarkation.

As already noted, the Marines were placing heavy reliance on their armor, confident that it was a match for the enemy’s Russian-built T–34 tank in Korea. Consequently, Craig’s staff reacted to the flood reports with concern. Headquarters FMFPac was asked to include four M–26’s in its first resupply shipment to the Brigade; arrangements were made for new parts to be flown to the port of debarkation, and ammunition to replace that damaged in the flood was loaded on board the larger convoy.

Misfortune struck again a few hours after Task Group 53.7 steamed from San Diego on 14 July. The transport *Henrico* developed a serious mechanical failure and was declared temporarily unseaworthy. This ship was carrying Lieutenant Colonel Murray, his regimental staff, and the entire 1st Battalion Landing Team. After Murray and his headquarters transferred to the APA *Pickaway* off San Clemente Island, the *Henrico* limped back toward California with about one-third of the Brigade’s fighting force. The vessel docked at the United States Naval Supply Depot, Oakland, on the 16th. Repairs were started in urgent haste, since there was no other ship available. For security reasons, the Marines were forbidden to leave ship except for training on the dock. On the nights of the 16th and 17th, they sat on deck and gazed longingly at the beckoning lights of San Francisco. Twice during this time the *Henrico* weighed anchor and passed westward under the Golden Gate bridge; twice it was forced to return for additional repairs. Finally, on the evening of the 18th, the vessel steamed under the great bridge for its third attempt. This time it kept going, but it would not overtake the convoy until the morning of the very day the ships reached their destination.

During the voyage, strict wartime security measures, including radio silence, were enforced on all ships. While the North Koreans were believed to have no warships left afloat, their naval capabilities remained hidden from the outside world by a blur of question marks. No one realized more than the commander of Task Group 53.7 that it was much too early to take Soviet Russia for granted.

The *Henrico*, now travelling independently, had a spine-chilling experience during her second night out
of Oakland. The ship’s radar picked up two “unidentified submarines” which appeared to be converging on the stern of the lone vessel. General Quarters was sounded. While sailors peered into the darkness from their battle stations, several hundred Marines joked weakly in the troop compartments below the waterline. After an anxious hour, the persistent spots on the electronic screen vanished.

Shipboard life for the Brigade was otherwise uneventful. The troops took part in physical drills as vigorously as the limited confines of vessels would allow. Daily classes and conferences emphasized those subjects most relevant to the news reports trickling back from the front. Success of North Korean armor stimulated keen interest in land mines and the new rocket launchers. Press commentaries on the battleground’s primitive environment made even field sanitation a serious matter. Since there was no military intelligence available on the North Korean forces, officers and NCO’s turned to publications on Russian tactics and weapons.

As previously noted, Sasebo, Japan, was the original destination of the ships transporting the Brigade’s ground elements. The *Achernar*, *Anderson*, and *Badoeng Strait* were bound for Kobe with MAG–33. When Craig’s proposal for consolidation was approved by General Headquarters, the entire convoy was ordered to Kobe. Then, on 25 July, Colonel Edward W. Snedeker, Chief of Staff, received the dispatch sending the ground force directly to Pusan.

This announcement came as no surprise to the majority of officers and men. Day by day, news reports had been outlining the course of the war. The shrinking perimeter of Walker’s army was traced on maps and sketches throughout every ship. After the Communist “end run” in southwest Korea, Marines began to wonder if there would be any front at all by the time they arrived. In the captain’s mess of the *Pickaway*, senior Marine and naval officers were giving odds that the Brigade would reach the South Korean port only in time to cover a general evacuation of the peninsula.[24]
With the Brigade well beyond the halfway point in its Pacific voyage, Craig and his staff could not afford to waste a minute. At 1700 on 25 July they left Tokyo by plane for Korea. En route they landed at Itami, where the Brigade commander and Cushman made hurried adjustments to meet the new situation.[25]

Leaving Itami on the 26th, they flew to Fukuoka, Japan. There they transferred from their 4-engine Marine aircraft to a smaller Air Force plane which could be accommodated on the primitive landing fields of Korea. On the last lap of their journey, they reached Taegu at 1400.

Taegu was a dismal place during this crucial phase of the UN delaying action. Hastily chosen as a headquarters by General Walker, the ancient town gave the appearance of a remote outpost. Its airstrip was crude. The fewness of the airmen and soldiers among the handful of transport and fighter planes served only to emphasize the critical situation of the UN forces.[26]

General Craig reported to General Walker immediately, while the Brigade G–3, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph L. Stewart, met with his Eighth Army opposite, Colonel William E. Bartlett. Later, Walker’s chief of staff, Colonel Eugene M. Landrum, assembled all the Marine officers for an official briefing. He explained that the Brigade had not been earmarked for any specific mission. The battle situation was too fluid for firm plans. Information from the field was sketchy and unreliable, as outnumbered Army forces slowly retreated. From the time of first contact by American units, the front had been more of a blur than a distinct line. Landrum concluded by saying that the Brigade must be prepared to move anywhere after debarkation—and on a moment’s notice.[27]

After he and his officers had been assigned rooms in a temporary barracks, Craig requested permission to reconnoiter the combat zone.[28] Walker assented, providing his own plane and pilot for the trip. Accompanied by Stewart and Lieutenant Colonel Arthur A. Chidester, his G–4, Craig flew first to Pusan, where he checked harbor facilities, roads, and railways. There he conferred with Brigadier General Crump Garvin, USA, to initiate preparations for the Brigade’s arrival.[29]

Leaving Pusan, the Marine officers flew over Chinhae, which they discovered to be a suitable base, if necessary, for VMO–6 and the Brigade’s air support control unit. Cruising westward, they passed over Masan, then continued toward Chinju. From the latter vicinity, the enemy’s envelopment was then threatening the western approaches to Pusan. Veering northward, the reconnaissance party paralleled the Naktong River. The pilot, who was familiar with the ground, briefed his passengers along the way. By the time the plane returned to Taegu, the Marines had a broad picture of the critical areas most likely to become Brigade battlefields.[30]

General Craig and his ground officers remained at Taegu 4 days. Attending daily briefings of the Eighth Army staff, they acquired a sound knowledge of the tactical situation. At a conference with Major General Earle E. Partridge and his Fifth Air Force staff,[31] the Marines were brought up to date on the disposition of aviation and its policy for supporting UN ground forces.[32]

In the fight for time, ground force units in line were frequently withdrawn and shuttled to plug gaps in the sagging front. Reports from the battlefield more often were food for the imagination rather than fact for the planning room. All of this created confusion among Eighth Army staff officers.[33]

In the Taejon area the 24th Infantry Division had lost 770 officers and men during the single week of 15–22 July. Of these casualties, 61 were known dead, 203 wounded, and 506 missing in action.[34] Among the missing was General Dean, and the wounded included a regimental commanding officer, a regimental executive officer, and a battalion commander.[35]
Following this ordeal, the 24th had been relieved by the recently arrived 1st Cavalry Division, which went into line alongside the 25th Division in the Kumchon area. ROK divisions held to the north and east, where NKPA forces were driving toward Pohang-dong.

The shape of strategic things to come was indicated late in July when two NKPA divisions completed a much publicized “end run” past the open UN left flank to the southwest tip of the peninsula, then wheeled eastward for a drive on Pusan.

General Walker reacted promptly to the danger by recalling the 24th Division from Eighth Army reserve and moving it southward from Kumchon to block the enemy near Hadong. With the recently landed 29th Infantry attached, the division totalled only 13,351 officers and men. Its front extended from the southern coast near Hadong to the town of Kochang, 40 miles north. In addition to manning this mountainous line, the 24th had troops in action at Pohang-dong, more than 100 miles away on the east coast. There some of its units fought as Task Force Perry, under direct control of Eighth Army headquarters.

The 24th Division and 29th Infantry had no more than deployed when they found themselves plunged into a confused 5-day fight. Although they sold ground as dearly as possible, the Army units were compelled to give up Hadong and fall back toward Chinju.

As the threat to Pusan grew more serious, the Eighth Army commander shifted units. In order to protect the approaches from Chinju to Pusan, he pulled the 25th Infantry Division back across the river Naktong near Waegwan and moved it from the northern to the southern front in 48 hours. The next day saw the 1st Cavalry withdrawing across the Naktong in the Waegwan area and blowing the bridges.

After being relieved in the south by the 25th Division, the 24th joined the 1st Cavalry withdrawal to hastily organized defensive positions east of the Naktong. ROK divisions continued to defend the northeast approaches, while the 25th Division stood guard to block any enemy move toward Chinju.

At this juncture General Craig became increasingly concerned about prospects of maintaining the Brigade’s integrity as a Marine air-ground team. He and his staff were aware that elements of the 29th Infantry had been rushed from their ships directly into combat in the Chinju area, and some units were badly mauled. Craig took occasion, therefore, to remind Army leaders once more of the Marine tactical concept of the indivisible air-ground team.

MAG–33, said Craig, would have to unload its planes and prepare them for action; and the control squadron would need an interval to set up co-ordinated tactical air support.
As July drew to an end, the situation both on the northern and southwestern fronts was developing into a crisis. Hourly it grew apparent that the Eighth Army’s perimeter would have to shrink even more, so that defenses could assume some depth in sensitive areas. Landrum indicated for the first time that the Brigade was being considered primarily for a mission on the left flank. Guided by this possibility, Craig and his staff officers devoted a day to drawing up a flexible operation plan. The purpose of this directive was to advise the Brigade’s subordinate commanders of possible commitment in the Chinju, Kochang, or Kumchon areas, in that order of probability. Also included were detailed instructions for movement to forward assembly areas, broad missions for supporting units, security measures to be taken, and a general outline of the situation ashore.

The advance party extracted from the plan a fragmentary warning order suitable for radio transmission. This message was delivered to Eighth Army headquarters with a request that it be sent immediately to the Brigade at sea. Now Craig assumed that Snedeker and Murray would have a reasonable impression of the situation awaiting them.

At an Army briefing on the 29th, the Marines learned that the UN left flank was collapsing. An air of uneasiness pervaded Taegu, and Eighth Army headquarters began preparations for displacement to Pusan. Craig was told that the Brigade definitely would be committed in the southwest, unless a more critical situation suddenly sprang up elsewhere. Again the Army officers added that the Marine unit actually must be prepared to move in any direction on short notice.

With the approval of the Eighth Army, the Brigade commander immediately sent a message to COMNAVFE requesting that the Marine air group be made available to support the ground force by 2 August, and that VMO–6 be transported to Korea as quickly as possible. Time was drawing short.

On 30 July, General Craig had a final conference with Generals Walker and Partridge. This time, Walker himself told the Marine leader that the Brigade would be sent to the southwest; and that the unit, once committed, would be free to push forward without interference from Eighth Army. Partridge interjected that his planes would be available to support Craig’s ground troops if Marine air did not arrive in time.

Immediately after the conference, the Marine officers set out for Pusan by jeep. While their vehicles bounced southward on the ancient road, army headquarters in Taegu was sinking to new depths of dejection. Chinju had just fallen, and the Red column was pounding toward Masan.
AFTER THE ADVANCE party reached Pusan, General Craig established a temporary command post in the headquarters building of General Garvin’s Base Command. Then the Marine officers plunged into the final phase of planning and preparation for the Brigade, although they were still handicapped by the undisclosed secret of the convoy’s arrival date. Staff gears were meshing smoothly by this time, with solutions being ground out for one problem after another.

On the night of 30 July, Lieutenant Colonel Stewart and other staff officers were discussing whether MAG-33 would be able to get its planes airborne in time to support the Brigade in its initial combat. Acting on a hunch, Stewart picked up a telephone in the slim hope of placing a call through to Japan. The long shot paid off. After some wrangling by startled operators, he managed to contact Itami Air Force Base and talk to Colonel Kenneth H. Weir, Cushman’s chief of staff.

Stewart briefed the Marine aviator on the latest developments, emphasizing that the Brigade would undoubtedly get into the fight soon after arrival. He asked Weir to send the Air Support Section and helicopters to Korea by LST as quickly as possible after unloading in Japan.[1]

Craig received a radio message that same night from FMFPac, informing him that the replacements for the Brigade would not be sent directly to Pusan, as requested. They were to be assembled at Camp Pendleton for travel with the 1st Marine Division, and this meant a delay which could be critical. Craig immediately insisted that the reinforcements be sent to Pusan to replace Brigade battle losses and form the third rifle companies.[2] The Marine leader’s determination in this instance proved to be a blessing a few weeks later.
On the morning of 31 July, Craig and Stewart set out by jeep to reconnoiter the rear areas of the crumbling southwestern sector. Kean’s 25th Division, having just replaced the 24th in line, was now blocking the threatened western approaches to Pusan. Since all indications pointed to the Brigade’s commitment in this area, Craig wanted to walk and ride over the terrain he had previously scouted from the air.[3]

He returned to Pusan just in time to receive a telephone call from Colonel Landrum of Eighth Army Headquarters. The chief of staff told him of General Walker’s intention to attach the Army’s 5th Regimental Combat Team, newly arrived from Hawaii, to the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. With two regiments under his command, Craig would be assigned a vital area of responsibility along the Nam River, near its confluence with the Naktong north of Masan.[4] Unfortunately, the Brigade reached Korea 1 day too late. When the 5th RCT debarked at Pusan on 1 August, it was earmarked for the 25th Division and placed in Eighth Army reserve.[5]

Also debarking on the 1st was the Army’s skeletonized 2d Division. This unit cleared Pusan and hurried to the hard-pressed Taegu area where it also passed into Eighth Army reserve.[6]

During the last hours before the Brigade’s arrival, Lieutenant Colonel Chidester was diligently engaged in the task—or art—of procurement. It has already been explained why the Marine ground force would debark for combat with little more than what its troops could carry on their backs. In order to offset partially the deficiencies, the G-4 successfully negotiated with Army authorities for 50 cargo trucks, several jeeps, some radio vans, and various other items of equipment. Officers of the Pusan Base Command reacted to all of Chidester’s requests with as much generosity as their meager stocks of materiel would allow.[7]

Not until the morning of 2 August did General Craig learn that Task Group 53.7 was scheduled to dock at Pusan that very evening. The last-minute disclosure relieved him of considerable anxiety, but he was still disturbed for want of specific orders concerning departure of the Brigade from Pusan. His instructions from General Walker were to debark the ground force immediately and have it prepared to move forward by 0600 the following morning. The same orders advised him that a specific destination “would be given later.”[8]

“Later” did not come soon enough for the Marine commander. As the long column of ships steamed into Pusan Harbor in the early evening, he still did not know where he would lead his Brigade the next morning.[9]
When Task Group 53.7 entered Far Eastern waters, the ships transporting the forward echelon of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing veered toward Japan, while the others continued to Korea. The Brigade’s air arm arrived at Kobe late in the afternoon of 31 July.

Within three hours debarkation had been completed and unloading was in full swing. A waiting LST took on Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron Two and the ground personnel and equipment of VMO-6. By the next morning it was steaming toward Pusan, carrying the vital link in General Craig’s air-ground team. Cushman and Weir were making good their promises.

Since harbor facilities at Kobe were unsuitable for offloading aircraft, the Badoeng Strait stood out to sea on 1 August and catapulted 44 of its Marine fighter planes into the air. The aircraft sped to the field at Itami, where they were quickly checked by pilots and crews for their imminent role in combat. On the following day, the other 26 fighters left the carrier and joined the first group ashore for maintenance and testing.

To achieve maximum mobility and striking power, Marine and Navy commanders agreed to base VMF’s 214 and 323 aboard aircraft carriers for initial operations over Korea. After only 1 day of refresher flights at Itami, the pilots of VMF-214 landed their planes aboard the U.S.S. Sicily. Two days later, on 5 August, Major Arnold Lund led his VMF-323 back to the Badoeng Strait.

The squadron of night fighters, VMF(N)-513, was land-based. Having been assigned to the Fifth Air Force, it would be controlled by the Itazuke field for night heckler missions over Korea. This unit had time for only a few night training flights before being committed to combat.

Kobe’s waterfront was the scene of feverish activity around the clock. The light observation planes and helicopters of VMO-6 were unloaded, assembled, and—to the amazement of local Japanese—flown from the very streets of the city to the base at Itami. There they were hurriedly checked by mechanics and prepared for the short ferry flight to Korea.

Headquarters and Service Squadrons of MAG-33 were left with the task of unloading supplies and equipment from the Achernar and Anderson. Since the three fighter squadrons were farmed out to the carriers and Air Force, Group headquarters turned its attention to administrative and maintenance matters. For the next month it would be hard-pressed to keep the carrier squadrons supplied with spare parts while providing replacement aircraft for the sea-borne units, handling a variety of airlift requests with its lone transport plane, and making arrangements for the support of VMF(N)-513 at Itazuke.
Landing of Ground Force

The hapless *Henrico* finally overtook Task Group 53.7 in the Tsushima Straits on the morning of 2 August. A few hours later the Marines of the Brigade got their first glimpse of Korea’s skyline. Seen from a distance, the wall of forbidding, gray peaks was hardly a welcome sight to men who had been broiled and toughened on the heights of Camp Pendleton.

For reasons unknown, neither Colonel Snedeker nor anyone else had received the operations plan which Craig had sent via Eighth Army at Taegu. Although every Marine in the convoy realized the gravity of the situation ashore, there could be no specific preparations by troop leaders whose only source of information was an occasional news broadcast.

Having heard nothing from his superiors, Lieutenant Colonel Murray was thinking in terms of a purely administrative landing. Had he known what awaited his 5th Marines ashore, he would have had his troops draw ammunition and rations while still at sea. Throughout the sleepless night that followed, he had ample time to reflect sourly on the fortunes of war.[16]

Shortly after 1700 on 2 August, the first ship steamed into Pusan Harbor. As it edged toward the dock, Leathernecks crowding the rail were greeted by a tinny and slightly tone-deaf rendition of the Marine Corps Hymn, blared by a South Korean band. Army troops scattered along the waterfront exchanged the usual barbed courtesies with their webfooted brethren aboard ship, and old salts smiled while noting that tradition remained intact.

When the *Clymer* approached its berth, Craig waved a greeting to Snedeker and shouted, “What battalion is the advance guard?”[17]

The chief of staff registered an expression of astonishment.

“Did you get my orders?” Craig called to Murray when the *Pickaway* slid against the dock.

“No, sir!”[18] replied the CO of the 5th Marines.

Craig ordered a conference at 2100 for the Brigade staff, Murray, battalion commanders, and the leaders of supporting units. When the officers entered the wardroom of the *Clymer* at the specified time, the last ship of Task Group 53.7 was being moored in its berth.

After introductory remarks by the general, his G-2, Lieutenant Colonel Ellsworth G. Van Orman, launched the briefing with a grim narrative of the enemy situation. Next came Stewart, who outlined tentative operations plans. The Brigade would definitely begin moving forward at 0600 the next morning, although a specific destination had yet to be assigned by the Army. Travel would be by road and rail. The necessary trains were already awaiting in the Pusan terminal, and the 50 trucks procured by Chidester were standing by, complete with Army drivers.[19]

Craig then summed up his earlier discussions with Walker. The Army leader had voiced a strong desire to use the Marines in an attack, for he felt it was high time to strike back at the Red invader. Employment of the Brigade as an offensive force was a natural conclusion to its commander, and he told his subordinates how he had won assurances for the integrity of the air-ground team. This was an encouraging note on which to close one of the strangest combat briefings in the history of the Corps. The leaders of over 4,000 Marines rushed from the ship to alert their units for movement into a critical tactical situation. They would leave in a few hours, but didn’t know where they were going.[20]
It is not surprising that the Pusan waterfront turned into a bedlam. As darkness settled, thousands of Marines poured onto the docks. Cranes and working parties unloaded vehicles, supplies and equipment, while a chorus of commands and comments was added to the roar of machinery. Supply points were set up under searchlights, and long lines of Marines formed on the docks, in buildings and along streets. Armfuls of C-rations, machinegun belts, grenades, and bandoleers gave men the appearance of harried Christmas shoppers caught in a last-minute rush.

The activity and din continued all night. Few men could sleep through the noise, crowding, and shuffling. Before dawn, new lines began to form in reverse as groggy Marines filed back aboard ships to get their last hot meal for many a day.

After the conference aboard the Clymer, Brigade headquarters resumed its efforts to obtain specific information from Taegu. Finally, at 2325, Landrum telephoned Craig and announced Walker’s decision—the Brigade would go westward to the vicinity of Changwon, where it would remain for the time being in Eighth Army reserve. Only Walker himself could order any further move. If some extreme emergency arose and communications with Eighth Army were lost, the Brigade would then come under the control of the CG, 25th Infantry Division.[21]

The long-awaited message gave added impetus to the unloading operations. Major William L. Batchelor’s shore party company devoted one of its principal efforts to the big howitzers and vehicles of 1/11, while English and his tankmen struggled to get their steel monsters ashore from the LSD’s. Engineer heavy equipment, mobile maintenance shops of the Ordnance Detachment, fuel, ammunition, and medical supplies swung from decks to docks, where waiting Marines rushed them off to staging areas around the waterfront.

Altogether, 9,400 tons of supplies were unloaded, and the vast majority were turned over to Army quartermaster authorities in Pusan. Four officers and 100 men of Major Thomas J. O’Mahoney’s Combat Service Detachment were designated as the Brigade rear echelon. This group would remain in the port city to handle logistical and administrative matters. Supplies were moved into Army warehouses, where they became part of the common pool shared by all units at the front. This led to confusion later, when the Brigade requested its own Class II and IV items, only to discover that they had already been issued to other outfits. But the Army divisions had already been fighting for a month in a war which caught the nation unprepared, so that the Pusan Base Command had no alternative but to issue supplies on the basis of immediate need, not ownership.[22]

The Brigade was prepared to travel light. Not only the bulk of supplies but also all personal baggage was left behind in Pusan, to be stored and safeguarded by the rear echelon. When dawn broke on 3 August, each Marine carried only his pack, weapon, ammunition, and rations.[23]
The Pusan Perimeter
Lynn Montross and Nicholas A. Canzona

Chapter 5. Prelude to Battle
The Brigade at Changwon

Despite the tumult of the sleepless night at Pusan, Lieutenant Colonel George R. Newton’s 1st Battalion set out for Changwon shortly after 0600 on 3 August. As advance guard for the Brigade, it made the 40-mile trip in Marine and Army trucks, reaching a point 1 mile west of the town at 1400. There the battalion took up defensive positions astride the Changwon-Masan road in order to cover the arrival of the remainder of the Brigade.[24]

Although he had orders to bivouac at Changwon, General Craig decided to deploy the Brigade defensively to the west of the town. This decision was prompted by the enemy situation west of Masan, which was a scant 6 1/2 miles from Changwon. Then, too, the Marine commander saw the layover as a final opportunity to check the field discipline of the Brigade.[25]

Between 0630 and 0700, the main body of the Marine ground force moved out of Pusan by road and rail. Vehicles over 2 1/2 tons, all heavy equipment, and the M-26 tanks were transported on flatcars. The roads were narrow and bumpy, and the churning wheels of the trucks threw up clouds of stifling dust that hung in the air and painted Marines and equipment a ghostly gray. Aboard the primitive trains, which frequently jolted to stops for no apparent reason, men tried vainly to fit themselves to miniature wooden seats constructed in perfect right angles. And always, the troops inhaled that characteristic odor drifting in from well-fertilized rice paddies.

By 1600, all combat and support elements of the Brigade, with the exception of one tank platoon, had arrived in the Changwon area. Southwest of the city the 1st Battalion was relieved of its responsibility on the left side of the Changwon-Masan road, when 3/5 occupied the high ground in that area. Newton was then able to extend his right flank farther along the towering ridge north of the road.[26]

South of the MSR, a wide rice paddy stretched between 3/5’s positions and the town. Almost in the center of this low ground was a hill commanding a good all-around view of the entire area. It was on this dominating height that Lieutenant Colonel Harold S. Roise deployed his 2d Battalion. Behind Roise, General Craig established his CP in a small basin among hills in the immediate vicinity of Changwon. Close-in protection for his headquarters was provided by the engineer company and various headquarters units. Throughout the interior of the bivouac area were tank platoons and the batteries of Lieutenant Colonel Wood’s artillery battalion.

As night settled on 3 August, an army of phantoms invaded the Brigade perimeter and drove to the very fringe of Craig’s CP. The reaction of green troops was typical of men new to combat. Shortly after 2200, a rifle shot cracked. Many Brigade Marines had never heard a weapon fired in combat, so they concluded that likely targets were present in the perimeter area. As nerve-taut men stared fixedly into the blackness, forms that had been harmless bushes and rocks took on the guise of Communist infiltrators.

The first shot was soon followed by others. Toward midnight, the firing developed into a continuous crackle, particularly in the immediate vicinity of the Brigade CP. Palpitating hearts pounded even more strenuously when two Marine machineguns began chattering in positions occupied by Brigade headquarters troops.

Anxiety also spread to the foxholes of the 5th Marines. In 2/5’s area one man was shot. The 1st Battalion suffered 2 casualties, 1 resulting from mistaken identity during challenging, the other inflicted when a weapon discharged accidentally.[27]

The commotion finally died down around 0300, after cursing NCO’s convinced the military novices that
they had been firing at delusions of their own overwrought imaginations.

Although such a reaction is not uncommon among untried troops, this realization was no balm to a wrathful Brigade commander at dawn on 4 August. Craig called in leaders of the most obvious offenders and severely reprimanded them. He made it known in no uncertain terms that such conduct would not be tolerated again; and from that time on, every man in the Brigade took him at his word.

The remainder of the stay at Changwon was relatively calm. On one occasion a group of seven unidentified persons was spotted atop a mountain overlooking the Brigade area. Closer scrutiny disclosed that the individuals had radios and were carefully observing all activity within the Marine perimeter. A platoon of infantry was dispatched to destroy what was apparently an enemy observation post; but by the time the rifleman scaled the height, both intruders and radios had disappeared.

The climb caused a number of heat prostration cases within the platoon, for Korean terrain and heat were giving Marines their first bitter taste of a crippling combination. Brigade helicopters, flown to Pusan on 2 August, set a combat precedent by delivering rations and water to the infantrymen on the mountain, and by evacuating the more severe heat casualties.[28]

While Craig’s ground force spent its time patrolling and training around Changwon, VMO-6 and the Air Support Section (MTACS-2) were readying themselves. Accompanying the 4 HO3S helicopters in the flight to Pusan from Japan on 2 August were 4 of VMO-6’s OY-2 observation planes. The other 4 light aircraft remained in Japan, to be used as spares. On 4 August the LST which had been dispatched by Cushman and Weir also arrived at the South Korean port. While two helicopters flew to Changwon to operate from Craig’s CP, the others, together with the rest of VMO-6 and the Air Support Section, moved to the airfield at Chinhae. By 5 August, MTACS-2 had established communications with the Sicily and Badoeng Strait and was ready for business.
The big picture, militarily speaking, was outlined in somber colors during the first few days of August 1950. Only the southeast corner of Korea was left to the Eighth Army and its battered ROK allies. Space had been traded for time until there remained in effect merely a UN beachhead about 90 miles long and 60 wide.

Unremitting enemy pressure throughout July had pushed the UN forces back to positions stretching raggedly from Pohang-dong on the east coast to Masan on the south coast by way of Taegu in the center. The logistical lifeline extended from Pusan to Taegu both by road and rail, and some 300,000 tons of supplies were moved in July by the Pusan Logistical Command.

The vital seaport had to be held if the UN forces were to retain a foothold in the peninsula, and the enemy was already threatening both Pohang-dong and Masan, each within 50 miles. Only by courtesy could the irregular chain of UN positions have been called a line. Gaps were the rule rather than exception, and an entire enemy corps might have driven through the mountainous area between Andong and Yongdok without meeting serious opposition. Nor was this the only spot where the dangerously stretched UN forces had to depend on the terrain for support. Yet the time had come to make a stand, and this final UN beachhead has gone down in history by the name of the Pusan Perimeter.

From Taegu in the center to the eastern coast, five depleted ROK divisions were arrayed during the first week in August. East of the Naktong, from the Taegu-Waegwan area southward, the 1st Cavalry and the 24th Infantry Division held defensive positions. This left the southern sector to the 25th Division, reinforced by the Army 5th RCT and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade.

The principal enemy units pressing toward Masan and Pusan in the southern sector were identified as the NKPA 6th Infantry Division and the 83d Motorcycle Regiment. Composed entirely of Chinese civil war veterans in July 1949, the 6th Division had at that time been the 166th Division, 56th CCF Army, which later entered Korea as a completely equipped unit. Its three infantry regiments, the 13th, 14th, and 15th, were distinguished throughout the invasion for a high esprit de corps. After capturing Yongdungpo, an industrial suburb of Seoul, the 6th had pushed southward and won fresh honors by forcing the river Kum and taking Kunsan by storm.\[29\]

On the eve of the Kunsan operation, according to a captured enemy document, troops of the 6th were informed that they were facing a United States Army regiment. “Since this unit is planning to advance to the north, it is our mission to envelop and annihilate it. . . . We are fully prepared and confident of success in this operation.”\[30\]

A numerical superiority as well as good combat discipline enabled the initial assault waves to cross the Kum in pneumatic floats and establish a bridgehead before noon on 16 July 1950. Half of the town of Kunsan was occupied before nightfall, and the United States and ROK defenders withdrew under cover of darkness.

Next came the “end run,” with 6th Division units racing toward the capture of Namwon, Kwangju, Yosu, and Mokpu in the southwest corner of the peninsula. No opposition awaited except ineffectual delaying actions by ROK constabulary troops. After mopping up a few small pockets of resistance, the 6th Division pushed eastward to lead the North Korean drive toward Pusan.

The capture of Sunchon gave the division an assembly area for the attack on Chinju. And on 28 July the commander, Major General Pang, issued a message to his troops:

“Comrades, the enemy is demoralized. The task given to us is the liberation of Masan and Chinju and the annihilation of the remnants of the enemy. We have liberated Mokpu, Kwangju and Yosu and have thereby
accelerated the liberation of all Korea. However, the liberation of Chinju and Masan means the final battle to cut off the windpipe of the enemy. Comrades, this glorious task has fallen to our division! Men of the 6th Division, let us annihilate the enemy and distinguish ourselves!”[31]

Up to that time the division’s total casualties had been remarkably few. Only 400 killed and wounded were reported from 25 June until after the capture of Kunsan, and the 6th had met scarcely any opposition since that action. It was just prior to the assault on Chinju, moreover, that the 83d Motorcycle Regiment was attached to reinforce the drive toward Pusan.

This unit had been part of the 105th Armored Division until June 1950, when it was given a separate existence. Equipment consisted of motorcycles with sidecars and jeeps of Soviet manufacture. Fixed machineguns on both types of vehicles were operated by the crews in addition to submachineguns. Not much is known about the numbers of the 83d at this time, but it had experienced little combat since the beginning of the invasion.[32]

During the advance on Chinju the NKPA column ran into elements of the United States 24th Infantry Division and was stopped by machinegun fire at Hadong. All three regiments of the 6th Division had to be committed before this halfway point could be secured, and the 83d Motorcycle Regiment was blooded in the attack. More hard fighting awaited on the road to Chinju, but the two NKPA outfits battled their way into the town on or about 30 July 1950.
These North Korean units were destined to become the opponents of the Brigade a few days later. Before the Marine ground forces could get into action, however, the air components struck the first blow.

When Lieutenant Colonel Walter E. Lischeid’s VMF-214 landed on board the Sicily on 3 August, eight of its Corsairs were immediately refueled and armed. At 1630, the initial Marine offensive action of the war was launched as the fighter planes roared up from the carrier’s flight deck. Minutes later their incendiary bombs and rockets were hitting Red-held Chinju and the village of Sinban-ni. A series of strafing runs concluded the Marines’ greeting to the North Korean People’s Army.[33]

While the 2 Red bases were erupting in smoke and flame, 2 other pilots of the squadron flew from the Sicily to Taegu to be briefed on the broad tactical situation. They returned from their visit with maps and intelligence material for guidance in future operations.[34]

The squadron flew 21 sorties on 4 August against enemy bases controlling the pressure on Eighth Army’s southern flank. Racing in from the sea, gull-winged Marine planes struck at bridges, railroads, and troop concentrations in the Chinju and Sachon areas.

On 5 August, the Sicily steamed into the Yellow Sea. Marine planes descended on Inchon, Seoul, and Mokpo, battering airfields, factories, warehouses, railroads, bridges, and harbor facilities. The same pattern of destruction was repeated the following day.[35]

On 6 August came a thundering bid for fame by VMF-323, as its sleek Corsairs streaked toward Korea. Operating from the deck of the Badoeng Strait, the squadron flew 30 sorties in deep support forward of Eighth Army lines. Carrying the mail with 500-pound bombs, 20-mm. cannon and 5-inch rockets, Marine pilots struck at Communist troop concentrations, vehicles, supply dumps, bridges and railroads.[36]
As early as 3 August, during the Brigade move from Pusan to Changwon, General Craig and Lieutenant Colonel Stewart had flown by helicopter to Masan for a conference of troop commanders. There they joined General Walker and General Kean at the latter’s 25th Division command post. Also present was Brigadier General George B. Barth, artillery officer of the 25th. [37]

Craig suggested to the Eighth Army commander that some ROK army trainees be attached to the Brigade. There were thousands of such Korean recruits, and a few serving as scouts, interpreters, and rear-area guards would be of great value to the Marines. Walker agreed to provide the native troops and arm them as well. [38]

The Army leader confirmed the previous night’s telephonic orders which had caused the Brigade’s move to Changwon. After the four generals had discussed the tactical situation on the southern flank, Walker directed Craig to have the Brigade prepared for commitment to combat any time after the evening of 5 August. [39]

This schedule worked out perfectly from Craig’s point of view. The Air Support Section at Chinhae had just established communications with the two carrier-based squadrons. Army-Navy-Marine co-operation thus enabled the Brigade commander to lead his entire air-ground team into battle.

On 5 August Craig and Stewart flew to Masan for a final meeting with Walker and Kean. The Eighth Army commander outlined his plans for the first UN counteroffensive. In forceful terms, he expressed his dissatisfaction with the course of the war up to that time. He announced that the strategy of trading space for time had come to an end, and he did not mince words in referring to past UN defeats. With firm conviction in the cause, he had ordered all units to stand to the death. The Eighth Army could not and would not lose more ground or equipment. [40]

Advances had been made by the enemy with such rapidity that he had extended his supply lines almost to the breaking point, concluded Walker. The time had come to strike back [41]

To the 25th Division, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, and 5th RCT would go the honor of launching the counterattack from Chindong-ni, a small coastal village 8 miles southwest of Masan on the road to Chinju. In its effort to roll up the southern UN flank, the NKPA 6th Division was exerting heavy pressure on Chindong-ni from both the west and north.

A few miles west, the irregular coastline takes a sharp turn to the south to form a stubby peninsula about 25 miles wide and 15 miles long. Near the western base is the important town of Sachon. About 10 miles above this western junction of peninsula and coast lies Chinju. Both Sachon and Chinju were the targets of Walker’s counteroffensive.

Approximately 3 1/2 miles west of Chindong-ni is the tiny thatched–hut hamlet of Tosan, an unimpressive road junction which could be easily overlooked. The western fork is merely the continuation of the main route leading directly to Chinju, some 25 miles distant. The other fork branches south from Tosan and also goes to Chinju; but it skirts the coastline of the peninsula just described, passing through the communication hubs of Paedun-ni, Kosong, and Sachon. Thus, while both roads lead to Chinju, the southern or peninsular route is 17 miles longer.

Since it was known that enemy forces were present on the small peninsula, any UN thrust astride the main road to Chinju would be exposed to a constant flanking threat from the left. To eliminate this danger, Walker had decided to send the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade around the southern route from Tosan to Sachon. After the peninsula was secured, the 5th RCT would strike out for Chinju along the main road, while the 35th
Infantry of the 25th Division guarded its right flank in the mountains to the north. [42]

Craig and Stewart opposed this plan, arguing that the Brigade itself would be exposed to flanking danger on the right, if it made the initial advance alone. [43]

After further discussion, it was decided that all three units would attack simultaneously along the routes already designated. However, the 5th RCT was given a preparatory mission of uncovering the Tosan junction before the Brigade began its advance. [44] D-day was scheduled for 7 August. All participating units were to be part of Task Force Kean, so named after the 25th Division commanding general who would exercise overall control.

Craig hurried from the conference to alert the Brigade. In a past military age a general might have sprung into the saddle, but the Brigade commander had discovered a steed that covered more ground. He and Stewart climbed into a HO3S-1 helicopter piloted by Lieutenant Gustave F. Lueddeke of VMO-6, and a few minutes later they landed at Lieutenant Colonel Murray’s CP to brief him on the forthcoming action.
Chapter 6. Action on Hill 342

ON 6 AUGUST 1950 the Brigade was attached to the 25th Infantry Division and ordered forward to Chindong-ni. The area from that village westward toward the Tosan junction was occupied by thinly spread elements of the 5th RCT and the 27th Infantry. While the former took over front line positions preparatory to launching the main attack on the next day, the latter was gradually displacing rearward to go into Eighth Army reserve.[1]

To facilitate the early relief of the 27th Infantry, Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Taplett’s 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, departed from Changwon at 1040, 6 August, and arrived at Chindong-ni less than 2 hours later. The infantry unit was accompanied by the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines; the 2d Platoon, 75-mm. Recoilless Guns; and the 3d Platoon, Company A Engineers. After assembling in a schoolyard north of the village, 3/5 relieved the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry, on and around Hill 255.[2]

One and a half miles out of Chindong-ni, the road from Masan takes a sharp turn so that it is running generally north and south before it enters the village. Hill 255 borders the west side of the road, rising from the valley floor just above Chindong-ni and climbing northward to its summit in a series of prominent steps. Its ridgeline is narrow, with the eastern slopes falling steeply to the Masan route while its western wall plunges sharply to the valley and road connecting Chindong-ni and Haman.

Taplett set up his CP, headquarters units, and weapons company along the first step of the hill. Higher up, at the top of the second rise, Captain Joseph C. Fegan deployed Company H in defensive positions facing generally north. Forward, a long narrow plateau stretched for 250 yards before the third step of the ridge rose abruptly to the second highest peak on the hill. Noting the advantages of the commanding ground to his north, Fegan requested permission to move his company forward to that area. Since this would have placed him 500 yards from the nearest 3/5 unit, the request could not be granted.[3]

The battalion commander intended to keep his defenses as tightly knit as possible in order to discharge his mission of blocking the approaches to the Masan-Chindong-ni MSR. Despite vigorous patrolling by 25th Division units in the mountains between the coastal village and Haman, intelligence reported increasing numbers of enemy troops, heavy weapons, and equipment in the area to the north. It appeared that large NKPA forces were slipping through and descending on Chindong-ni to “cut off the windpipe” of Walker’s southern flank.

First Lieutenant Robert D. Bohn, commander of Company G, deployed his 2d and 3d Platoons on Hill 99, to the west and across the valley from 255. He arranged his defenses to block the approaches from the high ground on his north (actually an extension of Hill 99) and from the valley to the west, separating him from massive Hill 342.[4]

On a small knoll at the base of Hill 255 was deployed Company G’s 1st Platoon, commanded by Second Lieutenant John H. Cahill. With the 75-mm. recoilless gun platoon attached, this unit guarded the Haman road 600 yards from Chindong-ni.[5]

On high ground east of the MSR and beyond the village sat the 2d Platoon of Company H, with the mission of defending against infiltration from the direction of the sea and the mountains southeast of the road to Masan.[6]

This completed the infantry deployment. Company H had its three platoons spread over 1,500 yards, while those of Company G ranged at least an equal distance. Due to the lack of a third company, Taplett had no reserve other than a handful of headquarters troops. Thus 3/5 got its taste of things to come in a strange war of
mountains and men.

As the riflemen were digging their hilltop holes with traditional distaste, other supporting elements of the Brigade and 5th Marines began to arrive at Chindong-ni and set up for business. These included the Brigade Reconnaissance Company and a platoon of the regimental 4.2-inch Mortar Company. All Marine units in the area temporarily came under control of 3/5’s Battalion Commander. Taplett was given the added responsibility of handling all area requests for tactical air support.

For the time being, the 3d Battalion itself was under operational control of Colonel John H. Michaelis, USA, commander of the 27th Infantry “Wolfhounds.” Verbal instructions from Major General Kean on 6 August had given the Army officer control of all troops in the Chindong-ni area. When a second Marine battalion arrived in the locale, command would then pass to General Craig.

By 1600, Taplett had reported his command post location and defensive positions to Michaelis. Immediately afterwards he ordered mortars and artillery to lay registration fires on the northern approaches to Chindong-ni. Having left the phantoms of Changwon far behind, the Marines of the reinforced battalion settled down for the night.
The Pusan Perimeter
Lynn Montross and Nicholas A. Canzona

Chapter 6. Action on Hill 342
First Platoon Fight

Shortly after midnight, the 3d Battalion received an unexpected message which precipitated the first Marine infantry action of the war. Colonel Michaelis radioed Taplett and passed on a directive from 25th Division, ordering the Marine battalion to commit immediately one reinforced platoon for the defense of Hill 342. He explained that this unit was to relieve a beleaguered Army company being slowly eaten away in a private war of attrition. Taplett informed the regimental commander that he could ill afford to spare 1 of his 6 rifle platoons, but was told in return that General Kean had ordered 342 held at all costs. [11]

Tagged with the ominous sounding name “Yaban-san” by Koreans, this hill resembles a huge molar whose roots rise from the MSR west of Chindong-ni and lead to a tremendous mass about 2,000 yards north of the road. There the ground climbs sharply, culminating in a peak 1,100 feet high. Beyond, a long saddle extends a few thousand yards northwest, connecting 342 with a height of almost 2,000 feet. The latter was a stronghold of NKPA 6th Division elements, making a determined bid to carry 342 and cut the MSR.

Assigned the mission of making the Brigade’s first ground contact was young Lieutenant Cahill of Company G. His 1st Platoon was reinforced with a machinegun squad and SCR-300 operator before he led it from 3/5’s perimeter.

Moving westward on the MSR, the platoon reached Michaelis’ CP, located near the bridges south of Hill 99. Cahill was told that he would be met by a guide at a road junction 700 yards farther down the MSR. From this point the platoon followed a soldier who escorted Cahill to the CP of the 2d Battalion, 5th RCT. This headquarters was situated just north of the road, on the tip of 342’s eastern “root,” 1 of the 2 long ridges leading to the hill itself.

The Marine officer was told to relieve the Army company on the summit and hold the hill with his platoon. Following a quick briefing, Cahill and the guide led the column northward from the CP, skirting the western base of the ridge. A few hundred yards along the way, the guide discovered that he had miscalculated in the darkness. More time was lost while the platoon descended to resume the correct route.

As the men threaded their way along the unseen trail, a few enemy artillery shells burst nearby. The column reached the end of the valley separating the two long spurs of 342, and a volley of rifle fire cracked in the darkness. Two of Cahill’s Marines were painfully wounded.

Since the column was still in friendly territory, the guide advised Cahill not to climb 342 until dawn shed light on the mystery. It was then 0500, 7 August, and the Marine platoon had marched 3 miles from its original position.

Shortly after first light, it was discovered that soldiers of the 2d Battalion, 5th RCT, had fired on the Marines, not realizing that friendly units were moving within the area.

As the sun rose in a cloudless sky, Cahill took the lead. First, he climbed the high ground joining 342 with its eastern spur, then crossed over and continued toward the peak from a southeasterly direction.

Click here to view map

The platoon made good progress at the outset, but the heat became stifling; and all the while the slopes of 342 stretched ahead like a continuous wall. Stumbling, gasping for breath, soaked with perspiration, every Marine reached the point at which he barely managed to drag himself up the steep incline. There were choked curses as men gained a few feet, only to slip and fall back even farther.

Water discipline collapsed as canteens were quickly emptied. Marines began to drop along the slope,
some unconscious, others doubled over and retching. The tactical formation of the platoon became ragged, but Cahill and his NCO’s urged the men upward.

Accompanied by Sergeant Lee Buettner, Cahill set out to contact the Army company commander on the summit and reconnoiter the area. Seventy-five yards from the top, he was fired on from the eastern slopes. Since he was in sight of the Army troops on the crest, it was obvious that the North Korean People’s Army had officially greeted the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade.