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COMMAND REPORT (CSGPO-28)

38TH INFANTRY REGIMENT

for

1 thru 30 September 1951

Assigned to: 2d Infantry Division
APO 248 US Army

Approved by:

FRANK T. MILLER
Col Inf
Commanding
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Beginning the month of September the 38th Infantry resumed attacking enemy positions to the Northwest.

Besides the organic units, the RCT had attached to it Company "C", 82nd AAA; the 109th Korean Regiment; Company "C", 72nd Tank Battalion; Company "C", 2nd Engineers, and the 58th Counter-fire Platoon. The 38th FA Battalion was in direct support.

On the first day of the month, the 1st Battalion was on the south slope of Hill 1179 (DT2035), the 2nd Battalion with a section of tanks from Tank Company was in positions in the vicinity of Hill 503 (DT1634), and the 3rd Battalion was in the vicinity of Hill 1179.

At 0830 hours 1 September, the forward CP reported the enemy withdrawing with "B" Company following them and "C" Company committed to exploit gains. The enemy was observed later in the open on Hill 1243. Artillery was placed with unknown results. "B" Company was engaged in a fire fight with unknown number of enemy in the vicinity of Hill 1059. At 0930 hours, "B" Company proceeded to within 100 yards of Hill 1059 while receiving heavy mortar fire. At 1630 hours, "B" Company also ran into machine gun fire from their left front. A little later an enemy platoon was observed pulling back off the high ground North of Hill 1059; machine gun fire was employed against the enemy. An enemy machine gun was observed to be firing from DT194374, and another one from the vicinity of Hill 1181 (DT20336); artillery was placed with unknown results.

At 1910 hours, Objective 2, in the vicinity of DT201380 was reported taken and occupied by the 1st Battalion minus one platoon of "A" Company, 38th Infantry, which was maintaining a blocking position to the west of Hill 992 (DT206363). The battalion spent the night in these positions with no enemy contact.1

The 3rd Battalion jumped off toward Objective 3 (Hill 1181) DT201387, at 1547 hours 2 September. At 1730 hours, lead elements of "I" Company were in the 1. B-2 FIR #185 011500 Sept 51
vicinity of DT203383 and were receiving mortar and automatic weapons fire from their front. By 1940 hours, they were about 100 yards from the top of Hill 1181. "L" Company moved around to the left while "K" Company followed "L" Company. By 2145 hours, "L" Company was reported on Hill 1181 and "I" Company just short of the top with an unknown number of enemy between the two companies. Early the next morning at 0355 hours "L" Company reported being counter-attacked by an unknown number of enemy from the North, East and West. They remained in position although short of ammunition and hand grenades, and with the assistance of "I" Company, repulsed the enemy.

Meanwhile, the morning of 2 September was spent preparing for an attack by the 3rd Battalion. At 1322 "K" Company had jumped off with "L" following, and "I" Company maintaining security of Hill 1181. By 1400 hours, "K" Company had progressed to the vicinity of DT203396 and received machine gun fire from tow machine guns located to their front. They placed 57 and 75mm recoilless fire to destroy these positions.

On 3 September at 1900 hours, "L" Company reported having taken Hill 1243 against light enemy resistance. The enemy soon after counter-attacked, but was repulsed and the 3rd Battalion organized a defensive perimeter for the night.

One platoon of Heavy Mortar Company was attacked in the early hours of 4 September by an estimated enemy squad-size patrol in the vicinity of DT180314. This attack was immediately repulsed, and the enemy patrol appeared to move South. Heavy Mortar Company suffered four WIA.

"F" Company jumped off from the vicinity of Hill 1179 at 0615 hours 4 September, with "E" and "G" Companies following in that order. By 1255, "F" Company had secured Objective 3 in the vicinity of DT155368, with the only enemy resistance encountered in the advance occurring in the vicinity of DT179354. "G" Company established a platoon-size blocking position in the vicinity of DT173355 at 1350 hours.

At 1200 hours 4 September, three enemy 76mm artillery pieces were captured by friendly elements. Two were located in the vicinity of DT195375, and one in the vicinity of Hill 1243 (DT205403).
Various patrols were dispatched on 5 September, but reported back without enemy contact, although one patrol observed enemy activity in the vicinity of DT164280. Another patrol reported firing artillery into enemy positions in the vicinity of DT164280.

"B" Company departed defensive positions in the vicinity of Hill 1179 at 1300 hours 6 September, to attack Hill 868 in the vicinity of DT178383. At about the same time, "X" Company left its assembly area in the vicinity of DT-190307 and assumed responsibility of Line Kansas. One Platoon to be located in the vicinity of Worun-Ni (DT163312), one in the vicinity of Hill 872 (DT177326), and one in the vicinity of Hill 770 (DT195324).

At 0600 hours 7 September, "B" Company attempted to gain Hill 868 (DT178383) against an estimated enemy company. Action continued throughout the day and "B" Company succeeded in advancing to within 100 yards of the top of the Hill. They broke contact at about 1500 hours after having suffered one KIA and six WIA.

A jeep from Heavy Mortar Company hit a mine at 2225 hours in the vicinity of DT162348, and suffered four WIA. Engineers working on North - South road in the vicinity of Pia-Ri - Worun-Ni, cleared and swept for mines to a point in the vicinity of DT162355.

On 8 September, four patrols were dispatched, and three ambush points established. All returned by 0800 hours 9 September with negative results.

"A" Company jumped off at 1000 hours 9 September to seize high ground in the vicinity of DT183395, and at 1420 hours was reported on the objective. Meanwhile, "G" Company had jumped off to seize Hill 868, and advanced to DT176390 without enemy resistance. At 1100 hours, they contacted an estimated 16 to 20 enemy in the vicinity of DT177380 employing 1 machine gun, three automatic weapons and hand grenades. "G" Company advanced to a point just short of the Southwest ridge of Hill 868, and at 1425 hours, was located at the vicinity of DT177382 and engaged with an estimated 15 to 20 enemy. By 1155 hours 9 September, "A" Company had succeeded in gaining the Northwest ridge of Hill 868, and had received sporadic small arms and automatic fire from the vicinity of DT167400 from 1600 to 2100 hours.

At 0650 hours 10 September, "A" and "G" Companies occupying ridges of Hill 868, jumped off to Southwest and Northeast respectively in an effort to dislodge...
the enemy on the ridge. "G" Company contacted the enemy in the vicinity of DT-178362 at 0700 hours. They withdrew and called artillery into enemy positions. At 1420 hours, they again moved forward in a Northeasterly direction and received fire from Hill 941 (DT17739) and from Hill 702 (DT16338).

At 1515 hours, "A" Company received intense automatic weapons and small arms fire from the vicinity of DT180388. At this time, they withdrew and placed 75MM recoilless rifle fire on enemy with unknown results. "A" Company made no further attempt to advance, and went into perimeter at 2000 hours for the night.

At 2230 hours, the 3rd Platoon wire crew of Heavy Mortar Company encountered estimated three enemy in the vicinity of DT1635. An exchange of small arms fire followed and the enemy dispersed into a river bed. Tank Company, 3rd Platoon of Heavy Mortar Company and "E" Company dispatched searching parties to locate the enemy.¹

On 11 September at 0800 hours "E" Company passed through "G" Company and resumed attack against enemy entrenched on Hill 868. At this time, "A" Company maneuvered to the west while "C" Company was held up by automatic weapons fire. "E" Company had advanced to within 75 yards of the top of the hill by 1240 hours where they were resupplied with ammunition. "A" Company advanced to within 50 yards of the top of Hill 868, and at 1410 hours requested air drop of rations. At this time "A" Company received heavy mortar fire from unknown enemy positions.²

"E" Company was moving forward with one platoon of "F" Company attached when they ran into enemy small arms and mortar fire at 1610 hours. Ten minutes later "C" Company was also under enemy small arms, automatic weapons and artillery fire from the Northeast. No estimate of casualties was given. Later, at 1800 hours, "A" and "C" Companies were on the ridge of Hill 868 and were separated by 200 yards from "E" Company. At 1840 hours "E" Company, 100 yards from 1st Battalion, was receiving fire from an enemy bunker. 57 recoilless rifle fire was placed on the bunker with unknown results. The 2nd Battalion reported receiving hand grenades and machine gun fire at the base of Hill 868. They were not in physical contact with 1st Battalion at this time. At 2200 hours, "E" Company, with two platoons of "F" Company attached, was 75 yards short of Hill 868 with continued enemy contact. An additional platoon of "F" Company was

¹ B-2 PIR #195 111500 Sept 51
² C-2 PIR #231 111500 Sept 51
utilized in resupplying ammunition to forward elements.

On 12 September at 0740 hours "C" and "E" Companies were receiving hand grenades and small arms fire from an enemy bunker located in the center of the hill. Again 57 recoilless rifle fire was placed on the bunker with unknown results. At 1300 hours on 12 September the 1st Battalion and "E" Company were under enemy mortar fire from the vicinity of DT178398, DT179401 and DT174406. Artillery was placed on suspected enemy mortar positions with unknown results.

Continued action marked the afternoon of the 12 September and the ridge was secured by 1915 hours. 1st Battalion counted 31 KIA and four M's were taken in the assault. A platoon from "C" Company was dispatched to the Northwest side of the hill to destroy existing bunkers and to check for possible enemy. The 1st Battalion plus "E" Company and two platoons of "F" Company, spent the night of 12 to 13 September in relative quiet. The 3rd Battalion contacted guides at a point on the North-South road, who led elements of the 3rd Battalion into positions to effect relief of the 1st Battalion. At the first light of 13 September, 3rd Battalion began the relief of 1st Battalion and completed this at 1200 hours. The 1st Battalion proceeded to assembly area at the vicinity of DT1725.

The 2nd Battalion started to move to an assembly area in the vicinity of DT1722 at 1200 hours 13 September and had completed this movement by 1345 hours. At 1810 hours 13 September, the 3rd Battalion CP closed their area in the vicinity DT161344, into new assembly area (DT162264) at 1930 hours. "K", "L" and "M" Companies were relieved by "K", "G" and "A" Companies of the French Battalion, respectively, and closed into their new assembly areas in the vicinities of DT145291, DT18260 and DT176299, in that order.

On 24 September, the 3rd Battalion was relieved of responsibility of occupation of the Line Kansas. All Companies closed in new area at 1045 hours in the vicinity of DT162264. The 1st Battalion conducted daily patrols to maintain surveillance of this line. "A" Company closed to new positions on 24 September in the vicinity of Hill 582 (DT107337).

The 1st Battalion closed into its new positions in the vicinity of Hill 868 at 1120 hours 25 September. "C" Company dispatched a squad-size patrol to the vicinity of Hill 941. The patrol called mortar fire with excellent results.

1. C-2 PGR #233 131500 Sept 51
When they attempted to withdraw, the enemy from Hill 841 cut off their route of withdrawal. An additional squad was dispatched from "C" Company to assist the patrol, which closed into friendly lines at 2345 hours 25 September, having suffered eight WIA.

"B" Company dispatched a squad-size patrol to the vicinity of Hill 1052 at 0800 hours 26 September. This patrol was fired upon in the vicinity of DT185400, by an unknown number of enemy using small arms and automatic weapons. The patrol withdrew and returned with no friendly casualties.1

On 27 September 1st Battalion sent out two patrols from the vicinity of Hill 868. Patrol #1 of "B" Company; a squad-size patrol, departed at 0800 hours to Hill 1052. This patrol received small arms fire at 1035 hours in the vicinity of DT187398. It returned without friendly casualties at 1130 hours. Patrol #2 of "C" Company; also squad-size, departed friendly positions at 0800 hours, and returned without sighting the enemy.

At 0930 hours 28 September, Medical Company moved from DT169241 to DT164282.

"M" Company dispatched a machine gun platoon to "C" Company's positions at 1530 hours. "C" Company dispatched a squad-sized reconnaissance patrol at 1300 hours 29 September to Hill 841 in the vicinity of DT1739. The patrol reported back having observed unoccupied enemy bunkers in the vicinity of DT17395.

Again on 30 September at 0715 hours, "C" Company sent out patrols at 0915 hours. Patrol #1, a two squad-size patrol, engaged an unknown number of enemy employing machine gun fire in the vicinity of Hill 841 (DT1739). The patrol withdrew and placed tank fire on suspected enemy positions with unknown results, and returned at 1515 hours with no further enemy contact. Patrol #2, a two squad-size patrol, engaged enemy in the vicinity of DT184400 at 1243 hours. Fire was initially received from three enemy followed by fire from an estimated enemy platoon, which employed small arms, automatic weapons, and machine guns. Patrol placed 75 recoilless and mortar fire on enemy platoon with unknown results. Patrol broke contact at 1330 hours, and closed friendly positions at 1430 hours 30 September 51.

1. C-2 FOR 246 261500 Sept 51

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- 6 -
SUBJECT: 3-l Evaluation for period of 1 thru 30 September 1951

TO: Commanding Officer
38th Infantry

SECTION I REPLACEMENTS

The new replacements coming into the regiment are of a higher caliber than those who arrived in the preceding months, consequently the efficiency of the regiment has benefited throughout the months of operations. N.C.O.'s are arriving in ever increasing numbers and have, for the most part proved themselves to be capable leaders. However the combat units are still plagued with men who through no fault of their own are practically useless to a combat unit.

The Headquarters and rifle companies are over loaded with this type of personnel and more are still arriving.

It is recommended that the replacements with reprofiles be stopped at the replacement company and distributed to non-combatant units.

SECTION II AWARDS AND RECOGNITION

The system of submitting recommendations for awards to include the Silver Star without sketches and sworn statements has lifted a great burden from the lower echelons and has expedited the recognition of acts of Valor. The effect of this early recognition of their deeds, on the enlisted men has proved to be a great morale factor.

It is recommended that the award boards sit at regular periods, and thereby eliminate the back logging of awards.

It is further recommended that all awards up to and including the Silver Star be published without further processing when submitted over the signature of the Regimental Commander.

SECTION III CASUALTY REPORTING

There is still a great tendency to exaggerate casualty figures.

The personnel who are responsible to tabulate the casualty figures must be trained and supervised in this all important function of the Battalion S-l Section. It must be impressed on all personnel the importance of
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SUBJECT: S-1 Evaluation for period of 1 Sep 51, Cont'd.

Correct casualty reporting and the all important time element involved.

It is recommended that clerks and members of Battalion S-1 Sections be trained in this work prior to the unit's being engaged, preferably when the unit is in a reserve status.

[Signature]

THOMAS A. DURANT
Capt., Infantry
Adjutant
The first days of the period found the Regiment attacking along the ridge line for Hill 1059 (DT 1340). The enemy, although his forces were badly mauled, offered stiff resistance to attacking forces. PW continued to report low morale and the varied number of units that they represented indicated that the enemy was using his forces piecemeal in a desperate attempt to stem the advance of friendly forces. Hill 1059, the initial objective, was secured on the first day of September. By September 3rd, Hill 1131 was taken and friendly forces, after beating off an enemy counterattack at 0200 hours, were mopping up the remaining enemy forces at 0300. Sept. By 0900 hours, L Co was on Hill 1243, after putting the enemy in retreat with a final bazooka attack. It was found during these attacks that the enemy, although weakened, continued to fight until killed. During this time friendly forces were subjected to heavy mortar and artillery barrages. Three (3) 76mm mountain guns captured during this attack further proved that the enemy, although lacking means of transportation, was still capable of transporting heavy equipment into otherwise inaccessible locations by breaking up such equipment into basic parts and packing it by carriers into desired positions.

Many friendly vehicles continued to hit mines on the Wurm-nr Valley road, although this road had been swept by Engineers and used daily by a limited number of vehicles. It was evident from the circumstances surrounding the affected vehicles that the mines were buried deep, rendering mine detecting equipment useless in their detection.

As the period progressed the enemy in further attempts to harass friendly forces, dispatched squad and platoon size groups to infiltrate friendly lines. One group succeeded in getting through and attacking the 3rd Platoon of the Heavy Mortar Company. A PW taken later in the day indicated that this group was dispatched to destroy our tanks and lay mines. When this could not be accomplished they attempted to destroy the mortars and further intended to attack friendly artillery positions.

The last few days of the month, reconnaissance patrols were dispatched daily to Hills 841 and 1052. Each day they encountered unknown number of enemy on both hills and were forced to withdraw. Throughout the month, the
33rd Infantry Regiment was in contact with elements of the II, III, and V North Korean Corps.

John J. Valentine
Major Infantry
S-2
SECRET

During the month of September the 33rd Infantry Regiment continued its attack against elements of the 2nd, 3rd, and 5th North Korean Corps. As was the case in previous weeks, progress was slow and the tempo of fighting very heavy. As the period came to a close the 33th Infantry had secured all its objectives and was in the process of mopping up. Furthest point of advance placed forward elements of the 33th Infantry on Hill 1243.

Enemy defenses encountered were composed of platoon size groups firing from well dug in emplacements on the forward and rear slopes of each small and hill. These groups defended their areas to the last man. Machine gun fire and grenades were very effective in slowing our advance, as the enemy would hold his fire until friendly forces were within 25 yards of his position. When our troops penetrated the 25 yard zone they were showered with heavy concentrations of grenades. This made progress both slow and costly.

Enemy tactics were similar to those encountered during the previous month. The enemy continued to employ heavy volumes of artillery and mortar fire on attacking elements of the regiment. During one of our attacks it was reported that enemy 76mm artillery pieces were delivering fire from a range of approximately 1000 yards. In addition, shell reports indicated that the enemy guns were located on the very top of the hills to our immediate front. After attacking Hill 1243, this information was substantiated in that three 76mm artillery pieces were captured in firing positions on the very top of the hill.

Mines were encountered in greater number than ever before. AT mines took a considerable toll of vehicles and caused a great number of casualties. In most cases AT mines were layed on the shoulders of roads and would detonate only after considerable traffic had passed over them. Mine detectors were of little value, as the mines were layed at a depth of approximately 18 inches and were placed together by wooden pegs, making detection almost impossible.

In addition, the area had been heavily shelled and the progress of the mine clearing teams was greatly hindered as the detectors continually picked up the fragments. AT mines were strewn in rice paddies on both sides of the road, with no attempt being made to conceal them.
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During the period many enemy patrols of squad and platoon size attempted to infiltrate our lines. In two instances enemy patrols were successful in penetrating our positions, however they were quickly eliminated by rear area patrols. Interrogation revealed that these patrols had the mission of mining our supply lines and capturing Pows.

A small supply of 1/25,000 maps was obtained during the period. These maps, when tried, were found very satisfactory and much more easily followed by inexperienced personnel. However, when a large supply was requested, it was found that only a limited number had been made and they were no longer to be had.

RECOMMENDATION:

That 1/25,000 maps be obtained in sufficient number so as to enable them to be issued to the line companies for general use.

John Valentine
Major Infantry
EVALUATION REPORT FOR 1-30 SEPTEMBER 1951

During the reporting period the 3rd Infantry made three attacks on fortified ridge top positions. All the attacks were successful and all followed the practice of using maximum fire support. Close coordination insured not only the maximum amount of fire power, but its use in a manner designed to free weapons capable of bunker destruction for that mission by using lighter weapons to neutralize the enemy, and to interdict his routes of supply, and reinforcement.

The fire support became more effective as assault troops became accustomed to following the fire closely, and gained skill in pointing out targets to the support groups. The most successful method, especially in haze and fog, was the use of full belts of tracers by forward units.

As support weapons commanders became more experienced the original rigid controls were relaxed, and weapons unit commanders were given support missions and effected liaison in the same manner as direct support field artillery.

This fire support system has developed a spirit of cooperation and teamwork between Heavy Weapons Company Commanders which increases the effectiveness of formal planning. The closer contact has also permitted an exchange of standards and new ideas.

Assault troops gained a respect and confidence for tank support which had not previously been reached.

Replacement Training:

All enlisted replacements received 7 days precombat training before joining their company. This training is believed to be responsible in a large measure for improved control and confidence in small units. A survey of replacements who received this training indicated that they appreciated its importance, and considered it very valuable.
Communications:

Communications were not adequate on several occasions during this period. This can be attributed to lack of adequate planning, foresight and supervision.

The communications plan must take into account not only the present tactical situation but probable developments and the capacity of personnel and equipment. Commanders and staffs must be instructed in methods which will reduce the communications load. Regular courier service and CW Radio are two services that can take increased loads of non-priority traffic.

Increased instruction and supervision has been initiated to correct these communications shortcomings.

ALBERT B. MILLOY
Lt Col, Infantry
S-3
HEADQUARTERS 36TH Infantry
APO 248 c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

3 November 1951

SUBJECT: Commander's Evaluation for period of 1 thru 30 September 1951

TO: Commanding General
2nd Infantry Division

The caliber of replacements received during the period improved considerably. The non-commissioned ranks continued to suffer the highest casualty rate and the higher percentage of non-commissioned officer replacements received over previous months materially aided the maintaining the efficiency standards of the Regiment. Re-profiled personnel continued to arrive in such numbers that it was impossible to assign all of them to duties commensurate with their physical capabilities. Consequently the unit has approximately one hundred fifty (150) personnel that could be utilized to better advantage in communications zone units.

North Korean troops continued to employ the same tactics as those encountered throughout the summer months. Enemy artillery and mortar fire increased in intensity. The weapons delivering this fire were difficult to neutralize or destroy as the enemy began emplacing these pieces in solid rock bunkers in the hills, and employed very effective camouflage. Tanks and 8" howitzers were found to be the best weapons for combating these pieces once they were located. Individual enemy soldiers still defended, with a fanatical stubbornness, and it was necessary to blast each man from his position. It was found that the white phosphorous grenade produced better results in assaulting bunkers than the fragmentation type.

Hostile groups continually attempted to move in close to friendly positions and did in during the hours of darkness. The regimental patrol program was stepped up to combat this tactic of the enemy and to curtail his patrolling activities.

The technique of employment and control of fire support teams improved as the Regiment made three successful attacks on fortified hill positions. Further, the support rendered by these teams became more effective as assault troops gained confidence in them and followed the fire just outside the bursting radius.
Communications improved somewhat with the advent of dry weather. However, an excessive amount of administrative traffic was put on tactical communications systems and necessitated the use of monitors to alleviate this condition.

Efforts to improve the supply economy program bore fruit as the amount of equipment lost in combat was reduced materially over previous months, even though offensive action increased. Battlefield recovery details combed the area for abandoned and damaged equipment with marked success.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

[Signature]
ALBERT H. MILLER
Lt Col  Inf
Exec   Off
31 August 1951

S T A F F

* Lt Col Raway
** Maj Hughes
* Capt Robinson
* Capt Valentine
** Maj Hodges
* Capt Catenbein
** Capt Brown
* 1st Lt Jacobs (TACP)
* Capt De Brooks
* 1st Lt Baggett
* Maj Blackburn
* 1st Lt Hailman
* 1st Lt Wood
** Capt Totten
*** Capt Helsel
* 1st Lt Ratte
* Capt O'Brien
* 1st Lt Hoffman
* 1st Lt Ryan
* Capt Harlow
* Capt Eagen

Ex Off
Adj
Asst Adj
S-2
S-3
Asst S-2
Asst S-3
Asst S-3
S-4
Lt
Mun 0
Motor 0
Asst Motor 0
Graves Regas
Chaplain
Chaplain
Personnel 0
Asst Personnel 0
Asst Personnel 0
Comm 0
T I & E

*** 51 - 60 Points
** 41 - 50 Points
* 30 - 40 Points
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SUMMARY

At 0830 hrs En obsvd to be w/d from pans Hill 1059 vic DT205368. Advancing elements of 38th pursuing en. At 0930 hrs advancing elem of 38th eng in fire fight w/unk no en vic Hill 1059, en employing S/A, A/W, Hand Grenades, and a hvy volume of mort fire in attempt to repulse attacking forces. At 1920 hrs forward elem of 38th on obj Hill 1059.

Moderate arty and mort fire continued to fall on the Regt'l sector during the period.

Enemy Losses: KIA (Counted) 117
KIA (Est) 50
WIA (Est) 123
PW 9
SECRET 2 Sept 51
SUMMARY

At 1000 hrs suspected NK straggler vic Hill 1001 inflicted one friendly WIA. En escaped into wooded area. At 1547 hrs attacking elem jumped off, and by 1730 hrs leading elem vic DT203383 were receiving PPsh, 60mm and 80mm mort fire from a stubbornly resisting en to their front. At 1820 hrs leading elem cont to advance under S/A fire from est 2 en Co's. Moderate arty and mort fire continued to fall on Regt'l sector during period.

Enemy Losses:  
KIA (Counted) 38  
KIA (Est) 75  
WIA (Est) 120  
FW 3

SECRET 3 Sept 51
SUMMARY

At 0400 hrs counter-attack was rec'd by lead plat, en employing A/W and S/A fire. By 0600 hrs counter-attack repulsed and by 0755 hrs lead plat mopping up on Hill 1181 vic DT203386. At 1230 hrs attacking elem of 38th Inf again jumped off. After moving forward to vic DT203396 MG fire was rec'd from 2 en MG's dug in to front of frd forces. 57 and 75 mm fire placed on MG's w/unk results. Leading elements of 38th continued to advance against a stubbornly resisting en who employed heavy S/A, A/W, MG, Mort fire, and Hand Grenades. At 1950 hrs L Co, Hill 1243 DT205403 rec'd counter-attack from est 25 en who employed 12 A/W's. En repulsed after 15 minute fire fight w/no friendly casualties.

Moderate arty and mort fire continued to fall on Regt'l sector during period.

Enemy Losses:  
KIA (Counted) 38  
KIA (Est) 75  
WIA (Est) 120  
FW 3

SECRET 4 Sept 51
SUMMARY

At 0203 hrs 3rd plat of Hv Mort Co, loc vic DT179309, attacked by an unk no of en employing S/A, A/W, and Hand Grenades. After brief fire fight en w/d to S. Friendly patrols dispatched to search rear areas for en. At 1200 hrs 3 en arty pieces were captured by elem of 38th Inf: 2 located vic DT193379, and 1 located vic Hill 1243, DT205403.

Moderate arty and mort fire continued to fall on Regt'l sector during period.

Enemy Losses:  
KIA (Est) 58  
WIA (Est) 123  
FW 14
SECRET

5 Sept 51

SUMMARY

2 Sqd size recon pat dispatched on 5 Sept 51. Pat observed est 2 or 3 en plats dug in on Hill 702. Pat 22 closed in at 1720 hrs and pat 23 closed in at 1840 hrs.

Light arty and mort fire fell on Regt'l sector during period.

Enemy Losses: KIA (Est) 10
WIA (Est) 25
PW 6

SECRET

6 Sept 51

SUMMARY

2 sqd size and 1 reinforced platoon size patrols were dispatched on 06 Sept 51. Pat reported many bunkers and a road block at DT156373. One pat stayed out and joined elem and their Co.

Sporadic arty and mort fire fell on Regt'l sector throughout period.

Enemy Losses: KIA (Counted) 56
KIA (Est) 30
WIA (Counted) unk
WIA (Est) 20
PW 9

SECRET

7 Sept 51

SUMMARY

3 sqd size recon pats were dispatched on 7 Sept 51. They reported unk no en vic Hills 702 and 894. All patrols closed in by 1830 hrs. Friendly forces suffered 1 KIA and 1 WIA from en mines during this period.

Enemy Losses: KIA (Est) 4
WIA (Est) 6
PW 10
SUMMARY

8 Sept 51

At 0700-0930 Sept 51 Hvy Mort Co suffered 4 WIA’s as a jeep struck an AT mine.

4 sqd size recon patrols were dispatched on 08 Sept 51. Patrols reported bunkers and unk en dug in Hill 702, small unk en Hill 894 and 668. 1 friendly WIA was suffered by pats during period.

Moderate arty and mort fire fell on Regt’l sector during period.

Enemy Losses: KIA (Est) 7
WIA (Est) 13
PsW 4

9 Sept 51

2 tanks struck en AT mines and no est of damage was available by close of period. AOP observed 7 arty pieces and air strikes were called upon with unk results.

1 sqd size recon pat on 09 Sept 51 and closed into friendly psns at 1830 hrs. Patrol obsvd est 150 en on Hill 702, arty and mortar fire was placed w/excellent results.

Moderate arty and mortar fire fell on Regt’l sector during period.

Enemy Losses: KIA (Counted) 3
KIA (Est) 1
WIA (Est) 2
PsW 3

10 Sept 51

C and G Co’s advancing on Hill 702 was receiving stiff resistance were unable to dislodge en and went into perimeter for night.

1 sqd size recon pat was dispatched on 10 Sept 51. Returned to friendly line at 1930 hrs with neg contact.

Enemy Losses: KIA (Counted) 9
KIA (Est) 8
WIA (Est) 20
PsW 4
SECRET

SUMMARY

11 Sept 51

Action light during day, except for a coordinated attack launched by E and A and C Cos. Advancing elements received heavy S/A, A/W and MG fire, also many hand grenades from a well fortified enemy dug-in on Hill 868. After repeated attempts to dislodge en, friendly forces went into perimeter for night.

No patrols were dispatched this date.

Enemy Losses:
- KIA (Counted): 6
- KIA (Est): 12
- PsW: 15
- WIA (Est): 17

SECRET

SUMMARY

12 Sept 51

At 0735 hrs friendly forces continued coordinated attack on Hill 868, and by 1515 hrs the Hill was secured. Intense mortar and arty fire fell on C Co during the attack.

No patrols dispatched on this date.

Enemy Losses:
- KIA (Counted): 157
- KIA (Est): 340
- PsW: 3
- WIA (Est): 150

SECRET

SUMMARY

13 Sept 51

Unident aircraft dropped 4 bombs vic DT173343 and 4 bombs vic DT182343, no friendly casualties resulting. Heavy mortar and arty fire fell on the Regt'l sector during period.

No patrols dispatched on this date.

Enemy Losses:
- KIA (Counted): 31
- KIA (Est): 80
- PsW: 7
- WIA (Est): 25

Korean War Project 2ID-00400584
SECRET
26 Sept 51

SUMMARY

2 squad size recon pats were dispatched on 26 Sept 51. Pat report receiving hvy volume S/A, A/W, and mort fire from vic Hill 841, pat w/d and placed mort w/excellent results. In process of withdrawing were cut off. Another sqd dispatched to assist in aiding of withdrawal. Friendly forces suffered 8 WIA's from this action. Both patrols had closed in by 1340 hrs.

Enemy Losses:  
KIA (Counted) 1  
KIA (Est) 2  
WIA (Est) 4

SECRET
27 Sept 51

SUMMARY

2 squad size recon pats were dispatched on 27 Sept 51. Pat reported unk no en dug in in bunkers on Hill 1052. Both pats had returned by 1300 hrs.

Enemy Losses: Negative

SECRET
30 Sept 51

SUMMARY

2 squad size combat pats were dispatched on 30 Sept 51. Pat to Hill 841 made contact at 0925 and rec'd A/W, M/G, and mort fire until 1245 at which time they withdrew to friendly pans. Pat to Hill 1052 made contact at 1243 receiving S/A, A/W, M/G, and mort fire from est en plat vic Hill 1052 until 1330, then they broke contact and returned to friendly pans.

Enemy Losses:  
KIA (Counted) 4  
KIA (Est) 15  
WIA (Est) 10
SECRET

HEA DQUARTERS
1st Bn, 38th Inf
APO 248

9 September 1951

SUBJECT: Combat Infantryman's Badge

TO: Commanding Officer
38th Infantry
APO 248

1. UP of AR 600-70 and Radio, Commander in Chief Far East Command ZK 10643, dated 12 July 1950 request that the second award of the Combat Infantryman's Badge be awarded to Capt Oran K. Henderson, 01307235, Company C, for satisfactory performance of duty in ground combat against an armed enemy.

2. UP of AR 600-70 and Radio, Commander in Chief Far East Command ZK 10643, dated 12 July 1950 request that the Combat Infantryman's Badge be awarded to 1st Lt James J. McMillin, 01300196, Company B, for satisfactory performance of duty in ground combat against an armed enemy. (POSTHUMOUS)

3. UP of AR 600-70 and Radio, Commander in Chief Far East Command ZK 10643, dated 12 July 1950 request that the Combat Infantryman's Badge be awarded to 1st Lt Charles W. Griscom, Jr., Company A, for satisfactory performance of duty in ground combat against an armed enemy.

4. UP of AR 600-70 and Radio, Commander in Chief, Far East Command ZK 10643, dated 12 July 1950 request that the Combat Infantryman's Badge be awarded to 2nd Lt William R. Gasbarro, 01307316, Company A, for satisfactory performance of duty in ground combat against an armed enemy.

5. UP of AR 600-70 and Radio, Commander in Chief, Far East Command ZK 10643, dated 12 July 1950 request that the Combat Infantryman's Badge be awarded to 1st Lt Richard O. Bright, 01327607, Company C, for satisfactory performance of duty in ground combat against an armed enemy.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

LLOYD R. MCVAY
WCOJ USA
Adjutant

SECRET
S-1 JOURNAL FOR SEPTEMBER 1951

1. September 1951
Companies continue in attack with air support.

2. September 1951
Br. continues in attack. 31 replacements arrive

3. September 1951
Br. holds positions. Clerks take muster of troops
enemy patrol reported near CP.

4. September 1951
Br. holds positions, companies paid.

5. September 1951
Co C has 5 casualties, Regt 1 NOO Council has little
to report.

6. September 1951
Companies move West to temporary reserve positions.

7. September 1951
Articles are submitted for "ROCK" Co B has fire fight,

8. September 1951
Companies remain in position. Work on awards.

9. September 1951
R&R quota. Religious services, companies move forward.

10. September 1951
Br. continues in attack. Big R Quota.

11. September 1951
120 replacements arrive and begin training.

12. September 1951
48 replacements begin training. Br rear moves to
Wondang-Ni.

13. September 1951
Troops move into reserve area.

14. September 1951
Speech by Lt Col Kimbrell, care and cleaning of
equipment and beautification of area begins.

15. September 1951
Br. commences training. Gen Boaner visits Br

16. September 1951
Br. Bear ration

17. September 1951
Church services maximum attendance. Movies

18. September 1951
Rain floors S-1 tent. Regt 1 Band plays for Br

19. September 1951
I.G. visits area. No complaints. G.I. Show "Too
Far East" is loudly applauded by Br

20. September 1951
Pre command inspections and preparation for Command
inspection occupies all day.

21. September 1951
Command Inspection

22. September 1951
Br. continues training. S-1 continues normal routine
duties.

23. September 1951
Church services. Preparation for parade. Co A has
party.

24. September 1951
Regt 1 parade, Co A relieves Co A 9th Inf

25. September 1951
Br leaves reserve area. 18 replacements arrive.

26. September 1951
9 ER's and 2 RA's leave on BIG R. Action started on
Form 54's.

27. September 1951
S-1 continues work on awards. R&R Quota 20 EM & 2 Off
Br commander arrives from front lines.

28. September 1951
Regt 1 Sgt Major discuses ER's with Co Clerks. Br
Commander goes back to front

29. September 1951
Normal routine duties.

30. September 1951
R&R men leave. Church services—maximum attendance.

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS
1st Bn, 38th Inf
APO 248

SECRET

JOURNAL SUMMARY FOR THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER, 1951

On 1 September, 1951, the 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry was engaged in an attack on hill 1059. At 011045I September B Company took the objective. These newly won positions were secured by the 1st Battalion and defensive positions were set up. The Battalion remained in these positions from 1 through 6 September at which time the Battalion moved to new positions and prepared to attack hill 868. On 09 Sept 1951 the Battalion moved out in the attack meeting heavy resistance from well dug in positions. The hill was secured in the morning hours of 12 September. On 13 September 1951 the 1st Battalion was rely'd on position by the 3rd Battalion, 38th Infantry. The Battalion moved to an assembly area at DT 165263 where the Battalion remained in extensive training for future operations until 25 September 1951, at which time the 1st Battalion (-A Company) moved to defensive positions in vicinity of Hill 868. On 241225 September A Company moved to the 9th Infantry sector and relieved A Company, 9th Infantry on Hill 618. The remainder of the month was spent in these positions. Extensive patrolling was carried out in the latter part of the month.

SECRET
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS 3RD BATTALION
38TH INFANTRY
APO 248, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

SECRET

1 October 1951

SUBJECT: Monthly Journal Summary

TO: Commanding Officer
38th Infantry
APO 248, U S Army

1 Sep-Impel called for info on Bryant Fuqua, EM not in Bn.
2 Sep-Rec'd 19 replacements from Impel.
3 Sep-Impel called for signed statement from Pfc Marion Chorne regarding POW status of 3mil Lee.
4 Sep-Impel requested names of 4 men by 1600 today, all must have at least 24 points: 2-1745's grade 5, 6, or 7, 1-1821 grade 4, 5, 6, or 7 and 1-1812 grade 5, 6, or 7. Physical check of Charles M. Clark asked for by Impel.
5 Sep-Impel requested statements of 3 witnesses on Pvt Floyd Rogers, MIA, 29 Jul. Impel called for Sgt Harold A. Ball, EM, to 34 Bn, for IFS disch.
6 Sep-Call from Reg't to have Pvt Lorn Durant at Reg't by 1800, for IFS disch.
7 Sep-Impel called to have 4 EM for Trng Cadre at Reg't by 0800.
8 Sep-Rec'd call from Impel for 3 reprofiles for asgmt to BFTOC.
9 Sep-Rec'd R & R quota of 2 Off and 18 EM.
10 Sep-Impel called for Pfc Eugene Kramer, Co K, and Pvt Donald Rosier, Hq Co, Smer Leave. Rec'd Rotation quota for all EM with 51 points and over to leave on 12 Sep. Reg't personnel rotations will leave at same time. Rec'd 63 replacements from Impel.
11 Sep-Baer ration picked up byLt Holmes at Sv Co.
12 Sep-Rec'd 16 replacements from Impel.
13 Sep-Impel called for one EM from Chicago to be at Reg't for PIO interview.
14 Sep-Unit moved forward to new positions in vicinity of Wondang-ni, N.K. (DT-162204). Section was set up and operating by 1100 hrs. Impel called for number of EM who left the ZI in Nov 50, and number of EM who have 43 points or more.
15 Sep-Call from Impel for check on Robert Kessinger, Co I, EM is at Index, have him picked up and returned to Co. All rotations will be at 30th Call betw 1300 and 1700 for dusting and will leave Sv Co at 0730 hrs 17 Sep 51.
16 Sep-Impel called for recs of all EM that were issued the CIB. Rec'd 24 replacements from Impel. All Co Clark's will go to Sv Co with rotatess to check on points.
17 Sep-Rec'd call from Impel all men needing legal assist will be at Reg't in P.M.

Korean War Project 21D-00400589
SECRET

Hq 34 Bn., Monthly Journal Summary 1 Oct 51
(Cont)

R & R quota 2 Off, 20 EM. Impel called to send truck to Sv Co to pick up 16 replacements.
18 Sep-Impel called for number of EM pers still in Bn. Two Capt's ass'd from Reg't.
19 Sep-Impel called for C. Green to report to Reg S-1, EM had left for rotation but was returned and was notified.
20 Sep-Impel called for 3 EM with IQ of 90 or more for Div Rad Schi. Also requested 1 EM at Reg for PIO interview.
21 Sep-Rec'd call for LOD standts on Shannon, Co L. Rec'd 55 replacements from Impel.
22 Sep-Impel requested breakdown of Co's by RA, NS, NG and EM.
23 Sep-Impel called for 1 Sgt, MOS 1821, 1 Sgt MOS 1824 and 3 Sgts MOS 3060 for Cadet in Japan.
25 Sep-Rec'd 19 replacements from Impel. Impel called for Capt Scott and Lt Morris to report to Jade for interview.
26 Sep-Rec'd call to have Jogoder and Alkany Co M, ready to rotate tomorrow.
27 Sep-Impel called for S. Simpson to be at Reg S-1 by 0930 20 Sep.
28 Sep-Call from Impel to have R & R ready to leave 0400 30 Sep 51.
29 Sep-Impel called informing that Bronze Star Medals for Bn were in.
EM for Jewish Services will leave Reg for X Corps at 1330, 30 Sep.
Rec'd 1 Off from Reg.
30 Sep-Impel called all class A agents to be at Reg S-1 by 1330.
Co's were paid during the evening hrs.

[Signature]
WILLIAM C. HOLMES
1st Lt Inf
Adjutant
SECRET

S-2 Unit Journal Summary
From 010001 to 302400-I Sept 51

Hq 3d Bn, 38th Inf Regt
Wondang-Ni, North Korea
DT 162264

On 1 (one) September, 1951 at 1215, Blue Bn CP moved to the area of lCo "I" Bn Ops Sgts and three (3) Korean personnel were killed by incoming arty.

At 020700-I Sept "IP" & "K" Co's were in the process of mopping up hill 1181, and at 1900 "II" Co was only 100 yards from securing their objective hill 1140. "K" & "L" Co's were jumped off on the attack on hill RJ on date 031230.

The following day at 042200 Sept Hq, "IP", "II" and "NM" Co's were relvd by 1st Bn and 2nd ROK's.

051730-I Sept, Co "IP" was called on to send a security guard to guard a white supply train enroute to Pia-Ri. Guard was dispatched at 1730.

061600 Sept, "K" Co positions were secured on Line, Kansas, and the following day 7 Sept, "K" Co positions were more strongly enforced. Blue Bn was notified that an enemy force estimated at battalion strength were sighted moving south with seven vehicles; artillery was called in with unknown results.

0800-082400 Saw no contact with enemy forces by Blue Bn. "E" Co it was learned, screened CP's to rear of their pens. They found approximately 12 en, some possibly wounded by MG.

From the period 100001 to 162254, Blue Bn made no contact with en forces. however, on the date 141130, Sept, "K" Co brought in four NAPA PsW who were immediately dispatched to Impel POW. Prisoners were from V Corps, 6th Div, 13th -Regt, 2nd En Rifle platoon.

From period 150001-261945 no contact was made with enemy; but a momentary alarm was sounded to Blue Bn stating that at 201945 Sept unidentified Korean Soldiers, well armed were located between "IP" Co's 1st & 2nd plats in vicinity DT 185324. They were later identified as ROKA soldiers of 3d Platoon, "IP" Co, 3d Bn, 27th Regt, 5th ROK's.

From 210001 to 280925 Sept no contact was made with the enemy. A brief summary of this period saw a red air alert at 221625 but signal of safety, White, was flashed at 221745.

Blue Bn established an Air Outpost on summit of hill 339 to be operated for duration of stay in Wondang-Ni area.

280925 H Co MG section en-route to join "IP" Co, 1st Bn was ambushed at vic of Satae-Ri by an undetermined no of enemy. "IP" Co of 1st Bn, at 1030 sent men and tanks to rescue MG squad. At 1630 "NM" Co MG section was out of Satae-Ri area and accounted for. 11 WIA, 2 MIA and 25 for Dy.

The remainder of the month from 29 to 30 Sept saw no enemy contact for elements of Blue battalion. Only reports came in that elements of Index and Inspire at hill 867 were receiving arty and mortar fire.

OFFICIAL

TOTH

LOCKHART

S-3

Korean War Project 2ID-00400591
On 1 Sept the Blue fwd GP moved to the vic of the 1st Co GP. On the 2d of Sept, the En attacked Hill 1181, being relieved of pans by the White En. The En jumped off at 1600, 1st Co in the lead, L Co second and K Co in the rear. I Co moved forward under mortar & MG fire and at 1900 I Co passed thru 1st Co to take up the attack. I Co reached the top of Hill 1181 at 1930 with moderate resistance by the en. L Co took up defensive positions on 1181 and during the night successfully repulsed several strong attacks by the en.

On 3 Sept 1 & L Co's again took up the attack, I Co remaining behind on 1181, K Co was in the lead, L Co second; the final objective being Hill 1243. K Co moved up through heavy MG/g fire to take Hill 1250. L Co passed thru K Co at 1550, and took up the attack, and was immediately pinned down by machine gun fire. The MG/g were knocked out by RR fire and L Co moved up 1243 under moderate MG & MG fire. By 1925 L Co had reached the top of 1243, with only light en resistance, and was cleaning up the objective. During the night there was a small counterattack of L Co pans, at 2100 the 27th ROK's contacted L Co. At 2100 the 27th ROK's lines extended to the North East.

On 4 Sept 1st & 1 Co's were relieved by 27th ROK's, L Co by Red En, the Blue En closed into an assembly area vic DT 190307 by 2300.

On 6 Sept K & L Co took up blocking pans on Line Kansas one platoon was in pen vic DT 167300, 2nd platoon Hill 672, 3rd platoon Hill 776. K Co was in pen by 1620. From 5 Sept to 12 Sept, the companies carried out organizational training. No enemy contacts during the remainder of the period.

At 0200, 13 Sept Blue En departed to take up pans on Line Hays. At 0930 L Co was in position on Hill 754 at 1130. The Blue GP closed into a new area vic DT 161324, & at 1245 K & L Co's relieved the Red En on the 868 ridge line.

At 1200 Impel 3 notified the Blue En it would be relayed by Icicle, Fr En, which was completed by 2300. The Blue En was to take up the responsibility of the white En on the Kansas line. H Co withdrew its supporting units and closed into an assembly area vic DT 167264 with the Blue GP.

II K & L Co's closed into pen on Line Kansas by 1215 on 14 Sept. Contact patrols were not between platoons and with the 5th ROK Div on the right by I Co of the 7th ROK Division on the left by L Co. All companies carried out organizational training in positions until 24 Sept. No enemy contact being reported during this period.

On 25 Sept the Companies moved off the Kansas Line & closed into an assembly area vic DT 153278 by 1130 to continue training. On 26 Sept I, K, & L companies closed into another assembly area vic DT 162264 by 1045.

On 27 Sept the N 75 RR section became attached to the 5th ROK Div as supporting units. The HMG platoon deployed from the N Co GP 30500 to be attached to I & G Co 38th Inf.

On 28 Sept a report was received by Blue En that the NNE Platoon had taken a wrong trail and had been ambushed by the enemy. A tank, infantry team was sent to contact the MG Platoon, and succeeded in relieving it, carrying most of the men out of the North Korean ambush. Final casualty figures 25 men unhurt, 11 WIA's and two MIA's. The three machine guns were destroyed by the Platoon. The HMG Section will be equipped and sent on hill 868 to support G Co, and on 29 Sept more En were sent to fill out the platoon.
On 1 Sept the Blue fwd CP moved to the vic of the I Co CP. On the 2d of Sept, the Bn attacked Hill 1181, being relieved of pans by the White Bn. The Bn jumped off at 1600, I Co in the lead, L Co second and K Co in the rear. I Co moved forward under mortar & MG fire and at 1900 I Co passed thru I Co to take up the attack. L Co reached the top of hill 1181 at 1930 with moderate resistance by the en. L Co took up defensive positions on 1181 and during the night successfully repulsed several strong attacks by the en.

On 3 Sept K & L Co's again took up the attack, I Co remaining behind on 1181, K Co was in the lead, L Co second; the final objective being Hill 1243. K Co moved up through heavy en small arms fire to take Hill 1240. L Co passed through K Co at 1550, and took up the attack, and was immediately pinned down by machine gun fire. The Mch/G were knocked out by RR fire and L Co moved up 1243 under moderate MG & A/W fire. By 1835 L Co had reached the top of 1243, with only light en resistance, and was cleaning up the objective. During the night there was a small counterattack of L Co pans. At 2100 the 27th ROK's contacted L Co. At 2100 the 27th ROK's lines extended to the North East.

On 4 Sept K & I Co's were relieved by 27th ROK's. L Co by Red Bn, The Blue Bn closed into an assembly area vic DT 190307 by 2200.

On 5 September K Co took up blocking pans on Line Kansas one plat was in pan vic DT 167300, 2nd plat Hill 872, 3d plat Hill 770. K Co was in pan by 1620. From 5 Sept to 12 Sept. the companies carried on organizational training. No o enemy contacted during the remainder of the period.

At 0200, 13 Sept Blue Bn departed to take up pans on line Hays. At 0930 L Co was in position on Hill 754 at 1130. The Blue CP closed into a new area vic DT 161244, & at 1245 K & I Co's relieved the Red Bn on the 868 ridge line.

At 1200 Impel 3 notified the Blue Bn it would be relieved by Idelac Fr Bn, which relief was completed by 2300. The Blue Bn was to take up the responsibility of the white Bn on the Kansas Line. M Co withdrew its supporting units and closed into an assembly area vic DT 167264, with the Blue CP.

II K & L Co's closed into pan on Line Kansas by 1215 on 14 Sept. Contact patrols were sent between plateaus and with the 5th ROK Div on the right by I Co the 7th ROK Division on the left by L Co. All companies carried on organizational training in positions until 24 Sept. No enemy contact being reported during this period.

On 25 September the Companies moved off the Kansas Line & closed into an assembly area vic. DT 153278 by 1430 to continue training. On 26 Sept I, K, & L companies closed into another assembly area vic DT 162264 by 1045.

On 27 September the M Co 75 RR section became attached to the 5th ROK Div as supporting units. The HMG plat deployed from the M Co CP 0300 to be reassigned to and support C Co 38th Inf.

On 28 Sept a report was received by Blue Bn that the MG Plat was not able to find the MG Plat was a 3 man ambush by the enemy. A 4 man infantry team was sent to contact the MG Plat, and succeeded in relieving it, carrying most of the men out of the North Korean ambush. Final casualty figures 25 men unhurt, 11 WIA's and two MIA's. The three machine guns were destroyed by the Plat. The Mch Gun Section will be equipped and sent on to Hill 868 to support C Co, and on 29 Sept more RR were sent to fill out the platoon.
S-3 UNIT JOURNAL SUMMARY
FROM 010001K TO 012000K SEPT 51
1. AT 0600 LC. RER THE WoULD BE A DELAY IN THE
RELIEF OF LC. BY 1220, LC WAS IN THE PROCESS OF BEING
RELIEVED
2. AT 0700 LC TAKK TWO P.W.I S, + TAKK THEM TO IMI,EL
FOR FURTHER INTERROGATION
3. AT 1340 THE BLUE CO MOVED FORWARD TO I CO.
AT 0800 I CO REC 2 RDS EST 82 MTR. K CO REC 8 RDS 76.
AT 0800 I CO REC 2 RDS EST 82. AT 2015 K CO REC APPRX. 20
RDS S.P. AT AN A2 OF 5988 MLLS 420 RDS OR 120 MTR AT AN
A2 OF 6020 MLLS. AT 1030 K CO REC 15 RDS 82 MTR AT
AN A2 OF 330° 335° WITH A 3 SEC FLASHBANG

OFFICIAL
LOCKHART
S-3

TOTH
MAJOR

SECRET