### 2d Infantry Division Staff

**for Period**

1 December 1950 - 31 December 1950

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Service Code</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commanding General</td>
<td>Maj Gen Laurence B Kaiser</td>
<td>(1-6 Dec 50)</td>
<td>05316 USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maj Gen Robert B McClure</td>
<td>(7-31 Dec 50)</td>
<td>010356 USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asst Division Commander</td>
<td>Brig Gen Joseph S Bradley</td>
<td>(1-15 Dec 50)</td>
<td>012428 USA</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Brig Gen George C Stewart</td>
<td>(16-31 Dec 50)</td>
<td>015349 USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Asst Div Commander</td>
<td>Colonel James F Barney Jr</td>
<td>(16-31 Dec 50)</td>
<td>012796 Art</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery Officer</td>
<td>Brig Gen Loyal M Haynes</td>
<td></td>
<td>06379 USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>Colonel Gerald G Epley</td>
<td></td>
<td>018770 GSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asst Chief of Staff, G-1</td>
<td>Lt Col James D Tammer</td>
<td></td>
<td>052132 GSC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asst Chief of Staff, G-2</td>
<td>Lt Col Ralph L Foster</td>
<td></td>
<td>022669 GSC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asst Chief of Staff, G-3</td>
<td>Lt Col Maurice C Holden</td>
<td>(1-10 Dec 50)</td>
<td>024534 GSC</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Colonel John C Coughlin</td>
<td>(11-31 Dec 50)</td>
<td>016898 GSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asst Chief of Staff, G-4</td>
<td>Lt Col Frank C Sinsel</td>
<td></td>
<td>028998 GSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjutant General</td>
<td>Colonel Lester W Teter</td>
<td></td>
<td>051312 AGD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation Officer</td>
<td>Major Robert L Hoffman</td>
<td></td>
<td>01176669 FA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaplain</td>
<td>Colonel Edward J DeMars</td>
<td></td>
<td>029128 ChC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Officer</td>
<td>Lt Col Richard O Gordon</td>
<td></td>
<td>024440 CMC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs Officer</td>
<td>Colonel John C Coughlin</td>
<td>(1-10 Dec 50)</td>
<td>018898 Inf</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Captain Lawrence B Farnum</td>
<td>(1-10 Dec 50)</td>
<td>061211 OE</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Major Edmund M Leavcy Jr</td>
<td>(11-31 Dec 50)</td>
<td>024698 OE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance Officer</td>
<td>Lt Col Everille A Lesley</td>
<td></td>
<td>039629 FC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Headquarters Commandant
Major Sumter R Nelson
0420240 Inf

Historian
Captain Fred J Meyer
0463996 Inf

Inspector General
Major Herman C Duvall (Lt Col 28 Dec 50)
0436250 IGD

Staff Judge Advocate
Lt Col Max W Hazelhurst (1-19 Dec 50)
038723 JAGC

Major Reginald E Ivory (20-31 Dec 50)
01582388 JAGC

Ordnance Officer
Lt Col Jack L Grubb
021180 Ord

Provost Marshal
Lt Col Henry C Becker
031944 OMP

Public Information Officer
Capt Bernard O A Bailey
01845729 GSC

Quartermaster
Lt Col Arnold C Gilliam
031570 QMC

Signal Officer
Lt Col Elmore F Berendt
0216733 SigC

Special Service Officer
Major Victor E Strom
01283163 Inf

Surgeon
Colonel Donald E Carle
020953 MC

T I & E
Captain Jerry L Peavey
01289617 GSC

Transportation Officer
Major George H Huffman
0494360 GSC

Regimental Combat Team Commanders

9th RCT
Colonel Charles C Sloane Jr (1-6 Dec 50)
016456 Inf

Colonel Edwin J Messinger (7-31 Dec 50)
018503 Inf

23d RCT
Colonel Paul L Freeman
017704 Inf

38th RCT
Colonel George B Peploe
016246 Inf
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
2d Infantry Division
APO 248 c/o Postmaster
San Francisco California

COMMAND REPORT
(CSHIS-5 (RL))

Period
From: 1 December 1950 Through: 31 December 1950

Approved By:

CLARK L. RUFFNER
Maj Gen, USA
Commanding

Copy Number 1
Number of copies prepared: 7

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NARRATIVE SUMMARY*
(December 1950)

The 2d Infantry Division, after completion of the long drive from the Naktong River to Chonju and north to the approaches to the Yalu River, had suffered reverses in the withdrawal from Kunu-ri when the advancing United Nations Forces were struck by the overwhelming strength of the Chinese Communist Forces. An estimated five Chinese Communist Divisions, exerting heavy, concerted pressure, had succeeded in enveloping friendly units on the right of the division forcing a displacement of the 2d Division to more tenable defensive positions to the south. Enemy elements had exacted a heavy toll during the fighting withdrawal of the division and the losses were so heavy that a reorganization of all divisional units was mandatory to bring its effectiveness back to a point where it could again assume its role as a major combat element in the combined forces of the United Nations.1

As the period drew to a close, the elements of the 2d Division were assembling seven miles south of Sunchon. Verbal orders had been received from Eighth Army directing the division to take up positions as Eighth Army Reserve in the vicinity of Chungchea. After the costly fighting of the period 25 November to 30 November, the division was to be given the time needed to regroup—should the frontline elements prove capable of containing the pressure of the advancing Chinese and an orderly disengagement be accomplished.2

*Unless otherwise indicated, all footnotes refer to documents prepared by 2d Division Headquarters Sections.

1. App G-2: PIR 71, 051800 Dec 50
2. App D-1a: J-3, G-3 Journal, 1 Dec 50
The verbal orders received by the Division on the 1st were confirmed in a radio message received on the 2d. The same message relieved the 2d from attachment to the IX Corps. The division, led by the 23d Infantry Regiment, began the move to the new area on the same day. On the following day, the division was directed to continue its movement to a new assembly area in the vicinity of Munsan-ni.1

At noon on the 2d of December, the staff sections of Division Headquarters (Rear) in Pyongyang were instructed to prepare their equipment for a withdrawal to Seoul. Two plans were to be prepared. Plan Able would include only the bare essentials which, because of military value could not be abandoned. All other material was to be prepared for burning or destruction by other means. Plan Baker was a list of all essential records, office and personal equipment. Again, all extra material was to be destroyed. At this time it had not been determined whether the move would be by truck or by rail. Another meeting was called on the same day at 1745 hours. Movement by rail was directed in three increments and movement to the loading area by echelons commenced immediately. The loading, much of it under blackout because of enemy air activity, was completed before midnight and the first serial, under the Finance Officer, departed. However, the trains remained in the loading area until the following day when they were coupled to an engine and moved into the main Pyongyang station.

During the move into Pyongyang, the train carrying the second and third serials passed thousands of retreating ROK soldiers many of them wounded and most of them without weapons. Upon arrival at the station, which was also filled with

1. App D-la; Radio Message, EUSA-K NGX30120 KGO 2 Dec 50
Korean soldiers, the locomotive was uncoupled from the train and hitched to a hospital train being evacuated that night.

Guards were placed on all of the boxcars of the train to prevent looting by many Koreans who milled about the station. During the night, a huge ammo dump on the outskirts of the city was accidentally set on fire by a burning truck. Many of the headquarters personnel mistook the explosions for enemy mortar and artillery fire but there were no indications of panic.

At 0800 hours on the 4th of December, the Staff Judge Advocate, the train commander of the third serial, called the section representatives together and told them that there was a good possibility that the train would have to be abandoned and stated that the headquarters sections would have to decide whether to destroy all equipment that could not be carried and walk south or wait and hope that a locomotive could be obtained. After a short discussion, it was decided to remain with the train for the time being. At 1130 hours, the postal officer began to burn his money order files, letters, and money orders of the train commander. At 1230 hours, soldiers and civilians began to loot those boxcars in the Pyongyang yards which it was not anticipated could be hauled south. A locomotive was secured at 1300 hours and hitched to the train, although the RTO officials said it could be used only for the evacuation of personnel. All records and equipment were left in the open gondolas which were detached from the train before it pulled from the station.

The movement out of Pyongyang did not commence until 1720 hours. By this time, looting by both civilian and military personnel had commenced and, as the train pulled from the station, Koreans could be seen leaving with the loot.
taken from the abandoned boxcars. As a result, the 38th RCT lost all of their personnel records, the Adjutant General most of his files, and the personnel lost most of their belongings.

The Division combat elements closed on Munsan-ni at 0630 hours on the 4th of December. The Division Forward Command Post which had opened at Chunghwa, was moved to Pongil-chon-ni on the 4th.

Eighth Army directed the 2d Division at this time to assemble the scattered remnants of the Turkish Brigade (most of whom were in railroad stations between Pyongyang and Kaesong) at Kaesong where they were to be attached to the 2d Division for operational control. The commander of the Turkish unit stated that it would be impossible to reorganize at Kaesong and requested that he be permitted to assemble his force in Seoul.

This request was honored by Eighth Army which, on 6 December, directed the 2d Division to initiate a request to the RTO officials at Kaesong to move the Turkish unit to Sosa (approximately six miles west of Yongdungpo) as expeditiously as possible and released the Turkish Armed Forces Command from attachment to the 2d Division and back to direct control of Eighth Army effective 1200 hours on the 7th.

In the meantime, Intelligence sources reported that there were many indications of a halt in the enemy advance.

The Chinese, more successful than they had expected in their

1. Personal observations of the Historian, Hq 2d Inf Div
2. App D-1a: J-14, G-3 Journal, 4 Dec 50
3. App D-1a: Radio Message, EUSAK GX50142 KGO
4. App D-1a: J-1, G-3 Journal, 6 Dec 50
5. App D-2: FOR 36G, C624001 Dec 50
initial attack, and improperly prepared to follow up their initial advantage, had evidently stopped to consolidate their gains before continuing their advance.¹

All elements of the division sent advance parties to the Seoul area south of the Yongdungpo area to scout out locations for the assembly of their units, and the 2d Division established its command post in the vicinity of Yongdungpo on the 7th. By 2030 hours on the 8th, all divisional units had completed the move to the rear and were located in the Seoul-Suwon area.²

Reorganization and resupply of all elements of the division were continuous during this period as only one unit--the 23d Infantry--was given a defense mission. It established a bridge guard at 083356. All other units commenced an intensive training program in which rifle marksmanship, night maneuvers, foot marches, and other activities considered to be the most important in the light of the Korean conflict were emphasized.³

Major General Laurence B Keiser, who had been evacuated for medical reasons after the withdrawal from Kum-ri, was replaced by Major General Robert B McClure on 7 December. The new Commanding General told his division that all non-essential impedimenta was to be shipped to Japan to permit greater freedom of movement. Paper work was to be cut to a minimum, all units whether tactical or administrative were to be prepared to move at a moment's notice.

On 10 December, the day that the division initiated a program of training in small unit tactics, physical conditioning, and maintenance of equipment, Eighth Army directed a reconnaissance of the road network to the area extending

1. App C-1a: J-44, 45, G-2 Journal, 4 Dec 50
2. App D-2: FOR 360, 082400I Dec 50
3. App D-2: FOR 363, 092400I Dec 50
east to Chuncheon and southeast to Chungju. The 9th Infantry Regiment, using the east route out of Seoul, was to reconnoiter from Hongchon to Hoengsong to Wonju. The 23rd Infantry, using the east route out of Suwon, was to reconnoiter from Wonju to Chechon to Chungju. The 38th Infantry, using the northeast route out of Seoul, was to reconnoiter the roads from Chuncheon to Hongchon. The terrain in the area was to be surveyed to determine its suitability for defense. All units were directed to prepare complete reports including sketches.1

On the following day, the division was strengthened by the attachment of a Netherland Detachment and a French Battalion. The Dutch were placed under the operational control of the 38th Infantry, while the French were attached for operational control to the 23d Infantry Regiment. During the next few days, the reconnaissance of the road nets and the accelerated training schedule went on concurrently.2

Indications of a resumption of the offensive by the enemy resulted in a temporary change in the plan for the division commitment on 13 December. The 9th Infantry was instructed to back up the west sector of the Han River line and prepare to cover the evacuation of Kimpo Airfield and the Inchon Harbor area. The 23d Infantry took over the defense of all the Han River bridges in the Seoul City area. The 38th Infantry was instructed to continue its plans to move into defensive positions in the vicinity of Wonju.3

The experience of supply personnel and the time, effort, and skill of the supply echelons were reflected in the

1. App D-4: Operation Directive, 1023001 Dec 50
2. App D-2: POR 369, 1124001 Dec 50
3. App D-5: Letter of Instruction, 1316001 Dec 50
rapidity with which the division issues in equipment were replenished. The G-4 noted on 15 December that the division was again supplied with sufficient equipment to make it combat effective.¹

On 14 December the 23d Infantry was directed to dispatch a contact patrol to Chunchon to contact the ROK 5th Division and to report on the roads and bridges. The motorized patrol left early the morning of the 15th, arriving at Chunchon at 1245 hours. Contact was made with KMAG representatives with the ROK 5th and 6th Divisions. KMAG reported that these divisions had been under day-long attack by an estimated four North Korean Divisions. The left flank of the 5th Division had been penetrated but the positions had been restored by noon on the 15th. Although the patrol found no evidences of enemy guerrilla activity, they did encounter heavy ROK foot and vehicle traffic on the roads leading into Chunchon.²

At this time the IX Corps was directed to relieve all 2d Division elements engaged in security missions along the Han River to ensure the least possible delay in the planned commitment of the division. All units were warned that a scorched earth policy would not be adopted should further withdrawals be necessary and that only goods of immediate military value to the enemy would be destroyed. Wanton demolitions were expressly forbidden.³

The Division Operation Plan No 1 was published on December 16th. This directed that the 2d Division move to the Hoengsong-Wonju-Chungju area and establish blocking positions to deny enemy movement south along the Hoengsong-

1. App E-1: Daily Journal, 15 Dec 50
2. App D-7: Patrol Report, 23d Inf, 14 Dec 50
3. App D-5: Letter of Instruction, 15 Dec 50
Chungju axis. All regiments were to begin drawing up their plans, plans were to be based on the operation of Regimental Combat Teams which were to be established upon announcement that the plan was to be executed. Instructions were issued on the same day for the issuance and use of individual panels for frontline identification from the air which would permit close-in tactical air support while lessening the danger of exposing the frontline units to strafing from friendly air.

The intelligence elements used every available source to determine the enemy intentions during this period. Both the Military Police Company and the Ivanhoe Security Forces were effective intelligence collecting agencies and, in addition, they prevented infiltration by enemy agents.

The division intelligence estimates gave as the enemy capability most likely to be adopted the continuation of the enemy attack by the reorganized North Korean military units backed by a Chinese Force of 150,000 who could be thrown into sectors where the North Koreans were experiencing the greatest difficulty. The size of the organized North Korean force was estimated at 140,000, exclusive of 23,000 guerrillas operating in rear areas.

By the middle of the month, the refugee problem had ceased to be acute and the Ivanhoe Security Force was directed to begin operating in the Wonju sector to learn as much as possible of enemy activity in this zone.1

A threat to the Seoul area resulted in the publication of Operations Plan 2 on the 17th of December. The 2d Division was to occupy defensive positions south of the Han River to cover the withdrawal of the I and IX Corps, provide security of the Han River crossings and insure the uninterrupted

1. App C-1b; J-231, G-2 Journal, 12 Dec 50.
flow of traffic in the Seoul area until the corps had withdrawn, then provide protection and assist in the evacuation of the Kimpo Air Base and Inchon. All regimental commanders were called into a division conference at 1800 hours on the 18th of December to discuss the Operation Plan 2.

The fluidity of the tactical situation was reflected by the many rapid changes in plan. Decisions reached on the 16th were voided on the following day when Eighth Army ordered the division to the Chungju area in a Top Secret Operational Directive.

Preparations for early employment were intensified and liaison officers were sent to IX Corps for orientation on the new assignment. Movement to the new area commenced on 21 December. Although moving into the IX Corps area, the division was to remain under the direct operational control of the Eighth Army. The Ivanhoe Security Force screened the area to be defended and reported that the area was free of both enemy and refugees and was under no threat of immediate attack. Emphasis of the training, which was continued, was now placed on night operations, use of demolitions, technical weapons training, and cross-country marching.

The new primary mission of the division was the construction of defensive positions in the Chungju area combined with aggressive patrolling to ferret out and destroy the enemy. The secondary mission was the protection of the Eighth Army east flank. It was to be assisted by the newly attached 1st Ranger Company.

The roads to the new defense zone were in many places

1. App D-6: Op Plan 2, 1722001 Dec 50
2. App D-16: J-54, G-3 Journal, 19 Dec 50
3. App D-16: Radio Message, EUSAK G039300 KGO
4. App D-2: POR 396, 2024001 Dec 50
5. App D-2: POR 399, 2124001 Dec 50
unsuitable for two-way traffic and all traffic was halted on the 22d of December to permit the return of personnel carriers and supply trucks.¹

The rapidity of the Eighth Army withdrawal, the depth of its defenses, and the lack of mobility and inelasticity of planning of the enemy forces had been primary reason for the complete severance of contact between the opposing Armies. The enemy had now had time to regroup, resupply, and move to positions from which to continue the attack. It was important that the Eighth Army elements be in position to counter the impending thrusts.²

The move of the 2d Division was one of a number made to counter this impending enemy thrust. Operation Order No 13, published on 23 December, assigned to the 2d Division the primary mission of securing the east flank of the Eighth Army. The 23d Infantry was to prepare and occupy defensive lines while establishing blocking positions along the Chungju-Wonju axis and on the road from Chupo-ri to Chungju. The 38th RCT (-) was to occupy defensive positions along the Wonju-Chunchon-Tanyang-Yongju-Andong axis. The remaining battalion of the 38th RCT, reinforced, was to insure the security of the Division MSR from Chungju to Mungyong. The 9th Infantry was to assemble at Chungju as division reserve and prepare to restore defense positions in the 23d RCT sector or to extend the east flank of the 23d RCT. It was also to occupy defense positions along the Chunchon-Hwanggang-ni axis with not to exceed one battalion while maintaining the remainder of its force for the protection of Chungju City from infiltrating enemy groups in coordination with the other divisional units stationed in

1. App D-1f: J-14, G-3 Journal, 22 Dec 50
2. App G-3: Intelligence Bulletin 5, 18 Dec 50

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Chungju. The 72d Tank Battalion was, from positions near Sangju, south of the main mountain barrier, to be prepared for commitment to the north or east. The 1st Ranger Company was attached to the 38th RCT.\(^1\) The Chief of Staff advised the G-3 to direct all units to plainly mark the villages and towns in the zone of responsibility. A marker with the name of the town in English was to be placed at the outskirts of all towns.\(^2\)

During the next few days, all units were engaged in reconnaissance and the construction and improvement of defensive positions. To bolster the defensive strength of the 23d Infantry, the Ranger Company was detached from the 38th Infantry and attached to the 23d. A major hazard and delaying factor during this period was the condition of the roads which were icy and hazardous for both tank and truck travel.\(^3\) All of the most dangerous sections of the more travelled roads were sanded by native laborers recruited by the division.\(^4\)

Change 1 to Operation Order 13 was published on 25 December. This established the northern limit of divisional responsibility as Chupo-ri and assigned the mission of establishing a patrol base at Hoengsong to the 2d Reconnaissance Company which was given the additional mission of protecting the 2d Division's west flank and maintaining contact with friendly elements in this area.\(^5\) Eighth Army directed the division to maintain close contact with the ROK II and III Corps at all times.\(^6\)

As the focal point of the impending attack had not

1. App D-3: Op Order 13, 2322001 Dec 50
2. App D-1f: J-5, G-3 Journal, 23 Dec 50
3. App D-1f: J-81, G-3 Journal, 24 Dec 50
5. App D-2: FOR 411, 2524001 Dec 50
yet been determined, the 23d Infantry was notified on 26 December to prepare defensive positions along the general line CS9603 to D80103 to block any enemy advance along the Han River. The positions were, however, only to be occupied on order from the Division Commander. As there was no enemy activity during this period, training was intensified and unit commanders began to survey their areas and prepare detailed demolitions plans which were submitted to division for immediate use should another general withdrawal be ordered.

After evaluation of all available intelligence had indicated the imminence of an enemy attack in the direction of Wonju and, on the 28th of December, Operation Order 14 was published calling for the primary defense effort on the Wonju-Chungju axis. The 23d Infantry, with artillery attachments but less the French Infantry Battalion and the 1st Ranger Company, was directed to move to Wonju and occupy defensive positions north of town blocking approaches thereto, and prepared to fight delaying action south along the Wonju-Chungju, and Wonju-Chupo-ri-Chungju axes. The 38th RCT, with 1st Ranger Company attached, was to prepare positions to delay and block enemy penetrations along the Chechon-Tanyang-Yangju-Andong axis, move one battalion to the vicinity of Chechon prior to darkness on 28 December and prepare to block all approaches thereto, the regiment was also to assume responsibility west to Chupo-ri and disperse or destroy all guerrilla units in that area. The 2d Engineer (C) Battalion (-) was directed to maintain the MSR and build fords. The 72d Tank Battalion was told to prepare for employment to the north-east while patrolling road nets and maintaining contact with the Netherland's Detachment. The 9th Infantry with the

1. App D-2: POR 414, 262400I Dec 50
French and Dutch units formed the division reserve.  

Although the 23d Infantry Regiment reported the town of Wonju extremely difficult to defend because of the flat terrain and lack of distinctive features for the defense, Eighth Army notified the division that it was to prepare for a blocking mission at Wonju.  

On the 29th of December, Eighth Army directed that a site be surveyed in Wonju which would be suitable for an air-strip large enough to accommodate C-47s. The completed survey was to be radioed to Eighth Army with an estimate of the amount of Engineer equipment and personnel needed to get the strip in operation. Because of the difficulty of communications in the division sector, the 38th RCT was given the authority to choose the route of withdrawal and also given the authority to determine its time of withdrawal in the event of attack by overwhelming numbers.  

The reports of Reconnaissance Patrols were so corroborative of the intelligence material already evaluated that, at 2325 hours on the 29th, the 2d Division was given the responsibility for defending the Wonju-Hongchon area—a greatly limited area compared to the one previously held, but much farther north. One RCT was to be assigned to the defense of Hongchon proper and to be prepared to block enemy movement from the north and east. The other RCTs were to be prepared to counter-attack and destroy all enemy units attempting to drive down the MSR.  

Operation Order 15, published and disseminated on 30 December, directed the 23d RCT to prepare and occupy delaying positions along the Chuncheon-Hongchon and Hangye-Hongchon

1. App D-3: Op O 14, 230500I Dec 50
2. App D-1g: Radio Message, GX20218 KGO
3. App D-1h: Radio Message, GX26221 KGO
4. App D-1h: J-43, G-3 Journal, 29 Dec 50
5. App D-1h: Radio Message, EUSAK GX20253 KGO
axes. It was also to establish and maintain liaison with the ROK Army or police units in Chunchon, Hangye, and Kujand-to. The 38th RCT (with the Netherlands' Detachment attached) was to occupy blocking positions south of Hoengsong, patrolling all roads in the vicinity and prepare to counterattack any enemy penetrations in its zone. An Engineer detachment was attached to each of the RCTs and the depleted Engineer Battalion was directed to do everything possible to maintain the MSR. The 9th RCT assembled in Wonju where it was to form the division reserve. The French Battalion, attached to the 9th RCT, was to secure and patrol the MSR from Wonju to Chupori to Chungju to Wonju and establish a check point at the ferry in the vicinity of Mokkyedong.

Reports of enemy probing attacks along the line had been increasing in frequency since the 21st of December. ROK units reported a steady buildup of enemy strength north of Chunchon. Guerrilla activity increased daily. It was believed that the enemy force, consisting entirely of North Korean units, could be expected to attack at any time and it was anticipated that reinforcement of the attacking North Koreans by Chinese troops was probable should the initial attack fail to penetrate the UN lines.

On the 30th of December, the 2d Division was notified that the Commanding General of the X Corps was desirous of visiting the Command Post to discuss future plans (the Division was to be attached to X Corps early in January). Work on the airstrip was speeded up to permit access to Wonju by air for both cargo planes and air liaison flights.

On the 31st of December, the Assistant Division Commander, forward with the 23d RCT, reported that an enemy

1. App D-3: Op O 15, 3013001 Dec 50
column was moving west toward the 23d RCT Sector and that a heavy fight was impending. He requested that the maximum available ammunition, gasoline, and rations be sent to the 23d RCT sector and that supporting air be alerted to give support in the impending fight. The 23d Infantry was instructed to suspend the movement of defensive elements to Hongchon and to devote its major effort to the security of the Hoengsong-Hongchon road.¹

As the period came to a close, the fighting units of the division prepared calmly for the battle they knew was coming while at the 2d Division Command Post in Wonju, General McClure and the Commanding General of X Corps, Major General Edward M Almond, conferred on the tactics with which they intended to halt the attacking enemy and bring victory to the American team.

¹. App D-21, FOR 429, 31 Dec 50
PERSONNEL

Staff Section Report of G-1, 2d Infantry Division
for
December 1950

As the period opened the 2d Division, having withdrawn from the Kunu-ri area, continued a planned, phased withdrawal to the vicinity of Yongdung-po. The primary mission of the division was the reassembly, reorganization, and reequipping of units. The strength of the division had dropped to an aggregate of 10,269 at the end of November. As this represented little more than half of authorized strength, it was necessary to submit emergency as well as scheduled requisitions to fill the replacement requirements. Replacements and returnees totaled 3,377 for the first two weeks of December and, although the flow slowed during the second half of the period, the grand total for the month was 5,070 replacements and returnees. Losses for the period, including both battle and non-battle, totaled 906 for a net gain of 4,164. Although these gains brought most of the service elements to a strength which permitted comparatively normal operation, the shortage of combat infantrymen remained acute, none of the infantry regiments having within a thousand of their authorized strengths.

The attachment of the French and Netherland's Detachments early in the period greatly increased the combat potential of the division. The French Battalion, with a strength of 1,020 was attached to the 23d Infantry Regiment while the Dutch Detachment of 630 men was attached to the 38th Infantry Regiment.

Although the attached Republic of Korea troops, who numbered a little over 1,000, showed no indications of improved

1. The supporting documents for this report are the Periodic Personnel Reports contained in Appendix B-2.
fighting efficiency or combat effectiveness (which remained at an estimated 40 to 50 per cent) the division requested that the ROK personnel be retained until the requisitions for American replacements were filled.

Casualties for the period were primarily a result of the cold weather. Frostbite and respiratory infections were the most common cause of non-battle incapacitation.

Military discipline was excellent throughout the period and most military offenders were handled at the lowest echelon of command. The three serious crimes (two rape, one assault) are under investigation. The rapidity of the withdrawal from Kunu-ri and the necessity for cross-country movement by units cut off late in November resulted in an initially high straggler rate. Straggling ceased to be a problem after the first week in December when a total of 724 men had been returned to their units and removed from MIA status.

The supervision of civil affairs ceased to be an important problem after the withdrawal below the 38th parallel and Civil Affairs personnel were utilized to aid in the control and screening of the refugees flowing through the division zone.

Although postal services were excellent during the period in which the divisional units were assembled in the Yongdung-po area, considerable delay was experienced in the delivery of mail after the 22d of December. The primary reasons for the delay were the wide dispersion of the units, the poor condition of the roads, and the lack of adequate transportation facilities.

There were no personnel problems during the period which were of a nature which would merit special study or expansive evaluation.
During the first few days following the withdrawal from the Kaehqun-Kujang-dong area the functioning of intelligence gathering agencies of the Division was very limited. The withdrawal of the Division continued and preparations were made for complying with Eighth Army orders directing the Division to move to the vicinity of Chungwha to revert to Army reserve.

The Ivanhoe Security Force continued its reorganization in the vicinity of Munsan-ni and screened refugees moving south. Refugees reported that the CCF had halted just south of Pyongyang to consolidate its gains; small groups of unarmed Chinese agents visited villages within 15-20 miles of Kaesong to spread favorable propaganda preparatory to further movement to the south by the main mass of the Communist armies.

By the 7th the Ivanhoe Security Force had moved to the vicinity of Anyang-ni where, working in conjunction with the Provost Marshal, it established points for checking refugees moving south.

On the 5th of December, Periodic Intelligence Report Number 71 was published. This summarized from an intelligence viewpoint the combat activities of the 2d Division during the withdrawal on 27-30 November and identified the enemy units which had forced the withdrawal.

A G-2 estimate of the situation was published 10 December and distributed to subordinate elements in order to familiarize them with terrain, hydrography, weather, and the enemy situation (disposition, composition, strength, status of supply, reinforcement, morale, and general combat efficiency). The estimate also covered the enemy's capabilities, enumerating and discussing each in turn.
In succeeding days units continued intelligence patrols and the Commanding Officer of Ivanhoe Security Force indicated that the refugee problem was no longer acute. The 2d Reconnaissance Company was ordered on reconnaissance missions along the Han River to secure information relative to tides, fords, boats, possible ferry sites, and feasible crossing points.

On the 14th of December the Division G-2 Section published Intelligence Bulletin Number 3. This discussed future enemy tactics, use of anti-personnel mines of Russian design, guerrilla activities, enemy capabilities, and possible Communist intentions; it also evaluated the morale effect of air drops of surrender leaflets by the UN Air Force.

Intelligence Bulletin Number 4 was published on 16 December. This bulletin outlined enemy capabilities, build-up of NK forces, CCF personnel losses, enemy techniques, enemy avenues of movement, and logistics.

Intelligence Bulletin Number 5, published on 18 December 1950 was disseminated to all lower echelons. Staff evaluation of existing conditions indicated that the enemy was regrouping, resupplying, and planning future operations from assembly areas in the vicinity of Pyongyang. The primary reason for the complete severance of contact between opposing forces was the rapidity and depth of Eighth Army withdrawal coupled with the lack of mobility and inelasticity of planning by the enemy.

In anticipation of a resumption of the Communist drive, the 2d Reconnaissance Company was told on the 20th of December to reconnoiter the Wonju sector and to send a messenger with overlays to the G-2 Section with a verbal report; the Ivanhoe Security Force had already commenced to expedite movement of ROK conscriptees southward.

The 2d CIC Detachment was told to conduct research on Chinese tactics on 23 December and on the same date the 2d
Reconnaissance Company was told to cease all other reconnaissance and utilize all of its personnel in a reconnaissance of the road nets in the area Yongung-Hachang-Sangju-Kouonje-Poun-Muni-Kounni-Dangjong-Koesang-Hadangni-Koesang-Yonpung. Reports of this reconnaissance to be submitted directly to the G-2 Section.

Intelligence Bulletin Number 6 was published 27 December. This Bulletin which included excerpts of studies made by higher headquarters was transmitted to all lower units of the Division. It was indicated that the enemy was capable of attacking Wonju with an estimated force of 7,000 North Korean troops within twenty-two (22) hours after the initial breakthrough with an aggregate strength of 22,000 within another 10 hours. The possibility of reinforcement by Chinese troops posed a constant threat.

On 30 December, as the Division was again committed to action, publication of Periodic Intelligence Reports was resumed.
OPERATIONS
Staff Section Report of G-3, 2d Infantry Division
for
December 1950

After completion of the withdrawal of the 2d Division to the Yongdung-po area, an intensive training program was initiated aimed at the correction of deficiencies noted during combat operation of the previous period and the molding of a cohesive fighting team of the veterans of the previous fighting and the large numbers of replacements received during the first part of the new period. All combat unit commanders were instructed to utilize the maximum time available for the training and indoctrination of the combat soldiers.

Particular emphasis was placed on night problems. As intelligence sources had revealed that one of the maneuvers of the Communist forces was to send small units forward with noise makers, bugles, whistles, and cymbals to draw fire and thus disclose the positions of the American defenders, stress was placed on the importance of fire discipline. The premature disclosure of defensive positions had been costly in previous fighting. It was felt that only by making all troops aware of this fact and instilling in them an awareness of their individual responsibilities could this common error be corrected.

It had been learned in the earlier fighting that night withdrawals were the most costly of any type of action and this fact was also emphasized in the training. Commanders at all echelons were instructed that, in future operations, positions would be held tenaciously at night, even should encirclement be unavoidable, to permit subsequent daylight
extrication by armor and supporting weapons.

Selected organic personnel of all combat units were given demolitions training as it was surmised that further withdrawals might be necessitated and Engineer assistance organic to the division was inadequate to perform all demolitions missions which would be required.

To assure uniformity in the tactics of the subordinate units, a list of general operational policies was prepared and disseminated. They are here briefly summarized: (1) methods of deception were to be utilized habitually; e.g. preparation of alternate and dummy positions, camouflage, and other means of deception; (2) sleeping bags were not to be utilized in front line positions; (3) warming fires near tactical positions were prohibited; (4) non-essential equipment and excess personal equipment was to be reduced to, and maintained at, the irreducible minimum; (5) the basic load of ammunition was always to be given the highest priority; (6) individuals and units were to maintain an adequate supply of hand grenades; and (7) might withdrawals were to be permanently discontinued.

As the poor physical condition of replacements was an important factor in the foot troubles and excessive fatigue which greatly diminished combat effectiveness of the Infantry units in the fighting north of Kunu-ri, march training was integrated into the training schedule, road marches being made with a minimum individual load of combat pack and rifle and at a minimum duration of one hour per training period.

French and Netherland Battalions were attached to the 2d Division on 12 December and further attached to the 23d and 38th Infantry Regiments. As the greatest shortage in divisional personnel was in combat infantrymen, the additional of the two units increased the combat potential of the division considerably. Close liaison was immediately established and
everything possible done to assure a rapport between the European contingents and the 2d Division units of which they became a part.

As it was anticipated that there would be a constant increase in close air support, and as experience had shown the necessity for devising some means, in addition to the standard large size Signal Corps panel, for the identification of the most advanced elements of frontline troops by friendly aircraft, red cloth panels were issued to the individual frontline soldiers. These panels, which were approximately two feet square, were to be spread on the ground when friendly aircraft were operating in the vicinity of the frontlines.

To permit instant measures in the event of guerrilla or other subversive activity in the assembly area, all regiments and the attached Dutch Battalion were required to maintain an alert company which could go into action at a moment's notice.

The many changes in the tactical situation necessitated continuous planning. As it was essential that the combat leaders be familiar with all of the possible locations they might be called upon to defend, an intensive reconnaissance of the entire Han River basin and the road net bisecting the area was initiated. Written reports, complete with detailed sketches, were prepared and submitted to the G-3 Section to facilitate plans and ensure up-to-date information once a definite zone of action for the 2d Infantry Division was assigned.

In securing information of roads and terrain in the possible areas of operation, full use was made of the KMAG officials who had operated in these areas in time of peace. Much information was also received from higher headquarters.

When the decision was finally reached to commit the 2d Infantry Division to the defense of the Wonju area, all efforts
were directed to the establishment of the best possible defense of this highly vulnerable line of approach to the heart of southern Korea.

As the period drew to a close, the division prepared to block the thrust of the Communist Forces down the Hongchon-Wonju road and Operation Order 15, which was published on 30 December, contained directions for the concentration of the entire division strength in this area—the division reserve being assembled in the general vicinity of Wonju while the 23d Infantry Regiment established a strong blocking position in the area immediately south of Hongchon.

The primary problem of the period had been the integration and training of the many replacements needed to fill up the combat strength of the division. The period of reorganization in the Yongdung-po area, although short, permitted the satisfactory completion of this requirement.
SECRET
LOGISTICS

Staff Section Report of G-4, 2d Infantry Division
for
December 1950

The attack by the massed Armies of the Chinese Commu-
nists had resulted in extremely heavy losses of personnel and
equipment of the 2d Division combat elements. At the opening
of the December period, the division was forced to operate with
a bare minimum of engineering and transportation equipment,
an almost complete lack of trained engineering personnel, all
classes of Quartermaster equipment, and most heavy Ordnance.

Although the division was withdrawing rapidly and trans-
portation facilities were at a premium, resupply of Class I, II, and V material was effected and the Division retained mo-

bility and a sufficient amount of those essential supplies
needed to meet the day to day requirements.

In addition to meeting the supply requirements of the
organic divisional units, G-4 was also responsible during the
early part of the period for supplying the Turkish Armed Forces
Command. The difficulty in supplying this unit was caused by
its dispersion along the rail line—a direct result of its
collapse under the heavy pressure of the enemy attack during
the last five days in November.

To adequately meet the paramount requirements of the
division and expedite the replenishment of all supplies re-
quired to bring it back to combat effectiveness, G-4 repres-
entatives established and maintained a close coordination
with the Army Technical Services and inaugurated a program
which limited the re-supply during the division move to its
assembly area in the Yongdung-po area and then expedited the
resupply of critical items from Eighth Army supply dumps to this easily accessible.

To lessen the strain on the organic transportation, all excess T/O & E equipment and personal baggage was sent to storage points in Japan. While this shakedown was in progress, the G-4 continued to concentrate on reequipping the division.

To facilitate the replacement of Ordnance equipment, specialist teams were sent out to all units to check Ordnance and report the shortages and those items needing replacement.

The attachment of the French and Netherlands Detachments increased the problems of the supply echelons. For example, both the French and Dutch requested and were granted bread allowances higher than those customary for American units although this strained the preparing facilities.

By the middle of December, the division had again achieved a state of combat effectiveness. Re-supply of all equipment was speeded after the 15th. Weapons, especially, arrived in increasing numbers from Army supply points.

Although large allocations of vehicles were made to the division, Eighth Army was unable, due to rail congestion, to move them from Pusan and special arrangements were made to send drivers organic to the division to Pusan where they picked up the trucks and drove them to the assembly area.

As the divisional infantry elements commenced combat operations again, emergency need for such things as ponchos and shelter halves developed. Although the existing Quartermaster channels were able to meet the emergency demands, the difficulties of supply were increased by the failure of Eighth Army to open forward supply points. Although the 2d Division G-4 made the Eighth Army supply agencies cognizant of this lack and requested that Army Supply Points be established in
the forward area Eighth Army refused to honor the request and the problems of supply remained major for the entire period.

After the move to the Chungju area the problem of maintaining adequate reserves of gas became crucial. The division was forced to truck its gas from Kumchon to Chungju—over 90 miles—and the supply route at one point crossed a mountain pass which was over six miles long. Although Eighth Army refused to move the gas dumps closer to the division immediately, it did assign the 534th Truck Company to the division to be utilized until dumps should be established within the standard operational range of organic transportation.

Near the end of the period, the logistics units and sections devoted their entire effort to the building up of the supplies of food and petroleum products to a point where the division could carry on its activities.

With the definite commitment of the 2d Division to the defense of the Wonju area, a request was made for the establishment of Army Class I, III, and V Supply points at Wonju. At this time, the closest Class V supply points were at Taegon, and Taegu, both places a prohibitive distance away. As the division had no ammunition dump at this time, it was requested that the Eighth Army expedite shipment of ammunition to the Wonju area.

From the logistics viewpoint, the major problems during the period were the distances separating the supply dumps and the using agencies, the shortage of vehicles to move supplies, and the poor condition of the road and rail supply network. Supply points of higher headquarters should be maintained in
An intensive training and indoctrination program, concurrent with the expeditious build-up of supplies and personnel, was of paramount importance during the first part of the period. To reassure the troops that an unplanned withdrawal was not anticipated, all units were assigned road net reconnaissance missions which oriented the troops with the road system which they might be called upon to defend.

By mid-month, through the attachment of the French and Dutch Battalions, the induction of reinforcements, and the re-equipping of both combat and service elements, the division had again achieved a state of combat readiness. The new men and the old had been molded into a fighting machine through a training program which stressed road marches, night operations, and other types of training tending to correct the deficiencies revealed during the fighting north of Pyongyang. The 2d Division was again ready to take its place in the front lines of the United Nations fighting forces.

Moving to Chungju in accordance with an Eighth Army directive, the 2d Division began its preparations for the defense of this important military area. Just prior to the close of the period, when the direction of the main enemy effort had become apparent, it was directed to establish its main defense at Wonju while assigning one RCT to blocking positions just south of the town of Hongchon. On the 31st of December, the 23d RCT, which had encountered the advance units of the enemy north of Hoengsong, was directed to suspend its move to Hongchon and to devote its entire effort to the security of the road.

Lessons learned during the previous month had been incorporated in the December training program. The effectiveness of this corrective training was now to be put to the ultimate test of combat.