FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO 2ndBn 1stMar 1stMarDiv ltr ser 0028-53 of 10 April 1953

From: Commanding Officer, 1st Marines
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps
Via: (1) Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Reinf), FMFPAC
      (2) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Diary, March 1953

1. Forwarded concurring with the recommendation contained in appendix VI.

   [Signature]

   H. D. ADAMS

Copy to:
CO 2ndBn 1stMar
SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CO 2d Bn 1stMar 1stMar 1 sr 0028-53 of
10 Apr 1953

From: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, FMF
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Diary for March 1953

1. Forwarded.

2. The security classification of this endorsement is
removed when detached from the basic document.

H. W. Buse, Jr.
By direction.
THIRD ENDORSEMENT on CO 2dBN 1stMar ltr ser 0028-53 of 10 Apr 1953

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps
Subj: Command Diary for March 1953

1. Forwarded.

2. This endorsement is downgraded to unclassified upon detachment from the basic document.

EDWARD A. WILCOX

By direction

Copy to:
CG 1stMarDiv
Comdt, MCS, Quantico, Va: 3 w/basic ltr and end's.

UNCLASSIFIED
2D BATTALION, 1ST MARINES

COMMAND DIARY

FOR

MARCH 1953
From: Commanding Officer
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps
Via: (1) Commanding Officer, 1st Marines
(2) Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Reinf), FMF
(3) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Diary, March 1953

Ref: (a) Part II, Chapter II (Change 4), Marine Corps Manual
(b) FMF FAC General Order Number 51 (Rev) of 11 Mar 1952
(c) Chapter VIII, Division General Order Number 101
(d) Regimental General Order Number 20 of 17 April 1952

1. INTRODUCTORY SUMMARY

As the period opened, the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines continued
to occupy and improve its sector of the Division reserve area,
C5129582, and carry out assigned missions. As a unit of the
Division reserve the Battalion continued to develop and improve
Line KANSAS and its combat outposts, maintained intensive train-
ing for all personnel, and conducted rear area foot and motor patrols.
Mobile shower units and a heated dressing unit, available for the use of the Battalion, was located at C5126982. Shows were shown in the evening. The 1st Engineer Battalion continued
maintenance on the approach road to the camp. Personnel of the
1st Company, 106th Regiment, Korean Service Corps were utilized
for fortification, road maintenance, supply, and police duties.

During the period 2 March through 8 March the Battalion partici-
pated in Marine Landing Exercise (Marlex XVII) on TOKO-OK-70
Island, Marley (XVII) order was included in the command diary for February 1953.

At 0130, 11 March the Battalion closed its old Command Post
in the vicinity of C5129582 and opened its new Command Post in the
vicinity of C5034007. The Battalion moved by motor March to the
LR sector occupied by 1/7. At 0130, 11 March, 2/1 relieved 1/7
of responsibility for the Left LR Battalion sector of the Center
LR Regiment on position. The area extends from the vicinity of
S9939395 to CTOs032.

During the period of 11 March through 11 March extensive
patrolling was carried out forward of the LR. Seventeen (17)
combat patrols, seventy-four (74) reconnaissance patrols and one
(1) layout were dispatched. Listening posts were established
during the hours of darkness by all rifle companies. All combat
patrols had the mission of capturing and/or destroying any enemy
or equipment encountered. They also had the mission of maintaining the initiative along the Hill 90-64 line to deny the enemy access to and freedom of movement in that area.

During the period 11 March through 31 March, Rifle Companies received one (1) hot meal each day of Able and Baker rations. Charlie rations were issued to each Rifle Company to supplement the one (1) hot meal per day. Hot showers were available to all personnel at a shower point located in the vicinity of C1028012. Clean clothes were available on an exchange basis.

During the period 11 March through 31 March a total of six-hundred and seventy-one (671) rounds of mixed enemy mortar fire, six-hundred and thirty-three (633) rounds of mixed enemy artillery fire, fifteen (15) rounds of mixed enemy mortar and artillery fire, and three (3) rounds of unknown enemy fire fell in the Battalion's sector of responsibility.

During the period 11 March through 31 March the Battalion suffered two (2) enlisted MIA, four (4) enlisted KIA, one (1) officer WIA, twenty-one (21) enlisted WIA, and eleven (11) enlisted WIA not evacuated. The Battalion transferred four (4) officers and one hundred eleven (111) enlisted personnel. The Battalion joined eleven (11) officers and seventy-nine (79) enlisted personnel. At the close of the period the actual personnel strength of the Battalion was forty-four (44) Marine officers, two (2) Navy officers, one thousand ninety-nine (1099) Marine enlisted and forty-one (41) Navy enlisted.

During the period the lowest temperature recorded was 19 degrees Fahrenheit and the highest temperature was 61 degrees Fahrenheit. There were 1.4 inches precipitation during the period.

The Battalion's consumption of POL for the month of March was 12,025 gallons of gasoline and 31,058 gallons of diesel fuel.

All times in the Diary are "Item" zone time.
CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE
2. CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE

1 March 1953: Morale of the organization was excellent.

The Battalion continued to occupy the reserve area, vicinity of CS128982, and carry out the mission of the Right Battalion Division Reserve Regiment. As a unit of the Division Reserve, the Battalion continued to develop and improve Line KANSAS and its combat outpost, maintained intensive training for all personnel and conducted rear area foot and motor patrols. Able and Baker rations were served at all meals for the entire Battalion. A mobile shower unit and a heated dressing unit for the use of the Battalion was located at CS128982. Movies were shown in the evening. The 1st Engineer Battalion continued maintenance on the approach road to the camp. Personnel of the 1st Company, 1066 Regiment, Korean Service Corps were utilized for fortification work, road maintenance, supply and police details.

Supervision and direction of the work on Line KANSAS and its combat outposts was accomplished by each company in its assigned sector. A portion of the work previously accomplished in the construction of bunkers and trenchline on Line KANSAS combat outposts was destroyed because of the warm rains and thawing of the frozen ground. The reconstruction of the command area was completed at 1030 this date.

The Battalion prepared for the movement and execution of Harlex XVIII. The advance party for Harlex XVII departed the area at 1715. See February Command Diary for Operation Plan 9-53, Harlex XVII.

2 March 1953: At 0050 the main body of the Battalion Landing Team (Rein) departed the Battalion area by motor march for the Kunsan-Ni railhead. At 0830 the main body departed the railhead by train for Inchon arriving there at 0730. At 0745 landing craft commenced transporting the main body to the APA 27 (USS CLARKS), LSTs 772 and 805. Embarkation was completed at 1015 and the ships sailed at 1400 for the immediate vicinity of Tok-Chok-To Island, dropping anchor at 1715. For a summary of events for Harlex XVII see Appendix IV, Enclosure 4.

Personnel at the Battalion Rear area Command Post consisted of the perimeter guard, Line JAMESTOWN familiarization detail, and Line KANSAS supervisory personnel.

Other activities routine.
3 March 1953: At 1300 the familiarization detail from the Battalion and Company "B" 1/1 departed for Line JAMESTOWN and (for) the 1st Battalion 7th Marines Area. This was in compliance to Annex Love of Operation Plan 8-53. (see February Command Diary, Appendix IV, for complete details)

The Battalion continued participating in Marlex XVII.

4 March 1953: The 4th Battalion, 11th Marines fired their T/O weapons at the Battalion's rifle range.

The Battalion continued participating in Marlex XVII.

5 March 1953: The 4.2 Mortar Company, 1st Marines fired their T/O weapons at the Battalion's rifle range.

The Battalion continued participating in Marlex XVII.

6 March 1953: The BLT (Reinf) of Marlex XVII commenced debarkation at 0000. The movement to the rear area Command Post was accomplished with two (2) trains from Inchon to Nonsan-Ni and two (2) motor march convoys from the railhead to the base camp. The first train departed Inchon at 1025 and the last elements arrived at the Battalion Command Post at 1645.

Other activities routine.

7 March 1953: One (1) Purple Heart Medal was awarded for wounds received in action.

At 0700 eight (8) men from Company "F" departed the Battalion Area for combat outpost 64A (CT010000), "INGRID" to effect one third relief. At 1600 nine (9) men from Company "P" departed the Battalion Area for combat outpost 92 (BT992015), "MARILYN", to effect one third relief. At 1725 ten (10) men from Company "B", 1st Battalion, 1st Marines departed their Battalion Area for combat outpost 128 (BT999021), "KATE", to effect one third relief. Company "B" 1/1 is to be under the operational control of 2/1 when 2/1 assumes responsibility for that sector of Line JAMESTOWN which 1/7 holds presently.

Other activities routine.
COMMAND DIARY, 1953

8 March 1953: Two (2) Bronze Star Medals were awarded by the Commanding Officer, 1st Marines at a Battalion formation.

At 0900 two (2) men from Headquarters and Service Company departed the Battalion Area for the Battalion Observation Post in the vicinity of CTO16016 in the 1/7 sector of Line JAMESTOWN. At 1400 eight (8) men from Company "F" departed the Battalion Area to effect two thirds relief of combat outpost "INGRID". At 1620 three (3) men from Company "E" departed the Battalion Area for the combat outpost #2, Hill 84, in the vicinity of BT970028. Eleven (11) men from Company "B" 1/1 departed the Battalion Area at 1700 to effect two thirds relief of combat outpost "KATE". At 1810 eleven (11) men from Company "D" departed the Battalion Area to effect two thirds relief of combat outpost "MARILYN".

Church services were conducted at the Battalion Area Chapel in the afternoon.

Other activities routine.

9 March 1953: Sixty-eight (68) men departed the Battalion Area at 0333 for the relief of combat outposts Two-Able (BT965026) and One (BT970014). Nine (9) enlisted men from Company "E" departed the Battalion Area at 0900 as part relief for combat outpost #2, Hill 84 (BT970028). At 1820 Company "E" (minus) departed the Battalion Area for 1/7 sector of Line JAMESTOWN to complete the relief of combat outposts #1 and #2. This relief was completed at 2330 and Company "E" came under the operational control of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines.

Other activities routine.

10 March 1953: Company "D" advance elements departed the Battalion Area at 0745 for 1/7 Line JAMESTOWN sector to relieve Company "B" 1/7 on the left sector of the Battalion front. At 0840 Weapons Company (minus) departed the Battalion Area for 1/7. At 1055 Company "F" advance elements departed the Battalion Area to relieve Company "C" 1/7 on the right sector of the Battalion front. At 1300 Weapons Company (minus) arrived at 1/7 CP and came under the operational control of 1/7. At 1500 the Command group of this Battalion arrived at 1/7 CP. At 1845 Company "F" (minus) departed the Battalion Area to relieve Company "C" 1/7 on position. Company "D" commenced relief of Company "B" 1/7 on position, relief was completed at 2100 and Company "D" came under operational control of 1/7. At 1910 Company "B" 1/1 commenced relief of Company "E" 1/7; relief was completed at 2230 and Company "B" 1/1 came under to operational control of 1/7.

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10 March 1953 Cont'd: Company "F" occupied the middle sector of the 1/7 front. At 2000 Company "F" commenced its relief on position of Company "C" 1/7. All patrols and listening posts from this Battalion were under the operational control of 1/7.

Other activities routine.

11 March 1953: At 0120 Company "F" completed its relief on position of Company "C" 1/7 and came under operational control of 1/7. At 0120 2/1 relieved 1/7 and assumed responsibility for the left Battalion sector extending from the vicinity of B9999998 to the vicinity of CT016032. The Command Post was closed at CS122982 and opened at CT024007 at 0120. At this time all elements of 2/1 under the operational control of 1/7 reverted to parent control and these elements of 1/7 remaining on line passed to the operational control of 2/1. At 0430 Company "B" suffered three (3) WIAE-NEA as a result of a friendly mine detonating in the vicinity of CT010019. One (1) combat patrol, squad reinforced, nineteen (19) men, departed the MLR at 2030 from Company "F", objective was in the vicinity of BT007032. The mission of the patrol was to capture or destroy any enemy if encountered. It also had the mission of maintaining the initiative along the Hill 90-64 line to deny the enemy access to and freedom of movement in that area. One (1) reconnaissance patrol, squad size, thirteen (13) men, from Company "D" departed the MLR at 2045. Sixteen (16) listening posts were dispatched at darkness. Including the four (4) permanent combat outposts, the Battalion had a total of five hundred twenty (502) men forward of the MLR. Two (2) rear area security foot patrols were conducted from Companies "D" and "B" over routes 1 and 2 respectively, (see operation order #10-53 for assigned sectors).

The Battalion received nineteen (19) rounds of mixed mortar and eight (8) rounds of mixed artillery.

Major General E. A. POLLOCK, Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Reinf) and Colonel H. D. ADAMS, Commanding Officer, 1st Marine Regiment visited the Battalion Area.

A hot shower unit with dressing rooms and clothing exchange was located in the vicinity of CT025012. Three (3) hot meals a day consisting of Able and Baker rations were served to Headquarters and Service Company personnel.
11 March 1953 Cont'd: One (1) hot meal a day of Able and Baker rations was served to all other Companies with Charlie rations for the other two (2) meals. The 1st Company, 103d Regiment, Korean Service Corps camp was located in the vicinity of CT024007. A helicopter strip was located in the vicinity of CT023007. The roads in the Battalion sector were in fair repair though the spring rains were causing an increased erosion problem.

12 March 1953: The combat patrol dispatched at 2030 on 11 March returned to the MLR at 0028 with negative contact. The reconnaissance patrol dispatched at 2345 on 11 March returned to the MLR with negative report. At 0550 one (1) platoon from Company "A" 1/1 arrived in the Company "D" area and came under the operational control of 2/1. This platoon manned positions on the MLR in order for a platoon from Company "D" to be brought back to the Battalion Command Post for a briefing of the night's combat patrol. Brigadier General BARE, Assistant Division Commander, visited the Battalion area at 1300 and attended the patrol briefing. The combat patrol, a platoon reinforced, sixty (60) men, departed the MLR at 1930 from Company "D". The mission of the patrol was to capture and/or destroy any enemy or equipment if encountered. It also had the mission of maintaining the initiative along the Hill 90-64 line to deny enemy access to and freedom of movement in that area. Its objective was Hill 90 in the vicinity of BT927023. Several "Valentine Packets" were picked up by the men. These packets contained propaganda regarding the peace offers that the Chinese Communists have made. A large crude sign made of cloth was also brought in and turned over to the Battalion S-2. This sign depicted the benefits of a United Korea and the peaceful intentions of the Chinese Peoples Army which was forced into war by the United Nations Armies. Two (2) reconnaissance patrols of one (1) squad each thirteen (13) men were dispatched from Companies "B" and "F". Negative results were reported. Thirteen (13) listening posts, were sent out at darkness. Including the four (4) permanent combat outposts, there were four hundred eighty-five (485) men forward of the MLR. Rear area security foot patrols were dispatched from Company "B" and Regimental AT Company to cover areas 3 and 4 respectively. They returned with a negative result.

The Battalion received five (5) rounds of mixed enemy mortar and one (1) round of enemy artillery fire.
13 March 1953: The previous night's combat patrol returned to the MLR at 0138 with negative contact. At 0400 the platoon from Company "A" 1/1 departed the Company "D" area and reverted to parent control.

The Battalion dispatched one (1) combat patrol, a platoon reinforced, sixty (60) men from Company "B". The mission of the patrol was to capture or destroy any enemy or equipment if encountered. It also had the mission of maintaining the initiative along the Hill 90-64 line to deny enemy access to and freedom of movement in that area. It departed the MLR at 2040 enroute to its objective in the vicinity of BT990017. Three (3) reconnaissance patrols of one (1) squad each thirteen (13) men were dispatched from Companies "D" and "F". Negative results were reported. Nine (9) listening posts were manned at darkness. Including the four (4) permanent combat outposts, there were four hundred and seventy-nine (479) men forward of the MLR. Rear area security foot patrols were dispatched from Company "D", 1st Tank Battalion, and Headquarters and Service Company to cover areas 5 and 6 respectively. They returned with negative results.

The Battalion received thirty-two (32) rounds of mixed mortar and eleven (11) rounds of mixed artillery fire.

14 March 1953: The previous night's combat patrol returned to the MLR at 0200 with negative contact.

At 1545 Company "E" suffered one (1) WIAE as a result of enemy sniper fire in the vicinity of BT990029.

The Battalion dispatched one (1) combat patrol of two (2) squad reinforced, thirty-one (31) men, from Company "F" at 2315. The mission of the patrol was to capture or destroy any enemy or equipment encountered. It also had the mission of maintaining the initiative along the Hill 90-64 line to deny enemy access to and freedom of movement in that area. It reached its objective in the vicinity of CT000027 at 0130 and returned to the MLR at 0630. One (1) reconnaissance patrol from Company "D" departed the MLR at 0450 and returned at 0640. Negative results were reported. Twelve (12) listening posts were posted at darkness. Including the four (4) permanent combat outposts, the Battalion had a total of four hundred and fifty (450) men forward of the MLR. Rear area security foot patrols were conducted by the 4.2 Mortar Company in areas 7 and 8 respectively, with negative results.

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14 March 1953: The Battalion received nineteen (19) rounds of mixed mortar fire and five (5) rounds of mixed artillery fire.

Colonel H. D. ADAMS, Regimental Commander, 1st Marines visited the Battalion Command Post at 1015 and departed at 1045.

15 March 1953: The Battalion dispatched one (1) combat patrol of one (1) squad (Reinf), nineteen (19) men, from the Company "F" sector at 1230. The mission of the patrol was to capture or destroy any enemy or equipment encountered. It also had the mission of maintaining initiative along Hill 90-64 line to deny enemy access to and freedom of movement in that area. It reached its objective in the vicinity of CT007032 at 2045 and returned to the MLR at 2314 with negative contact. One (1) reconnaissance patrol from Company "B", squad size, thirteen (13) men, departed the MLR at 2304. Thirteen (13) listening posts were posted at darkness. Including the four (4) permanent combat outposts, the Battalion had a total of four hundred and fifty-eight (458) men forward of the MLR. Two (2) rear area security foot patrols departed from Headquarters and Service Company and the Regimental Anti-Tank Company to cover areas 9 and 10 respectively, with negative results.

Brigadier General BARE, Brigadier General M. H. NELSON, Colonel L. C. PLAIN, Lieutenant Colonel F. D. FEEZELL, Lieutenant Colonel F. E. GARRETTSON arrived at the Battalion Command Post at 1030 and departed the area at 1055.

The Battalion received forty-nine (49) rounds of mixed mortar fire twenty-three (23) rounds of mixed artillery fire.

16 March 1953: The previous night's reconnaissance patrol from Company "S" returned to the MLR at 0145 with a negative report. At 0345 a reconnaissance patrol, squad size, thirteen (13) men was dispatched from Company "D" and returned to the MLR at 0730 with a negative report. At 1233 enemy troops of undetermined number were observed on Hill 80 in the vicinity of BT984033. Fire from 81mm Mortars was called in from combat outpost #2 and the enemy troops dispersed with one (1) estimated KIA. One (1) combat patrol of two (2) squads reinforced, thirty-five (35) men, was dispatched at 2200 from Company "F". The mission of the patrol was to capture and/or destroy any enemy or equipment encountered. The mission also included maintaining the initiative along the Hill 90-64 line to deny enemy access to and freedom of movement in that area. One (1) reconnaissance patrol from Company "D", squad size, thirteen (13) men, departed the MLR at 2300. Thirteen (13) listening posts were established at darkness.
COMMAND DIARY, 1953

16 March 1953 Cont'd: Including the four (4) permanent combat outposts, there was a total of four hundred and fifty-four (454) men forward of the MLR. Two (2) rear area security foot patrols departed from Headquarters and Service Company and Company "D" to cover areas 11 and 1 respectively.

Colonel H. N. BUSE, Jr., Chief of Staff, 1st Marine Division visited the Battalion Area. Colonel W. M. NELSON, Division Inspector, inspected Companies "D" and "F".

The Battalion received fifty-six (56) rounds of mixed mortar and seven (7) rounds of mixed artillery fire.

17 March 1953: The previous night's combat patrol reached its objective, Hill 88 in the vicinity of BT985027, at 0145 and returned to the MLR at 0400 with negative contact. The reconnaissance patrol from Company "D" returned to the MLR at 0230 with a negative report.

At 1420 an 81mm Mortar Forward Observer observed an undetermined number of enemy in the open, vicinity of BT972047. Fire from 81mm Mortars on combat outpost #2 resulted in one (1) estimated enemy WIA. At 1720 the 81mm Mortars from combat outpost #2 again fired in the vicinity of BT978032. The enemy casualties were one (1) counted WIA and two (2) estimated WIA.

The Battalion dispatched one (1) combat patrol, platoon reinforced, fifty-eight (58) men, at 2005 from Company "B". The mission of the patrol was to capture and/or destroy any enemy or equipment encountered. It also had the mission of maintaining the initiative along the Hill 90-64 line to deny enemy access to and freedom of movement in that area. Company "E" dispatched at 1953, a reconnaissance patrol of fire team size, four (4) men. Thirteen (13) listening posts were established at darkness. Including the four (4) permanent combat outposts, there was a total of five hundred and one (501) men forward of the MLR. Rear area security foot patrols were conducted by Companies "B" and "F" to cover routes 2 and 3 respectively.

The Battalion received six (6) rounds of mixed mortar and twenty-three (23) rounds of mixed artillery fire.

18 March 1953: The previous night's combat patrol from Company "B" reached its objective, Hill 90, vicinity of BT987023, at 0205 and returned to the MLR at 0435 with negative contact. The fire team reconnaissance patrol from Company "E" returned at 0200 with negative report.
18 March 1953 Cont'd: At 0800 Company "E" reported they observed two (2) enemy digging in the vicinity of Hill "YOKE", BT999037. The indirect 50 caliber machine guns, located on combat outpost #2, fired resulting in one (1) enemy counted KIA.

At 0340 Company "D" dispatched one (1) reconnaissance patrol, squad reinforced, twenty (20) men, to clear enemy mines in the tank positions on Hill 90, vicinity of BT986023. It returned at 0620 with a negative report on enemy mines in the area swept. At 0500 Company "E" dispatched from combat outpost #2, a two (2) man layout with one (1) PRG-6 for communication. No activity was reported until 1430 and then at 1715, ten (10) enemy were observed in the vicinity of BT978032. The 81mm Mortars fired and the casualty report was one (1) enemy estimated WIA. At 1910 the layout reported an estimated thirty (30) to forty (40) enemy in the vicinity of BT985032. The 81mm Mortars fired again, resulting in two (2) enemy counted WIA. The patrol returned to COP #2 at 1940. Company "F" dispatched at 1930, one (1) reconnaissance patrol to sweep the area to the immediate front and flanks of combat outpost "INGRID", CTOL1030. The patrol returned at 2200 with a negative report. One (1) combat patrol, platoon reinforced, fifty-eight (58) men, was dispatched at 1930 from Company "B". The mission of the patrol was to capture and/or destroy any enemy or equipment if encountered. It also had the mission of maintaining the initiative along the Hill 90-64 line to deny enemy access to and freedom of movement in that area. Thirteen (13) listening posts were posted at darkness. Including the four (4) permanent combat outpost, there was a total of four hundred and sixty-seven (467) men forward of the MLR. Rear area security foot patrols were conducted by the Regimental Anti-Tank Company and Company "D", 1st Tank Battalion, over routes 4 and 5 respectively.

The Battalion received twenty-five (25) rounds of mixed mortar and thirteen (13) rounds of mixed artillery fire.

19 March 1953: At 0115 Company "F" suffered two (2) WIANE as a result of one (1) round of 82mm Mortar fire in the vicinity of CTOL1030. At 0104 Combat outpost "INGRID" was receiving on the average of one (1) round of 82mm Mortar fire every forty-five (45) seconds. This barrage of mortar fire lasted approximately forty (40) minutes. The Battalion was placed on a 100% watch at 0124. At the time that the 2nd Battalion's combat outpost "INGRID" was receiving this mortar fire, combat outposts "HEDDY" 3/1 and "ESTHER" 3/1 were receiving similar barrages of
19 March 1953 Cont'd: 82mm Mortar fire. All indications pointed to a "probe" by enemy forces. When the 2d Battalion was notified that the combat outpost "HEDDY" 3/1, which is adjacent to combat outpost "INGRID", was receiving small arms fire and automatic weapons fire from in front of their position, the 2d Battalion supported the defense of combat outpost "HEDDY" with 81mm Mortar fire and 50 caliber machine gun fire from Hill 229, CT016016. Automatic weapons fire from combat outpost "INGRID" and 60mm Mortar fire from Company "F" supported the defense also. Twenty-six (26) rounds of 81mm Mortar illumination was fired in the vicinity of CT013033 to keep a constant vigil in front and to the right flank of combat outpost "INGRID". At 0200 Company "F" reported all fire from enemy mortars had ceased on combat outpost "INGRID". The 81mm Mortar illumination continued throughout the hours of darkness with a varied time schedule.

The previous night's combat patrol from Company "B" returned to the MLR at 0105 with negative contact. One reconnaissance at patrol from Company "D", squad thirteen (13) men, was dispatched at 0542 and returned to the MLR at 1035 with a negative report. At 0525 Company "E" dispatched, from combat outpost #2, one (1) reconnaissance patrol of fourteen (14) men. The patrol's objective in the vicinity of BT97020, was a hill on which a 50 caliber machine gun position was to be dug. The patrol returned at 1620 with its mission accomplished and a negative report on enemy activity. At 2158 a combat patrol from Company "D" was dispatched from the MLR. The mission was to capture or destroy any enemy or equipment encountered. Thirteen (13) listening posts were posted at darkness. Including the four (4) permanent combat outposts, there was a total of five hundred and eighteen (518) men forward of the MLR.

The Battalion received sixty-seven (67) rounds of 82mm Mortar fire and no artillery fire.

20 March 1953: The previous night's combat patrol from Company "B" reached its objective, Hill 90 in the vicinity of BT986023, at 0115 and returned to the MLR at 0455 with negative contact. At 1510 six (6) enemy were observed in the open, vicinity of BT983055. The 81mm Mortars fired with a result of two (2) enemy estimated KIA. At 1620 an unknown number of enemy was observed digging in the vicinity of BT97034. The 81mm Mortars fired with a result of three (3) enemy estimated WIA. At 1625 Company "E" suffered two (2) WIA and in the vicinity of BT971026 as a result of 60mm Mortar. At 1817 an unknown number of enemy was observed in the open, vicinity of BT972049. Friendly 81mm Mortars fired with a result of two (2) estimated enemy WIA.

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20 March 1953 Cont'd: The development of Line JAMESTOWN continued throughout the Battalion's period on line. To date there were two (2) crew served weapons positions constructed by Company "B". Company "D" constructed one (1) 60mm Mortar position and three (3) rabbit holes. Company "E" constructed two (2) crew served weapons positions and nearly all of the trench line of COP #2 was dug to the prescribed depth of six (6) feet, though some widening remained to be done. Company "F" completed one (1) storage shelter.

Thirteen (13) listening posts were posted at darkness. There was a total of four hundred forty-two (442) men forward of the MLR. Two (2) rear area security foot patrols were dispatched from the Regimental Anti-Tank Company and Headquarters and Service Company to cover areas 8 and 9 respectively.

The Battalion received thirty-four (34) rounds of mixed mortar fire and eight (8) rounds of mixed artillery fire.

A combat patrol, squad reinforced, twenty-one (21) men was dispatched from Company "F" at 1933. The patrol's objective was Hill 54, vicinity of CTO07032. The mission was to capture and/or destroy any enemy or equipment if encountered. It also had the mission of maintaining the initiative along the Hill 90-54 line to deny enemy access to and freedom of movement in that area. At 2116 the Company "F" combat patrol engaged an estimated enemy platoon at CTO06031. Visibility was restricted considerably because of no moon and low hanging clouds. Friendlies employed SA, AK, GREN, 81mm Mortars, 4.2 inch Mortars and Artillery. The enemy employed PPSH, Carbines, Grenades and Machine Guns. At 2121 radio contact (PRC-6) ceased from the patrol to Company "F". Reinforcements were dispatched at 2125 from Company "F" to combat outpost "INGRID". At 2135 friendlies disengaged from the enemy and withdrew towards the MLR via the rear of combat outpost "INGRID". Radio contact was established with the combat patrol from the Company "F" CP at 2144. The transmission was very short and unreadable. Three (3) men from the combat patrol arrived at the center gate of the Company "F" MLR at 2210. They related that the patrol had suffered casualties and it needed aid. At 2251 a platoon from Company "F" was dispatched to guide the remaining eighteen (18) men of the combat patrol back to the MLR. At 2320 fourteen (14) men from the combat patrol arrived at the MLR to make a total of seventeen (17) friendlies returned with four (4) friendlies MIA. The platoon that was dispatched to reinforce the combat patrol was reduced to continue forward. They covered the terrain in which the friendlies had engaged the enemy and searched for the four (4) MIAs.
21 March 1953: The platoon from Company "F" continued its search for the four (4) MIAs. On several occasions the platoon investigated various possibilities as it progressed forward of combat outpost "INGRID" towards a steel tower, vicinity of CT001024, near where the original patrol had engaged the enemy. At 0055 ten (10) enemy were seen in the vicinity of CT001024 and 81mm Mortar fire was called by the patrol leader. No estimate was made as to the casualties inflicted on the enemy. At 0255 two (2) MIAs were found and were brought back to the MLR. Both men were KIA. The platoon continued searching until 0528 when they returned to the MLR. The friendlies suffered two (2) MIA, two (2) KIA and two (2) WIAE. The enemy casualties inflicted by the patrol were eight (8) counted KIA, three (3) estimated KIA, four (4) counted WIA and four (4) estimated WIA. Observers for 81mm Mortars estimated two (2) enemy KIA and five (5) WIA. The 4.2 Mortars estimated three (3) KIA and two (2) WIA. Artillery counted five (5) KIA, twelve (12) estimated KIA and twenty-three (23) estimated WIA.

Two (2) Purple Heart Medals were awarded for wounds received in action.

At 0300 Company "E" suffered one (1) WIAE near vicinity of BT968034 as a result of a friendly hand grenade. At 0700 Company "E" fired 60mm Mortars at four (4) enemy observed in the vicinity of BT968034. Two (2) enemy KIA were estimated by the FO observing the action. At 1825 Company "E" observed nine (9) enemy vicinity of BT983034. The 81mm Mortars fired for an estimate of one (1) enemy WIA.

Company "D" dispatched one (1) reconnaissance patrol squad thirteen (13) men, at 1945 to sweep the hill mass entitled the "STAR", vicinity of BT983016. It returned at 2400 with a report that several cat and crow calls were heard in the vicinity of CT998027. Because of the frequent reports of hearing cats and bird calls followed by the noise of movement it was assumed that these calls were listening posts signaling to a larger force. At 2140 Company "B" dispatched one (1) reconnaissance patrol, squad thirteen (13) men. Thirteen (13) listening posts were posted at darkness. Including the four (4) permanent combat outposts, there was a total of four hundred and eighty (480) men forward of the MLR. Rear area security foot patrols were conducted by Headquarters and Service Company to cover area 10 and 11.
21 March 1953 Cont'd: The Battalion received twelve (12) rounds of mixed mortar fire and no artillery fire.

Major General E. A. POLLOCK, Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, Colonel E. R. SMOK, G-3, 1st Marine Division, and Colonel H. E. ADAMS, Commanding Officer, 1st Marine Regiment visited the Battalion area at 1030 and departed at 1145.

22 March 1953: The previous night's reconnaissance patrol from Company "B" returned to the MLR at 0206 with a negative report.

At 0000, one (1) enemy was observed in the vicinity of BT972038, Hill 822. A LMG from combat outpost #2 BT970028 fired with a result of one (1) enemy counted WIA. At 0815, ten (10) enemy were observed in the open vicinity of BT982041. A casualty report of one (1) estimated enemy WIA resulted from 81mm Mortar fire. One (1) reconnaissance patrol, squad, thirteen (13) men departed at 0615 from Company "D". The patrol returned to the MLR at 0805 with a negative report. One (1) reconnaissance patrol, squad reinforced, eighteen (18) men, departed COP #2 for "No Name Ridge", vicinity of BT977028. The patrol returned at 2238 with a report that two (2) red flares and one (1) white flare in the vicinity of Hill 123, were observed. One (1) reconnaissance patrol, squad thirteen (13) men, departed the MLR at 0802 from Company "F". Rear area security foot patrols were conducted by Companies "D" and "B" to cover areas 1 and 2 respectively. Thirteen (13) listening posts were established at darkness. Including the four (4) permanent combat outposts, there was four hundred and ninety-two (492) men forward of the MLR.

The Battalion received ten (10) rounds of mixed mortar fire.

23 March 1953: The previous night's reconnaissance patrol from Company "F" returned to the MLR at 0040 with a negative report. A combat patrol, platoon reinforced, sixty (60) men, was dispatched at 0035 from Company "D". The mission of the patrol was to capture and/or destroy any enemy or equipment if encountered. It also had the mission of maintaining the initiative along the Hill 90-64 to deny enemy access to and freedom of movement in that area. The patrol swept Hill 90, vicinity of BT987023, and returned to the MLR at 0618 with negative contact. They reported there were no signs of fresh digging or enemy activity.
23 March 1953 Cont'd: At 1700 Company "E" suffered one (1) WIA in the vicinity of BT971027 as a result of an enemy 60mm Mortar. At 1919 six (6) to eight (8) enemy were observed in the vicinity of BT978023. A friendly "sniper", equipped with a U. S. Rifle, Cal. 30, M1, fired with a result of one (1) enemy counted WIA.

Three (3) friendly tanks departed the MLR at 1713 for Hill 90, BT9887032. A squad of infantry accompanied them for closein protection against enemy forces. The tanks carried construction and fortification material (barb wire, stakes, bunker timbers) to deceive the enemy into believing that friendly forces were attempting to occupy Hill 90 as a permanent combat outpost. While on position the tanks fired approximately forty (40) rounds of 90mm shells at observed and known enemy positions. The tanks and infantry departed Hill 90 at 1931 for the MLR. At 1936 a combat patrol, platoon reinforced, sixty (60) men, departed the MLR for the "Horseshoe" which is adjacent to Hill 90 and on the enemy's route of approach to Hill 90. The mission of the patrol was to capture and/or destroy any enemy or equipment if encountered. At 2301 Company "F" dispatched one (1) reconnaissance patrol, squad thirteen (13) men. The patrol returned to the MLR at 2324 with a report that two (2) sets of foot prints which were believed to have been enemy were seen in the vicinity of CT009028. Thirteen (13) listening posts were posted at darkness. Including the four (4) permanent combat outposts, there was a total of four hundred and ninety-eight (498) men forward of the MLR. Rear area security foot patrols were conducted by Company "F" and the Regimental Anti-Tank Company to cover areas 3 and 4 respectively.

The Battalion received forty-five (45) rounds of mixed mortar and forty (40) rounds of mixed artillery fire.

24 March 1953: The previous night's combat patrol, platoon reinforced, sixty (60) men, set up an ambush on the "Horseshoe", vicinity of BT989031, and stayed on position approximately one and one-half (1½) hours. It returned to the MLR at 0010 with negative contact.

At 0100 Company "B" dispatched one (1) reconnaissance patrol to sweep the area in the vicinity of CT998022. The patrol returned to the MLR at 0605 with a report that movement was heard in the vicinity of CT002022, but investigation proved negative. At 2200 Company "B" dispatched one (1) reconnaissance patrol to reconnoiter a well worn path running along the reverse
24 March 1953 Cont'd: slope of Hill 88. One (1) combat patrol, platoon reinforced, fifty-eight (58) men, from Company "B" departed the MLR at 1940. The mission of the patrol was to capture and/or destroy any enemy or equipment if encountered. It also had the mission of maintaining the initiative along the Hill 90-64 line to deny enemy access to and freedom of movement in that area. The combat patrol set up an ambush, vicinity BT999027, with a support group two hundred (200) yards to the east on Hill 88, BT985025.

Between the hours of 1745 and 1827 Company "E" observed five (5) enemy, vicinity BT973038, and four (4) enemy, vicinity BT973038. The 81mm Mortars fired with a total of seven (7) count­ed WIA. Thirteen (13) listening posts were posted at darkness. Including the four (4) permanent combat outposts there were four hundred and ninety-eight (498) men forward of the MLR. Rear area security foot patrols were conducted by Company "D" 1st Tank Battalion and Headquarters and Service Company to cover areas 5 and 6 respectively.

The Battalion received eleven (11) rounds of mixed mortar fire and fifteen (15) rounds of mixed artillery fire.

25 March 1953: Two (2) Purple Heart Medals were awarded for wounds received in action.

The previous night's combat patrol from Company "E" returned to the MLR at 0245 with negative contact. A Company "E" reconnaissance patrol returned to COP #2 at 0200 with negative report. At 0245 reconnaissance patrols were dispatched from Companies "D" and "E". The patrols were squad, thirteen (13) men. The mission of the patrols was to reconnoiter enemy activity over known avenues of approach which were frequently employed by the enemy. The patrol from Company "E" returned to COP #2 at 0628 with a negative report. The patrol from Company "D" returned to the MLR at 0638 with a negative report. A reconnaissance patrol, two (2) squads, twenty-seven (27) men from Company "F" was dispatched at 2003 reaching its objective, vicinity of CT008032, at 2226.

At 1902 seven (7) enemy wearing packs were observed, vicinity BT983032. Fire from 81mm Mortars resulted in one (1) enemy estimated WIA. Thirteen (13) listening posts were posted at dark­ness. Including the four (4) permanent combat outposts, there was a total of four hundred and eighty-three (483) men forward of the MLR. Rear area foot patrols were conducted by 4.2 inch Mortar Company to cover areas 7 and 8.
26 March 1953 Cont'd: The Battalion received fourteen (14) rounds of mixed Mortar fire and eighteen (18) rounds of mixed artillery fire.

A combat patrol, platoon reinforced, sixty (60) men, departed from Company "D" at 2002 with the mission of capturing and/or destroying any enemy or equipment if encountered. It also had the mission of maintaining the initiative along the Hill 90-64 line to deny the enemy access to and freedom of movement in that area. The patrol set up an ambush, vicinity of BT 992027, on the "Horseshoe". After being in ambush position approximately two (2) hours, the patrol continued on its route along and forward of the Hill 90-64 line. At 2351 the combat patrol engaged approximately thirty-five (35) enemy, vicinity of BT 984020. The fire received by the combat patrol from the enemy was sparse and very sporadic during the first few minutes. Progressively the enemy fire became more concentrated and culminated when a Maxim machine gun, 7.62mm opened fire, vicinity of BT 984017. The combat patrol immediately upon contact set up in a perimeter defense. The friendly employed SA, AW, Grenades (Frag), LMG, 4.2 inch mortars, 81mm Mort, 60mm Mort, 75mm Recoiless, 4.5 inch multiple rockets, and artillery. The enemy employed SA, AW, PPSH, Grenades, MG and Mortars.

26 March 1953: The combat patrol from Company "D" continued a fire fight until 0035. At 0035 one (1) group of enemy disengaged and started withdrawing to the reverse slope of the "STAR", BT 983017. Another group of enemy, vicinity of BT 982020, withdrew to the reverse slope of the left finger of Hill 90. Both enemy groups upon withdrawing started moving towards Hill "Three Fingers" vicinity of BT 982026. During mortar illumination, 81mm Mortars and machine guns from vicinity of COP #2 fired at the enemy during their reinforcement and retreat movement. At 0040 a platoon from Company "D" was dispatched to assist the combat patrol. A platoon from Company "C" 1/1 arrived at Company "D" area and came under the operational control of 2/1. The reinforcing platoon met the combat patrol at the stream bed, vicinity of BT 988019, where the combat patrol rallied for a physical count. At 0204 the combat patrol started moving towards the MLR under the protection of the reinforcement platoon. A platoon consisting of Headquarters and Service Company personnel was ordered to render aid in carrying stretchers from the MLR to the combat patrol.
26 March 1953 Cont'd: Two (2) Armored Personnel Carriers at 0211 were dispatched forward of the MLR to pick up the combat patrol's wounded. At 0240 the combat patrol and reinforcing patrol arrived at the MLR. At 0250 the APC's arrived at the Company "D" aid station. During the combat patrols' return to the MLR, enemy mortar fire was received between COP "Marlyn" and COP "Kate". Counter-mortar fire was immediately effected with gratifying results. At 0315 the platoon from Company "C" 1/1 departed 2/1 enroute 1/1. Friendly casualties consisted of two (2) KIA, eleven (11) WIAE, and five (5) WIANE, Enemy casualties inflicted by the combat patrol and supporting arms consisted of five (5) KIA, eight (8) estimated KIA, and twenty-one (21) estimated WIA.

Company "D" dispatched one (1) reconnaissance patrol, squad reinforced, nineteen (19) men, at 0500 to sweep the "Star", BT 983017 and the area in which the combat patrol had engaged the enemy in a fire fight a few hours previously. The patrol returned at 0700 with a negative report. At 0315 Company "B" and at 0345 Company "E" dispatched reconnaissance patrols. A negative report was turned in for the two (2) patrols when they returned to the MLR at 0600 and 0701 respectively.

At dusk three (3) enemy were seen vicinity BT983032 and five (5) enemy, vicinity BT987037. The 81mm Mortars fired with a result of one (1) enemy counted KIA, one (1) counted WIA, and one (1) estimated WIA. Thirteen (13) listening posts were posted at darkness. Including the four (4) permanent Combat Outposts, there was a total of four hundred ninety-three (493) men forward of the MLR. Rear area security foot patrols were dispatched from Headquarters and Service Company and Company "D" to cover 11 and 1 respectively.

The Battalion received one hundred fifty-one (151) rounds of mixed mortar fire and one hundred seventy (170) rounds of mixed artillery fire.

27 March 1953: At 1930 Company "B" dispatched a reconnaissance patrol, squad reinforced, twenty-one (21) men. During the course of the patrol it set up an ambush, vicinity BT002022. The patrol returned to the MLR at 2320 with a negative report. At 2050 Company "D" dispatched a reconnaissance patrol, squad reinforced, fifteen (15) men. The patrol returned to the MLR at 2329 with a negative report. Company "F" dispatched a reconnaissance patrol squad reinforced, nineteen (19) men at 2104.
27 March 1953 Cont'd: At 2310 Company "B" received fire on COP "Kate" from an estimated two (2) enemy squads, vicinity CT002012. Friends employed SA, MGs, and 60mm Mortars. The enemy employed SA and AW. After a 15 minute, long range fire fight, the enemy disengaged at 2325. There were negative friendly casualties. Enemy casualties were two (2) counted KIA and five (5) estimated WIA.

At 1450 Company "E" suffered one (1) WIAE, vicinity BT971026, as a result of an enemy 82mm Mortar. At 1645 Company "B" suffered two (2) WIANE, vicinity CT005013 as a result of an enemy 81mm Mortar. An unknown number of enemy was observed, vicinity CT008021. Fire from 81mm Mortars was delivered with a casualty count of two (2) counted KIA and four (4) estimated WIA. Thirteen (13) listening posts were posted at darkness. Including the four (4) permanent combat outposts, there was a total of five hundred fifty-seven (557) men forward of the MLR. Rear area security foot patrols were conducted by Company "E" and Company "F" to cover areas 2 and 3 respectively.

At 1930 elements from 1/1 commenced departing 2/1 to their parent unit with the last element departing at 2110. The cancellation of the Battalion's relief of Line JAMESTOWN necessitated that the units of 1/1 revert to their parent unit control.

The work on Line JAMESTOWN was progressing rather slowly because of the numerous patrols and number of men involved. Thus the time factor was limited for construction work on Line JAMES-TOWN. To date, Company "B" has constructed two (2) new fighting holes on COP "Kate". Company "D" built one (1) reverse slope storage bunker and a concertina gate for the tank road in front of COP "Marilyn". Company "E" completed one (1) machine gun position, one (1) observation post on COP #2-Able, "The Toothache", and twenty-two (22) new rabbit holes. Company "F" completed twelve (12) new fighting holes and one (1) reverse slope bunker.

The Battalion received fifty-four (54) rounds of mixed mortar fire and eight (8) rounds of mixed artillery fire.

28 March 1953: The reconnaissance patrol from Company "F" returned to the MLR at CCOI with a report of noises and movement, vicinity of BT010031. This was investigated but negative results were found.

Company "F" dispatched a combat patrol, two (2) squads reinforced thirty-five (35) men, at 1941. The mission of the patrol was to capture and/or destroy any enemy if encountered. It also had the mission of maintaining the initiative along the Hill 90-64 line to deny enemy access to and freedom of movement in that area.
28 March 1953 Cont'd: The patrol reached its objective at 2145 and set up in an ambush, vicinity CT002027. Company "D" dispatched a reconnaissance patrol, squad reinforced, twenty-one (21) men, to encompass "Marilyn" at 1945. It returned to the MLR at 2235 with a negative report. At 2000 Company "E" dispatched a reconnaissance patrol, squad reinforced, twenty-one (21) men. Company "B" at 2020 dispatched one (1) reconnaissance patrol, squad thirteen (13) men to reconnoiter enemy activity. The patrol reached its objective, vicinity BT999018, at 2136 and returned to the MLR at 2246 with a negative report.

Between the hours of 1845 and 2030 Company "E" observed an unknown number of enemy at BT983022 and three (3) enemy in the vicinity of BT988033. Fire from 81mm and 60mm mortars resulted in an estimated nine (9) enemy WIA. Thirteen (13) listening posts were posted at darkness. Including the four (4) permanent combat outposts, there were four hundred ninety-five (495) men forward of the MLR. Rear area security foot patrols were conducted by Companies "B" and "F" to cover areas 2 and 3 respectively.

The Battalion received five (5) rounds of mixed mortar fire, eleven (11) rounds of mixed artillery fire and fifteen (15) rounds of mixed mortar and artillery fire.

Major General E. A. POLLOCK, Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, Lieutenant General F. A. HART, Commanding General, FMFPac, and Colonel E. R. SMOAK, G-3, 1st Marine Division visited the Battalion CP at 1445 and departed at 1450.

29 March 1953: The previous night's combat patrol from Company "F" returned to the MLR at 0037 with negative contact. The reconnaissance patrol from Company "E" returned to COP #2 at 0010. At 0156 Company "D" dispatched a reconnaissance patrol, squad reinforced, twenty-one (21) men. The patrol returned at 0705 with a negative report. At 0135 Company "F" dispatched a recon­naiss­ance patrol, squad reinforced twenty-one (21) men. The patrol returned to the MLR with a report of digging in the vicinity of the village at CT007024. No enemy were observed during the patrol. At 0130 Company "B" dispatched a reconnaissance patrol, squad reinforced, fifteen (15) men. The patrol returned at 0540 with a report that the land line had been cut to COP "Kate". One (1) enemy was observed on the skyline in the vicinity of BT987020.

A combat patrol, two (2) squads reinforced thirty-five (35) men, from Company "B" departed the MLR at 1940. The mission of the patrol was to capture and/or destroy any enemy or equipment encountered. It also had the mission of maintaining the initiative along the Hill 90-64 line to deny enemy access to and freedom of movement in that area. The patrol reached its objective.
29 March 1953: vicinity BT999027, at 2115 and set up in an ambush for approximately one and one-half (1½) hours. At 1945 Companies "D", "E" and "F" dispatched squad reinforced patrols from their sectors. The patrol from Company "D" returned to the MLR at 2255 with a negative report. The patrol from Company "F" returned to the MLR at 2358 with a report of several foot prints believed to have been of the enemy. Thirteen (13) listening posts were posted at darkness. Rear area security foot patrols were dispatched from the Regimental Anti-Tank Company and Company "D", 1st Tank Battalion to cover areas 4 and 5 respectively.

At 1500 elements of Company "G" 3/1 arrived at 2/1 to commence partial relief of combat outpost "Kate". The relief of combat outpost "Kate" was to be managed in two reliefs with 50% of the personnel being relieved on succeeding reliefs.

The Battalion received twenty-six (26) rounds of mixed mortar fire and seventy-six (76) rounds of mixed artillery fire.

30 March 1953: The previous night's combat patrol from Company "E" arrived at the MLR at 0002 with negative contact. The patrol was able to move quickly over the well worn trails because of the full moon. The Company "E" reconnaissance patrol returned to COP #2 at 0020 with a report that three (3) enemy were seen "dog-trotting" across the rice paddy between COP #2 and Hill 134. The reconnaissance patrol immediately converted to a combat patrol and set up in a "V" formation. The enemy became aware of the patrol and changed their course to two (2) defilade position. The patrol reported negative enemy movement after this incident.

All patrol action was cancelled until 2400 because of a suspected attack by enemy forces. Exact location was not known, but it was suspected to be against the outposts under the control of the 3d Battalion on the 2d Battalion's right flank. Thirteen (13) listening posts were posted at darkness. Including the four (4) permanent combat outposts, there were three hundred and ninety-three (393) men forward of the MLR. Rear area security foot patrols were conducted by 4.2 Mortar Company and Headquarters and Service Company to cover areas 6 and 7 respectively.
30 March 1953 Cont’d: The Battalion received twenty-two (22) rounds of mixed mortar fire and two (2) rounds of artillery fire.

31 March 1953: Four (4) Purple Heart Medals and one (1) Gold Star in lieu of third Purple Heart Medal were awarded for wounds received in action. Four (4) reconnaissance patrols were dispatched between the hours of 0130 and 0200. They reported negative movement of enemy forces. The four (4) patrols returned at first light with the last one reporting in at 0615.

A combat patrol, platoon reinforced, sixty (60) men, was dispatched from Company "D" at 1935, with the mission of capturing and/or destroying any enemy or equipment if encountered. It also had the mission of maintaining initiative along the Hill 90-64 line to deny enemy access to and freedom of movement in that area. Movement was rapid with the trails clearly defined under the full moon. The platoon set up an ambush on the "Horseshoe", adjacent to Hill 90. After one and one-half (1½) hours of negative contact, the patrol left their position and swept Hill 90 and the "Star" before returning to the MLR. Company "D" dispatched a daylight reconnaissance patrol at 1300 to the "Star" and the adjacent abandoned village. Several items of enemy equipment were brought back. The items of note were:

1 pr of tennis shoes
2 AT Grenades
6 stick type grenades
1 page of enemy Christmas propaganda which had a portion of a letter a CCF soldier had started to write his son.
1 Japanese coin

Company "F" dispatched a reconnaissance patrol, squad fourteen (14) men at 1935. The patrol returned at 2315 with a negative report. Company "F" dispatched a reconnaissance patrol at 1940, squad reinforced twenty (20) men. The patrol returned at 2315 with a negative report. At 2100 Company "B" dispatched a reconnaissance patrol, squad reinforced, twenty-one (21) men.

At 0255 elements of Company "B" 1/1 departed 2/1 enroute to their parent unit. At 0610 elements of Company "G" 3/1 arrived as the final relief for combat outpost "Kate" and completed the relief at 0720. At 1450 elements of 60mm mortar sections attached to Company "G" 3/1 arrived at Company "B" and came under the operational control of 2/1. At 2335 a section of the ATA platoon, Weapons Company 3/1 arrived at COP # 1 and came under the operational control of 2/1. At 2355 the 1st platoon of Company "G" arrived at Company "B" 1/1 and came under the operational control of 2/1.
31 March 1953 Cont'd: At 2120 Company "E" suffered one (1) WIANE vicinity of BT91028 as a result of one (1) 60mm Mortar. Thirteen (13) listening posts were posted at darkness. Including the four (4) permanent combat outposts, there were five hundred and twenty-three (523) men forward of the MLR. Rear area security foot patrols were conducted by the 4.2 inch Mortar Company and the Regimental Anti-Tank Company to cover areas 8 and 9 respectively.

Major General E. A. POLLOCK, Commanding General, 1st Marine Division and Mr Harry HENSCHEL, Chairman of the Armed Forces Committee of the National Jewish Welfare Board visited the Battalion CP at 1345 and departed at 1530.

The Battalion received thirty-eight (38) rounds of mixed mortar fire and one (1) round of artillery fire.

G. A. GILILLAND

APPENDICES

Appendix I Directives Received
II Directives Issued
III Situation Overlays
IV Reports and Summaries
V Photographic Supplement
VI Comments and Recommendations
APPENDIX I

DIRECTIVES RECEIVED
a. 1st Marines Operation Orders:  
   #7-53  
   28 March 1953

b. 1st Marines Operation Plans:  
   #6-53  
   25 March 1953

c. 1st Marines Administration Orders:  
   Negative

d. 1st Marines Administration Plans:  
   #7-53  
   2 March 1953

e. 1st Marines General Orders:  
   #35  
   2 March 1953  
   #36  
   14 March 1953  
   #37  
   14 March 1953  
   #38  
   21 March 1953

f. 1st Marines Memorandums:  
   #10-53  
   19 March 1953  
   #12-53  
   24 March 1953

g. 1st Marines Training Orders:  
   #10-53  
   1 March 1953  
   #11-53  
   20 March 1953

h. 1st Marines Letters:  
   0042-53  
   10 March 1953

i. 1st Marines Dispatches:  
   0414451  
   0716101  
   1918001  
   1117101  
   1910001  
   z108461  
   z412001
APPENDIX II

DIRECTIVES ISSUED
2d Battalion, Battalion Order

- Battalion Order 30
- Battalion Order 31
- Battalion Order 32
- Battalion Order 33

2d Battalion, Operation Order

- Operation Order 10-53

Dates Issued:

- March 10 1953
- March 11 1953
- March 11 1953
- 6 March 1953
- 11 March 1953
- 10 March 1953
- 11 March 1953
BATTALION ORDER

NUMBER...30-53

6 March 1953

Battalion Order Number 30-53

Ref: (a) Battalion Order Number 30-52
    (b) Battalion Order Number 42-52
    (c) Regimental Memorandum Number 74-52 w/changes 1 and 2
    (d) Division Memorandum Number 222-52
    (e) Division Memorandum Number 1-53
    (f) Division Memorandum Number 11-53

Encl: (1) Letter from General Ridgway dated 8 Jan 53
    (2) Fire Prevention Deficiencies list of
    (3) Stove Repair and Inspection Teams, duties of
    (4) Operation and Maintenance of Stove, Tent, M-1941, Oil
    Burning
    (5) Reports Due
    (6) Immediate Fire Report of

1. General.
   a. References (a) and (b) are hereby revoked.
   b. Reference (c) is the 1st Marine fire bill. Reference (d)
      contains instructions for operation of "Tent Stove M-1941" and
      "Yukon Stove M-1950". Reference (c) clarifies the classification
      of fires, types of fire extinguishers and fire fighting equipment;
      provides a basis for the requisitioning and distributing thereof.
      Reference (f) contains instructions for fire prevention and fire
      protection.
   c. This order amplifies and supplements instructions contained
      in references (c), (d), (e) and (f).
   d. Fire continues to be a hazard to personnel and property
      within this organization. During the month of January 1953 I Corps
      reported 38 fires which resulted in I death, 11 other casualties and
      approximately $35,000 in property damage.
   e. Carelessness and/or negligence on the part of individuals
      is the primary contributing factor for most fires.

2. Organization.
   a. Battalion Fire Marshal
      (1) The Headquarters and Service Company Commander is desig-
      nated as Battalion Fire Marshal and in addition, is designated Fire
      Marshal of Headquarters and Service Company.
      (2) He will be responsible for the following:
         a. Training company fire marshals and all "Stove Repair
            and Inspection Teams".
      (3) Maintaining available fire fighting equipment and instruc-
      tions in the proper use of same.
      (4) For reports see enclosure (5).
   b. Company Commanders will:
      (1) Appoint an officer as company fire marshal.
      (2) Detail one NCO with two assistants to act as company
          "Stove Repair and Inspection Team" and assist company fire marshals.
(3) Designate by name an individual for each tent, bunker and building in his area who will be responsible for compliance with the pertinent regulations of this order.

(4) Determine the fire prevention deficiencies that exist within his area of responsibility and institute vigorous remedial action.

(5) Thoroughly indoctrinate all personnel of his command in the necessity of preventing loss of life and property by fire.

(6) Make a daily fire prevention inspection of his area of responsibility.

(7) Make necessary reports as contained in enclosure (5).

c. Company Fire Marshal will:

(1) Assist company commanders in fulfilling the requirements of this order.

(2) Be designated as assistant battalion fire marshal.

(3) Make necessary reports as contained in enclosure (5).

d. Stove Repair and Inspection Team

(1) The Stove Repair and Inspection Team will perform duties in accordance with enclosure (3) of this order.

c. Tent, bunker and building responsibility. Individuals designated by company commanders are responsible for tents, bunkers and buildings within their areas of responsibility and will perform their duties in accordance with paragraph 3 of this order.

3. Regulations. The following fire regulations will be published to all hands for information and compliance.

a. Stoves and space heaters:

(1) Stoves and space heaters will not be in contact with wooden decks or within four (4) feet of any unprotected inflammable material wherever practicable but in no case less than two (2) feet or within five (5) feet of an inflammable wall or tent side.

(2) Stove pipes will be insulated and kept away from tents by metal shields. (Same to apply to sand bag bunkers, etc.)

(3) Stoves will not be operated above carbureter settings of 6.

(4) When all personnel in tents are sleeping their stoves will be turned off.

(5) When all personnel in bunkers are sleeping the stove will be turned off.

(6) Stoves and heaters will not be left burning in unoccupied spaces, nor during the hours between 0800-1700 in non-working spaces.

(7) Only company "Stove Repair and Inspection Teams" are authorized to conduct repairs on stoves and heaters.

(8) Appropriate operating instructions will be conspicuously posted in the vicinity of each stove and space heater.
(9) To stoves will be cleaned every seven (7) days. Yukon stoves will be cleaned every three (3) days. However, while making daily stove inspection the "Stove Repair and Inspection Team" will see that any stove needing to be cleaned is cleaned as often as necessary.

b. Fuel

(1) All hands will practice conservation of petroleum products.

(2) Neither gasoline nor mixed petroleum products will be used as fuel for stoves or space heaters.

(3) Fuel spillages will be covered with sand or washed down immediately.

(4) Gasoline will not be used for cleaning purposes.

(5) Generators will be allowed to cool before refueling.

(6) Smoking will not be permitted within fifty (50) feet of fuel dumps. "NO SMOKING WITHIN 50 FT." signs will be plainly printed in English and Korean and conspicuously displayed around dump areas.

(7) Neither fuel nor fuel containers will be stored in occupied spaces such as tents, bunkers and mess halls. They will not be placed on top of or near the entrance of bunkers.

(8) Gasoline will not be put in open containers.

(9) Drip cans will be placed under all cans or drums that leak fuel.

c. Extinguishers:

(1) hen available extinguishers will be located in accordance with reference (6).

(2) Extinguishers will be tagged and frequently inspected by assistant company fire marshals. The inspector will initial and indicate the date of each inspection on the tag.

(3) Extinguishers which need refilling will be turned in to the BATTALION FIRE MARSHALL together with a certificate, signed by the Company Fire Marshal, as follows: "I certify that the contents of this extinguisher were expended on (DATE) by extinguishing a blaze in (LOCATION). The Battalion Supply Officer will forward this extinguisher and the certificate to Supply Officer, 1st Marines.

(4) In instances where fire extinguishers have been received empty from a supply agency on initial issue or have been accidently discharged, the certificate referred to above will not state.

d. Field Range Fire Units:

(1) Heater unit tanks will be inspected periodically for worn or stripped threads.

(2) Burners will be inspected periodically for damaged fuel lines.

(3) Fuel valves will be disassembled periodically to check for wear at the valve stem packing unit.

e. Miscellaneous:

(1) Lanterns and individual cooking stoves will not be fueled in occupied spaces.
(2) Electrical wiring will be checked periodically. Frayed or worn insulation will be replaced.

(3) Fire breaks will be established where danger exists from grass and brush fires.

(4) A minimum of six (6) personnel will be maintained in a standby basis for each company to take immediate action should a fire start.

(5) Fuel hoses will be protected in such a manner to prevent them from being pulled loose from carburetors.

(6) No person will operate a stove or space heater who is not thoroughly familiar with its operating procedure and safety precautions.

(7) Improvised or non-standard heating or lighting equipment, unless specifically authorized by unit commanders, will not be used.

4. Plan

a. Most fires are readily preventable by proper maintenance and inspection procedures. The success of this fire plan primarily exists on intensive and continuous training of personnel who operate tent stoves, together with an adequate system of fire inspection.

b. Inspections

(1) Company commanders personally will make a daily fire prevention inspection of their area of responsibility, checking for deficiencies listed on enclosure (2).

(2) Company Fire Marshals will make frequent inspections of their respective company areas to insure compliance with regulations of this order.

(3) Assistant Fire Marshals will make inspections of company stoves everyday. They will be guided by enclosure (4), TM 7-250 of March 1952, TM 7-255 of February 1952 and enclosure (3).

c. All personnel will be thoroughly indoctrinated with the necessity of preventing the loss of life and property by fire.

d. Company Commanders will insure that paragraphs (a), (b), enclosures (1) and (2) and other applicable, pertinent provisions of this order are brought to the attention of all individuals of their commands at least once each month.

c. Company Commander will insure that adequate and appropriate fire fighting equipment is maintained in accordance with reference (d) and that all his personnel are thoroughly schooled in their use and maintenance.

f. Standard procedure in the event of fire:

(1) Sound alarm by shouting “FIRE” three (3) times and give location.

(a) If fire is in a living space insure that all occupants evacuate the space immediately.

(2) Commence fighting the fire.

(a) Remove all flammable materials from a tent, bunker, or building, if possible.

(b) Remove fuel, ammunition, motor vehicles and all government property from vicinity of fire.
(c) If fire gets out of control in a tent immediately strike the tent by cutting the lines and remove the tent to an isolated area.

(d) Sand or dirt may be utilized to extinguish any type fire as an immediate measure, however, water points and appropriate fire extinguishers should be used whenever possible.

(3) All personnel within voice call of a fire will answer the fire call. Personnel will carry helmets to be utilized in fighting fires. Helmets provide an acceptable field expedient for bucket brigades.

(4) The senior officer or noncommissioned officer on the scene will assume control of fighting the fire until the Company Fire Marshal arrives. He will insure that the Officer of the Day is notified as soon as possible.

(a) The Officer of the Day will immediately notify the Battalion Executive Officer and the Battalion Fire Marshal.

(b) Then on line the Company Fire Marshal will immediately notify the Battalion Fire Marshal and the Battalion Executive Officer.

5. Reports
   c. See enclosure (5).

BY ORDER OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL GILLIAND

H. C. RHIFEL
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer
MESSAGE FOR GENERAL RIDWAY, 8 JANUARY 1952

RESTRICTED
SECURITY INFORMATION

Subj is fire prevention and fire protection.

1. Ref. Cir nr 29, Far East Command, 20 July 1951

2. In a recent conflagration at a major camp within this command involving millions of dollars in the loss of critically needed and valuable troop accommodations, together with much significant combat and station equipment, the deplorable absence of command control indicated a serious lack of appreciation of their responsibilities on the part of subordinate commanders and leaders. The indications were as follows:

   a. Loose control in command supervision on the part of both troop and station complement commanders in all echelons of control.

   b. Failure to establish and follow adequate procedures for fire prevention, fire protection and fire fighting.

   c. Inexcusable neglect of duty by troops in the protection of government property.

3. I am convinced that every conscientious commander without exception shares my determination to protect the United States government against these avoidable property losses which are today more damaging and inexcusable than ever before in our history. I am equally convinced that there is no valid reason for excusing the vast majority of these distasteful fires. Hereafter I shall consider fires resulting in any substantial loss to the U.S. government as a clear indication of neglect on the part of the immediate commander concerned and of the next superior in the chain of command, until clear evidence establishes the contrary.

4. My objective is the complete elimination of all substantial losses by fire due in any degree what ever to neglect. I assume that every responsible commander and householder, in the military service of the U.S., in this theater, has a like objective.

5. Upon receipt, each addressee will with the least practicable delay convey these instructions to all individuals concerned with his command authority: institute a dynamic system of command supervision of a continuing nature, designed to obtain the objective stated above, and insure that appropriate disciplinary action is initiated promptly in the case of every individual duly found responsible, directly or indirectly, for causing a fire, fighting a fire in a desultory manner, or failing adequately to protect U.S. government property during or after a fire.

6. Each addressee will without delay report in writing to me the action taken and the measures instituted by him in compliance with these instructions. Thereafter each addressee will report in writing to this headquarters on or shortly after the first of each month that all responsible commanders and individuals subordinate to him have had their attention again called to these instructions and fully understand them.

7. Upon relief from present assignment of any addressee herein, he will formally end in writing personally bring those instructions to the attention of his successor. Signed RIDWAY

C-C-P-Y

DECLASSIFIED
FIRE PREVENTION DEFICIENCIES

1. It is the responsibility of all Company Commanders to determine the fire prevention deficiencies that exist within their area of responsibility and to institute vigorous remedial action.

2. Fire prevention deficiencies include the following:

a. Command inspections which fail to detect and correct hazards.

b. Open fires in or near buildings or tents.

c. Lack of adequate fire hills.

d. Failure to conduct regular fire drills.

e. Field ranges, space heaters, and tent stoves improperly installed.

f. Fueling field ranges inside a building or tent.

g. Lack of positive steps to prevent smoking in a restricted area.

h. Fires too close to fuel or ammunition storage.

i. Lack of adequate fire breaks in open storage areas.

j. Use of gasoline or gasoline-diesel mixture in space heaters.

k. Improper storage inflamable products and waste.

l. Accumulation of inflamable trash.

m. Existence of oil soaked areas.

n. Existence of leaks in stove units, fuel lines, K.L. cans and drums.

o. Lack of instructions, supervision and proper fire prevention signs for indigenous labor.

p. Failure to use field expedients to supplement available fire fighting equipment.

q. Improper use or lack of maintenance of issued fire fighting equipment.

r. Failure to use spark arrestor.

s. Use of improvised or non-standard heating equipment unless specifically authorized by unit commander.

ENCLOSURE (2)
DUTIES OF STOVE REPAIR AND INSPECTION TEAMS

1. Preventive maintenance is necessary to insure efficient operation of the various types of heating equipment utilized within the company. Therefore, every member of the stove repair and inspection team must be familiar with contents of T1-10-725 "Stove Yukon and T1-10-725 "Stove Tent M-1941".

2. The members of the Stove Repair and Inspection Teams are also Assistant Company Fire Marshals and are under supervision of the Company Fire Marshal.

3. Special attention must be given to extension tubes in gasoline can adapter for burner, all stove tent M-1941. It is imperative that all personnel be instructed in the proper method of exchanging fuel containers. Correct procedure may be found on page 24, T1-10-725. All broken extension tubes should be returned to Battalion Supply Officer for repair.

4. The duties of the stove Repair and Inspection Teams are as follows:

   a. Instruct company personnel in the provisions of enclosure (4).

   b. Supervise the cleaning of tent stoves M-1941 and Yukon stoves.

   c. Insure that all stoves in the company area are cleaned at least once each week, and at any other time deemed necessary.

   d. Turn in all broken and defective stove parts to Battalion Supply for repair or replacement.

   e. Inspect all stoves in the company area at least twice a week. Check float valve to see that it is securely mounted and properly connected; that controls are undamaged.

   f. Inspect all fuel containers attached to stove hoses for leaks.

   g. Assist company fire marshal in enforcing regulations of this order.

   h. In the event of fire immediately report to the scene and insure that provisions of paragraph 4 (f) of this order are complied with.

INCIDENT (3)
1. Operating Instructions

a. To light

(1) Remove stove lid.
(2) Set flow adjustment knob of float valve to "0".
(3) Turn inlet shut off knob to "ON" position.
(4) When the fuel begins to flow into burner bottom, drop a lighted match or paper into burner.
(5) Replace stove lid.
(6) Wait 10 to 15 minutes and set flow adjustment knob... for size of flame desired.

b. To shut off

(1) Turn flow adjustment knob to zero.
(2) Turn inlet shut off knob to "OFF" position.
(3) Check when flame is out to be certain oil flow has stopped.

2. Preventive maintenance

a. Daily

(1) Make sure there is no dirt on inside of burner.
(2) Check stove pipe sections and see that they are tight.
(3) Check hose line for leaks.
(4) Make sure that fuel container is full and that drum or can support is of sufficient height to facilitate the flow of fuel from container to burner.
(5) Check all fittings, washers, and gaskets for leaks and tighten them when necessary.
(6) Check tent shields for proper installation.

b. During operation

(1) Check float valve and fuel hose for leaks.
(2) Catch for soot or smoke.
(3) See that fuel hose and overflow hose do not touch the stove and that overflow hose is outside tent and slopes downward all the way.
(4) Check for discharge from overflow hose. Overflow hose is a safety device and will not normally have fuel coming from it.

c. Monthly

(1) Remove stove pipe and clean out the soot.
(2) Remove stove to outside and clean out soot.
(3) Check all fuel lines for leaks.
(4) Check fuel container for leaks.
(5) Check all fittings, washers, and gaskets and tighten when necessary.

(6) Operate adjustments and shut off knobs to see that they turn properly.

3. Precautions
   a. Do's
      (1) Shut off burner completely when tent is not occupied.
      (2) Keep stove and stove pipe free of soot.
      (3) Use diesel fuel only.
      (4) Install stove in sand box large enough to insure safety from fire.
      (5) Keep fuel container filled.
      (6) Inspect all fuel hoses for leaks.
      (7) Keep face and eyes away from stove opening when lighting.
      (8) Place lighted paper in hot burner before turning on fuel.
      (9) Wipe up excess fuel from burner bottom before lighting.
      (10) Maintain a clean smokeless flame. In the event that other than a clean smokeless flame occurs, shut off the stove as paragraph 1 (6) above, disconnect fuel lines from fuel tank and wait until stove is cold before taking necessary maintenance measures.
   b. Don't's
      (1) Do not allow soot to accumulate.
      (2) Do not allow unauthorized personnel to clean carburetor.
      (3) Do not use sand box as ash tray.
      (4) Do not light stove if excess fuel is in burner.
      (5) Do not let fuel hose touch a hot stove and never expose hose to heat.
      (6) Do not let excessive fuel to be fed to a cold burner.
1. The Battalion Fire Marshal shall prepare the following reports:

   a. He will prepare for the battalion commanders signature, an immediate report (Enclosure 6), based on the immediate report submitted by the Company Fire Marshal. (See paragraph 3.a. (1) below). This report is to be forwarded, if practicable, to Commanding Officer, lst Marines within 24 hours. In no case will the report be forwarded later than 36 hours.

   b. In accordance with lst Marines dispatch 2012301 January 1953 prepare the required report to be forwarded to reach lst Marines (Attn: H-4) prior to 1200 each Saturday.

   c. In addition to the reports and actions required by the above paragraphs, the Battalion Fire Marshal will make a telephone report to lst Marines (Attn: H-4) within one (1) hour after any fire which results in a death, lost time casualty, or an estimated loss of government property in excess of $10,000. The report will include the following information:

      (1) "Date Time Group" of fire.
      (2) Unit where fire occurred.
      (3) Number and type of casualties.
      (4) Estimated monetary loss involved.
      (5) General description of property involved.

2. The Company Commander shall prepare the following reports:

   a. In accordance with paragraph 4. b. (1) of the basic order, Company Commanders will submit a report in writing to this headquarters (Attn: On Fire Marshal) by 1200 every Friday listing any fire deficiencies noted in their area with positive corrective actions planned. Corrective actions taken will be included in succeeding reports. The succeeding reports will also include any new deficiencies noted and the corrective action planned.

   b. In accordance with paragraph 4. d. of the basic order, Company Commanders will submit to this headquarters (Attn: On Fire Marshal) prior to the 25th of each month the following report:

      I certify the provisions HUSM letter AG67KG, 12 Jan 1952. Subj: "Fire prevention and fire protection" and message from CINCFL, since subject, have been brought to the attention of all personnel of this command during the present calendar month.

      (1) Provision of HUSM letter AG67KG, 12 Jan 52, are included in paragraph 4. c. and enclosure (2).

3. The Company Fire Marshal shall prepare the following reports:

   a. In case of fire or explosion followed by fire which results from causes other than enemy action and damage to equipment, material, structures, or other government property (other than motor vehicles, truck cranes, and aircraft damaged incident to their operation) to the extent that the estimated cost of repair or replacement is twenty-five (25) dollars or more, the following reports will be submitted to this headquarters:

      (1) Immediate Fire Report: (Enclosure (6))

      (1) This report will be submitted to the Battalion Fire Marshal, in the rough, as soon after the fire as practicable, but not later than 24 hours.
(2) Report of Investigation:

(a) Whenever a fire occurs in the company area the Company Fire Marshall will be appointed as investigating officer in accordance with Chapter IV, Naval Supplement to the Manual for Courts-Martial, 1951. He will submit the report of the investigation as soon as practical after the fire. The report will contain a determination as to whether or not the fire resulted from negligence or violation of orders of regulations on the part of any person or persons. In addition, the report will include an itemized monetary value list of all government and personal property destroyed or damaged. Investigating officers will inform personnel who have lost personal property by fire of their rights under Personnel Claims Regulations, Appendix II, Naval Supplement to NAVCIRC, 1-8, 1951. Government and personal property will be itemized separately. Prompt disciplinary action will be taken against any individual found to be directly or indirectly responsible for causing a fire through negligence or violation of orders.
DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
2d Battalion, 1st Marines
1st Marine Division (Reinfl), M.F.
c/o P.I.C., San Francisco, California

RESTRICTED
SECRET INFORMATION

ARCHIVAL FIRE REPORT

DATE TIME: 1200, 15 JUL 52

1. DATE TIME GROUP: 1200, 15 JUL 52

2. GOVERNMENT PROPERTY LOSS (APPROXIMATE VALUE): $100,000

3. PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT PROPERTY IMMEDIATELY INVOLVED IN FIRE WHICH WAS DESTROYED OR DAMAGED:

4. APPARENT CAUSE OF FIRE:
   - Carelessness
   - Malfunction of equipment
   - Violation of orders

5. TYPE OF STRUCTURE OR EQUIPMENT:
   - Tent
   - Bunker
   - Marshall
   - Quonset
   - Maintenance shop
   - Other (Insert appropriate nomenclature)

6. PERCENTAGE OF LOSS FROM STRUCTURE:

7. TYPE OF WAVE, FUEL, ETC., CARRYING FIRE:
   - Heater (100,000 BTU) (Insert appropriate nomenclature)
   - Tent heater (12,000 BTU)
   - Space heater (10,000 BTU) (Insert appropriate nomenclature)

8. TYPE OF FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT DEPLOYED TO EXTINGUISH FIRE:
   - Foamite
   - CO-2
   - Carbon Tetrachloride
   - Water
   - Field range
   - Lantern
   - Other (Insert appropriate nomenclature)

9. INJURED: 0
   DEAD: 0

10. BRIEF CHRONOLOGICAL Factual Narrative:

   Unit Commander

   (Sign)

   (Initials)

   (Insert)
Headquarters
2d Battalion, 1st Marines
1st Marine Division (Rein), TARF
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

11 March 1953

BATTALION ORDER

NUM-31-53

1. Special orders for the sentry of check point #1

2. The mission of this post is to prevent unauthorized persons from visiting COP #1, COP #2, OP #1-3, the Truce Site Area and other areas forward of the KLR in the Truce Corridor.

3. All unauthorized persons will be apprehended and the S-2 notified immediately.

4. No persons will be allowed forward of Check Point #1 without an authorized pass, except for the following:
   a. Convey of delegates and/or correspondents attending the Truce Site, P'anmunjom Truce meetings.
   b. MP's and Army personnel stationed near the Truce Site who possess proper identification or orders.
   c. All general officers and their parties.
   d. Division Chief of Staff and party.
   e. Regimental Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, S-3
   f. Battalion Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, S-2, S-3 and S-4

5. All other persons desiring entrance to the P'anmunjom Area must have a pass signed by the S-2, except as indicated in paragraph 6 below.

6. Personnel of the KMC Regiment will be permitted entrance to the P'anmunjom area only if carrying a pass signed by:
   a. Senior Advisor, KMC Regiment Advisory Group
   b. Executive Officer, KMC Regiment Advisory Group
   c. Operations Officer, KMC Regiment Advisory Group
   d. Senior Advisor, KMC Artillery, Advisory Group

   Sample signatures of the above listed officers will be kept in the sentry booth at all times.

7. The sentry on duty at night will call the S-2 once an hour between the hours of 2400 and 0700.

8. The sentry will carry out all Special and General Orders for a sentry on post.

9. The sentry will wear the uniform of the day, with steel helmet and helmet cover. He will be armed with his T/O weapon; clips or magazines will be inserted in the weapon with the belt loaded on an empty chamber. Only in the case of danger to life, property or imminent attack will a round of ammunition be loaded in the chamber.

BY ORDER OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL GILLIAND

[Signature]

H. C. REIFOL
Majer, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

Adjutant
SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

Headquarters
24th Battalion, 1st Marines
1st Marine Division (Reinf), FMP
O/F PPU, San Francisco, California

11 March 1963

BATTALION ORDER

No. 11, 32-53

Patrol Concepts and Instructions

1. The purpose of this order is to set forth the concept of and instruction for patrols conducted by this battalion.

2. Patrols will be conducted to:
   a. Maintain initiative against the enemy
   b. Obtain tactical information
   c. Capture prisoners
   d. Infllict maximum enemy losses with minimum friendly losses

3. a. A combat patrol expects to gain contact with the enemy and fight and is so manned, armed and equipped. Missions for combat patrols may include, but are not limited to:
   (1) Gain contact with the enemy
   (2) Capture prisoners
   (3) Ambush enemy groups
   (4) Capture and occupy enemy terrain

   b. A reconnaissance patrol gathers information and is usually small in size. Reconnaissance patrols observing for an extended period of time may be called patrol patrols.

   c. A listening post is a small unit employed near friendly positions covering likely avenues of approach to give early warning of enemy movement or attack during darkness or limited visibility.

4. A combat patrol shall be considered an operation concept from normal security requirements and will be conducted as directed by the Battalion Commander. Company Commanders shall provide night time security in the form of reconnaissance patrols and listening posts to give early warning against surprise attack.
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Battalion order No. 32-53 (Cont'd)

5. Briefing and debriefing

a. Briefing and check of patrols will include

(1) Mission

(2) Route and plan of maneuver including check and rallying points

(3) Reinforcement plans

(4) Withdrawal plans

(5) Fire support including illumination

(6) Communications

(7) Combat and equipment readiness

(8) Chain of command and succession of command

(9) Evacuation plans

(10) Intelligence security (no compromising documents carried by patrol members, communications security, etc)

b. Reconnaissance patrols and listening posts will be briefed and checked by a commissioned officer.

c. Combat patrols will be briefed by a commissioned officer in the presence of a field grade officer or by a field grade officer. If the combat patrol is of platoon size or larger the patrol briefing may be conducted by the Regimental Commander, Regimental Executive officer, or a field grade staff officer from Division.

d. Patrols of platoon size or larger will be debriefed by or in the presence of a field grade officer. The intelligence officer will debrief all patrols which take contact immediately after their return.

6. Commanders will establish positive methods for checking in all personnel who have participated in patrols. Personnel who have been removed from control of patrol leader shall be required to check in at a specific location designated by the company commander.

BY ORDER OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL GILILLAND

[Signature]  

R. L. DUNN
Major, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

SECRET
Headquarters
2d Battalion, 1st Marines
1st Marine Division (Headquarters, FIF)
c/o AC, San Francisco, California

10 March 1953

BATTALION ORDER

GURD ORDERS, CHANG-DAO AREA

REF: (1) Battalion Order Number 15-53

INCL: (1) Special Orders for the Battalion Security Officer
     (2) Special Orders for the Sergeant of the Guard
     (3) Special Orders for the Corporal of the Guard
     (4) Special Orders for the Main Gate Sentry
     (5) Special Orders for the Sentry on Post 11
     (6) Special Orders for the Sentry on Post 12
     (7) Special Orders for the Sentry on Post 13
     (8) Special Orders for the Sentry on Post 14
     (9) Special Orders for the Sentry on Post 15
     (10) Special Orders for the Sentry on Post 16

1. Reference (3) is superseded by this order.

2. Headquarters and Service Company will provide the permanent
   Sergeant of the Guard, Corporal of the Guard, Main Gate sentries
   and the seven (7) sentries for Check Point #2.

3. Each sentry will carry his normal arm. Weapons will be carried
   with stock forward (or hidden down), and chamber empty, with a
   loaded clip or magazine inserted. Sentinels will not load a round
   in the chamber unless personal attack is imminent, or to preserve
   order or protect lives or property.

4. During the hours of darkness, sentries will challenge all persons.

5. Any unidentified or suspicious person will be apprehended and
   the Sergeant of the Guard notified immediately.

6. Each sentry will carry out all Special Orders and General Orders
   for a sentinel on post.

7. Headquarters Commandant is designated as Battalion Security
   Officer.

BY ORDER OF LT. COL. R. C. HUEBER

R. C. HUEBER
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

Adjutant
1. The Battalion Security Officer will be directly responsible to the battalion executive officer for the security of the Command Post.

2. He will ensure that all members of the guard are properly instructed in their special and general orders.

3. In the event of any unusual issue, he will immediately notify the Battalion Executive Officer.

4. He will inspect the Command Post area daily. Any fire hazards or other discrepancies will be brought to the attention of the section head concerned, with a report to the Battalion Executive Officer of action required and/or taken to rectify discrepancies.

5. He will ensure that all posts are in proper state of order.

6. He will be responsible for the organization and training of the guard.

7. He will be responsible for the provisional force required to defend the Command Post or support the IFA.
SINGLE ORDER FOR THE SERGEANT OF THE GUARD

1. There will be a permanent Sergeant of the Guard from H&H Company who will be responsible for the Battalion of Guard.

2. He will keep a log of all events taking place during his tour of duty.

3. He will assist in posting the initial relief and ensure that all sentries know the limits of their posts.

4. He will sleep in the guardhouse.

5. He will be responsible to the Security Officer and will investigate and report any unusual occurrences to him immediately.
SPECIAL ORDER FOR THE CORPORAL OF THE GUARD

1. The Corporal of the Guard’s post will be located in the Guard tent.
2. The Corporal of the Guard will post his relief.
3. The Corporal of the Guard will instruct his relief before posting them.
4. The Corporal of the Guard will check his sentries, hourly, between the hours of 1900 and 0700.
5. During the absence of the Sergeant of the Guard, the Corporal of the Guard will assume the duties of the Sergeant of the Guard.
6. The Corporal of the Guard will supervise the loading of all weapons before the relief is posted.
7. The Corporal of the Guard will be responsible to the Sergeant of the Guard.
8. The Corporal of the Guard will investigate any unusual occurrences and notify the Sergeant of the Guard immediately.
1. This is a twenty-four (24) hour post. A permanent detail of four (4) men are assigned to this post. One (1) sentry will be on duty at all times. Tour of duty will be three (3) hours.

2. The sentry will be in the uniform of the duty, with steel helmet. He will be armed with a pistol, caliber .45. Weapon will be carried with hammer down, chamber empty and with a loaded clip inserted. Only in case of danger to life, property or imminent action will a round of ammunition be loaded in the chamber.

3. The sentry will stop all vehicles entering and leaving the Command Post, to insure that the driver has possession of an authentic trip ticket. If the vehicles carry an officer or passenger, inspection of the trip ticket is not necessary.

4. All field or general officers entering the Command Post will be reported to the Battalion Commanding Officer and Executive Officer immediately by calling 5-6 tent.

5. The sentry will be familiar with the location of all sections of the Command Post area in order to give adequate directions to visitors.

6. Between 2100 and 0800 no one without a curfew pass will be permitted to leave the Command Post except the Commanding Officer, the Executive Officer, the S-2, S-3 and officers or RCO's in charge of tactical units on an assigned mission requiring their presence outside of the Command Post.

7. During the hours of darkness the sentry will question all indigeneous persons without a riding escort and notify the Security Officer.

8. The sentry will carry out all Special and General Orders for sentinels on post.
SPEC BRD NO. FOR THE POST ON POST #1

1. Post #1 will be manned from 1900 until 0700.

2. The limits of the post will be from the northeast section of the ammunition dump, southwest to the skin gate, thence to the Brick Guard House, around the Brick Guard House to the protective wire, inboard along the protective wire in a northeast direction by the H&O Company area, across the creek on the west side of the Command Post to a point directly opposite the T.C.-artillery billeting area, and thence return to starting point. He will remain on the inside of the protective wire. A routine patrol of the post will be accomplished at least once an hour.

3. The sentry will patrol continuously, checking in with the Skin Gate Sentry on each round. In the event of any unusual occurrence, he will notify the Sergeant of the Guard by the nearest available phone. In the event of an attack he will alert the Command Post by firing his weapon three (3) times in rapid succession.

4. The sentry will wear the uniform of the day, with helmet, helmet cover and carry his T/C weapon. Clips or magazines will be inserted in the weapon with the bolt closed on an empty chamber. Only in case of danger to life, property or an attack is imminent will a round of ammunition be loaded in the chamber.

5. The sentry will insure that blackout regulations prevail.

6. The sentry will carry out all Special and General Orders for a sentinel on post.

ENCLOSURE: (5)
SPECIAL ORDER FOR THE MANNING OF POST 2

1. Post #2 will be manned from 1900 to 0700.

2. The limits of the post are from a point directly opposite the T.C. artillery billeting area, outboard along the protective wire in a northerly direction to the point where the power line cable falls across the protective wire, and thence return to the starting point. He will remain inside the protective wire. A routine patrol of the post will be accomplished at least once an hour.

3. The sentry will patrol the post continuously, checking in with the Main Gate sentry hourly with the phone at the power line cable at the northern limit of his post. In the event of any unusual occurrence he will, if near the northern limit of his post, notify by phone, the Main Gate sentry, who in turn will notify the Commander of the Guard. If at the southern limit of his post he will notify the Sergeant of the Guard by the nearest available phone. In the event of an attack he will alert the Command Post by firing his weapon in the air three (3) times in rapid succession.

4. The sentry will wear the uniform of the day, with helmet and helmet cover and carry his T/0 weapon. Clips or magazines will be inserted in the weapon with the belt closed on an empty chamber. Only in the case of danger to life, property or an attack is imminent, will a round of ammunition be loaded in the chamber.

5. The sentry will insure that blackout regulations prevail.

6. The sentry will carry out all Special and General Orders for a sentinell on Post.

ENCLOSURE (6)
1. Post #3 will be manned from 1900 to 0700.

2. The limits of the post are from the point where the power line cable falls across the protective wire, northeast along the path inside the wire to a point where the protective wire intersects the road that leads up to Hill 229, and thence return to the starting point. The sentry will remain inside the protective wire. A routine patrol will be accomplished at least once an hour.

3. The sentry will patrol the post continuously checking in hourly with the Main Gate Sentry, using the phone at the western limit of the post. In the event of an unusual occurrence, he will notify the Sergeant of the Guard by the nearest available phone. In the event of an attack he will alert the Command Post by firing his weapon in the air three (3) times in rapid succession.

4. The sentry will wear the uniform of the day with helmet and helmet cover and carry his T/O weapon. Clips or magazines will be inserted in the weapon with the bolt closed on an empty chamber. Only in case of danger of life, property or an attack is imminent will a round of ammunition be loaded in the chamber.

5. The sentry will insure that blackout regulations prevail.

6. The sentry will carry out all Special and General Orders for a sentinel on post.
SPECIAL ORDE RS FOR THE STATION OF POST #4

1. Post #4 will be manned from 1900 to 0700.

2. The limits of the post are from a point on the road leading to Hill 229 opposite helicopter strip #32, southeast on the path which leads to the small building behind the supply area and thence to the southwest corner by the ammunition dump. A routine patrol will be accomplished at least once an hour on the post.

3. The sentry will patrol the post continuously checking in hourly with the Main Gate Sentry using the phone at the building behind the supply area. In the event of unusual occurrence he will notify the Main Gate Sentry who will in turn notify the Sergeant of the Guard. In the event of an attack he will alert the Command Post by firing his weapon in the air three (3) times in rapid succession.

4. The sentry will wear the uniform of the day with helmet and helmet cover and carry his T/C weapon. Clips or magazines will be inserted in the weapon with the bolt closed on an empty chamber. Only in case of danger to life, property or in attack is imminent, will a round of ammunition be loaded in the chamber.

5. The sentry will ensure that blackout regulations prevail.

6. The sentry will carry out all Special and General Orders for a sentinal on post.
1. Post #5 will be manned from 1900 to 0700.

2. The sentry will patrol continuously the Command Post Area and\n    Weapons Company Area in a counter-clockwise direction outboard of\n    all buildings in the area. A routine patrol of the post will be\n    accomplished at least once an hour.

3. In the event of an unusual occurrence he will notify the Ser-\n    geant of the Guard by the nearest available phone immediately.

4. The sentry will wear the uniform of the day with helmet and hel-\n    met cover and carry his T/6 weapon. Clips or magazines will be in-\n    serted in the weapon with the bolt closed on an empty chamber. On-\n    ly in case of danger to life, property or an attack is imminent,\n    will a round of ammunition be inserted in the chamber.

5. The sentry will ensure that blackout regulations prevail.

6. The sentry will carry out all Special and General Orders for a\n    sentinel on post.

7. The sentry will check in at the Sergeant of the Guard check each\n    hour.
1. Post #6 will be manned from 1900 to 0700.

2. The sentry will patrol continuously the area encompassing the Commanding Officer's Quarters, 1st Officer, Battalion Aid Station and Communications Section, later, Food and Supply Area. A routine patrol will be accomplished at least once an hour.

3. In the event of an unusual occurrence he will notify the Sergeant of the Guard by the nearest available phone immediately.

4. The sentry will wear the uniform of the day with helmet and helmet cover and carry his T/6 weapon. Clips or magazines will be inserted in the weapon with the belt closed on an empty chamber. Only in cases of danger to life, property or in attack is imminent, will a round be loaded in the chamber.

5. The sentry will insure that blackout regulations prevail.

6. The sentry will carry out all Special and General orders for a sentry on post.

7. The sentry will check in at the Sergeant of the Guard check each hour.
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

76 BN, 1ST MAR
1ST MAR DIV (REINF), WVF
IN THE FIELD
111800I MAR 1953

OPERATION ORDER)
NUMBER...10-53

MAN: KOREA 1:25,000

TASK ORGN: 1ST MAR UN Plan 5-53

1. a. Current FIRs
b. 1ST MARINE (REINF) conducts rear area patrols to ensure
   security of rear of Line JAMSTOWN in assnd sector

2. a. 2d BN conducts rear area patrols in assnd sector
b. For Rear Bvys, areas of responsibility, LDE see
   ANX AAR - OVERL

3. a. Co "B" (Reinf): Assn'd responsibility for area #2
b. Co "D" (Reinf): Assn'd responsibility for area #1
c. Co "F" (Reinf): Assn'd responsibility for area #3
d. At Co(-), 1ST MAR: Assn'd responsibility for areas
   #4 and #9

e. DS Th Co(-): Assn'd responsibility for area #5

4. a. Port Co(-): Assn'd responsibility for areas
   #7 and #8

f. NAS Co(-), 2/1: Assn'd responsibility for areas
   #6, #10 and #11

x. (1) Patrols will be made on foot
   (2) Patrols will be of FT (4 men) size
   (3) For patrol schedule see ANX BAKER
   (4) All reports will be made by phone to Windshield #
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Operation Order No. 10-53 (Cont'd)

4. No change

5. No change

BY ORDER OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL GILILLAND

H. C. REIFEL
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DIST: SPECIAL

F-F-I-C-I-A-L

R. L. DOMINICK
Major, USMC
S-3

SECRET
### Annex B for 10-53

#### Patrol Schedule

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By Order of Lieutenant Colonel G. Gililand

DIST: SPECIAL

H. C. Reifel
Major, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

J. L. Dominick
Major, USMC

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
OVERLAY OF REAR AREA PATROLS
Map: KOREA 1:25,000
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

APPENDIX III
SITUATION OVERLAYS

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

2d Bn, 1st Marines
1st Mar Div (Reinf), FMF
In The Field
Korea

OVERLAY OF TRAINING AREAS
010001I March to 110120I March 1953

Map: Korea 1:25,000
Sheet 6527 I NW
6527 I SW

Appendix III 2d Bn, 1st Marines, Command Diary, March 1953

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

2d Bn, 1st Marines
1st Mar Div (Reinf), FMF
In The Field
Korea

SITUATION OVERLAY
110120I March to 312400I March 1953

Map: Korea 1:25,000
Sheet 6527 IV NE

Appendix III 2d Bn, 1st Marines, Command Diary, March 1953

SECRET
APPENDIX IV

REPORTS AND SUMMARIES

APPENDIX IV

Enclosure 1.- Special Report on Truce Agreement
Enclosure 2.- Special Services Summary
Enclosure 3.- Patrolling in Korea
Enclosure 4.- Special Report - NARLEX XVII
Enclosure 5.- TACP Summary
Enclosure 6.- Medical Summary
Enclosure 7.- Mortar and Hand Grenade Ammunition Expenditure Report
Enclosure 8.- Station List
Special Report On Truce Agreement

ENCLOSURE 1

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Headquarters
2d Battalion, 1st Marines
1st Marine Division (Reinf), PFC
C/O FFO, San Francisco, California

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 1st Marines
Subj: Truce Agreement, Special Report on

Encl: (1) Overlay of enemy position and concept of attack against the MOLAR (BT963028)

1. In recent months the enemy has accomplished a maneuver in the vicinity of Combat Outpost #2 which poses a threat to the security of that outpost and greatly increases the possibility of a serious international incident. To be specific, the enemy has moved in between Combat Outpost #2 and the circle of 1000 yards radius around Panmunjom. He is currently engaged in a defensive organization of the terrain feature commonly known as the "MOLAR" (BT963028). This project is being accomplished in traditional CCF fashion. Weapon positions and deep underground bunkers and caves are being constructed with a feeder trench leading from one of the near by enemy strong points. At the present time the position is manned by an estimated platoon minus.

2. Continued organization of the "MOLAR" poses a threat and seriously hampers the mission of United Nations forces in this sector for the following reasons:

   a. In a very short time the "MOLAR" will be sufficiently organised to serve as a possible departure point for a sizeable CCF attack against Combat Outpost #2. If forces manning Combat Outpost #2 abide by the restrictions of the neutrality agreement they will be unable to defend their position against such an attack. If friendly forces choose to break the restrictions, at the very least an incident of serious magnitude will have been provoked and our forces will have been in error.

   b. At the present time, this battalion, if ordered to execute the Pammunjom Rescue Plan as ordered by higher echelon, would be seriously hampered if not totally prevented from carrying out the plan. The "MOLAR" very effectively blocks the main route of the rescue force. At best, in the event of execution of the Rescue Plan this battalion would be involved in a costly action before the Panmunjom circle could be entered.

   c. Currently the "MOLAR" has a high nuisance value. The enemy engages in harassing Combat Outpost #2 with small arms, machine gun and mortar fire without fear of retaliation. The enemy further enjoys excellent observation of many of our reverse slope positions.

ENCLOSURE (1)
SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION  

3. In order to deny the enemy the capability of provoking friendly forces into a violation of the neutrality agreement and to place Combat Outpost #2 in a more advantageous tactical position the following recommendation is made:

   a. That an unsupported night attack be conducted against the "MOLAR" for the purpose of seizing, occupying and defending the terrain and destroying and/or capturing the enemy thereon.

4. Such an attack offers every possibility of success and can be conducted without violation of the neutrality agreement.

G. A. GILLILAND
SPECIAL SERVICES SUMMARY

During the period 1 March through 10 March movies were shown nightly with an average attendance of five hundred. This average attendance includes all enlisted pay grades and officers.

The Battalion received a new movie projector and sound equipment which greatly improved the caliber of the projection system. Generally the films shown were very good excepting the Television Revues.

The Battalion was allotted two beer rations, but only one was purchased because of the poor traffic ability of the roads from the Battalion CP to the Service Battalion.

The Battalion Post Exchange was stocked twice during the month. The supplies received were limited in quantity and were sold on a ration basis. This ensured an equal share of PX items to all personnel of the Battalion. The chocolate drink "Toddy", which was in demand constantly, was very limited in quantity. Doughnuts were received from the Division Special Services once during the month and were given to the general mess for equal distribution.

There was one U.S.O. show, "Face The Music", consisting of all Army personnel, shown at the Battalion CP. Attendance was low due to the tactical situation but those who attended were very enthusiastic.

The sports program was limited to non-supervised games with athletic equipment constantly in demand. The Battalion was represented in cribbage, checker, chess and table tennis tournaments during the month. Softball and baseball equipment was received and a Battalion softball team was being promoted.

Reading material received from Regimental Special Services was adequate in newspapers and pocketbooks. The supply of magazines was limited.
SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

Patrolling in Korea

Patrolling in Korea forward of the MLR has been one of the positive ways to carry the aggressive spirit of the American Marine to the enemy. For all practical purposes one might visualize two enemies deeply entrenched some 2000 meters apart in certain areas and 200 meters apart in others. Long range high and flat trajectory weapons carry destruction constantly to the enemy, but physical and close-in contact is limited to patrol action and raids. The unoccupied ground between the enemy's MLR and the friendly MLR is kept under constant surveillance by intensive patrolling.

There are two types of successful patrols being conducted against the enemy in Korea today. These are the combat patrol and the reconnaissance patrol. The two types have a very specific function and must be employed in conjunction with one another to ensure adequate coverage of every possible move the enemy may make forward of his MLR.

Reconnaissance patrols are usually conducted by a squad or more. The missions of the reconnaissance patrol are to reconnoiter enemy activity, familiarize personnel with the terrain, trails and to locate friendly ambush sites. Special missions may be assigned to a reconnaissance patrol, however, the missions stated above are employed most frequently. Formal arms are put aside for automatic weapons like the M1911, Carbine, and "Grease gun" whenever these scarce weapons are available. The M1 rifle is not an ideal patrol weapon because of its weight and slow rate of fire. Equipment is kept to a minimum and is carefully checked for rattle, and serviceability.

The clothing worn must allow for freedom of movement even under the most hazardous conditions. Warm weather presents no problem with the use of the Marine Utility. Patrols in sub-zero temperatures were difficult to run properly with the cold weather clothing that was issued the Marine in Korea during the winter months of 1952 and 1953. The parkas were too bulky to allow for quick action and maneuvering. The cold weather trousers were made of a material that "swished" every time a step was taken. The men would rather be chilly or cold then give away their position through excess noise. The thermo boot, an unsurpassed boot for extreme cold temperatures, was too heavy and cumbersome to move quickly and quietly. Many patrol leaders would not allow their men to go on reconnaissance patrols in extreme temperatures unless clothed only in flak jackets and field boots. They felt that continuous movement and the nervous tension would produce enough body heat to keep the patrol members warm. On no occasion was any Marine from this Battalion treated for frost bite during the winter months as a result of participating on a reconnaissance patrol.

ENCLOSURE (3)
The second patrol widely used by Marines in Korea is the combat patrol. These patrols vary in strength from two (2) squads reinforced to a platoon reinforced. The platoon sergeant or platoon commander is in charge of the combat patrol. The basic mission assigned these patrols is to capture and/or destroy the enemy and his equipment if encountered. Another mission frequently assigned a combat patrol along with its basic mission is to maintain the initiative along a certain hill or ridge line to deny the enemy access to and freedom of movement in that area. The objective usually is a certain hill mass that the enemy is known to occupy on various occasions, and if succeeding to occupy this hill mass permanently, would present a serious threat to friendly positions. Routes to these objectives are previously reconnoitered and the one allowing the most freedom of movement to the flanks for deployment is chosen. Anti-personnel and body trapped anti-tank mines channelize the patrol route to such a degree that often the patrol must travel in a column formation. The mine fields seriously hamper the maneuverability of a patrol if fired upon while in a column formation in an open rice paddy. Of course, employment will be ordered by the patrol leader regardless of the mine hazard if the tactical situation so dictates. Normal arms are carried and supplemented with as many automatic weapons as are available. Excess automatic weapons are controlled by the Battalion and distributed to the companies for their use when needed. The combat patrol is reinforced with one or two LMGs (preferably A-6s) to be set up as a base of fire on a commanding piece of ground. If enemy bunkers or emplacements are to be destroyed the combat patrol will employ the use of flamethrowers, 3.5 inch rocket launchers and stick charges of between 6 and 10 pounds each of C3 charge. Supporting arms play a vital role in ensuring the success of the patrol if contact is made. Terrain factors in certain sectors of the MLR govern the amount of supporting arms fire which can be used effectively. The sector that the 2d Battalion holds presently allows the maximum use of supporting arms. Objectives are 1000-2000 meters from the MLR and on lower ground than the MLR allowing overhead fire for flat trajectory weapons. Artillery, 4.2 inch Mortars, 81mm Mortars, 60mm Mortars, 75mm Recoiless Rifles, 4.5 inch multiple rocket launchers, direct and indirect fire 50 Caliber MGs, and tanks are on call or in position for immediate action. Armored Personnel Carriers are on call to assist in the evacuation of any casualties incurred. The combat patrol is the battalion's long arm for offensive action and is therefore supported with the maximum fire power. The tanks not only play the role of a powerful guardian with their 90mm gun, but are used extensively to light up to eight hundred (800) yards away an area with their detachable spot light.
SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

Communication is an ever-present problem with a combat patrol. For patrols going beyond 1000 meters in rugged terrain the AN/PRC-10 is carried for radio communication to the company CP. Inter-patrol communication is carried on very effectively with AN/PRC-66. Wire is carried in most cases, but it presents a problem when the distance exceeds one half (\(\frac{3}{4}\)) to one (1) mile. The dispensers are carried on pack boards and spliced together as the wire is expended. As a rule, wire has proved to be a satisfactory means of communication for the combat patrol but not recommended for the reconnaissance patrol. If at all possible, the wire should be policed upon return for it leaves an excellent means for enemy reconnaissance patrols to learn our patrol routes.

A variation of the combat patrol is the combat ambush, which is being employed more and more by Marines in Korea. It is also a favorite type patrol used by the enemy against our patrols. A careful selection of the terrain must be made; enemy patrol habits must be studied; and the routes the enemy most frequently follows must be determined in order to ensure the proper selection of an ambush site. The size of an ambush is determined by the enemy force expected to be encountered. The ambush personnel should be equipped with automatic weapons. A smaller unit is more effective for it is easier to control the surprise element which is so essential in the combat ambush. The initial burst of fire will inflict the greatest number of casualties and so it is imperative to arm the men with automatic weapons to ensure maximum effectiveness of this initial burst. Once the element of surprise is gone the odds are reduced considerably for the ambush party.

There are two methods employed in the displacement of the men. The first one is the "V" or horseshoe type where the enemy is allowed to walk to the apex of the "V" before he is fired upon. A "snatch" group is placed near the apex to capture enemy or material. After the enemy is disorganized the ambush party will close the gap in the open end of the "V" to encircle a portion of the enemy. It is a general principle for ambushes in Korea that the ambush will attempt to isolate a portion of the enemy and not attack the entire group. This principle is flexible for the enemy's patrol size and formation will govern the degree to which it can be applied. The second type ambush used by Marines is the "parallel bar" type. This is used along a wide trail or road. The enemy is allowed to pass through until the point of the enemy patrol reaches the extreme for end of the ambush before fire is brought to bear. It is important to remember that if fire is brought to bear too quickly, the enemy will split in a predetermined fashion to
encompass the ambush. Supporting arms, communications, and other principles applied on a combat patrol are also applicable to the combat ambush.

Night camouflage applies to all three types of patrols. An excellent blacking is the soot out of a diesel fuel oil stove. This, applied to the face, neck, and hands, affords adequate camouflage for the exposed extremities.

A patrol cannot hope to be successful unless every member knows exactly the mission, route, order, and part he plays in executing the patrol. A thorough briefing must be completed in sufficient time to allow every patrol member to prepare his plans, clothing, and equipment for the patrol. A policy of the 2d Battalion in briefing combat patrols and ambushes is to bring the unit making the patrol back to the battalion CP the day before the patrol is to be run. After a period of relaxation a "chalk talk" is held with the patrol diagrammed on a blackboard. When this is completed a rehearsal is held on a similar terrain until all members have the plan of action firmly fixed in their minds.

Patrolling will not stop the enemy from patrolling or probing the outposts or the KIA, but it will subdue their activities considerably. Our patrolling must be aggressive and continuous to maintain the proper security and protection for the KIA.
There has never been any doubt that the function of the Marine Corps is largely amphibious in nature. Unfortunately however, this fact has been neglected under the influence of the present tactical situation here in Korea. The 2d Battalion, 1st Marines is fully aware of the fact that a well trained and a well prepared Marine Corps is a strong and powerful Marine Corps. In keeping with this belief, intensive training has been conducted in the principles of amphibious warfare. This intensive training reached its culmination in MARLEX XVII.

MARLEX XVII was an amphibious training exercise. In spite of the fact that the site of the problem was close to an active combat zone, all the training which was conducted by this battalion emphasized the proper methods and procedures by which an amphibious landing is conducted. The combat atmosphere which pervades this area was used as an effective background against which the pattern of serious motivation was painted. The knowledge that this training might very well be a preface to actual operations in the near future inspired the officers and men alike to absorb the maximum possible benefit from the problem.

At 07:05 on 1 March the operation commenced when the advance party departed the 2/1 Command Post area. It was the mission of this advance party to proceed to Incheon, Korea by train and to conduct the preliminary liaison between the battalion and the Navy Task Force involved. This preliminary liaison encompassed such routine points as arrangements for the messing and berthing of the Battalion Landing Team. It was also the duty of this advance party to establish and handle the embarkation schedule. Planning of shipboard routine and routes of passage for embarkation and disembarkation was also accomplished at this time.

The main body of the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines' Battalion Landing Team commenced its movement to the ships at Inchon at 0050 on 2 March when it departed the Battalion CP by motor convoy. The motor march was of short duration as the main part of the movement was accomplished by rail. The troops left the trucks at the railhead at Munsan-Ni and immediately boarded the waiting train. At this time a supplementary meal of Assault Rations 1-A was issued to the troops for consumption during the train ride. The train left Munsan-Ni at 0230 and arrived at Inchon at 0700. The troops were met at the port by elements of the advance party who immediately guided them to waiting landing craft for the movement from the dock to the ship, the APA 27 (U.S.S. CYMBER). This phase of the ship's loading commenced at 0745. Every available type of landing craft was utilized to expedite this movement, including LCVP's, LOU's, and LCI's. At 1015 it was reported that the entire Battalion Landing Team was aboard and the ship was able to weigh anchor and got underway at 1400.

ENCLOSURE 4
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

The Battalion Landing Team itself was composed of the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines; a Shore Party Team (which included the 1st Team of Company "C", 1st Shore Party Battalion); detachment from 1st Signal Battalion; beachmaster detachment of NBC #1 (including UDT); detachment from Evacuation Section of H&ES Company, 1st Shore Party Battalion; detachment from 1st Amphibious Truck Company, 7th Motor Transport Battalion; and detachment from Amphibious Construction Battalion; detachment from Company "C", 1st Tank Battalion; detachment from 3d Battalion, 11th Marines; detachment from Amphibious Tractor Battalion; detachment from Armored Amphibious Tractor Company; detachment from 1st ANGLICO, 1st Signal Battalion; detachment from Military Police Company, Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division (Reinf), 1st AF; and Company 9 (Reinforcement), 2d Battalion, 1st HIC Regiment. The total complement of the Battalion Landing Team was sixty (60) officers and one thousand three hundred and forty (1,340) enlisted men.

Additional shipboard planning commenced within a few minutes after sailing when a meeting of the staff officers was held at 1440. This was followed by a meeting of the individual Boat Team Commanders at 1630.

The short trip to the training area in the vicinity of the island of Takok-To was completed when the ship dropped anchor at 1715. The bulk of the Task Force was present at this time, including the LST 303, the LST 771 and the LSD 26 (U.S.S. TOR-74).

The actual training of the personnel in the procedures for leaving the ship and the routes by which this would be accomplished began at 1830 when all troops were instructed to lie below for debarkation drill. This drill commenced at 1900 and was conducted to insure thorough familiarization with boat stations and the routes to them by all members of all boat teams. Confusion was held to a minimum in spite of the fact that it was dark at this time and the ship was blacked out. The drill was secured at 2130. Five minutes later, at 2135, a meeting of all boat and troop commanders was held. At this meeting the few minor difficulties encountered during the drill were ironed out and a smooth system for the following day was established.

A Rehearsal Day for the entire problem had been scheduled for 7 March, however inclement weather characterized by heavy seas necessitated a change of plans. General Quarters was sounded in preparation for the expected disembarkation at 0610, however the condition of the seas caused H-Hour to be delayed for 1 hour at 0615 and General Quarters was accordingly secured. The call was sounded again at 0710, but it was secured at 0720 when the weather forced another 1 hour postponement of H-Hour. The day's exercise was finally cancelled at 0815. At 0840 the troops laid below to prepare for a debarkation drill which commenced at 0900.
This second drill run very smoothly and it was secured at 1047.
The balance of the day was spent in final inspections of men and
equipment as well as in rest and relaxation.

Originally, 4 March had been scheduled as D-Day, but this was
changed to a Rehearsal Day as a result of the weather of 3 March.
Seas continued to be a little higher than usual, but they were not
bad enough to interfere with the operation. General Quarters was
sounded at 0610 and Condition 1-Acme was set at 0620. From this
point the debarkation and landing continued in a routine fashion
until the troops were on the beach and the tactical situation
became the matter of prime importance.

As one of the two companies in the assault, Company "E" re-
ported hitting the beach at 0831. They immediately were taken
under heavy fire by enemy artillery located on the high ground
on the right flank of Red Beach. The other assault company,
Company "B", reported that it was ashore at 0940 and was moving
toward objective 2, a hill in the vicinity of BS445229. The CP
group came ashore at 0945 and immediately set up in defilade
behind the high ground in the center of the beach. At 0955
Company "B" reported that it was receiving small arms fire from
its right flank, but it continued to maintain in advance at a
slow pace. At this same time, Company "F" came ashore and was
assigned the mission of seizing and holding objective 3, a hill
mass in the vicinity of BS452241. Serial number 115, the lst
Team Company "C", lst Shore Party Battalion, was ordered ashore
at 1014 and three (3) minutes later hit the beach. At the same
time the CP was relocated to a position on the hill top in the
center of the beach in the vicinity of BS445223. The detachment
from the Korean Marine Corps was ashore at 1018 and was dis-
patched to seize objective 3, a hill mass in the vicinity of BS
452243, at 1020. The next fifteen (15) minutes Company "P" was
behind Company "D" on the left flank of the beach and both com-
panies were making slow progress. Company "E" continued its
advance with two platoons in the face of steady small arms resis-
tance. Serial 114, which was made up of the 7th Company, 2d
Battalion, lst KMC Regiment, was dispatched to the beach at this
time, and Weapons Company reported that it was set in in the
vicinity of BS442222. At 1037 wire communication was established
with all companies. Serial 115, made up of a 105mm Howitzer, was
lance at this point in the operation. By 1050 Company "P" had
established its CP in the vicinity of BS443225 while Company "D"
was located 300 yards away in the vicinity of BS443225. Company
"D", on the other side of the beach, had established itself in
the vicinity of BS441216. At 1055 the Tactical Air Control
Party reported that the resistance on objective 4 had been
neutralized. Company "E" reported that it had no contact with
its 2d platoon, however it continued its advance. Increasing
numbers of civilians in the area hampered the advance so much
that it had become a major problem by 1107.
In the early morning hours of this day, the first element of Company "E" were into the enemy trenches on objective 1, a hill mass in the vicinity of LST 603, by 0045. When the problem was secured at 0130 all elements of the Battalion Landing Team were reported as being on the beach with the exception of the 89 Platoon of Company "E" which had been stranded aboard one of the LST's due to a mechanical breakdown in the lead LVT.

Upon notification that the problem was secured, all units returned to the loading area. As soon as each unit reported in, elements of the 1st Shore Party Battalion issued Assault A-1 sections which they had landed ashore. The noon meal was then eaten on the beach. At 1000 the first wave of LVT's was loaded for the return to the various ships. All units were reported back on board prior to 1300. The balance of the day was spent in criticism of the day's activity and in final preparation for the D-Day landing.

When D-Day arrived, it was found that the slightly adverse weather conditions of the preceding days continued to prevail. In spite of this the initial phases of the landing proceeded without mishap. The benefits of the rehearsal were obvious as the units quickly organized themselves on the beach and pressed the attack on the enemy. All units moved into action much more rapidly than they had on the preceding day.

The advance was pressed forward vigorously in the face of slight enemy opposition. By 1001 the infantry elements were all ashore with the exception of the Korean Infantry who comprised the flanking reserve. One (1) minute later Company "E" reported that it had advanced to objective 1, a hill mass in the vicinity of E 6042 N. During the next few minutes, the companies established their Combat Posts in the same general vicinities as on rehearsal day. The increased character of the enemy resistance required the better utilization of the various supporting arms. Such targets as bunkers, active mortar and artillery position, and heavy concentrations were frequent targets for friendly artillery, mortars, air and naval aviation. When the tanks came ashore at 1019 they were immediately pressed into service in the support of Company "D" in the relatively open ground characteristic of one of the left flank. The Commander of the Transport Element was ashore by 1040. At 1045 Company "D" reported that it was being hit in a counterattack by an estimated two (2) companies of enemy. By 1058 this counterattack had been thrown back with heavy enemy casualties (15 KIA's and 15 WIA's). At 1100 the Korean Marine Corps detachment reported that it had come ashore and established a CP in the vicinity of E 6043 N. This unit moved directly into the attack and maintained its integrity until it was pinned down by enemy mortar fire from the vicinity of E 6043 W which had caused 3 WIA's. At 1107 the Tactical Air Control Party reported that the strike in front of Company "E" had caused an estimated 90 enemy KIA's and that the strike in front of Company "E" had partly neutralized the target area, objective 4.
SECRET
SECRET INFORMATION

Prior to securing the problem at 1130, Major General Edwin A. Fulbrook, Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Head), Maj, and Colonel H. D. Adams, Commanding Officer, 1st Marines visited the scene. After observing the operation for a short while, they both expressed high satisfaction with the conduct of the exercise.

As on the previous day, the troops then assembled on the beach where they received their rations and ate the noon meal. The return trip to the APA 27 commenced at 1345 and was soon completed without event. Again, the balance of the day was spent in a review and critique of the morning's activities. The valuable lessons which were brought out in the difficulty of control and organization of a landing on a hostile beach under fire were again discussed. The general feeling which prevailed among the experienced observers was that the operation had been highly successful. Confidence in their skills and abilities and deep interest into the troops and they had gained valuable experience in the practice of an amphibious assault.

At 0800 on 8 March General Quarters was sounded preparatory to evacuation, which commenced at 0830. The return to the dock at Inchon was accomplished so that the first of two (2) trains was enroute to Kunsan-Ni at 1025. This train arrived at Kunsan-Ni at 1230 and the troops transferred to the truck convoy in time to leave the railhead at 1400. This group arrived at the Battalion CP at 1555. At 1645 the final elements arrived to bring to a close one of the most successful of all such operations, MAJLEX XVII.
TACP SUMMARY

The Tactical Air Control Party was in Division reserve from 1 March to 10 March. From 2 March through 6 March the Tactical Air Control Party participated in the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines MARLEX XVII. On 10 March the TACP team relieved the TACP team of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines on Line JAMESTOWN.

The TACP team performed all of its responsibilities as a supporting arm attached to this Battalion in a satisfactory manner. There was one (1) change of personnel in the TACP during the period.
MEDICAL SUMMARY

During the period 1 March through 31 March the Battalion Aid Station treated or consulted four hundred and sixty-four (464) men. The following list categorizes the patients into the following classes:

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ENCLOSURE 6
MORTAR AND HAND GRENADE AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE REPORT

During the period 1 March through 31 March the Battalion expended the following amounts of ammunition:

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Hand Grenades 23
**Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, 1st Marine Division (Reinf), PFEF**
q/o FPO, San Francisco, California

10 March 1953

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* Denotes Personnel Filling Two (2) T/O Billets
### Headquarters

3rd Battalion, 1st Marines
1st Marine Division (Reinf), FWF
P.O. Box 841, San Francisco, California

KOREA

**DATE**

**ASSIGNED**

**PRESENT**

**DUTY**

10 March 1953

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4- Denotes personnel filling two (2) T/O billets
### Headquarters

3rd Battalion, 1st Marines
1st Marine Division (Reinf), FMFPac

C/O P.O. Box 1008, San Francisco, California

**Date Assigned** 03 Jan 1953

**Date Present** 25 March 1953

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APPENDIX V

PHOTOGRAPHIC SUPPLEMENT
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

APPENDIX VI

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

ENCLOSURE 1 - Visual Signaling
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COMMENT: The employment of ground signals by Marine Units to supplement radio and wire communication for combat patrols has been very limited because of preassigned designations. In contrast the CCF Army use ground signals extensively and effectively.

RECOMMENDATION: That the preassigned designations of ground signals (pyrotechnic code) be modified to provide several rather than two unassigned ground signals for each MLR Regiment. This would allow a much broader use of ground signals by patrols as an alternate or primary means of communication easily coordinated at Battalion level.