AFFIDAVIT BY ANsehen BAKER TO DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

Headquarters
1st Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

2:30 PM 26th Corps. 28th Div. 5th Corps. 1st Div. 28th Div. 26th Corps. 1st Div. 28th Div. 26th Corps.

PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 43

Period covered: 051205 - 061200 December 1950.

MAP: AMS 7751 KOREA 1:50,000

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. See overlay.

b. Point of contact.

HAGARU-RI to CV 5558; KOTO-RI; CHUN-HUNG-RI; MAJJO DONG.

c. Identification and Order of Battle.

052215 - G-2, 1st Mar Div: 3 POWs taken at HAGARU-RI on 5 Dec from 1st BN, 267th Regt. 24th Div (?) 25th Corps. 20th Div. deserted on 3 Dec. Reported they crossed YALU about 20 days ago. Arrived in area 4 miles north of HAGARU-RI 052300 Dec. Stated 26th and 26th located north of 267th. At time POWs deserted, division was in same area. Division never engaged in combat, however, had some losses as result of air strikes. Food had been expected from the rear but it never arrived. Each regiment had about 20 horses.

061130 - 1st Marines: CCF POW captured 8 Dec. From 3rd BN, 176th Regt, 2nd Div, 20th Corps. Stated 177th, 179th, and 186th were located on east side of MSR at CV 5766. Relieved 060300 by 172nd Regt. 58th Div. Stated all three regiments moved to north. (11 civilians sent to rescue wounded near KOTO-RI were captured in that same area. They were taken south to CV 5557 on 5 Nov where 2 escaped.) POW said 3 PNs executed ambush night of 20 Nov.

061130 - G-2, 1st Mar Div: POW captured 061100 east HAGA SUS-RI claimed to be from 228th Regt. 78th Div, 25th Corps. Stated 287th Regt also in that vicinity.

APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX BAKER TO DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

- 47 -
APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX BAKER TO DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

061645 - 1st Marines: Wounded POW captured on 5 Dec at KOTO-RI claimed 3rd Bn., 566th Regt, 4th Div (?), 20th Corps. Said his regiment was relieved by elements of the 30th Corps, and that his regiment was to move north to Manchuria. Said there was one regiment west of KOTO-RI and three east of KOTO-RI.

2. ENEMY OPERATION DURING PERIOD.

a. Summary.

(1) The tank-led withdrawal from HAGARU-RI got under way in early morning as our forces moved out initially against slight resistance that quickly stiffened as the enemy defended from favorable high ground along both sides of the MSR. During the morning, heaviest resistance came from the high ground to the east. A strong pocket of resistance was encountered at SANGAEON-RI, holding up the advance until the enemy could be driven out by air and ground attacks. Weather that closed in late in the period slowed down air strikes and limited the advance of forward elements to a point some four or five miles from KOTO-RI as the period ended. Afternoon action was marked by heavy hand-to-hand fighting. As the leading elements moved out of HAGARU-RI an enemy concentration in the high ground to the east was hit by a combined air and ground attack that dispersed the enemy and left the high ground in our control. A P captured during that engagement revealed the probable presence of the 23rd CCF Corps in the area east and northeast of HAGARU-RI. P's captured at KOTO-RI during the morning indicated the disposition of at least two divisions between HAGARU-RI and KOTO-RI with more troops located to the west.

(2) At the same time, the enemy force went into action in the MAJON DOO-CHINHUNG-RI area, closing the MSR in three separate but coordinated actions between those two points. At SUDONG, 75 CCF with automatic weapons, machine guns and small arms launched two different attacks on friendly forces at SUDONG, the first came at about 061000 and was driven off when a relief patrol from the 1st Bn, 1st Marines at CHINHUNG-RI moved in. After the patrol moved back to CHINHUNG-RI a second stronger attack was staged. Another relief patrol helped to drive back the enemy and the Marine Engineer Detachment there, with its equipment was moved to CHINHUNG-RI.

South of SUDONG, a L. vehicle
Marine convoy was attacked by an estimated 200 enemy about 6611CC, half way between SUDONG and MAJON DONG. Last reports indicated that the road and convoy were in enemy hands. Air reported an estimated enemy company digging in along the high ground just east of the attack site. An Army company sent out as a relief column during the afternoon was reportedly pinned down by heavy enemy fire and unable to pull out as the period closed.

Some 2,000 yards northwest of MAJON DONG a tank led army infantry patrol and a platoon of Marine tanks moved to the vicinity of CV 5840 where some 200 CCF troops were encountered. Tank machine gun fire killed an estimated 30 CCF troops before drawing back. During the engagement enemy troops tried unsuccessfully to use Molotov Cocktails and satchel charges against our tanks. No friendly casualties were suffered.

A late report from the 96th FA Bn quoted a civilian as saying that the villagers in INHUNG-NI (CV 6728) had been told to move out because of an impending communist attack in that vicinity tonight. Reports continued to indicate the influx of enemy into this general area and the increased movement of fleeing refugees southwestward into the immediate HAMCHUNG area.

b. Enemy Tactics and Weapons or other Materiel.

C58150 - X Corps: Interrogation of US POWs indicate CCF using chemical type grenades. Described as "POLICE MASHER" type, approximately 6 to 10 inches long with small charge 3 to 4 inches on end. Charge bursts (described as low order) generating yellowish smoke, aggravating coughing and sneezing, giving positions away. Shortly thereafter, positions are showered with "Frag" and "Concussion" grenades.


(1) Air Force.

4 bombs dropped and CP strafed at HAGARU-RI about 652200.

(2) Administrative Units.

Negative.

(3) Anti-Aircraft Defenses.

Negative.

APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX BAKER TO DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

- 49 -
APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX BAKER TO DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

(4) Anti-Tank Units:
  Negative.

(5) Armored and Motorized Units:
  Negative.

(6) Artillery:
  Negative.

(7) Engineers:

061100 - VMQ-8: Vicinity CV 5466L one road block and bridge blown.

061400 - VMQ-8: Air reports three road blocks vicinity 5553.

061200 - 1st BN, 1st Marines: Bridge blown out at CV 5242Q but can be by-passed easily.

(8) Infantry:

052145 - X Corps: Air made strikes on two enemy troop concentrations at 051830. One at CV 5541 and another 1500 yards northeast. Small groups enemy moving east from HUKBU-RI during afternoon.

060915 - 1st BN, 1st Marines: Sighted 5 enemy TA 58-54. Army patrol fired on by estimated squad at TA 5946Q.

061100 - TAO: Aircraft hitting positions at CV 5271L. Enemy dispersed at CV 5167.

061000 - VMQ-8: Observed enemy troops digging in 5654X2, estimated 50 troops. Inv. vicinity CV 5655A0 enemy dug in. Approximately 40 enemy dug in. Observed enemy troops at CV 5468LM moving to draw at CV 5468G. Enemy troops east of KAGARU-RI dispersed under air and ground attack.

061100 - 11th Marines (Rear CP): Three members of HAMHUNG Secret Police picked up and reported that 6 NK soldiers were going to attack the Army Hospital 121 today.

061000 - VMQ-8: Friendly convoy attacked by 100-200 enemy vicinity CV 5646-5841 (half-way between HUKBU and HAGARU-RI). Enemy had three machine guns and an undetermined amount of mortars.

APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX BAKER TO DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

- 66 -
APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX BAKER TO DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

061630 - Tank Bn: Tank platoon supported by Army Infantry encountered approximately 100 CCF vicinity CV 5869. Tanks moved out without Infantry to CV 584-001, killing an estimated 30 enemy. CCF attempt to use Molotov Cocktails and satchel charges without success.

(9) Other Elements.

Negative.

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX BAKER TO DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX BAKER TO DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

a. Estimated Enemy Losses (POWs and Casualties).

(1) Estimated En KIA during period (Tn Bn) - 30

(2) Total estimated KIA to date - 8692.

b. Enemy Combat Efficiency.

Excellent.

c. Morale.

Excellent.


Negative.

e. Weather.

Weather forecast 0600 - 0900:


4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

a. As of 08 Dec 50, four hundred and seventy four (474) Chinese Nationals (consisting of 130 families) are residing in Hungnam City. During the North Korean Government regime, all Chinese Nationals were controlled by the Chinese Overseas Federation Association (COPA), which was on a Nation-wide level, with Provincial and City Branches. Chinese Nationals were permitted membership in the North Korean Labor Party (NKLP) (Korsett). The Chinese Nationals from the Hungnam area, who had joined the NKLP, fled before the advance of United Nations Forces.

b. Necessary arrangements have been completed for the establishment of screening points on all roads leading into Hungnam from the North. These screening points are to be manned by Hungnam City Police during daylight hours only.

c. Information passed to Commanding Officer,
2nd Engineer Special Brigade (ESB) at Hungnam Port to the effect that a Japanese National, who was employed as a steward, climbed the mast of the Shinano-maru and made a sketch indicating the location of guard posts. This information, plus information on supplies, equipment, and personnel passing through the Port facilities, was passed on to Korean contacts by burial in a tin can at a designated spot. This espionage ring shows connections with the Japan Communist Party (JCP). Subject steward has been returned to Tokyo for further investigation.

5. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AT END OF PERIOD.

No change from FIR No. 42.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL SMITH:

E. W. SNEEDER
Colonel, USMC
Deputy Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

E. G. VAK. OHMAN
Lt. Col., USMC
Assistant G-2

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1st SF Bn
1st Sig Bn
1st ConservGrp
1st Serv Bn
1st Ord Bn
1st Amphib Tace Bn
MG-12
Ren Co
X Corps
3rd Inf Div

7th Inf Div
41st Brit Indep BM
VMA-6 (Lt. Padwell)
VMA-6
CHC
FMF PAG
FMF LHA
HCs
2nd Mar Div
I 3rd Corps
HISP
ComNavFE

APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX BAKER TO DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

- 53 -
APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX BAKER TO DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

Headquarters
1st Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 42
Period covered: 041800-051800 December 1950

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.
   a. See overlay.
   b. Point of contact.
      No change.
   c. Identification and Order of Battle.

   FY captured 5 December at Hagaru-ri
   claimed to be from the 280th Fegt, 77th Div,
   25th CCF Corps. He stated that the entire
   Corps probably consisting of the 76th, 77th
   and 78th Divisions, was in this area, probably
   between Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.
   a. Summary.

   Enemy activities were at a minimum
during the day with no engagements reported
anywhere in the Division sector. The most
significant reports revealed at least several
hundred enemy moving north and west toward
Yudam-ni and then cutting southwest for a
possible by-pass of the Hagaru-ri area and
more southern intercept of our MSR. Also,
during the day vehicle tracks crossing the
Chosin Reservoir east of Yudam-ni were re-
ported. Reports of enemy between Hagaru-ri
and Koto-ri by air indicated little enemy
activity by troop movement while close aerial
reconnaissance of the road between Koto-ri
and Chinhung-ni continued to point out many
unoccupied defensive positions overlooking and
covering the MSR. Air and artillery strikes
were continued against enemy targets in the
Hagaru-ri area.

   No further reports were received
of enemy movement toward Hajei Dong. No
enemy contacts were reported throughout that
area, as the period ended.
b. Enemy Tactics and Weapons or other Material.

Negative.


(1) Air Force. Negative.

(2) Administrative Units. Negative.

(3) Anti-Aircraft Defenses. Negative.

(4) Anti-Tank Units. Negative.

(5) Armored and Motorized Units.

050900 - G-2, 1st Mar Div: Enemy convoy of undetermined size hit by night hecklers at CV 4226, north of Yudam-Ni. One truck destroyed.

051130 - X Corps: At C60900 road from southern tip of Cheon Reservoir to CV 5258. Road shows much use, many tracks but no activity observed.

CA 4404 to north tip of Cheon Reservoir also many tracks but no activity observed.

051340 - VHO-6: Vehicle tire tracks observed on ice from CV 5076 to CV 5476.

(6) Artillery. Negative.

(7) Engineers.

050930 - 1st En, 1st Marines: Patrol on 4 Dec reports road block at CV 5054.

(8) Infantry.

041820 - TAC: Air struck enemy in positions at CV 4773, 4774, 4775, 4776, 4777, 4778, 4779, 477C with excellent results. Enemy occupies high ground from CV 5760 north, did not appear to be in great strength. Many unoccupied trenches and fox holes.

041900 - VHO-8: Heavy enemy concentration of troops in 3rd CL-LI (CV 4677), reported during day. Air struck enemy at CV 4797, 4798, 4798V with napalm, rockets, VT bombs, Reg bombs, 20mm and 50 caliber during afternoon (4 Dec). Believed to have inflicted 80% casualties on troops in that area. Approximately 2000 CCF in fox holes.
and slit trenches in vicinity CV 4671, 4671, 4771, 4670, 4670, and 4770. These positions were hit by air, after strike enemy started up the ridge to take up firing positions. Troops were deployed. Additional air strikes brought on these troops. Broke them up. Troops started running to west. Additional air strikes effective. Three enemy machine gun nests and lines of foxholes facing east overlooking airfield. 2 lines of foxholes are 50 yards apart. Approximately 75 yards west of second line of foxholes in grove of pine trees are additional enemy positions. First row of foxholes, enemy observed watching airfield. These positions are at CV 4989l8, F4, H3, H4, M, L. Air strike not made.

042040 - X Corps: Air reported this afternoon that many troops and pack animals are moving south from 60 to 75 miles north CHOSIN Reservoir.

042134 - X Corps: At 041705I air attacked 16,000 to 18,000 enemy moving south vicinity CV 6431. Towing artillery or supplies.

050930 - 1st Bn, 1st Marines: Civilian reported CCF occupying village to left of MSR at CV 5555. Reports from patrol states enemy positions in high ground both sides of road vicinity CV 5455 and CV 5156.

051215 - VMO-3: Observed small groups of enemy up to ten in number moving north toward YUDAM-Ri and westward on road beyond YUDAM-Ri. Total approximately 100 enemy.

051345 - VMO-3: 600 - 800 troops sighted vicinity CV 4574 moving north along road to road junction at CV 4560 then turned southwest along road toward SINPO-Ri (CV 3272).

051400 - VMO-3: Building and tunnel CV 5756 at SUNAI-Ri reported to shelter enemy personnel. 10 actually seen. Tracks in area indicate many more. Also observed yesterday. Post patrol 1000 from this position down over hill overlooking road.
APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX BAKER TO DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

001645 - VH0-6: Enemy troops reported moving southwest out of YUDAM-RI throughout day. From HAGARU-RI south to KOTO-RI saw only 5 enemy in area of stalled convoy.

(9) Other Elements. Negative.

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

a. Estimated Enemy Losses. (POWs and Casualties.)

No report.

b. Enemy Combat Efficiency.

Good to excellent.

c. Morale.

Good to excellent.


Negative.

e. Weather.

Weather forecast for 052400 - 062400:


4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

School teacher at Hungnam Senior High School reportedly spread malicious communistic propaganda to the students, and persuaded at least nine (9) students to join the North Korean People's Army (NKPA). Subject teacher currently holds the position of Administrative Education Sub-Section Chief at the Hungnam City Hall. Investigation completed and recommendation for removal of said official has been passed on to Hungnam Civil Affairs Officer.

5. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy Courses of Action.
(1) Impede our withdrawal along the HAGARU-RI - HAMhung axis by every means possible with an estimated two CCF divisions supported by an undetermined amount of artillery.

(2) Attack the withdrawing elements of the division from all sides at any time with an estimated six CCF divisions supported by an undetermined amount of artillery and armor.

(3) Reinforce the above capabilities at any time with CCF and NK units of undetermined strength.

(4) Conduct small scale harassing attacks.

b. Discussion and Analysis.

(1) The enemy has shown no inclination to attack our forces at HAGARU-RI, probably choosing to launch his attacks and conduct his defense simultaneously as the Division undertakes the slow withdrawal from HAGARU-RI. That he intends to deny our movement southward by every means at hand has been confirmed by numerous reports of his defensive organization. While action to blow bridges and craters along the MSR has already been taken by the enemy, it is apparent that much last-minute action has been held in abeyance pending our actual movement down the road. Aerial reconnaissance has shown many important bridges apparently entrenching while small fires have been blown. The enemy is highly capable of rendering the circuitous road through the pass south of KOTO-RI impassable by demolitions. Such action would make our forces highly exposed to enemy fire from favorable and well prepared positions.

(2) The lack of activity in the area south of HAGARU-RI for the past two days has given the enemy an opportunity to regroup his forces along the MSR and to close reinforcimg troops in positions to undertake offensive action either against our units at HAGARU-RI or at any desired point to the south. The capture of a prisoner from the 77th Division lends credence to the presence of new units already in the immediate area and uncommitted. It is highly possible that the enemy now consists of the 20th Corps as well as elements of the 26th, 27th and 24th Corps. The enemy total is considered to be at least 50,000 to 60,000 in the Division zone, capable of action against our troops, with the possibility of an equal number of reinforcements still unconfirmed and unidentified. Such a force, combined with his mobility and freedom from logistical ties, strengthens his attack capability.
APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX BAKER TO DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

materially. In addition, presumed distribution of his forces provides the enemy with the capability of attack throughout almost the entire length of the MSR with the most recent activity occurring around MAJON DONG.

(3) Recent troop movement and vehicle sightings indicate that the enemy is undertaking large scale reinforcement of this area. The period over which these observations have been made is such as to allow the entrance already into the CHOSIN Reservoir area of considerable numbers. Such reinforcement capability will have an important bearing on the success of our mission, with each day allowing an increase in enemy units capable of commitment.

c. Relative Probability of Adoption:
5 a(1) and (2) concurrently with 5 a(3) and (4).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL SMITH!

E. L. SNEIDEN
Colonel, USMC
Deputy Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

E. G. VAH ORMAN
Lt. Col., USMC
Assistant G-2

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FSOC (1)
1st NAV (1) Ron Co (1)
1st Mar (5) X Corps (3)
6th Mar (6) 3rd Inf Div (2)
7th Mar (6) 7th Inf Div (2)
11th Mar (6) 1st Brit Indep Bn (1)
1st Tk Bn (1) VNC-8 -Lt. Radwell (1)
1st Eng Bn (1) WNC-6 (1)
1st SP Bn (1) CHE (1)
1st Sig Bn (1) FPC (1)
1st ComServGrp (1) LGCS (1)
1st Serv Bn (1) 2nd Mar Div (1)
1st Ord Bn (1) 1 ROK Corps (1)
1st Amphib TracEn (1) MISO (1)
1AG-12 (1) COM NAV FE (1)

APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX BAKER TO DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

- 59 -
APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX BAKER TO DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

Headquarters
1st Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force
 c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California
12:54:14jnl
Ser 0059-5
4 December 1950

PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 42

Period covered: 01000 - 04000 December 1950

MAP: AMS L751 KOREA 1:50,000

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. See overlay.

b. Point of contact.
   HAGARU-RI and KOTO-RI area.

c. Identification and Order of Battle.

(1) The following code numbers of CCF units are taken from X Corps 568, dated 032400:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>CODE NAME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9th Army Grp</td>
<td>Lungnum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th Army (Corps)</td>
<td>Yi Shang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60th Div</td>
<td>6 or 34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>179th Regt</td>
<td>971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>276th Regt</td>
<td>762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Bn, 179th Regt</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One PI reports that the 39th Army, designated in mid-October the "55th Unit", was re-designated 00 24 Nov the "Tientsin Unit".

(2) X Corps: KLU (Agent) reports 2 Dec observed 8,000 CCF from 124th Div at CV 5858. Had old and worn uniforms. CCF officer said 124th was ordered to take HAGARU-RI by 6 Dec and capture 6,000 trucks loaded with supplies. Called this group began congregating at KADONG (?) for the drive on HAGARU-RI. These troops had no supplies at all.

(Comment: 4,000 would be closer for 124th. The fact of no supplies and old uniforms is consistent with known CCF of the 124th. Supposed to have been committed vs 6th Army. This was first trip for this KLU.)

2. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. Summary.

(1) The only engagements reported
within the Division sector during the period occurred west of HAGARU-RI where the enemy made late attempts to cut off rear elements of the 5th, 7th and 11th Marines as they neared the completion of movement to HAGARU-RI. Two artillery batteries caught heavy enemy attacks before dawn from an undetermined number of enemy. The attacks were thrown off and the convoy completed the three-day ordered withdrawal late in the period. Sniper fire and harassing enemy action was encountered up to the HAGARU-RI defense perimeter. At the same time and covering this move, aircraft continued devastating attacks on enemy troop movements and installations.

Air hit enemy concentrations two miles northwest of HAGARU-RI where a civilian had reported 10,000 CCF troops earlier in the day. Air had reported many enemy troops with 200 horses in this same locale the preceding day. Reports continued to indicate strong enemy concentrations southwest of HAGARU-RI around SUNCHOL-LI (CV 4767), while a CIC agent reported 300 enemy three miles northeast of HAGARU-RI planning an attack on HAGARU-RI tonight. An air strike was made on the SUNCHOL-LI area later in the day against troops in the nearby deep ravine and on the surrounding high ground at CV 4767, CV 4766, CV 4868 and CV 4969. Five strikes were made, plastering the entire area with napalm, rockets, bombs and machine gun fire. Estimated 75-80 per cent casualties inflicted with dead soon throughout the target area.

Enemy occupied entrenchments south of HAGARU-RI along both sides of the MSR were confirmed in the day’s reports.

(2) The entry of enemy reinforcements into the Division sectors was reported from both the north, east and west. Air conducted heavy strikes during the night against much vehicular traffic southward from CHUNGJIP. During daylight hours a civilian reported 2,000 CCF moving southwestward approximately 25 miles northwest of HAHNUNG, and a TAC with the 7th Infantry Regiment reported the eastward movement of many CCF troops from HUKSU-RI. The mission is reportedly to sever our MSR at MAJONG-DONG (CV 5582). There are already in that vicinity an estimated 500 CCF troops. The enemy has previously been active against the MSR north of MAJONG-DONG, with a railroad bridge blown at CV 5582 and a railroad bridge blown at CV 6664Q. An attempt to close the pass leading to KOTO-RI from the south has been made with a segment of the narrow road blown.

(3) Confirmation of the enemy's plan

APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX BAKER TO DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
to attempt to cut off our withdrawal was further borne out by reports of heavy enemy concentrations both east and west of the CSS at KOKO-RI and northward. A KLO (agent) report said there were large numbers of CCP just south east of KOKO-RI, with continued sightings of prepared enemy defense installations throughout the area. A late Air report by VMF-301 said approximately 25 British Commando troops were sighted at CV 5665 and a food drop was made by the observation plane. No enemy was observed in the immediate area. Enemy in buildings at CV 5662 and in positions in CV 5666 were fired on with good results by friendly artillery.

b. Enemy Tactics and Weapons or other Material.

(1) A delayed report by the B-2, 1st Marines, said the enemy encountered by them was well trained and well led. He utilized many patrols, listening posts and snipers to observe our movements. During the attack, the enemy sounds bugles and blows whistles constantly as in an attempt to demoralize and confuse our troops. Green and red flares are fired probably as predesignated signals for attacking and maneuvering.

(2) In the attacks, the enemy uses part of his troops to get as close as possible to our positions in order to use hand grenades, while at the same time covering their advance with covering automatic weapons fire. CCP infiltration techniques are excellent. While under fire enemy troops crawl from one firing position to another, displaying no reluctance to engage in close hand-to-hand combat.

(3) ConNav maintained Chinese Communist troops have white perks which they make into topees during air attacks.


(1) Air Force. Negative.

(2) Administrative Units.

031830. - VM-6: Artillery reports suspected enemy CP at CV 1888.-H.

041600. - X Corps: Civilian reports 3 different division CPs in YNG KOKO-RI (CV 1332) on 3 Dec.

(3) Anti-Aircraft Defense.

Negative.
APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX BAKER TO DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

(4) Anti-Tank Units: Negative.

(5) Armored and Motorized Units.

032628 - X Corps: At CHANGJIP (47-1600), enemy vehicles strung out over thirty miles moving south. At 032030, 20 of these vehicles struck by air. More strikes being made.

(6) Artillery: Negative.

(7) Engineers.

032040 - X Corps: Bridge blown at CV 6641.

040930 - 11th Marines report bridge blown by enemy vicinity CV 4772.

041730 - VM-6: At CV 554P eastern half of bridge blown out; will take major repairs.

Railroad bridge over road at CV 554P blown out.

(6) Infantry.

031830 - VM-6: Enemy reported on Hills 1692 (CV 5070) and 1756 (CV 4269) were hit by air and artillery. Enemy sighted retreating east at CV 4973B. Enemy dug in at CV 1772JMO and on hill at CV 4971Q. Much evidence of enemy in village at HINCHO JANS (CV 5068N).

031835 - TEQ: Air strikes on enemy troops in high ground from 4973E to 4973, all enemy ran to secondary road that parallels main from 4972E to 4973E retreating in southwest direction seeking shelter in houses; many houses burnt. As troops ran out of houses, they were hit by air strikes. Numerous enemy killed.

032015 - G-2, 1st Mar Div: Civilian reports many CCF crossed the line from east to west in vicinity YUDIK-MI.

040330 - 11th Marines: "K" Btry attacked at CV 1772, another Btry attacked at CV 5071.

041045 - G-2, 1st Mar Div: Civilian reports 10,000 CCF moved in area between PELIKUK (CV 5072) and JUHUNG-MI (CV 4976). Air striking. Enemy running into hills.

APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX BAKER TO DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

- 63 -
041500 - X Corps: Civilian reports (C-3):
Large number of CCF moved from
SUCHANG-NI (CV 2310) to IPSEONG-NI
(CV 2635) during night 3-4 December.

041600 - X Corps: Civilian telephone operator
intercepted message that 2,000 CCF
are moving south from KI-PO-NI
(CV 8269).

Search and attack mission against
groups moving east from HUKSU-NI
along road toward MAJON-DONG called
for 041600.

7th Inf AO reports many CCF moving
east from HUKSU-NI toward MAJON-DONG
(CV 5660). Mission to cut MSR.

041730 - WH-6: Friendly artillery fired
into 100 enemy at CV 54637, caused
20 casualties.

Enemy troops scattered along ridge
from CV 54684 to 54680. 80 CCF in
buildings at CV 54680 were fired on
by artillery, two direct hits which
accounted for many enemy casualties.

(9) Other Elements.

Negative.

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

a. Estimated Enemy Losses. (POWs and
   Casualties).

   (1) Delay report of enemy KIA by 1st
   Mar - 1153.

   (2) Total estimated KIA to date - 2082

   (3) Total POWs to date - 2,669

b. Enemy Combat Efficiency.

   Good to excellent.

c. Morale.

   Good to excellent.


   Negative.

e. Weather.

   Weather forecast 04000 - 06000.

APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX BAKER TO DIVISION SPECIAL
ACTION REPORT
APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX BAKER TO DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT


4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

Negative.

5. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AT END OF PERIOD.

No change in enemy capabilities or discussion from FIR #4C.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL SMITH:

E. V. SHEDEKER
Colonel, USMC
Deputy Chief of Staff

ENCLOSED (1): Organizational Chart Inf. Regt. of Communist Chinese Forces.

OFFICIAL:

E. G. VAN ORN
Lt. Col., USMC
Assistant G-2

DISTRIBUTION:

1st Sig Bn (1)
1st CmsrvGrp (1)
1st Serv Bn (1)
1st Ord Bn (1)
1st ADC (1)
1st BC (1)
3rd Inf Div (2)
7th Inf Div (2)
41st Brit Ind RM (1)
VMD-6-Lt. Radwell (1)
VMC-6 (1)
VMC-5 (1)
VMC-4 (1)
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31st Spt Bn (1)

APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX BAKER TO DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

- 65 -
Period covered: C31800 - C31800 December 1950

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. See overlays.

b. Point of Contact.

6th and 7th Mar: CV 4170 along MSR to CV 6C73.
3rd Bat, 1st Mar: HAGARU-RI area.
1st Mar: KOTO-RI and CHINHUNG-NI area.

c. Identification and Order of Battle.

(1) 1st Marines: 2 F0Us claimed to be from 2nd and 4th Bns, 16th Brigade. FO's surrendered. FO's stated that Brigade arrived, KOTO-RI area 29 Nov. Mission to set up blocking positions and to form perimeter around approach to west. Also states the strength of the Bns were 1500-1600 and that of the Brigade was 6000-7000. Had 150 casualties night of 29 Nov. Reports that 300 troops had deserted this unit. Said only small units of company size were probing MSR to South. Had no knowledge of units to North and had no association between the 16th Brigade and those units.

(2) FO, CHIN in Tai, captured 3 December 1 mile N' HAGARU-RI, claimed to be from Mortar Co., 6th Bat, 305th CCF Artillery Regt.

Former Chinese Nationalist, he stated 305th crossed Yalu about a month ago and walked to the general area where captured on 022000 December.

Stated Regiment had 3 battalions of 4 companies each. Doesn't know about other companies but said his company had 150 men and 10 officers. Thinks others about the same. 305th was never in combat until 2 December.

Weapons of company included two 80mm mortars with a rifle for each squad leader and officer. He said he saw three 80mm artillery (mortar) pieces in regiment. All enlisted.
APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX BAKER TO DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT.

except those carrying mortars carry seven rounds of ammo.

Eight pounds of rice issued to each individual after crossing the Yalu. No other food supplies carried by unit. Heard from other soldiers that ammo was to be supplied from the rear later. Had no knowledge of other units in the area. Said the 30th arrived in full strength and know of no attached units.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. Summary.

(1) The combined 5th and 7th Marines convoy continued its tedious planned withdrawal to HAGARU-RI during the period against varying scattered to heavy resistance as air reported the forward elements less than a mile from the HAGARU-RI defense perimeter at 031730Z. Intense air support kept the enemy resistance from being extremely stubborn in favorable defense terrain as the convoy made difficult and slow progress under enemy pressure from all sides. Air and artillery strikes swept the ridges and valleys, north and south of our forces, killing many enemy. A late report told of enemy in the high ground at CV 4775 and CV 4269 being hit by air and artillery and retreating east. Enemy entrenchments in high ground at CV 4772 indicated some enemy resistance to forward elements was still to be expected although latest air reports stated the area to the rear of the column was generally clear. Reports as the period closed still pointed to enemy troop concentrations south, west and north, with KUDAKAN-RI now enemy-held. No regimental reports of enemy resistance were available at the end of the period.

(2) The enemy was generally quiet throughout the rest of the division zone, with added reports of enemy activity south and west of KOTO-RI being received. The enemy is well entrenched around the crucial pass south of KOTO-RI, with an estimated two companies in the high ground around the pass reported by a 1st Bn, 1st Marines patrol on 2 December. Additional road blocks and blown bridges were also reported between CHINHANG-NI and KOTO-RI, with enemy movement reported during the period both east and west of the MSR. Further reports from the 1st Bn, 1st Marines, indicate that BUNGA-RI (CV 4557) is the probable pivot point for an enemy division's actions against the MSR in the KOTO-RI and CHINHANG-NI areas. An observation post reported the enemy moving back into the valley to the west of CHINHANG-NI. Air re-
reported the presence of some 200 enemy moving southeast from UNBONG-RI toward MAJON-RI while a 3rd Bn., 7th Infantry Regt., company encountered an undetermined number of CPP in the high ground at CV 5339 and CV 5938, south of MAJON DONG. The enemy moved briefly into the MAJON DONG bridge area around midnight 2 Dec with a machine gun and demolitions, to partially blow out the bridge at that point under cover of machine gun fire against U.S. Army troops there. The bridge was made operable during the day.

(3) General air reports indicated a build up of enemy forces in Hukso-RI area and on the road leading into the MSR at MAJON DONG. Reports were also received indicating eastward movement of enemy forces south and west of YONGCHUNG.

b. Enemy Tactics and Weapons or other Material.

Negative.


(1) Air Force. Negative.

(2) Administrative Units.

C31850 - VMC-8: Air destroyed a house vicinity CV 537613 believed to be an enemy CP.

(3) Anti-Aircraft Defences. Negative.

(4) Artillery.

C31400 - 1st Bn., 1st Marines captured one mountain gun, 76mm, on 1 Dec. vicinity CV 5149.

(5) Armored and Motorized Units.

Negative.

(6) Anti-Tank Units.

Negative.

(7) Engineers.

C21950 - VMC-6: At 537402, two tanks and one truck which had been knocked out are being used by the enemy as a road block. This block is being covered by 40 troops in positions at CV 5374 B4 -53-RL-2. Bridge at CV 53751, blown out.

APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX BAKER TO DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

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000915 - X Corps: Bridge 2 miles north of MAJON-DONG blown.

022200 - 1st Bn, 1st Marines reports bridge out at CV 5456L3, road block covered by CCF at this point.

021800 - X Corps: Air status roads jammed with many enemy troops moving east at DA 5644.

021850 - VMQ-6: Approximately 600 enemy vicinity CV 5476, 5477 and 5577. In the high ground CV 5860 observed approximately 600 enemy troops, at CV 5220, well fortified with hundreds of positions, 40 enemy in positions at CV 5374B-C-H1-7 guarding road block and covering main road leading south. Hill at CV 5474 hit by 2 air strikes; estimate 60% casualties to enemy. Air strike on 4 houses, one believed to be CP, at CV 5376L3, houses completely destroyed many enemy killed, 9 air strikes made using bombs, napalm, rockets and strafing on CV 5476, and 5477, results undetermined.

022200 - 1st Bn, 1st Marines: Estimated two enemy companies dug in occupying the saddle at CV 5368 and 5867 just south of KOC-RI and in ridge line to the west and across the road at pass to east. Villages to the north of CV 546L3 are bivouac areas.

030915 - X Corps: MAJON-DONG CV 5940 was under attack by a small group, attack lasted one hour apparently a screening action to cover for the blowing of a bridge.

Artillery reports that the enemy machine gun positions that were being constructed yesterday and later fired on CV 6235 area are now unoccupied.

031125 - X Corps: 175 - 200 enemy (CV 5548)

031315 southeast of UNSONG-NI (CV 5648) heading southeast toward HACION-NI and towards MAJON-DONG.

031300 - G-2, 1st Mar Div: 7th Marines reports estimated enemy division between head of column (CV 5375L1) and HAGARU-RI.

031400 - VMQ-6: Artillery delivering fire into enemy position CV 5941.

APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX BAKER TO DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX BAKER TO DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

031500 - 1st Bn, 1st Marines: 1st Marines Rcn patrol reported enemy moving back into valley in vicinity CV 5149. Patrol engaged a force of some 500-550 enemy in this vicinity on 1 Dec, enemy was forced to withdraw. Enemy had elaborately prepared positions along entire valley, centered around schoolhouse. Evidence that enemy is using much US equipment.

031540 - CCF: At 031540 air struck troops and buildings CV 5877. At 031545 air attacked 100 enemy in CV 4178. At 031545 15 CCF came out of hills to surrender due to the air strike. 2000 CCF reported at CV 4775. Believe air has been called.

031710 - VMC-1: Observed scattered troops from CV 6552T to 615x, At CV 6361 and 615x 2nd Bn, 1st Marines attacked enemy in farm houses and trenches.

031725 - TAO: 5th and 7th Marines convoy 3-4 miles out of HAGARU-RI at 031630 getting excellent air support.

(9) Other Elements,

031400 - 1st Bn, 1st Marines: Civilian picked up on 30 Nov at YONGSU JANG CV 5249, said he was picked up by 100 CCF on night 27 Nov to serve as guide for blowing railroad bridge. Did not reach bridge. Reconnoitered 1st Bn area and then cut over into mountains where escaped the next morning. He said the CCF troops were armed with rifles, pistols, and five hand grenades each. They also had several boxes about 12 inches by 5 inches by 8 inches containing demolition. (Possibly mines).

031500 - Tank Bn: 2 CCF, 1 NK and a civilian reconnoitered bridge site yesterday afternoon prior to blowing it up last night. When the enemy moved during the night to blow the bridge he set up machine gun at the most favorable position to screen the demolition work. After the bridge had been partially blown the enemy withdrew leaving 5 dead. A pressure charge was used to cave in the second span. Bridge passable to jeep.
APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX BAKER TO DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

a. Estimated Enemy Losses (POW's and Casualties).
   None reported.

b. Enemy Combat Efficiency.
   Good - excellent.

c. Morale.
   Good - excellent.

   Negative.

e. Weather.

Weather Forecast 031200 - 041800:
Partly cloudy to mostly clear. Visibility 7 - 10 miles except 3 - 5 miles from noon haze. Winds light variable. Maximum temperature today 42; maximum temperature tomorrow 45; minimum temperature tonight 29.

Reservoir Area: Same except partly cloudy to occasionally cloudy. Maximum temperature today 86 degrees; maximum temperature tomorrow 36 degrees. Minimum temperature tonight 16 degrees.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

Negative.

b. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy Courses of Action.

   (1) Attack front and flanks of the Division and attached units with an estimated five CCF Divisions supported by undetermined amount of artillery and armor.

   (2) Impede our planned withdrawal south along the MSR with an estimated two divisions supported by an undetermined amount of artillery.

   (3) Reinforce the above capabilities with CCF and NK units of undetermined strength at any time.

   (4) Conduct small-scale harassing air attacks.

b. Discussion and Analysis.

   (1) Despite the heavy and highly effective air attacks which the enemy has been subjected
APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX BAKER TO DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

To south of YUDAM-NI for the past two days, his prime capability is still that of attacking to destroy UN Forces in this area. Unquestionably his ability to launch full scale attacks against this Division has been greatly reduced by his losses over the past few days, yet he still has a highly effective and numerically superior force with which to continue his mission. His mobility and independance of logistical support operates in his favor even as it militates against the accomplishment of our ordered withdrawal.

(2) The enemy tactics in the past have been to conduct attacks against our units in coordination with road blocks cutting off ground communication leading to the forces attacked. That he may be planning strikes against the 1st and 2nd Bns, 1st Marines, may be indicated in the accelerated enemy activities both east and west of the MSR and in particular west and southwest of KOTAD and CHINHUNG-NI. During the period the enemy tried to destroy a bridge at MAJON DONG; was encountered in undetermined force by Army units during the day at MAJON DONG, was reported moving back into the valley which leads onto the MSR at CHINHUNG N I; and was reported building up his force at HUKSU RI, directly west of MAJON DONG.

(3) The crucial factor at this time is the efficiency with which the enemy can reinforce his troops in this area. Increased offensive action against our forces at HAGARU-RI and the movement southward from there may be expected coincidental with the arrival of reinforcing enemy units. It is considered that large scale action will be held up pending such help. It is possible that some of these reinforcements have already arrived in the area but not in the desired force. Too, his forces in this area may shortly be strengthened from both the east and the west with resultant enemy action against our MSR expected from these points.

Relative Probability of Adoption:
5 a(1) and (2) concurrently with 5 a(3) and (4).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL SMITH:

E.W. SNEDEKER
Colonel, USMC
Deputy Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

E.G. VAN OHMAN
Lt.Col., USMC
Assistant G-2

APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX BAKER TO DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

- 72 -
APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX BAKER TO DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

DISTRIBUTION:

CG (1)
ADC (1)
C/S (1)
G-1 (1)
G-2 (3)
G-3 (1)
G-4 (1)
Adj (5)
FSCC (1)
1st HN (1)
1st Mar (5)
5th Mar (5)
7th Mar (5)
11th Mar (6)
1st Tk Bn (1)
1st Engr Bn (1)
1st SF Bn (1)
1st Sig Bn (1)
1st ComServGrp (1)
1st Serv Bn (1)
1st Ord Bn (1)
MAG-12 (1)
Rcn Co (1)
X Corps (2)
3rd Inf Div (2)
7th Inf Div (2)
41st Brit Indep RN (1)
VH-60 - (Lt. Radwell) - (1)
VH-6 (1)
CMC (2)
FMF PAC (2)
FMF LANT (1)
MCS (1)
2nd Mar Div (1)
1 HUK Corps (1)
MISD (1)
ComNavFE (1)

APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX BAKER TO DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

-78-
PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 39

Period covered: 011800 - 021800 December 1950

MAP: AM5 L761 KOREA 1:50,000

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD
   a. See overlays.
   b. Point of contact.
      Unchanged.
   c. Identifications.

A 7th Infantry Division source indicated that the 70th and 80th CCF Divisions were operating against U.S. Units east of the GHOSIN Reservoir. No new units were identified in the Division zone during the period.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.
   a. Summary.

   (1) The enemy resisted fiercely the movement of the 5th and 7th Marines from YUDAM-NI toward HAGARU-RI as he fought a determined, attacking defense of the MSR, defending from favorable high ground positions and attacking our forces viciously from all sides. The two regimental convoys' foremost element was reported by aerial observer at 021800 as being at OV 4275, approximately four miles south of YUDAM-NI and some five miles west of HAGARU-RI. Tank led, the movement was stopped by a blown-out bridge, while numerous road craters and road blocks still remain along the MSR to HAGARU-RI. The enemy launched out again throughout the night in an obvious attempt to overrun our positions as he struck in coordinated attacks from the south, southwest, west and north against both the 5th and 7th Marines, continuing the attack throughout the day in conjunction with his stubborn defense of high ground defenses. Despite this defense and the attacks, our advance continued for some 4,000 yards during the day. Heavy air strikes were conducted against the enemy as observers continued to report a defense in force with an estimated one to two enemy divisions blocking the route to HAGARU-RI. Heavy fighting and intense enemy fire marked the
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APENDIX IV TO ANNEX BAKER TO DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

the day’s activities. The main force of the attack during the night was thrown from the north and northwest by an estimated two battalions, with another two battalions hitting from the south and west. This day saw close fighting on all sides of the friendly forces. Highlighted during the period was the junction of convoy elements with Fox Company, 7th Marines, which had been cut off since the counteroffensive began.

(2) At the same time little enemy contact was recorded throughout the remainder of the Division zone. The focal point in the HAGARU-RI area was east of the CHOSIN Reservoir where U.S. Army units fought against a large enemy force entrenched along the MSR south to HAGARU-RI to withdraw back to join our other forces there. The enemy continued to attack the surrounding units and successfully attacked a convoy moving southward some four or five miles north of HAGARU-RI. Several hundred U.S. and ROK troops succeeded in reaching our lines by crossing the reservoir on the ice, as a tank-led rescue column was turned back by heavy enemy fires. No other activity was reported in the HAGARU-RI area.

(3) In the KOTO-RI area, little enemy contact was reported with continued indications of a determined stand by the enemy along the MSR to the south. Heavy concentrations of entrenched units were confirmed along the MSR midway between KOTO-RI and HAGARU-RI. Air again reported troop concentrations west of KOTO-RI and a civilian report stated 600-800 enemy troops were dug in on the south slope of the mountain facing the pass south of KOTO-RI. This civilian report said CCF troops occupied CHAEWON-RI (CV 5458) and HAMADE-RI. Previous civilian reports had indicated at least one division concentrating in this area at least a week ago while a P’50 taken several days ago placed the enemy number at two divisions. Also in this same general area, air reported 3,000 enemy troops at the south end of the FUSEN Reservoir at 021045. Civilian and patrol reports of new sightings stated that small numbers of CCF troops had been seen in at least three places in the ORO-RI – SINGHUNG area.

(4) Increased heavy enemy activity was reported during the period near the X Corps boundary south and west of HAMBUNG, and an air report told of numerous enemy jamming the roads in the YONGDOE area, some 10 miles west of WONSAN, and moving east. Air also reported 2000-3000 enemy troops with 80 vehicles and many of the carts moving south of CHAEHUNG toward the CHOSIN Reservoir at 020925.

APENDIX IV TO ANNEX BAKER TO DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

- 76 -

DECLASSIFIED
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b. Enemy Tactics and Weapons or other Material.

Negative.

e. Operations of Enemy Component Elements.

(1) Air Force: Negative.

(2) Administrative Units: Negative.

(3) Anti-Aircraft Defense: Negative.

(4) Anti-Tank Units: Negative.

(5) Armored and Motorized Units.

020600 - X Corps: Air reports 2 trains and truck convoys moving south from KANGGE.

020925 - Air: 2000 - 3000 enemy with 40 vehicles and many ox carts moving south from CHANGJIN.

(6) Artillery: Negative.

(7) Engineers.

020930 - Artillery A0 reports road block at CV 5374T consists of 3 friendly tanks. All knocked out. Being covered by enemy from high ground CV 5373 GHS and CV 5474GLF. Also reports knocked out convoy at this road block, vehicles all burning.

021600 - VMQ-6: Air reports large road block at 4275F. Entire road blown out at this point. From this point to 43734 6 additional road blocks observed. Also holes in road.

021800 - X Corps: Civilian reports tank ditch dug across road at CV 5457.

(8) Infantry.

012219 - 1st Marines: Air reports enemy south of regiment's positions moving south. Enemy position unknown.

020840 - 7th Marines (ISUM 011500 - 026600): Enemy attack throughout period from north, west, south and southwest. Estimated 4 enemy battalions. Enemy very determined. Launched several counterattacks. Estimated 100 enemy crossed ice attacking south at 41734X. One to two battalions attacked southeast at 4078CGKU. Unknown enemy attack ridge 3976 from northwest to southwest. Estimated battalion attacked to the north.
APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX BAKER TO DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

in 4175 from the MLR as of 020440. Enemy counterattack continues.

020930 - Artillery AO: Observed 300 enemy at HUCHANG-NI CV 5376. Roadblock at 6374T being covered by enemy from high ground. CV 5373GMS and 6474GLM.

021045 - 7th Mar: 3rd BN 5th Marines moved to TA 4075B. Was halted by heavy fire.

021045 - 9th Mar: 3rd BN 5th Marines moved to TA 4075B, was halted by heavy fire.

021045 - 9th Mar: 3rd BN 5th Marines moved to TA 4075B, was halted by heavy fire.

021100 - X Corps: FSCC reports at 020300 large concentration of enemy and equipment CA 4010.

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021210 - TAO: Reconnaissance made to vicinity of CV 5536. Observes many tracks leading to a mine in that area. 5 enemy observed on hill south of mine. Search from KOTO-RI southeast to CHUNGCHON-NI CV 7216 then to ORO-RI CV 6620. Negative results. Many civilians observed along road at SINSUNG-NI CV 6947.

021210 - TAO: Reconnaissance made to vicinity of CV 5536. Observes many tracks leading to a mine in that area. 5 enemy observed on hill south of mine. Search from KOTO-RI southeast to CHUNGCHON-NI CV 7216 then to ORO-RI CV 6620. Negative results. Many civilians observed along road at SINSUNG-NI CV 6947.

021210 - TAO: Reconnaissance made to vicinity of CV 5536. Observes many tracks leading to a mine in that area. 5 enemy observed on hill south of mine. Search from KOTO-RI southeast to CHUNGCHON-NI CV 7216 then to ORO-RI CV 6620. Negative results. Many civilians observed along road at SINSUNG-NI CV 6947.

021500 - 11th Marines AO: 3 enemy in white coats observed early morning hill 1178 CV 6574J. Small arms from this area directed at army troops on reservoir CV 6178. Small groups enemy observed firing harassing fire on army troops from north CV 6576-95.

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021500 - 11th Marines AO: 3 enemy in white coats observed early morning hill 1178 CV 6574J. Small arms from this area directed at army troops on reservoir CV 6178. Small groups enemy observed firing harassing fire on army troops from north CV 6576-95.

021515 - Tank BN: Local Chief of Police reported 200 CCF in TALIMAU-NI CV 6634 4 days ago for food and clothing. 2 CCF in PUNSONG-NI CV 6538 2 days ago, sought food.

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021515 - Tank BN: Local Chief of Police reported 200 CCF in TALIMAU-NI CV 6634 4 days ago for food and clothing. 2 CCF in PUNSONG-NI CV 6538 2 days ago, sought food.

Marine patrol observed 6 CCF in vicinity CV 7536 late 1 Dec; enemy dispersed.

Civilians also report CCF coming to ORO-NI CV 6636.

021600 - VBC-6: early afternoon reports: Observed 200 enemy in foxholes CV 4176 to 4274G. Air struck estimated 200 enemy at CV 4176 to 4274G. Enemy troops of battalion size 3976 along ridge line to 3976K. Posters CV 5556 to 6656 but no troops. 1 division estimated between 7th Marines and HAGARU-RI. Heavy fighting going on, on all
APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX BAKER TO DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

sides at 021100.

021720 - TAC: Large enemy concentrations at 4172DLJG, 4175SHS and 4273. Enemy on top of ridges in fox holes 3875, 3975, 3976. Enemy in fox holes at 4274, 4279, 4170, 4074.

021800 - X Corps: FSCC reports at 021600: Air attacked SCS enemy CV 5373. At CV 4667 trench along ridge with MG positions. 200 - SCS foxholes at 5763 - 5767. Troops moving from the west into a long entrenchment at CV 5367, 5767.

2 bunkers located at CV 5363. Many foxholes and entrenchments on ridge line CV 4769, west of KOTO-RI.

Civilian reports SCS-SOO enemy troops dug in on south slope of mountain facing pass south of KOTO-RI. CUF troops are occupying CHAENOJI, CV 5458 and HAMADE-JI.

021730 - X Corps: Estimated one enemy regiment north of KOTO-RI. Estimated battalion scattered along road to west and south. Enemy has no supporting arms, has a few mortars, few rifles, mostly SMGs and LMGs.

021740 - VMG-6: At 021605 friendly patrol on ridge line 4275, enemy in fox holes to their front.

(9) Other Elements. Negative.

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

   a. Estimated Enemy Losses. (PO's and Casualties).

   No reports received.

   b. Enemy Combat Efficiency.

   Excellent.

   c. Morale.

   Excellent.


   Negative.

   e. Weather.

APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX BAKER TO DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

- 78 -
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APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX BAKER TO DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT


4. COUNTERINTENTION NEGATIVE.

5. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AT END OF PERIOD.
a. Enemy Courses of Action.

(1) Attack front and flanks of the Division and attached units with an estimated 6 to 8 CCF Divisions supported by undetermined amount of armor and artillery.

(2) Reinforce the above capability with CCF and UN units of undetermined strength at any time.

(3) Conduct small scale harassing air attacks.

b. Discussion and Analysis.

(1) There are no indications of change in the enemy's capabilities, with his primary intention still that of attacking and annihilating U.S. Marine and Army and Fukuoka forces in this area. It has become apparent that his drive in the CHOSIN Reservoir area is being given top priority in his overall counteroffensive. His determination in this attempt to wipe out our forces is well demonstrated by the fierceness with which he attacked the 8th and 7th Marines south of YUDAI-NI.

(2) His reinforcement capability has strengthened by the air report of additional forces moving southward from CHANGJI with at least 40 vehicles and many ox carts. This is probably the rest of the 26th and 27th Corps or the remaining elements of the 9th Army Group. Probable identification of the 78th and 80th Divisions east of the CHOSIN Reservoir and large numbers of enemy south of the FUSIN Reservoir supports this probability.

c. Relative Probability of Adoption: 5a(1) concurrently with 5a(2) and (5).

APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX BAKER TO DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

DECLASSIFIED
APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX BAKER TO DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL SMITH:

F. H. McALISTER
Colonel, USMC
Deputy Chief of Staff

E. G. VAN ORMAN
Lt. Col., USMC
ACoF's, G-2

DISTRIBUTION:

CG
ADC
CG/3
G-1
G-2
G-3
G-4
Adj
FSCG
1st Hvy
1st Mar
6th Mar
7th Mar
11th Mar
1st Ck Bn
1st Engr Bn
1st SP Bn
1st Sig Bn
1st ComServGrp
1st Serv Bn
1st Ord Bn
EAG-12
RCB Co
X Corps
3rd Inf Div
7th Inf Div
41st Brit Indep BN (1)
VHC-6 - (Lt. Redwall) - (1)
VHC-6
CMC
FMF PAC
FMF LANT
MCB
End Mar Div
I PCH Corps
MISD
ComNavPE

APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX BAKER TO DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

- 80 -
15 August 1951

COMMANING OFFICERS

AWG-1

Lieutenant Colonel Walter L. J. Bayler (Col) 1 Jul 43 - 5 Apr 44

Lieutenant Colonel Ethridge C. Best (Col) 6 Apr - 16 Nov 44

Major James E. Webb, USMCR 17 Nov 44 - 28 Aug 45
5th MCRD
Bldg 4, Henderson Hall
Arlington 8, Virginia

Major Robert Barry, USMCR 28 Aug 45 - time of
4th MCRD
Room 816, City Centre Bldg
121 N. Broad Street
Philadelphia 7, Pennsylvania

surrender
COMMANDING OFFICERS

**MASG-42**

Major Stewart B. O'Neill, Jr. (Ret'd) - LtCol
3681 Jewell Street
San Diego 9, California
1 Jan - 20 Feb 43

Major Ernest R. West (Col)
21 Feb - 24 May 43

Colonel Lawson H. M. Sanderson (BrigGen)
25 May 43 - 23 Feb 44

Lieutenant Colonel William D. Roberson (Col)
24 Feb - 3 Mar 44

Colonel Frank D. Weir
4 Mar - 13 Mar 44

Colonel Lawson H. M. Sanderson
14 Mar - 11 Sep 44

Lieutenant Colonel William D. Roberson
12 Sep 44 - 1 Mar 45

Lieutenant Colonel Nathan T. Post
2 Mar - 17 Mar 45

Lieutenant Colonel Owen A. Chambers
18 Mar - 2 Jun 45

Colonel Thomas J. McQuade (Ret'd) - Col
525 E. Washington Street
Charles Town, West Virginia
3 Jun 45 - time of surrender
COMMANDING OFFICERS

MASG-44

Major Daniel W. Torrey, Jr. (Col) 1 Jan - 10 Jan 43

Lieutenant Colonel Edward B. Carney (Col) 11 Jan - 27 Oct 43

Major Daniel W. Torrey, Jr. 28 Oct - 8 Dec 43

Lieutenant Colonel Edward L. Pugh (Col) 9 Dec 43 - 5 Jan 44

Lieutenant Colonel Daniel W. Torrey, Jr. 6 Jan - 21 Jan 44

Colonel Harold R. Lee 22 Jan - 5 Jun 44

Lieutenant Colonel Daniel W. Torrey, Jr. 6 Jun - 17 Sep 44

Lieutenant Colonel Milo G. Haines (Col) 18 Sep 44 - 31 Aug 45

Colonel Luther S. Moore 1 Sep 45 - time of surrender
15 August 1951

COMMANDING OFFICERS

AWG-2

Captain Ira Brock
(LtCol) 11 Oct 43 - 8 Feb 44

Lieutenant Colonel Robert O. Bisson
(Col) 9 Feb - 26 Dec 44

Major Evans Spalding, USMCR
9th MCRD, Room 311
U. S. Court of Appeals Bldg
1212 North Lake Shore Drive
Chicago 10, Illinois 27 Dec 44 - 24 Jan 45

Major Ira Brock 25 Jan - 2 Apr 45

Major Frederic Solomon, USMCR
5th MCRD
Bldg 4, Henderson Hall
Arlington 8, Virginia 3 Apr 45 - time of surrender
15 August 1951

WING COMMANDERS, WORLD WAR II

9th MAW

Colonel C. F. Schilt
(MajGen) 1 Apr - 16 Jun 44

Brigadier General L. G. Merritt
(Ret'd) - MajGen
West Columbia, South Carolina 17 Jun 44 - 16 Feb 45

Colonel L. T. Burke
(Ret'd)
200 W. Desoto Street
Pensacola, Florida 16 Feb - 22 Apr 45

Brigadier General H. D. Campbell
(Ret'd) - MajGen
Highgate Springs, Vermont 23 Apr - time of surrender