- (CSHIS-5) -

COMMAND AND UNIT HISTORICAL REPORT

38th Infantry Regiment

for

November 1950

Assigned To: 2d Infantry Division

APO #248 US Army

Approved By:

JOHN G. COUGHLIN
Colonel  Inf
Commanding

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS
38th Infantry
APO 248 c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

28 March 1951

AG 314.7

SUBJECT: Command and Unit Historical Report (CSH 18-5)

THRU: Commanding General
2d Infantry Division
APO 248 c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California
ATTN: Historian

TO: The Adjutant General
Department of the Army
Washington 25, D.C.

1. Under the provisions of Memorandum 72, dated 30 August 1950, 2d Infantry Division, the Command and Unit Historical Report for the month of November 1950 is here-with submitted.

2. The attached report was obtained by personal interview with members of this command who served in command capacities during this period.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

J. C. Brink
J. C. BRINK
Major, Inf
Adjutant

1 Incl:
Command and Unit Historical Report for November 1950.
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HEADQUARTERS 38TH INFANTRY
APO 248 c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

25 March 1951

From: Regimental S-2
To: Historical Section, 38th Inf

I certify that to the best of my knowledge and belief the following listed dates of November Journals this Section, were lost at Kuni-Ri, 30 November 1950 due to enemy action.

1 November 1950
2 November 1950
3 November 1950
10 November 1950
13 November thru 30 November 1950

Capt Inf
Regt S-2
HEADQUARTERS 38TH INFANTRY
AFO 248 c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

31 March 1951

FROM: Regimental S-3

TO: Historical Section, 38th Infantry

I certify that to the best of my knowledge and belief the following listed dates of November Journals this Section, were lost at Kun-ri, 30 November 1950 due to enemy action.

20 November 1950
21 November 1950
22 November 1950
28 November 1950
30 November 1950

[Signature]

WARREN D. HODGES
Maj
Inf
Regt
S-3

Korean War Project 2ID-00400075
HEADQUARTERS 38TH INFANTRY
AFO 248 c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

1 April 51

SUBJECT: Missing 1st Bn Journals for period of November 1950.

I certify that to the best of my knowledge and belief, the following listed dates of November Journals, 1st Bn 38th Inf, were lost at Hoengsong on 12 February 1951 due to enemy action.

S-1 1 Nov to 30 Nov (inclusive).
S-2 1 Nov to 12 Nov (inclusive)
     15 Nov
     18 Nov
     20 Nov to 30 Nov (inclusive).
S-3 1 Nov to 30 Nov (inclusive).

JOHN VALENTINE
Captain, Inf
Historian
FROM: S-2

TO: Historian, 38th Infantry

C-E-R-T-I-F-I-C-A-T-E

I certify that journals for S-2, covering November 1950 period were lost 30 November at Kuni-Ri due to enemy action.

HAROLD V. MAIXNER
Lt. Col. Inf
Commanding

FROM: S-3

TO: Historian, 38th Infantry

C-E-R-T-I-F-I-C-A-T-E

I certify that journals for S-3, covering November 1950 period were lost 30 November at Kuni-Ri due to enemy action.

HAROLD V. MAIXNER
Lt. Col. Inf
Commanding
HEADQUARTERS
2nd Bn, 39th Infantry
AFO 249

31 March 1951

CERTIFICATE

1. I certify that the following listed dates of November journals of this hqs were lost at Runi-Ri 30 November 50 due to enemy action:

2. Missing dates of journals of this hqs for November are:

3-1 Section - 1st to 3rd Nov (inclusive)
- 10 Nov
- 21 Nov
- 22 Nov

3-2 Section - 22 Nov
- 21 Nov
- 27 to 30 Nov (inclusive)

3-3 Section - 21 Nov
- 22 Nov
- 29 Nov

[Signature]

ROBERT L VAN SHOTEN
Captain, Infantry
Battalion Adjutant
TO: Historian, 38th Infantry

I certify that journals for S-1, covering November 1950 period were lost 30 November at Kuni-Ri due to enemy action.

HAROLD V. MAIXNER
Lt. Col.  Inf
Commanding

TO: Historian, 38th Infantry

I certify that journals for S-2, covering November 1950 period were lost 30 November at Kuni-Ri due to enemy action.

HAROLD V. MAIXNER
Lt. Col.  Inf
Commanding
HEADQUARTERS 3RD BATTALION
38TH INFANTRY
APO 248 c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, Calif.

29 March 1951

FROM: S-3

TO: Historian, 38th Infantry

C-E-R-T-I-F-I-C-A-T-E

I certify that journals for S-3, covering November 1950 period were lost 30 November at Kuni-Ri due to enemy action.

Harold V. Naixner
Lt. Col. Inf
Commanding
NARRATIVE SUMMARY
of
38th Infantry Regiment
November 1950

SECRET
1 November 1950:
The regiment continued to occupy its assembly area in the vicinity of Seoul. Units continued training, reorganization, and maintenance of equipment and vehicles. "I" Company continued to guard the pontoon bridges over the Han River from north into Seoul. "L" Company continued to secure the Yong-dong-po railroad terminals. Officials in the terminals stated that pilfering and thievery had been completely eliminated since the company had taken over the guard. The 1st Bn remained under the operational control of the 3rd Logistical Command, located in Inchon. At 1650 hours, orders were received to move the Regiment, less Tank Company, (which was to move under the control of the 72nd Tank Bn) to Sariwon. Throughout the remainder of the period units made preparations to move.

2 November 1950:
"I" Company, "L" Company, and the 1st Bn were relieved from attachment and reverted to regimental control. At 0400 hours, the 2nd Bn, followed by Headquarters & Headquarters Company, Medical Company, 1st Bn, 3rd Bn, and Service Company, departed for Sariwon. The motor march to Sariwon was made without incident and the regiment closed into Sariwon at 1915 hours. Orders were then received from Division to move the next morning at 0400 hours to a position north of Sunchon.

3 November 1950:
The Regimental Quartering Party departed Sariwon at 0145 hours. Using the same march formation employed for the move on 2 November, the regiment departed Sariwon at 0400 hours. The march was made without incident and the regiment closed into Tappo-ri at 1645 hours. Forty 2½ ton trucks, received from army for the move, were ordered held in reserve to keep one Bn completely mobile and ready to move immediately on orders. The 1st Bn was selected as the mobile force. The regiment then went into a perimeter defense and prepared patrol plans for the following day. Reports received from the front, (approximately 3 miles north of Tappo-ri) indicated that the ROKs were in contact with the enemy. There was very little activity during the night. Refugees coming across the river in the 1st Bn sector throughout the night were turned-over to the ROK forces in the area for disposition. Instructions were forwarded to the battalions to keep refugees on the roads, and moving south of the combat area. At 2145 hours, "G" Company of the 2nd Engineers was placed in direct support of the regiment.

4 November 1950:
There was no enemy activity reported during the early morning hours. At 0745 hours, the 3rd Bn sent a platoon sized patrol to occupy and outpost Hill 703, a large hill mass directly to the regiment's front. The terrain was very rough and steep. Stripping themselves of all excess equipment, one squad worked their way up to the top of the hill. No enemy or ROK troops were sighted. Orders were sent to the patrol not to occupy the hill, but to return to their parent organization. The 2nd Bn sent a patrol to contact the 9th Infantry located at Kunu-ri and obtain their dispositions, right flank coordination, and enemy situation.
The patrol worked its way to the base of the hill and part of the way around without making contact with enemy or ROK forces. The 1st Bn sent a patrol south, parallel to the river, to look for crossing sites and to check the road network. This patrol reported no suitable crossings, and that the roads would not handle over a 3/4 ton truck.

At 0940, division Air OP observed an estimated 2 enemy companies moving toward Hill 325, on the Regiment's left flank. The 2nd Bn immediately formulated plans to send one rifle company with one platoon of 4.2 mortars to the area. However, before this force departed from their area, division informed them that this hill was in the 9th Infantry sector, and they would deal with the threat.

At 1047 hours, units were alerted to occupy defensive positions in their assigned sectors. The 3rd Bn to occupy the left sector, the 2nd to occupy the right, and "A" Company, (remaining on the perimeter of the mobile 1st Bn) was to occupy defensive positions to the right of the 2nd Bn. Reconnaissance patrols left for their respective sectors at 1515 hours, orders 3rd received from Division that the regiment would not occupy the MLR, but would outpost it only. "F" Company occupied outposts on Hills 219, 189, and 415 while "K" Company occupied outposts on Hills 437, 287, and 151. The remainder of the period was quiet with units improving their positions on the perimeter.

5 November 1950:
Throughout the period there was no enemy activity in the regimental sector. The 2nd and 3rd Bns maintained their outposts and sent patrols to their front to contact the enemy and to sweep the area. A patrol from "F" Company departed for Hill 1011, swept around the base, searched out the ridges leading to the top, and covered the forward and rear slopes without making enemy or friendly contact. Contact patrols were dispatched to the 9th Infantry, II ROK Corps, and the 6th ROK Division Headquarters to ascertain troop dispositions and exchange information.

At 1350 hours, the regiment was alerted to move the mobile Bn, with BCT attachments, as soon as possible to the vicinity of Yongdong-ni. The 1st Bn was ordered to move when the attachments necessary to make them a BCT were available to them. At 1545, the 1st BCT moved out. The BCT commander was informed that if he had to fight his way up to assume his assigned position, (set up road blocks and assume a blocking position at the road junction between the towns of Cho‘ang and Yong-dong-ni) he was authorized to stop the movement and proceed the following day at sunrise.

At 1500 hours, the regiment was alerted to move in BOT formation as soon as additional transportation was available. The 2nd Bn immediately pulled-in their outposts and made preparations to move in BOT formation.

Orders received from division indicated the following dispositions: the 2nd BCT was to go into an assembly area approximately 5 miles to the rear of the 1st BCT. The 1st BCT was to move through the 2nd and 1st Bns to the town of Yongwon and there establish road blocks and assume blocking positions. The entire movement was to be accomplished as BCTs. In addition, a task force from the 2nd Reconnaissance Company would screen to the front of the 1st BCT to allow uninterrupted movement to assigned sectors.

Upon reaching the town of Youngha-ri, at 0100 hours, the 1st Battalion Commander was informed by messenger that the 2nd Reconnaissance Company was in contact with the enemy ahead.
He then stopped his column for the night, forming a perimeter type defense.

Meanwhile, the 2nd BCT, Regimental Headquarters Company, Medical Company, and Service Company departed Topto-ri at 2000 hours. These units, after an uneventful motor march, closed into the town of Pukchang-ni at 0600 hours.

6 November 1950:

Upon closing into the Pukchang-ni area, radio contact was established with division and subsequent orders were given for the lst and 2nd BCTs to remain in their present positions until further orders. At first light, transportation was dispatched to the 3rd BCT, Tank Company, Mortar Company, and the remaining rear elements to move them to the Pukchang-ni area.

Division further defined the mission of the regiment by ordering the BCT to assume blocking positions to the north and east, to sweep and protect the right flank of the Corps, to maintain aggressive patrols, contact and combat in nature. Another mission defined was to maintain daily contact, by means of patrols, with any ROK or US units in the area and to receive troop dispositions and enemy information. At daybreak, the lst and 2nd BCTs and the Regimental I&R platoon were ordered to send out aggressive patrols.

The lst BCT was ordered to contact the 2nd Reconnaissance Company at Maengsan, and the 2nd BCT was ordered to contact the 16th and 21st ROK Regiments in the vicinity of Tokchon. The I&R platoon was ordered to sweep the right flank to Sochang-ni to determine enemy presence and the trafficability of roads.

At 1515 hours, division ordered the movement of one BCT to a position east of Yong-dong-ni to prevent enemy movements from the north and east. The 2nd BCT was accordingly ordered to move to this new position. By 1745 hours, the entire BCT was closed into their new area and were in the process preparing defensive positions.

The remainder of the period was quiet with the 3rd BCT closing into Pukchang-ni at 2230 hours.

7 November 1950:

Activity throughout the early morning hours was limited to the 2nd BCT occupying defensive positions and manning road blocks.

At 0835 hours, "G" Company, in defensive positions facing east, was hit by an estimated 250-300 enemy from the north and east, with heavy automatic weapons fire, small arms, and sporadic mortar rounds, the enemy attacked frontally, and on the left flank, attempting to drive the company from its defensive positions. The Company was successful in beating off the attackers. At 1135 hours, the enemy again attacked, this time frontally and from both flanks. Inflicting heavy casualties upon the enemy, the defenders were able to stem the advance, and force the attackers back. Again, at 1430 hours, the company was under attack. However, this attack was of short duration and by 1500 hours the company was still maintaining its strong defensive position. The company suffered 6 KIA and 40 WIA, while the enemy suffered 75 known casualties.

That night, under cover of darkness, "G" Company moved its CP to a new location, as the company commander had observed that throughout the fighting the enemy had scouted out most of his positions. It was fortunate that this move was made, for after darkness, an enemy patrol, of platoon size, succeeded in infiltrating behind the company's lines and attacked the old CP location.
Expend many grenades and small arms fire, the enemy was thrown into confusion when a patrol covering the old OP location directed fire on them, forcing them to retreat in the direction of their own lines.

"E" Company, on line to the left of "G" Company, was not in direct contact with the enemy although they were able to aid "G" Company with their machine guns on their right flank. During the early evening hours, "E" Company could hear movement to their direct front, but no enemy contact was made.

From the days action with "G" and "E" Companies, it was apparent the enemy was either moving more troops into position or shifting his forces to attempt a breakthrough at some point. Accordingly, the decision was made to commit the 3rd BCT to the left of the 2nd BCT, exclusive of the river.

At 2000 hours, the 3rd BCT was alerted to move as soon as possible after daylight to assume defensive and blocking positions to the left of the 2nd BCT. Advance parties immediately left to contact the 2nd BCT and obtain as much information as possible as to flank contact and enemy locations and make their ground reconnaissance for their defensive positions.

The 1st BCT remained in their position in the vicinity of Yongha-ri and sent patrols to sweep the right flank along with the I&R platoon. All patrols reported negative enemy contact, but much information on the trafficability of the road network was obtained.

8 November 1950:
At 0637 hours, "G" Company received scattered enemy small arms fire from their front. Preparations were made to repulse another enemy attack. However, it did not materialize, for by 0805 hours, all firing had ceased and the entire 2nd Bn front was quiet.

At 0700 hours, the Regimental I&R platoon departed Pukchang-ni to check the road network for possible enemy roadblocks up to the 2nd BCT area. In the vicinity of Sinsongni, an enemy machine gun and small arms fire confronted the patrol from the right. The patrol returned the fire and ran the gauntlet without suffering any casualties. The "getaway" vehicle, attempting to back out, was hit by a few rounds of automatic weapons fire and ran off the road. The personnel of the vehicle, using ravines and ditches for cover, backed away to warn the 3rd BCT, moving up, of the roadblock.

At 0730 hours, the first unit of the 3rd BCT cleared Pukchang-ni for their assigned area. Several miles short of the enemy roadblock, the I&R platoon contacted them, warning them of the roadblock. One platoon of "G" Company was immediately sent to the hills on both sides of the road to make contact with enemy forces maintaining the roadblock. The nearby hills were scoured but no enemy forces discovered. The BCT passed through the area without incident.

The 1st BCT was ordered to send a company sized patrol to sweep through the ambush area for a distance of 3000 yards on both sides of the road. The combat patrol returned that afternoon with negative results.

At 1250 hours, "E" Company sent a 17 man patrol north along the road to Yongwon. The patrol departed and reached a point approximately one mile north of "E" Company's positions when radio contact was lost.

Meanwhile, units of the 3rd BCT began to arrive to relieve units of the 2nd BCT, which had taken positions north of the river. By
1530 hours, all units were in position and ready to coordinate and make preparations to send patrols to their front.

At 1400 hours, "E" Company, relieved by "K" Company, moved south to envelope the enemy's right flank by moving up and occupying Hill 672. At 1504 hours, "E" Company moved out and started up the ridges leading to the top of the hill. Initially, the resistance encountered consisted mainly of light small arms fire. However, as the attack progressed upward, the resistance stiffened and heavy automatic weapons fire was being received by the company. The company continued their advance in the face of this fire, and by 1700 hours, the right half of the hill was secured. By 1720 hours, the entire hill was occupied and mopping up operations were in progress. The hill was immediately secured against possible enemy counter-attack. The company suffered 2 KIA, 4 WIA and inflicted 60 known enemy dead. It was estimated that "E" Company took the hill against an enemy force of a company, plus.

At 1900 hours, the first reports of "E" Company's 17 man patrol began arriving at Headquarters. The patrol leader and one other man were picked up by "K" Company as the two men approached the 3rd BCT's defensive positions. Both were wounded and in need of immediate medical aid. After receiving medical aid, they were able to tell what had happened.

"The patrol left "K" Company lines heading north to Yongwon. As they approached the village of Tuom-ni, a civilian was observed coming in their direction along the road. On sighting the patrol, the civilian ran back into the village. Because of the suspicious actions of the civilian, the patrol entered the village in a column formation. As they passed the first houses, they were fired on from both sides of the road. Moving into one of the buildings, the patrol was successful in beating off several rush attacks by an estimated 200 enemy. The patrol then decided to make a break out of the trap and return to friendly lines. Firing all their weapons, the patrol rushed out of the house and broke up into small groups, heading for the nearby hills and friendly lines."

The 3rd BCT was alerted to be on the lookout for any members of the patrol attempting to return to our lines. The BCT was at the same time alerted to prepare an armored combat patrol to proceed to the town of Tuom-ni at first light and search the area for any other members of the patrol and then to destroy the village.

9 November 1950:

At 0345 hours, an enemy patrol, of platoon size, was successful in infiltrating around the west flank of "K" Company's defensive positions and opened fire on the rear of the company. The company immediately returned the fire and proceeded to eject the infiltrators. Although the company observed enemy casualties, the bodies could not be found at daylight and it was assumed that the enemy had removed their casualties while withdrawing.

At 0545 hours, two more men from the "E" Company patrol returned through "K" Company's lines. They also were wounded and received immediate medical aid. They were evacuated immediately to the Aid Station for treatment. At 0945 hours, one more man from the patrol came through the lines, also seriously wounded.

At 0945 hours, the Assistant Division Commander ordered the complete destruction of the village of Tuom-ni, if it had not already been accomplished. Interrogation of the men of the patrol who had returned indicated that the villagers had assisted in drawing them into the trap. Instructions were issued that when the
armored recovery patrol cleared the village the air force was to bomb the village, followed by an artillery barrage until all buildings were destroyed.

The armored patrol from the 3rd BCT proceeded north and approximately 1000 yards south of Tuom-ni, found four men of "E" Company patrol. One dead and the remaining three wounded. They were laying on the hillside, stripped of all their clothing, bayoneted and beaten with rifle butts. The wounded were quickly evacuated and the patrol continued on toward the town where they found the remainder of the patrol. In this last group, 6 men were wounded and 3 dead. They also had been stripped of their clothing and left to die of bayonet, bullet, and wounds inflicted by rifle butts in the below freezing weather. One of the men had approximately 50 bayonet wounds on his body penetrating approximately \( \frac{1}{2} \) to 1 inch.

The armored patrol found no enemy or civilians in the town, so returned to their lines with the dead and wounded. The total casualties for the "E" Company patrol was 5 dead and 12 wounded. (One of the wounded died in the aid station while undergoing treatment).

Ten minutes after the armored patrol cleared the town, the air force, with 3 flights of 4 planes each, set the town ablaze, firing rockets and napalm while the artillery, firing high explosives leveled the town.

Meanwhile, patrols from the 2nd and 3rd BCTs were dispatched to the north and east, cross-country, to contact enemy forces if possible. A few prisoners were captured who were stragglers from the enemy outposts. All were Chinese troops. Questioning of the civilians in the small villages in the area revealed the fact that the enemy was apparently withdrawing to the north.

As a result of enemy action during the period, all units were instructed to move their Command Posts, under cover of darkness, to a new location and the old location to be covered with automatic weapons. Foot patrols were ordered to keep off the roads and trails. Cross country routes would be used to prevent ambushes.

10 November 1950:  
Enemy activity throughout the early morning hours were negligible except for movement in a small village to the left of "A" Company. The company fired 5 rounds of mortar into the village and all movement ceased.

Patrols were dispatched by the 2nd and 3rd BCTs to contact enemy forces with negligible results. A 3rd Bn patrol picked up one prisoner who claimed that there were 100 enemy wounded in the town of Nasang-ni. This town was already under attack by the air force and they reported that the town was left in ruins.

At 1420 hours, division notified the regiment that the 2nd and 3rd BCTs would be relieved by the 1st and 3rd Bns of the 10th ROK Regiment. The relief would be accomplished over a period of two days. The 2nd BCT was to be relieved commencing at daylight, 11 November, and thereafter to proceed to Sunchon. This, however, was later changed to Pukchang-ni. They were ordered to locate an assembly area for the 1st ROK Bn, which was moving up late in the afternoon.

During the afternoon and evening hours there was no enemy activity. Civilians were reported passing through the 3rd Bn lines, which indicated the enemy was moving into their front in numbers. Regiment immediately ordered the Bn to stop civilians from passing through the lines to prevent enemy infiltration. The 3rd Bn was given permission to fire on the civilians if they did not respond to orders or interfered in any way with military operations.
11 November 1950:

Enemy activity during the early morning hours was slight. The 3rd BCT heard movement to their front, close in. After throwing grenades toward the movement all activity ceased. Patrols were sent in the early morning to search the area but returned with negative results. At daylight the relief of the 2nd BCT began and by 1030 hours was completed with the first march units moving back into the regimental perimeter to Pukchang-ni at 1345 hours.

Meanwhile, the division issued orders that the regiment would assume blocking positions and secure the town of Pukchang-ni. The regiment was also ordered to continue aggressive patrols to the east and southeast in its area of responsibility.

At 1330, "C" Company departed to Chasan to relieve "I" Company, of the 23rd Infantry, from its mission of protecting IX Corps Headquarters.

The 3rd ROK Bn moved into an assembly area to the rear of the 3rd BCT, preparatory to effecting relief at daybreak.

Throughout the day, the 1st and 3rd BCTs sent out patrols to the east and southeast to reconnoiter the road network and the trafficability of them.

12 November 1950:

At daybreak, the 3rd ROK Bn commenced the relief of the 3rd BCT and completed by 1030 hours. At 1330 hours, the 3rd Bn closed into the regimental perimeter and assumed blocking positions to the west of Pukchang-ni.

Patrols to the east discovered all road network leading east had been effectively cut by means of craters or boulders in the road. Attempts to make contact with the 65th RCT on the regiment's right were unsuccessful. Air accompanied all patrols to assist in searching out the road network and maintaining communications with the regiment.

13 November 1950:

There was no enemy activity during this period. Civilian reports repeatedly mentioned the presence of enemy in the area. However, when combat patrols were sent to the reported locality, no enemy were found. Patrols were sent from each BCT to the south and east in an attempt to find possible roads to the east.

14 November 1950:

The 65th RCT dropped an overlay of their position, and pointed out a location where contact between units might be effected. No enemy contact was made during the period. Patrols had been dispatched to the east and southeast and reported all roads had been effectively cut.

15 November 1950:

An overlay of our positions was dropped to the 65th RCT and an overlay of the route we would attempt to use was shown. The Regimental I&R platoon was dispatched over a new road discovered from Noln-ni east, but again, three large craters were discovered, and "C" Company, 2nd Engineers was notified to attempt to fill these holes. The craters measured approximately 15 feet in depth and 35 feet in diameter.

16 November 1950:

Patrols were again dispatched, the majority over-land, cross-country to the east and southeast in an attempt to pin-down civilian reports of enemy in the area. All returned with negative results.
The 2nd Engineers, by nightfall, had one of the craters passable to 2½ ton trucks and the second crater partially repaired.

17 November 1950:
Patrols were again sent out from each BCT to investigate Civilian reports of enemy in the hills who came out only at night for the purpose of raiding their villages. The patrols returned with negative results. Civilian reports were apparently falsely made in an attempt to get UN Army protection for their villages. No enemy activity was encountered during the period.

18 November 1950:
Patrols were again sent out by all BCTs and the Regimental I&R Platoon. The I&R patrol was reinforced with engineer personnel who marked and tested the structural capacities of bridges and roadways to the east. A new road was discovered south of the road being prepared by the engineers. However, at the town of Habongsan-ni, they discovered a destroyed bridge that required 60' spans. Engineers accompanying the patrol stated that no vehicular bypass was possible due to the terrain on both banks of the stream. Other patrols reported that the ROK forces to our front had stabilized the lines, and Tokchon was in friendly hands. During this period, motorized patrols were having difficulty obtaining sufficient gas for their reconnaissance. Division had reported that POL supplies were in a critical state, and motorized patrols should be used only when necessary. Foot patrols would be increased.

19 November 1950:
Patrols were dispatched from the 1st and 3rd BCTs at daybreak. However, the 2nd BCT patrols were delayed due to lack of gas. Division informed the regiment that POL supplies were on the way. Sufficient gas was obtained from Service Company to dispatch the 2nd BCT patrols. Patrols from the 1st and 3rd BCTs consisted primarily of foot patrols, whose missions were to scout the nearby hills for a distance of approximately 5 miles from the BCT position. Motorized patrols were contact in nature, obtaining the latest situation from the front, plotting friendly and enemy lines. An "E" Company motorized patrol contacting villages to the southeast for intelligence information came across freshly dug roadblocks on a secondary road. These roadblocks consisted of deep square holes dug near bridges where a bypass was impossible. Civilians in a nearby town stated that approximately 20 enemy had dug the craters the previous night, and then gone into the hills. However, during the entire period, no enemy contact was made. One patrol from "F" Company discovered 1 North Korean soldier in a town. He was not armed and stated that when his regiment had been overrun, he returned to his home, intent on peaceful living. This PW was returned to the regimental PW cage, and after interrogation was sent to division.

20 November 1950:
The Regiment continued its assigned mission of securing and maintaining blocking positions in the vicinity of Pukchang-ni and protecting the right flank of the Eighth U.S. Army. The Regiment began preparations to move north to occupy designated assembly areas, along the ED prior to going into the attack to seize Division objective "A".

A motorized patrol from the 1st BCT made contact with the 10th ROK Regiment at Maengan. The ROK's reported engaging an estimated force of 3 enemy companies, possibly Chinese, 3,000 yards south of Yongwon. At this time the 1st ROK Bn was reported to be across the river at Sinpyong.

A reinforced reconnaissance platoon, accompanied by a squad from "G" Company, 2d Engineer Bn, departed from Pukchang-ni and proceeded 4 miles north of Tokchon where they encountered the 18th ROK Regiment launching an attack. The patrol returned to Tokchon and proceeded west to Kunu-ri on a road reconnaissance.
Upon their return, they reported the road to be in good condition with one-way traffic at various locations.

As of 1600 hours Battery "A", 503rd FA Bn, and one ammunition Section, Hq Battery 503rd FA Bn, were attached to Regiment.

21 November 1950:

In order to comply with a Division directive, Regiment ordered the 1st & 3rd BCTs to effect the relief of elements of 2d ROK Corps by darkness. Preparations were started in the early morning and at 0155 hours the 3rd BCT departed from their positions located in the vicinity of Pukchang-ni. They were followed shortly thereafter by the 1st BCT and Battery "G", 36th FA Bn. Prior to moving out, the 1st BCT was strengthened by the return of "G" Company, 36th Infantry, which had been attached to IX Corps in the Chasan area. After an uneventful move of approximately 24 hours all three units closed into their designated assembly area in the vicinity of Changseong-ni. Meanwhile, the remaining elements of the regiment continued preparations for moving the following morning.

22 November 1950:

At 0730 hours, the remainder of the regiment, with attachments motored to Changseong-ni. The trip was uneventful and by 1616 hours the regiment, in its entirety, had closed into position.

Prior to darkness, the 1st BCT had completed the relief of the 1st Bn, 19th ROK Regiment and 1st & 2d Bns, 5th ROK Regiment. In the meantime, the 3rd BCT effected the relief of 3rd Bn, 5th ROK Regiment and 3rd Bn, 3rd ROK Regiment, thereby completing the relief of elements of the 2nd ROK Corps as ordered by Division.

The Regimental I&R Platoon made a reconnaissance forward of the L/D approximately 5 miles where they contacted elements of the ROK 3rd Regiment. The ROKs informed them that the enemy was located approximately 5 miles to their front.

23 November 1950:

During the early morning hours no enemy contact was made. Although Division designated 24 Nov as "D" Day, verbal permission was obtained to exploit, tactically, the information received from the I & R Platoon the preceding day. It was decided that the 1st & 3rd BCTs would attack and secure the Tokchong-Kujang Dong road. At daylight, both BCTs proceeded forward without encountering any enemy opposition. At 1500 hours they had occupied positions on the high ground, just north of the road. The 3rd BCT held positions in the vicinity of Somin-ni while the 1st BCT took up positions to their immediate left.

During the move forward, "I" Company discovered an abandoned mine which contained more than 500 tons of American made mortar and small arms ammunition. This was subsequently investigated and found to be an enemy ammunition dump.

The 3rd ROK Regiment, which was in position along the right flank of the 3rd BCT, tied its left flank onto the right flank of 3rd BCT.

Platoon sized combat patrols were sent to the north approximately 3000 yards without making enemy contact. Preparations were made for combat patrols to range to the northeast.

Arrangements were also made for both BCT Commanders to make an aerial reconnaissance of objectives in their respective zones of action. Meanwhile the 2d BCT was directed to pass through the 1st BCTs positions and prepare to continue to advance, on order, until they had reached Phase Line 2.
24 November 1950:

At daylight, the 2d BCT departed from Changsang-ni on orders from Division, to prepare to pass through the 1st BCT. As the BCT was moving forward, patrols dispatched to the north returned without making enemy contact. Meanwhile, Commanding Officers of the 2d and 3d BCTs were making an aerial reconnaissance of objectives in their zones.

At 1200 hours, while the 2d BCT was moving forward to positions in rear of the 1st BCT, leading elements of the 1st BCT observed a 9 man enemy patrol crossing the river, heading for the high ground to the BCTs front. This patrol was quickly brought under fire and forced to return to the direction from which it came; however, later investigation showed that three members of the patrol were killed.

An air observation plane reported observing freshly dug positions on Hill 1229, center of the regimental zone, and estimated that approximately 500 enemy occupied the position. An air strike was directed on the hill, killing an estimated 150 enemy. Meanwhile, "E" Company had out-posted Hill 453, located on the north side of the river, with a re-enforced platoon.

Prior to affecting a relief of the 1st BCT, the 1st & 2d BCT Commanders made a ground reconnaissance.

25 November 1950:

At 0015 hours, regiment directed the 2nd BCT that they would relieve the 1st BCT and a company of the 9th Inf Regiment, which was located on the Regiment's left flank. This relief was to be effected as soon as possible after daylight. All BCTs were notified; with the exception of "E" Company out-posting Hill 453, no units would move north of Phase Line #1, except on Division order. However, Regiment requested that one Company occupy Hill 1229, a dominating terrain feature on Phase Line #2.

Patrols of 3d BCT were sent forward at daylight with the mission of reconnoitering the anticipated route of advance of the Bn. The forward limit of the patrols to be Phase Line #2. Simultaneously "A" Company was ordered to move forward and, if possible, occupy Hill 1229. After moving forward approximately 1000 yards, the company was held up by flanking fire being delivered from their right. A patrol from the 3d BCT was also involved in a fire fight, receiving fire from the same sector. At 1525 hours, after having inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy, "A" Company was given a regimental order to disengage and proceed to its objective, by dusk, "A" Company had advanced to a point approximately 2000 yards north of Hill 453. While proceeding over the bottom slopes of Hill 625, in their zone of advance, "A" Company ran into an enemy out-post of 3 men.

The enemy opened fire, at an estimated range of 10 yards, with automatic weapons and hand grenades. Simultaneously, an enemy machine gun, on the upper-most slopes of the hill, joined the out-post in delivering fire on "A" Company. Never-the-less, the 1st BCT Commander ordered the company to remain in position through the night and to continue the attack the following morning.

By 2100 hours, the 1st BCT had been relieved by the 2d BCT reverting to regimental reserve, in positions along the MSR.

At 2300 hours, "P" company was under moderate machine gun and mortar fire coming from their immediate front. Within a few minutes the company was heavily attacked by an estimated battalion. The 2nd and 3rd BCTs were alerted immediately to be prepared for a heavy enemy attack. At 0245 hours, a platoon from "L" Company, located on "P" Company's right flank, was under attack.
The intensity of the attack was so great that the machine gunners, in their desire to repulse it, exhausted all their ammunition and were forced to withdraw to the center of the company perimeter to await replenishment of ammunition, leaving the riflemen in positions to stem the enemy's advance.

The Collecting Station, located on the MSR, 1000 yards to the rear of "P" Company, was receiving light mortar and small arms fire. All personnel, with the exception of the men on duty in the operating room, were ordered to form a perimeter defense on the high ground surrounding the station.

At 0400 hours, "P" company informed Regiment that an estimated 40 enemy had penetrated their right flank, opening a gap between "P" & "L" Companies. Regiment immediately ordered 2d BCT to fill this gap.

26 November 1950:
At 0001 hours Regiment ordered 1st BCT to have 1 company occupy the high ground north of the "Aid Station" to assist in defending it, and block any enemy penetration. At 0100 hours, "B" Company, which had been selected for this mission, moved out. "A" company, in position across the river, reported that the enemy, estimated to be in platoon strength, had started to attack. The company was fighting desperately and within the next hour the enemy had built up its forces until they were now attacking in BN strength. Unable to pierce "A" Company's defense, the enemy skirted their flanks and completely encircled them. Permission to withdraw to the Regimental defense line was requested, but this request was denied along with an order to hold the positions now occupied.

Midnight found "G" Company on the regiment's left flank occupying positions on Hill 291. They reported observing enemy groups infiltrating in the area of the Regiment's and 9th Regiment's boundary. Within a few minutes "G" company reported being attacked by an estimated enemy company. This was the last report received from them for sometime, as all communications with them were lost. Meanwhile "F" company was receiving mortar and small arms fire. The fire increased in its intensity and by 0030 hours the company was under an attack which succeeded in piercing the center of the company's defense line. A platoon of "E" company was sent to attempt to close this gap, but the unit was found to be inadequate. In order to attempt to hold the line, the platoon was re-enforced by two more squads from "B" company.

To the left of "P" company, "L" company was under heavy attack and by 0030 hours the enemy had penetrated their positions simply because of their overwhelming numerical superiority. Because of the penetration, one platoon was forced to withdraw into "P" company's area, where they joined forces with an "E" company platoon. Meanwhile, the BCT CP, in the town of Somin-Dong, was under intense small arms and mortar fire. The freezing climate took its toll for most vehicles were cold and could not be started, making it necessary to abandon them. The BCT Commander ordered that the CP be immediately evacuated. As the CP was being evacuated, a direct mortar hit demolished the only radio set, leaving them without communication.

The BCT Aid "Station" and a section of tanks, which were located in the vicinity of the CP also withdrew. Prior to withdrawing two tanks had been lost. The tankers reported encountering rocket launcher fire, apparently American made, for the first time since the Regiment had been committed in Korea.

Personnel of the BCT CP, and elements of "L" company, withdrew in a southerly direction. Upon reaching Hill 404, a perimeter defense was organized.
During this period, "I" & "K" companies, in position 3 to 5000 yards to the north-east of "L" company, reported no enemy activity, but could hear firing to their left rear.

At 0200 hours, "A" company began a fighting withdrawal, carrying their wounded (15 men) with them.

At 0215 hours, the Regimental Collecting Station was ordered to move to the Regimental CP area. This move was accomplished, but only after many of the patients and 11 of the medical personnel were wounded.

At 0230 hours, the enemy attack was gaining momentum, when suddenly, from all parts of the regimental area, came enemy bugle calls and whistle blasts. Immediately, upon these signals, enemy pressure along the regimental front ceased. However, enemy groups that had penetrated the regimental line were re-grouping somewhere behind our lines. The lull in activities was short-lived for at 0300 hours the enemy was delivering automatic and heavy caliber mortar fire on "F" company's position. Meanwhile, "A" company, limited to the FO radio for communication, reported their ammunition, food, and water supply was critical, and also having completely exhausted all their machine gun ammunition. In order to rectify this situation an air-drop was arranged for daylight, however it never materialized.

0430 hours saw the enemy launching a new attack in "L" and "F" company's sector. Initially both company's held their ground, but were later forced to withdraw slightly. In order to cope with this attack regiment ordered the 3d BCT to withdraw all its units and form new defensive positions along a north-west – south-east axis, 1000 yards south of Somin-Dong. Regiment ordered 1st BCT, with "G" company, 2d Engineer BN attached, to attack at daylight to restore the 2d & 3d BCT positions and protect the MSR.

The 1st BCT moved out prior to daylight with their front parallel to the MSR. While the BCT was moving forward in an easterly direction, "F" company, which already had been committed, was attacked by an estimated enemy company causing them to withdraw approximately 500 yards. The 3 BCTs, plus "G" company, 2d Engineer BN, and elements of Regimental Headquarters Company were now committed; communications between Regiment and BCTs were very poor with the situation as follows: "A" company, 2-3000 yards north of the MLR, surrounded by an estimated enemy battalion; "G" company on Regimental left flank was last reported to be in a fire fight with an estimated enemy company; "E" company on "G" company's right flank, was being heavily attacked; "F" company fighting by platoons with one platoon fighting in designated company area, with the whereabouts of the remaining elements of the company not known; "I" company approximately 1000 yards west of Somin-Dong, with the remaining platoons disorganized, wandering aimlessly along the MSR; "I" & "K" companies on Regiment's right flank had held their positions without any action, but the Regiment's right flank had faded behind them, consequently, they were isolated; "B" company which had attempted, unsuccessfully, to hold the line forward of the Aid Station and behind "F" company had been heavily attacked forcing them to withdraw approximately 1000 yards southward, "C" company & "I" company 2d Engineer BN were advancing in an attempt to stabilize the regimental front and to continue the attack until they had restored the original regimental MLR.

At 0500 hours Regiment granted a request to withdraw the "E" company outpost to the regimental defense line.

As the BCT was moving forward they encountered many ambushes. It was now apparent that small enemy groups were moving throughout the regimental rear making reorganization of the regiment all the more difficult.
At dawn, 4 tanks and a make-shift platoon made up from elements of medical, "I" and "H" company men, attacked to the east in an effort to open the MSR to Somin-dong. After encountering only scattered resistance the MSR was cleared to Somin-dong, whereupon the unit changed the direction of its attack to the south, enabling the 3d BCT to return to its original position.

After many unsuccessful efforts to contact "A" company, a liaison pilot was requested to reconnoiter the area in which "A" company was last reported. Flying over the area the pilot reported observing small groups of friendly troops, completely surrounded, fighting their way toward friendly lines. It was further reported that in their fighting withdrawal the troops were carrying their wounded with them. However, there was no definite proof that these groups were elements of "A" company.

The 1st BCT, consisting of "E" company and "G" company, 2nd Engineers, moved down the MSR in the direction of Somin-dong, sweeping the hills on both sides of the road as they advanced. Resistance was light as the enemy was now fighting in small groups. Meanwhile, the 3d BCT was reoccupying the CP held the previous night. However, they were having a difficult time clearing enemy snipers who were firing at very close range.

At 0634 hours "F" company's forward observer reported elements of "A" company passing through "E" company's area. However, these men proved to be stragglers of "A" company who had fought their way through the enemy encirclement.

Air liaison reported observing heavy fighting in the vicinity of the "I" and "K" company boundary lines. Although air could not locate "G" company, he reported that all foxholes in their previous positions were empty. Air also reported that "A" company, reduced approximately to platoon strength, was moving south approximately 1000 yards north of 2d BCT lines. By 1040 hours the first elements of "A" company had fought their way back to friendly lines. The second group, accompanied by elements of "E" company CP arrived at 1400 hours. Elements of both groups totaled 4 officers and 92 En.

Intelligence reports estimated that during the preceding 12 hours a full enemy division had been attacking the regiment. Though casualties were heavy, the regiment was successful in holding it's ground along the entire front with the exception of the right flank where the pressure was heaviest. At 1200 hours regiment ordered a new defense line established. This line would be approximately 2-3000 yards north of the MSR, with the right flank bending back west of the Somin-dong-Tockchon road. By setting the defense up in this manner, the regiment would be in position to protect both Division and 6th Army's right flank. At 1800 hours the regiment had occupied its new defensive position. The 3d BCT was ordered to withdraw "I" and "K" companies and organize a defense line approximately 1-3000 yards west of the Somin-dong-Tockchon road.

The 1st BCT was to assume positions 2-3000 yards south of this road with the 4th BCT remaining in their original positions.

The regimental defense area was now a large horse-shoe shaped arc running generally north-west to south-east.

Losses sustained by "A" company caused them to be ineffective as a company, therefore "G" company, 2d Engineers, was assigned to the 1st BCT as a rifle company. The remaining men of "A" company were ordered to the regimental reserve, in rem of the regimental CP.
In a disengaging action, one platoon of "G" company was assigned the mission of covering the withdrawal of "A" company and the remaining two "I" company platoons. Fighting every step of the way, the two companies arrived at the BCT CP just prior to darkness.

At 1757 hours Regiment received information regarding "G" company's fate. The remnants of the company, 1 Officer and 50 men, arrived at the MSR with reports of fighting a withdrawal. They reported that shortly after midnight the company's CP was surrounded by an estimated enemy company. Attempts to contact the CP were unsuccessful as all communications were out. The officer observed heavy fighting in progress to the rear of his positions, consequently he ordered all weapons to cover the rear. As the new positions facing the south were being dug, the platoon was attacked by an estimated enemy company. After holding their position for 30 minutes the platoon was forced to withdraw toward their left flank. In the process of withdrawing, they had entered the area of a friendly platoon where they joined forces and continued to battle. As soon as there was a lull in the fighting, the platoon leader dispatched patrols to both flanks with the mission of contacting friendly forces. The patrols were out only a short time before they returned with the information that large numbers of enemy forces were on their flanks. Because of this information, the platoon leader made the decision to attack directly to the south in an attempt to reach the regimental lines. The attack was hindered considerably because the group was carrying their wounded.

The enemy, sensing the purpose of the attack systematically delivered fire on the rear elements of the group, inflicting heavy casualties and cutting off small groups as they fired. After fighting savagely for approximately 6 hours the group arrived at friendly lines. Regiment now directed the service train and the Regimental Collecting Station to move in the vicinity of the Regimental CP.

Meanwhile, the 3d ROK Regiment of the 7th ROK Division, passing through our area in a withdrawal action, was attached by a Division verbal order and to come under the command of the 38th Infantry commander.

The 2d BCT retained their original positions. As the status of "G" company was unknown, "G" company, attached to the 2d BCT, was ordered to restore the original "G" company lines. The 3d BCT, along the right of the 2d BCT, occupied positions generally north to south. The 1st BCT was in position from east to west generally parallel to the MSR, with two ROK gaps connected to their left flank; the remaining ROK units (4 in a ROK regiment) were in an assembly area 500 yards in rear of the front line ROK one.

While moving into position, "G" company was attacked by a large enemy force and shortly thereafter was completely encircled. In the meantime "F" company's CP was attempting to drive an enemy force out of their area. While this action was going on, "L" company was staving off an enemy attack from their rear. The action was very heavy and at 0230 hours "F" and "L" companies reported their positions penetrated. Simultaneously, the 3rd BCT was receiving intense small arms fire and was forced to withdraw approximately 2000 yards to the west. "F" and "L" companies, fighting desperately, were forced to withdraw approximately 2000 yards south where they occupied the high ground north and south of the MSR. Meanwhile, "G" company reported that the enemy had succeeded in encircling them. In addition to being encircled, the 3rd platoon was cut off from the rest of the company by a wedge driven through the company lines. However, the company was fighting ferociously in an attempt to break out of the encirclement and reach friendly lines.
27 November 1950.

At 0030 hours, "A" company reported elements of "G" company drifting through their lines. After clearing "A" company's area these elements reorganized for further action. Meanwhile, "I" company reported that they had suffered 30 casualties.

Regiment then directed the 3d BCT to contact the 3d ROK Regiment, directing them to send one battalion to the area occupied by "F" and "I" companies with the mission of strengthening the line. The 3d ROK Regiment was further ordered to dispatch two battalions to the MSR with one battalion in position on the north and one on the south of the MSR.

Renewing its offensive, the enemy was driving the left flank of "I" company on Hill 404, attempting to encircle them. During this time an estimated enemy battalion was driving "A" company back enabling the enemy to recapture the town of Somin-dong. Because of this action the MSR between 3rd BCT and Regiment was effectively cut.

"I" company and a section of tanks which was supporting them broke out of the enemy encirclement and blasted their way through enemy held Somin-dong to a friendly road block 1000 yards west of the village, joining forces with the road block, "I" company fought its way to 4d BCT area.

"B" company, now occupying defensive positions on Hill 404 and 360, continued to be under heavy attack. The enemy forced elements of the company to withdraw to the northern slopes of Hill 404 with the remaining elements of the company fighting desperately to hold Hill 360.

Meanwhile, the enemy had succeeded in driving a wedge between "L" company and the ROK on their left flank, enabling him to deliver observed fire on the Regimental CP and Collecting Station. However, "L" company and the ROK on counterattacked and, with the aid of an air strike, retook their positions.

The 3d BCT, again cut-off, was ordered to consolidate its elements and work west, cross country, in an attempt to join the regiment. Meanwhile the Regimental CP, and the 56th and 503rd FAsns, in positions in rear of the Regimental CP, were attacked from the rear by an estimated enemy company. Administrative personnel and the CP was overrun, and the CP line of approximately 100, causing the enemy to retreat. Mortar rounds continued to fall in the CP area, giving evidence that another attack was to follow. In order to repel the anticipated attack regiment directed the reserve ROK on to occupy the high ground south of the CP.

At 1100 hours, "A" company was again under heavy attack and was forced to withdraw with the right flank of the ROK on. Immediately, Regiment directed "G" company to return to 1st Bn control, whereas, the 1st BCT commander ordered the company to attack in the vicinity of "B" company's area and restore that part of the line. At 1405 hours, the 1st BCT reported observing a steady column of enemy entering a mine shaft on Hill 943, 2500 yards south of the Regimental CP. Regiment ordered the 1st BCT to investigate immediately. "A" company, supported by two tanks and a section of 40mm guns, plus an air strike in the shaft vicinity, started to drive to the mine shaft. In the meantime "G" company had re-established and restored "B" company's, and the ROK lines.
It was now apparent that the regiment was being attacked from three sides. In order to cope with this situation, regiment directed the 3d BCT to cover the withdrawal of the 2d BCT, enabling 4th BCT to assume positions in the south and south-west portion of the regimental area. The 1st BN was to assume positions to the east and north-east; the 3d BCT, after covering the withdrawal of the 2d BCT, would withdraw through the 1st BCT and occupy positions on the western portion of the regimental perimeter. In order to complete the perimeter 2 ROK Bns were set up on the southern portion of the perimeter; 1 ROK bn on the northern portion and their remaining bn in the vicinity of Umdong-dong, in reserve.

After covering the withdrawal of the 2d BCT, the 3d BCT, moving through the 1st BCT, discovered many gaps in the lines. Regiment directed that the 3d BCT would have "L" company assume positions astride the NSR until the 1st BCT could re-occupy their positions. As the 1st BCT attack progressed, "L" company was attached to them. The 3d BCT, minus "L" company, proceeded to its assigned area.

"A" company, making progress in their attack, reported the enemy occupied commanding ground overlooking the center portion of the regimental area. Regiment immediately directed the Collecting Station and Service Train to move to the vicinity of the Division CP, which was approximately 20 miles to the south and south west of their present location. Simultaneously the FA was ordered to displace 6-7000 yards west, placing them in the 9th Infantry Regiment area. Prior to darkness the Regimental CP displaced 1000 yards west along the NSR.

After "A" company reported having the situation well in hand (1725), the regiment spent the rest of the period reorganizing digging positions and establishing lateral contact between units. Some PWs captured during this period proved to be members of units other than those the regiment had been fighting. Intelligence sources estimated that during the past 48 hours the regiment had been attacked by 2 Chinese Divisions, supported by large caliber mortars.

It was strange to note that some prisoners taken by the enemy, after being unarmed, were returned to our lines. Those that had been wounded were first treated and then shown the route to friendly lines.

November 1950:

Shortly after midnight, an outpost forward of "A" company's positions was being driven back by a heavy enemy attack. Within a few minutes "A" and "L" companies, of the 36th Infantry and "G" company of the 2d Engineer Bn, were hit by a fierce enemy attack. A seesaw battle raged and after four hours of fierce fighting, these units were driven from the hill. However, within a matter of minutes the three companies, with the support of a tank platoon, counterattacked and reoccupied the hill.

At 0200 hours, the Regimental CP was again forced to displace as it was receiving small arms and mortar fire from the enemy who had penetrated "A" company's position. No sooner had regiment moved to the 3d BCT's CP area, the enemy occupied the area of the old regimental CP, cutting the NSR. Approximately 300 enemy had cut the NSR and were occupying the high ground on both sides of the road. Regiment directed the 1st BCT to disengage and fight its way through the "road block" and organize new defensive positions approximately 1000 yards west of the NSR. Meanwhile, the ROK bn facing the north was being attacked by two enemy companies.
At 0500 hours, the 1st BCT found it difficult extricating itself, therefore a platoon of tanks and a company of ROKs were directed to go to their assistance. At dawn this task force engaged the road block and after 45 minutes of savage fighting, drove the enemy into the hills. However, before succeeding in driving off the enemy, two tanks were lost to enemy 2.36 rockets. Having cleared the road, the task force continued on until they made contact with the 1st BCT. With a platoon of infantry and tanks acting as a covering force, the 1st BCT withdrew to the regimental CP area.

Division now directed regiment to break contact and proceed by motor march, with the ROKs moving across country on foot, to the vicinity of Kujang-dong, as the 9th and 23d Infantry Regiments on our left were also being forced to withdraw under heavy enemy pressure.

Arriving in Kujang-dong, the regiment started to reassemble and take assigned defense positions to the east of the town. However, before these positions could be occupied, orders were received to get the regiment on the road and move south. Additional instructions would be given by Division while on the move. The regiment moved out of Kujang-dong at 1500 hours.

The strength of the companies within the regiment was low, with some companies numbering 2 officers and 40 to 50 men, however, stragglers from the two previous nights' action continued to drift into the column each time it halted.

Approximately 10 miles south of Kujang-dong, the regiment received additional orders from Division to take up defensive positions north and east of Kum-ri with the 23d Infantry on our left and the Turkish Brigade on our right. Without halting the column the regiment continued south through Kum-ri and into an assembly area, approximately 2000 yards to the south.

29 November 1950:

After spending the early hours of the period in the assembly area the regiment moved out to occupy defensive positions designated by Division. Prior to reaching their limiting point the 2d BCT discovered that the enemy had already occupied the area and was delivering heavy fire on them. Apparently, the enemy was in position in force, for the Turkish Brigade, in the vicinity of Sinmi-ni, reported being surrounded and that a withdrawal of approximately 5000 yards south-east was being planned.

Coordinating with the 23d Infantry and the Turkish Brigade, a new limiting point, 2000 yards to the rear of the positions assigned by Division was agreed upon. The regiment moved into its new defensive area and spent the remainder of the morning preparing defensive positions.

At noon, orders were received to dispatch one company to the Division CP to assist in clearing a road block which was hampering operations. Immediately "C" company, part of the regimental reserve, set out to assist in clearing the road block. An analysis of the road network established the fact that vehicular movement was heavier than usual, making the evacuation of wounded and re-supply of ammunition extremely difficult.

However, regiment remedied the situation by directing all vehicles, not necessary to the immediate tactical situation, be withdrawn south of Kum-ri.

At approximately 1400 hours the 3d BCT was being attacked from the north, east and south, and within a few minutes its right flank was over-run. The remaining elements of the BCT held their ground even though they were faced with a possible encirclement. It became apparent that the enemy was launching a major attack, with the main effort placed along the Kaechon-Kunu-ri...
road, for the enemy had forced the Turkish Brigade to withdraw from Kaechon and was driving very hard on the 2d BCT's positions.

The Turkish Brigade now in rout left the regiment's right flank completely unprotected, allowing the enemy to skirt the right flank, cutting off the 2d and 3d BCTs. The 1st BCT was ordered in position to assist the two BCT's in an attempt to hold the regiment's right flank.

As the 1st BCT moved forward they encountered large masses of Turkish troops and vehicles, in complete rout moving down the road, making it impossible for the BCT to accomplish its mission. Upon notifying regiment of the situation, the 1st BCT was directed to take up defensive positions astride the road, 2000 yards east of Kunu-ri. Subsequently regiment ordered the 2d and 3d BCTs to return to the regimental perimeter as best they could.

During this period the ROKs reported being under heavy enemy pressure and were in the process of withdrawing. Regiment assigned them new defensive positions 3000 yards to the rear of positions now held, with specific instructions to tie in with the 1st BCT.

As the 2d and 3d BCTs attempted to fight their way to the regimental area the enemy disabled the first few vehicles in a narrow pass, making vehicular movement impossible. Forming a perimeter defense around their vehicles the BCT's fought off continued attacks for several hours. Meanwhile, during this action an alternate route of escape was located.

30 November 1950:

Evacuating their wounded by ambulatory vehicles and instructing the infantry to make their way on foot as best they could, the 2d and 3d BCTs were able to get their tanks and some wheeled vehicles around the pass. Continuing on with the Tank-Infantry patrol in the lead, the BCTs fought their way to the regimental perimeter. Upon arrival the BCTs began reorganizing. However, reorganization was quite difficult, as the infantrymen that were left behind with instructions to come in on their own, started to arrive at all conceivable points of the regimental front. Upon completion of their reorganization, the BCTs were ordered to tie in with the 1st BCT and the ROKs. Division informed regiment at 0100 hours that Kunu-ri, the only known escape route for the regimental vehicles, was now partially in enemy hands. Division directed regiment to cover the withdrawal of the 23d Infantry and then go into a new defensive position south of the river, tying in with the 23d Infantry on the left.

The 23d Infantry, on the regiment's left, withdrew just south of Kunu-ri to the high ground as directed.

The Regimental Commander requested division to direct the 23d Infantry, by a platoon of tanks and a company of infantry, to cover the regimental withdrawal over the route through the southern outskirts of Kunu-ri. This was done.

The 3d ROK Regiment was ordered to fall back to the south of the river and tie-in on the high ground with the 23d Infantry, protecting the right flank with one battalion that was already south of the river.

Regiment then ordered the 1st BCT, 3d ROK Regiment, and a platoon of tanks to cover the regimental withdrawal. The 1st BCT, after covering the regimental withdrawal, would travel cross country and form at the assembly point.
As most of the service train and organic vehicles had displaced the previous evening, the evacuation of wounded by vehicles was extremely difficult. In order to make more room for patients, Medical Company was forced to discard some of its equipment. This equipment was destroyed so that it would be of no use to the enemy.

The main body of the regiment formed on the road and prepared to move in the direction of Kunu-ri. At 0300 hours, the regiment moved out with its flanks secured by heavy flank guards.

Encountering only sniper fire as they moved, the regiment arrived at the assembly area at 0400 hours. Meanwhile, the rear guard had started its withdrawal while in contact with the enemy. Moving across country the rear guard arrived shortly thereafter.

Reorganization was difficult. The weather was biting cold. Casualties in the 2nd and 3rd Bns had been heavy, units were mixed and there were stragglers. The men, in addition to being cold were tired. Despite these difficulties Battalion Commanders and their decimated staffs lost no time in assembling their units and by first light were moving towards their new defensive positions south of the river.

No sooner had the regiment started to reorganize when heavy mortar fire started to fall in the area. Simultaneously, the 23d Infantry, in defensive positions to the north, was under heavy enemy attack.

Shortly thereafter, the regiment proceeded south on the Kunu-ri-Sunchon road. After travelling approximately 3 miles south, the regiment halted and prepared to occupy defensive positions south of the river with all battalions on line.

At this time, division informed regiment that the MSR through Sinanju and Sunchon had been cut by the enemy, and that the regiment would proceed to the Division CP, where upon arrival, the regiment would assist the Division forces in fighting out of the enemy encirclement. The regiment proceeded toward the Division CP and closed in the area at approximately 1300 hours. Upon arrival, preparations were made to move through an enemy road block located between the Division CP and Sunchon. The regiment was directed to lead the break out, motorized. The order of march through the road block was as follows: 2d BOT, Regimental Headquarters and Special Unit Headquarters, 3d BOT and 1st BOT.

During this time, regiment had lost all communications with the 3rd ROK Regiment and contact was never regained. However, it was discovered later that the ROKs, after serving as a rear guard for the regiment, had broken up into many small groups with instructions from their own unit, to reform at Sunchon. This did not comply with the instructions given by the Regimental Commander (to occupy a defensive position south of Kunu-ri on the right of the 23d Infantry). Arriving at the road block area, the 2d BOT found "G" company 38th Infantry, and the 9th Infantry along with other divisional elements fighting a firmly entrenched enemy in positions on both sides of the road. Forming a Tank-Infantry team, with remnants of "G" and "H" companies, the 2d BOT moved through the friendly troops and started to attack down the MSR in an effort to clear the road block. After passing through a heavy curtain of automatic fire, the fire slackened allowing them to advance approximately 200 yards without opposition.

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At approximately 1330 hours, the regiment was ordered to move through the road block, motorized. Some men rode artillery vehicles as well as tanks. As the column was under orders to keep moving, the tanks and wheeled vehicles, with air, artillery and infantry support, continued to press forward. Progress was extremely slow for in addition to the enemy fire, the column was forced to halt many times to clear the road of destroyed and abandoned vehicles. Each time the column halted, foot troops dismounted from their vehicles and attempted to find cover as best they could on each side of the road. As the column advanced, and new enemy strong-points were met, courageous officers and non-commissioned officers organized groups, which in some cases included ROKs, Turkish troops and elements of the division, to eliminate these positions. No sooner would a strong-point be eliminated and the infantry proceed forward, the enemy would re-occupy the positions with new weapons and continue to fire upon the column. The leading elements finally succeeded in running the road block at approximately 1600 hours.

After the regiment had passed through the road block, an assembly area was immediately set up and reorganization of the regiment was started.

Initially, the status of the regiment was bleak as only 5-600 officers and men could be accounted for. Subsequently stragglers continued to drift in throughout the remainder of the period and prior to midnight it was discovered that elements of the regiment, numbering approximately 500 officers and men, had continued through Sunchon and were reassembled with Service Company on the outskirts of Pyong-yang.

A tabulation of the total casualties sustained by the regiment for the preceding 5 days action totalled more than 1400, however stragglers continued to arrive making an exact count an impossibility.

JOHN G. COUGHLIN
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding
SERVICE COMPANY
38TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
APO 248 c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

SUBJECT: Daily War Diary

TO: Commanding Officer
38th Infantry Regiment
APO 248 c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California
ATTN: S-2

In compliance with un-numbered Memorandum, Headquarters, 38th Infantry Regiment, subject, Daily War Diary, the following report is submitted.

27 Nov 50- Moved by motor convoy to approximately 5 miles north of Wan-ni, Korea.

Robert C De Vos
Major Inf
Commanding

SECRET
White forces have difficulty forming a new position at the base of the mountain. Contact Blue and select limiting point on R. Also contact ROK Blue and select limiting point on L. Units contacted and limiting points agreed upon. For disposition are attached overlay.

While moving to occupy assigned areas "E" and "F" lost came under SA and AW fire from NW. Blue and ROK Blue were requested to turn fire. Suggested they be obtained from Blue. Blue then under attack from R. where Turkish unit had withdrawn. One of 3 AA dispatched to reinforce 20th. Blue unit in full flight, going west with foot troops, motors, and arty clogging the road. White fire (number of hits unknown) falling in Blue, N. Matten, and Turkish arty area. 3 rounds fell in White CP area. White ordered to withdraw and establish def. point in vic 141182. En fire coming from NE, E, and SE. Road to W effectively blocked by Turkish vehicles which came under en fire in vic 141182.
Ordered withdrawal of "E", "F" and
elements of Blue Br. MSR
from IFR 107 West completely
blocked by wrecked and immovable
vehicles. Those men still in
vic of vehicles ordered to occupy
and defend high ground
531956 under direction of
Lt Col Sheldon & Lt Knight.
Fires in attacks were repelled. Elements of White
and Blue ordered to return
to Rgt C Parac 300100 Nov.
Wounded taken to hill and
mounted on tanks. Men
organized and marched to
Rgt perimeter vic 486966.
Br C D wounded.