SECRET

COMMAND REPORT (CSHIS-5(R1))

38TH INFANTRY REGIMENT

for

1 thru 31 May 1951

Assigned to: 2d Infantry Division
APO 248 US Army

Approved by:

JOHN G COUGHLIN
Colonel, Inf
Commanding
The month of May opened with the 38th RCT improving defensive positions on the NO-NAME-LINE. The 2nd Battalion, given the mission of establishing a patrol base forward of the MLR, continued to dig in in the vicinity of D5018903.

In accordance with 8th Army instructions, units were ordered to intensify patrol activities from present defensive positions to the north as far as the SOYANG RIVER, in order to dominate respective zones of operations.

In compliance with Division Operations Instructions #69, dated 7 May 51, 2nd Battalion was relieved in position by 3rd Battalion, 9th RCT, at 081030 May. Concurrently, 2nd Battalion was released attachment 38th RCT and became Division reserve.

During the period of 1 thru 12 May, daily patrols of company and platoon size were dispatched forward and to the flanks of the Regiment's zone of responsibility. In most cases, all patrols returned with negative reports. In a few instances, light contact was made with small enemy groups. On each occasion where contact was made, the enemy was taken under fire by artillery with good results. The patrols dispatched during this period were equipped with SCR 300 Radio's; liaison planes operated on the same channel for added security. In addition, all company size patrols and some platoon size patrols moved out with an FO for immediate use of artillery when necessary. During the hours of darkness, artillery fired H & I fires; in addition, heavy bombers were utilized to pound suspected enemy points and build-up areas.

1 O-3 O/1 ated Op O #25 14 May 51
2 E-3 O/1's (patrol) 1-12 May 51
3 B-2 PIR's S-2 1-12 May 51
4 B-1 S-2 Journals 1-12 May 51
The 38th RCT utilized this period to improve present defensive positions by laying thousands of AP mines, miles of tactical wire, and fougasses. It was felt that the anticipated enemy attack would be of such strength that we should be prepared to fire artillery on our own positions. With this in mind the Regimental Commander, directed that every man would have his position so well covered by logs and dirt, that it would be impossible to sustain casualties from friendly VT shells. (This order paid handsome dividends during our defensive stand). I was further directed that each CP would lay a minimum of three separate lines for positive assurance of good communications during the enemy's attack. In order to insure that the men of the regiment were making full use of camouflage on position, a Regimental Staff-Officer flew over the area daily and made a report to the battalion commander of all discrepancies noted.

On the 13th of May, the 38th RCT received verbal instructions from Division that one company of the 2nd Battalion would revert to our control for the purpose of discovering the boundary between the CCF and NK forces in the Division zone. Company was selected and departed at 130350 May from the vicinity of D8017902. Upon reaching the vicinity of D8027995, the patrol received S/A and AW fire from the top of Hill #499. Artillery was placed on the hill and the patrol moved on. Upon reaching the top of Hill #499, the patrol encountered heavy S/A and mortar fire and was forced to withdraw to allow an air strike to be placed on the hill. The air strike did not materialize, whereupon, the patrol returned to its base.

At 131500 May, the 2nd Battalion (-), in Division reserve, was released from Division control and reverted to the control of the 38th RCT. "En" Company, which was attached to Task Force

1 C-3 o/1 #1
2 Capt Manning, 8-3
3 B-3 o/1 patrol 13 May 51 & Capt Manning, 8-3
4 C-1 journal J62 13 May 51 (8-3)
5 C-2 FOR #118 131500 May 51
6 C-1 8-3 journal J75 13 May 51
(Cont'd, Narrative Summary 1-31 May 51)

Zebra, on the right, was notified that they would be relieved the following day at which time they would revert to parent control. 1

At 140745 May, the 2nd Battalion (-) relieved the 3rd Battalion, 9th RCT, on position, in the vicinity of D50250. The 2nd Battalion was given the mission of operating a patrol base from this point in order to insure the regiment against surprise attack. "F" Company, 38th RCT, was relieved by the 1st Ranger Company and closed into the 2nd Battalion area at 141600 May.

During the day, Division ordered the 1st Battalion, 9th RCT, to relieve the Netherlands Detachment, in position on the left flank of the 38th RCT. 2 This relief was accomplished at 141330 May, whereupon, the Netherlands Detachment moved out to the vicinity of D50887, where they would reconnoiter and be prepared to counter-attack in the 1st Battalion sector. 3

On 15 May, platoon size patrols were dispatched from "C", "E", "G" and "K" Companies, and the "Rock Ranger" Company, 38th RCT. 4 At 151245 May, "A" and "F" Companies received heavy mortar fire from Hill #499 and the high ground vicinity of D5036954. 5 Meanwhile, "C" Company was able to move forward to the vicinity of Hill #618 where it became engaged with an estimated enemy platoon. At this time, all the patrols withdrew to strategic positions, placed artillery on the enemy, and returned to their areas without further contact. The "Rock Rangers", attached to the 1st Battalion, were ordered to take up defensive positions on the right flank of "C" Company and the left flank of Ivanhoe Security Force, thereby tying in the Regiment's right flank with friendly forces on our right. At 151540 May, the "Rock Ranger's" CP reported many enemy crossing the river (D5045994), and moving south. This group was brought under artillery fire with unknown results. Approximately one hour later, ACP reported an estimated

1 0-2 FOR #118 131500 May 51
2 0-2 o/1 ated FOR #119 dtd 141500
3 0-2 FOR #119 dtd 141500
4 B-2 o/1 (patrol) 15 May 51
5 C-1 8-3 journal J53 dtd 15 May 51
enemy regiment moving south from the vicinity of D8034993. This group was also placed under artillery fire with unknown results. During the remainder of the night, extensive H & I missions were delivered by the 38th FA battalion.1

On 15 May, reinforced platoon size patrols were dispatched from "F" and "I" Companies, Netherlands Detachment. Patrols were ordered to move forward to prearranged phase lines and await orders from regiment prior to moving forward to new phase line. This method of patrolling was adopted to insure that all patrols would move forward on line, thereby minimizing the possibility of enemy encirclement. It was also felt that should one patrol get into trouble, they could easily be assisted by the patrols to their flanks. As the patrols advanced to the second phase line (93 grid line), "F" Company observed an estimated enemy platoon dug-in, in the vicinity of D8012940. Artillery was immediately placed on this target with unknown results.2

At 161350 May, the right flank platoon of "C" Company, 38th RCT, engaged an estimated enemy platoon with S/A, grenades, mortar and artillery. Throughout the engagement, several mines were heard exploding in front of "C" Company's position, giving indication that the mine field was taking its toll of enemy. Approximately fifteen minutes later, all firing had ceased and negative reports were received.3

At 161550 May, under the protective cover of inclement weather, enemy activity to the front of the Regimental sector increased. At this time, the 1st Battalion reported an estimated 300 enemy vicinity D8065932 and 300-400 vicinity D872922.4 Fighter aircraft was requested and made available, however, they were unable to locate the targets due to poor visibility. At 161645 May, the 1st Battalion reported a large number of enemy advancing from D805932 toward "A" Company's positions and by
161847 May, all companies of the 1st Battalion were calling for artillery fire to their front. Simultaneously, two squads of "c" Company were engaging an estimated enemy company in the vicinity of DS092930. At 161915 May, the "Rock Ranger" Company reported that they had closed into positions (DS094952), and were tied in physically with Ivanhoe Security Force and 2nd Battalion, 23rd RCT.1

Throughout dusk the enemy's main effort continued to be centered in the 1st Battalion sector. At 161950 May, a flight of friendly air hit the enemy forward of the 1st Battalion position, (DS092930), with unknown results. At 2000 hours, "c" Company reported receiving 30 to 40 rounds of either artillery or 120mm mortar within a two minute period commencing at 1955 hours. No known casualties were suffered and Hill #588 (DS077938), believed to be the source of fire, was brought under observation by liaison plane, however, this operation was hampered by inclement weather and a negative report was submitted. By 162045 May, 1st Battalion reported an estimated 1000 enemy, in groups of 500 each, advancing south from DS068947, and from east of Hill #588 (DS08 3940).2 A radar control bomber strike was directed against these targets with unknown results. At 162055 May, the 1st Battalion reported that the ridge line north and east of their positions, formally occupied by elements of Ivanhoe Security Force, was now in enemy hands. At 2125 hours, Task Force Zebra placed artillery on this ridge line.

At 162145 May, 2nd Battalion reported enemy on the forward slopes of Hill #755 (DS018899). The attack which followed was repulsed by "E" Company assisted by artillery fire. At this time, "p" and "q" Companies were not in contact.3

At 162150 May, the 3rd platoon of "A" Company began receiving S/A and scattered SP fire. Friendly artillery together with S/A

1 0-2 POR #112 dtd 171500 May 51
2 0-1 S-3 Journal J77 dtd 15 May 51
3 0-2 POR #122 dtd 171500 May 51
and mortar fire of "A" Company quickly neutralized the area, however, at 2230 hours, enemy artillery fire began to fall in rear of the 1st Battalion CP.1

In the meantime, the 2nd Battalion, in position forward of the MLR, was being attacked by an unknown number of enemy. "B" Company, occupying Hill #755, was attacked by superior enemy force and was forced to withdraw. The subsequent counter-attack was successful in retaking the position but again the enemy in large numbers attacked and succeeded in pushing "B" Company off the hill.2 This was accomplished with utter disregard for human lives as friendly mines, mortars, and artillery were taking a terrific toll of enemy. Meanwhile, "E" and "G" Companies reported increased enemy activity against their positions and by 170045 May, reported that they were under heavy enemy pressure. At this time, "E" and "G" Companies were ordered to withdraw while "F" Company, in the vicinity of Hill #368, fought a delaying action and was further instructed to dispatch one platoon to Hill #915 to augment the two I&R squads manning an OP on this hill.

At 170125 May, the 1st Battalion was ordered to dispatch a platoon of "A" Company, Netherlands Detachment, to Hill #975 where it would rejoin its parent company. (Platoon Patrol from "A" Company, Netherlands Detachment, when it returned through 1st Battalion lines initially, remained with that battalion as the enemy were following closely. As soon as pressure slackened, 1st Battalion would send the platoon back to its parent unit).

At 170132 May, 3rd Battalion reported flares in the vicinity of DS04677, in front of "I" Company's positions, and directed mortar fire onto this location.3 In the meantime, "I" Company was subjected to periodic mortar fire at the rate of 2 rounds per minute. A few moments later, "I" Company received 6 - 8 rounds of 120mm mortar.4

1 C-1 S-3 Journal J92 16 May 51
2 C-1 S-3 Journal J103 16 May 51
3 C-1 S-3 Journal J15 dtd 17 May 51
4 C-2 FOR #122 dtd 171500 May 51
(Cont'd, Narrative Summary 1-31 May 51)

"F" Company, in the vicinity of Hill #508, fighting a delaying action, was getting increased enemy activity and by 170210 May, was under heavy attack. At 170215 May, enemy activity in the 1st Battalion sector reached its peak when the 2nd platoon of "A" Company reported an enemy breakthrough. "A" Company requested and received, "on position artillery concentration, in an attempt to stem the enemy's advance and seal the breakthrough area with artillery.

At 170230 May, "A" Company, Netherlands Detachment, was directed to proceed to the breakthrough point and close the gap. At 170500 May, 3rd platoon of "A" Company, 38th Infantry on Hill #1051, received a "banzai" attack and was forced off the hill to the pass in the vicinity of Hill #1051. Meanwhile, the remainder of "A" Company, 38th Infantry continued to be in contact with the enemy now located on Hill #1051 vicinity D8084931, while friendly artillery continued to pound reported enemy troop concentrations.

By 170715 May, the enemy had succeeded in exploiting the breakthrough between Hills #1051 and #914 despite heavy concentrations of artillery and mortar fire. In the meantime, "A" and "B" Companies, Netherlands Detachment, began to advance towards Hill #1051 and Hill #914 respectively, with the mission of counter-attacking and restoring the position. At 170930 May, "A" Company, Netherlands Detachment, ceased their advance towards Hill #1051 to permit artillery concentrations to blast the hill. Within a few moments, 1st Battalion reported the center platoon of "A" Company, 38th Infantry, had been overrun and the positions were now in enemy hands.1 The left platoon of "A" Company was ordered to prepare to attack these positions and close the gap. At this time, a message was intercepted by an interpreter from the Netherlands Detachment which said in effect, "Send troops to east of Hill #1051"; (apparently the enemy planned to exploit his breakthrough immediately).

At approximately 170950 May, a large enemy force was observed moving south in the vicinity of D80795. Fighter aircraft was sent to the target area for air strikes on this enemy group.2

1. C-1 S-3 Journals 346 dtd 17 May 51
2. C-1 S-3 Journals 363 dtd 17 May 51

Korean War Project 2ID-00400429
Meanwhile, Division indicated that the French Battalion, 23rd Infantry, was proceeding up the valley towards the scene of the breakthrough. **"F"** Company, Netherlands Detachment, moved to within 1/2 and S/A range of the advancing enemy unit and started delivering fire on their flanks.  

At 171105 May, Tank Company, 38th Infantry, directed a 10 sun indirect fire TOT against massed enemy in the valley from D803950 to D8070950.  

At 171155 May, the Commanding General, 2d Infantry Division, directed the Netherlands Detachment to advance on Hill #1051 under the cover of artillery fire.  

At approximately 171225 May, Air OP reported a general withdrawal of enemy forces to the north. This report was substantiated by an intercepted message picked up by the I & R OP (in Chinese) ordering the Opcode to withdraw to the north.  

At 171303 May, "F" Company, 23rd Infantry, and "O" Company, 38th Infantry, were engaged in firefights with an unknown number of enemy, however, they reported that the enemy was being contained.  

At 171320 May, 3rd Battalion, 38th RCT, was directed to dispatch two platoon size patrols to the general vicinity of Hill #755; the first patrol, accompanied by an FO, was ordered to occupy Hill #755; the second patrol, to proceed in a NW direction to search area for friendly WIA, equipment and to determine number of enemy dead. Both patrols departed at 171450.  

Plans were effected for the Netherlands Detachment to jump off, in an attack, following a rolling artillery barrage, to regain Hill #1051. At 171420 May, the Netherlands Detachment jumped off and by 171655 May, leading elements for "E" Company were located in the vicinity of D803905 and proceeding toward Hill #1051. At 171650 May, an air strike was directed against Hill  

1 POR #122 dtd 171500 May 51.  
2 C-1 8-3 Journal J71 May 17 51.  
3 C-2 POR #122 dtd 171500 May 51.
(Cont'd, Narrative Summary 1-31 May 51)

#1051 and at 171750 May, "E" Company, Netherlands Detachment reported engaging an undetermined number of enemy in the vicinity of DS008930. At this time, on Division order, the Netherlands Detachment was instructed to proceed to the northern slopes of Hill #710, (DS075905), to tie in with "A" Company, 38th Infantry, on line.\(^1\)

At 171525 May, the I & R OP observed a company-size enemy patrol approaching their area from the vicinity of DS040897 and at 171540 May, reported that the enemy force had deployed in an effort to outflank the I & R OP. Consequently, regiment ordered the outpost to withdraw and at 172025 May, artillery was placed on Hill #916.

Two platoon-size patrols from the 3rd Battalion departed at 171415 May, and upon arriving in the vicinity of DS036886 the patrols observed an unknown number of enemy with light MG's bazookas, and AW's, proceeding south from the vicinity of DS043886. Patrols further reported that many enemy now occupied Hill #916. In view of the close proximity of this large enemy force, the patrols were ordered to return to their area and at 171650 May, arrived their area.\(^2\)

The 2nd Battalion (-), following their withdrawal from positions in front of the 3rd Battalion, assembled and began reorganizing in the vicinity of the Regimental OP (DS069780). At approximately 171725 May, "F" Company was ordered to proceed to Hill #975, DS090897, and occupy the hill, joining a composite platoon from the 1st Battalion already located on this hill.\(^3\) The remaining elements of the battalion, after reorganizing, moved out and occupied defensive positions along the ridge line extending from Hill #975 SE to Hills #627 and #691. "F" Company, reinforced with a M3 section, departed at 171835 May and by 172040 May, started up Hill #975 with little opposition.

1. G-2 POR #123 dtd 181500 May 51
2. G-2 POR #123 dtd 181500 May 51
3. G-1 S-3 journal J125 dtd 17 May 51
At 171200 May, 1st Battalion reported that the enemy had over-run the left flank of "G" Company. Immediately, friendly VT fire was called on these positions and followed by a counter-attack by a platoon of "A" Company and the reserve platoon, the position was regained and the line restored although an estimated 30 enemy were reported as having infiltrated through the lines.

At 171350 May, the Commanding General, 2d Infantry Division, ordered the attachment of the 2nd Battalion, 5th Infantry, for operational control and the battalion was designated for employment along the ridge line running thru Hill "719, (38059856).

A platoon from "C" Company, which had been dispatched to clear the area SE of Hill "724 (38069884), became engaged in a fire fight with an unknown number of enemy and after a brief period, proceeded on without opposition.

Meanwhile, "A" Company, dug-in for the night with their right flank approximately 300 yards from Hill "973 while "F" Company, on Hill "975, tied in with the right flank of 1st Battalion. The 1st Ranger Company remained in the vicinity of 1st Battalion CP for counter-attack employment. At 172045 May, the 3rd Battalion started to receive sporadic enemy artillery fire and at 172215 May, the 3rd platoon of "L" Company was subjected to an attack by an estimated 40 - 50 enemy who penetrated through the mine fields and barbed wire entanglement in front of "L" Company's position before withdrawing. At 172240 May, "K" Company reported bugle blaring in front of their positions and an unknown number of enemy attacking through the mine fields to "K" Company's front. At 180042, "K" Company reported the loss of the battalion CP position on Hill 800 and "K" Company reserve platoon was sent to attempt to stem the enemy's advance. By 180130 May, "K" Company had retaken the hill, however, at 18030 May, "K" Company was still under attack.

1. C-1 S-3 Journal 5/30 dtd 17 May 51
2. C-2 FOR 5/30 dtd 181500 May 51
3. C-1 S-3 Journal 5/30 dtd 17 May 51
4. C-2 FOR 5/30 dtd 181500 May 51
(Cont'd, Narrative Summary 1 - 31 May 51)

In the meantime, at 180045 May, the 1st Battalion reported the second of two attacks on their CP position, however, both attacks were repelled with the aid of a 75mm RR section from "F" Company. The left platoon of "E" Company, vicinity DSO55880, reported being surrounded and was ordered into a perimeter to hold off the enemy. At 180140 May, the 1st Battalion rear CP and the 2nd Battalion CP, vicinity DSO85865, was attacked by an estimated 15 enemy. By 180155 May, the attack had been repulsed.

At 180200 May, the 2nd Battalion was ordered to send "E" Company to plug the existing gap between "A" and "E" Companies in order to stop all infiltration. At 180230 May, "E" Company, proceeding N and W to cover the valley north of Hill #710, D-808875, was engaged by an unknown number of enemy.

By 180340 May, the enemy was successful in surrounding the 1st and 2nd Battalion's rear CP positions. Consequently, "E" Company was ordered to return immediately to assist in repelling the enemy force while artillery fire was directed onto Hill #710 to cover "E" Company's withdrawal. In addition, "G" Company was recalled from the NE to join "E" Company since the 1st Battalion had reported an enemy fire block on the MSR in the vicinity of DSO88852.

At 180415 May, the right flank of "I" Company and left flank of "K" Company were overrun and the reserve platoon of "I" Company was dispatched, together with an AV team, to close the gap. By 180555 the gap was closed and the line restored, however, some enemy sniper fire was still being received from rear of "L" and "M" Companies' positions.

As "E" and "G" Companies were withdrawing to assist the battalion CP's, a platoon of tanks was alerted to move to the CP area and neutralize or run the reported enemy fire block.

1. C-1 S-3 Journal J16 dtd 18 May 51
2. C-1 S-3 Journal J30 dtd 18 May 51
3. C-1 FOR #123 dtd 181500 May 51.
(Cont'd, Narrative Summary 1 - 31 May 51)

Meanwhile, at 180430 May, "F" Company began receiving heavy enemy pressure forcing them to withdraw to Hill #975. In the 1st Battalion sector, enemy activity was reported as being moderate to heavy and at 180450 May, the 1st Ranger Company was employed to assist the companies on line. At this time, "B" Company was still surrounded and in a perimeter defense.

A platoon of tanks from Tank Company, 38th Infantry, departed 180455 May and by 180520 May, had passed through the fire block and set up with elements of the 1st and 2nd Battalion's, D8085842, members of the rear CP's who had withdrawn from their CP area and reorganized. In addition, personnel from "B" and "G" Companies started to arrive. The tanks, accompanied by some of the infantry troops, continued north along the road meeting little resistance until, at 180620 May, the tank-infantry team reached the vicinity of D8088859 where the infantry proceeded to sweep the area to the front. During the course of this advance, an estimated 15 enemy were killed and considerable friendly equipment was recovered. At 180850 May, an unknown number of enemy dug-in in the vicinity of D8090854, were subjected to tank and S/A fire, in addition to artillery and air which was called to hit this target.

During the morning hours of 18 May, relatively light enemy contact was reported and all efforts were concentrated on re-establishing our defensive lines. Division initiated plans to effect the relief of the 38th Infantry by the 23rd and 9th Infantry, however, the 38th Infantry was instructed to improve and strengthen all positions pending this assistance. The 3rd Battalion, 9th Infantry, was returned to the control of parent unit during this period. At 181200 May, "A" Company, Netherlands Detachment, in the vicinity of

1. C-1 S-3 Journal J41 dtd 18 May 51
2. C-2 FOR #123 dtd 181500 May 51
3. C-1 S-3 Journal J63 dtd 18 May 51
4. C-2 FOR #123 dtd 181500 May 51
(Cont'd, Narrative Summary 1-31 May 51)

DS028248, reported observing an estimated 150 enemy vicinity DS 077855 and "Z" Company, Netherlands Detachment, now located vicinity DS094852, reported receiving mortar fire from DS093858. 1

At 181340, 1st Battalion reported unknown number of enemy forward of Hill #275 and artillery fire was placed upon this target. 2 "W" Company, 38th Infantry, still on positions vicinity Hill #724, DS070855, remained surrounded and air strikes and artillery were directed against Hill #710, (080875), in an effort to eliminate known enemy on this hill. At this time, the Netherlands Detachment was alerted to move into regimental reserve following their relief by elements of the 9th Infantry. 3

At 181500 May, "I" Company was under moderate attack from an unknown number of enemy. Artillery was called and within two minutes, 400 rounds of artillery were delivered against this attack causing the enemy to disperse. At the same time, "I" Company reported they were receiving S/A fire from their right flank which developed into a physical attack forcing a portion of "L" Company's right flank from position. The reserve platoon of "L" Company counter-attacked and the positions were restored by 181710 May. 4

At 1818 hours, 18 May, 3rd Battalion was instructed to give as much aid as possible to "Z" Company, who was withdrawing. 5 Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion, 9th Infantry, was moving towards Hill #754 to the NE and by 1900 hours, "L" Company, 9th Infantry was reported on the right flank of "I", 38th Infantry, and going into position.

At 182120 May, "K" Company reported considerable noise and shouting in the vicinity of Hill #598. Artillery fire was placed on the hill but at 182140 May, the left flank of "K" Company and the right flank of "I" Company reported receiving light S/A fire and a few rounds of artillery fire. 6 The enemy continued to

1. C-1 S-3 journal J77 dtd 18 May 51
2. C-1 S-3 journal J85 dtd 18 May 51
3. C-2 PFR #123 dtd 181500 May 51
4. C-2 PFR #124 dtd 201500 May 51
5. C-1 S-3 journal J101 dtd 18 May 51
6. C-1 S-3 journal J128 dtd 18 May 51
(Cont'd., Narrative Summary 1-31 May 51)

Advance towards the position of "I" and "G" Companies' blowing bugles and whistles. More artillery was requested and in a period of four minutes, 600 rounds of artillery were delivered. Some of this artillery fire was called "on position". The artillery fire was very effective and at 182207 May, all enemy action ceased.1

"I" Company, 9th Infantry, was reported on Hill #754 tied in with "L" Company, 9th Infantry, thereby refusing the right flank. "G" Company, with the Netherlands Detachment, was moving up from the south to ease the pressure on the 1st Battalion. At 181520 May, Hill #442 was secured by "A" Company, Netherlands Detachment, who were relieved by "G" Company on this hill. A platoon was pushed out on the nose of Hill #442 for added protection and observation.

At 181503 May, "H" Company, Netherlands Detachment, was on Hill #535 and was in the process of being relieved by elements of the 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry. At 181710 May, Netherlands Detachment was ordered to assemble their units in the Service Train area and by 181830 May, had closed into the new area. "H" Company, the only element of the 2nd Battalion, 38th Infantry, now being utilized, reported a considerable amount of fire coming from the vicinity of Hill #710, however, this fire was not directed against "G" Company. At 182215 May, instructions were received attaching "G" Company, 38th Infantry, to the 9th Infantry, to remain in position on Hill #442 until relieved by elements of the 9th Infantry.2

Meanwhile, plans were in progress for withdrawing the 1st Battalion from their positions. Request was made to the Division for fighter planes over the target area every fifteen minutes and for as much artillery as possibly could be made available. The artillery fire called for a ten minute preparation covering the entire front of the 1st Battalion at H-10, H-hour at 1800 hours. Following the ten minute preparation, the route of the battalion.

1 C-2 FOR #124 dtd 201500 May 51
2 C-2 FOR #124 dtd 201500 May 51
(Cont'd, Narrative Summary 1 - 31 May 51)

(south), would be boxed in. Concentrations on Hill #710 which had been occupied by the enemy were scheduled. The fighter planes were instructed to circle outside of the area and prepare to come in on call. All friendly units were informed of the plan and the time of withdrawal. At 181750 May, seven (7) Field Artillery Battalion's of light, medium and heavy, controlled by the 38th FA Battalion FDC, began shooting the planned fires and at 181800 May, the 1st Battalion commenced its withdrawal. Adjustment and control of artillery fires was initially thru liaison plane and contact with the battalion was maintained thru this medium, however, a sudden severe thunderstorm broke about 181820 which drove all planes back to their bases. This storm continued thru out the night. Communication with the 1st Battalion was lost. The 1st Battalion filtered back thru our lines in small groups during the remainder of the night and the following morning.¹

At 190050 May, the 3rd Battalion reported a re-enforced attack from the vicinity of Hill #916, towards "K" Company.² Artillery fire, along with supporting 4.2's and 81mm mortars, was directed against the attacking force and by 190130 May, all firing had ceased. At 190250 May, "I" Company was under heavy attack and was also receiving artillery fire. At 190255 May, plans were received from Division to the effect that the Marines, on our left, would shift to the right and relieve the 38th Infantry at daylight, 19 May.

At 190300 May, "I" Company reported that the enemy was building up his attack, however, intense artillery and 3/A fire soon repulsed this attack and at 190330 May, the situation was under control."³ In the "I" Company Sector, friendly troops were in hand-to-hand combat with the enemy before he was driven off. Meanwhile, "K" Company had repulsed an attack which appeared to be diversionary with little trouble. During the remaining hours of darkness, the 3rd Battalion received many small probing attacks as

1. O-2 PCR #124 dtd 201500 May 51
2. Q-1 S-3 journal J5 dtd 19 May 51
3. Q-1 S-3 journal J19, J20 dtd 19 May 51
well as considerable mortar and artillery fire. The FA Battalion fired countless rounds of harassing, interdiction and defensive fire with excellent results.¹

At 190640 May, a warning order was received from Division to be prepared to be relieved on positions by elements of the 1st Marine Division on the morning of 19 May. On relief, the entire regiment was to be assembled in the vicinity of the Regimental CP with attachments reverting to parent unit control.²

At 190700 May, the 3rd Battalion reported that "L" Company, 9th Infantry, was under attack and that their left flank had lost some ground. "I" Company, 38th Infantry, immediately moved two (2) squads plus the command group, to plug this penetration.³ The attack continued against the left flank of "L" Company, 9th Infantry, was forced to give up their positions on Hill #737 and pull back to the ridge line running to Hill #754. The CP of "L" 38th Infantry, was hit from behind and only through the aggressive action of the remainder of the command group was the attacking force dispersed and the rear of "L" Company secured.⁴

Instructions were received from Division to attach one company to the 23rd Infantry. "D" Company was selected and departed at 190935 May. At 190925 May, Division informed the 38th Infantry that it would move to an assembly area in the vicinity of CHUJON-NI. They further informed us that "C" Company would be relieved by the 9th Infantry at 1200 hours and "E" Company would return upon release by the 23rd Infantry.⁵

At 191205 May, the 3rd Battalion, 38th Infantry, was directed to fall back to a phase line extending from Hill #736 to #534 and #719, as soon as possible. As the 3rd Battalion began to pull back, no enemy contact was reported.⁶ Initially, the 3rd battalion was to remain on the phase-line until the 1st Marines were in position. At 191550 May, Division was informed that elements of the Marines were in position at 191415 May. Instructions were

¹ C-2 FOR #124 dtd 201500 May 51) ² C-2 FOR #124 dtd 201500 May
² C-1 S-3 Journal J25 dtd 19 May ³ C-2 FOR #124 dtd 201500 May
³ C-1 S-3 Journal J37 dtd 19 May ⁴ C-1 S-3 Journal J51 - 19 May
⁵ Korea War Project 2ID-00400438
(Cont'd, Narrative Summary 1 - 31 May 51)

immediately sent to the 3rd Battalion to withdraw to the vicinity of the Regimental CP.

At 191648 May, the left platoon of "F" Company was engaged with a large group of enemy. A heavy artillery concentration was dropped on the enemy and by 191730 May, "F" Company had disengaged, with the enemy fleeing to the north.¹

At 191940 May, the 2nd Battalion had cleared the area on its way to the new assembly area, followed by the 1st Battalion at 192030 May. The 3rd Battalion cleared at 192130 May, with the Regimental CP closing its old location and opening at DS129488, 192130 May.

The regiment closed into its new assembly area vicinity, KUNAN-Ni, DS129488, at 200130 May, and was ordered to immediately begin reorganization and rehabilitation of personnel and equipment.

Effective 200530 May, Netherlands Detachment was relieved from control of the 38th Infantry and attached to the 23rd Infantry to be committed on Division order only.

At 201250 May, on X Corps order, the 38th Infantry was directed to move one ECT to the vicinity of YUDONG-Ni (DS255593), and at 201445 May, the 3rd Battalion, with "C" Etry, 38th FA Battalion attached, a platoon of tanks, a platoon of 4.2 mortars, TACP and Medical support, departed.²

Enemy casualties for period of 16 thru 19 May: Counted:
KIA - 2000 Estimated enemy KIA & WIA - 8000.³

Friendly casualties for period of 16 thru 19 May: WIA - 758,
KIA - 37, MIA - 469.⁴

(For amount of equipment lost during this period, see "Supporting Documents, Section II, D-3). At 201530 May, on Division order, the 3rd Battalion was relieved from control of the 38th Infantry and attached to the 15th RCT.⁵

1. C-1 S-3 Journal J75 dtd 19 May 51
2. C-2 PCR #124 dtd 201500 / C-1 S-3 Journal J5 dtd 20 May 51
3. B-2 FIRs 16 thru 19 May 51
4. A-2 PDS Rpt 16 thru 19 May 51
5. C-1 S-3 Journal J18 dtd 20 May 51

- 17 -
During the day, the regiment received 15 Officers and 228 En replacements.1

The 38th Infantry (-), continued in Corps reserve until 211000 May, at which time, X Corps notified us that the unit had now reverted to Division control. Simultaneously, Division ordered the 38th Infantry (-) alerted for movement on a two hour notice.

At 211158 May, on Division order, 38th Infantry (-), was directed to move to an assembly area vicinity of DS2562, closing before 2400 hours, 21 May.2

1st Battalion, leading element of 38th Infantry, (-), closed into the new area vicinity of DS247645 and in compliance with Division order, the 1st battalion was instructed to send one Company further north to secure the pass at DS265680. "A" Company was designated and by 211830 May, had established defensive positions in the pass. "C" Company was alerted to assist "A" Company if the necessity arose. Meanwhile, 3rd BCT, which reverted to the control of the 38th Infantry at 211700 May, commenced readjustment of positions to conform to the new boundary designated by Division, while the remainder of the 38th Infantry began to arrive in the new assembly area. By 211805 May, 2nd Battalion, the last element of the regiment, had closed.3

At 211825 May, one section, "A" Btry, 32nd AAA Battalion, was attached to the 38th Infantry.

At 212130 May, Division instructed the 38th Infantry to alert the 3rd Battalion, Tank Company, 38th Infantry, and the section of AAA to move at first light and assemble at PUNG-I-NI, for employment with a special task force, without interrupting the regimental mission of securing the Division east flank and the pass at DS265680. Upon approval of higher headquarters, the 2nd Battalion was substituted and Tank Company, 38th Infantry, was replaced by a company of tanks from the 72nd Tank Battalion. The

1. A-1  PDS Rpt 20 May 51
2. O-2  FOR #125 dtd 211500
3. O-2  FOR #125 dtd 221500
(Cont'd, Narrative Summary 1 - 31 May 51)

section of AAA was directed to remain in support of the 3rd Battalion. 1

At 220600 May, the 2nd Battalion commenced their move. In the meantime, the 2nd Battalion was relieved from control of the 38th Infantry and placed under the control of "Task Force Yoke".

At 22140 May, on Division order, 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry, was directed to effect the relief of the 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, as early as possible, and at 221310 May, the 38th Infantry was relieved of all responsibilities of the pass. (DS 265680). Immediately, "A" Company was withdrawn from the pass and joined the 1st Battalion in its movement to the north to effect the relief of the 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, which was accomplished 221945 May. In the meantime, the 3rd Battalion was instructed to withdraw from present positions and proceed to an assembly area in the vicinity of DS261758. 2

At 221800 May, Division ordered one company from the 3rd Battalion to occupy blocking positions vicinity DS3273 to guard approaches from the NE. 3 "K" Company, with two (2) platoons of tanks, was selected, and by 222105 May, had occupied the designated positions in the vicinity of DS318728. The 3rd Battalion's relief of 15th RCT began at 230540 May.

At 230600 May, the Netherlands Detachment was detached from the 9th Infantry and reverted to control of the 38th Infantry; "C" Btry, 38th FA Battalion, relieved from attachment of 38th Infantry and 38th FA Battalion, placed in direct support; 72nd Tank Battalion (-) and "C" Company, 2d Engineer Battalion, were placed in direct support of the 38th Infantry. 4

At 230925 May, Division advised the 38th Infantry that objective for 23 May was to secure the road vicinity of DS318658. 5

At 231215 May, 3rd Battalion, including "K" Company and 2 platoons of tanks, which had been relieved of their previous mission,

1. C-1 S-3 Journal J33 dtd 21 May 51
2. C-1 S-3 Journal J40,41,42 dtd 22 May 51
3. C-1 S-3 Journal J47 dtd 22 May 51
4. C-2 FOR #127 dtd 231500 May 51
5. C-1 S-3 Journal J38 dtd 23 May 51
(Cont'd, Narrative Summary 1 - 31 May 51)

jumped off in the attack north, following the river road to secure the pass, vicinity DS2905, in an effort to envelop the objective from the west. At 1500 hours, the 1st Battalion jumped off attacking directly north, cross-country, to secure the lateral road in the vicinity of DS2905. In the meantime, the Netherlands Detachment closed into an assembly area vicinity DS267350, and were alerted to follow the 3rd Battalion on order. They were to move and remain in the vicinity of the pass if the 3rd Battalion and Tank Company were successful in their attack.

In the 1st Battalion sector, "C" Company proceeded forward against light and sporadic S/A fire and with the assistance of friendly artillery, was successful in occupying Hill #1009, DS 315761. "D" Company, attacking NE, proceeded without contact to Hill #548 and at darkness, formed a perimeter in the vicinity of DS295750; "A" Company, generally followed "C" Company and joined them on Hill #1009 where both companies buttoned up for the night.

In the 3rd Battalion sector, "H" Company, with 3 platoons of tanks attached, proceeded north along the river road and occupied Hill #511, DS251951, without enemy contact. "I" Company, with a platoon of tanks, secured Hill #502 at 231925 May, against light sporadic resistance. "II" Company, moving forward in the central portion of the 3rd Battalion sector occupied Hill #504, DS273801, with one platoon occupying the high ground at DS263802. By 231925 hours, "I" Company (-), was located on Hill #468, with a platoon on #463. At 231951 May, heavy S/A and mortar fire forced "I" Company to withdraw from Hill #502 to the vicinity of DS258200, where they formed a perimeter for the night.

At 232145 May, 1st Battalion was ordered to secure positions for the night utilizing the perimeter defense, also, 1st and 3rd Battalions were directed to continue the attack at daylight, 24 May. Meanwhile, "A" Company, Netherlands Detachment, assumed

1. C-2 FOR #127 dtd 231500 May 51
2. C-2 FOR #128 dtd 241500 May 51
3. C-2 FOR #128 dtd 241500 May 51
(Cont'd, Narrative Summary 1 - 31 May 51)

blocking positions at DS5273 as ordered by Division. The 2nd Battalion, in an assembly area, DS270750, was alerted to move to the vicinity of MAA-3I, DS2484. ¹

At 240800 May, the 1st and 3rd Battalions jumped off to continue the attack. By 241148 May, "A" and "C" Companies had secured Hill #955. "B" Company was now approaching Hill #549. In the 3rd Battalion sector, "I" Company secured Hill #453 while elements of "I" Company were on Hill #304 at DS273301. By 241450 May, "A" Company had secured their objective and were in position N and S of the pass; "I" Company was located at DS232333. ²

Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion was proceeding cross-country without contact, with "A" and "C" Companies located at DS323602 and "B" Company at DS306810. At this time, the 2nd Battalion, reinforced by Tank Company (-), was ordered to move east along the lateral road to the road junction at DS343827.

At 241600 May, "A" and "C" Companies had proceeded just south of Hill #1103, where they encountered an estimated enemy company. After three unsuccessful attempts to dislodge the enemy with the assistance of artillery, they were ordered to withdraw, regroup and by-pass the Hill on the west and proceed to the vicinity south of the 3rd Battalion's positions and the pass. In the meantime, "B" Company continued forward on the left flank of the battalion and at 250020 May, leading elements of the company arrived in the vicinity of Btry "B", 38th FA Battalion, where they remained for the night. ³

Netherlands Detachment was ordered to proceed to an assembly area vicinity DS245047 and at 241755 May, cleared the area and closed in their new location in the early hours of 25 May. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion, moving forward without opposition, reached the lateral road and proceeded to deploy their units to secure the pass area. ⁴

1. C-2 FOR #128 dtd 241500 May 51
2. C-2 FOR #128 dtd 241500 May 51
3. C-2 FOR #129 dtd 251500 May 51
4. C-2 FOR #129 dtd 251500 May 51

- 21 -
The 2nd Battalion, moving east along the lateral road, proceeded to the vicinity of DS2985 where it became necessary to leave their tanks because of road conditions. The battalion continued on foot to the vicinity of DS3286 where, at 242200 May, they formed a perimeter defense. Plan for the attack the following day was to have the 3rd Battalion to the west, the 2nd Battalion to the east of the MBR, the Netherlands Detachment proceeding in the center, prepared to assist either attacking battalion. At 250700 May, the 2nd Battalion jumped off east along the lateral road, after proceeding about 500 yards, ran into enemy S/A fire. This fire continued to increase in intensity until 251010 May, when mortar fire started to fall in the area along with heavy A/V fire, forcing "F" Company to withdraw. At 251100 May, elements of both battalions received a few rounds of 81mm mortar as well as heavy S/A fire from high ground north of Hill #419. By 251200 hours, both battalions began to assemble south of Hill #419, DS33680, preparing to attack along the ridge lines east and west of the road.1

At 251235 May, "H" Company began moving towards Hill #619 with "M" Company advancing along its western slopes and "L" Company along its eastern slopes, while the 3rd Battalion's elements on the left side of the road jumped off for Hill #675 and subsequent envelopment of ARBU-DONG from the west.2 Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion (-), was ordered to move forward to an assembly area at DS297851.

At 251400 May, "M" Company reported receiving fire from Hill #714, road junction vicinity Hill #419 and from DS3589.3 However, fire had lessened considerably and at 251325 May, "F" Company was directed to assemble in the vicinity of the road junction vicinity Hill #419, while "H" Company, with "L" Company following, continued on to Hill #619 with instructions to cease advance to permit artil-

1. G-2 FOR #129 251500 May 51
2. G-2 FOR #129 dtd 251500 / G-1 8-3 Journal J44 dtd 25 May 51
3. G-1 8-3 Journal J45 dtd 25 May 51
(Cont'd, Narrative Summary 1 - 31 May)

lery preparation on Hill #714, their next objective. After seizing Hill #714, "E" and "D" Companies were instructed to continue along the ridge line and coordinate the development of the enemy in a pocket, with the 3rd Battalion on the left.

At 251450 May, 3rd Battalion was still proceeding against moderate to heavy opposition. A platoon from "I" Company was now occupying PHAL-DONG and one platoon occupying PAGANAMI. "I" Company, located on Hill #973, was moving towards Hill #681 and east, to cut the road south of HUSU-DONG.¹

At 251500 May, 3rd Battalion continued the attack west of the MSR against moderate to heavy resistance. At 2340 hours, they occupied the following defensive positions: "I" Company from DS337915 to DS350905; "I" Company and "A" Company from DS333901 to DS345000. In the meantime, the 2nd Battalion occupied defensive positions in the vicinity of DS352910 to DS351888.²

At 260300 May, plans were firmed up for operations on 26 May. The Netherlands Detachment was given the mission of attacking cross-country to secure Hill #1091 and from this position, they would cut off a possible enemy escape route. The 2nd Battalion was to attack and secure Hill #694 and move NE to secure the main objective of HYON-NI. The 1st Battalion was given a similar mission, however, moving in on HYON-NI from the west. The 3rd Battalion would remain in reserve, prepared for employment where necessary.

At 260330 May, the Netherlands Detachment moved forward without opposition.³ After progressing 4-5000 yards, they were ordered to swing to the east and sweep down to the road where they would assemble and continue along the road toward HYON-NI. This order was issued after the 1st Battalion, mounted on tanks, had cleared the pass in the vicinity of Hill #513 with little opposition. There were indications that the enemy had abandoned well constructed positions and it was felt that no time should be lost to exploit the situation. 1st Battalion was ordered to proceed with all speed.

1. C-2 PCR #129 dtd 251500 May 51
2. C-2 C-130 dtd 251500 May 51
3. C-1 S-3 journal dtd 31 May 51
(Cont'd, Narrative Summary 1 - 31 May 51)

towards HYON-NI and the 2nd Battalion was ordered to come off the
hills, leaving one company in the vicinity of the pass and move
forward as rapidly as possible. Mission of the 2nd Battalion was
to lend assistance to the 1st Battalion if the situation arose.
The tanks encountered a few mines in the form of buried mortar
shells, however, they were quickly removed by the AT&L platoon.¹

At approximately 261500 May, the tanks approached the vicin-
ity of YONG-PO, DS381977, where they began receiving heavy mortar
fire. 1st Battalion withdrew slightly and deployed their units
on the left and right of the road to overcome this resistance,
however, the enemy was determined and fighting a stiff delaying
action. Heavy mortar and artillery concentrations were placed on
Hill #726 and #625, allowing "F" Company to move on Hill #726
against light resistance. "A" Company, on the right of the road,
was encountering sniper fire thus making its progress tedious and
slow. "C" Company, with a section of tanks, moved up the road
and occupied Hill #625, while the tank-infantry task force remain-
ed in the vicinity of DS379977. At approximately 261945 May, it
became apparent that the enemy would continue to resist our advance,
consequently, the 1st and 2nd Battalions were ordered to form a
perimeter defense in the vicinity of DS375960. The Netherlands
Detachment arrived approximately at 262100 and was ordered to go
into defensive positions in the vicinity of Hill #399.

Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion, which was moving forward by
vehicle, closed into an assembly area at DS366964 at 262400 May.

At 270700 May, the 1st and 2nd Battalions jumped off in the
attack; 1st Battalion on the left of the road, 2nd Battalion on
the right.² By 271045 May, elements of the 1st Battalion were
between Hills #567 and #568, clearing the area of all enemy as
they moved. "A" Company moved on Hill #558 with no resistance,
however, they observed a considerable number of enemy attempting
to escape along the road to the NW across the river. They im-
mEDIATELY covered the rear with MG mortars and artillery fire,

1. C-2 POR #130 dtd 261500 May 51
2. C-1 S-3 Journal dtd 14 May 51
(Cont'd, Narrative Summary 1 - 31 May 51)

which resulted in heavy casualties and confusion among the re-
treating enemy.¹

Meanwhile, "a" Company was making slow progress because of
the treacherous terrain and at 271500 May, had reached the vi-
cinity of DS412987 with only occasional sniper fire for resis-
tance. At this time, the tanks were moving forward very rapidly
and by 1615 hours, were in the town of HYON-NI where they proceed-
ed to fire on all the immediate surrounding hills to clear the
area of enemy resistance.² The Netherlands Detachment, following
the tanks, was given the mission of clearing the high ground east
of HYON-NI; Hills #521 and #520. "E" Company, Netherlands Detach-
ment, secured Hill #521 against little opposition. "C" Company,
Netherlands Detachment, secured Hill #520 after approximately 120
enemy were dispersed by artillery fire.³

The 2nd Battalion dispatched "E" and "F" Companies to estab-
lish a large skirmish line in the vicinity of the "99" horizontal
grid line, with orders to move north to the E-W lateral road and
sweep it of all enemy.

At 280750 May, the 3rd Battalion, with tanks, AAA and AT & M
platoons attached; and supported by 4.2's and 38th FA Battalion,
jumped off to continue the attack north to HYJE,⁴ followed by the
Netherlands Detachment. At DT387023, the lead tank hit a soft
shoulder and turned over, simultaneously, "A" Company and the re-
mainder of the tanks were subjected to a heavy volume of mortar
fire from the high ground overlooking the road. Meanwhile, "I"
Company, sweeping forward on the right of the road, proceeded to
Hill #799 which they secured at 291015 May.⁵ "I" Company then
continued their advance westward toward Hill #669 and upon seizure,
were directed to drop back and clear out the enemy holding up the

1. C-2 FOR #131 dtd 271500 May 51.
2. C-1 8-3 Journal J36 dtd 17 May 51.
3. C-2 FOR #132 dtd 281500 May 51.
5. C-2 FOR #132 dtd 281500 May 51.
(Cont'd, Narrative Summary 1-31 May 51)

advance of "I" Company and the tanks. By 291500 May, "I" Company was near the crest of Hill #659 and observed the enemy moving north. "L" Company, on the west of the road, continued to move without contact and were beginning to swing to the east to envelop the force holding "K" Company, from the west, however, the enemy holding up the advance of "A" Company and the tanks, was neutralized by friendly air strikes.1

"A" Company (-) departed at 1300, 29 May, towards the valley, vicinity of DS405015, to assist a platoon which reported increased 8/A fire from the valley. At approximately 1515 hours, the remainder of the battalion was directed to proceed to secure this area. The 3rd Battalion and Netherlands Detachment, continued to advance and at approximately 2000 hours, was instructed to assemble in their respective areas and prepare perimeter defenses for the night.

Plans were initiated to continue the advance on 29 May with 1st and 2nd Battalions comprising the main efforts. 2nd Battalion would jump off 290530 May, to sweep the left of the road, (the entire battalion), with appropriate sized units peeling off to sweep the ridges along the route. 1st Battalion, on the right of the road with a similar mission. The Netherlands Detachment and 3rd Battalion were directed to assemble and prepare for employment in either sector. It was planned the 38th Infantry would arrive in INJE by 291400 May. The battalions jumped off on 29 May and proceeded along route without enemy contact. At 291415 May, leading elements of the attacking battalions made contact with the 2nd Recon Company, vicinity 295129, which had been dispatched to the SE from INJE.2

The Netherlands Detachment, proceeding on foot behind the 1st and 2nd Battalions, closed into an assembly area at 291700 May, where they were attached to the 23rd Infantry for operational control.3

1. C-2 POR #133 dtd 291500 May 51
2. C-2 POR #133 dtd 291500 May 51
3. C-2 POR #134 dtd 301500 May 51
(Cont'd, Narrative Summary 1 - 31 May 51)

The 3rd Battalion and other elements of the Regiment commenced moving forward and closed into the vicinity of INJE. The road and valley were impassable to our tanks. (Tank Company, Service Company, Hq. Hq. Company (-), were making preparations to move forward the following day).

At 0000 May, word was received that the 2nd Battalion Train, proceeding toward INJE, had run into an enemy roadblock at DT301102.1 "L" Company, reinforced with a section of mortars and 4.2's was directed to the area to eliminate the road block.2 After sweeping the area for most of the day, a report was received from the patrol that they were pinned down by an estimated 60 - 70 enemy. Immediately, the patrol was ordered to withdraw and at 2020 hours, the patrol broke contact and returned to their area. Friendly casualties: 2KIA, 10 WIA.3

During the day, Division ordered the employment of the regiment to insure the security of INJE and furnish protection for the bridgehead in the vicinity of DT224059.

At 0400, 31 May, 1st and 2nd Battalions departed to effect the relief of the 23rd Infantry.4 This relief was accomplished by 0600 hours; 1st Battalion on the left of the MSR and the 2nd Battalion on the high ground left of the 1st Battalion, however on Division order, the 2nd Battalion was ordered to withdraw and dispatch two rifle companies to tie in with the right flank of Netherlands Detachment, vicinity of DT298140. This mission was accomplished by "E" Company and "F" Company with "G" Company in battalion reserve.5

In the meantime, the Netherlands Detachment, which reverted to the control of the 38th Infantry at 310500 May, had occupied positions at HANYANG-DONG, DT295150 to DT298140, relieving "K"
(Cont'd, Narrative Summary 31 May 51)

Company, 23rd Infantry, and tying in with the French Battalion who remained in their previously occupied positions and were attached to the operational control of the 38th Infantry.

At 010930 the 3rd Battalion departed INJE to occupy positions to provide security for the bridgehead in the vicinity of DT237050. 3rd Battalion closed in the vicinity of the bridgehead 311445 May, and by 0915 hours, had completed the relief of elements of the 9th Infantry. On the night of 31 May, sporadic mortar fire and 76mm artillery fire were received by the Netherlands Detachment and French Battalion, with no casualties resulting. The month of May closed with the front line battalions on the alert for anticipated attack from the SE.

T H E E N D
HEADQUARTERS 38TH INFANTRY  
P.O. Box 248, c/o Postmaster  
San Francisco, California  

SECRET  

16 June 1951  

SUBJECT: S-1 Evaluation for period of 1 May 1951 thru 30 May 1951  

TO: Commanding Officer  
38th Infantry Regiment  
APO 248  

Section I: Administrative Checks  

During the first half of May the Regiment was in reserve with  
the primary mission of training and administration. The Division  
Rear along with the Regimental Personnel Sections moved to Wonju,  
a distance of some 40 miles from the Regiment. This made it possible  
to send the 1st Sergeants, Company Clerks and Unit Administrators  
from the various companies back to the personnel sections to check  
and verify Morning Reports, promotion status of men, pay, Casualty  
Reports and various other administrative matters. A schedule was  
set up between S-1 and the personnel office for these personal to  
go back to make checks to insure that all units made this check and  
further to keep all units from going at one time. Under conditions  
like those in Korea and where the personnel sections are so far to  
the rear, it is recommended that the above mentioned system of  
checking be used whenever possible.  

Section II: Awards and Decorations  

A study was made during the month regarding the number of  
recommendations for awards that had been submitted by the Regiment  
and for which orders had been issued. This study revealed that 34  
recommendations had been submitted as much as 3 months ago or  
longer, 55 for at least 2 months and 35 for at least 1 month. By  
further checking it was found that 30% of the persons that had been  
recommended were now casualties and were no longer with the Regiment.  
It is recommended that recommendations for awards be handled more  
expediously and that orders be issued within at least 10 days  
after the recommendations are submitted enabling the unit to make  
the presentation while the action is still fresh in the minds of  
the men.  

SECRET
Section III: Movies

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For the period 10 to 16 May it was impossible to make movies available to three Battalions inasmuch as they were deployed in a defensive position in mountainous terrain. Movies were shown to the Special Units from the 10th to the 16th of May. After 16 May no movies were shown as the Regiment was heavily engaged. Recommend that movies be made available to the Battalions at every opportunity letting the Special Units wait until such time as the Battalions are unable to show movies.

Section IV: Casualty and Strength Reporting During actual Combat

During the period 16 to 30 May, the regiment was engaged in both defensive and offensive operations. It was found that it is absolutely necessary that a qualified Battalion S-1 representative be present with the forward Battalion Command Post to keep on the spot up to date strength figures of both officers and enlisted men in the various companies. This S-1 representative must have available to him the same communication facilities as the Battalion S-2 and S-3. With this S-1 representative forward, the Battalions are able to report casualty facts and strength more expeditiously giving the Battalion Commander, Regimental Commander and Division Commander up to date information that is necessary for future tactical planning. When the Regimental Command Post is split and there is a forward OP, then it is necessary that there be a Regimental S-1 representative at the forward command post to receive the Battalion casualty and strength information and be able to keep the Regimental and Division Commanders abreast of the casualty and strength situation.

JOHNNIE C. BRINK
Major Infantry
Adjutant

SECRET
SUBJECT: S-2 Evaluation, May 1951

TO: Commanding Officer
38th Infantry
APO 248
San Francisco, California

1. The 8th Army directive that civilians be turned away from the front lines by artillery and/or small arms fire was difficult to carry out, due to the hesitancy on the part of the younger soldiers to fire directly upon groups of old men, women and children. It was noted that three to four days prior to the enemy offensive, the enemy moved large masses of civilians out of their assembly areas. These civilians moving in masses of 3-5000 each, advanced toward friendly lines. In most cases, Liaison aircraft were able to observe each group three (3) to four (4) miles in front of our positions. This gave the regiment sufficient time to dispatch or reroute patrols to intercept these groups and turn them back. However, some groups were able to approach our front lines, passing through our wire entanglements. Civilians turned back at this point are able to return to the enemy and report friendly dispositions.

2. It was noted by interrogation of FWs and civilian informatics that the enemy based the time and date of his attack upon weather to insure poor visibility on the part of our aircraft and artillery. During the enemy attack, troops and OPs reported visibility of less than 50 yards, and artillery liaison aircraft could only fire by observing through holes in the overcast.

3. While wire and mine obstacles were excellent in slowing down the first waves of enemy, their inclination to utilize column attacks made obstacles only effective after the first few waves.

4. The Civilian Transportation Corps utilized for hauling supplies had insufficient supervision and accommodations for housing. Reports from friendly personnel who were present when their positions were over-run indicated CTO personnel picking up weapons and joining enemy troops.

5. There was a marked critical shortage of grease pencils, acetate, thumb-tacks, rubber cement, cellophane tape, masking tape and other necessities during the entire month. Present issues are completely insufficient unless supplemented by private purchase.

6. The provisions of AR 380-5 require that secret and confidential documents when transmitted are to be inclosed in double sealed envelopes. However, the void supply of envelopes makes it mandatory that each person transmitting secret or confidential material violate the AR unwillingly.

7. Present regulations require that US Personnel be cleared to handle secret, confidential and restricted matter, however, other UN Forces, (i.e. Dutch and French), working as an integral part of the US Units do not come under these regulations. This leaves the person transmitting necessary operational data to these forces open to punishment under the Articles of War.

June 1951
SUBJ: S-2 Evaluc on May 1951, Cord’t.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

SECRET

1. Civilians who approach within the limits of UN lines be accepted through the lines and evacuated immediately through PW channels to the rear.

2. Wire and minesfields be layed in at least three belts to insure greater enemy casualties and impede their wave tactics.

3. More thorough screening be made of Civilian Transportation Corps units to insure no unwanted elements are present. More interpreters and Officers be assigned to each unit to better control these groups. A squad tent be issued per platoon to provide them shelter in the areas where all civilian houses have been destroyed by air and/or artillery. This would also greatly assist control by preventing them being scattered throughout the area, thusly confusing enemy from friendly personnel.

4. The present issues of necessary operating office supplies be increased in quantities to supply four (4) battalions plus the regimental operating sections.

5. That necessary steps be taken to amend AR 580-5 to alleviate the requirement of double sealed envelopes when transmitting secret and confidential material within division levels.

6. That necessary regulations be issued covering the security clearance of UN forces other than US Personnel. Also, that due to the turn-over of personnel, a brief temporary form be established that does not require such explicit data which can normally be obtained only by consulting the family bible.

SECRET

Captain, Inf.
S-2
SUBJECT: S-3 Evaluation For Period 1 Thru 31 May 51

TO: Commanding Officer
38th Infantry
APO 248

1. The period 1 through 15 May was spent in extensive patrolling to the front of the LITTLE NO-NAME LINE. Enemy contact was made in several instances and in order to utilize the maximum control over the patrols and to prevent them from being cut off or surrounded a series of phase lines was initiated for patrols. As the patrols reached a phase line, they halted and made lateral communication with one another. Then on regimental order the patrols would push off for the next phase line. This proved very effective as it minimized the opportunity for enemy encirclement and also tended to give patrol members an added sense of security.

2. The use of artillery on patrols proved to be very effective. A forward observer was with each patrol and as the patrol moved forward, the FO would call for a few rounds just forward of the patrol for registration purposes. In the event the patrol ran into enemy activity, there would be no time lag between the fires being adjusted and the "fire for effect" being delivered. It is recommended that all patrols probing deep into enemy territory use this system for maximum amount of enemy casualties and minimum amount of friendly casualties.

3. Patrols departing from various company areas would have to be guided through the minefields and other barrier type installations. By observation, the enemy could ascertain the safe lanes in the minefield. To offset this, a certain portion of the minefield would be disarmed just prior to daylight and the patrol would pass through the area just as if there was nothing
there. This proved to be very effective in deceiving the enemy.

4. The period 16 through 19 May found the 38th fighting a great defensive battle against elements of three Chinese Corps. The one prominent feature that stood out was the bunker-type emplacement with overhead cover. This overhead cover should be of such a thickness to withstand artillery "VT" fires. Time and time again the Chinese would penetrate our positions only to be repulsed by artillery "VT" fires on position. In addition, it was learned that if at all possible, bunker-type emplacements should have apertures in all directions. The enemy then could not assault the position without being detected through the apertures. Also these bunkers should be constructed for three men to insure maximum fire power as well as a feeling of security among the men.

5. The use of tactical wire in conjunction with mine fields did much to stem the Chinese horde. However, it is felt that a 6-strand (toward enemy) double apron fence is the most effective barrier. Also, this wire and mine fields, in addition to being laid in the logical avenues of approach, should also be laid in the less logical avenues of approach as the advance of the enemy is unpredictable.

6. Troops must be indoctrinated with the fact that a clever enemy will endeavor to create the impression that our own mortar and artillery are falling short when in fact it is enemy fire timed to coincide with ours.

7. In the pursuit, it was learned that a greater number of machine guns would greatly speed up the advance of friendly units. The increase in fire power would decrease enemy resistance or overcome it much more rapidly. The M-16 is excellent for this purpose, however crews must be trained and know how to conduct a search by fire.
Hq 38th Inf
Subj: S-3 Evaluation For Period 1 Thru 31 May 51

30 Jun 51

8. The use of the SCR 300 radio with the regimental com- 
mander has proved to be very effective and is highly recommended. 
By this means of communication, the regimental commander is able 
to keep abreast of the situation and is better able to control 
his battalions.

9. It is recommended that in operating over difficult ter- 
rain, the 3.5 rocket launcher be replaced by a light machine 
gun to increase the firepower. At no time during the past month 
was the 3.5 rocket launcher used when the same mission could be 
accomplished by the 57mm recoilless rifle. A 3.5 rocket launcher 
ammunition bearer is only able to carry a few rounds due to the 
weight and as yet suitable targets for the 3.5, such as tanks, 
have not been encountered. The 3.5 rocket launcher could be left 
in the trains and if an operation is made over tank country then 
the 3.5 rocket launcher could be utilized.

WILLIAM E. HANNING
Capt
S-3
HEADQUARTERS, 38TH INFANTRY
APO 248 c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

30, June 1951


TO: Commanding General
2d Infantry Division

1. Operations in May, particularly our successful defense against the massed CCF offensive 16-19 May, indicated the necessity for construction of more extensive field fortifications than heretofore. In this instance it was clearly apparent that the enemy continues to attack in a column of waves thus facilitating his rapid advance through our minefields. To counter this action it is strongly recommended that the depth of all friendly minefields be greatly increased. In addition, preferably 3 or 4, bands of apron fence will effectively delay the enemy long enough for friendly artillery, mortar and other supporting weapons fire to break up and destroy Chinese banzai attacks.

2. On numerous occasions the enemy was successful in penetrating our positions but was driven off, with terrific losses, through the use of friendly VT fire on positions. It is recommended that whenever time permits, all bunker type emplacements will include extra strong overhead cover of such thickness to withstand VT fire. In addition, the bunkers should have firing apertures on all sides in order that occupying personnel can deliver fire regardless of the direction of the enemy attack. Emplacements should be manned by three men thereby facilitating maximum firepower and also giving to men an added sense of security.
(Cont'd, Commander's Evaluation Report for period 1-31 May 51)

3. Civilians approaching friendly tactical wire and mine fields should not be turned back, but should be allowed to pass through friendly lines and assembled, under guard, in the rear areas. It is felt that on some occasions, civilians that approached our positions and were turned back, relayed vital information concerning our defense area to the enemy.

4. While Civilian Transportation Company personnel are very effective as carriers in mountainous terrain, they also pose a serious security problem. During the enemy attack, it was reported that some of the Civilian Transportation Company's personnel picked up discarded weapons and joined the enemy attacking our troops. It is recommended that a ROK Officer be made responsible for the actions and supervision of each group of 25 men, thereby reducing the confusion and adding control during an attack.

5. During the period 1-15 May, a new system of patrolling was introduced: A series of phase lines were set up and as each phase line was reached, the patrols halted, made lateral communication, and awaited orders from regiment to move the succeeding phase line. This method minimized the opportunity for enemy encirclement, concentrated the fire power of patrols, and gave members of the patrols an added sense of security. This method proved to be very satisfactory and is highly recommended.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

[Signature]

WILTON G NORUM
Lt Col, Inf
Exec Off
**38TH INFANTRY STAFF (MAY 51)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CO</th>
<th>Coughlin, John G. - Colonel - 18898 - Inf</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ex Off</td>
<td>Ncrum, Milton G. - Lt Col - 0297857 - Inf</td>
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<tr>
<td>S-1</td>
<td>Brink, Johnnie C. - Maj - 0046558 - Inf</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ass't.</td>
<td>Hughes, Daniel F. - Capt - 01285055 - Inf</td>
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<tr>
<td>S-2</td>
<td>Abanto, Rizalito - Capt - 01301590 - Inf</td>
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<td>S-3</td>
<td>Manning, William E. - Capt - 060466 - Inf</td>
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<tr>
<td>S-4</td>
<td>Peterson, Lawrence R. - Maj - 01291512 - Inf</td>
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**1ST BN**

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<tr>
<th>CO</th>
<th>Kimberell, George W. - Lt Col - 0358524 - Inf</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ex Off</td>
<td>Lieber, Herbert L. - Capt - 01291298 - Inf</td>
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<tr>
<td>S-2</td>
<td>Cronin, Gilbert F. - 1st Lt - 01313392 - Inf</td>
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<tr>
<td>S-3</td>
<td>Sundt, Carl J. E. - Capt - 0554325 - Inf</td>
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**2ND BN**

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<tr>
<th>CO</th>
<th>Hinton, Reginald J. - Capt - 01313094 - Inf</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ex Off</td>
<td>Hinton, Reginald J. - Capt - 01313094 - Inf</td>
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<tr>
<td>S-2</td>
<td>Forney, Jason E. - Capt - 01286266 - Inf</td>
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<tr>
<td>S-3</td>
<td>Duncan, James R. - Capt - 062221 - Inf</td>
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**3RD BN**

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<tr>
<th>CO</th>
<th>Hanes, Wallace M. - Lt Col - 033384 - Inf</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ex Off</td>
<td>Toth, Louis L. - Maj - 01288468 - Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-2</td>
<td>Logan, John A. - Capt - 0523243 - Inf</td>
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<tr>
<td>S-3</td>
<td>Burton, Rhondal - Capt - 01287301 - Inf</td>
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**NETH DET**

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<tr>
<th>CO</th>
<th>Eckhout, Lt Colonel - Inf</th>
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**SERVICE COMPANY**

| CO       | Voorhis, Thomas K. - Capt - 01049005 - Inf |

**HV MTR COMPANY**

| CO       | Brown, Jack D. - 1st Lt. - 0537506 - Inf   |

**TANK CO 38TH INF**

| CO       | Turner, Tom W. - 1st Lt. - 01323366 - Inf  |
I certify that the 3-1 Journal, 1st Bn, 38th Infantry, 2d Infantry Division, from 1 May 1951 to and including 17 May 1951 was lost to due to enemy action in the vicinity of Kun-Hui-Gol, South Korea on 18 May 1951.

* * *

HEADQUARTERS
1st Bn, 38th Inf
APO 248
SECRET
12 June 1951

MONTHLY SUMMARY OF S-1 JOURNAL
12 June 1951

18 May 1951
- Rear OP attacked by Chinese. OP personnel break out of trap approximately 0530. Bn fought way out of trap with out of trap with heavy casualties. Breakdown of strength of companies - Hq Co 12 off 65 EM, A Co 2 off 115 EM, B Co C 0 off 76 EM, C Co 1 off 104 EM, D Co 3 off 96 EM.

19 May 1951
- Stragglers still reporting in. Closed out 1915 hours to move to Ch'Dong-ni, South Korea, DS 127481.

20 May 1951
- Received 140 EM and 7 officer replacements. Bn reorganizing. Capt Leiber - Bn Exec, Lt Gardner - S-3, Lt Cronin 3-2, WOJG MoVay - C-1, Lt Arlington - Hq off, Lt Neal - Hq Co Cmdr, Lt Gwyn - A Co Cmdr, Lt Reden - B Co Cmdr, Lt Beacham, C Co Cmdr, Lt Love - D Co Cmdr.

21 May 1951
- Closed out Ch'Dong-ni, South Korea, DS 127481 at 0900. Closed in Kuran-ni, South Korea, DS 248646 at 1600. Bn set up positions as ambush party in a draw approximately a mile from CPs.

22 May 1951
- Closed in to new area, Chogadong, DS 302729. Closed out Ch'Dong-ni. Company moved upon attack positions.

23 May 1951
- Companies continue in the attack. Routine S-1 functions.

24 May 1951
- Closed out Chogadong, South Korea, DS 0512781. Closed in Kaeryong-dong, South Korea, DS 275855. Battalion continue to attack.

25 May 1951
- Lt Col Kimbril, new battalion commander, vice Lt Col Maixner. Normal operation of S-1.

26 May 1951
- Bn still in the attack! Tentative move to new area. Normal S-1 functions.

27 May 1951

28 May 1951

29 May 1951
- Battalion in the attack. Enemy retreating. Routine S-1 functions.

30 May 1951
- Closed out Hyon-ni, South Korea, DS 402005. Closed in the vicinity of Inje, North Korea, DS 277145. Battalion moved up pass to Inje against limited enemy resistance. S-1 still reorganizing and straightening records.

31 May 1951
- Bn moves up to rear guard defensive positions to protect the right flank of the Northeast units. Normal administrative functions of S-1.

Korean War Project 21D-00400461
SECRET

STATEMENT

5 June 1951

I certify that the S-3 Journal, 1st Bn, 38th Infantry, APO 248,
for the period covering 1 May 1951 to and including 18 May 1951, was
lost due to enemy action in the vicinity of Kun-Mol-Gol, South Korea.

[Signature]
CARL E. SUNDS
Capt. Inf.
S-3

SECRET

Korean War Project 2ID-00400462
ON 1 MAY 1952 IMPEL CALLED FOR THE NAME OF ONE (1) MAN FOR HONOR GUARD. ONE AWOL RETURNED TO COMPANY "I". BATTALION STRENGTH AS OF 2100 ON THIS DATE WAS 37 OFFICERS AND 875 ENLISTED MEN. CASUALTY REPORT SUBMITTED TO IMPEL ON 2 MAY 1952. TEN (10) MEN RETURNED TO DUTY. ON 1 MAY IMPEL CALLED FOR CERTIFIED NAMES OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY MEMBERS. ON 3 MAY IMPEL CALLED FOR MEN ON UNFRIENDLY GROUND. ON 5 MAY IMPEL CALLED FOR PARTICIPATION IN BUN HQ FOR INTERVIEW WITH HQ. ONE (1) OFFICER AND ONE (1) EM LEFT ON DUTY. THREE (3) MEN RETURNED TO DUTY. IMPEL CALLED ON 5 MAY FOR A CHECK DAFTINGTON TO SEE IF HE WAS IN BATTALION. ALL COMPANIES CHECKED AND NO RECORD FOUND OF EM. COMPANY "J" CALLED AND REPORTED THREE (3) AWOL BUT ALL REPORTED BACK TO COMPANY BEFORE DAY WAS OVER. R & R QUOTA WAS RECEIVED FROM IMPEL WITH A BREAKDOWN OF ONE (1) PER COMPANY. COMPANY "J" CALLED ON 7 MAY AND REPORTED ONE (1) AWOL. NAME WAS PV2 RUDY S. QUINTIN RA19366488. TWO (2) REPLACEMENTS RECEIVED AND ASSIGNED TO HQ AND TWO MEN RETURNED TO DUTY. ON 8 MAY FOUR (4) MEN RETURNED TO DUTY. ONE (1) EM FROM EACH COMPANY WENT BACK TO PICK UP PX RATIONS. MEN FOR R & R LEFT. ONE (1) OFFICER AND ONE (1) EM LEFT FOR DUTY. SGT PERCY COMPANY "F" LEFT UNDER GUARD FOR REGIM NT TO BE RETURNED TO JAPAN FOR COURTS-MARTIAL. ON 10 MAY FOUR (4) MEN RETURNED TO DUTY FROM HOSPITAL. ON 11 MAY CHECKED ON PFC LEW C. GILLER FOR ROATION DATE. CALLED COMPANY COMMANDERS FOR CERTIFICATES FROM THOSE MEN SUBMITTED FOR CYDGE TRAINING ARE QUALIFIED. RECEIVED A CALL FROM IMPEL ON 12 MAY FOR ELEVEN (11) MEN TO BE AT ROATION CENTER AT 0700 ON 14 MAY. ON 14 MAY IMPEL REQUESTED STATUS OF PV2 RALPH R. ROGER COMPANY "I". He was MIA on patrol action on 30 APRIL. LT NEWTON CALLED TO HAVE CHILDREN FROM COMPANY K REPORT TO REGIM NT. THREE (3) MEN RETURNED TO DUTY. STATUS WANTED ON PFC FRANCIS JOHNSTON CO L ON 15 MAY BY IMPEL. EM WAS SAW ON 13 FEB, TRANSFERRED HOSPITAL TO IMPEL ON 19 FEB. ON 16 MAY IMPEL CALLED TO HAVE ELMER R. GIBSON CO K REPORT AT 2400. ON 19 MAY CAPTAIN HOGAN AND QUARTERING PARTY LEFT FOR NEW AREA. PULLED OUT OF POSITION BACK TO ASSEMBLY AREA THEN WALK BATTALION LEFT FOR NEW AREA NEAR CHUNG-NI. CASUALTIES FOR 17 MAY WERE WT 1, 18 MAY WT 9, WT 39, WT 41, 19 MAY WT 7, WT 21, WT 44, 20 MAY WT 2, WT 20 MAY CAPT HOGAN AT ADJUTANT CALL AT REGIM NT MOVED TO NEW AREA VICINITY OF PUNGNA-NI. ON 21 MAY CALLED ALL COMPANIES TO HAVE PHYSICAL MUSTER AND SUBMIT ROSTERS IN FOUR (4) COPIES, ALSO BRING MORNING REPORTS UP TO DATE. BROKE DOWN CBS BY RANK AND CALLED INTO IMPEL. ON 22 MAY BATTALION DEPARTED FOR NEW AREA AT WADUNJU. (PS565 758) ON 23 MAY IMPEL CALLED FOR INFORMATION ON PFC CALIBERTS CALVAN CO K. EM WAS LT A on 12 FEB 51, Transferred to hospital unknown 5 MARCH 51. CASUALTIES WT 8, On 24 MAY BATTALION MOVED TO NEW AREA. CASUALTIES ON 24 MAY WT A, WT 11, On 25 MAY WT 11, WT 44, 26 MAY WT 7, WT 35, WT 6. ON 28 MAY FIFTEEN (15) MEN LEFT ON DUTY. CASUALTIES WT 4, WT 50. ON 29 MAY BATTALION MOVED TO NEW AREA AT INJE. CASUALTIES WT 1, WT 11, On 30 MAY ADJUTANT CALL WAS HELD AT IMPEL. CASUALTIES WT 13, WT 3. On 31 MAY BATTALION MOVED TO NEW AREA AT PUCHONG YON (PS28968). IMPEL CALLED TO HAVE PAY PICKED UP AT REGIMENT. CASUALTIES WT 2. BATTALION STRENGTH AS OF 2100 ON 31 MAY WAS 23 OFFICERS AND 711 ENLISTED MEN.
During the period from 1 May to 15 May 1951, the Battalion conducted intensive and aggressive patrolling in the vic KIWANISMAL, South Korea DS043634. These patrols were conducted to both the front and rear of the Battalion sector. The patrols were also instructed to seek and destroy enemy by maximum use of Air and Artillery support. The patrols were also instructed to seek and destroy enemy by maximum use of Air and Artillery support. The patrols were also instructed to seek and destroy enemy by maximum use of Air and Artillery support.

During this period there was no enemy contacted. At approx 151245K May the two lead scouts of Co K patrol observed enemy in a dug-in position, the patrol fired upon the enemy and was soon engaged in a firefight which lasted for 35 min. The patrol repelled a heavy volume of SA and AV fire; the enemy attempted to outflank the patrol but before this could be accomplished Co K patrol withdrew to strategic defensive positions vic DS030940. Upon Rept's order the patrol returned to parent organization without further incident. At 160630K May Co I dispatched a platoon size patrol to patrol the area forward of the Bn sector but due to fire-fights by adjacent friendly unit with the enemy, Co I patrol was ordered return to parent organization. On 17 May 1951 the enemy activity to the Bn front had increased considerably and adjacent units were under constant attack. At 171440 Co I & K each dispatched a platoon size patrol to the front of the Bn sector. At 1825 Co I patrol ret and repth the engaged the en vic DS028873 and they killed 18 en, there were no friendly casualties. At this time there were many reports of large enemy concentrations to our Bn front. Friendly artillery was brought on the enemy causing heavy casualties. At 2210hrs and est 40,50 en attacked Co L pens but the en was soon repulsed. En casualties 10 KIA, unk WIA. During the remainder of the period there were several other reports of en assault on Co L pens but they were all contained. Co L & K also reported heavy sporadic SA fire during the hours of darkness on 17 May 1951. At 180035K May Co K, after receiving a heavy volume of SA fire from an est 3 en Co, withdrew from their pens on HILL 800, however after friendly artillery was lifted elements of Co K "banned" the hill and by 0120 hrs Co K had retaken their pens after driving the enemy off. At 0215 hrs Co I was again attacked and by 0325 Co L and K also reported they were under attack. During the attack friendly artillery had placed a heavy volume of fire on the enemy causing heavy en casualties. At 0515 hrs the enemy penetrated Co L pens but the gap was soon closed and by 0535 the enemy had withdrawn. During the morning of the 17th there was considerable rear action due to enemy infiltrators. There were also reports that the enemy was again massing in front of the Bn sector vic HILL 916. Friendly artillery and Air strikes caused the enemy to disperse. Throughout the remaining hours of daylight all enemy activity was brought under friendly artillery fire. At 2130 Co I reed a light attack but this was soon repulsed and only sporadic SA fire was rptd during the rest of the period of 18 May. During the early morning hours on 19 May the enemy began many probing attacks against all positions of the Bn. At 0655 hrs the enemy had penetrated the lines of the unit on Co L left flank, the enemy then attempted to surround Co L but before this could be accomplished Co L withdrew their left flank to strategic defensive positions and sealed off the enemy. During the morning the enemy attacks lessened and during the afternoon only sporadic SA fire was rptd. This Bn was relieved by the 1st Marine Division at approx 1945 hrs. During the period from 23 May to 31 May this Bn went into the attack against the enemy, enemy resistance during this period was light to moderate. At 31 May the Bn was LOC at INJS, North Korea D3263113.