FIRST ENDORSEMENT on 1st MarDiv sec ltr ser 0071752 of 27
Jun 1952

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps

Subj: Special Action Report, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, forwarding of

1. Forwarded.

J. L. STEWART
By direction

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
From: 1ST Mar Div
To: 1ST Mar Div
Subj: Aviation 1ST Mar Div

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Copy #: 3,4,5 Loss Real
17Jul 52

Operations

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DECLASSIFIED
SECURITY INFORMATION

From: Commanding General
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Special Action Report, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, forwardings of

Encl: (1) CO 7th Mar ltr 004543 dtd 17 June 52 w/2 Encl.
        (2) 7th Mar Opn Plan 16-52 dtd 2615001 May 1952

1. Enclosures (1) and (2) are forwarded herewith.

2. The effectiveness of enemy artillery and mortars is considered to be of particular interest. Enemy artillery is dug into caves in the sides of hills. While this somewhat channelizes their fire and limits the traverse that can be obtained, it also considerably reduces the effect of our counter-battery fire. Aircraft rockets have been found to be particularly effective against targets of this type, so that aircraft on station tend to reduce enemy artillery fire to a minimum.

J. T. SELDEN

DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10

DECLASSIFIED
SECURITY INFORMATION

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division

Subj: Special Report of Action, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, 30 May 1952

Enclosure: (1) 001st Btn 7th Mar secret ltr ser 00263-A of 11 June 1952
(2) 001st Btn 7th Mar secret special Action Report of 31 May 1952

1. Enclosures (1) and (2) are forwarded herewith.

2. The information, comments, and recommendations contained in the enclosures are believed to be of interest and value and are, in general, concurred in by this headquarters.

T. C. Moore, Jr.

SECURITY INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR 8450.2
SECURITY INFORMATION

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division

Subj: Special Report of Action, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, 31 May 1952

Encl: (1) CO 1st Bn 7th Mar secret ltr ser 00989-A of 11 June 1952
(2) CO 1st Bn 7th Mar secret Special Action Report of 31 May 1952

1. Enclosures (1) and (2) are forwarded herewith.

2. The information, comments, and recommendations contained in the enclosures are believed to be of interest and value and are, in general, concurred in by this headquarters.

T. C. MOORE, JR.
From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 7th Marines
Subj: Report of Company Operation of 23 May 1952

Encl: (1) S-1 Report
(2) S-2 Report
(3) S-3 Report
(4) S-4 Report
(5) Communications Report
(6) Medical Report
(7) Chaplain's Report
(8) Air Report
(9) Artillery Report
(10) Tank Report
(11) Company "A" Report
(12) Company "C" Report

1. Enclosures (1) through (12) are forwarded for information and evaluation.

George W. E. Daughtry

DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10
S-1 REPORT

The battalion casualty report of the action of 28 May 1952 lists a total of 148 casualties. Attached units suffered eight casualties. The following chart is a breakdown by units and disposition of casualties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>&quot;A&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;C&quot;</th>
<th>WPNs</th>
<th>H&amp;S</th>
<th>4.2</th>
<th>TACP</th>
<th>GEORGE</th>
<th>ARTY</th>
<th>1ST</th>
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<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
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The nine KIAs were eight Marines and one Corpsman.

The following is a breakdown of casualties by rank:

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<th>TSGT</th>
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The following is a breakdown of casualties by MOS:

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All non-evacuated casualties were returned to duty within 72 hours. Regimental Headquarters sent 18 replacements from that headquarters the following day. Four additional replacements were sent to the line from Battalion H&S Company. A study of the nature and extent of wounds of evacuated would indicate that 75% will be returned to duty within 10 days. In view of the 21st Replacement Draft in Korea, this battalion will not suffer from shortage of personnel.

During the period 29 May - 2 June an additional 48 minor wounds were reported, none of which required evacuation.

ENCLOSURE (1)
S-2 REPORT

The enemy opposing ABLE was estimated to be one infantry company of T/0 strength. The enemy's defense was deployed in a horseshoe fashion from CT 044065 to CT 046065. Papers obtained from a dead Chinese officer indicated that the identification of this unit was the 5th Company, 2nd Battalion, 559th Regiment, 187th Division, 63rd CCF Army.

The enemy, initially defending Hill 104, CT 044066, were armed with small arms, automatic weapons and organic mortars. The defensive strategy employed by the enemy was sound and well planned. The likely avenues of approach to Hill 104 were mined or covered by tactical wire. Tactical wire used by the enemy was in some cases booby trapped with grenades and the trench lines contained booby trapped grenades also. The trench line occupied by friendlies after securing Hill 104 was very shallow, approximately 2½ feet deep and not connecting in all cases. The enemy firing positions were such that they were able to deliver effective cross fire upon friendlies attacking their positions and the fact that the enemy were caught totally by surprise enabled the assaulting units to avoid this threat.

When friendlies began their assault, many of the enemy withdrew in a disorderly fashion. However, a large portion of the defenders chose to fight until they were destroyed. The enemy who withdrew took up positions in defilade on the north slope of Hill 104 and called in their supporting mortar and artillery fires on friendlies. Due to the accuracy of enemy mortar fire, it is assumed preregistration of the trench line had been made before the attack. The enemy hurled grenades from protected positions on the north slope and their 60mm and 82mm mortars delivered accurate and deadly fire consistently upon friendly positions.

The enemy employed a machine gun from the vicinity of CT 041069 after Hill 104 was secured, but due to the defensive positions of the assaulting force this gun did little damage. This gun was destroyed immediately upon arrival of the first friendly tank on Hill 104. Enemy mortars remained active until friendly air arrived on the scene and silenced all remaining enemy activity. The enemy casualties on Hill 104 inflicted by ABLE were a counted 30 KIA and three WIA and an estimated 25 KIA and 40 WIA.

As a diversionary action to draw the enemy from Hill 104 and release the pressure on ABLE, a reinforced platoon from CHARLIE attacked enemy positions in the vicinity of CT 033057. The enemy delivered sporadic sniper fire as the friendlies moved up to assault the objective. The friendly's base of fire successfully knocked out the snipers, and the assault unit received little fire until they were within thirty yards of the enemy and the base of

ENCLOSURE (2)
fire could no longer fire without endangering the friendly troops. At this time the enemy employed small arms, automatic weapons and concussion grenades. The enemy's method of delivering grenades was to place several men in a large cave dug into the bottom of their trenches which were approximately 5½ feet deep. Several men would arm grenades and one man would throw, not aim, but deliver enough grenades to cover a large area. The concussion type grenade caused few casualties. Friendlies stormed the trench line killing 15 enemy with fragmentation grenades, small arms fire, and bayonets. As soon as the friendlies had secured the trench line, the enemy opened up with three machine guns firing down the trenches now occupied by the friendlies. Light enemy mortars began dropping in and around the trench line. The enemy began to launch a counterattack but the friendlies, who were by this time using enemy grenades as well as their own, broke up this action.

The friendlies broke contact and withdrew to the MLR and received an estimated 500 rounds of mixed artillery and mortar fire during the withdrawal. Enemy casualties were a counted 15 KIA and an estimated 15 KIA. No identification or papers were found on the bodies. The enemy observed were clean, well uniformed, and very healthy in appearance. The enemy's will to fight and defend was excellent.

The day's operation was given invaluable assistance by radio intelligence intercept action which enabled the Battalion Commander to keep abreast of the enemy tactical situation at all times.
C-3 REPORT

The actual conduct of the operation, from the point of view of unit commanders as well as staff officers involved, is included in Enclosures (2) through (12) of the basic letter.

The C-3 Report can be summed up with the following:


1st Battalion, 7th Marines Secret Operation Plan Number 16-52, DTG 2615C01 May 1952, previously submitted.

APPENDIX ABLE - 1/7 Sequence of operations (Planning Stage) (Secret).

APPENDIX BAKER - 1/7 Operational Sequence of Events.

APPENDIX CHARLIE - Enemy Radio Intercept information received by the Battalion Commander during the course of the operation. This information proved to be invaluable in that the battalion was forewarned of enemy intentions and activities resulting in immediate counter-action directives.
1/7 SEQUENCE OF OPERATIONS (Planning Stage)

PHASE 1

AFTER H-HOUR ALL TIMES DEPENDS ON SITUATION AND PROGRESS OF ASLT UNITS.

0245: Open Bn OP 181.
0245: Able Co move out from MLR.
0245: 1 Plat Charlie Co move out from MLR.
0300: Able cross L.D.
0300: 1 Plat Charlie cross L.D.
0400: Able Aslt Plat in psn base 104. (also base of fire Plat).
0400: Plat Charlie in initial psn CT 040054.
0400: Charlie Plat attack by fire on OPLR 5 and Chirung-dong.

(0345-Fox, 2/1 will attack 2/1's OPLR 1 by fire).

(1 Plat Fox at CT 059072).
0400: Arty Barrage on 104, 81 and 4.2 Barrage on 104, controlled by ABLE.
0400: Aslt Plat close on 104 following Sup/A barrage.

Secure Obj 1 - Prepare to move out for Obj 2 on order.

PHASE 2

#0500: Rocket Ripples on Tumae-ri, Obj 2.
#Controlled by Bn on call from Able.

#0505: Air Strike - AD's G.P. on Tumae-ri (Diverted if necessary)
#Controlled by Bn on call from Able.

(0510:)
Able Co move out from 104, aslt high ground N.W. and Tumae-ri.

0515: Air-Smoke Taedok-San and high ridge N.W. Tumae-ri.

4.2 prepared to smoke Tumae-ri on pull out.

APPENDIX ABLE TO ENCLOSURE (3)
0520: Arty smoke Taedok-san and OP's on hill mass N.W. Tumae-ri.
0525: Arty fire counter-btry.
(0525): Dog Co 1 Tank, prepared to fire on Northeast slopes Tumae-ri from psn CT 055048, on order. 1 Tank prepared to fire on OPLR 5, Chirung-dong and Taedok-san from psn CT 050048.
0600: 2nd Plat prepared to move from assembly pt to 104. (On completion road mine clearance) by Engrs with Able Co.
0800: Plat Charlie Co prepared to close on OPLR 5, on order, continue attack by fire.
0900: Air Strike on Red Hill or Chirung-dong as situation requires.
Note 1. On completion of raid on Tumae-ri, pull back to high ground N.W. 104. PREPARE FOR CATK from Red Hill.
1/7 OPERATIONAL SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

0245- Opened Bn OP on 131
0245- Able Co move out from MLR.
0245- 1 Plat Charlie Co move out from MLR.
0300- Plat Charlie crossed LD
0315- Able Co crossed LD
0437- Charlie opened fire
0438- Charlie 2 observed "red star streamer" near 104
0440- Able under mortar fire - called in Arty fire.
0455- Charlie Plat under mortar fire.
0503- Able 3 in psn
0525- 1st Ech Able moving up both slopes obj #1
0537- Charlie ordered to move on OPLR #5
0554- Charlie moved out toward OPLR #5
0558- Able secured obj
0600- Able requested medical supplies
0615- Able setting up defense
0620- 2 engrs started clearing tank road from front to rear.
0625- Charlie reports large enemy movement on Taedok-san
0630- Charlie entering enemy trenches on OPLR #5 - heavy fire fight
0642- 1 tank ordered out beyond COP #1 to fire on Taedok-san
0730- Engrs started clearing mines from forward tank toward 104
0732- Tanks pulling into firing psn in front of COP #2 - target Taedok-san

APPENDIX BAKER TO ENCLOSURE (3)
0733- Charlie Plat commenced withdrawal
0745- 1 Plat Charlie ordered to be attached to Able Co
0752- Tanks arrived 104
0753- Duck departed MLR for Able Co
0800- Tanks on psn on 104
0818- Plat Charlie ordered to return OPLR #5
0830- Requested rocket ripple on Tumae-ri through Wine 3
0833- Bullet Proof vests transfer from George Co to Charlie Co completed
0905- 1 tank in psn by 81's firing on Chirung-dong
0905- Charlie 1 held up and ordered to move back to MLR
0930- Charlie 1 back in MLR
0945- Charlie 2 arrived Able Co psn
1142- Able ordered to prepare to withdraw
1215- Air Strike by Army Jets
1300- AO spotted 6 active mortars North of Tumae-ri, Eliminated.
      Also spotted 2 mortars N.W. of Tumae-ri with body of troops around
      mortars, Eliminated. Incoming temporarily ceased.
1345- Able entered COP #2
1405- Able Co closed on MLR
1412- Closed En OP on 181
1455- En reported counter-attacking on 104

APPENDIX BAKER TO ENCLOSURE (3)
ENEMY RADIO INTERCEPT 28 MAY 52

Unknown to Unknown: Ask the cucumber to start serving rice. At the triangle area in the valley.

25 from 23: Obs many en at 12th Sqd front. No 1 also has en. Treat the en. The situation may cause us to move our home. En arty bombarded the 12th Sqd. The en is stopping the savings.

23 from 25: Did any of the en turn to ash.

25 from 23: Nothing happened here.

23 from 25: How many of our fried noodles (troops) did the en turn to ash.

25 from 23: I can't tell you the correct no.

25 from 23: 1 of our soldiers belonging to 19 has been brought back to #8 pen from 301. As a broken noodle. Contact #8 to organize the unit. Find out the reason 19 went to construct the fortification and was hit. Now they moved home. Where are the rest?

23 from 25: The able ones walked back and the broken noodles taken back by litter. The wire is out. Be secure on this net.

From 23: Obs many en in front of me request arty.

From #1 Kung-Chon: Our #9 pen has retreated to #8. Did you strengthen the unit?

#1 Kung-Chon from Unknown: Yes I did.

Unknown to #1 Kung-Chon: The en is very active on our E. now.

23 from #2 Comrade: Rept how many en and where are they.

#2 Comrade from 23: The en # cannot be counted at the place where our troops are resisting.

23 from #2 Comrade: Be quick to obs.

#2 Comrade from 23: The CO says the soldiers cannot be clearly obs. There may be more than 1 cart (Plat), but less than 2.
25 from 253: Request our winter melons and watermelons to our front.

253 says: Cucumbers should hit a little further.

25 says: Where?

253 says: To our right flank.

18 from 182: The CO orders that we be sure to control the situation on the left, right, and even at the back of our position.

23 from #2 Comrade: Where are the enemy now?

#2 Comrade from 23: On the maneuvering ground and on the hill.

23 from #2 Comrade: Where are our own troops?

#2 Comrade from 23: Not very far off.

23 from #2 Comrade: Who and how many?

#2 Comrade from 23: The 3rd Sqd is squatting inside the trench, they were working there when the situation started. They are still there, request the Plat CO's instructions on how to get them out of there.

23 from #2 Comrade: Where is the spot?

#2 Comrade from 23: The spot is on the trench on the hill.

253 from 25: Enemy is moving home. Request Melon mission hit the small highway at the foot of this hill.

25 from 253: Which side of road?

253 from 25: The opposite side.

25 from 23: More enemy are obs on the hill now. Request more melons.

25 from 23: Reg Melon at the foot of our own hill.

23 from 25: Why?

25 from 23: Because the enemy are there.

18 from 182: Reg reinforcements.

APPENDIX CHARLIE TO ENCLOSURE (3)
18 from 132: We lost our #2 psn. 18 says have the en arr #2 factory?

From 132: Yes they are staying there now.

From 13: How was the condition?

From 132: We did not prepare well. Tell our reserve unit to come into action at once.

From 13: Where?

From 132: Our new factory (psn).

From 13: How many do want?

From 132: 1 case of noodles (Plat).

From 132: The en will break our new psn if you don't send us Reinfl.

From 13 to 132: The CO orders you to hold this psn, we cannot afford to lose it, rush the en off the hill. It is an order.

#1 from 101: Hill 104 foreground we discovered. 1 en old cow. Request arty take action.

18 from 132: We have reorganized and the reinforcements have arr.

132 from 13: Hold that psn.

From 132: The en arty is firing on us.

From 13: Begin to accuse the en.

From 132: Send another CO. Everything needs to be reorganized.

From 132: Many of our troops are wounded. The CO 1st Plat is wounded. Send more troops.

132 from 13: Our man has taken a bag of noodles to your psn now.

From 132: He has not arr.

APPENDIX CHARLIE TO ENCLOSURE (3)
From 18: The ditch between #2 and #3 is occupied by the en. Since the en is firing smoke shells you can utilize this time to retaliate the en.

18 from 182: We have prepared many flying hand grenades to attack en.

18 from 182: The ground nut is hitting us. Is this our own ground nut? If no please fire on #2 psn.

182 from 18: Tell the Political off, that we have set the signal for the attack. A Black one to retaliate the attack and a White one for all melons to concentrate fire on #2.

From 182: What should we do first?

From 18: Fire first the attack.

182 from 18: Our melons are on the way now. Begin to retaliate.

From 182: Whose order?

From 18: From Chief of Staff Officer.

From 182: The reinf haven't arr yet.

From 18: They're coming. Prepare all troops to go into action.

From 182: The en is breaking our #2 psn we are ready to accuse them. Send home made noodles at once.

From 182: The en is at #3 psn at our back tell reinf to come this minute.

From 18: They will arrive.

18 from 182: The en are swarming the highway and are at our backs now. The reinf are nestling there. They do not come here. Tell them to come.

18 from 182: The en is now breaking down our #3 psn. Send reinf. We are besieged. Send help.

182 to 18: Use mortars on them on #2 psn, we may have to rush them.

182 to 18: Send us another Comdr. Ours is wounded.

APPENDIX CHARLIE TO ENCLOSURE (3)
182 from 13: Don't be so excited.
13 from 182: Tell the CO to talk to me.
182 from 13: He is very busy and is giving orders.
13 from 182: Our side is the most important side.
From 182: Request 1 more case of Noodles to come at once.
182 from 13: Use the North Melon to hit the old #2 psn. Be quick, situation critical.
182 from 13: We will send you all the melons now. Organize 2 teams to retaliate the en.
From 182: Immediately a cucumber msn at #2 psn. We are fading.
From 13: We are going to reinf you.
From 182: I am carrying the radio on my back now. I cannot walk easy in this deep trench with this radio on my back.
From 13: CO said the melons will open at #2.
From 182: The Resistance is becoming weaker, request more noodles from home.
From 13: The reinf left 10 min ago.
13 from 182: CO says keep very calm and steady. The sit seems to be very very critical.
253 from 23: Our melon hit too short the target is the slope on the other side of the road now.
23 from Ko-No: The en are approaching us send some of your troops to the front of our hill.

APPENDIX CHARLIE TO ENCLOSURE (3)
S-4 REPORT

Prior to commencement of the operation the following supplies were pre-stacked at ABLE supply point:

- One day Charlie rations
- 50 filled 5-gal. water cans
- One filled 300-gal. water trailer
- Two basic fills of ammo, including pyrotechnics
- 150 small and 50 large battle dressings
- 3000 cc of Serum Albumen
- 60 stretchers

All of the above were sent forward to Hill 104 with the exception of the water trailer. KSCs were used along the trail from the MLR through COP 2 to Hill 104. DUKWs and tanks were used along the road from the MLR to Hill 104. Trucks, DUKWs and Jeeps with trailers were used by supply activities in rear of the MLR.

The DUKWs were invaluable in this operation, especially in that portion of the operation where they were used to carry ammunition and supplies to Hill 104 and to evacuate casualties on the return trip. On the order to withdraw, they were used to haul equipment back from the objective. Because of the racks along the inside of the cargo space, it was possible to load stretchers suspended across the space easily and in an orderly manner, utilizing a maximum of space. The DUKWs were found to be much smoother riding than tanks or trucks. Seventy-five KSCs were used to carry stretchers, albumen, and supplies to Hill 104 immediately after the assault. They were then used as stretcher bearers for evacuation over the trail until the road was cleared. On the order to withdraw they were used to load supplies on tanks and DUKWs for movement to the rear. Some were used at Hill 104 to distribute supplies to the individual platoons. The KSCs were outstanding throughout the operation.

One engineer officer and two engineer teams of three men each were attached to the task units. One team had the mission of clearing the area around Hill 104. The second team had the mission of clearing the heli-copter strip at CT 046063, near Hill 104, and the road leading back to the MLR. The air strip was cleared under heavy fire but never used due to continuous mortar fire on it. Clearing of the road enabled tanks and DUKWs to reach the objective. The engineers did an outstanding job.

Every Marine and corpsman who went forward of the MLR wore an armored vest. Approximately 530 were used. One hundred and sixty vests were hit or damaged to some degree. Sixteen required survey. It is quite possible that more vests were hit but probably only slightly since to date no more have been turned in for survey.

ENCLOSURE 4

DECLASSIFIED
COMMUNICATIONS REPORT

Each lettered company was provided with two trunk lines before the company operation. It was planned to extend ABLE's two lines by using M-306/G mounted on packboards. Two wiremen moved out with ABLE to extend these two lines. The two lines were subjected to interruption by various enemy actions, mortar and artillery. The battalion was unable to maintain its primary means of communication, wire, with ABLE during this operation. A platoon from CHARLIE used wire communications from the company OP to their objective. It was also subjected to interruption. Wire contact was maintained with BAKER, CHARLIE, and WEAPONS at all times due to aggressive trouble shooting. The battalion OP was provided with two lines to the battalion switchboard, one line to TACP forward, one line to a radio intercept platoon, and one line to observation post #1. Only the radio intercept line was subjected to interruption.

A total of six SCR-300 radios were employed with ABLE. One SCR-300 radio was used with each platoon, one with the company commander, one was used for communication with the unit on the right flank, and the one remaining was with the executive officer of the company. The Battalion Commander had instantaneous voice communications with ABLE at all times. Radio communication within the company was interrupted due to damaged radio equipment. Most of the damage was caused by small arms and shrapnel. Two SCR-300 radios were lost by ABLE. Two SCR-536 radios were also lost by the company. The SCR-536 radios were employed for communication between squads. CHARLIE had one SCR-300 radio damaged badly. ABLE was provided with one channel, the battalion tactical channel for the company operation. This net became overcrowded due to TACP and other supporting units using the same channel. BAKER, CHARLIE, and WEAPONS shared one channel with good results.

With the Battalion Commander on the OP, two SCR-300 radios were employed. One on the battalion tactical channel on which ABLE operated, and one on the division infantry common channel on which BAKER, CHARLIE, and WEAPONS operated. The regimental tactical net, and the regimental command nets were guarded at the rear CP. One radio operator with CHARLIE was killed. ABLE had one radio operator KIA and two WIA. The enemy employed small arms fire and mortars to knock out these operators. Enemy interception was reported on ABLE's channel. Normal security measures were practiced but more operator training in transmission security measures should be included on a battalion training schedule.

No pyrotechnics were used for this company operation. One BD-72 was borrowed to handle the additional lines required for the company operation. Both BAKER and CHARLIE had three SCR-300 radios assigned to them. Six SCR-536 radios were employed by ABLE, and six by CHARLIE. It is suggested that the table of equipment for SCR-300 radios be raised from 10 to at least 20 for an infantry battalion.

ENCLOSURE (5)
MEDICAL REPORT

To support the company operation on 28 May 1952, two Forward Aid Stations were established in the vicinity of the MLR and the rear Battalion Aid Station was maintained in the Battalion CP area. At 0600, on order, a Forward Aid Station, with a medical officer and four corpsmen was set up at CT 050520. Sixty-seven men who were wounded during the attack on Hill 104 were transported via Marine and KSC stretcher teams to this aid station. At 0815 a medical officer arrived from 3/7 to take charge of the casualties at the Rear Battalion Aid Station. This aid station furnished medical care for the CHARLIE wounded who were not evacuated via a forward aid station. At 0845 a second Forward Aid Station, with a medical officer and two corpsmen, was established just to the rear of ABLE's left flank along the road that had been cleared to Hill 104. Three DUKWs and one tank brought 27 casualties from Hill 104 to this aid station.

During the operation 9 men were KIA, 193 were WIA, one died of wounds, and there were no MIA. Land mines caused two KIA and four WIA. Missiles caused two KIA and six WIA. Shrapnel caused five KIA and 174 WIA. No wounds were discovered in the areas covered by the armored vests (USMC 1951) though cursory examination revealed many rents in the vests.

Eighty-two WIA were evacuated from the battalion for further treatment. Twenty-seven of these evacuations were by helicopter from the Forward Aid Stations to Medical Companies. Fifty-five WIA were evacuated via DUKW, personnel and ambulance jeeps and truck from the Forward Aid Stations directly to the Regimental Aid Station. The morale of the casualties was good.

Medical Supplies on hand for the operation and amount used were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>On hand</th>
<th>Used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stretchers</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Less than 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blankets</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>Less than 65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serum Albumin, units</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saline/glucose solution, liters</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dressings, battle</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dressings, vaseline</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dressings, copper sulphate</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morphine syrettes, g/r ½</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Splints, issue, arm</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Splints, issue, leg</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourniquets</td>
<td>unlimited</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydrogen peroxide, bottles, large</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercuroilate, bottles, large</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adhesive tape, rolls</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ENCLOSURE (6)
The company corpsmen in the assault ran low at one point on the supply of morphine syrettes, albumin units and dressings. As soon as word of the shortage reached the Battalion Aid Station, additional supplies were carried to the company on Hill 104 via the supply train. Originally, each of the eight company corpsmen carried 10 morphine syrettes, two units of albumin and 10 dressings. It is recommended for future planning that the assault corpsmen should carry a few additional syrettes, albumin units and battle dressings in their pockets.

The Aid Station bunker at CT 052050 offered protection to personnel against incoming mortar and artillery fire, although a corpsman and a member of the air team in that area sustained minor shrapnel wounds. The bunker was not large enough for the entrance of stretchers or the performance of various surgical procedures. Fortunately, however, the casualties were attended to and cleared by prompt air and land evacuation during the lulls in enemy firing. A bunker of sufficient size in this area to offer protection to the wounded and aid station personnel would have been ideal.

Although the second Forward Aid Station to be established depended on runners for communication with ABLE supply point, air and land evacuation to the rear was not curtailed. Helicopters flying low along the MSR were easily hailed to land and evacuate the seriously wounded. DUKWs and jeeps shuttled the remaining casualties in a prompt fashion. In the future, it is recommended that an aid team always have an air team member with signal panels and radio in order to facilitate rapid air evacuations.
CHAPLAIN'S REPORT

The Regimental Chaplain was aware of the operation against the enemy several days in advance. This was helpful in planning services for the men before the actual operation began. The Catholic Chaplain was given this information and he held services also. Services were held in the Company and Platoon CPs on 26 and 27 May.

On 23 May the Chaplain saw the first WIA at the Battalion Aid Station at 0710. He then proceeded to the Forward Aid Station. The Catholic Chaplain had been notified and was at the Forward Aid Station. The Chaplains brought spiritual comfort to the wounded and had prayer or administered last rites for the dead. They helped where needed in the aid stations, assisting the doctors and corpsmen in various ways. The Chaplain's jeep was assigned the task of taking wounded personnel to the Battalion CP.

The Chaplains divided their time between Battalion Aid Station and the two Forward Aid Stations. The Tank Battalion Chaplain, who had personnel in the area, helped bring spiritual comfort to the men. He brought coffee up for his men, and the Regimental Chaplain arranged for coffee, oranges, juice and cigarettes through the Mess and Special Services Officer.

The Chaplains held Divine Services at the Battalion CP after the operation. Communion Service was held at 1930 on 28 May and Catholic Mass at 1100 on 29 May. Chaplains visited CHARLIE, ABLE, and EASY Medical Companies to check on wounded who had not been evacuated to the Hospital Ship.

A Regimental Memorial Service is planned when the Regiment goes into reserve.
AIR REPORT

The air plan was set up as follows: (1) furnish an OE observation plane from 0445 until sundown, to assist in controlling close air support and to spot enemy mortar and artillery positions; (2) furnish air support to neutralize enemy counter-measures after Hill 104 was taken; (3) furnish air support to neutralize Tumae-ri before the assault; (4) furnish a smoke screen for the assault on Tumae-ri and air support in the general area on Chirung-dong and Red Hill; and (5) provide helicopters to evacuate emergency cases from two strips located at the Battalion Forward Aid Station and the base of Hill 104.

The TACP was divided into two groups. One group consisting of an officer and three men went forward with the Command Group of ABLE. The objectives of this group were to provide close control over the aircraft for air support, and to reestablish helicopter strip No. 28, at the base of Hill 104, for emergency evacuations. The second TACP group, consisting of one officer and five men, remained at the Battalion OP. The objectives of the second group were to assist in the control of the close air support and to control the helicopter evacuations from the Battalion Forward Aid Station.

The TACP forward set up their CP five yards from ABLE'S CP on Hill 104. The FAC working with the engineers attempted to reestablish helicopter strip No. 28. A strip could not be set up at the base of Hill 104 because the ground was soft and the low areas were under water. Evidently the enemy had been farming the area and flooded the land. The next suitable area in defile was 500 meters south of Hill 104. The engineers cleared the area and set up a helicopter strip which could have served as a forward evacuation point, however, enemy incoming mortar fire was frequent and accurate in the area. The FAC considered it unsafe to open the strip and passed the word to continue removing emergency cases from the Battalion Forward Aid Station, 2000 meters south of Hill 104. If air support had been available the incoming could have been neutralized and the strip made serviceable.

Weather in the target area was below flight minimums for close air support from H hour until approximately H plus 8 hours, and below minimum for the observation plane until H plus 6½ hours. The first aircraft over the target area was the OE observation plane at approximately 1100 (H plus 8 hours). It was difficult to establish ground to air communications. Prior to 1100 both MAN radios, which operate on a VHF network, became inoperative. One radio had a mechanical failure; the other was damaged by incoming mortar. One SCR-300 radio, which operates on an M HF network, was damaged by incoming artillery. The SCR-300 was repaired and satisfactory performance was obtained. Communications were established with the OE through the SCR-300. Aircraft do not normally carry this radio but the FAC requested the OE to be so equipped. Direct communications were not possible with the fighter bombers and attack bombers. All messages from the FAC to the support aircraft had to be relayed through the OE who could contact both parties.

ENCLOSURE (8)
The first close air support aircraft, eight F-84 Air Force jets, arrived on station at 1150 as the word was being passed to retire from Hill 104. Artillery attempted to mark the targets with red smoke but were unsuccessful. The FAC then requested a white smoke marker. Artillery put a round of WP on the target. However, there was so much smoke, both enemy and friendly, in the area that the aircraft was unable to identify the correct WP. The FAC talked the lead aircraft onto the target in a dummy run by using prominent landmarks and directions. The direction of runs was set up in such a manner that the FAC could tell if the planes were on the target as they started their dives. If any plane appeared to be in a flight path dangerous to the friendly FAC was prepared to call off the attack.

Enemy incoming mortar was still heavy as the jets started their attack to cover the retirement. The jets dropped their entire load on enemy positions approximately 200 meters north of the friendly. All the ordnance hit in the target area. Two mortar positions were destroyed but the incoming was still heavy.

The second group of aircraft on station was a flight of seven AD attack bombers. The OE had spotted several mortar positions which he requested to hit. The FAC turned the control of the aircraft over to the OE and cleared him to hit any targets north of the first target hit. The FAC maintained a position to observe the line of attack so he could break off the runs if necessary. The AEs hit four separate targets and they did a remarkable job. In a matter of ten to fifteen minutes incoming mortar fire was reduced to zero. The troops were able to make an orderly withdrawal and clear the area of all combat equipment.

The following is a table of air results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>JETS</th>
<th>AD</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mortars Destroyed</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortars Damaged</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers Destroyed</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trenches Destroyed, in yards</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.50 caliber Destroyed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA, estimated</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10-20</td>
<td>15-25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All air evacuation was handled from the Battalion Forward Aid Station. Eleven helicopters were called in to evacuate 27 wounded. The helicopter pilots did a fine job. On several occasions they landed on a road intersection, 200 meters south of the Aid Station, for pickup, while the Aid Station was receiving incoming.
Once the air support aircraft arrived in the target area they did a splendid job. If air had been available as planned, it is believed that the casualties would have been cut in half. It would have been possible to operate a forward evacuation strip and the infantry could have moved on to Tumae-ri. Under similar conditions, where air is a primary support arm, it would be advisable to have an alternate plan available to delay the attack until such time as air can operate.
ARTILLERY REPORT

The initial barrage scheduled for 0400 was delayed since ABLE was not yet in position; however, the barrage remained laid on the objective. ABLE was brought under fire by small arms and mortars at 0440 and went into the attack. This limited the prepared artillery barrage to five minutes. FOX ONE called fires of the prearranged defense plan. The counter-mortar plan went into effect and counter-battery fire was fired until 1300. Artillery remained on call until the objective was secured at 0555. At 0600, as the infantry was beginning to organize, on Hill 104, one rocket ripple and 105 howitzer fire was brought on Tumae-ri. Thereafter, all artillery remained on call. At 0800 artillery fired on known avenues of approach and assembly areas behind Tumae-ri and Chirung-dong. At 0811 artillery received radio intelligence that the enemy was preparing a counter-attack. Artillery Liaison registered medium and light artillery on approaches to 104. From the Tumae-ri sector, and layed but did not load, two batteries of medium artillery and five batteries of light artillery, plus rockets, on these approaches. As a further precaution, firing data was computed for the military crest and reverse slopes of OPLR 5. FOX THREE was covering the withdrawal of CHARLIE. About 0900 it was noted that, after a preliminary barrage and some smoke signals, the Chinese attacked OPLR 5. Artillery layed with the data to hit OPLR 5 and opened fire as the enemy reached the crest, catching them in the open. Artillery continued to fire until the tanks were in position to observe the rear of OPLR 5. Batteries relayed on Hill 104. About 1000 radio intelligence stated that the Chinese were pinned down on OPLR 5 by tanks and artillery and that the survivors could not escape. Artillery was then again brought in on OPLR 5.

At 1220 ABLE was ordered to commence withdrawal. The withdrawal was covered by rockets, which fired one ripple, and by light and medium artillery, which fired HE and smoke. At 1405 ABLE returned to the MSR and artillery ceased fire.

The use of prepared fire plans for these operations is urged and the results are excellent. These plans simplify the job of the FO and also enables the artillery Liaison Officer to call accurate fires in close when the FO is out of contact.

Counter-battery and counter-mortar fire were weak for two reasons. Weather was poor thus keeping air observation on the ground until noon. Once the OE was on station the fires improved. Lack of training of artillery FO team and infantry in analysis of craters slowed fire considerably. Training in the companies by the FO is urged, for accurate information given rapidly during an enemy barrage will enable rapid, accurate fire to be brought on the enemy.

ENCLOSURE (9)
Seventy-eight missions were fired during the day. The number of rounds fired was as follows:

2-11 2,930 rounds
3-11 550 rounds
4-11 122 rounds
Artillery 2,930 rounds
Rockets 233 rounds
4,650 rounds total

Artillery communications were set up to include three land lines to the rear, from three OPs, all of which were tied in. These lines stayed in operation continuously except for a one-half hour period. One land line was laid forward and remained in operation except for a two hour period. Radio communications were in all the time. Radios were CS9 type and contact was maintained with FOX ONE, three OPs, Artillery Liaison, Battalion CP, and with FIX.

The disposition of artillery personnel was as follows:

a. Nud obs. team with A Co.
   1 FO Lt, 1 Scout Sgt., 1 619 opr., 2 wiremen

b. Arty Lno team on Bn OP
   1 Lno Lt., 1 619 opr., 1 wireman

c. Shifted B Co. FO and radio opr. to A Co.
   OP on standby. Scout Sgt. and wiremen of this team remained in B Co. OP
   2 wiremen from A Co. remained on A Co. OP

d. Nud obs team of C Co. remained in C Co. OP and conducted fire from there.

e. Opr. Sgt., 2 wiremen remained in Bn CP. Thus all land lines were covered from both ends expediting repair of lines.

The following comments relative to artillery smoke are submitted:

a. W.P. - excellent for marking and harassing enemy personnel. For use of cover rather poor due to billowing effect. W.P. is extremely limited in 11th Marines.

b. H.C. - Ammunition was old thus the effect was very poor. Recommend no use of H.C. smoke.

c. Color - Ammunition old and attempts to use it were failures. Recommend W.P. for marking.

ENCLOSURE (9)
TANK REPORT

On 27 May, DOG TANKS, while in direct support of the 7th Marines, was ordered to support a company patrol of the 1st Battalion, with two tank platoons. The 2nd Platoon was assigned the mission of close support and the 3rd Platoon was assigned the mission of giving the patrol covering fire support from fixed positions.

At 2200 on 27 May the 3rd Platoon moved into fixed firing positions at CT 051047 and CT 054047, one section of tanks at each position. This platoon supported with covering fire from 0700 to 1400, the fire being controlled by the Company Commander from the OP. The 3rd Platoon expended 214 rounds of 90mm HE and 13 rounds of 90mm WP, destroying nine enemy bunkers, one enemy firing point, two enemy personnel shelters and shot up and damaged twelve enemy communications trenches. No estimate of enemy killed and wounded is given.

The 2nd Platoon moved out in support of the company, on order of the Battalion Commander, who was on the OP. The Platoon Leader took one section of tanks forward and kept one section in support. The forward tanks would make a firing run and on the return march would be available to carry out wounded. The support section would make its firing run at the same time carrying needed ammunition and supplies forward. As soon as a firing run was completed, a section would return to rearm and proceed forward once again. This cycle was continued until 1400 when the platoon was ordered back to the assembly area. The 2nd Platoon expended 177 rounds of 90mm HE and two rounds of 90mm WP. Eight enemy bunkers were destroyed, three enemy OPs were destroyed and eight enemy communications trenches were shot up and damaged. An estimated twenty enemy personnel were killed.

The corpsman attached to the 2nd Platoon, when the infantry was getting numerous casualties, volunteered himself and worked forward with the infantry from 0300 to 1400 aiding wounded.

ENCLOSURE (10)
COMPANY "A" REPORT

AELT crossed the LD at 0300. The 1st platoon, followed by the Command Group took a route leading to the ridge left of Hill 104. The 3d platoon passed the LD and followed a route leading to a small hill mass to the rear of Hill 104. The 1st platoon moved slower than contemplated because of darkness and heavy weapons personnel, and was late in arriving in the assault position. After five minute artillery barrage, the 1st platoon assaulted the objective assisted by the 3d platoon firing at Hill 104 and Un'gok. After the hill was secured, the 3d platoon moved up to Hill 104 mopping up by-passed enemy. During the assault casualties were sustained while crossing a mine field. Also, a very heavy barrage of enemy mortar and artillery was brought to bear on Hill 104. All but one wire line was knocked out by incoming mortars and artillery fire. Also, all but two SCR-300s were knocked out along with the radio operators. In the confusion the Command Group became separated. Due to heavy casualties in the 1st platoon, the 3d platoon was ordered to stand by to continue the attack on intermediate objective 2, covered by fire from the 1st platoon. Enemy artillery and mortar fire increased in tempo until it was impossible to move in the open except when absolutely necessary to evacuate casualties. Scheduled air support and observation were not on station because of inclement weather. Although friendly artillery was effective to a degree on counter-mortar and artillery fire, the enemy continued to keep the 104 hill mass under heavy fire. During some periods the company was sustaining casualties at the rate of 12 per five minutes. Practically every bunker had either been demolished by friendly artillery and air, or the enemy had them heavily booby-trapped; consequently cover was at a minimum although continuous effort was made to alleviate the situation. As soon as possible an engineer team, covered by a fire team, was sent back with the mission of clearing a trail for vehicular traffic. As casualties mounted, the operation was hampered because communication was being constantly knocked out and because there was no air observation to assist in bringing effective fire on sources of enemy mortar and artillery fire. Recommendation was made to the Battalion Commander that the company hold and defend the position and continue the attack if and when air support was available. Permission was granted and the company continued to defend and improve occupied positions. One platoon of tanks was called forward to assist in knocking out enemy bunkers and known mortar positions. In view of the casualty situation it was recommended that, for defense of Hill 104, or for continuation of the attack, a reinforcing platoon be attached as soon as possible. During the operation certain enemy intelligence information was available to higher authority pertaining to the effectiveness of the operation as well as enemy intentions. This information acted as a morale booster and also enabled the company to prepare for additional enemy activity.

The company was ordered to withdraw under cover of air and supporting arms. The withdrawal was orderly and all known friendly supplies and equipment were returned to the MLR. Very shortly after the withdrawal a concentrated barrage of enemy mortar and artillery was placed on Hill 104. The enemy counter-at-tacked into empty positions and were hit hard by friendly artillery and air.

ENCLOSURE (11)

DECLASSIFIED
Supply and evacuation during the operation played a major role. Evacuation and supply points were set up at the foot of the objective immediately after it was secured. Due to the large number of initial casualties a shortage of stretchers resulted during the first half hour. KSC supply and litter carriers arrived about one hour later and evacuated all wounded. More stretchers were sent up and evacuation was speeded up considerably. One difficulty experienced was the constant enemy mortar and artillery fire received on the supply and evacuation route. Several KSCs were wounded and one killed as a result of this situation. The KSCs should be commended for the fine job they did carrying out the wounded and bringing in supplies. After the DUKWs were able to come up the road to the evacuation and supply point, KSCs were utilized to load and unload these vehicles. Wounded were carried to the evacuation point by members of the platoon and these personnel carried ammunition and supplies back to the platoon sectors. At one time tanks were requested for evacuation; however DUKWs arrived just as the first casualty was being loaded into the tank. It is recommended that tanks not be used for this purpose except under extreme conditions or only for evacuation of wounded who are not too serious. The hatch through which the casualty must be loaded is very small and an extreme amount of man-handling is required. Upon order to withdraw immediate steps were taken to evacuate all supplies and to insure that none were left on the objective. Tanks and DUKWs were used to carry much of the equipment. Platoons each brought platoon supplies and equipment from the objective and either loaded it on vehicles or carried it back to the MLR. The withdrawal was orderly and was conducted with no casualties.

APPENDIX ADE - Pertinent Comments

ENCLOSURE (11)
The following comments were taken from statements prepared by members of the company in various capacities, i.e., squad leaders, fire team leaders, attached unit leaders, etc. and are deemed pertinent:

During the withdrawal of platoons, HMGs were used as a covering fire element.

One platoon commander observed that the enemy had their hill positions, trenches and bunkers zeroed in with mortars. Quick thinking in moving out of these prepared positions and on to higher ground saved many lives when subsequent mortar fire traversed these positions.

During a small counter-attack action by the enemy it was observed by the platoon sergeant that the enemy would creep right up to the fringe of the mortar impact area to close in for the assault when the fire lifted. As the barrage lifted, grenades were thrown and then the attack commenced.

Inspection of one large enemy bunker disclosed that the enemy leaves a hole in the top through which grenades can be thrown. Also, the bunker is constructed with two horizontal boards clear of the deck. When a grenade enters the bunker, the enemy jumps up on the planks and the grenade drops in the bottom of the bunker in the slime and mud and is oftentimes rendered relatively ineffective.

At one time the assault platoon's first squad was pinned down for 10 minutes by friendly HMG fire. Apparently the signal to shift fire was not given or not understood.

In the assault platoon there was a tendency for BAR and MG men to fire aimlessly after the defense set up. It is understandable that fire discipline will slack off in such a situation. It was noticed, however, that the first attempt at counter-attack was directed at the location where these men had been firing. It was also noticed by several individuals of this platoon that heavy mortar fire was received on the trench lines but that relatively little was received on the top and forward slopes higher up the objective. Most men observed too far out from the defensive positions, and the majority were too slow looking up after a mortar barrage. One additional fact was noted in this platoon - that when the counter-attack struck, the area hardest hit was a din of confusion and yells for corpsmen which, if the attack had been in force, would have pinpointed the weakest part of the defense for the enemy.

APPENDIX ABLE TO ENCLOSURE (11)
From a total of 16 reports scanned it was noted that in five instances comment was made that it was too bad the withdrawal had to be ordered because the hill could "easily" have been held. It was also noted that many mentions were made of the high morale of the men.

The third platoon, with 1 LMG and 1 BMM section attached, firing in support of the 1st platoon's attack, expended 28 boxes of machine gun ammunition and 30 bandoliers of M-1 ammunition.

One Marine in the 3rd platoon stepped on a shoe mine and suffered no injury. The man following received a minor wound in the leg. A small field of "bouncing bettys" was discovered on the left slope of Hill 104. A path was cleared through this field by the simple expedient of unscrewing the fuses since all were exposed, relatively new and easy to dismantle.

Considerable barbed wire was booby-trapped with American fragmentation grenades.
COMPANY "C" REPORT

The 3d platoon of CHARLIE moved out from the MLR at 0230 in very foggy weather. Control by communications was difficult since radio silence had been ordered and since the laying of wire was difficult in the darkness and fog.

The 3d platoon established its base of operations and opened fire on OPLR 5 and CHUNYING-DONG at about 0425. Due to fog it was impossible for the Company Commander at the OP to determine whether the 3d platoon was neutralizing its assigned areas. However, no return fire was heard from OPLR 5 for quite a while. The CCF troops there were obviously taken by surprise.

The Company Commander manned the company sound power phone at the OP, maintaining communications with the 1st and 2d platoons as well as the 60mm mortars and the 81mm and 4.2 mortar F0's. The Company Executive Officer manned the direct line sound power phone which connected the Company OP, company rear supply point, the 3d platoon and the base of fire at OP 4 about 700 yards from OPLR 5. This base of fire unit was manned by a squad from the 1st platoon and two heavy machine guns, with an officer in charge.

At about 0535 the Battalion Commander asked if the 3d platoon was ready to take OPLR 5. The platoon was ready and was alerted by radio since land line was out temporarily. The code name for OPLR 5 was MARILYN, the name of the platoon commander's wife. The 3d platoon was informed that artillery was STRICKLAND, the name of the FO. As many code words as possible were used since the enemy has an SCR-300 set up on the Battalion channel. Artillery then laid down a barrage of approximately 15 minutes duration. 4.2s, 81s and 60s were used to cover OPLR 5 from the time artillery lifted and the time the patrol was close enough to assault the objective. The mortars were shifted left until time to lift fires completely.

When the platoon assaulted the objective, incoming 60 mortar shells intercepted the forward supply route. This fact was not known to the Company Commander until informed by the platoon commander after return to the MLR that the platoon had practically run out of ammunition. The company was first aware that the platoon was in trouble when the platoon requested permission to pull back (using another code word). Upon being given direct instructions to inform why the request was made, the following message was received: "Enemy right, enemy left, enemy rear, KIA, WIA!" Permission was obtained from higher authority for the 3d platoon to withdraw. The 3d platoon then asked for help. After alerting what men were available in the 1st platoon (one squad was set up as a base of fire for the 3d platoon, one squad was helping move supplies to the forward supply point and the 2d platoon was attached to ABLE), the 3d platoon was informed that help was on the way. In code the 3d platoon further reported that contact could not be broken without help.

ENCLOSURE (12)
About this time the enemy fired two red star signals, presumably calling for artillery. The 3d platoon broke contact, bringing back all casualties. OPLR 5 was then smoked with 4.2s and 81 mortars as well as artillery, covering the 3d platoons withdrawal. Heavy mortar fire commenced to fall on the forward slope of OPLR 5 as the 3d and 1st platoons began to pull back to the forward supply point, which was also receiving heavy incoming. Through lack of an OE the enemy mortar positions could not be located. Suspected positions on the reverse slopes of OPLR 5 and the ridge behind OPLR 5 were fired on. Heavy artillery fire was falling on the CHARLIE sector at this time, apparently aimed at the OP.

When the patrol had reached the MLR, the base of fire squad was pulled back. This squad was receiving 60 mortar fire at the time. The squad returned to the MLR, having to abandon some MG ammunition to save lives.

During the operation CHARLIE suffered 2 KIA (1 in Able sector) and 22 WIA (9 in Able sector). The patrol leader counted 15 enemy KIA and estimated 15 additional in a huge pile of bodies in the network of trenches on OPLR 5.

The 3d platoon could have held OPLR 5 if sufficient ammunition had been available, immediately, to the platoon on the objective. Ammunition was available at the forward supply point and could have been taken to the 3d platoon if enemy mortar fire had been neutralized. Artillery, 4.2, 81 and 60 mortars fired on all suspected positions in the vicinity of OPLR 5, Chirung-dong and Taedok-san. OE observation would have made a great deal of difference.

APPENDICES:
ABLE - 3d platoon report
BAKER - Report of action on COP 4
CHARLIE - 2d platoon report
The Operation Order was received on 26 May 1952 in the late evening. On the morning of 27 May, a meeting was called for all unit leaders. The order was read by the Company Commander and all phases explained in detail. Ammunition requirements for all weapons were estimated, and the Gunnery Sergeant, and the Company Executive Officer contacted Battalion Supply to make all arrangements for ammunition to be delivered to the Company Supply Point. All ammunition, bullet-proof vests, extra MGs, flame throwers and spare parts were carried to the edge of the reverse slope by ESCs during the afternoon of the 27th. All ammunition and equipment were inventoried by the platoon guide and inspected by the platoon commander.

A meeting of all fire team and squad leaders, leaders of attached units and the platoon headquarters was held at noon on the 27th of May. The order was read and all phases explained in detail.

A site was selected for a forward aid station. Arrangements were made for a supply of stretchers, medical supplies and a reinforced rifle squad to act as stretcher bearers. The site selected was at CT 041049, in a defiladed area at the bend in the trail. One corpsman and a fire team were stationed there.

Arrangements were made for a working party of one squad from the first and second Platoons which would move all ammunition and equipment forward to a supply point located at the furthest point forward of the M1R between two hills occupied by the 1st Platoon of CHARLIE. A defiladed area was selected and all the ammunition and equipment was moved forward under cover of darkness.

The total strength of the task unit was 135 men. A time schedule was established. All attached units were to be in their assembly areas by midnight.

The order of march was organized as follows:
Third squad, 3d platoon - assault force. Its purpose was to precede the main body, clear all enemy opposition, beware of all ambushes and guide the main body. The platoon commander was with the assault squad.

The 1st section of the light MG platoon followed the third squad. BMGs were substituted for the T/O MGs and 22 boxes of ammunition were carried by this section (the 1st squad, 1st Platoon was to be on position on COP 4 with 13 boxes of RG ammunition). The first section of MGs followed the 3d squad to the LD, then moved off to the left and proceeded to COP 4, joined the 1st squad, 1st Platoon and set up as a base of fire on OPLR 5.

The 2d squad, 3d platoon followed next, each man carrying one box of MG ammunition.

APPENDIX ABLE TO ENCLOSURE (12)

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The 3d section, MG platoon followed next, carrying two .50 caliber MGs, 2 HMGs and 22 boxes of MG ammunition.

The 2d section of HMGS from WEAPONS came next, carrying two HMGs and 35 boxes of MG ammunition.

The next unit was the 2d section of the Assault Platoon of WEAPONS, carrying two flame throwers and four 3.5 rocket launchers.

Next came the lst squad of the CHARLIE mortars, carrying two tubes and 45 rounds of HE. Two rounds of MP were carried as the signal to open fire. The alternate signal for open fire was to open fire with the .50 caliber MG.

The next unit was the supply party and Forward Aid Station, including the platoon guide, company rockets, corpsman and covering fire teams carrying stretchers, medical stores and a telephone for forward supply.

Last was the lst squad, 3d platoon, including a wire team and the platoon sergeant, each man carrying one box of MG ammunition. One runner and SCR-300 operator were with the platoon commander and one runner with the platoon sergeant.

All units began moving into position at 0030, 28 May. All troops were issued bullet-proof vests and assault rations. Each man was inspected to assure that he carried a minimum of three bandoliers plus a full belt of M-1 ammunition (full belt for BAR men), three grenades and the assigned boxes of MG ammunition. All unit leaders reviewed plans and a time check was made at 0200.

The force moved out of the assembly area at 0220 and crossed the MIB at C230. Movement was slow due to excessive amount of heavy weapons and ammunition. Visibility was nil. Crossed LD at 0300. First section, IMG platoon left main body and proceeded to COP 4 to set up base of fire. Signal to shift base of fire was a green smoke grenade. The main body moved into position at 0415, the position having been cleared by the assault squad between 0400 and 0415. A .50 caliber MG and one HMG were placed with the 3d squad, 3d platoon at CT 040054. The two 60 tubes were set up at CT 0400540. The platoon CP was established at CT 040054. The lst squad at CT 0400539. The assault section established at CT 0410520. Ammunition carriers immediately started a shuttle between the defense perimeter and the forward supply points.

The patrol opened fire on Chirung-dong and OPLR 5 at 0427, and at the same time the base of fire opened up from COP 4. Intermittent fire was received from snipers on OPLR 5 and fire was returned from Chirung-dong. Enemy artillery roared in the supply point at 0445; communications were knocked out. Continued slow rate of fire until 0555.

APPENDIX ABLE TO ENCLOSE (32)
Friendly forces dropped an artillery barrage on CPLR 5 and platoon was ordered to move on that objective and continue attack by fire. The platoon base of fire was moved to the left to give overhead fire on CPLR 5 while the assault force moved into position. No rocket ammunition had been brought by the assault squad so they could not be utilized in the attack. The platoon moved forward in wedge formation with the 1st squad on the point, 2d squad left and 3d squad right. The 3d section LGs brought up the rear. The two 50s, two MGs, mortars and assault squad formed a base of fire. The Platoon Commander moved out with the assault force and the Platoon Sergeant remained with the base of fire. After moving two-thirds of the way towards the top of the right flank of CPLR 5, the signal was given to cease base of fire and shift fire from COP 4 to the left flank of CPLR 5. Twenty-five yards further, the platoon was stopped by small arms and grenade fire. The 3d squad deployed to the right. The 2d squad made a wide flanking movement to the left and moved forward with the 1st squad. The order was given to fix bayonets and the 1st and 3d squad moved forward using assault fire and throwing grenades. Bayonets were used in the final assault to gain the right edge of the trenches. Momentarily stopped by about 10 enemy throwing grenades and firing burp guns, the two squads retaliated with grenades, and using assault fire and a bayonet attack destroyed the position. Moving forward again the platoon was hit by a group of 20 enemy throwing grenades and firing machine guns and burp guns. Inspired by Private First Class John D. Kelly, who sacrificed his life, the platoon assaulted again and gained possession of all the high ground on CPLR 5 and quickly moved into the enemy trenches. Machine guns were set up quickly and the enemy was pursued down the reverse slopes. In the meantime, the 2d squad swept over its portion of the objective, destroyed the bunkers in the sector and one enemy machine gun. The enemy was heavily dug in on two reverse slope fingers running vertical to CPLR 5 and estimated to be in excess of 100 troops. The 2d squad was moved down the right more until pinned. Fifteen enemy dead were counted in the area occupied by the platoon, but there were no parapets on the bodies. One was an officer. All had neat haircuts, were clean in character, well uniformed and equipped and very young looking. More enemy dead were to the rear but all were under direct machine gun fire and search was impossible. Due to numerous casualties and shortage of ammunition, a request was made to withdraw. Meanwhile the enemy had reorganized and appeared to be preparing a counter-attack to the right. Lack of sufficient ammunition prevented breaking up this move. Sniper fire was being received from the left rear. At this time all automatic weapons were out of ammunition; all grenades had been used and the riflemen were low on ammunition. Some use was made of enemy grenades. Unsuccessful attempts were made to blow up enemy grenade dumps. All enemy carbines were smashed where possible. Utilizing one fire team as a covering force the platoon withdrew with all casualties. In the meantime the enemy regained the top of CPLR 5 and pursued the platoon by fire. The platoon was pinned down on arrival at the forward supply point by a heavy mortar and artillery concentration. The platoon then returned to the MLR pursued by sporadic enemy mortar fire the entire time.

APPENDIX ABLE TO ENCLOSURE (12)
Friendly casualties were one KIA and 14 WIA. Enemy casualties were 15 counted KIA, 15 estimated KIA and an undetermined number of WIA. One enemy machine gun, numerous burp guns and grenades were destroyed. No enemy information could be found on the dead.
The base of fire on COP 4 was able to deliver heavy and accurate fire from the time of the open fire signal until the assaulting force was near the top of the objective and the fire was shifted. Shortly thereafter COP 4 began to receive heavy enemy mortar fire. Hastily dug shallow positions on COP 4 offered some protection but not enough to prevent several men from receiving wounds.

On the withdrawal of the assaulting force the base of fire opened up on the enemy once more. Almost immediately a heavy mortar fire was received which necessitated taking the guns out of action and moving to new positions. Within an unbelievable short time fire was again received on the new positions. The enemy had excellent observation and it is believed that the mortars delivering the fire were emplaced on the reverse slope of CPLR 5. The order was received to withdraw upon order after the withdrawal from CPLR 5 had been effected. This was done on order down the forward slope of COP 4 in a draw. The draw was immediately hit by a 10 minute mortar barrage. The base of fire then returned to platoon position in the MLR and set up to prepare for a possible counter-attack.

The positions on COP 4 are not adequate for protection of occupying troops. It is recommended that these positions be improved to include more and deeper trench-works and bunkers, if it is to be utilized on similar missions in the future.
At 0745 the Company Commander ordered the 2d platoon of CHARLIE to reinforce ABLE on Hill 104. At 0815 the platoon left the MLR via the valley trail in ABLE sector. At 0845 the platoon was met by a guide who led the platoon to 104. From 0900 to 0930 moved slowly up trail under heavy mortar and artillery fire. Reported to ABLE at 0930 and was ordered to protect rear and flanks of ABLE position, tying in with the right and left platoon of ABLE to make an all around defense. At 1230 was ordered to set up as a rear guard to cover withdrawal of ABLE. After covering withdrawal the platoon returned to MLR, arriving at 1430.
From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division (Reinf), FMF

Subj: Special Action Report of Operation Conducted on 28 May 1952

1. On 24 May 1952 this Battalion was verbally directed to formulate plans for an air, artillery, tank-infantry assault against fortified positions at CT 040386, CT 044036 and CT 044074, verbal orders were confirmed by Frag Order 2703001. The plan was executed on 28 May 1952. The mission was two fold: (1) One platoon (Reinf) from Charlie Company was directed to bring CT 040386 under long range attack by fire, to divert enemy attention from the main objective. (2) Main objective, CT 044036 and CT 044074 was assigned to Able Company, to penetrate enemy MLR, destroy installations and capture PAV, locate and establish a perimeter defence on best defensible ground, on or near hill 104. The attacked and supporting units were to destroy all enemy installations and bunkers on and near the objective, and to support the attack and withdrawal of infantry units. In addition infantry units were to furnish small arms protection to the tanks and Engineer units forward of the MLR.

2. The Task Organization for the Operation was composed as follows:

1st Battalion, 7th Marines (Reinf) LtCol DAUGHTR

Head Company
Det 1st Sig Bn
TACP
Arty Lt Tm, 2nd Bn, 1st Mar
2nd and 3rd Plat Dog Tanks D/C

Able Company (Reinf) 7-26 Capt THOMPSON
Arty FC Tm, 2nd Bn, 11th Mar - 7-7
4.2 Mortar Co FC Tm - 4
81mm Mortar Plat FO Tm - 1
1st and 3rd Sec Aslt Plat - 7-2
1st and 3rd Sec HMG Plat
2 Teams Engrs (6 men)
2nd Plat, Dog Tanks - 1-28
1 Hire Team

End (C) -1-

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SECURITY INFORMATION

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT OF OPERATION CONDUCTED ON 28 MAY 1952 (CONT'D)

b. Charlie Company (Reinf)  
   Arty FO Tm, 2nd Bn, 11th Mar  
   4.2 Mortar Co FO Tm  
   60mm Mortar Plat FO Tm

   (1) 3rd Plt, Charlie Co (Reinf)  
        2nd Sec HMG Plt  
        1 Sec LMG Plt  
        2nd Sec Asst Plt  
        1 Sec 50 cal LMG  
        1 Sqd 60mm Mortar Sec

   Lieut SIERES

   Capt OWENS

c. Baker Company (Reinf)  
   Arty FO Tm, 2nd Bn, 11th Mar  
   4.2 Mortar Co FO Tm  
   60mm Mortar Plat FO Tm  
   1st and 2nd Sec 75mm Recoilless Rifle Plt

   Lieut TEDESGHI

   Capt WHITMORE

c. Weapons Company (-)

3. PLANNING PHASE

   a. The planning phase commenced on 24 May 1952, and consisted primarily of a conference between cognizant Battalion elements and liaison officers of those units attached for the operation. The conference formed a plan of attack, a plan of maneuver, and a flexible time schedule prepared to provide for variables of weather and errors in time and space estimation, together with foreseeable contingencies.

   Comment: The time allotted for the planning phase was considered adequate, however receipt of confirming Frag Order on 27 May, setting forth H-Hour, objective and mission, did not allow sufficient time to firm up final plans, conference and briefing of all subordinate leaders.

   Recommendations: That written order be given at earliest practicable date.

4. TRAINING PHASE

   a. Special training was not considered necessary, nor did time permit training, for this operation.
SECURITY INFORMATION

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT OF OPERATION CONDUCTED ON 28 MAY 1952 (CONT'D)

C. Due to weather, air was delayed several hours; on arrival of air the coordination of artillery and air was effectively controlled by ground teams attached to the forward units.

Comment:

a. Forward elements received several hundred rounds of enemy mortar fire, which was eliminated on arrival of air over the target.

b. The pull out was executed under cover of two separate air strikes, with no casualties.

Recommendations:

a. That future operations of this nature be preceded by the conference method of training utilizing all available material on enemy tactics and habits.

b. That information vital to the success of an operation be passed down to all leaders, to include squad leaders.

5. TACTICS AND OPERATIONS

a. The tactical plan was as follows: H-Hour 0300

H-15 min: Able Co The assault unit move out from MLR.

Charlie Co The supporting platoon (reinf) move out from MLR.

H-Hour Able Co Assault platoon cross Line of Departure.


At approximately H plus 1 assault platoon Able Co was to be in pen at base of hill 104 CT 044065 and commence assault on hill 104. Support platoon from Charlie Co was to be in pen vic CT 040054, bring under 105 fire CPLR No 4 vic CT 060066, enemy pen at Chirung-dong, vic CT 060066, pen to divert enemy and prevent their reinforcing objective 1 and 2 in Able Company sector.

Artillery, Sima Mortar and 4.2" Mortar barrages on call from Able Co on objective 1 (Hill 104).
SECURITY INFORMATION

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT OF OPERATION CONDUCTED ON 22 MAY 1952 (CONT'D)

Tanks from 2nd Platoon, Dog Co, available on call from Able Co.

Able Co after seizing objective number one (1) hill 104 move remainder of Company up on hill 104 and high ground Northeast of 104 and set up perimeter defense, reorganized and commence one platoon assault on Obj 2 (enemy pens on Tumae-ri).

b. In general the operation proceeded and was executed as planned but not, however, as scheduled. Able Co and one platoon Charlie Co moved out from Line of Departure to their respective objectives at 0318 and 0330 respectively. At 0437 one platoon Charlie Co opened fire on assigned targets. Able Co at 0440 under mortar fire called in prearranged artillery fires and at 0503 commenced assault on objective number 1. At 0558 Able Co secured objective number (1) and commenced reorganization, set up perimeter defense and prepared to defend objective, (1) pending arrival of air, (2) from expected enemy counterattack. One platoon Charlie Co at 0557 ordered to move up to CPLR #6. At 0630 Charlie Co started assault on CPLR #5 with two squads in a frontal assault and one squad in a left flank envelopment. The objective was taken and 10 enemy were killed and 15 wounded. At 0733 Charlie Co commenced withdrawal because of lack of ammunition and completed withdrawal to MLR at 0930.

Able Co continued to occupy objective No 1 and called in artillery and mortar fire on enemy positions. At 0752 three tanks from 2nd Platoon, Dog Co arrived on objective (1) and commenced firing on targets of opportunity.

At 1100 the first aircraft were on station and at 1150 8 Air force F-84 jets commenced strike on CT 044063. This was followed by 7 AD's at 1230 that hit CT 046074, CT 05072, CT 036069 and CT 024032. At 1425 two F4U's, one with smoke and the other as an escort laid a smoke screen from north side of Tumae-ri to Taeok-sen. At 1405 Able Co withdrew to MLR with all personnel and equipment.

Comment: It is believed that the operation as planned and executed was tactically sound and operationally successful. The coordination between infantry, artillery, tanks and aircraft was outstanding. It is significant that on withdrawal from objective 1, there were no casualties what-so-ever due to friendly air cover. Ninety-five percent of the friendly casualties were inflicted by enemy mortars and artillery which could have and would have been silenced, if the weather had been operational for aircraft.
Recommendations:

(1) That a limited objective attack such as this be planned and executed only when ideal weather conditions exist so that all supporting arms can be fully utilized.

6. Due to the limited scope of the operation no special problems relative to the utilization or coordination of artillery, air, or other units were encountered. All supporting arms, communications and organic Battalion units functioned effectively and efficiently.

7. It is believed that a combined tank-infantry task organization is a potent force capable of extremely effective operations against the enemy. Air cover is considered to be an absolute necessity in operations of this type in order to silence the enemy mortar and artillery fire. Friendly counter-battery fire is very ineffective without the guidance and direction of an AC, due to the constant displacement of enemy artillery and mortars. In any future operations of this type it is very important that ideal weather conditions exist so that each and every supporting arm, particularly air, can be used.

8. FINDINGS:

a. (1) Enemy tactics includes: booby trapping own bunkers, trenches, and equipment prior their pull out, as evidenced by finding these items in positions occupied by enemy KIA.

(2) Enemy front line positions were zeroed in with heavy mortar concentrations, indicating their emergency barrages were laid directly on their own MLR, thus permitting a delayed pull back, heavy mortar concentrations, then followed by a prearranged counter attack.

b. The appearance of air cover silenced all artillery and mortars.

c. A minimum of eighty-five (85) per cent of all casualties were due to fragments of artillery and mortars.

d. That the enemy laid mortar barrages on radio locations during transmissions, when radio displaced, mortars continued on the last position until transmissions were made from a new location, then the concentration shifted to the new position of the radio.

e. That a reserve of engineers, and other elements were needed.

f. That an armored vehicle was invaluable in evacuating the wounded.

GEORGE W. E. DAUGHERTY

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SECURITY INFORMATION

OPERATION PLAN
1. NUMBER: 12-52

TASK ORGANIZATION:

1st Battalion, 7th Marines (Reinf)  
LtCol DAUGHTRY

H&S Company
Det 1st Sig Bn
TACP
Arty Ltn Tm, 2nd Bn, 11th Mar
1 Plt 75mm Recoiless Rifles

a. Able Company (Reinf)  
Capt THOMPSON
Arty FO Tm, 2nd Bn, 11th Mar
4.2 Mortar Co FO Tm
81mm Mortar Plt FO Tm
1st and 3rd Sec Asslt Plt
1st and 3rd Sec HMG Plt
2 Sec Engrs (6 men)
2nd Plt, Dog Tanks
1 Wire Team

b. Charlie Company (Reinf)  
Capt OWENS
Arty FO Tm, 2nd Bn, 11th Mar
4.2 Mortar FO Tm
81mm Mortar Plt FO Tm

(1) 3rd Plt, Charlie Co (Reinf)  
Lt SIERA
2nd Sec HMG Plt
1 Sec LMG Plt
1 Sec 50 cal LMG
1 Sqd 60mm Mortar Sec

c. Baker Company (Reinf)  
Capt WHITMORE
Arty FO Tm, 2nd Bn, 11th Mar
4.2 Mortar Co FO Tm
81mm Mortar Plt FO Tm
1st and 2nd Sec 75mm Recoiless Rifle Plt

d. Weapons Company (-)  
Lt TEDESCHI

1. a. Current enemy forces opposing the 1st Bn, 7th Marines are the tentatively accepted 1st and 2nd Bn and the accepted 3rd Bn of the 589th Regt, 187th Div, 63rd CCF Army.

SECRET

Enclosure (2)
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

OPERATION PLAN NUMBER 15-52

Little is known of the composition of the 1st and 2nd Bn which are located in the Tumae-ri and Chirung-dong area respectively. The 3rd Bn of the 559th Regt is located on Taedok-mun via CT 012067 and is deployed with three rifle companies and a wpns company on line. The 1st Bn, 559th Regt is believed to be employed in the Tumae-ri area in depth from CT 045070 to CT 035091. In view of the recent enemy activity on Hill 104 via CT 044056, it is believed that the enemy permanently occupies that position with an unknown number of troops.

The 2nd Bn, 559th Regt is believed to be employed in the Chirung-dong area in depth from CT 035067 to CT 020090. It is of significant importance to note that recent forward patrols of OPLR # 6, via CT 033058 have made enemy contact during the hours of daylight and darkness. It is therefore probable that the enemy permanently occupies that position with an unknown number of troops.

The current strength of the 559th Regt is estimated to be 3,147 men. Therefore it must be assumed the three battalions plus the Heavy Weapons Battalion are also up to T/O strength or 447 men per Infantry Battalion and 569 men per Heavy Weapons Battalion.

The 187th Division of the 63rd GCF Army has no known organic units in reserve however the 189th Division of the 63rd GCF Army has only one identified regiment on line leaving the unlocated regiments in that division. Therefore the possibility of these units reinforcing the 559th Regt must be considered. The 188th Rct of the 63rd GCF Army is now in reserve located approximately seven miles north of the 559th regimental sector, and must also be considered as a reinforcing unit.

For current enemy defensive installations see Annex BAKER.

2. a. 1/7 conducts company attack on Tumae-ri (via CT 044078), and platoon attack on OPLR No 5 (via CT 035058).

b. LD, and objective as shown on Opn Overlay, see Annex ABLE.

c. H-Hour, D-Day to be announced.

SECRET

ENCLOSURE (2)
SECRET

SECREy INFORMATION

OPERATION PLAN NUMBER 16-52

(Cont'd)

d. 2nd Plat Dog Tanks, assembly point, via CT 055045. Pre-
pared to move to objective No 1, or order.

e. (1) 3rd Plat Dog Tanks, prepared to support the Bn in its Man.

S. a. (1) Able Company (Reinf) conduct attack on Hill 104
(objective No 1) and Tumae-ri, (objective No 2).

(2) Organize ground, establish perimeter defense and
patrol base with two platoons on high ground N.W. Hill 104 via
CT 041070 and one on Hill 104 for advanced patrol base.

(5) Engineer Team No 1 attached to Asst Plat, Man clear
route. Engineer Team No 2 attached to Co CP, Man clear CP area
and road from fwd CP to MLR.

(4) 2nd Plat Dog Tanks move out, on order.

b. (1) Charlie Co (Reinf), on order, send one (1) Plat (Reinf)
to via CT 040054, bring under MG fire OP No 5 via CT 035047,
enemy Fams at Chirung-dong, via CT 038068, Man to divert enemy and
prevent their reinforcing objectives 1 and 2 in Able Company sector.

(2) Utilise to maximum, 3.5" rockets, 00 cal LMG, MG and
60mm Mortar.

(3) Be prepared to support Able Company, on order.

e. Baker Co (Reinf) continues to defend Bn sector MLR, pre-
pared to support either Able or Charlie, or order.

x. (1) Initial route of evacuation and supply via 104 and
road to MLR.

(2) Provide security patrols to flanks, and contact patrol
to possible friendly units on right.

(3) Establish night perimeter defense and forward patrol
base.

(4) Establish "close in" fire team listening posts.

(5) Destroy all enemy installations and heavy weapons
on objective 2.

SECRET

Enclosure (2)
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

OPERATION PLAN NUMBER 16-52 (CONT'D)

(6) Send all prisoners direct to Bn CP.

(7) Supporting fires indicated on Opn Plans 13-52 and 16-52

(8) Air strikes on call, smoke plane on station.

(9) Fwd elements display Air Panels.

(10) All personnel fwd MLR wear bullet proof vests and helmets, carry entrenching tools.

(11) Bn 8-2 establish plan of observation of enemy.

Report all sighting to 5-3 immediately.

4. a. All personnel armed with full of ammunition, M-1 60 rnds plus 1 bandoleer, all personnel armed with a minimum of two (2) fragmentation grenades. HMG's and LMG's carry 4 boxes per gun. Company dump carry an additional full of ammunition for immediate resupply, all types, including 60mm, 3.5 rockets, demolitions, refill of napalm for flame throwers.

   b. Two canteens water.

   c. One day "C" rations.

   d. Fwd supply point for Able Co to be announced.

   e. Establish Bn Fwd Aid Station CT 052050, on order.


5. a. Guard Bn Tactical Net.

   b. Able Company use 2 SCR-300, one on separate channel for inner company communications, one on Bn tac.

   c. Bn lay wire to Able Co fwd CP.

   d. Assign alternate methods of signalling in case of primary failure.

(1) Primary, wire.

SECRET

Enclosure (2)
OPERATION PLAN NUMBER 16-62

(2) Alternate, Radio.
(3) Alternate, Pyrotechnics.
   (a) ASC -- Box me in.
   (b) ASP -- Fire VT on my Ptn.
   (c) GSC -- Cease Fire.
   (d) WSP -- Illuminate my Ptn.
   (e) RSP -- Send help.

   e. In 3-2 monitor intercept net, report immediately to 3-3 information relative to Opn.

BY ORDER OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL DAUGHERTY

H. V. JOBLIN
Major, U. S. Marines Corps
Executive Officer

ANNEXES:

ABLE -- -- -- Opn Overlay
BAKER -- -- -- Intelligence Overlay

DISTRIBUTION: "SPECIAL"

OFFICIAL:

T. R. CATHEY
Major, USMC
S-3

Enclosure (2)
SEQUENCE OF OPERATION:

0520: Arty smoke Taedok-San and en Os's on hill mass N.W. Tumae-ri.

0525: Arty fire counter-btry.

0525: Dog Co 1 Tank, prepared to fire on Northeast slopes Tumae-ri from ptn CT 055048, on order. 1 Tank prepared to fire on OPLR 5, Chirung-dong and Taedok-San from ptn CT 050048.

0600: End Plat Prepared to move from assembly pt to 104. (On completion road mine clearance) by Engrs with Able Co.

0800: Plat Charlie Co prepared to close on OPLR 5, on order, continue attack by fire.

0800: Air Strike on Red Hill or Chirung-dong as situation requires.

Note 1: On completion of raid on Tumae-ri, pull back to high ground N.W. 104. PREPARE FOR CATK from Red Hill.

SIGNED FOR BY:

S. H. Pratt
MajGen

Enclosure (2)
COPIE

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

1ST BATTALION (REINF)
7TH MARINES (REINF)
1ST MAR DIV (REINF)
IN THE FIELD

1/7 SEQUENCE OF OPERATIONS:

PHASE 1
AFTER 4-HOUR ALL TIMES DEPEND ON SITUATION AND
PROGRESS OF ASLT UNITS.

0245: Open Bn OP 131.

0245: Able Co move out from MLR.

0245: 1 Plat Charlie move out from MLR.

0300: Able cross L.D.

0300: 1 Plat Charlie cross L.D.

0400: Able Aslt Plat in pen base 104. (Also base of fire Plat).

0400: Flat Charlie in initial pen CT 040054.

0400: Charlie Plat attack by fire on OPLR 5 and Chirung-dong.
(0345 Fox, 2/1 will attack 2/1's OPLR 1 by fire).

0400: Artillery Barrage on 104, 81 and 4.2 Barrage on 104,
controlled by Able.

0400: Aslt Plat close on 104 following Sup/A barrage.

PHASE 2

*0500: Rocket Ripples on Tumae-ri, Obj 2.
*Controlled by Bn on call from Able.

*0505: Air Strike - AD's G.F. on Tumae-ri (Diverted if necessary)
*Controlled by Bn on call from Able.

(0610): Able Co move out from 104, aslt high ground N.W. and
Tumae-ri.

0615: Air-Smoke Taedok-san and high ridge N.W. Tumae-ri.

4.2" prepared to smoke Tumae-ri on pull out.

SECRET

Enclosure (2)
1st Battalion (Reinf)  
7th Marines (Reinf)  
1st Mar Div (Reinf)  
In the Field  
281500I May 1952

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DISTRIBUTION: Same as Opn Plan 16-52

OFFICIAL:

BY ORDER OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL DAUGHTRY

W. O. BUTLER  
2nd Lt, USMC  
S-2

H. V. JOBLIN  
Major, U. S. Marine Corps  
Executive Officer

SECRET  
Enclosure (2)
SECRET

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on 1st MarDiv sec ltr ser 0071152 of 27
Jun 1952

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps

Subj: Special Action Report, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines,
forwarding of

1. Forwarded.

J. E. STEWART
By direction

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION